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
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

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THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING
HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS.

MONUMENTUM ÆRE PERENNIOUS.



AN ENLARGED EDITION, IN EIGHT VOLUMES.



THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING
HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS,

BY COLONEL GURWOOD, C.B., K.C.T.S.

*ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH, AND DEPUTY LIEUTENANT
OF THE TOWER OF LONDON.*


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THE
OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THE PENINSULA.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck. Boecillo, near Valladolid, 30th July, 1812.

I received this morning your letter of the 28th June, with all the enclosures you refer to, excepting your instructions to Lieut. Gen. Maitland; and I am happy to find that, although it appears that you don't expect any successful result from the operations of the Sicilian army on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, to which point I shall advert presently, you had resumed the intention of sending them there. I acknowledge that I thought that, upon consideration, you would find the grounds for your intended expedition to the coast of Italy so little satisfactory, that you would resume the plan for the Eastern coast which had been concerted and arranged; and every thing remains in exactly the state in which it was in the beginning of June, excepting that the first division of the Sicilian army has gone, according to your former directions, to Sardinia. I should hope, however, that there will be no inconvenience in bringing it back from thence.

In regard to the aid to Spain to be derived from this expedition, I am concerned to find that you have altered your opinion upon it since you first proposed the measure to government; and if I did not hope that Gen. Maitland and the Staff and other officers of the Sicilian army would alter their opinion upon a nearer view of what they have to accomplish, and its effect upon the contest, I should despair of any success from persons coming on a service holding such opinions.

I am quite certain that they can succeed in taking Tarragona, and in opening a communication between the fleet and the Spanish army by Tarragona, which is in itself a service of the greatest importance. I am likewise quite certain that they can take the city of Valencia; that they will thereby give to the Spaniards, and deprive the French of, an important resource; that the war will revive again in Valencia; and that, if matters are well arranged in that quarter, the enemy will never again gain possession of that city.

But if I should be mistaken in my expectations of their success in these operations, I can't be mistaken in their effect upon my own. I have lately, on the 22d, beaten Marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Duero; and our troops have this day entered Valladolid. The King is at Segovia, with a corps of 12,000 or 15,000 men; and, having driven Marmont from the lower Duero, my next object is to prevent him and Marmont, if possible, from joining, which I am about to attempt. But either the French must lose all their communications with their troops in the north of Spain, or they must oblige me to withdraw towards the frontiers of Portugal. They cannot effect this object without bringing against me Suchet's army, or the army of the South, or both. I cannot but think it very important that the attention of Suchet should be diverted from his supposed operations against me by the operations of the Sicilian army, which will go to such important objects as Tarragona and Valencia. I should think it would be diverted from me by the operations of the Sicilian army, if they are in time, because I find that Sir H. Popham, with a few hundred marines and the guerrillas of the North, has succeeded in preventing Caffarelli from detaching any thing to Marmont's assistance, excepting cavalry, notwithstanding the positive orders of the King; and that he had obeyed these orders so far as to order troops to march to Marmont, which, upon hearing of Popham's operations, he countermanded. Then, if Suchet's attention should not be diverted from me, and, notwithstanding Marmont's defeat, the French should become too strong for me in Old Castille, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that Gen. Maitland's progress will be unopposed, and that we shall take Tarragona and Valencia.

But it is not impossible, that neither my success in Castille, nor Gen. Maitland's on the Eastern coast, will eventually give any aid to Spain; upon which point I have nothing to say. That is a subject for the consideration of politicians; and, as a military officer, I can advert to any plan only as being likely to be attended with military success, or otherwise; but I beg to remark, that the same observation is applicable by politicians, not only to every military plan, but to the general operations of every war, and even to the objects of the war itself.

I have taken up so much of your attention upon this subject, because in my opinion, without intending it, you have, by a few words, thrown upon the King's ministers a larger share of the responsibility for the success of Gen. Maitland's expedition than belongs to them. I am certain he will succeed; and, at all events, he will do good to my operations. But much as I wish for their success, I assure you that I should not give my advice that Gen. Maitland's credit, or the safety of the troops, should be risked for that object only.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

Adverting to the Spring inspection of the 2d batt. 87th regt., I have to request that the return of Courts Martial during the period may be an extract from the Courts Martial book; in which must be detailed the soldier's name, the crime for which tried, the name of the officer who

ordered the trial, the name of the President of the Court Martial, the sentence, and the punishment inflicted or remitted.

To Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

I have received your letter of the 29th, and have spoken to Gen. Alava respecting the requisition on Peñaranda for bedding for the hospital at Salamanca. I shall send the requisition; but you have at Salamanca the Intendant Señor Mexia, and he is the person who ought to make the requisition, and who has the power to enforce it.

Have we any hospital bedding of our own on the way up? Could we not have paillasses and sheets made at Salamanca? We must expect some, I am afraid a large, increase of sickness; but adverting to the size and commodiousness of the buildings at Salamanca, to the existing probability that we shall keep possession of it in security, to the general healthiness of the situation, and to the ease with which the hospital at Salamanca can be evacuated if necessary, I am desirous, if possible, of not allowing the men to go farther back than that place.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

I have the honor to transmit a dispatch which I have received from Earl Bathurst, containing an application from Gen. Mazaredo to have the regiment which he commands supplied with arms and clothing; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply with his wishes, and have the '*Voluntarios de la Patria*' furnished with arms and clothing from the equipments at your disposal at Cadiz, provided the corps should be in a sufficient state of discipline to receive arms.

In the event of there being any clothing in store of the pattern of that worn by Gen. Mazaredo's regiment, I will thank you to cause that to be issued on this occasion.

To Earl Bathurst.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

In compliance with the directions contained in your Lordship's dispatch of the 30th June (No. 6), I have requested His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz to supply Gen. Mazaredo's regiment with arms and clothing from the equipments now at his disposal at that place.

To Gen. Santocildes.

Cuellar, 1st Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 30th,

G. O.

Mojados, 31st July, 1812.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests to have returns of the several men missing from their regiments on the march of the 10th inst.

3. It is reported to the Commander of the Forces, that the enemy have in their power above 100 British soldiers, taken on that day, straggling in the rear and in the flanks of the army.

4. As the army did not march more than 10 or 11 miles on that day, and the country was perfectly open, the straggling of these soldiers, and their being prisoners, must be attributed to the neglect of the officers of their regiment.

5. It is quite obvious that if the soldiers cannot be made to march in their ranks at all times, the army cannot effect a march in the face of an enemy, and it is so far unfit for service.

6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the General officers of the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to take measures to prevent the too prevalent practice of falling out.

and I have written to the Conde de Amarante to request him to form the blockade of Zamora.

I should hope that your Excellency would experience no difficulty in procuring mules to draw the artillery which I have placed at your disposition, by requisition on the large towns of Leon, the Asturias, and Castille.

I have moved here in consequence of the reports of the King's intention to move to Aranda de Duero, to join the remains of the '*Armée de Portugal*;' but it appears that he has taken the position at Segovia principally to cover Madrid, and I conclude he will move as soon as I shall approach him. I have learnt that the enemy have still about 200 men in Tordesillas; and I beg leave to recommend to your Excellency to send a force to take them, and gain possession of that town and the bridge over the Duero. They have nothing in Simancas.

To Gen. the Conde de Amarante.

Cuellar, 1st Aug. 1812.

Having suggested to Gen. Santocildes the expediency that he should cross the Duero with the troops under his command, it is desirable that, in order to protect the communication of Gen. Santocildes with the kingdom of Galicia, the troops belonging to your Excellency's division, now upon the Esla, should blockade Zamora, at least on the right of the Duero, if it should not be practicable for them to effect that object on the left of that river.

The garrison of Zamora consists of 800 men, I believe without cavalry, and your Excellency will be the best judge whether the force under your command, now on the Esla, is sufficient to undertake the blockade of that place on one or both sides of the Duero, under existing circumstances, and you will blockade the place or not, on one or both sides of the Duero, as you may think best.

G. O.

Cuellar, 1st Aug. 1812.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers and the commanding officers of regiments, and of the depôts at the several hospital stations, and the commanding officers of detachments on their march, will take measures to prevent the soldiers from plundering and eating the unripe grapes.

3. The followers of the army, the Portuguese women in particular, must be prevented by the Provosts from plundering the gardens and fields of vegetables: the women must be informed that they must obey orders, or they will be turned out of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that, till further orders, there may be issued to each soldier daily an eighth of a pound of rice, if it can be procured; if it cannot, the same quantity of wheaten flour, or of barley, or of wheat, which the officers are requested to see that the soldiers boil up with their soup. If barley or wheat should be issued, the husk should be beat off before it is boiled.

5. As much of the sickness of the troops is attributed to the use of raw spirits by the soldiers in the hot season, the Commander of the Forces desires that the officers will see that the men of each mess in their companies mix their spirits with four times the quantity of water as soon as the spirits are issued by the Commissary. If the Commander of the Forces should find that the officers of any regiments omit to carry into execution this order, he will not only give directions that all issues of wine and spirits to such regiments may be discontinued entirely, but he will find himself under the necessity of taking other means to enforce obedience to orders which have for their object the health of the soldiers.

G. O.

Cuellar, 2d Aug. 1812.

Col. Gordon, the Q. M. G. of the Forces, having joined this army, he will assume the duties of the Q. M. G. department; and the Commander of the Forces desires that all the departments of the army will report to and correspond with him.

Au Gén. el Conde de Penne Villemur.

Cuellar, ce 2 Août, 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence, sans date, sur l'habillement de la 5^{me} armée Espagnole. D'abord il faut que je vous dise que je n'ai pas encore d'habillement pour la cavalerie. En second lieu, il paraît que le régiment *del Union* est bien habillé, et il serait inutile de l'habiller de nouveau; mais si vous voulez envoyer un officier avec des charrettes à Alcacer do Sal, vous recevrez l'habillement pour 1400 hommes pour les régiments 1^{er} de *Leon* et *Tiradores de Badajoz*.

Je ne puis vous donner aucune réponse sur votre proposition de lever un corps d'hussards pour servir avec les troupes Anglaises; vous devriez la faire à votre gouvernement.

Je vous prie d'ordonner à votre Commissaire que vous enverrez à Alcacer do Sal, de donner un reçu pour les articles d'habillement qu'il recevra.

To Lieut. Gen. Maitland.

Cuellar, 2d Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th July, and with it the duplicates of the enclosures in a letter of the 28th June, which I had received from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

I have now the honor of enclosing the copy of a letter which I wrote to Adm. Sir E. Pellew on the 1st ult., containing my opinion on the line of operations to be followed, which I have every reason to believe will be successful.

I hope that you will be joined by Gen. Roche's division.

I have to inform you that this army beat Marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, on the 22d July; and we have pursued him beyond the Duero, and have taken possession of Valladolid. Marshal Marmont is badly wounded.

The King had collected the army of the Centre to co-operate with Marmont; and he retired first upon Madrid. He afterwards came forward to Segovia, where he remained till yesterday morning; but finding that I had turned some troops upon him, after Marmont had been driven across the Duero, he has retired through the Guadarrama to Madrid.

I enclose a list of the corps of Suchet's army, and their strength of non-commissioned officers and R. and F., as present and fit for duty in April last. The 20th and 60th regts. besides belong to this army, but I don't know their strength; and I am inclined to doubt their being with it.

Since this return, Suchet has sent a division, under Gen. Palombini, to join the army of the North, and I believe some troops to join the King.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Cuellar, 2d Aug. 1812.

I write to inform you that I have ordered the Commissary Gen. to pay the chest of the 'Aids' 100,000 dollars on account of the subsidy for August. You received 200,000 dollars in July; that is, 100,000 of the sum received from England, and 100,000 of another sum.

To Lieut. Gen. Maitland.

Cuellar, 3d Aug. 1812.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received further intelligence of the strength and disposition of the army in Valencia.

On the 18th June, the troops in the enclosed list, of which you have the

strength under arms in the list I sent you yesterday, were distributed as therein stated in the kingdom of Valencia. It appears that they were collected on and south of the Jucar about the 20th July, and that the 2d division, under Gen. Harispe, had some success near Castalla, where they were attacked on the 21st, as it is stated, by 12,000 men, under the command of Gen. J. O'Donell and Gen. Roche.

It appears that Suchet felt great uneasiness respecting a fleet which appeared off the coast of Cullera at that period; which fleet I suppose to be either the empty ships attached to Gen. Roche's division at Alicante; or the transports with Gen. Roche's division on board, returning to join you at Majorca, after hearing that Lord W. Bentinck had sent the troops under your command; or the transports attached to Gen. Roche's division, with Spanish troops on board, proceeding to make a landing on the coast of Valencia, in co-operation with the attack by Castalla.

The 16th regt., stated in the enclosed paper to be at Cuenca, arrived at Madrid on the 30th July.

To Lieut. Gen. Roche.

Cuellar, 3d Aug. 1812.

I write to let you know that we beat Marshal Marmont in a general action fought near Salamanca on the 22d of last month. He and many other General officers were wounded, and some killed; and the army almost destroyed as a military body. We pursued them beyond the Duero, and they are going to Burgos.

The King assembled, at Blasco Sancho, the army of the Centre, and was in march to join Marmont, when he heard of his defeat; he retired on the 25th, and went through the Guadarrama, but returned again to Segovia on the 27th, from whence he retired to Madrid on the 1st inst. He is very anxious to receive reinforcements from Suchet; and one regiment, the 16th, has joined him at Madrid. It arrived there the 30th.

I see by the French accounts, that the troops under Gen. J. O'Donell met with a check at Castalla on the 21st inst. They say that you were with them. But as there was likewise an expedition at sea off Cullera, I trust that that part of the story is not true; and that you will have joined the troops with which you were destined to act, and which have at last arrived at their destination.

Pray let me hear from you. I send this letter to Gen. J. O'Donell, to be opened by him or any of the Spanish or English generals.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cuellar, 3d Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 7th July, and I am much obliged to you for what has been done for March and Lord C. Manners.

In respect to Col. Gordon, I hope that you will feel no uneasiness in regard to representations quite unauthorised by me, in respect to his being sent here. If I had felt any objections to the appointment, I should have objected to it with as much freedom as I consented to it with readiness; and I entertain no doubt that he will be of much use to the army and to me.

I don't consider Stewart to have resigned his office, nor do I know how Pakenham feels about succeeding to it if he has. I will, however, speak to him. I am glad to find that Lord Aylmer is coming out, as it is time

that we should have somebody besides Waters at the head of the Adj. Gen.'s department.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 3d Aug. 1812.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 8th July, in which you have informed me of the additional sums of money sent, and to be sent, for the use of this army. I am much obliged to your Lordship for this attention to our wants.

The arrival of the money will not only be very convenient and tend much to our security, but, adverting to the comparative prices of all sorts of grain in this country and on the coast of Portugal, and to the expense of transport, I can assure your Lordship that it will decrease that part of the expense which defrays the consumption of grain by the troops and horses, to the amount of very nearly two thirds of the whole. Your Lordship will therefore see how important it is to keep up, if possible, the supply of money to the army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 3d Aug. 1812.

Lord W. Bentinck has transmitted to me a copy of his letter of the 29th June to the Earl of Liverpool, in which he has informed his Lordship of his intention to resume the plan of sending the expedition to the Eastern coast of Spain; and I received yesterday a letter of the 18th July, of which I enclose a copy, from Lieut. Gen. Maitland, who has arrived in Majorca in command of the British and German troops.

I was concerned to observe in the letter from Lord William to the Earl of Liverpool, that it was the opinion of —, and the general opinion in Sicily, that the Spanish cause would derive 'no real aid' from this expedition; notwithstanding that Lord William had been the first to propose the expedition to the east coast of the Peninsula, and that I had concurred with him in thinking that it would be highly advantageous to the cause of the Peninsula in general, and to the operations of the army under my command in particular.

Notwithstanding the disadvantage with which every service is carried on by officers who are of opinion that their efforts will be useless; and notwithstanding that it appears too by the enclosed letter from Lieut. Gen. Maitland, that he is not satisfied with his force, and not decided as to his object, I now entertain no doubt respecting the military success of this expedition, if the plan of operations is carried into execution which I suggested to Lord W. Bentinck when the expedition to the east coast of the Peninsula was first in contemplation;* and which I repeated to Adm. Sir E. Pellew in my letter from Alaejos of the 1st July.†

It is true that, owing to the alteration of the destination of the expedition, Gen. Roche's division has returned from the rendezvous to Alicante; and it is probable that they will not be employed in the first instance as was intended and expected. But it appears that they are employed in operations in Valencia against the army under the command of Marshal Suchet; and so far, they divert the attention of a part of his force from the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Maitland.

* See vol. v. p. 556.

† See vol. v. p. 729.

If the Lieut. General should be successful in taking Tarragona, he will have rendered a most important aid to the cause in Spain. The Spanish army in Catalonia will again have a secure point of communication with His Majesty's fleet, and with the government at Cadiz; and the war in Catalonia will assume a new aspect. If Lieut. Gen. Maitland should be able afterwards to take the city of Valencia, he will deprive the enemy, and will give to the Spaniards a resource of the utmost importance to both; and the retention of the possession of that city, connected with the position of the allied army in Castille, must have the most important result respecting the enemy's position in the South of Spain. But I may be mistaken regarding the military success of Lieut. Gen. Maitland's expedition; and it is possible, though by no means probable, that he will fail in his attack upon Tarragona, and may not be able to make that proposed upon Valencia. I beg leave, however, still to submit to your Lordship my opinion that the disposable troops in Sicily could not be employed in a manner more advantageous to the cause of the allies in Spain, than in drawing the attention of the enemy to the east coast.

In my dispatch of the 28th ult. (No. 8), I transmitted to your Lordship a return of the army under the command of Marshal Suchet, to which the command of the army in Catalonia has recently been added. I see from the intercepted letters, that the King has been most urgent with him to send troops into Castille to reinforce the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the army of the Centre; and one regiment, the 16th of the line, arrived at Madrid on the 30th July. There is no doubt that still further reinforcements would have been sent before this time if expectations had not been entertained on the eastern coast of the arrival of the troops from Sicily; and they would now be sent before long, if those troops did not appear upon the coast.

I may be mistaken; but it appears to me to be an important military object to the cause of the allies, not to allow the brave army under my command to be overpowered in Castille by the junction in operation against them of all the French armies in Spain. In every view, therefore, of success or failure by the troops under Lieut. Gen. Maitland, it appears to me that they will render material aid to the cause of the allies in Spain.

I now beg to draw your Lordship's attention to that part of Lord W. Bentinck's instruction to Lieut. Gen. Maitland, enclosed in his dispatch to the Earl of Liverpool, of the 29th June, in which his Lordship directs the Lieut. General to quit the coast in the second week in September. It is perfectly true that His Majesty's government had at first in contemplation only a short service on the east coast; and that I reckoned upon the co-operation of the troops from Sicily only till the period of the equinoctial gales. Circumstances, however, have now materially altered; and either my position in Castille must be supported by the continuation of the appearance of the troops on the eastern as well as on the northern coast of the Peninsula, or it must be expected that I shall be obliged to withdraw into Portugal at an early period after those troops shall have withdrawn.

If Lieut. Gen. Maitland should succeed in taking Valencia, there appears no reason for which he should quit the coast, unless, indeed, the

enemy's army in the Kingdom of Naples should be so reinforced as that the island of Sicily shall be in danger. If he should not succeed in taking Valencia, as long as the allies shall remain in possession of Minorca, Alicante, and Carthagena, there appears no reason why the fleet of transports and troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Maitland should quit the coast, or should discontinue their efforts to alarm the enemy for the safety of their possession of Valencia. The expedition to the northern coast might likewise remain on the coast to keep up the alarm which has already been so useful to this army. This is my view of these operations at the present moment; and I hope that, if your Lordship should concur in it, you will send orders accordingly to Lieut. Gen. Maitland, and to Sir H. Popham.

Circumstances may put it in my power to acquire fresh successes, particularly against the army of the Centre; and this army may by its own efforts secure its position in Castille at least till the French shall evacuate Andalusia. It will then remain to be considered what ought to be done with the Sicilian troops; but in the mean time, I trust that your Lordship will not allow them to withdraw from the Peninsula, as ordered, in the second week in September.

To the Officer commanding H. M.'s ships at Coruña.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send one of His Majesty's ships to England with my aide de camp, Capt. the Earl of March,* who has charge of dispatches which it is important that His Majesty's government should receive at an early period.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I take the opportunity of Lord March's going to Coruña with dispatches for England, to write you a few lines to inform you that we have driven Marmont's army, I believe, as far as Burgos, since our victory of the 22d of last month. I have come here with our right, in order to look a little after the King, who had assembled the army of the Centre about Segovia, but he has retired upon Madrid.

I beg leave to congratulate you upon the success of your operations. They have been of great use to me, as I know that Caffarelli was prevented from detaching more than cavalry to Marmont's assistance, and that he even recalled a division of troops which had marched for that purpose. I trust, therefore, that you will not discontinue them.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 28th July, enclosing one of the 7th May from Lord Strangford. I beg that you will mention to Lord Strangford how much obliged to him I am for the trouble he has taken about grain for us; and I beg that you will, without loss of time, take measures for the importation to Portugal, from Brazil and the River Plata, of as large quantities of wheat and wheat flour, principally, as can be got; and of barley, oats, and Indian corn.

* The Duke of Richmond, K.G.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

The French army of the Centre, after having passed through the Guadarrama pass, and after its head had arrived at the Venta de San Rafael, returned to Segovia, where King Joseph arrived on the 27th July at night. The object of this movement was apparently to divert the allied troops from the pursuit of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and to enable the latter to maintain themselves upon the Duero, in which, however, the enemy did not succeed. Their rear guard remained in some strength on the left of the Duero during the 28th and 29th; but the Light and 1st divisions, and the cavalry, having crossed the Eresma and Cegar rivers on the latter day, the enemy's rear guard retired during the night across the Duero, and thence followed the movements of the main body towards Villavañez, abandoning Valladolid, and leaving there 17 pieces of cannon, a large quantity of shot and shells, and other stores, and the hospital, with about 800 sick and wounded.

The guerrilla chief, Marquínez, took 300 prisoners in the neighbourhood of Valladolid on the 30th. Our advanced guard crossed the Duero, and our parties entered Valladolid on the same day; and I had the satisfaction of being received by the people in that city with the same enthusiastic joy as I had been in all other parts of the country.

The '*Armée de Portugal*' having thus crossed and quitted the Duero, it was necessary to attend to the movements of the army of the Centre, and to prevent a junction between the two on the Upper Duero, which it was reported was intended. While therefore the advanced guard and left continued the pursuit of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' I moved the right along the Cegar to Cuellar, where I arrived on the 1st inst.

The King retired from Segovia on the evening of the 1st, and marched through the Guadarrama; and he left at Segovia an advanced guard, principally of cavalry, under Gen. Espert, having destroyed the cannon and ammunition which were in the castle; having carried off the church plate and other valuable property, and having levied a considerable contribution on the inhabitants of the town. I have not yet heard whether a detachment which I sent to Segovia yesterday, under Brig. Gen. D'Urban, had entered that town. The '*Armée de Portugal*' have continued their retreat towards Burgos.

The siege of Astorga is not yet brought to a conclusion; but upon finding that the King had returned from La Venta de San Rafael on the 27th July, I requested Gen. Santocildes to come nearer to this army, and to cross the Duero with that part of his corps which had approached that river, and he is now at La Nava del Rey; but he is about to return to the right of that river, and he will place himself near the fords of Pollos and Herreros, and communicate with our left.

The enemy have continued to increase their force in Estremadura, and had moved about the 27th or 28th towards the Guadiana, and threatened a force which I had requested Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to place at Merida, with a view to its march to the right of the Tagus, in case the enemy's long-threatened detachment should move in this direction. But Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill having moved from Zafra to Villa Franca, the enemy retired again into La Serena.

I enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's report of a very handsome affair with the enemy's cavalry on the 24th July, by the division of cavalry under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine.*

By accounts from Cadiz of the 24th July, I learn that Gen. Ballesteros having moved towards Malaga, some apprehensions were entertained that he was cut off from San Roque and Gibraltar, by the rapid movements of Gen. Villatte's division from the blockade of Cadiz to the neighbourhood of Los Barrios; and it appears that Gen. Leval, with another division, was between Gen. Ballesteros and Malaga.

There had been no accounts from Gibraltar of a later date than the 21st, at which time it appears to me that it was not practicable for Gen. Ballesteros to retire to Gibraltar; but I trust that, finding that to be impracticable, he will at once have taken his line of retreat upon the kingdom of Murcia.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B., to Gen. the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

Zafra, 27th July, 1812.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine, and one from Major Gen. Long, reporting an affair between some of our cavalry and 3 regiments of the enemy's cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Ribera, on the 24th inst.

Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B. Los Santos, 25th July, 1812.

I have the honor to report to you that a body of the enemy's cavalry, consisting of 2 regiments of dragoons and one of chasseurs, under the command of General of Brigade Lallemand, attacked yesterday morning the Portuguese piquet at Hinojosa, which they drove in as far as Ribera, where 4 squadrons of Portuguese cavalry were stationed under the command of Col. Campbell.†

The force under Col. Campbell being greatly inferior to that of the enemy, he was under the necessity of retiring upon Villa Franca, which he did in the best order, Major Gen. Long advancing at the same time from Villa Franca, with the brigade of British cavalry under his command, and Capt. Lefebre's troop of horse artillery, to support him. The enemy, on perceiving the advance of Gen. Long's brigade, halted on the high ground betwixt Ribera and Villa Franca, Gen. Long also halting until joined by a part of his brigade that had been detached in the morning to observe the enemy on the side of Usagre. During this interval I directed Major Gen. Slade, with 2 regiments of his brigade, to move from Los Santos, and direct his march on the left flank and rear of the enemy. As soon as Gen. Long had collected the whole of his brigade, he moved forward against the enemy, who immediately withdrew beyond the defile at Ribera. Gen. Long passed the defile to the right and left of the town, and attacked the enemy with much spirit, whilst the artillery fired with great effect from the high ground on the Villa Franca side of the defile. The enemy retired rapidly upon Hinojosa, closely followed; from Hinojosa the enemy retired to Llera, and from thence to Valencia de las Torres. They were followed as far as Llera. At Hinojosa the 2 regiments under Major Gen. Slade joined Major Gen. Long's brigade, having made a very rapid march at a trot from Los Santos, but from the great distance could not arrive in sufficient time to cut off the enemy's retreat upon Llera.

Major Gen. Long speaks in the highest terms of all the troops under his command, particularly the horse artillery, who displayed great activity in their movements and precision in their fire, by which the enemy suffered very considerably. The loss of the enemy on this occasion has been about 30 men, and a great many horses killed; 11 men and above 30 horses taken. The loss on our side has been only one man killed, and 7 wounded.

Major Gen. Long to Lieut. Gen. Sir W. Erskine, Bart. Villa Franca, 25th July, 1812.

I have the honor to enclose Col. Campbell's report upon the proceedings of yesterday, at the point where he was more immediately engaged; and his report is sufficiently circumstantial, and, as far as I can judge, correct, to render it unnecessary for me to expatiate on the subject.

I received the report of the enemy's advance upon Ribera too late to admit of my preventing his occupying that town, and the commanding heights on this side. The account of his force was so differently represented, that having 3 troops of the brigade absent, I thought it not advisable to act against him until they could be recalled; and as the attempt

† Maréchal de Campo Sir J. Campbell, K.C.T.S.

It appears that when Lieut. Gen. Roche found that Lord W. Bentinck did not propose to carry into execution the plan of operations which had been concerted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, he returned with his division from Majorca to Alicante.

I judge from the French accounts which I have received, that Gen. J. O'Donell, who commands the Spanish army of Murcia, and, it is said, Gen. Roche, attacked the French Gen. Harispe, on the 21st July, at Castalla in Valencia, while a body of troops in a fleet of transports, as I believe, coming from the south, threatened a landing on the coast near Cullera. The French reports state that Gens. O'Donell and Roche were defeated by Gen. Harispe, and lost 3000 prisoners and 3 pieces of cannon; but Marshal Suchet had collected the greatest part of the French force in Va-

to dislodge him might bring on a serious affair, on ground of which all the advantages were on the enemy's side, I was anxious to secure the support of the 3d dragoon guards, stationed at Fuente del Maestre, and to wait for the report of what might be passing on the side of Usagre, before I commenced any offensive movement.

Finding, upon the arrival of the patrol from Usagre, that no enemy was in that neighbourhood, I directed the troops under my command (without waiting longer for the 3d dragoon guards) to proceed against the enemy. They retired across the river, which enabled me to bring up the artillery upon the heights they had relinquished, and to employ it with evident and very great effect; and I continued my advance upon, and pursuit of the enemy as rapidly as I thought consistent with the preservation of order and regularity, beyond the defile of Himojosa, when, from the lateness of the hour, the fatigue sustained by the Portuguese troops, the artillery, and one squadron of the hussars, I judged it proper to halt.

Nothing could exceed the steadiness of the 9th and 13th dragoons, the activity of the artillery, and the precision of their fire, or the good countenance and gallantry displayed by those portions of the Portuguese troops and of my own brigade that had the opportunity of closing with and engaging the enemy. And I consider myself justified in estimating the loss of the latter, at the very lowest, at 45 men killed and prisoners. With respect to the horses, so many were left mutilated and killed on the field, and others caught and carried away by the peasants, that I have no criterion by which to judge of the enemy's loss in this respect; but we have only brought away 20.

I feel myself particularly indebted to Col. Campbell for his assistance and co-operation; and I should be wanting in justice if I omitted to express my admiration of the conduct of the artillery under the immediate orders of Capts. Lefebre and Whinyates, and my approbation of the spirit displayed by a squadron of the 2d hussars, under Major Wissel, supported by the two divisions of the 9th and 13th dragoons, under Lieut. Handley of the former, and Lieut. Edwards of the latter regiment.

It is equally my duty to acknowledge the services I received from Capt. Wemyss and Lieut. Strenuwitz, two of your personal staff, whose zeal, spirit, and exertions were, as usual, conspicuous; nor are the officers of my own Staff (Brig. Major Dunbar and Capt. Dean) less deserving of my notice.

Enclosed is a return of casualties sustained upon this occasion.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, in an affair with the enemy near Ribera, on the 24th July, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	—	—	—	—
Wounded	—	—	6	7	6
Missing	—	—	—	1	—

lencia, consisting of 3 divisions of infantry and his cavalry, on and to the south of the Jucar.

The 16th French regt., from Marshal Suchet's army, joined the army of the Centre at Madrid, on the 30th July.

Lord W. Bentinck having resumed the expedition to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, I have a letter from Lieut. Gen. Maitland, of the 18th July, announcing his arrival at Majorca, and stating that the troops which were sent from Sicily, the equipments from Portugal, and the troops under Gen. Whittingham, were collected there.

I have received no further accounts of the operations under Sir H. Popham.

P.S. I have just heard that the French troops under Gen. Espert have withdrawn from Segovia by San Ildefonso.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, giving an account of the sick and wounded officers and soldiers, and a medical return of the sick and wounded officers.

I likewise enclose the money state of the field army of the 1st Aug.; and a memorandum, showing the difference of our numbers by this and the state of the 12th July, enclosed on the 14th July.

I am sorry to say that the British troops are by no means healthy, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to make moderate marches with them, and to encamp them in healthy situations, and that they have never failed to receive their regular food. The 5th and 38th regts., and the troops recently arrived from England, are excessively unhealthy; and those arrived from the Mediterranean, viz., the 2d batt. 4th regt., from Ceuta, and the 82d regt., from Gibraltar, are not much better, although the latter have not yet joined the army, and are not on the returns.

The truth is, that neither officers nor soldiers are accustomed to march. The soldiers are very irregular; and, owing to their irregularities, are not able to bear the labor of marching in the heat of the sun; and then the commanding officers of each of the 2d batt. 4th, the 1st batt. 5th, 38th, and 82d regts., as well as the commanding officer of the 1st batt. 42d regt., have disobeyed the orders which were given to them, to have their men supplied with blankets before they marched from Lisbon, and they are consequently very inadequately protected, in comparison with the other soldiers, from the sun in the day time, and from the dews at night.

It gives me great concern to be obliged to bring under your Lordship's view this state of this fine army; but bad as it is, I think there is reason to apprehend that it will become worse in the course of the next 2 months.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I have the pleasure to send you a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, which I have received since I wrote my dispatch on our sickness this day. However, it is very bad; and it is melancholy to see the finest and bravest soldiers in the world falling down, owing to their own irregularities, and the ignorant presumption of those who think they know better what is good for them than those do who have been serving so long in this country.

If your Lordship should reinforce this army by an entire regiment, or regiments of infantry, I recommend that they should come to Coruña. Let cavalry or artillery horses, or detachments of recruits for infantry, go to Lisbon as usual. Let regiments of infantry coming to Coruña bring with them articles of equipment according to the enclosed list; and I will take measures to have those regiments provided with mules and means of transport at Coruña, and that they shall be fed and taken care of on the road. If you should send any regiments to Coruña, and there should be any recruits ready to be sent at the same time for any other regiment in the army, they might come by Coruña likewise, attached to the regiment, and under charge and direction of its commanding officer.

It would be desirable to send with any regiments which should land at Coruña a Staff Surgeon and a hospital mate, in case any men should become sick on the road, that they might not want medical assistance, as I fear they could get none in Galicia. I am in hopes, however, that as the weather becomes cool in Galicia and Leon at an earlier period of the season than it does in Portugal, and particularly as there is no *new* wine in Galicia, troops marching through that province in August and September will not suffer in their health as they would in Portugal, and that we shall get them to the army in a tolerable state for service. But many preparatory arrangements must be made for cavalry and artillery horses, and for recruits, which can be made only at Lisbon, for which reason I recommend that these should be sent to that place.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cuellar, 4th Aug. 1812.

I send duplicates of my dispatches of the 21st, 24th, and 28th ult., and dispatches of yesterday's and this day's date, to England by my aide de camp, Capt. the Earl of March, by Coruña, as I think it possible that they may reach your Lordship at an earlier period than by way of Lisbon.

The A.G. to the Officers comg. the 4th, 5th, 38th, 42d, and 82d regts. 4th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to inform you that I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to express his surprise that you should have marched your regiment from Lisbon without their blankets, and it is his Excellency's desire that you will assign your reasons for having done so. Blankets are most essential in this country to shade the men from the hot sun in the day and cover them from the cold dews at night. The present unhealthy state of your corps is attributed to the want of blankets, and it is probable the Commander of the Forces will, though reluctantly, be obliged to order your regiment to the rear.

To Major Gen. Ross.

Cuellar, 5th Aug. 1812.

Gen. Roche or Gen. O'Donell will have apprised you of recent events in this quarter, and I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th July.

I beg that you will leave a sufficient garrison in the forts of Las Galeras and Atalaya, and will proceed with the remainder of the troops under your command to join and put yourself under the command of Lieut. Gen. Maitland, applying to Capt. Adam, or any other officer of the navy on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, to provide you with means to transport your troops.

In case Lieut. Gen. Maitland should not land on the Peninsula, or

should re-embark, you will understand that you are to return to Carthage, with the troops under your command, from which place you are detached only for the moment; and you will be so kind as to retain in your hands the control over all that is going on there, and desire the Commanding officer to report to you every thing that occurs.

I shall apprise Major Gen. Cooke of my having given you these instructions, which I send open to Gen. O'Donell; and you will be so kind as to communicate them to Gen. Maitland.

To Lieut. Gen. Roche.

Cuellar, 5th Aug. 1812.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you on the 3d. It is useless to tell you or Gen. O'Donell what I propose to do, because you cannot aid in my plans. I only request that you may not be defeated again; and to accomplish this object, you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain.

Threaten as much as you can, but don't engage in serious affairs.

Send the enclosed to Gen. Ross, and the other to Gen. Maitland. You may peruse both.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Cuellar, 5th Aug. 1812.

I believe you are aware that I have always had the best intelligence from Salamanca, which was given to me by persons residing there at the constant risk of their lives, who have uniformly refused to be rewarded for their services, which they very justly considered to be rendered to their country. They have now applied to me to have their services considered and rewarded by the Spanish government, and I enclose you the papers which they have sent me; and I request you to use your utmost influence with the government, that they may attend to the claims of these worthy individuals.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Cuellar, 5th Aug. 1812.

I have this day received your letters of the 14th, 17th, two of the 20th, and one of the 21st, which had been delayed in consequence of my having given orders that the post might be stopped when Marshal Marmont was moving on our right flank.

In answer to that of the 17th, I have to assure you that I never authorised Mr. Mackenzie to issue that or any other Proclamation. I must observe, however, that our situation in Portugal is rather a difficult one. We are required to make the greatest exertions to carry on the war, and the government give us no assistance, and take no steps to have their own orders and regulations carried into execution. Then, if any subordinate British officer surpasses the bounds of his authority in order to call forth adequate exertion, the subject is immediately made one of serious complaint and remonstrance. How long is this state of things to continue to exist?

I have referred your letter to the Commissary Gen., and have desired him to call upon Mr. Mackenzie to account for his conduct in issuing such a Proclamation.

In your letter of the 20th, I see another instance of the readiness of

Dom M. Forjaz to make any complaints, and to discover any excuse for not doing that which ought to be done. The truth is, that we owe nothing to the Portuguese government on account of posts, as will very easily be shown; and I have ordered the accounts to be closed up to the 29th June last. But if we owed any large sums, it must be admitted that we have before paid them regularly; and I see no reason whatever why Dom M. Forjaz should be allowed to delay paying Mr. Reynolds till the army account should be settled. However, the army account shall be settled forthwith, and there shall hereafter be no accounts whatever with the Portuguese Post office.

In answer to your other letter of the 20th, regarding an increase of subsidy, I have but to repeat that not only I shall not propose, but I shall oppose myself to every augmentation of the Portuguese subsidy in any shape. It was always settled that the British officers in the Portuguese service were to be paid from the chest of the 'Aids;' and neither the Paymaster Gen. of the army, nor the Paymasters of their regiments, know any thing about their pay. Mr. Bell, as keeper of the chest of the 'Aids,' makes such arrangements as he thinks proper, either with provincial paymasters, or others, for their payment of these officers; and I deny that the supply of money from the Commissariat to the chest of the 'Aids' has been so low as to prevent latterly their regular payment.

I refer to my letter of the 9th May to Dom M. Forjaz, and to the state of our subsequent payments to the end of July, to show that the payments in money and kind by the Commissariat have exceeded the subsidy; but the real state of the case is, that the omission of the government to supply other funds for the support of the army has rendered it necessary to issue to the military chest, from the chest of the 'Aids,' all the money which has been lodged in the latter, and nothing has remained to pay the English officers.

I believe the arrangement was, that the Portuguese government should make a specific demand for supplies of grain and provisions by the 20th of every month for the succeeding month, with which I would comply if I could; and I wait for that demand for the month of August.

In regard to money, I have already ordered, as I told you in my letter of the 2d inst., that 100,000 dollars should be given immediately for August; and I shall order that further sums be given when I shall hear that we have them to give.

I have but one answer to give to your letter of the 21st. The government will make such regulations as they may think proper regarding entries of grain, or other supplies for the British army, and they shall be obeyed as far as it may be in my power to enforce them. If the army should suffer any inconvenience from such regulations, I shall make a representation on the subject to my own government, who will take such measures as they may think proper.

I conceive that there are strong objections to any interference on the part of the officers of the Portuguese government in the army stores, or in the purchases by the British Commissariat; nor do I see what object this interference is to attain. I don't approve of the Portuguese *employés*, from top to bottom; and it is not improbable that the object of this inter-

ference, and these inquiries, is to enable some of them to give information to the sellers and importers of corn of the state of our stores, to enable them to regulate their sales according to this information. However, let the government regulate the matter as they please, and their regulation shall be obeyed; and if I should find that inconvenience results from it, I shall inform my government of it.

Memorandum to be communicated to Gen. Santocildes.

Cuellar, 5th Aug. 1812.

The army under Marshal Marmont having decidedly retired upon Burgos, and that of the King upon Madrid, the Light and 1st divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army, which have been hitherto towards the river Duero, have received orders to move nearer to the main body of the army, which will move towards Madrid.

The body of Major Gen. Anson's brigade will remain at Villavañez, in order to keep up the alarm on that side; and 2 or 3 squadrons are to be sent to Peñafiel, in order to observe the Upper Duero.

Gen. Alava is requested to give directions that the guerrillas of Saornil and El Principe may place themselves under the directions of Major Gen. Anson.

The 6th division of infantry, and certain other troops, of which a list will be sent to Major Gen. Clinton by the Q.M.G., are to remain at Cuellar; and those troops of Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, which have lately been employed to keep up the communication with the 1st and Light divisions, must now be employed to keep up the communication with Major Gen. Clinton.

It is recommended that Gen. Santocildes should remain on the right of the Duero, about Tordesillas, occupying Simancas, and communicating with Major Gen. Anson at Villavañez, through Valladolid.

The guerrillas of Marquiñez should act under the directions of Gen. Santocildes, and should observe all that passes towards Palencia, &c., on the right of the Pisuerga.

The Conde de Amarante should continue to blockade Zamora, on the right of the Duero.

In case the enemy should move by Palencia, and endeavor to raise the siege of Astorga, or the blockade of Zamora, while the allied British and Portuguese army will be engaged towards Madrid, which is not very probable, as they have nothing but the cavalry in a state fit for service, the Conde de Amarante must necessarily raise the blockade of Zamora, and retire behind the Esla; and Gen. Santocildes should likewise take such a position with his troops on the Esla, as to cover the operations of the siege of Astorga.

If the siege of Astorga should be brought to a conclusion, and that part of the army of Galicia should be at liberty, we shall be informed of it; and this event will make so important a change in our situation, that a new arrangement will be suggested to Gen. Santocildes for the whole army.

In case the enemy should manœuvre by the Upper Duero, moving above the junction of the Pisuerga, Major Gen. Anson should retire upon Major Gen. Clinton's corps at Cuellar, and, if necessary, both upon Segovia, so

as to draw nearer to the army. In this case, and more particularly if the enemy should not have moved any troops upon Palencia, or the right of the Pisuerga, Gen. Santocildes should cross that river at Simancas, and by moving along the Duero, endeavor to cut off their communication with Burgos.

The troops under Don Julian to be directed by Gen. Alava to follow the movements of the allied British and Portuguese army.

To Gen. Santocildes.

Mozoncillo, 5th Aug. 1812, 6 P.M.

Upon considering our situation in all its views, I have thought that I should do most good to the cause by marching immediately upon Madrid, and by endeavoring to dislodge the enemy from thence; and I enclose the memorandum of the plan which I have ordered for the troops under my command remaining on the Duero, and at Cuellar; of that for the Conde de Amarante; and of that which I recommended for the adoption of your Excellency.

I propose to return to this part of the country, and to resume our plans on Zamora, as soon as I shall have removed the King from Madrid.

I recommend to your Excellency to attend to the enemy's movements from Burgos towards the kingdom of Leon. I propose to return into Old Castille as soon as I can; but I think it most likely that as soon as they shall hear that I am gone towards Madrid, they will move some troops in the direction of the kingdom of Leon, and much will depend upon your being on the Escla before them.

You should lose no time in getting to your army your guns from Salamanca; and in removing from Valladolid the shot and shells to Salamanca, and the guns into Galicia.

A. G. O.

Mozoncillo, 6th Aug. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to have to inform the army that he has received a report that two British soldiers were murdered at Medina del Campo, on the — inst.; and that he has reason to apprehend that this misfortune is to be attributed to the misconduct of the British soldiers in that and other towns on the road between Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and the army.

2. The Commander of the Forces now gives notice, that he has directed that no officer or soldier may be supplied with provisions or forage, on his road to or from the army, between Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca and the army, excepting at the places at which it will be specified in his route that he is to receive provisions and forage; and any officer who shall apply for either at any other place is to be reported to head quarters; and any soldier who shall apply for provisions is to be confined, and sent a prisoner to the nearest British post, and will undoubtedly be brought to trial before a Court Martial, for a disobedience of orders.

3. The Commander of the Forces hoped that the kind treatment which the officers and soldiers of the army have received from the Spaniards, would have had the effect of inducing them to treat the inhabitants of the country with kindness, to respect their property, and to refrain from making demands upon them which they have no right to make.

4. He now warns them of the consequence which will attend their misconduct: they may depend upon it that the Spaniards will not submit to be ill treated; and the Commander of the Forces recommends to the soldiers to behave towards the inhabitants of the country as they have deserved by their conduct to the army since they have passed the frontiers of Portugal.

5. This order is to be printed: it must be read to every detachment which will pass from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, and a printed copy must be delivered to the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding it; and it must likewise be read to every detachment which will leave the army for Salamanca, or will leave Salamanca to go to Ciudad Rodrigo.

The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions.

5th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to request that for the future the daily state of the — division may be detailed by regiments, agreeably to the form of which I send you a sufficient number of copies for present purposes, and shall send you others when those now sent shall be used. The totals, British and Portuguese, will, of course, be exactly the same as the daily states usually sent in, and I shall have the advantage of observing in what particular regiment the greater number of casualties may occur.

To Gen. Santocildes.

San Ildefonso, 9th Aug. 1812.

When I was at Valladolid, it was settled between Gen. Alava and me that the officers and soldiers whom the French had left there should be sent off to Coruña; and I understood from Gen. Alava that Don Benito Marquinez had sent off all, of both descriptions, who were able to bear the journey. Yet I have heard that French officers have appeared in the streets of Valladolid perfectly recovered, and with their swords on.

I beg to draw your Excellency's attention to this subject, and to point out to you the impropriety of the existence of such a practice, and the inconvenience which must result from it.

It is desirable that, as soon as any officers or soldiers should recover sufficiently, they should be sent off to Coruña; and that every measure should be adopted which is practicable, in order to interrupt the communication between the enemy at Burgos and the city of Valladolid.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Torre Lodones, 11th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst., but none others, whether in cipher or in ordinary writing.

I beg to observe to you that I have no cipher in which I could correspond with you: and unless the Spaniards in the north are very different from those I have seen elsewhere, or the enemy opposed to you more active than those I have met with, you have no reason to apprehend that your letters will be intercepted. Those to whom they may be entrusted may not choose to take the trouble of carrying them; but they would prefer death to delivering them to the enemy.

I am much obliged to you for your account of your operations. In regard to those which you have proposed to Gen. Mendizabal, I beg to remind you that Marmont's army have fled to Burgos; and, although they are not in a state to meet us, or any other body that can be called an army, I fear they would be too much for Mendizabal and his guerrillas. Mendizabal will of course have heard of Marmont's march to Burgos, and will have taken care to keep out of the way.

In regard to Mendizabal's operations, it is difficult, if not impossible, for me to point out what they ought to be, as I am entirely ignorant of his force and means. I have never yet seen or heard of a Spanish corps capable of undertaking any serious operation against the enemy, such as

G. O.

San Ildefonso, 8th Aug. 1812.

5. The Commander of the Forces desires that rice, wheat flour, or wheat, may be issued to the troops under the order of the 1st inst., but not barley, unless it should be absolutely necessary.

6. He desires that when the troops receive rum, it may be mixed with three times the quantity of water, instead of four times, as therein ordered.

the siege of Burgos would be, even if Marmont's remains had not gone there, unless in co-operation with a British corps; and I can't recommend for Mendizabal that which I am quite certain he has not the means of accomplishing.

In regard to us, after I had driven Marmont's army beyond the Duero, and that they had quitted that river on their way to Burgos in a state of disorganization and distress, from which they will not soon recover, I turned my attention towards the army of the Centre, under the King, which was collected on my flank and in my rear. They have retired from Madrid, and I hope to be in that city to-morrow, and, if I can, give the King a blow; and when the army of Galicia, which has now been two months engaged in the siege of Astorga, can bring that operation to a close, I may turn my attention to the north. But we have still too many enemies in the centre and south untouched to think of that side.

In the mean time, the guerrillas in the north, and Mendizabal, should do every thing in their power to harass the enemy, to prevent them from collecting magazines of provisions, and, above all, from communicating with each other. Any town or village which should supply the enemy with any thing, unless obliged by force of arms, should be destroyed.

If the Spaniards will not raise regular armies, and fight like other people, we must make the whole population enter into the war if they choose to continue it.

P.S. The numbers in your signal book would be as good a cipher as we could use; but you must send me a book by a messenger from Coruña, and let me acknowledge the receipt of it before you use it in this manner.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Torre Lodones, 11th Aug. 1812.

I received this morning your letter of the 3d, enclosing the intelligence from America.

As the mouth of the Channel, and the coasts of Portugal and Spain, will swarm with American privateers, it will be very desirable that you and Adm. Martin should write, as I shall, to England, to have measures adopted for the security of our packets in particular, and for the general security of our communication with Coruña on one side, and Cadiz and Gibraltar on the other.

In regard to the first, I shall recommend that we may have, at all times, a ship of war cruising off Cape Finisterre, and that the packets homeward bound should be ordered to make Ushant, from whence they should be seen in safety to Falmouth; and that those outward bound should be ordered to make Cape Finisterre.

In regard to the second object, I propose to recommend that the Admiral of the Lisbon station should be reinforced in frigates and craft to enable him to secure the communication between Cape Finisterre and the Rock of Lisbon, and between the Tagus and Cadiz and Gibraltar.

P.S. We shall be in Madrid to-morrow. I am not quite certain whether the enemy mean to leave a garrison in the Retiro.

The advanced posts were this day withdrawn towards Talavera; but I see by letters from Hill of the 6th that to that day nothing had moved from Estremadura to join the King. I propose to detain the mail till we shall have entered Madrid.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Torre Lodones, 11th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, containing a memorial from Lieut. Col. Stewart, of the 50th regt., in favor of the widow of Capt. Candler of that corps, and one from Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, forwarding and recommending an application from the widow of Capt. Prescott of the Royal Fusiliers, to receive some provision for herself and children. I beg you will submit these papers to the favorable consideration of H.R.H. the Commander in Chief.

To Earl Bathurst.

Torre Lodones, 11th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, on the subject of the clothing for the Portuguese army; and I beg to recommend that, if your Lordship should approve of the arrangements proposed by the Marshal, measures may be taken to insure the early arrival of all the equipments required.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

I have long intended to write to you, but I have really not had time to write to any body. I was much concerned to learn that you were so unwell; but I hope that you will soon be better, as I am very anxious to have you again with the army.

Our operations, since you left us, have been as follows. We followed Marmont as closely as we could to the Duero, but he marched at such a rate, and our troops were so much fatigued, that after the first day we did him but little mischief. After driving him from Valladolid, it appears that he and the King, who had returned from this side to Segovia, had thoughts of joining at Aranda de Duero, and I moved our right to Cuellar. I there gave the troops a day's halt, upon finding the King retired upon Madrid; and afterwards I thought that, upon the whole, the best thing I could do would be to move upon the King and fight him, or force him from Madrid, which I have carried into execution. I could not go farther north without great inconvenience, and I could at that moment do nothing else. I have left Anson's brigade on the Duero to observe Marmont; and Clinton's division, and all the new infantry, at Cuellar, to support and keep the communication with him. The King has retired upon Aranjuez and Toledo, leaving a garrison in the Retiro.

We had a devil of an affair on the evening of the 11th. The French, 2000 cavalry, moved upon the Portuguese cavalry; D'Urban ordered them

G. O.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests that the soldiers may not be allowed to walk about the streets of Madrid, unless regularly dressed in their uniforms with side arms.
2. Those going to work or on fatigue in their fatigue dresses, will of course be under the orders of officers or of non-commissioned officers.
3. In case any officers are desirous of seeing the Palace, they are requested to apply at the entrance for some of the servants of the household to attend them.

to charge the advanced squadrons, which charge they did not execute as they ought, and they ran off, leaving our guns (Capt. Macdonald's troop). They ran in upon the German cavalry, half a mile or more in their rear, where they were brought up; but they would not charge on the left of the Germans; these charged and stopped the enemy; but Col. de Jonquières was taken, and we have lost a good many of these fine fellows. There are 20 killed, and about as many wounded and prisoners. We likewise lost 3 guns of Macdonald's troop in the Portuguese flight, but the French left them behind.

If Elley is recovered, I wish you would desire him to have an eye to the sick and wounded horses and men of the cavalry, particularly of Ponsonby's brigade, which are at Salamanca.

The 5th dragoon guards are very weak. I have written to England about horses; but I am sadly apprehensive that our horses will fall off terribly before the campaign will be over. They are now, however, in as good condition (the Germans in better) as they have been during the campaign: but the wear and tear in these constant marches and skirmishes must wear them out.

I have desired the light dragoons and hussars to mount some of their dismounted men upon French and Spanish captured horses. I think that the heavy cavalry also might do something of the same kind: that is, they might mount upon French horses the men who attend the baggage, and bring all the effective English horses into the ranks. I wish you would turn this suggestion over in your mind.

P.S. I shall make every body shoe up while we shall be engaged in the siege of the Retiro.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 29th June, regarding your pay. Your name was not included in the abstract solely by mistake, which mistake I have had rectified, and the matter will be settled as you wish.

You see by the date of this letter that we have got on since you left us.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

Having found that the army under Marshal Marmont continued their retreat upon Burgos, in a state not likely to be able to take the field again for some time; and knowing that I could not quit the river Duero in pursuit of them at the present moment, without incurring great inconvenience, and exposing the rear and communications of the army to the operations of the army of the Centre, under the King, I determined to move upon that army, and to endeavor to bring the King to a general action, or to force him to quit Madrid.

Accordingly I moved from Cuellar on the 6th inst., leaving there the 6th division, and the regiments which had lately joined the army from England and Gibraltar, and which were in a state of health not to be able to bear the march, and Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry on the Duero, to observe the movements of the '*Armée de Portugal*.' These troops were put in communication with Gen. Santocildes' division of the army of Galicia, likewise on the Duero, near the fords of Pollos and

Herreros; and the parties of guerrillas under Marquínez, Principe, and Saornil, were attached to Major Gen. Anson and Gen. Santocildes, and objects fixed for their attention. We arrived at Segovia on the 7th, and at San Ildefonso on the 8th, where I halted one day, to allow the right of the army more time to come up.

No opposition was made to the passage of the troops through the mountains; and Brig. Gen. D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, the 1st light battalion of the K. G. L., and Capt. Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, had been through the Guadarrama pass since the 9th. He moved forward on the morning of the 11th, from the neighbourhood of Galapagar, and, supported by the heavy cavalry of the K. G. L. from Torre Lodones, he drove in the French cavalry, about 2000 in number, and placed himself at Majadahonda, with the Portuguese cavalry, and Capt. Macdonald's troop, and the cavalry and light infantry of the K. G. L. at Las Rozas, about three quarters of a mile distant.

The enemy's cavalry which had been driven off in the morning, and had moved towards Navalcarnero, returned about 5 in the afternoon; and Brig. Gen. D'Urban having formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majadahonda, supported by the horse artillery, ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which appeared too far advanced to be supported by their main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but unfortunately turned about before they reached the enemy; and they fled through the village of Majadahonda, and back upon the German dragoons, leaving behind them unprotected and unsupported the guns of Capt. Macdonald's troop, which had been moved forward to co-operate with the cavalry. By the activity of the officers and soldiers of Capt. Macdonald's troop, the guns were, however, moved off; but owing to the unfavorable nature of the ground over which they were moved, the carriage of one was broken, and 2 others were overturned, and these 3 guns fell into the enemy's hands.

The Portuguese dragoons having fled through Majadahonda, were rallied and re-formed, when the heavy dragoons of the K. G. L., which were formed between that village and Las Rozas, and the German cavalry, charged the enemy, although under many disadvantages, and stopped their further progress; but I am sorry to say that they suffered considerable loss, and that Col. de Jonquières, who commanded the brigade, was taken prisoner.*

The left of the army was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, at the Puente del Retamar, on the Guadarrama river; and Col. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry and a brigade of infantry of the 7th division having moved forward to the support of the troops in advance, the enemy retired upon Majadahonda as soon as they observed these troops, and night having come on they retired upon Alcorcon, leaving our guns at Majadahonda.

I have reason to believe, both from the manner in which the enemy came on to the attack of the Portuguese troops, and from other circumstances, that they had been informed that we had none but Portuguese dragoons in front, and that there were no troops in the neighbourhood to support them. The occurrences of the 22d July had induced me to hope that the Portuguese dragoons would have conducted themselves better, or I should

* See Appendix, No. III.

not have placed them at the outposts of the army. But every day's experience shows that no reliance can be placed on cavalry which is not in a perfect state of discipline, and of which the men don't feel a perfect confidence in the officers. I shall therefore not place them again at the outposts, or in situations in which by their misconduct they can influence the safety of the other troops.

I am happy to report that the officers of the Portuguese cavalry behaved remarkably well, and showed a good example to their men, particularly the Visconde de Barbacena, who was taken prisoner. The conduct of the brave German cavalry was, I understand, excellent, as well as that of Capt. Macdonald's troop of horse artillery. The light infantry battalion were not engaged.

The army moved forward yesterday morning, and its left took possession of the city of Madrid, the King having retired with the army of the Centre by the roads of Toledo and Aranjuez, leaving a garrison in the Retiro.

It is impossible to describe the joy manifested by the inhabitants of Madrid upon our arrival,* and I hope that the prevalence of the same sentiments of detestation of the French yoke, and of a strong desire to secure the independence of their country, which first induced them to set the example of resistance to the usurper, will induce them again to make exertions in the cause of their country, which, being more wisely directed, will be more efficacious than those formerly made.

The heavy guns, with the aid of which we took Salamanca, are in the rear of the army, and I hope that we shall not find it difficult to take the Retiro. But I believe that we must break ground before the place.

I have not yet heard that Astorga has fallen; but the garrison which the enemy left in Tordesillas, about 260 in number, surrendered to Gen. Santocildes on the 5th inst.

I have received no further reports of the situation of Gen. Ballesteros since the 21st July.

I have letters from Gen. J. O'Donell and Gen. Roche of the 26th July; and the army of Murcia, under the command of the former, was defeated by Gen. Harispe on the 21st July. It appears that the Spanish troops moved forward to attack Gen. Harispe's posts at Castalla and at Ybi. Those which attacked the former were repulsed with the loss of 2000 men and 2 pieces of cannon. Those which attacked the latter, under the command of Gen. Roche, conducted themselves remarkably well, and covered the retreat of the troops under Gen. O'Donell, and afterwards effected their own retreat in good order to Alicante.

I have not heard from Gen. Maitland since the 18th July.

There had been no movement of importance in Estremadura as late as the 9th inst.

* *Le Précis historique de la Guerre de la Péninsule de 1807 à 1814, servant d'instructions aux Journaux des Sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans cette guerre, par Belmas, chef de bataillon du Génie,* vol. i. p. 235, contains the following passage: 'Lord Wellington fit son entrée à Madrid le 12 Août avec 30,000 hommes. L'ivresse avec laquelle il fut reçu fit bientôt place à d'autres sentimens, lorsqu'il frappa cette ville d'une contribution.' The last assertion is not correct. Lord Wellington never raised, or permitted to be raised, any contribution at Madrid or elsewhere.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the affair at Majadahonda, on the 11th Aug. 1812.

	King's German Legion and Royal Horse Artillery.				Portuguese.			
	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.
Killed	1	1	18	12	3	—	30	11
Wounded	5	5	36	12	3	—	49	5
Missing	1	—	20	44	1	1	21	37

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 13th Aug. 1812.

You will see in my dispatch my reasons for moving on this city, to which I have to add that I could undertake nothing else excepting the siege of Zamora, for which I shall have time till the end of September. As the siege of Astorga is not concluded, it would have answered no purpose to undertake that of Zamora at present. But we must have Zamora and Toro before the Duero shall fill. A further reason for moving to Madrid is, that I think my being here will have a good effect throughout Spain and all Europe.

I have heard of war being declared by America, and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to our communications by the packets. We may depend upon it that the mouth of the Channel and the coasts of Portugal will swarm with privateers, and it will be necessary to take some steps to protect the packets.

I have desired Mr. Stuart to suggest to Adm. Martin to station a vessel off Cape Finisterre; and I would beg leave to recommend to your Lordship that the outward bound packets should be directed to make Cape Finisterre, and those homeward bound to make Ushant; and that the squadron off Brest should be directed to detach a small vessel to see them in safety to Falmouth. It would be necessary also that the Admiral at Lisbon should be reinforced in small vessels, to enable him to observe the coasts of Portugal and Spain, as far at least as Gibraltar.

P.S. The troops that are with the army have improved in health in the last week. I don't know how those are at Cuellar, but I am afraid not as they ought to be. I hope your Lordship will not forget horses for our cavalry and artillery.

G. O.

Madrid, 14th Aug. 1812.

1. There will be wanted 2000 gabions of 2 feet diameter in the whole, and 2 feet 6 inches long; and 200 fascines, 18 feet long and 1 foot diameter; and 1400 pickets, 3 feet 6 inches long.

2. A working party of 150 men of the Portuguese brigade in the 3d division are to parade this day at 12 o'clock at the Custom house, to make these gabions and fascines, and pickets, for which the men will be paid the price for each which they were paid under the orders of the 18th Dec. last.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Madrid, 14th Aug. 1812, 7 P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 13th; and you will have heard that we have this day taken the Retiro, with 1800 men, nearly 200 pieces of cannon, and 20,000 stand of arms; and I think it a matter of indifference what movement the '*Armée de Portugal*' may make.

The only thing I recommend is that which you have suggested yourself, viz., to move the point of communication from Medina to Arevalo. Indeed, upon your letter of yesterday, this might as well be done at all events, and I gave orders accordingly to Scovell and the Commissary Gen.; but if you should have found occasion to alter the communication, I hope you will have sent back along the road as far as Salamanca.

I shall expect further intelligence from you; and shall feel no difficulty now in going to you at a moment's notice.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 15th Aug. 1812.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the garrison of the Retiro surrendered by capitulation yesterday; and I have now the honor to enclose a copy of the capitulation.*

We invested the place completely on the evening of the 13th; and in the night, detachments of the 7th division of infantry under the command of Major Gen. Hope; and of the 3d division of infantry, under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, drove in the enemy's posts from the Prado, and the Botanical garden, and the works which they had constructed outside of the park wall; and having broken through the wall in different places, they were established in the palace of the Retiro, and close to the exterior line of the enemy's works enclosing the building called La China. The troops were preparing in the morning to attack these works preparatory to the arrangements to be adopted for the attack of the interior line and building, when the Governor sent out an officer to desire to capitulate; and I granted him the honors of war, the baggage of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, &c., as specified in the enclosed agreement.

I enclose a return of the strength of the garrison, which marched out

* Capitulation proposed by Gen. the Earl of Wellington, Commander in Chief of the Allied Army, and accepted by Col. La Fond, Commandant of the Fort of La China.

14th Aug. 1812.

1st; The garrison shall march out of the fort with the honors of war, and shall lay down their arms on the glacis.

2d; The garrison, and persons of every description in the fort, shall be prisoners of war.

3d; The officers shall be allowed to retain their swords, their baggage, and their horses, according to the number allowed them by the regulations of the French army; and the soldiers shall keep their knapsacks.

4th; The magazines of the fort of every description shall be delivered to the officers of the respective departments, and the French Commandants of Artillery and of Engineers shall furnish lists of the contents of each dépôt. The plans of the fort shall also be delivered to the Commanding officer of the British Engineers.

5th; This capitulation shall take place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and the gates of the fort shall be occupied by the troops of the allied army as soon as this capitulation is ratified.

WELLINGTON.

This capitulation is ratified by the Colonel commanding the fort of La China.

yesterday at 4 o'clock on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. We have found in the place 189 pieces of brass ordnance in excellent condition, 900 barrels of powder, 20,000 stand of arms, and considerable magazines of clothing and provisions, and ammunition. We have likewise found the eagles of the 13th and 51st regts., which I forward to England to be presented to His Royal Highness by my aide de camp, Major Burgh.*

The King has retired across the Tagus, and his head quarters were, by the last accounts, at Ocaña.

I have received no letters from Gen. Maitland since the 18th July; but I have received a letter this day from Gen. J. O'Donell, of the 10th inst., from Murcia, in which he informs me that Gen. Maitland had arrived at Alicante on the 7th inst. with the troops from Sicily, where he was about to land; and that he, Gen. O'Donell, intended to join him with 3400 infantry, and 1100 cavalry, and 8 pieces of cannon, besides the troops of Gen. Roche's division, in order to co-operate in his operations against Marshal Suchet.

As the Italian division of Suchet's troops are with the King, and the 16th French regt., I should think that the allies will be numerically the strongest in the kingdom of Valencia, although inferior in composition; and that proportion of them at least which will land from their ships, in a state of equipment very unfit to take the field. I should have preferred the plan of conjoint operations with the Navy which I had proposed for the consideration of the naval and military officers in the Mediterranean, or any other of that description, to the plan which it appears is in contemplation; but I hope this plan will be successful.

I see by a letter from Gen. Ballesteros to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill of the 29th July, that he had been in Malaga on the 14th July, after an engagement with Gen. Leval near Coin. Gen. Ballesteros was at Graza- lema on the 9th; and he states that Gen. Villatte, with a strong division, was near San Roque, and he is therefore cut off from Gibraltar. I have a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill of the 8th inst.; and although Gen. Drouet had been in movement for 3 days, it does not appear that his movements are of any importance, or have any reference to the state of affairs in this part of the country.

I have received a report of the 13th from Major Gen. Clinton at Cuellar;

* Major Gen. Lord Downes, K.C.B., &c.

G. O.

Madrid, 15th Aug. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that all the officers, as well Portuguese as English, on duty in the palace of the Retiro since yesterday at noon, may be put in arrest, and their names reported, for having allowed the stores in that palace to be plundered, notwithstanding the orders they received, and that they and the men under their command were placed on duty there purposely to prevent the plunder.

2. The Commander of the Forces ordered on the 13th inst. that the soldiers should not be allowed to walk about the streets of Madrid unless regularly dressed as soldiers with their side arms. It has always hitherto been understood it was incumbent on the officers and non-commissioned officers of the army to see that the orders of the Commander of the Forces are obeyed; but he has seen soldiers walking with non-commissioned officers, in presence of officers, not dressed as ordered, and all kinds of irregularities going on in presence of and unnoticed by the officers.

3. No army can continue long together and successful if orders are not strictly obeyed: and the Commander of the Forces holds the officers responsible for their soldiers; and in case of misbehaviour of the latter, he will call the former to account.

that a detachment of the '*Armée de Portugal*' had made a movement from the neighbourhood of Burgos towards Valladolid; but I imagine this movement is made solely with a view to obtain provisions.

I enclose returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the affair at Majadahonda on the 11th inst. ;* and of the loss in the attack of the works of the Retiro.†

This dispatch will be delivered by my aide de camp Major Burgh, who will be able to explain any further circumstances relating to our situation; and I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's protection.

P.S. Since writing this dispatch, I have received a letter of the 10th from Gen. Maitland from Alicante, of which I enclose a copy, in which that officer informs me that he had on that day landed at that place.

I have omitted to inform your Lordship that I ordered on the 5th that Gen. Ross might join Lieut. Gen. Maitland with the troops at Carthagena, excepting a sufficient number to garrison the forts Las Galeras and Atalaya, which are the two most important points at Carthagena.

Proclamation.

Madrid, 15th Aug. 1812.

Castillans! On the road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, and from thence to this city, stations have been arranged at which the officers and soldiers of the army under my command, going and coming, may receive with regularity the rations of provisions and forage they may require; and as these stations have been carefully specified in the route or passport given to every officer or detachment of soldiers, authorising them to march from one station to another, there can be no doubt where these stations are. Consequently, it is not required that rations or forage should be furnished to any officers or soldiers of the allied British army, at any place not specified on the route or passport. Moreover, it is required that information shall be immediately given to my head quarters, giving the number of the regiment of the officer or soldier to which he may belong who disobeys the above order, and who requires rations at any place not expressed; and if a soldier, corporal, or serjeant, he will be conducted to the Commandant of the first military station of the allied British army; and the same is also to be observed with any soldier who may otherwise conduct himself improperly.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Madrid, 16th Aug. 1812.

The state of affairs in this part of the Peninsula, in Estremadura and Andalusia, induces me to be of opinion that the time is at last arrived at which it will be expedient for the troops stationed at Cadiz to take some more active measures than it has been possible to adopt hitherto, in order to raise the blockade of that place. It is certain that the effect of these measures, if they should not raise the blockade, will be to divert the enemy's attention more effectually from Gen. Ballesteros, and from Gen. Sir R. Hill; and possibly the whole together, combined with events in this and other quarters, may produce not only the raising of the blockade, but the evacuation of Andalusia.

I request you, therefore, to consider of a plan, and the means of

* See p. 25.

† One R. and F. killed, and 16 wounded.

executing it, for the attack of the enemy's troops opposite Cadiz, by which the blockade is maintained. You, on the spot, must of course be the best judge of this plan, upon which, at this distance, I can scarcely venture to form an opinion. But it should be founded solely on its own grounds; should be unconnected with any plans of operation by other corps of troops in the field, excepting as far as the operations of those corps should affect the strength of the blockading army, and should combine the following objects: 1st; the security of your own position on the Isla and at Cadiz: 2dly; the facility of carrying the plan into execution with the largest proportion of troops which can be employed upon it, consistently with the first object, against the smallest body of the enemy. The attack should be made, therefore, against one of the enemy's flanks from your weakest point, which I take to be Stⁱ Petri; but in this I may be mistaken; and the foundation of the plan should be an attack in the way of assault, or of siege of his works, as he does not intend to attack yours in that way.

If, therefore, the enemy's works on his left flank should be too strong to be taken by storm, you should encamp your troops and break ground regularly before them, and carry them one after another, if you should be strong enough to cross the river of Stⁱ Petri at all; and you will bear in mind in these operations, that as long as you can withdraw your troops

G. O.

Madrid, 16th Aug. 1812.

1. The establishment of the corps of Guides is to be as follows, from the 25th July:

Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Troop serj. majors.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Farriers.	Privates.
6	6	7	8	8	4	100

2. The Commander of the Forces has been induced to order into arrest the following officers, viz.:

* * * * *

For neglect of their duty while on guard in the palace of the Retiro, in allowing their sentries to permit persons to carry out clothing and stores during the day and night of the 14th inst. while they were on guard over that palace purposely to prevent these deprivations.

3. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned to be under the necessity of observing upon the conduct of officers who have invariably conducted themselves well in the field: but the officers of the army must recollect, that to perform their duty with gallantry in the field is but a small part of what is required from them; and that obedience to order, regularity, accuracy in the performance of duties, and discipline, are necessary to keep any military body together, and to enable them to perform any military operation with advantage to their country or service to themselves.

4. The Commander of the Forces now desires that these officers may be released from their arrest, and may return to their duty.

5. The Commander of the Forces knows that all the regiments of the army, Portuguese as well as English, have got with them carts which they have pressed: he desires that before to-morrow morning these carts may be delivered over to the Commissariat attached to these regiments, and that the Commissaries will send the owners of the carts to their homes with their carts, paying them their hire.

6. This order does not refer to carts which have been with the regiments before the 22d July last.

7. The Commander of the Forces, in publishing, for the information and guidance of the army, the following letter from the Sec. at War, is concerned to observe that he experiences too frequently the inconvenience from the lamentable inattention of the officers of the army, not to be sensible of the truth of the observation of the Sec. at War: officers of all ranks and in all situations are too much in the habit of leaving to their inferiors the performance of the most important duties, without taking the trouble even of superintending their conduct; and the consequence is, that all duties are negligently and inaccurately, if at all, performed, and the most serious inconveniences are felt by the service:

* * * * *

back to their position on the Isla, and your artillery and stores, which, if depôts of too cumbrous a magnitude are not formed, will not be difficult, you accomplish my object if you oblige the enemy to recall troops from operations against Gen. Ballesteros or Sir R. Hill.

I beg you to consider and suggest a plan through His Majesty's Ambassador for the consideration of the Regency, on the principles above pointed out; and that it may be carried into execution without further reference to me, without loss of time.

I enclose the copy of an order which I sent on the 5th inst. to Major Gen. Ross.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Madrid, 16th Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst.

I broke up from Cuellar on the 6th, and marched upon Segovia, and thence by San Ildefonso and the passes of Navacerrada and the Guadarrama to this place, leaving at Cuellar, and on the Duero, a considerable detachment to observe the movements of the enemy's troops in the north of the Peninsula.

The King's army retired before us; and we entered Madrid on the 12th, a French garrison still occupying the Retiro. We invested that place completely on the evening of the 13th; and on that night the troops of the 3d and 7th divisions drove the enemy from their works outside of the Park wall, within which, and in the Palace of the Retiro, they were established during the night. In the morning we were preparing to attack the exterior works of La China, when the enemy capitulated; and we have taken about 2400 prisoners, 189 pieces of cannon, 20,000 muskets, clothing, and military stores of all descriptions.

The King retired across the Tagus, and was on the 13th at Ocaña. He marched yesterday morning towards Villatobas and Corral de Almaguer; and it now appears certain that he is going into the kingdom of Valencia.

Including the Italian division of Suchet's army, commanded by Gen. Palombini, and the 16th French regt., he has, I should think, from 17,000 to 20,000 men, of which number from 2000 to 3000 are cavalry, the greater part French, of the 12th, 18th, 19th, and, I think, 22d dragoons. There are some Westphalian and Spanish cavalry, and some of all nations. There is the 75th French regiment of infantry, three battalions, 1500 strong; one battalion of the 12^{me} *légère*, 500; and either one or two battalions of the 28^{me} *légère*. All the rest are troops of Baden, Westphalia, Spanish *juramentados*, and the King's guards of all nations, and are not very respectable.

I don't know upon what plan of operations you propose to proceed. If circumstances should suit, and you propose to move forward on Valencia, I recommend to your attention my first campaign in Portugal. I kept the sea always on my flank. The transports attended the movements of the army as a magazine, and I had at all times, and every day, a short and easy communication with them. The army, therefore, could never be distressed for provisions or stores, however limited its means of land transport; and, in case of necessity, it might have embarked at any point of the coast.

If you should not advance according to this or any other plan, I have no doubt that you can maintain Alicante against both Suchet and the King; and if you should effect that object, and keep Carthagena, I hope still to derive further advantages from the prosperous state of the campaign.

I think it proper to apprise you that I have applied to the Sec. of State, to annul that part of the instructions from Lord W. Bentinck which directs you to quit the coast in the *second* week in September; and you will therefore remain either on the coast of Spain, or in the adjacent islands, till you shall receive further orders from the Sec. of State, notwithstanding the instructions from Lord W. Bentinck.

To Don Juan Martin (El Empecinado).

Madrid, 16th Aug. 1812.

I congratulate your Excellency on the surrender of Guadalaxara. I cannot agree to the articles 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the capitulation, on account of the reasons expressed in the accompanying paper; but it was known that the articles of the capitulation were concluded under a supposition that they should be subject to my opinion, and should therefore not affect the capitulation. God preserve your Excellency many years.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 16th Aug. 1812.

I enclose my dispatches, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs here. The King is decidedly off to Valencia; and I hope now to be able to clear out Andalusia by a direct movement on that kingdom before the year closes. However, much will depend upon circumstances.

I have ordered Maitland to remain on the eastern coast, notwithstanding Lord W. Bentinck's instructions, till he shall receive the further orders of the Sec. of State; and I have desired him to wait for them. I am going to write to Hill to tell him that he need not now attend to me in any manner, unless Soult should move through La Mancha with his whole army; and to desire him to push Drouet hard; and I desire Gen. Cooke to cross the S^t Petri, if the French army of the blockade is not much stronger than him; and if he can do nothing else, he must proceed regularly against the enemy's works. All this will prevent Soult from detaching towards Valencia, unless he should go with his whole army; and if he should, my object is gained.

The time of the Spaniards here has hitherto been spent in *regocijos*; and never did I see such joy as there is in all ranks. We shall now, however, proceed to business, I hope, and shall think of raising and disciplining troops, and of finding means to pay and support them.

I have not heard of Castaños since the 2d. He was then at Lugo, which place he was to quit on the 4th. His presence, as being the Chief in all this country, is much wanted here.

Besides the events mentioned in the enclosed dispatches, Toledo has been evacuated, and Guadalaxara, with a garrison of 900 men, has surrendered upon capitulation. They insisted upon surrendering to me; but I forced them to surrender to the Empecinado. I don't mention these events in this dispatch, as the first depends upon a guerrilla report, which is not always true; and I don't approve of some of the articles of my *confrère's* capitulation; and I have sent it back to him.

To Col. Malcolm.

Madrid, 17th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 22d July, for which I am much

obliged to you, and I sincerely congratulate you on your return to England. Pray present my best respects to Mrs. Malcolm.

I am among a people mad with joy for their deliverance from their oppressors. God send that my good fortune may continue, and that I may be the instrument of securing their independence and happiness.

I am concerned for Campbell, but he must go to the Isle of France, or he will be laid upon the shelf. I know these things better than he does.

P.S. There is one of the family, called Jera, as well as I could make it out (besides wife and children and Arab horse), with whom I am in no manner acquainted.

To Major Gen. Walker.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 7th; and I assure you that I should have been very sorry if you had remained at Lisbon one moment after it was in your power to quit that place, to obey any order of mine, or to conform to any military rule. Your case is beyond all rule, and I should be much concerned if you allowed yourself to be put to any inconvenience by considering it in any other light.

I hope that you will soon be able again to join us.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

I have heard that the government have appointed Señor ——— to be Intendant of the province of Salamanca, instead of Señor Mexia, in whose favor I have applied. I applied for Mexia only because he had rendered important services; and I must add, that since he has acted as Intendant under the orders of Gen. Castaños, he has conducted himself remarkably well; and has been of material service to the army, as well British as Spanish.

I am quite certain, that the existing Spanish government have no intention of doing any thing offensive to me; but if I did not feel this, certainly I should entertain doubts of their intention, in consequence of this appoint-

G. O.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently requested that regular foraging parties might be sent out from each regiment and brigade, and the mode is clearly pointed out in orders, in which the receipt for forage is to be given to the owner, whether it should be dry or green, thrashed, cut, or otherwise.

2. The object of these orders is, 1st; to insure regularity, and that there shall be no waste: 2dly; to render it certain that every body obtains his due proportion of forage: and, 3dly; to insure to the owners the value of what is taken from them.

3. Notwithstanding the repeated orders given on this subject, and that they are so easy of execution, the time of the Commander of the Forces is occupied in receiving complaints from the inhabitants of all the villages in the neighbourhood of every station of the troops, of the outrages committed to obtain forage, and of their total ruin, in consequence of their having been left without receipt, or any evidence that their property had been taken from them on account of the public service.

4. The constant disobedience of orders, in points on which obedience is so easy, and obviously so beneficial to all concerned, would lead to a belief that it was intentional, if the long acquaintance of the Commander of the Forces with the army did not convince him that it is the effect of the inattention to and inaccuracy in the obedience of orders, of which the officers are too much in the habit.

5. The Commander of the Forces entreats the General officers to attend to their divisions and brigades, and to see that the orders above referred to, and all others, are strictly obeyed and carried into execution with accuracy, by the officers and troops under their command: if this is not done, they may depend upon it that the army cannot perform the service of which it would otherwise be capable.

6. The General officers commanding the Portuguese troops must take care that the orders of the army are obeyed by them as well as by others.

ment. Señor ——— is the person who was employed by the Central Junta to attend this army. He is not only the most useless and inefficient of God's creatures, but is an impediment to all business; and he cannot speak one word of truth. After knowing the truth of all my complaints of those days, and as he assured me (and I believe him), reporting them to his employers, he suddenly turned round when the Junta sent Señor * * * * with a sum of money to supply our wants (which sum of money Señor * * * * put into his own pocket), and he swore that we wanted nothing, and were amply supplied. He had the impudence to tell me so at Truxillo; and after I had forced him to acknowledge that he told a falsehood, I turned him out of the room, and desired that I might never see his face again. Whether the government appoint him or not, I shall of course hold no communication with him; and it will remain for the government to consider whether it is desirable that such a man should be appointed to a situation in which he can have any thing to say to this army.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to apply to the government to appoint Don Alexo Guillen, of Salamanca, to be a Canon of the Cathedral of Santiago, in Galicia. He is more intelligent, and has rendered more service to the cause, than any man in Spain; and I earnestly entreat that he may receive this appointment.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

Considering it desirable that a brigade of heavy artillery, 24 pounders, and a brigade of 9 pounders, should be in reserve with this army, I enclose estimates of the carriages, horses, &c., which will be required to be added to the ordnance establishments which we have at present.

The 9 pounders are already at Lisbon; but I request your Lordship to give directions that the 24 pounders, horses, &c., required for the whole equipment, may be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be convenient; and that we should have an additional company of artillery.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

The King retired from Ocaña on the 16th inst., and his army are in march towards Valencia. The enemy have abandoned Toledo, which has been taken possession of by a party of the guerrillas of El Medico.

In consequence of the King's retreating, and in order to get the troops under shelter from the sun during this month, I have moved the whole to the Escorial, with the exception of the Light and 3d divisions of infantry, and Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, which will continue at Madrid. Since the capture of the Retiro, the garrison of Guadalaxara, consisting of 700 men, has surrendered to the Empecinado by capitulation, on nearly the same terms as those which I granted to the garrison of the Retiro.

By reports from Major Gen. Clinton, I learn that a part of the remains of the '*Armée de Portugal*' had moved forward from the neighbourhood of Burgos, and some of their detachments were understood to be in Valladolid on the 14th inst., Gen. Santocildes having withdrawn the troops of the army of Galicia, which occupied that town. Some of their detachments were likewise on the right of the Pisuerga. I think it probable that they have made this movement in order to drive back the Galician

troops from the neighbourhood of Pollos and Herreros, that they may communicate with, and probably carry off, the garrisons of Zamora and Toro. It is not impossible, likewise, that they may attempt to relieve Astorga, and to withdraw that garrison. I had expected they would make this movement as soon as they should get them together, when I undertook the march upon Madrid; and I suggested to Gen. Santocildes that he should fall back in time upon the Esla, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to oppose the enemy vigorously. As the allied British and Portuguese army would be obliged to attack Toro and Zamora, in case the enemy should not withdraw from these places, and possibly even Astorga, adverting to the slow progress which has been made in the siege of that place by the Galician army, I don't consider it a misfortune that the enemy should withdraw the garrisons; as we shall be saved a long march at an unfavorable season, and an operation which will take time, and in which we must expect to incur some loss. I have ordered Major Gen. Clinton from Cuellar to Olmedo.

By accounts from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill of the 12th, it appears that Gen. Drouet had drawn in his right from La Guareña; but he still held Hornachos.

By accounts from Cadiz to the 6th inst., it appears that Gen. Villatte had returned to the blockade. Gen. Ballesteros had taken 300 prisoners at Osuna; and by the reports of the position of the troops, it appears that the road to Gibraltar is again open to him.

In consequence of the retreat of the King into Valencia, and the certainty that it is not intended to join the troops under Drouet to the army of the Centre, and of the landing of the troops under Gen. Maitland at Alicante, I have again released the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill from the necessity of attending to the movements of this army; and have directed the General to move with activity upon Drouet, to drive him entirely out of Estremadura, if his force should be sufficient; and to threaten to enter Andalusia.

I have likewise directed Major Gen. Cooke to consider of a plan for attacking the works of the blockading army before Cadiz, either by assault, or more regular approach, if it should be necessary; and to carry that plan into execution, if he should consider his force sufficiently strong to be able to quit the protection of his works on the Isla at all. By these measures, aided by the operations of Gen. Ballesteros, we shall at least harass the enemy in Andalusia, and we shall prevent him from detaching to other quarters; and we may induce him to withdraw entirely, without the necessity of collecting in Andalusia a larger force.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

In reference to the correspondence which has lately taken place on the subject of providing supplies of ammunition for Cadiz, I beg leave to transmit, for your Lordship's information, an extract of a letter from Major Gen. Cooke, stating the quantity of ammunition which has lately been expended at Cadiz, in his opinion, without adequate object; and the remonstrances he has made on the subject to the Spanish authorities through His Majesty's Ambassador.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 18th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 23d July, in which you have enclosed statements of the bills drawn on the Treasury from this country between the 1st Jan. and the 4th July, upon which I beg to assure you that they afford no evidence of the quantity of specie which has gone through the military chest in that period.

The Commissary Gen. is very unwell; but I hope by the next post to let you know the exact amount which we have received in money.

The whole sum of £410,000, drawn by Commissary O'Meara, is for provisions and supplies for the troops at Cadiz; and the sum of £386,000, drawn by Mr. Mackenzie at Oporto, is for the same. The whole of the drafts of Mr. Duff is for money, more than half of which is spent at Cadiz, &c.; Mr. Pipon's drafts are generally for supplies of provisions purchased from the Americans, &c., and a very small proportion for money; but you shall know exactly how this matter stands.

In the mean time, whatever may be the sums for which we have drawn, we are in the greatest distress, which is certainly at present occasioned in some degree by our distance from Lisbon, and the difficulty of carrying the money to the army. I have been able to pay the troops only half of their pay for the month of April, the Staff only for February; and I did that by applying to our own service the money sent by my brother for Spanish services.

I am sorry to say that I have reports that the sick and wounded officers at Salamanca have been obliged to sell their clothes to get money.

The want of money in the army is become a most serious evil; and we may trace to this want many of the acts of plunder and indiscipline by which we are disgraced every day. We must be regularly supplied, or we cannot go on.

More has been done by government lately than had been done for many months, I may almost say years, before; but I think that government have been wrong in employing the Bank to make their purchase of bullion to supply this army. My opinion has invariably been, that if a small sum, even £100,000, were sent out every month, it would enable us to manage the exchanges, and to obtain our money at a cheaper rate. I can never believe that inconvenience would be felt in England by the export in coin of £100,000 every month; but the fact is, that government go to the Bank to procure the coin, instead of employing their agents to purchase it as the dealers in coin do; and the Directors of the Bank, having upon their shoulders the supply of the coin for the interior circulation, as well as the supply of the wants of government for the service abroad, act like all other men; they supply that demand which is made with most noise and clamour, and our distant whispers are unattended to. Thus, when the China fleet arrived lately with a sum of money, the Bank took the whole that I believe appeared on the manifest for the interior circulation, and did not give us even a shilling; and we get the gleanings.

I am quite convinced that if government were to employ an agent to purchase £100,000 every month, the circulation in England would not feel the drain, and we should be very much relieved, and the exchanges would be much improved. We must, however, prevent Lord W. Bentinck from

coming to Gibraltar and carrying off four millions of dollars at 6*s.* 8*d.* each, while we give from 5*s.* 4*d.* to 5*s.* 8*d.*

You will see how we stand by the report in my dispatch. I think that the French mean to carry off the garrisons from Zamora and Toro, which I hope they will effect, as otherwise I must go and take them. If I don't, nobody else will, as is obvious from what has been passing for the last 2 months at Astorga. My wish is now to canton the army for 2 or 3 weeks, till the rains in September, and then to march into Andalusia with part of it, and Hill's corps, so as to be certain that Soult will go out.

Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province, as they have absolutely no communication of any kind with France, or with any other French army; and they are pressed on all sides by troops not to be despised, and they can evidently do nothing. But I suspect that Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him; and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops to the south without incurring the risk of injuring their health. In the mean time I must have possession of the whole course of the Duero, and I may then venture to leave in this part of the country a large detachment of our army, and the Galician army, which I hope I shall get Beresford to command. I am not so certain of this, however, as he is still confined by his wound.

I don't expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry *viva*, and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country. I can do nothing till Gen. Castaños shall arrive, and I don't know where he is. I am afraid that the utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how to avoid being beat. If we can effect that object, I hope we might do the rest. My opinion is, that the government and Cortes should come to Ciudad Rodrigo, or the frontiers of Galicia, which I think of proposing to them; but I must wait till I see Castaños.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Madrid, 20th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 9th; and although I approve of the expedition to Huelva, I am inclined to be of opinion that the operation which I recommended to you in my letter of the 16th inst. would, upon the whole, answer the best effect.

As far as I can judge of your force, and that of the Spaniards on the Isla, I should imagine that you would be able to operate upon the enemy's works for the blockade with 10,000 men, still keeping a sufficient body opposite the Trocadero, and on your own left towards La Carraca. If I should be correct in this conjecture, you will have enough for your object, and the enemy will soon be forced to adopt some decided line respecting the blockade, and possibly regarding their position in Andalusia.

You must operate with heavy artillery, however, at once, if you cannot carry the enemy's works by assault, or you may depend upon it that you will effect nothing that is important, even in the way of diversion.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 20th Aug. 1812.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures from Sir H. Wellesley, by which I have been informed that the Cortes and government of Spain have been pleased to confer upon me the Order of the Golden Fleece.*

I beg your Lordship to lay these papers before H.R.H. the Prince Regent, and to request his permission that I may accept the honor which the government and Cortes of Spain have conferred upon me.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 20th Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst., in which you have enclosed the translation of one from the Minister of Grace and Justice, and a letter from the same Minister to myself, in which he has informed me that the Cortes had, at the recommendation of the Regency, done me the honor to confer upon me the Order of the Golden Fleece.

I beg that you will request the Minister of Grace and Justice to take an early opportunity of returning to the Regency and the Cortes my thanks for the favor with which they have viewed my services, and for the honor which they have been pleased to confer upon me.

I have made application to H.R.H. the Prince Regent for permission to accept this honorable mark of distinction, and of the favors of the Cortes and government of Spain.

The A.G. to Officers commanding at hospital stations.

20th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to request that in future whenever any party of men are marched from your station to join the army, you will report it by letter to this office, mentioning the number and the officer's name in command of the party. I have also to request that you will direct the officers in command of detachments to inform the Adj. Gen. from time to time of the state of their parties and progress on the march, agreeably to the G.O. of the 13th June, 1809, No. 5. Whenever there are a sufficient number of men (40 or upwards) fit to join the army, you will receive an order from the Adj. Gen. for their march, agreeably to the G. O. of the 13th June, 1809, No. 1; but they must not move without this order. The receipt of this letter is to be acknowledged.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 23d Aug. 1812.

Since I wrote to you on the 18th respecting the appointment of Señor — to be Intendant of Salamanca, I find that official notification of that gentleman's appointment has been received, which, however, I hope will be cancelled as soon as you shall have received my letter. Alava and

* See Appendix, Vol. V., No. XXIII.

G. O.

Madrid, 22d Aug. 1812.

1. French money being in circulation in this part of the country, it is to be received and issued by the departments of the army at the following rates, in comparison with Spanish dollars and *reales vellones*; it being observed that the Spanish dollar is worth 4s. 6d. English, or 800 Portuguese *reis*, and that every *real vellon* is worth 40 Portuguese *reis*, or 2 *vintems*.

The piece of silver called 1 *franc*, at 3 *reales* 24 *maravedis* (there are 34 *maravedis* in a *real*, and 680 in a Spanish dollar); the piece of 2 *francs*, at 7 *reales* 16 *maravedis*; the napoleon of 5 *francs*, at 18 *reales* 34 *maravedis*; the napoleon of 20 *francs*, at 75 *reales*; the piece of 15 *sous*, at 2 *reales* 26 *maravedis*; the piece of 1 *livre* 10 *sous*, at 5 *reales* 18 *maravedis*; the piece of 3 *livres*, at 11 *reales* 2 *maravedis*; the *louis* of 24 *livres*, at 88 *reales* 30 *maravedis*.

The Commander of the Forces requests that the several divisions of infantry may be marched the distance of between 6 and 8 miles every third morning at dawn of day; and that the regiments may be exercised in some of the manœuvres ordered for the troops, every day on which they are not marched as above ordered.

O'Lawlor (particularly the latter) know the reason which I have to complain of this person, and both have made representations against the appointment.

So much depends upon the regular supply of our armies, that I hope the Spanish government will take care to avoid making themselves so far responsible for this important object, as to dismiss from the office of Intendant of Castille a man who has hitherto given the greatest satisfaction; and to place in it one entirely inefficient, one who before was a very efficient cause of our withdrawing from the Spanish territory, and whom I was obliged to turn out of my house.

I don't at all like the way in which we are going on, particularly in relation to appointments to offices and great situations, in which branch of the government alone it is, I am afraid, in the power of the existing Regency to do much good.

They have sent an inefficient person, a ———, to command in Estremadura, displacing Monsalud, with whom we have all hitherto gone on well. Another equally inefficient, and without character, Gen. ———, has been sent to supersede Don Carlos in Old Castille; and I learn that they have appointed a Gen. ——— to command in New Castille, in which situation is included that of Governor of Madrid, which is at present by far

G. O.

Madrid, 23d Aug. 1812.

The Commander of the Forces requests that orders may be given to the commanding officers of regiments, to the officers under their command, the bāt men, muleteers, &c. &c. attached to the several regiments, to prevent them from riding on the public walks. There are roads for horses and carriages, which must be used; and horses and carriages must not be allowed to go on the walks intended for those on foot.

A. G. O.

Madrid, 23d Aug. 1812.

The following regulations relative to the issue of bāt and forage money, published in the G. O. of 1st Sept. 1809, are now republished for general information:

No. 3. Regimental officers having brevet rank to receive the proportion allotted to that rank, and not according to their regimental commissions.

No. 4. An officer holding 2 commissions, or 2 employments of any kind, to receive for 1 only.

No. 5. To enable them to equip themselves for field service, all officers (staff or regimental) ordered for the first time to join an army on foreign service, if they embark during the period on which 200 days' bāt, baggage, and forage money was issued to the troops on that service, to be permitted to receive that allowance, whatever the period of their arrival may be: in like manner if they embarked during the period of the issue of 165 days' forage money, to be permitted to receive that allowance, unless, however, they shall have received at any time previous to their embarking, or are to receive, any outfit money, or sums by any other name or denomination on the above account; in which case such sums are to be deducted: but officers (either staff or regimental) being absent on leave on account of ill health or private affairs, on their returning to their duty, are not to receive bāt, baggage, and forage money, unless they shall produce proper certificates that they have embarked not later than 61 days after the period when such allowance commences, and it shall appear to the officer commanding that they have used due diligence in repairing to their duty.

6. In bāt and forage allowance given to each company, the bāt money and 2 rations of forage being allowed for the service of the company, the officer actually commanding the company is to receive it, in the first instance; and any officer taking the command during the period of the issue, is entitled to receive from him a due proportion of that money for the remainder of the period: this regulation also applies to the bāt money, and 2 rations of forage, issued to the paymasters and surgeons.

7. Officers who may obtain promotion, or may be appointed to staff situations, provided it is notified in orders to the army to which they belong, before half the period for which bāt and forage money has been issued expires, to be entitled to receive the difference between the sums paid to them in their former rank, and the rank or situation to which they are promoted or appointed in staff situations, but they are not to receive any difference of bāt or forage money, if their promotions or appointments are notified subsequent to half the period for which bāt and forage money has been issued.

the most important post in the country, with duties to be performed which require activity and intelligence; and yet the person selected to fill this office is, I understand, an idiot, of between 70 and 80 years of age. I assure you that I don't at all like the way in which we are going on, and persons here are much dissatisfied with the neglect of them by the government.

A month has now elapsed since the battle of Salamanca, and I have not even heard of Gen. Castaños.

Excepting in this town, where there was no regular authority when I entered it, and when I forced them to proclaim the constitution, and proceed to the elections immediately, these ceremonies have been, as usual, unaccountably delayed; and at Valladolid, Santocildes contrived to delay them till the French came in, and there the constitution has never been proclaimed at all, and the town is still governed by the French authorities.

I am afraid also that, owing to the usual delays, the French found there their artillery and stores, and, what is particularly to be lamented, their muskets, of which they were much in want, as, even of those who were not wounded in the battle, the greater number threw away their arms afterwards, or during the retreat.

What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerrillas are getting quietly into the large towns, and amusing themselves, or collecting plunder of a better and more valuable description; and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or to secure our advantage.

This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs; and though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castille, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do any thing, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Sir H. Douglas of the 18th, and the copy of intelligence from Salamanca of the 20th, which will show you how Spanish military affairs are going on.

I hope the French will carry off the garrisons of Zamora and Astorga, as well as that of Toro. Any thing is better than that I should have to attack and carry those places; but I am repairing my heavy train for that object, and my troops are in march in that direction; and I must go if the French should maintain their garrisons. But whether I go, or the French should withdraw these garrisons, what will the world say? What will the Spanish nation in particular say of the Spanish officers and army upon such occurrences as the failure to take such a place as Astorga, after nearly 3 months' siege, and of allowing the garrison of Zamora to be relieved and carried off by a defeated army? At the same time I am so well aware of the inefficiency of the Spanish officers and troops when alone, that I recommended the measures which will enable the enemy to relieve Zamora: that is, foreseeing that the French would endeavor to relieve or carry off the garrison of Astorga as soon as they should hear

that I had marched towards Madrid, I recommended that Santocildes should take care to be first upon the Esla; but if I had conceived 8000 Spanish to be equal to 4000 men of any other nation, I should have recommended him to maintain the blockade of Zamora, and to cover the siege of Astorga.

Pray request Gen. O'Donell to peruse the account of the transactions at the head quarters of the army of Galicia, given by Sir H. Douglas. Can any army carry on operations against the French under such circumstances? I have a great regard for Gen. —; but I should like to know what military part he plays in this drama. If he is a Commander in Chief, why does he not put himself at the head of his troops? The army of Galicia is the only one in Spain, and the 8000 men under Santocildes the active part of that army. Why is not the Commander in Chief with that part? These are questions which must occur to every reflecting mind; but there is no inquiry in Spain on subjects of this description.

I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be overpowered, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say? That we had made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances; and that from Jan. 1812, we had gained more advantages for the cause, and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations, than had ever been gained by any army in the same period of time, against so powerful an enemy; but that, being unaided by the Spanish officers and troops, not from disinclination, but from inability on account of the gross ignorance of the former, and the want of discipline of the latter, and from the inefficiency of all the persons selected by the government for great employment, we were at last overpowered, and compelled to withdraw within our own frontier.

What will be Lord Castlereagh's reply to the next proposition for peace? Not that we will not treat if the government of Joseph is to be the guaranteed government, but he will be too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of withdrawing with honor from a contest in which it will be manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to carry it on on the part of the Spaniards, there is no prospect of military success. Thus this great cause will be lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at their head capable of conducting them.

Pray represent these matters to the government and the leading men in the Cortes, and draw their attention seriously to the situation of their affairs.

I have a letter from Gen. Maitland of the 17th. He was at Monforte, Roche at Alcoy, O'Donell at Yecla; and Suchet at San Felipe, it is supposed about to cross the Jucar. Maitland says that Soult is certainly about to retire, and he says through Valencia. I don't know how he has discovered either one or the other fact. I have later intelligence from Andalusia, and I don't believe Soult will retire till I go there.

I have not heard of the King for 2 or 3 days. He was near Belmonte when I heard last.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Madrid, 23d Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 14th, enclosing one from Don E. de

Bardaxi, in regard to rations from the British Commissariat, for officers in the Spanish service who may land at Lisbon, and have occasion to travel through Portugal in the service of government, or on their private affairs. I concur in thinking that some measure should be adopted to supply these officers with provisions, but I see no necessity why they should be so supplied by the British Commissariat, and I am glad that you declined interfering.

It appears that Mr. Pipon has misunderstood the orders which have been given on this subject. I don't allow any officer or soldier in the Spanish service to receive rations from the British Commissariat, who is not travelling through Portugal by a route from the Q. M. G. of the army, or one from the A. Q. M. G. with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill. When Gen. Castaños, or any other officer, wishes to send an officer or detachment through Portugal, application is made to one of these authorities for a route, and in that route is specified where provisions are to be received.

I can't allow any person, excepting the authorities above mentioned, to give these routes; and, therefore, when any Spanish officer or detachment may land in Portugal, and may have occasion to march through the country, receiving provisions from the British Commissariat, application for a route must be made here.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Madrid, 24th Aug. 1812.

I received yesterday your letter of the 17th.

According to the last accounts which I have of the King's force, his rear guard had gone to La Roda on the 19th.

By the accounts of the 17th, which I have from Estremadura, it would appear that Soult was about to make a general movement in Andalusia, but in what direction it is difficult to judge. I should imagine, however, in the direction of Granada and Murcia.

I don't know what garrison has been left in Carthagená besides the detachment of His Majesty's troops in the castles of Las Galeras and Atalaya; I should hope, a sufficient body to prevent the enemy from getting possession of that post by a *coup de main*, on his passage through the kingdom of Murcia.

As the allied forces in Valencia and Murcia will necessarily be thrown upon the defensive for a moment, while the enemy will be in strength in those parts, and as I conclude that the greater part of those forces will be collected in Alicante, it would be desirable to strengthen our posts at Carthagená during the same crisis, which I hope will be only momentary.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 24th Aug. 1812.

I have been going on for more than three years upon the usual allowance of a Commander in Chief, that is £10 *per diem*, liable to various deductions, among others of income tax, reducing it to about 8 guineas; but it will be necessary that government should now either give me an additional pay under the head of table money, or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities, &c., which I am obliged to incur, in the existing state of this country, or I shall be ruined.

It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but I believe there is no service in which a Commander in Chief with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service, whose receipts have been confined to £10 *per diem*, with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a government, with that of Commander in Chief, or an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble or responsibility or the expenses of any at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect in these days to be well served at the lowest possible rate of expense, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I can't defray without doing myself an injury.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

24th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct that the hospital station at Oeiras should be broken up. The invalids and convalescents at that station will be turned over to Belem without loss of time, and the officers composing the Staff of the Oeiras depôt will proceed to join their regiments, where their services are much required. The Commander of the Forces has also been pleased to express his approbation of the manner in which the depôt at Oeiras has been conducted since its establishment.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Madrid, 25th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, containing the names of the medical officers of this army who are absent from it, to whom it is desirable that orders should be given for their immediate return to their duty; and a letter from the same gentleman, with a requisition of the additional assistance he considers necessary for the performance of the service under his charge, and recommending officers to be promoted to different situations in that department. I beg you to submit these papers to the Commander in Chief, and desire his attention to the remarks which I have placed on Dr. M'Grigor's letter.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 25th Aug. 1812.

The King has continued his march towards Valencia, and, according to the last accounts which I have received, his rear guard was on the 19th at La Roda.

I have received a letter of the 17th from Lieut. Gen. Maitland, who had marched from Alicante, and was at Monforte; Gen. Roche was at Alcoy, from whence Suchet had retired to San Felipe; and it was supposed he was about to cross the Jucar. Gen. O'Donell was on the same day at Yecla, in Murcia.

The enemy's troops from Valladolid drove in Major Gen. Anson's piquets at Tudela on the 18th. The General, however, still maintains them on the left of the Duero. The enemy have moved a body of troops from the neighbourhood of Valladolid, consisting of about 6000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, under Gen. Foy, which, on the 17th, carried off the garrison of Toro. They then were joined by a body of infantry of the same strength, which had likewise marched from the Pisuerga on Rio Seco,

and the whole were, on the 20th, about 2 leagues distant from Benavente ; the Galician troops, with the exception of the cavalry, which still remained at Benavente, having marched towards Astorga. The enemy had left the garrison of Zamora still blockaded by the Conde de Amarante, but I have reason to believe they will relieve and probably carry off that garrison, on their return from their expedition towards Astorga.

Your Lordship will have observed from my last dispatch, that I had expected, when I moved towards Madrid, that the remains of the '*Armée de Portugal*' would make the movements towards the Duero, and for the relief of Zamora, Toro, and Astorga, which they have made ; and I suggested to Gen. Santocildes that he should be certain of being on the Esla before the enemy.

My motive for this suggestion was the apprehension that the detachment of the army of Galicia, or the whole army of Galicia engaged singly with the enemy, would be defeated, even by the remains of the '*Armée de Portugal*;' and I considered it of little importance that the enemy should relieve and carry off these garrisons, which it was obvious must be attacked by the allied troops under my command, at great inconvenience and some loss if we hoped to succeed. But it is not very encouraging to find that the best army in Spain, that of Galicia, cannot take such a place as Astorga after a siege of more than 2 months ; that every important operation must be performed by the allied British and Portuguese army ; and that it would be imprudent to risk the best army in Spain alone in operations against the enemy, even after the enemy have sustained such a defeat as that near Salamanca on the 22d July.

I am not discouraged by these facts, but I wish that the Spanish government would reflect seriously upon them ; and it might be hoped that measures would be adopted to apply a remedy.

Major Gen. Clinton did not move to Olmedo, according to my first orders, and I have not heard that he had moved in that direction in obedience to a second order which I had sent him. His movement in that direction in time would have been a check upon those which the enemy have made against the Galician army, and upon all their operations in that quarter.

By accounts from Cadiz of the 9th inst., I learn that Gen. Cruz had returned to that port, with the detachment which had been sent to the southward for the relief of Gen. Ballesteros. Another expedition had immediately been fitted out, consisting of 3500 Spanish troops, under Gen. Cruz, and 1500 British and Portuguese, under Col. Skerrett, with a view to attack Niebla. These troops had landed at Huelva on the 14th and 15th, but the enemy evacuated and destroyed the castle of Niebla on the 12th.

It is generally reported, and I have reason to believe, that the enemy's army of the South is about to make a general movement. It is difficult at this distance to form a judgment in what direction, but it is supposed in that of Granada and Valencia ; and from some circumstances which have been stated, such as that carriages with baggage had been sent from Drouet's detachment towards Cordova, and that all persons belonging to the civil departments were to march with the army, I am inclined to

believe there is some foundation for this supposition. I have apprised Lieut. Gen. Maitland of this notion of Soult's movement, and have desired him to take care that Alicante and Carthagera do not fall by a *coup de main* effected by his troops on their march.

I have informed Major Gen. Cooke that I prefer a direct attack upon the enemy's posts before Cadiz, to any other operation by way of diversion, if he should think himself sufficiently strong to attempt to leave the Isla; and I conclude that the troops will immediately be recalled from Niebla, and the attempt made upon the enemy's posts if they should still maintain them.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Madrid, 27th Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., regarding the demands of the Portuguese government for the month of September, and I have ordered 2000 *moios* of wheat, 1000 of barley, and 1000 quintals of salt meat to be issued from the British stores.

I beg you just to observe that the quantity of wheat is sufficient for 100,000 men for 30 days.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Madrid, 27th Aug. 1812.

In answer to your letter of the 16th inst., I have to inform you that I have appointed Capt. Mackenzie, of the 77th regt., to be Commissary for prisoners of war at Lisbon, and have directed him to take charge of all the prisoners of war now at that place, or who may be sent there hereafter: and I beg that you will apply to the Portuguese government, that all the prisoners now in charge of the Portuguese departments may be delivered over to the charge of Capt. Mackenzie, when he shall be ready to receive them.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Madrid, 27th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I hope the official accounts of the battle of Salamanca will have given as much satisfaction as that first received. The consequences of that battle have already been very important, and, if I am not much mistaken, will be still more so.

In respect to the departments of the A. G. and Q. M. G., all the departments of this army, excepting the Medical department, were already in communication with the Q. M. G. I don't know why the Medical department was in communication with the Adj. Gen.'s department; but that department particularly ought to have been in communication with the Q. M. G. Every thing else remains as it has always been.

I am not sorry that Col. Gordon has been with this army. He sees now the real difficulties of our situation, and he, as well as others, may derive some advantage from seeing what an army, particularly a British army, in the field, really is. I hope he likes his situation and will remain in it, and that I shall not have the disadvantage of having another Q. M. G.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Madrid, 29th Aug. 1812.

Since I wrote to you on the 24th, I have received a dispatch from the

Sec. of State of the 7th inst., enclosing instructions to yourself of the 6th Aug.

I send you a copy of that part of these instructions which relates to your conduct. I don't send the whole, as the communication is not quite secure, and the latter of them refer to points of which it is desirable that the enemy should have no knowledge.

Your instructions place you under my command. They direct you to return to Sicily, if Lord W. Bentinck should require the troops under your command to return to that island, in consequence of any danger menacing it, in his opinion, requiring your return, unless I should have given you orders to remain in the Peninsula, notwithstanding such orders.

You are directed to be governed as to your departure from the Peninsula by your communications with Adm. Sir E. Pellew, if the safety of the troops under your command should depend on the protection to be afforded by the fleet.

If the safety of the troops under your command should not be compromised by the absence of the fleet, it will not be necessary for you to regulate your departure from the Peninsula by any maritime movements which Sir E. Pellew may think it advisable to make.

In my letter of the 24th, of which I enclose a duplicate, I recommended certain measures to your attention, which I find, by a letter from Gen. O'Donell of the 25th inst., that you had adopted, in consequence of the junction in Valencia of the army under the King with that under the command of Marshal Suchet.

It does not appear to me at all probable that these armies united will make any attack on you, nor, as long as you will be in the strength in which I understand from Gen. O'Donell that you are in Alicante, is it probable that both united will make any attack upon the positions occupied by this army and its detachments. Affairs, therefore, cannot be in a better state for all the objects which I have in view in this quarter and in other parts of Spain.

If Marshal Soult should move in the direction of Valencia, I shall have early intelligence of his movement; and I shall have it in my power to adopt such measures to aid the troops at Alicante as I may think proper.

I beg that as soon as possible, you will let me know whether ships can lie in safety at Alicante during the gales which may be expected in the next month. If they cannot, you should send to Mahon, without loss of time, all those not required for the supply of the troops under your command. I also request to know from you whether it be possible to embark from Alicante, if the enemy should invest the place: as far as I can judge from the plan, it is so.

Gen. O'Donell has informed me that the yellow fever prevails at Carthage. If that should be the case, Gen. Ross should keep on shore only that part of the British garrison which may be sufficient to occupy Las Galeras and Atalaya, and the remainder should be kept afloat in the offing.

There is no chance of Soult's attacking that place if the yellow fever prevails, as it is reported to do, throughout the country.

There was no knowledge in Estremadura on the 23d of Soult's commencing his movement.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received yours of the 20th; and I enclose a duplicate of mine of the 16th, which appears to be the only one you have not received.

Tell Gen. Ross that I have received his of the 18th, and he may keep his troops on the island instead of afloat, as I had proposed; and take care to remove any men who may fall sick at Carthagena as soon as possible, and keep them in a separate place on that island.

I shall answer your letter fully this day in cipher, and you can decipher it when you get the cipher, which is now on its passage from England. In the mean time I rely upon you to secure Alicante.

I take measures this day to have you supplied with provisions; and I recommend that both the British and Spanish troops should maintain their positions outside of Alicante as long as possible, in order that both, but particularly the latter, may draw provisions from the country, and that their consumption may not fall on the magazines of the town.

Proclamation.

Madrid, 29th Aug. 1812.

Spaniards! It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last 2 months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners daily brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the Usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers, who have had the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages acquired. It should be clearly understood that the pretended King is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

Spaniards! You are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do every thing in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon in disgrace a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

Spaniards! Resist this odious tyranny, and be independent and happy.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 20th.

It does not appear to me to be probable that the King and Suchet, even when joined, will make any attack upon you at Alicante, and you

should endeavor to maintain yourself at a distance from the town, so as to draw supplies of provisions from the country as long as you may find it to be possible, particularly for the Spanish troops.

In expectation of being obliged to retire within the works of the place, you must immediately land from the transports a sufficient quantity of provisions to last the troops under your command, including Gen. Roche's and Gen. Whittingham's divisions, for one month; and I have directed that 1,000,000 rations of flour or biscuit, and 500,000 of salt meat, may be immediately sent to Alicante for the use of the troops under your command, from which quantity you will replace what you will have taken out of the store ships or transports, or you will make such other use of it as you may think proper. But you will in the first instance take from the store ships and transports a quantity of provisions to last the troops under your command not less than one month, and for as much longer as you may deem it expedient to have provisions in Alicante.

I am aware that taking provisions out of the transports may interfere with the execution of orders which you may receive from Lord W. Bentinck to return to Sicily, but I take the responsibility of that inconvenience upon myself.

As far as I can judge from the plan of Alicante, there will be no difficulty in communicating with the ships, even though the place be closely invested; and if the measures above referred to should not provide sufficiently for the troops under your command, you must take more provisions from the transports, and you must apply to Mr. Tupper to assist you in importing provisions for your troops. If it be true that, notwithstanding Alicante be closely invested, it is possible to communicate with ships in the offing, there can be no more difficulty in instructing you regarding your military conduct at that place than regarding the provisions. Nothing of importance can be done till Soult shall have joined the King; and you will then understand that I expect you to maintain yourself at Alicante as long as it may be possible.

I conceive that it will be possible for you to maintain yourself even against Soult and the King united, as long as you can keep the communication open with the sea; but as soon as you find that communication so seriously menaced as to be in danger to be lost, you are to withdraw and embark the whole army, English as well as Spaniards.

I proceed to-morrow to join the detachment of this army collected at Arevalo, with which I shall march to drive the detachments of the '*Armée de Portugal*' from the Duero, which have advanced to that river since I have been in this quarter, and to establish a good communication between this army and the Spanish army of the north, to which Astorga has recently surrendered.

As soon as matters shall be there arranged to my satisfaction, I propose to return here; and I hope by that time to be joined by Sir R. Hill and his troops from Estremadura, if Marshal Soult should have evacuated Andalusia. If he should have marched through Granada and Murcia into Valencia, I shall be here, I hope, before he can be in a situation to do you any injury.

Two divisions of this army, and a brigade of cavalry, remain here, and

2 divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, at the Escorial, during my absence in the north.

To the Marques de Astorga, Conde de Altamira.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 7th inst. and its enclosure, and I have forwarded the letter to your agent in this city.

I beg to return your Excellency my best thanks for the politeness of your letter, and for your kindness in permitting me to use your Excellency's palace in this city.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

I have received a letter from the Minister of Grace and Justice, by the hands of Col. Don Ildefonso Ruiz de Ribera, together with the Collar of the Order of the Golden Fleece.*

I request you will return my thanks to the Minister for this mark of the favor of the Regency.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 17th inst. I am not desirous that any rule should be departed from in investing me with the Order of the Golden Fleece, and I shall wait till there will be an opportunity for some Sovereign to invest me. You will send me the usual licenses and dispensation. I wish you would send me the Order of San Fernando, or a drawing of it, that I may have it made in England.

I send my dispatch off this day.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a return of intrenching tools required for the service of this army, which I will thank your Lordship to have sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

To Earl Bathurst.

Madrid, 30th Aug. 1812.

According to accounts which I have received from Gen. J. O'Donell, commanding the Spanish army of Murcia, of the 25th and 27th inst., I learn that the King had decidedly marched into Valencia. His troops passed the castle of Chinchilla (the garrison of which fired upon them), and they arrived at Bonete on the 24th. The cavalry under Gen. O'Donell, 1500 in number, were at Albacete on the 25th, and the General himself, still at Hellin on the 27th, and his infantry, 4000 in number, were in that neighbourhood.

It appears, that upon hearing of the King's approach to the kingdom of Valencia to join Suchet, Lieut. Gen. Maitland had determined to retire eventually upon Alicante, with the Sicilian division under his command, and the Spanish troops under Gens. Whittingham and Roche. He had advanced as far as Elda; but he retired to Monforte, from whence he writes on the 20th; Gen. Whittingham's division being still at Elda, and the Spanish cavalry advanced to Castalla. I have directed the General to

* See Appendix, Vol. V., No. XXIII.

maintain himself at Alicante; and I have ordered that he may be supplied with provisions.

Gen. Maitland's determination to retire upon Alicante, and his stating that he has a sufficient number of men to maintain himself there without the assistance of Gen. O'Donell's corps, and the reports which Gen. O'Donell had received of the intention of Soult to join the King's army in Valencia, through Murcia and Granada, and the prevalence of the yellow fever in Murcia, had induced Gen. O'Donell to move to the northward, and I have suggested to him to put himself in communication with the allied army in this quarter.

Since I wrote to your Lordship on the 25th inst., I have received reports that the garrison of Astorga had surrendered by capitulation on the 19th, to the number of 1200 men. Gen. Foy arrived at La Bañeza for their relief on the 21st, with the detachment which I informed you was in march for that purpose; and his parties found the place abandoned by the Spanish troops, the French garrison having been carried away as prisoners; and I expect that he arrived at Zamora on the 25th or 26th.

As soon as the King's march into Valencia was decided, I ordered the 1st and 5th divisions, Gen. Pack's and Gen. Bradford's brigades, and Col. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, to assemble at Arevalo, to which place the 6th division had been marched also by Gen. Clinton by mistake; and I propose to join these troops, and to proceed to establish a secure communication between this army and the army of Galicia; and to drive off the parties of the '*Armée de Portugal*' which have come forward to the Duero since I have been obliged to attend to the state of affairs in this quarter.

The reports still continue to prevail of the intention of Soult to evacuate Andalusia, and I enclose a paper which is a translation of the order issued to the army of the South on the 15th inst., the Emperor's birth-day,* from which there is reason to believe that such a design is entertained; and Gen. O'Donell tells me in his letter of the 27th from Hellin, that he has reason to believe that the march will be by Granada and Murcia. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill had no intelligence that the march was commenced on the 23d inst., when I last heard from him; but there was every appearance of it; and it is reported that Gen. La Cruz's troops were in possession of San Lucar la Mayor, and even of San Lucar at the mouth of the Guadalquivir. If these reports should be well founded, the siege of Cadiz is certainly abandoned.

I propose to return to this part of the country, as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction on the right of the Duero; and I hope I shall be here, and shall be joined by the troops under Sir R. Hill, before Soult can have made much progress to form his junction with the King.

With a view to Sir R. Hill's march, we are employed in repairing the bridge at Almaraz.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacoeche, Lisbon.

30th Aug. 1812.

In doing myself the honor of transmitting you the enclosed correspondence, I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that if Gen. — will not furnish the Portuguese dragoons to escort the money alluded to, British infantry must be allotted to the performance of that duty; at the same time his Excellency requests you will show the letters in question to Mr. Stuart, in order

that he may see the little assistance the Portuguese authorities are disposed to give to that which has proved their security.

Memorandum for Major Gen. Baron C. Alten and Don Carlos de España.

Madrid, 31st Aug. 1812.

It being necessary that I should go to the northward with the troops assembled at Arevalo, the 3d and Light divisions, and Gen. V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, are to remain at Madrid, till further orders, with one battalion of Don Carlos' infantry. The 4th division will be at the Escorial, and Don Carlos' division at Segovia; Gen. D'Urban's cavalry at the Palacio de Rio Frio.

The King having decidedly gone into Valencia, and there being in that kingdom a body of the allied troops too strong for Marshal Suchet, and no intelligence having been yet received of the commencement of the march of the army of the South, it does not appear at all probable that the enemy will attempt to disturb the tranquillity of this part of the country during the time that I shall be absent. But it is necessary to provide for all events, and the following instructions are to be attended to.

Gen. J. O'Donell, in command of 4000 infantry and 1500 cavalry of the army of Murcia, is at Hellin, on the frontiers of Valencia; and I have recommended to him to throw his rear upon this town, and to communicate with our troops which will be here; and to fall back upon them if it should be necessary.

The Empecinado, with the troops under his command, is gone forward by Cuenca, towards the frontiers of Valencia.

In case the enemy should advance in force, it must be from the South; and if the force should not be considered too strong, particularly in cavalry, the 3d, Light, and Don Carlos' divisions, and Gen. Alten's and Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, must be collected on the Tagus about Aranjuez, first to cover the retreat upon them of Gen. O'Donell's corps, and next to oppose the farther progress of the enemy. The guerrillas of the Medico must be thrown into Toledo.

Attention must be paid to the fords about Fuentidueña by the Empecinado, or the troops collected in that direction, if the enemy should direct his march by Tarancon. When the enemy shall advance, all the arrangements must be made for the evacuation of Madrid, such as sending away sick, stores, &c.; and eventually, for the destruction of every thing which cannot be carried away.

If the enemy's force should be deemed too strong for the allies, the city of Madrid must be evacuated, the troops must march by the Escorial upon Arevalo, as soon as Gen. J. O'Donell shall either have joined on his retreat, or shall have made his retreat in another direction.

Orders have been given to Major Hartmann of the Royal German Artillery to make arrangements for destroying the stores and burning the buildings in the Retiro, which orders he will lay before Gen. Alten and Don Carlos de España. If the retreat from Madrid should be determined upon, measures should be immediately adopted for destroying every thing in the Retiro according to those orders, before the troops shall depart. If the troops should be assembled on the Tagus, and the retreat from thence should afterwards be determined upon, orders should be given for de-

stroying the stores and buildings in the Retiro, for which the preparations should be arranged as above stated, as soon as the retreat from the Tagus shall be determined upon. A constant daily communication must be kept with me by the guides who will remain on the road.

I have been much satisfied with the conduct of the allied troops since they have been in Madrid. I trust that the same good conduct of officers and troops will continue; and that Gen. Alten will enforce my orders respecting these points.

In case it should be determined to destroy the stores and buildings in the Retiro, it will be necessary to order the inhabitants of Madrid to take away the palisades from the ditches, particularly of the exterior works. It is imagined they will do this willingly if only permitted.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Villa Castin, 2d Sept. 1812.

Since I wrote to you on the 30th, I have received your letter of the 24th Aug.

I beg you will understand that I propose that the troops under your command should occupy the heights outside of Alicante, which are to the southward and westward of the town, to rest your left on the sea.

As the cipher sent by the Sec. of State is deficient, as affording no means of spelling words, I propose to use that which I sent to Lord W. Bentinck, when it is necessary to cipher words not to be found in the Sec. of State's cipher.

Understanding from a letter from Gen. Donkin that the alphabet sent to Sir E. Pellew was not correct, I think it probable that that sent to Lord William may not have been so, and I enclose another. You will of course have the instructions how to use it.

Head quarters are this day at Villa Castin, and will be to-morrow at Arevalo.

I am happy to find from Col. Jones' report that there will be no difficulty in supplying you with provisions at Alicante to any amount you can require. If this should be the case, it would be a great convenience to me if you would write to Mr. O'Meara, the Dep. Commissary Gen. at Cadiz, to say that you will not require the provisions which I had ordered should be sent for your use.

I hear that the enemy have evacuated Zamora, which is a fortunate event, as it will enable me to rejoin the troops to the south at a more early period.

A Don Carlos de España.

Arevalo, ce 3 Sept. 1812.

Je vous envoie une lettre du Gén. Castaños, et une pour le Gén. Maitland à Alicante, que je vous prie de faire envoyer par ma cousine la

G. O.

Villa Castin, 2d Sept. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces draws the attention of the officers commanding regiments to the following letter from the Sec. at War, complaining of the delays in transmitting the accounts of the several regiments.

2. The Commander of the Forces knows no reason why the accounts of the regiment should not be settled as regularly by the paymasters of regiments in this army as by the paymasters of regiments in England; and he desires they will enforce the regulations on this head.

* * * * *

Marquesa de Alcañices ; et une pour la Condesa de Chinchon,* que je vous prie de donner au Col. Ribera pour être apportée à Cadiz.

Le concierge du palais a 2 étendards pris à Guadalaxara par l'Empeinado, que vous devriez envoyer à Cadiz par le Col. Ribera, pour être présentés au gouvernement.

Le Gén. Castaños était à Astorga le 30 ; l'Armée de Galice sur l'Esla. Les Français étaient encore à Valladolid et sur le Duero aujourd'hui. Nous allons à Olmedo demain.

Nous avons les gazettes d'Angleterre du 15, venues par la Coruña. Les nouvelles de la Russie ne sont pas mauvaises. On dit que le Danemarck fait la paix avec les alliés.

J'ai rencontré aujourd'hui la Marquesa de Alcañices et Guillen auprès de Labajos. Ils seront à Madrid demain.

A Don F. X. Castaños.

Arevalo, ce 3 Sept. 1812, à 2 heures de l'après midi.

J'ai reçu ce matin votre lettre du 30 à Villa Castin, et je viens d'arriver ici. Je compte m'avancer sur Olmedo demain matin. Je crois que Soult a l'intention de quitter le midi de l'Espagne, mais qu'il ait cette intention ou non, il est fort nécessaire de chasser tout-à-fait les troupes de Marmont sans perdre du temps, pour me laisser en liberté de m'opposer à Soult avec toutes mes forces. Je prends donc avantage du moment que le départ du Roi m'a donné, pour venir de ce côté-ci, et je pousserai les choses aussi loin que je pourrai. Mais j'ai grand besoin de votre assistance. J'ai des grosses pièces, et j'ai l'idée de faire même le siège de Burgos. Mais il faut que cela dépende des circonstances ; et en tout cas il faut établir une bonne communication entre vos troupes et les miennes, et être ferme sur le Duero. Il est fort à désirer que vous vous avanciez vers

* The draft of this letter written to the Condesa de Chinchon is unfortunately missing from the Duke of Wellington's papers, but the letter of the Condesa, to which it was a reply, is as follows :

Doña Maria Teresa de Borbon, Condesa de Chinchon, to the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo,
Earl of Wellington, &c. Cadiz, 16th Aug. 1812.

When a transient gleam of light flattered me with the hopes of a happy change in my lot, I found myself on a sudden involved in new afflictions on seeing my country overrun in the most iniquitous manner by a cruel and treacherous enemy.

The day once more dawns, and your Grace's glorious victories have instilled new animation throughout this distressed country ; and as I consider myself as far from being the least interested in this happy prospect, I find the greatest pleasure in having an opportunity to give your Grace a testimony of my feelings.

Having learned that government, in the name of our beloved King, has conferred on your Grace the Order of the Golden Fleece, and having in my possession that which was worn by my late father, the Infante Don Luis (which in my eyes constitutes its merit), I have to request your Grace will do me the honor to accept of it, as a proof of the high esteem your heroic actions have inspired me with ; and I feel myself singularly fortunate in having been able to procure it a successor who has rendered himself so worthy the gratitude of my country.

When your Grace considers I am but a beginner in the English language, I hope you will excuse my deficiency of style, being only animated with a desire to convince your Grace how far I wish to contribute to that fraternity which ought to animate the two nations.

That your Grace may continue in your glorious career, and add fresh laurels to the numberless you have already acquired, is the sincere wish of, my Lord, your Grace's most obedient servant and admirer,

MARIA TERESA DE BORBON,
Condesa de Chinchon.

Valladolid avec toutes vos troupes aussitôt que vous recevrez cette lettre ; et que je puisse m'aboucher avec vous bientôt. Je compte être à Valladolid le 6 de ce mois ; mais je vous écrirai tous les jours jusqu'à ce que j'aie le plaisir de vous voir.

J'envoie un officier pour examiner Zamora et Toro, et me faire un rapport de l'état où ces places se trouvent ; parceque je crois qu'il conviendrait beaucoup à nos opérations futures de tenir ces deux places, ou au moins une des deux. Je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez envoyer l'ordre qu'on les laisse voir à l'officier que j'y enverrai ; et qu'on cesse de travailler à leur destruction, si on l'a déjà commencée, jusqu'à ce que j'aie le plaisir de vous voir.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Olmedo, 4th Sept. 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know when you get any detailed reports of the stores for the Spanish army sent to Coruña. The government have been pleased to leave at my disposal the stores sent to the Peninsula for the Spanish army ; and I had wished that the whole should be sent to Cadiz or Lisbon, because I have with those places a constant communication, because I can command a communication between those places and every other part (of the coast at least) of the Peninsula, and because there are at those places persons whose services I can command to take charge of the stores, to distribute them as ordered, and to account for them. I don't possess those advantages in relation to Coruña.

I am very glad that Mr. Forster has given licenses to American ships to import corn to Lisbon. I wish you would give licenses to Portuguese ships to do the same from America. We should then be certain of receiving the supplies. We cannot be certain that Americans, having a license to import to Portugal, will not import to France ; taking the risk of running the latter part of the passage.

P.S. I conclude that Sir W. Beresford has seen and approved of the recruiting papers. I shall write about the northern militia as they deserve.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

4th Sept. 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, in reply to a communication from Capt. Craig covering an application from the Colonel of the 101st French regt. for an advance of money, that none has been sent by Marshal Marmont or any other French General for his use. His Excellency has further directed me to observe that he has made frequent advances of money out of his own pocket to French officers, without ever having been repaid one farthing, and that he is determined to do so no more, and the French officers must blame their own government for the miseries they suffer when prisoners.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Olmedo, 5th Sept. 1812.

I think it my duty to enclose, to be laid before the Spanish government, a letter addressed by Gen. J. O'Donell to Lieut. Col. Jones, stating the total want of provisions in Carthagená.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Olmedo, 5th Sept. 1812.

I beg to refer to you a letter which I have received from the Commissariat of the brigade of Royal Carabineers with Gen. J. O'Donell's army ; and I request, that if it be in your power, you will supply this corps with

the clothing and cavalry equipments which it requires, and have them forwarded to Alicante as soon as possible.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have great pleasure in informing you that I have received the directions of the Prince Regent to invest you with the Order of the Bath, which direction I shall obey with the greatest satisfaction when the insignia, which I expect by the first messenger, shall come out. I hope that you will be well enough to come to head quarters; but if you should not, I will try to go to you.

They are sending us immediately a remount of between 700 and 800 horses for the cavalry, and 3 squadrons of the Blues, and 4 of the Life Guards, so that we shall be tolerably strong again.

I hear that Soult has raised the siege of Cadiz; and as in that case we may have to make an effort to hold our ground in New Castille, I have thought it proper, in expectation of Soult's raising the siege of Cadiz, to move this way, and oblige the '*Armée de Portugal*' to go farther off. We turned them out of this place this morning.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 1st by Lieut. Macfarlane, whom I send back to you.

The French evacuated this town yesterday morning, and their rear guard was last night at Dueñas, on the road to Burgos. I shall follow them as far as I can; but I must attend to the south, where it is reported that Soult is in movement, having raised the siege or blockade of Cadiz.

A Don F. X. Castaños.

Valladolid, ce 7 Sept. 1812.

Je suis arrivé ici ce matin. J'ai passé le Duero hier, comme je vous l'ai annoncé; mais j'ai trouvé l'ennemi bien posté à La Cisterniga, et en force dans la ville; et comme j'ai vu que je pourrais seulement emporter le poste de La Cisterniga hier après midi, et que je n'aurais pas eu le temps de manœuvrer pour les forcer de quitter la ville, j'ai remis l'affaire jusqu'à ce matin. Ils sont restés dans la ville jusqu'au dernier moment, et en sont sortis enfin par le pont qu'ils ont fait sauter. Ils ont aussi fait sauter le pont de Simancas hier au soir. Je les ai laissés, il y a une heure, marchant sur Cabezon.

Ils m'ont paru être de 16,000 à 18,000 hommes; mais je crois que Foy les a rejoint ce matin. Je désire beaucoup avoir de vos nouvelles; si vous avez marché, et où vous êtes. Je compte donner un jour de repos à mon monde demain, et j'espère avoir de vos nouvelles.

On me dit que le siège de Cadiz est levé; mais je n'en ai pas des nouvelles officielles.

A Don Carlos de España.

Valladolid, ce 7 Sept. 1812.

Je suis arrivé ici ce matin, l'ennemi ayant quitté la ville à regret. Je vous prie de ne pas laisser publier dans la Gazette où je suis. Je vous envoie une lettre du Général Vives, qui exige votre attention. Vous voyez qu'il dit qu'il n'a pas assez de monde pour donner une escorte de

300 hommes aux prisonniers depuis Ciudad Rodrigo jusqu'à Sabugal. Comment cela peut-il arriver ?

Sur les affaires de *las traidoras*, je vous conseille d'agir selon la constitution. Vous n'avez aucun droit de les faire aller dans un couvent si elles ne le veulent pas. Mais vous pouvez les prévenir, que si elles ne sont pas discrètes, vous ne pouvez pas les protéger ; et peut-être qu'elles voudront y aller elles-mêmes. Vous devez leur envoyer les lettres anonymes qui vous parviennent sur leur compte. Ce serait la seule attention que j'y donnerais à votre place, à moins que ces dames ne commettent des faits qui puissent donner prise à la loi.

To Major Gen. G. Murray.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 18th Aug., for which I am much obliged to you, and I assure you that I have every day fresh reason to regret your departure.

I hear that the siege of Cadiz is raised ; and there is a storm brewing up from the south, for which I am preparing by driving the detachments of the '*Armée de Portugal*' away from the Duero ; and I propose, if I have time, to take Burgos from them. In the mean time, I have ordered Hill to cross the Tagus by Almaraz, when he shall find that Soult moves out of Andalusia. There are three divisions of this army at Madrid and the Escorial, and between *Aliados* and Spaniards I shall have there above 40,000 men.

I have, I hope, relieved Gen. Maitland of all anxiety at Alicante, by taking upon myself all responsibility, and giving him positive orders for his conduct, so that he will only have to fight in a good position, his supplies being secured to him from the sea. By keeping this detachment at Alicante, with Whittingham's and Roche's Spaniards, I shall prevent too many of the gentlemen now assembled in Valencia from troubling me in the upper country.

Matters go on well, and I hope before Christmas, if affairs turn out as they ought, and Boney requires all the reinforcements in the North, to have all the gentlemen safe on the other side of the Ebro.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 22d, and I am very much obliged to you for thinking of our Lieut. Generals, but I am afraid we shall have more of them than we shall have divisions. I enclose a list of our divisions and of the Generals of them, and you will see how we stand.

I put Pakenham to the 3d division by Gen. Picton's desire when he was ill ; and I am very glad I did so, as I must say he made the manœuvre which led to our success in the battle of the 22d, with a celerity and accuracy of which I doubt that many are capable, and without both it would not have answered its end. Pakenham may not be the brightest genius, but my partiality for him does not lead me astray when I tell you that he is one of the best we have. However, he keeps the division till Gen. Colville or some other shall return to it, and he will then go to his Fusilier brigade.

Sir J. Murray is a very able officer, and I should be very glad to have

him, but you will see that we have now no room for him. I should not be sorry to lose the services of — — —; and I think Major Gen. Hope can't bear the climate: but I shall be sorry to lose him, as he is very attentive to his duty. I think also that Gen. Campbell will not last long.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 18th, for which I am much obliged to you. I have written to Torrens about you, but we have at present no vacancy. All our divisions are filled, except the 3d, and there are three Lieut. Generals coming out.

To H. R. H. the Duke of York.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 15th Aug., marked 'Private,' regarding the command of the two brigades of Guards.

When Gen. Campbell went to the command of the 1st division of infantry, I allowed Col. the Hon. T. Fermor* to succeed to the brigade of Guards, as being the senior officer, because Gen. the Hon. E. Stopford was in England, of whose appointment to this command your Royal Highness had before approved, and I could not make any other arrangement without taking upon myself to appoint an officer to command this brigade. I told Col. Fermor that the arrangement was but temporary, and that when Gen. Stopford should return to the army, he must resume the command of the brigade of Guards, unless your Royal Highness should have ordered any other arrangement.

I think that notwithstanding that many officers of superior rank are coming out, Major Gen. Campbell will still remain in command of a division; and Major Gen. Cooke must remain at Cadiz, in consequence of the orders of the Sec. of State, notwithstanding that I have accounts that the blockade is raised.

Your Royal Highness will have been informed that Major Gen. Wheatley died at the Escorial on the 1st inst.; and I am concerned to add that I left Major Gen. Hulse very unwell at Arevalo on the 4th, and worse accounts have since been received of him. Major Gen. Hulse is at present in the command of the 5th division. I request your Royal Highness will therefore let me know what arrangements shall be made for the command of the two brigades of Guards in the event to be apprehended of the death of Major Gen. Hulse, or of one brigade if Major Gen. Hulse should fortunately recover. As I have not yet heard of Gen. Stopford's arrival at Lisbon, I can receive your Royal Highness' commands before I shall have occasion to decide whether he shall resume the command of the brigade now with the army, to which he was before appointed with your Royal Highness' approbation.

P.S. Sept. 8. I am concerned to have to inform your Royal Highness that the melancholy event which I expected has occurred: Major Gen. Hulse died yesterday morning at 10 o'clock, at Arevalo.

* The late Earl of Pomfret.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

Upon referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of the 24th July, as printed in *The London Gazette* of the 16th Aug., I observe, that although I reported my sense of the conduct of the German brigade under Major Gen. Bock, on the 23d July, I omitted to include the name of the Major General in the enumeration which the dispatch contains of officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves.

I beg to take this opportunity of rectifying this omission; and of assuring your Lordship that the Major General distinguished himself in the operations which led to the charge, and in the charge made by the gallant troops under his orders, as he has upon every occasion which has offered since he has been under my command.

From my personal observation, and the reports which I have received since the action of the 22d July, I am afraid that I have omitted the names of many other officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves; and in a case in which all did their duty in a manner so honorable to themselves and to their country, the limits of a dispatch don't permit the mention of the names of all who have drawn the notice of their superiors by their conduct. I must, however, correct the omission of which I have been guilty in the case of Lieut. Col. Arentschildt and the 1st hussars of the Legion, who were highly distinguished by their conduct throughout the whole of the day of the 22d July; and likewise in that of Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., who attended Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton throughout the action, was wounded by a bayonet in the charge made by Gen. Le Marchant's brigade, and had 2 horses killed under him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I quitted Madrid on the 1st inst., in order to direct the movements of the troops ordered to be collected at Arevalo, as reported in my dispatch of the 30th Aug.; to which I subsequently added the 7th division of infantry, and Major Gen. Bock's brigade of dragoons.

We moved from Arevalo the 4th, and passed the Duero on the 6th, at the fords of Herrera and El Abrojo.

After Gen. Foy had found that the garrison of Astorga had surrendered by capitulation, he returned to the Escla, and marched upon Carvajales with a view to surprise and cut off the corps of Portuguese militia which had been employed under Lieut. Gen. the Conde de Amarante in the blockade of Zamora. The Lieut. General, however, made good his retreat without loss to the frontiers of Portugal; and Gen. Foy carried off the garrison of Zamora on the 29th Aug., and marched for Tordesillas.

I can't avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the conduct of the Conde de Amarante, and of the militia under his command, in these operations. The zeal of the militia of the province of Tras os Montes in voluntarily serving beyond the frontier of the Kingdom, deserves the highest commendation.

The whole of the remains of the '*Armée de Portugal*' having been thus collected between this place and Tordesillas, we found their advanced guard yesterday strongly posted on the heights of La Cisterniga, and I knew that there was a considerable body of troops in and about this town.

As it was late in the day before our troops had crossed the Duero, we did not move forward till this morning. The enemy retired from La Cister-niga during the night; and they abandoned the town on our approach to it in the morning, and crossed the Pisuerga, and blew up the bridge. They were closely followed by Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby with a detachment of the 12th light dragoons through the town; but as some time had elapsed before the infantry could come up, the enemy could not be prevented from destroying the bridge. They then retired along the right of the Pisuerga to Dueñas, where their rear will probably halt this night.

When Gen. Foy moved towards Astorga, the army of Galicia retired; and since his march to the Duero, they have again advanced to the Esla. I have requested Gen. Castaños, who is now with the Galician army, to move forward and put himself in immediate communication with me; and I propose to push the '*Armée de Portugal*' as far as I can, preparatory to the operations which I may expect to the southward.

I have received several reports that Marshal Soult had raised the blockade of Cadiz, and had entirely evacuated Seville about the 25th or 26th Aug.; but by some unaccountable accident, I have received no letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill since the 25th, nor any from Cadiz of a later date than the 17th. I give credit, however, to the reports to which I have above referred; and I shall return to the south as soon as I shall be made acquainted with Soult's progress.

The Empecinado has informed me that Gen. Villa Campa had taken prisoners the troops which had been the garrison, and had evacuated Cuenca after the surrender of the Retiro. These troops amounted to 1000 men, with 2 guns, and belonged to Suchet's army.

My last accounts from Lieut. Gen. Maitland are of the 24th. He was then in Alicante. Major Gen. Ross had returned to Carthagena with his detachment.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I am very much obliged to your Lordship for having adverted to my expenses in this country, and for having provided for them so handsomely. You will have received a letter from me on this subject since you dispatched yours of the 22d. I should never have written upon it, if I had not incurred an enormous expense at Madrid, which I could not bear.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 22d Aug., in which you have communicated to me that it is the intention of His Royal Highness to propose to Parliament at its next meeting, to grant me the sum of £100,000, to enable me to support suitably the honors which His Royal Highness has recently been pleased to confer upon me.

I request your Lordship to take an early opportunity of expressing my gratitude to His Royal Highness for all his favors; they are far beyond my hopes, and I can show my gratitude for them only by continuing to serve His Royal Highness with the same zeal and devotion which have already acquired for me such substantial proofs of His Royal Highness' favor.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Valladolid, 7th Sept. 1812.

I have received your several letters to the 22d Aug., for which I am much obliged to you, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the favorable prospect which you have before you. I still think, however, that you will require an enlargement of the basis of your government, in order to carry on your business in the House of Commons. I have not heard of the young men who are in office, but I should doubt their being a substitute for Mr. Canning.

I am much concerned that Pole is not with the government. I have always been on the best terms with all my brothers, and I am very sorry that he does not belong to a government which I am serving, and by which I have been so kindly treated.

P.S. You will see that I have got Gen. Maitland at Alicante. I have given him positive instructions, which will relieve his anxieties, and he will have nothing to do but fight in a good position if he should be attacked, and receive his provisions from the sea; in the mean time by having an army at Alicante, I shall prevent too many of the enemy from leaving Valencia to annoy me in the upper country.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Robe, R.A.

7th Sept. 1812.

I have submitted to the Commander of the Forces the several enclosures contained in your communication of the 22d ult., and his Excellency is sorry to observe in the perusal of them that there exist such abuses in the artillery, and desires to be informed by what existing order a subaltern of drivers can take away from the brigade to which he is attached 2 men and 3 animals without leave. His Excellency is not aware when it has occurred in any other corps or department (excepting the artillery) that an officer has ventured to quit it without his leave, even in the instance of removal to an hospital. I am therefore to request Capt. — may be placed in arrest for suffering such irregularities, as well as Lieut. —, and to observe that there is no use in having with the army officers of different ranks, if those of the superior rank do not do their duty in preventing irregularities and breaches of duty by those of inferior rank. Lieut. — is to be put in close arrest, and in such to be forwarded to head quarters.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Clinton, 6th division.

7th Sept. 1812.

Having submitted to the Commander of the Forces the recommendation contained in your letter of the 4th inst. relative to the succession of Lieut. Graves to the vacant Brigade Majorship in the 6th division, in the room of the late Capt. Hobart, I am to acquaint you that his Excellency cannot accede to the appointment of a subaltern officer to that Staff situation.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 31st Aug., and I conclude this will find you at Truxillo, or possibly farther on. It appears now quite clear that Soult has evacuated the south-west parts of Andalusia, but I am not certain whether he will direct his march upon Granada or upon La Mancha; from Drouet's movement upon Cordova, I should think upon Granada.

Upon the receipt of this letter I beg you will cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and canton your troops with their right at Almaraz, and their left

G. O.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in communicating to the army the following extract of a letter from the Sec. of State. (*Thanks for Salamanca.*)

* * * * *

at Oropesa. Come forward yourself to Oropesa. Col. Diggins commands a regiment of Portuguese cavalry at Plasencia, or thereabouts; order him to join you. Establish letter parties from Oropesa through the mountains to Avila, and thence to Arevalo, to communicate with the guides of this army which are there. Establish other letter parties direct from Oropesa to Madrid, to communicate with the Light, 3d, and 4th divisions, and Gen. Alten's cavalry which are there. Gen. C. Alten is the senior officer. Let the parties understand well what they are to do, and send somebody along both roads to make arrangements that men and horses may be fed.

I quitted Madrid on the 1st, and came here with the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, and Gen. Anson's, Col. Ponsonby's, and Major Gen. Bock's cavalry, in order to drive Marmont's parties to a greater distance preparatory to the events likely to occur about Madrid and the Tagus. We drove them from hence on the 7th, and I have waited here to receive accounts of the army of Galicia, and shall move on to-morrow; but I shall return to Madrid as soon as I shall hear that the plot thickens to the southward.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 31st Aug., regarding the Portuguese cavalry. I did not answer the former one upon that subject, because I wished to see and talk to D'Urban before I wrote to you. He appears, by what I hear from Harvey, anxious that the proposed punishment should not be carried into execution; and it is as well, therefore, that it should be left alone. As for sending this cavalry to the rear, that is impossible just at present. We have still a good deal upon our hands, and we are worse provided with cavalry than our neighbours; and a body commanded by such a man as D'Urban, even though they will not fight, are better than none. In fact, they behaved infamously, and they must not be employed again alone, or with our cavalry, who gallop too fast for them, but only as they were on the 22d July, viz., in support of our infantry, and with English dragoons with them.

From some mistake in the post office, Col. Gordon received your letter regarding the not sending you the distributions before I received that which you wrote to me on the 1st inst.; and I immediately pointed out to him, not only the propriety that a General officer in your station should receive the distribution, but the absolute necessity for it, in order to enable you and your Staff to carry on your duty; and I desired him to alter a letter he wrote to you from Olmedo accordingly.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what you wish to have done with Assist. Provost Mackay, who is in confinement at Salamanca. It is very clear to me that he knew the Portuguese serjeant was serjeant of the guard, and he had no right to confine him; and for this, if you wish it, he shall be dismissed from his station. But what is to be done to the Portuguese serjeant of the guard, who resisted the authority of the Provost, and protected the depredators? As for Mackay's releasing the serjeant, I believe he had a right to do so, and probably the confinement of the serjeant may be deemed a sufficient punishment for his offence.

The office of Provost is not adverted to in the Mutiny Act and Articles of War; and the application of the authority of the British Provost to the Portuguese army is quite irregular. But I believe if we did not so apply it, the unfortunate inhabitants of the country would derive but little advantage from its establishment.

You will learn the news here from my dispatch.

To Lieut. Col. Dalbiac, 4th dragoons.*

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which the late Major Gen. Le Marchant was President, from which it appears that the sentences were agreed to, and had been written out, but the Major General had omitted the formality of signing them.

The Court will recollect whether this is the fact, and if it is so, I request you to sign the proceedings in presence of the General Court Martial, annexing to them a minute of your having done so by my orders conveyed in this letter.

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose duplicates of cartels which I have given to Lieut. Col. the Visconde de Barbacena of the 12th Portuguese dragoons, Lieut. Miranda of the same regiment, and Capt. Dynely of the Royal Artillery; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have them delivered to Lieut. Col. Voirol, Capt. Gravelle, and Lieut. Londeaux, and have those officers sent to France by the first opportunity, in exchange for the 3 first mentioned.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 31st. If the government have any funds to spare, I see no objection to their buying up and destroying paper money.

I must observe, however, that the Portuguese paper money is not at a discount, in relation to silver, much greater than the excess of the market price of silver in England beyond the Mint price, by which excess the depreciation of Bank of England notes is estimated. Now, I believe that the security for a Bank of England note is infinitely better than that for the Portuguese paper; and it is no bad thing if the regular payment of the interest has brought the Portuguese paper to a par nearly with Bank notes.

The reason why the payment of the interest has not materially affected the discount is, that since the interest has been paid, the paper has *really* been in circulation: before, it was not; it was locked up in our chest, and its value was supported solely by our taking it in payment for our bills on England. But we could go on no longer in this way; and I must have prevented the Commissaries from taking the paper at all, if measures had not been adopted to raise its credit. I don't see exactly what part our Commissaries are to play in the purchase of this paper by the government out of the funds allotted for the payment of the interest.

I don't know what business Capt. — has to communicate at all with Dom M. Forjaz, or with any body excepting his commanding officer.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir C. Dalbiac, K.C.H.

Does Dom M. Forjaz wish that the enemy should have plans of his works? and will he answer for his Portuguese militia, &c., to keep the prisoners employed solely on the road, and not to allow them to see the works? The prisoners are now under our charge, and I hope that not a man of them will remain at Lisbon.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, No. 27, of the 21st Aug.; and I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I concur entirely in Sir R. Kennedy's opinion regarding the expediency of appointing a Board, consisting of an officer of the army, one of the Commissariat, and one of the Department of Accounts, to consider of the claims of the inhabitants of the Peninsula for supplies furnished to the British army, for which they may not possess regular vouchers.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

Since I wrote my dispatch, No. 28, I have received a dispatch of the 29th from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill from Llerena, to which place the General had moved in pursuit of the troops under Gen. Drouet. He sends me the enclosed letter from Col. Skerrett, who commands the British and Portuguese troops which compose part of the detachment under Gen. La Cruz, from which I learn that the allies had entered Seville on the 27th.

I conclude that the blockade of Cadiz is raised, as I have received several accounts of the destruction of military stores at Seville by the enemy before they withdrew their force from thence; but I have received no authentic account of the raising of the blockade. I enclose the only one which I have received. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will move to the bridge of Almaraz as soon as he finds the evacuation of Andalusia decided upon. I beg to congratulate your Lordship upon these events.

I have halted here this day to give rest to the troops, which have marched for several days, and to receive intelligence from Gen. Castaños.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I send the dispatches by the messenger, Mr. Vick, to Coruña, in hopes that he will find there the ship *Sylvia*, which brought him to Santander.

I understand that the Earl of March, whom I sent to Coruña from Cuellar on the 4th Aug., in consequence of Sir H. Popham's offer to send a vessel to England with any dispatches which I might forward, and who arrived at Coruña on the 8th, was still there on the 31st, waiting for a vessel to convey him.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to my letter of the 13th Aug., regarding the necessity of providing for the safety of the packets on their passage to and from Lisbon.

To Earl Bathurst.

Valladolid, 8th Sept. 1812.

I am very much obliged to you and to the government for all that has been done for me, for which I have requested Lord Liverpool to thank the Prince Regent.*

* Advanced to the dignity of Marquis of Wellington, 18th Aug. 1812.

I shall receive with gratitude any honor which His Royal Highness may think proper to confer upon me, but the addition proposed to my arms is the last which would have occurred to me. It carries with it an appearance of ostentation, of which I hope I am not guilty; and it will scarcely be credited that I did not apply for it. However, I prefer the addition proposed by your Lordship* to that proposed by Lord Wellesley.

I am quite surprised at the conduct of the ——. I always thought the Order of the Bath that mark of the King's favor which it was most desirable to an officer to receive; and I mentioned it to you, as I thought it likely it would be agreeable to ——. It might be very proper to create him a Peer, but I would not propose such an arrangement to government. Even if it had been proper that I should do so for any officer, I should have considered it my duty to make government acquainted with what I know are * * * 's feelings on this subject. He was much disappointed and hurt that this mark of the King's favor was not conferred upon him when the restrictions ceased, and I really believe that his regard for me alone prevented him from resigning his situation. If — had been made a Peer, I really believe he would have resigned, notwithstanding that he is junior to ——. But your Lordship is aware that we none of us act discreetly in cases in which our own passions are concerned; and I believe that my friend * * * is anxious to obtain this honor for the very reason which would induce the government to doubt the expediency of granting it to him.

I should be very glad to have the assistance of Gen. Fane, but we have no vacancy at present in the cavalry. The situation he held with Gen. Hill is filled by ——. But he is a Lieut. General, and must continue in that situation; and unless Fane should get the brigade of Horse Guards, there is not even a brigade of cavalry vacant for him.

Upon referring to my dispatch, I observe that as it relates to the affair with the rear guard on the 23d, as well as to the action of the 22d, I ought to have mentioned Gen. Bock; but I did not mention him, because neither he nor the German brigade were engaged in the general action. I shall correct this; but I would suggest to your Lordship, that as this was a general action, in which all the troops were at least in the cannonade, and all shared in the pursuit, even though not engaged in the action, all the General officers present should receive the thanks of Parliament. I am

* Whitehall, 25th Aug. 1812.

H.R.H. the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, hath been graciously pleased, by an especial warrant, to grant unto Arthur, Marquis of Wellington, Knight Companion of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's forces in Spain and Portugal, His Majesty's Royal license and permission that he and his descendants may bear, as a Royal augmentation, *in the dexter quarter of the arms of Wellington*, AN ESCOCHEON, charged with the Crosses of St. George, St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, *being the Union badge of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland*, as a lasting memorial of the glorious and transcendent achievements of the said Arthur, Marquis of Wellington, on various important occasions, but more particularly in the recent brilliant and decisive victory obtained over the French army by the troops under his command, near Salamanca, on the 22d July last; such Royal augmentation being first duly exemplified according to the laws of Arms, and recorded in the Heralds' College. And also to command that this especial mark of His Majesty's Royal favor be registered in this College of Arms.

aware that this is a question of Parliamentary practice, in which I may be wrong.

I have no particular partiality to my son's title; but as the King had conferred it upon me, I did not think it proper to apply to have it altered. I believe he ought to be an Earl; and as the Earldom is not of that title, I believe there must be some alteration. I have no desire, however, that the title itself should be altered, nor even that my son should be made an Earl, unless it should be necessary.

The A.G. to Officers commanding at hospital stations.

8th Sept. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the —, requiring further instructions relative to the march of convalescents, &c. from the depôt under your command, I am to acquaint you that you are in future to abide by such directions in the performance of this service as you have already received, or may hereafter receive, from the Q. M. Gen.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Valladolid, 9th Sept. 1812.

As I understand that Gen. Hamilton is still very unwell, and as the Conde de Amarante will, it is to be hoped, now have little to do in Tras os Montes, I wish you to consider whether it would not be expedient to appoint him to command Hamilton's division during the absence of the latter. I only suggest this for your consideration.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Valladolid, 9th Sept. 1812.

I have just received your letter of the 5th, and I imagine that Col. Elley has been troubling you on subjects on which he might have relied on my exertions in his favor. In regard to his promotion, I enclose you what Torrens says of it. The Duke of York says the same. It is not given to him now, because the Commander in Chief is unwilling to make a precedent of giving an officer the rank of Colonel by brevet as a reward for service. Whether right or wrong, this is a reason which cannot be overcome.

I did Col. Elley an injustice in not mentioning his name in my dispatch of the 24th; and I declare I thought I had mentioned it. However, I corrected this omission in a dispatch I wrote yesterday respecting him and other officers; but I am not certain that I have not so far done him an injury by attending to his wishes upon this subject, as that his promotion will be delayed.

It is obvious that the Duke of York will not make the precedent of promoting for service to the rank of Colonel. This shows that a man is not the best judge of what is good for himself.

In regard to Capt. —, I can't recommend him now; but I will on the first occasion that offers. He likewise has done himself a great injury by writing an intemperate letter, which I ought not to have forwarded for him, respecting the promotion of Major —; and the fact turned out to be, that his money for the purchase was not forthcoming, according to the regulations: another proof that we are none of us the best judges in cases in which we are personally concerned.

I wish to God you were well.* Matters are going on famously. Hill's

* Wounded at Salamanca.

corps will soon be across the Tagus; and I shall have the whole army either together or in close communication. The blockade of Cadiz is raised, Seville evacuated, and Soult retiring through Andalusia.

I am about to join here with the Galician army, and to push the French as far as I can, and then return with some of the troops, particularly the heavy cavalry, towards Madrid. I have ordered the 2d hussars round from Cadiz.

A Don F. X. Castaños.

Valladolid, ce 9 Sept. 1812.

Je vous envoie mon aide de camp, le Col. Gordon, pour vous expliquer l'état des affaires, et pour vous montrer combien il est urgent que l'armée de Galice se mette en communication avec nous le plutôt possible, et que je puisse tourner toute mon attention à notre droite.

L'infanterie de l'avant-garde a marché ce matin vers Dueñas, où l'armée les suivra demain. Les Français étaient hier matin à Dueñas. Je mettrai mon quartier général demain à Cabezon ou à Cigales.

C'est vraiment très important que je puisse m'aboucher avec vous; sans quoi nous courons risque de perdre la Castille en gagnant l'Andalousie et la Valence. Mais nous garderons tous trois si nous pouvons faire un bon arrangement pour ces pays ci. Le blocus de Cadiz est levé, nos troupes sont entrées à Séville; Soult est en pleine marche pour évacuer l'Andalousie. Il reste à savoir par où il passera. S'il passe par Granade, nous avons le temps pour tout; s'il vient par La Manche, il faut que je retourne tout de suite à Madrid.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Valladolid, 9th Sept. 1812.

You will have received the orders of the Sec. of State to send to Lisbon the 3d batt. 1st Foot Guards, which were to be relieved, as I am informed, by the 2d batt. 59th regt.; and I conclude that you will have carried those orders into execution before you will receive this letter.

In the course of yesterday and this day, I have received accounts to which I give credit, that the enemy had entirely raised the blockade of Cadiz, and it is now necessary that I should give you the instructions which I have received from the Sec. of State for your guidance, in case of the occurrence of this event.*

You will withdraw the British garrison from Tarifa, with the exception of the Royal artillery and engineers, who are to continue to construct the works and buildings on the island till further orders.

The following troops are to be embarked and sent round to Lisbon without loss of time, unless you should have the means of transport, &c., so as to enable you to march them through the country, viz.:

Detachment of the 2d hussars, K. G. L.; 20th Portuguese regt.; 3d batt. 1st Foot Guards; detachment 2d batt. 95th regt.; company of the Royal Staff corps; 2d batt. 87th regt.; Capt. Owen's and Capt. Dickson's companies of artillery; all the artillery horses and mules, excepting 170 horses; artillery drivers in proportion to the number of horses and mules sent.

Col. Skerrett must come in command of these troops.

If you should be able to equip the troops as they ought to be, to be

* See p. 74.

enabled to march through the country, they must move by Seville, Monasterio, Medellin, Truxillo, &c.

In case the troops should land at Lisbon, Col. Skerrett will have instructions from Gen. Peacocke for his guidance. If they should march, he must do every thing in his power to communicate with Gen. Hill, and through him with me. If he should have any sick with his detachment in passing through Estremadura, he must send them to Gen. Hill's hospitals at Elvas, from the British magazines at which place he may draw supplies; giving notice to the Commissary there of his wants, and sending means of transport to convey what he will require.

If the troops should march, they must have with them the necessary officers of the Commissariat, Medical department, &c., and each man must be equipped with a blanket, as well as his great coat; they must likewise carry a bill hook for 10 men. The men must be provided with tin camp kettles, one for 6 men; which they must carry. If there should be no tin camp kettles, they must have those made of cast iron, which must be carried on mules, one for the kettles of each company. There must be a mule to carry the entrenching tools of each regiment; one to carry the Paymaster's books; and one the Surgeon's chest of each regiment.

If the troops should march, you will send with them a 9 pounder brigade of ordnance, and one hospital waggon for each battalion, drawn by 6 of the waggon train horses, if you should have any hospital waggons at Cadiz.

I have received the orders of the Sec. of State to desire that you will stay in command of the British troops which will remain at Cadiz and Carthagena, consisting of

4 companies of the Royal artillery; artillery drivers; engineers; 2d batt. 47th regt.; 2d batt. 67th regt.; waggon train; De Watteville's regt.; battalion of foreign recruits; 170 artillery horses.

In case the 2d batt. 59th regt. should have arrived at Cadiz before you will receive this order, you will send either that battalion, or the 2d batt. 47th regt., with Col. Skerrett's detachment, according to your judgment which of the 2 is most fit for service in the field. Whenever the 2d batt. 59th regt. shall arrive after you shall have carried these orders into execution, you will send to Lisbon whichever of that battalion, or the 2d batt. 47th regt., is most fit for service, retaining at Cadiz one British battalion.

I beg you to lay these instructions before His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz, for the information of the Spanish government.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Valladolid, 9th Sept. 1812.

Major Gen. Cooke will lay before you the instructions which I have sent him in consequence of the information which I have received, which renders it probable that the enemy have raised the blockade of Cadiz, and have evacuated the south west part of Andalusia.

I beg you will do me the favor to congratulate the Spanish government on this event; and at the same time convey to them the following suggestions. The experience which I have acquired in military affairs has taught me not to rely implicitly on any prosperous state of affairs. An

accident, trifling probably, abstractedly, may be attended by the most important consequences; and it is the duty of a prudent government, by precautions to prevent, or at all events diminish, the evil which may result from such accidents. I earnestly recommend to them, therefore,

1st; To keep up the works which have been formed at the Isla and Cadiz at such vast labor and expense; and never to leave that place without a respectable garrison. With this view, and to take care of the stores belonging to the British government which are there, I have desired that some troops might remain at Cadiz.

2dly; To have all the enemy's works completely destroyed, and all the guns and stores in them, in the lines of the Guadalete and in Seville, &c., removed to Cadiz without loss of time.

3dly; To secure the Peninsula of the Trocadero by good works, in the same manner as has been done with the Isla, and the communication between the Isla and Cadiz.

I have above recommended to the Spanish government nothing of which I have not myself set the example. All the works which saved Portugal in 1810, and will, I trust, eventually save the Peninsula, are kept in the most perfect state; and many improvements have been made to them, and additional works have been constructed since the French have been obliged to retire from Portugal. On the same principle, the chief engineer of the British army is now employed in the repair and improvement of the works of Badajoz; and the works of all the towns on the frontiers of Portugal are kept in the best state, and the towns are sufficiently garrisoned to preserve them against a *coup de main*.

I am sorry to say that this is not the case in respect to Badajoz or Ciudad Rodrigo. In the former place, I understand that there are not more than 700 men; and in respect to the latter, the Governor informed me some days ago, that he could not afford a detachment of 250 men to escort the prisoners taken in the Retiro, till they should be relieved by the garrison of Almeida. The consequence of any check to the allied armies which would oblige them to retire upon either of those places, would be the fall of the place for want of a garrison to defend it.

I recommend that Gen. Ballesteros' army should be reinforced as far as may be possible, and that it should carry on operations at all times between the enemy on the one side, and Cadiz and Seville on the other; taking care not to be committed.

I have ordered Gen. Hill to draw nearer to me, and he will cross the Tagus, and move towards Madrid. I shall thus have the whole of the allied British and Portuguese army collected, and communicating by a short communication.

I shall, I hope, be in communication with the army of Galicia by my left; with the army of Estremadura by my right; and I am already in communication with the troops under Gen. O'Donnell from Madrid. Thus, Gen. Ballesteros will always be on the left flank or rear of the enemy, while I shall be in their front; supported by the Spanish armies of Galicia, Estremadura, and Murcia; and it may be hoped that, unless some accident happens, they will not be long on this side of the Ebro.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Robe, R.A.

9th Sept. 1812.

I have duly submitted to the Commander of the Forces the several explanations contained in your letter of the 8th inst. relative to Lieut. —, of the Royal artillery; and I am further to request you will acquaint me for his Excellency's information, 1st; whether an officer of the artillery, or artillery drivers, receiving the allowance of bât and forage money, is entitled by the regulations of the Q. M. Gen. of the ordnance to one public mule for his personal baggage: and, 2dly; whether by the same authority one baggage animal is appropriated to the carriage of the necessaries, &c. of 2 drivers. His Excellency has been pleased to desire that Capt. — may be immediately released from his arrest.

Memorandum for the Commissary General.

Cigales, 10th Sept. 1812.

As 6 squadrons of the Life and Horse Guards are coming out to Lisbon, consisting of 900 horses, it will be necessary to make arrangements for providing this brigade with the regulated number of mules to attend them, viz., 450.

These mules might be hired in Estremadura, and might be collected for them at Elvas, Badajoz, and Campo Maior. The Commissary Gen. is requested to report the progress in obtaining these mules.

Au Gén. Santocildes.

Dueñas, ce 12 Sept. 1812, à 8 heures du matin.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre d'hier à 9 heures du soir. Il est bien vrai que je vous ai donné rendez-vous à Valladolid, mais c'était pour le 6 ou le 7, et non pour le 12; et depuis je n'ai jamais pu vous dire où vous devriez aller, parceque jusqu'aujourd'hui je n'ai pas su où vous étiez. Il y a trois jours que mon aide de camp est allé vous chercher et le Gén. Castaños, par la route qu'on m'avait indiqué que vous prendriez.

J'espérais que, sachant que j'étais hier à Dueñas, vous vous seriez rapproché de moi aujourd'hui; mais je vois que vous en êtes plus éloigné, et que vous avez continué toujours votre marche sur Valladolid.

A présent je vous prie de rassembler vos troupes le 14 à Palencia.

Je pars tout de suite pour Magaz. Mes troupes ont marché ce matin, et continueront de s'avancer.

To Don Ramon Noblezo y Lozemo.

Magaz, 12th Sept. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter, and a most beautiful pair of pistols which you have forwarded to me; and I beg leave to return you my most sincere thanks for the honor which you have done by sending me this beautiful present.

Memorandum for the Q. M. G.

Magaz, 12th Sept. 1812.

It is necessary that arrangements should be made at an early period for bringing up the clothing of the troops which should be put on them about Christmas.

There are two great roads by which to communicate with the army, viz., that by Badajoz and that by Ciudad Rodrigo. Besides these, there is that by Castello Branco and Plasencia; but this falls into the road from Badajoz to Madrid, and difficulties might be experienced in using it. Indeed the only roads which can be used for this or any other purpose are those upon which previous arrangements will be made.

The clothing for the troops in the 2d, 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, and

Gen. Alten's, Gen. Slade's, and Gen. Long's brigades of cavalry, might be sent by Elvas and Badajoz; that for the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, Col. Ponsonby's, Gen. Bock's, and Gen. Anson's cavalry, by Ciudad Rodrigo.

The three modes of communicating with Badajoz should be adopted, viz., by the Alcacer do Sal river, by the Tagus to Abrantes, and by the great road from Aldea Gallega. Each road should be allotted for the baggage of one or two divisions.

The clothing which is to come by Ciudad Rodrigo should be transported from Lisbon to Oporto or to Figueira, at the mouth of the Mondego. From Oporto it must come by water to Barca d'Alva, and from thence to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo in carts. From Figueira it must come up the Mondego in boats as far as Foz Dão, and thence in carts by Celorico to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.

Each mode should be allotted to one or more divisions.

The only mode of arranging this carriage of the clothing forward from Elvas and Badajoz, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, is to have the work done by stages.

It is supposed that the clothing for each regiment will require on an average 30 carts, and it is supposed that in the manner above proposed there will not be much difficulty in transporting the clothing to Elvas and Badajoz, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.

The Commissary Gen. should then make arrangements for working carts at certain stages on the great military lines of Salamanca, Arevalo, &c., from Ciudad Rodrigo; and of Merida, Truxillo, the bridge of Almaraz, Oropesa, Talavera, from Elvas and Badajoz.

It is obvious that the same number of carts, or rather carts to carry the same weight, should be at each stage.

The A. Q. M. G. at Lisbon would then send off the clothing, for which commanding officers of regiments should be directed to write by one of the lines of communication to Elvas and Badajoz, or Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, as above arranged.

The officer of the Commissariat at Aldea Gallega, Abrantes, Alcacer do Sal, Oporto, and Figueira, Barca d'Alva and Foz Dão, should be directed to find means of conveyance for the clothing of those places respectively on the requisition of the officers or non-commissioned officers in charge of it.

An officer of the Q. M. G.'s department should be stationed at Elvas, and another at Almeida, to communicate with the officers of the Commissariat, and to regulate the loading and departure of the clothing of the several regiments, which should be sent on in succession by stages. According to this mode of proceeding, all the clothing of the army would reach the regiments in about 8 or 10 weeks, supposing that the stages of the carts did not require more than a week for each trip, and that there were carts in sufficient numbers to carry the clothing of two regiments at a time.

The officers of the Q. M. G.'s department at Elvas or Badajoz, or at Almeida, or Ciudad Rodrigo, should be directed to report to the Q. M. G. the arrival and departure of the clothing of each regiment at or from that

station, specifying in charge of whom, and upon how many carriages loaded.

The officer of the Commissariat at each stage on the road should report when the clothing of any regiment passes his stage, in charge of whom, and on how many carts loaded; by which means it would be known at all times what progress the clothing should make, and where the clothing of every regiment might be.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Magaz, 12th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 30th Aug. I don't know what to recommend to you about the government. It appears to me that every thing in which the Spaniards are concerned is going on as badly as possible; and I really believe there is not a man in the country who is capable of comprehending, much less of conducting, any great concern. If there was, it might be worth while to endeavor to have him appointed to the government. As it is, things cannot well be worse than they are, and it is better that we should not interfere in any way.

As for military matters in this quarter, I wrote to Castaños from Madrid on the 30th, to tell him that I was going to move upon Valladolid, and eventually to drive the French across the Ebro, if I had time; and requesting that the army of Galicia might join me at Valladolid, where I should be on the 6th. He says he did not receive my letter of the 30th, nor another I wrote him on the 3d from Arevalo, till the 7th. But the fact is that I marched from Madrid to Valladolid, halted one day and turned out the French, before the courier could carry my letter to Castaños. Then Santocildes has been 6 days marching. He was yesterday within 3 leagues of us, and knew it last night, but he has this morning moved to Valladolid, 8 leagues from us; and unless I halt 2 days for him, he will not join us for 4 or 5 days. Then, out of 30,000 men that they feed in Galicia, he has only brought 11,000 infantry and 350 cavalry to join us!

What do you think of his losing all the guns and stores we took in Valladolid in the pursuit of Marmont's army, and 400 of the prisoners? Then I desired him to proclaim the Constitution forthwith, but having delayed it *à mañana*, the French returned, and the Constitution was not proclaimed till I drove them out the other day.

I certainly did right in proclaiming the Constitution at Madrid the day after I entered it. I did the same at Valladolid, and I shall do the same wherever I go.

To Earl Bathurst.

Magaz, 12th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 26th. My dispatch of the 18th Aug. will have shown you what description of ordnance I wished to have; and I write to Gen. Peacocke to desire him not to send the 12 pounders.

I was misled by Sir H. Popham to send March to Coruña from Cuellar. He arrived there in 4 days, but there was no vessel to take him away till the 31st.

I assure your Lordship that you can depend no more upon the reports of ——— than you can upon those of any body else; and I earnestly

recommend to government to publish respecting the army only what comes from myself. I write a report once a week, which contains all occurrences, and I should think that the public might be satisfied with these reports. It might have been as well also if Sir H. Popham's exultation upon the success of his operations in diverting the attention of the enemy from me, had not been published. I mention this because I know that the French act a good deal upon any information from our papers, which they deem at all authentic.

Your Lordship will see that Andalusia has been evacuated and the siege of Cadiz raised; but I don't much like the way in which affairs are situated. I can't get the Spaniards to make an exertion for themselves; and they are really more backward in the military art than I had thought it possible. Of 30,000 men who are fed as soldiers in Galicia, Santocildes has brought into Castille only 11,000 ragged infantry and 350 cavalry, and I can't prevail on these to make a direct movement to join me. The object of our operation to the north is therefore making but slow progress, and I fear that I shall have to return to Madrid without having accomplished it. ——— has contrived to quarrel with ——— and ———, and he is here instead of being at the ——— head quarters

I have a letter from Sir R. Hill of the 4th, from Castuera, but he had not received my orders to approach the Tagus, which river I have since sent him orders to cross. Here also there will, I am afraid, be some delay.

Au Gén. Dumouriez.

Torquemada, ce 12 Sept. 1812.

Il y a long temps que je ne vous ai pas écrit, car je savais que je ne pourrais vous rien apprendre que vous ne trouveriez pas dans mes dépêches. Enfin voilà le blocus de Cadiz levé, et l'Andalousie évacuée par les Français, par les suites d'un mouvement en Castille, et de la bataille de Salamanque et ses suites. Tout le monde parait vouloir se rassembler en Valence; et en attendant que les plans se développent, que les troupes du Général Hill s'avancent d'Estremadure, et que les troupes Espagnoles puissent se rassembler, je chasserai les parties de l'armée de Marmont du Duero; et je les pousserai aussi loin que je le pourrai, et je tâcherai d'établir une bonne communication entre les détachemens Anglo Portugais que je dois laisser ici, et l'armée de la Galice, afin d'assurer ma gauche quand je serai engagé vers Valence.

La prise de Madrid a été un coup très avantageux en vue politique et militaire. Il nous a fait beaucoup de bien; et, je crois, nous a valu l'évacuation de l'Andalousie.

Il faut que je vous prie tous en Angleterre de ne pas voler trop vite. De corps vraiment militaires en Espagne à opposer aux Français, il n'y a que l'armée Anglo Portugaise. Pour les autres, j'en serai satisfait s'ils ne se laissent pas détruire. Voilà tout ce que je leur demande. Mais vous devez sentir qu'on ne peut pas faire grande chose bien vite, avec une telle disparité de forces.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

I beg you to apply to the Portuguese government for permission to

import the grain mentioned in the enclosed letter from the Commissary Gen., free of duty.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

Referring to your letter of the 25th Aug., I have the honor to enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, stating, that notwithstanding 5 Surgeons and 12 Hospital mates have been ordered to proceed forthwith to this country, he shall still require those for whom he made a demand on the 22d ult.

P.S. I beg to observe that there is not a single medical officer in reserve with this army, and to refer you to the list sent home in my letter of the 25th ult., of those absent. I beg leave likewise to inform you, that we have not one officer of the Commissariat in reserve, to be employed on any service; or one officer of the Pay department; and I am now obliged to send officers of the regiments in charge of money from one station to another; not one regiment being complete in officers. It is very desirable that heads of departments should advert to the returns sent home regularly from this army, and keep all the departments complete in officers. Requisitions from me can be sent only when wants occur, take one month to get home, and 3 months before the army can receive the benefit of them.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

I received from the Adj. Gen. by the last post a letter of the 1st Aug., in answer to one which I wrote to him on the 15th April last, in regard to the transmission of invalids from Portugal to England, and the settlement of their accounts.

Since I received His Royal Highness' orders, to which my letter of the 15th April was an answer, I have had frequent complaints from the Superintendent of Hospitals of the detention in Portugal of soldiers after Medical Boards have invalidated them; which detention has invariably been occasioned by the necessity of settling their accounts previous to their being sent to England under His Royal Highness' orders.

Upon receipt of the Adj. Gen.'s letter of the 1st Aug., I desired Dr. M'Grigor to put in writing what he had frequently reported to me on this subject, and I now enclose his letter. In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties under which we labor are but little known in England. 1st; there is no soldier in the army who has at present been paid to a later date than the 24th April, for want of money. His accounts are settled every month. But, 2dly; if a soldier has been in hospital since the month of March last, at which time the soldiers had not been paid later than January, and the pay for March not received till June or July, I should like to know how it is possible for any officer to come to a settlement by a correspondence with one officer, who has to settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to England at the same moment? It is quite impossible; and the consequence is, that the poor men are detained 3, 4, or 5 months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence respecting their accounts is finished, during which time many settle all accounts with this world.

It is a great error to suppose that the lower orders are always right in

their complaints, and the higher orders always in the wrong. My experience has taught me, that nine times in ten, the soldiers loudest in their complaints and claims have no ground for either the one or the other, and are generally in debt to their Captains. Those who are wounded invariably either throw away or sell their necessaries; and whether the ground is held or not by the army, they claim compensation from the public. Their claim can be settled only by a Board. No officer of a regiment has the power either to admit or to refuse it. Yet, if a soldier makes such a claim at Lisbon, the officer who is to settle the soldiers' claims before they go to England must detain at least as many as one transport will contain, till the claims of one for losses of this description shall be inquired into by post; every letter now requiring three weeks to get an answer. While this is going on, many die who might be saved; and after all, a soldier's account can never be settled satisfactorily excepting with his regiment.

I have ordered Gen. Peacocke to carry strictly into execution His Royal Highness' orders; and I shall repeat my directions to him by this post. But I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay before him the enclosed letter, and make known to him what I have above represented.

There is no point in the service to which I have at all times paid so much attention as to the settlement of the soldiers' accounts: I consider early settlements to be essential to discipline; but I am quite convinced that it is impossible to attain His Royal Highness' object in this country without detaining here the men 3 or 4 months after the necessity for their return to England shall have been pronounced; and the consequences are seen in Dr. M'Grigor's letter.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Hope, from which you will see that he is obliged to quit the army. Indeed his health has always been in such a state as that he could not be said to be fit for service in this country. It does not appear to me to be necessary to relieve him, as you will have observed from my last letter that we have more General officers to command divisions than we have divisions to be commanded. What we want in them is health, good will, and abilities to perform the duties of their situation. I am sorry to say that the perpetual changes which we are making, owing to the infirmities, or the wounds, or the disinclination of the General officers to serve in this country, are by no means favorable to the discipline and success of the army, and don't augment the ease of my situation.

To Earl Bathurst.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

I see that some person employed by Lord Castlereagh has made some discoveries approaching to the key of the Paris cipher, in which some letters were written, which I have transmitted to your Lordship.

It is obvious, from the perusal of this cipher, that this discovery is not complete; but as nearly all the letters which we now intercept are written in this cipher, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me what has been discovered.

To Earl Bathurst.

Torquemada, 13th Sept. 1812.

I have continued to follow the movements of the '*Armée de Portugal*' since I last addressed you, but I have not pressed them as hard as I might, as I wished to be joined by the army of Galicia. These troops, to the number of 11,000 infantry, 350 cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery, will be at Palencia, about 3 leagues from hence, to-morrow.

Your Lordship will have received from Major Gen. Cooke the reports of the enemy's having raised the blockade of Cadiz, in the night of the 24th Aug.,* and of the very handsome attack made by the Allies under Gen. La Cruz on the enemy's rear guard, at Seville, on the 27th Aug., in

* Major Gen. Cooke to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington, K.B. Cadiz, 26th Aug. 1812.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the enemy abandoned his position and works opposite to Cadiz and the Isla on the night of the 24th and morning of the 25th, except the town of Puerto de S^{ta} Maria, where a body of troops remained till the middle of the day, and then withdrew to the Cartuga. He has left a very numerous artillery in the several works, and a large quantity of stores and powder; and although most of the ordnance has been rendered useless, he appears to have retired from his position with more precipitation than I should have expected.

A considerable body of cavalry was brought down previous to the retreat commencing.

The towns of Puerto Real and Chiclana are now occupied by detachments of Spanish troops; and a party of the Hanoverian hussars is at the first mentioned place, to which Col. Lambert had moved from the Portazgo with them, and some light troops from this division.

Major Gen. Cooke to Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 30th Aug. 1812.

Since my letter of yesterday's date, reporting the entry into Seville of the allied corps under Gen. La Cruz and Col. Skerrett, I have received a dispatch from the latter, of which I transmit a copy herewith, and a return of the killed and wounded of the British detachment.

Col. Skerrett to Major Gen. Cooke.

Seville, 28th Aug. 1812.

I have the honor to report the movements of the detachment under my orders since the date of my last, the result of which, the capture of the city of Seville by assault, defended by 8 French battalions and 2 regiments of dragoons entrenched, will, I trust, be considered as honorable to the allied arms and serviceable to the cause of Spain.

On the 24th inst. Gen. La Cruz Mourgeon, commanding the Spanish troops, and myself, judged it advisable to make a forward movement on Seville; for this purpose it was advisable to force the enemy's corps of observation of 350 cavalry and 200 infantry at San Lucar la Mayor. I marched from Manzanilla with 800 troops, composed of the 1st regt. of Guards, the 87th, and the Portuguese regiment, Brig. Gen. Downie, accompanied with 600 Spanish troops. The Spanish column attacked on the right, and the British and Portuguese on the left. The French were driven through the streets with precipitation, leaving some killed, wounded, and prisoners. We took post at San Lucar without the loss of a man.

On the 26th inst., Gen. La Cruz and myself having judged that it would be attended with the most beneficial effects, both on the public opinion and in saving the city from being plundered, if the French could be precipitated in their retreat from Seville, the allied troops in consequence marched for this purpose, and arrived at the heights of Castillejos de la Cuesta, immediately above Seville, on the morning of the 27th, at 6 o'clock.

The Spanish troops formed our advance. The French advance was driven in; the cavalry retired, leaving the infantry in the plain, which last were charged by the Spanish cavalry, who made many prisoners.

The Spanish troops attacked a redoubt on our left, and lost a good many men. The columns advanced into the plain, by which movement this redoubt was turned, and its communication cut off; the Spanish troops under Gen. La Cruz took the right, and made a détour to arrive and attack on that flank of Triana (the suburbs of Seville). I ordered the redoubt to be masked by a detachment of the 20th Portuguese regt., and advanced a field piece with some troops, to keep in check the enemy's fire at one of the gates of the city opposite to us; and after giving sufficient time for the Spanish column to arrive, the British and Portuguese troops advanced to the attack in front: the cavalry and artillery advanced at a gallop, supported by the grenadiers of the Guards, and the infantry following.

The enemy abandoned the gate; we entered the suburbs, and advanced near to the

which attack the allied British and Portuguese troops under Col. Skerrett distinguished themselves. The bridge of Seville was thereby saved, and the enemy was prevented from destroying many guns and valuable stores which the town contained.

Marshal Soult directed his march upon Granada, and Gen. Drouet upon Jaen, according to the last accounts. I have not heard of the arrival of either at those places. Gen. Ballesteros, reinforced by the Spanish troops under Gen. La Cruz, and by other Spanish troops, detached from Cadiz, making in the whole, as I am informed, a corps of 15,000 men, was in pursuit of the enemy.

bridge of Seville with as much rapidity as possible, in hopes of preventing its destruction, which would have rendered it extremely difficult for us to succeed. We were checked by the fire of grape shot and musketry at the turning of the street. The grenadiers of the Guards advanced to our support, and drove every thing before them. At this moment part of the Spanish column arrived; we advanced to the bridge under a heavy fire; Capt. Cadoux, of the 95th, with great judgment made a flank movement on our left; Capt. Roberts, of the artillery, brought up with rapidity 2 guns; a heavy fire of cannon and musketry was soon brought to bear on the enemy, who were driven from their position on the other side of the river, and from the bridge, which they had only in part destroyed. The grenadiers of the Guards, and some Spanish troops, led the columns that crossed the bridge. A general rout ensued, and the enemy were driven through the streets, which were strewn with their dead, and pursued at all points, leaving behind them valuable captures of horses, baggage, and money.

It is difficult for me to express the joy of the people of Seville. The inhabitants, under the fire of the French, brought planks to lay across the bridge; and their acclamations and vociferous marks of joy, added to the immense crowd, rendered it extremely difficult for the officers to advance through the streets with their columns.

The vast extent of this city, the exhausted state of the troops, who had advanced in double quick time for 3 miles, and the want of cavalry, rendered it impossible to continue the pursuit beyond the town. Such was the rapidity of our attack, that this victory over a French division, and the passage of a bridge which the enemy had materially destroyed, with his infantry and artillery formed on the banks of the river, was achieved with a loss that appears almost incredible.

I have only to regret the loss of one officer, Lieut. Brett, Royal artillery, who was killed, gallantly fighting his gun, at the bridge. The intrepidity of this valuable officer was observed by the whole detachment.

The loss of the enemy must have been very great. We have taken several officers, and, I believe, nearly 200 prisoners.

The conduct of every officer and soldier has been above praise: where all have behaved well, it is difficult to distinguish; I must, however, mention the detachment of the King's German Legion, commanded by Cornet Wieboldt; the artillery, by Capt. Roberts; the detachment of the 95th, by Capt. Cadoux; and the grenadiers of the 1st regt. of Guards, by Capt. Thomas. To Col. Maitland, 1st regt. of Guards (second in command), I am much indebted from the commencement of this service; and in the attack of Seville his military talents, intrepidity, and zeal were particularly conspicuous. I am also much indebted to Lieut. Col. Colquitt, commanding a detachment of the 1st regt. of Guards; to Lieut. Col. Prior, commanding a detachment, 20th Portuguese regt.; and to Major MacLaine, commanding a detachment 87th regt.

The exertions of Capt. Wynyard (Coldstream Guards), A.A.G., and Lieut. Reid, Royal Staff Corps, Staff officers attached to the detachment, have been indefatigable. Capt. Banbury, 20th Portuguese regt., Brig. Major, and Lieut. Smith, Royal Engineers, were at this time detached on other service.

During the whole of this attack, our allies, the Spaniards, have rivalled the conduct of the British and Portuguese troops; and Gen. La Cruz Mourgeon, by his military talents and bravery, has principally contributed to the successful result of the day.

Enclosed is a return of the killed and wounded.

During last night a division of 7000 or 8000 French troops passed by. Our attack has saved the city from the devastations and contributions with which it was threatened.

Capt. Wynyard is the bearer of this dispatch, who will inform you of any further particulars you may require.

P.S. A return of the guns and military stores taken will be sent as soon as the quantity can be ascertained. Two of the field pieces which the enemy advanced against us, fell into our hands.

I have directed Major Gen. Cooke, by the instructions of which I enclose a copy,* to send to join this army the allied British and Portuguese troops now at Cadiz, with the exception of one British battalion, the regiment 'de Watteville,' and the battalion of foreign detachments, and 4 companies of British artillery, the engineers, &c., which are to remain at Cadiz: and I have desired Major Gen. Cooke to remain at Cadiz in the command of these troops, and those at Carthagera. The troops will be sent round to Lisbon, or will march, according to the facility which Major Gen. Cooke will experience in providing for them on their march. I am inclined to believe they will march, as I understand, from Major Gen. Cooke's last letter, that he was about to move the troops to Seville.

My last accounts from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill are of the 4th inst. He was then at Castuera, in Estremadura; but he had not received my instructions of the 24th Aug. to approach the Tagus. I have since sent him orders to cross that river and to move upon Oropesa.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Clinton, 6th division.

13th Sept. 1812.

Having submitted to the Commander of the Forces the representation contained in your letter of the 10th inst. relative to —, the German, who originally engaged himself as master of the band of the 61st regt., I am directed by his Excellency to request that this man, being a follower of the army, may be forthwith brought to a Regimental Court Martial for having absented himself from that corps without leave; and I am further to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces cannot admit of his joining any other corps in this army, and the necessary instructions will be sent as to his further disposal so soon as he has been tried for the offence specified.

Au Gén. Santocildes.

Torquemada, ce 14 Sept. 1812, à 8 heures du matin.

J'ai continué à avancer depuis que je vous ai écrit le 12, et mes troupes seront aujourd'hui à Palenzuela, et le quartier général et le gros de l'armée à Cordovilla.

Il serait à désirer que vous puissiez venir demain avec vos troupes à Quintana del Puente.

To Gen. Don Xavier Elio.

Cordovilla, 14th Sept. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 9th inst.

I recommended to his Excellency Gen. J. O'Donell that he should put himself in communication with this army, lest the troops under his command should be destroyed by those of Soult, on the expected march of the latter from Andalusia into the kingdom of Valencia; and I recommended the same to you.

All that I am anxious about is that none of the bodies of Spanish troops now existing should be defeated, as I am of opinion that if that misfortune can be avoided for a short time, there are grounds for me to hope that we may be able to oblige the enemy to evacuate the Peninsula.

* See page 65.

G. O.

Cordovilla, 14th Sept. 1812.

2. Ensign —, of the — regt., having been dismissed from the Portuguese service, is to join the 40th regt. forthwith.

3. The Commandant of Santarem is to communicate to him this order, and he is to see that he obeys it; and Major Royal will report on what day Ensign — sets out from the dépôt.

Under these circumstances, your Excellency will be the best judge whether, with a corps now consisting of 4000 infantry and 1300 cavalry, which when more than double that number were lately defeated by one French division, it is expedient that you should expose yourself to be attacked by an army which does not amount to much less than 50,000 men.

In regard to the proposal of your Excellency, to draw from Alicante the division of Spanish troops under the command of Gen. Roche, I have to remind your Excellency that these troops are the garrison of Alicante; and your Excellency is much mistaken if you suppose that I will allow the British troops under Lieut. Gen. Maitland to be the garrison of Alicante, instead of those under Gen. Roche.

I now give notice to your Excellency, that if I don't learn by the return of the courier that you have ordered Gen. Roche to remain at Alicante, I shall send orders to Gen. Maitland to embark the troops under his command from Alicante, where it will, in that case, be useless for them to remain.

The facts regarding Alicante are as follow: There are no provisions in the place for the Spanish troops, and the place cannot be supplied unless the communication should be kept open with the sea. The communication with the sea will be lost unless the troops at Alicante can maintain themselves on the heights outside of the town; and there will not be a sufficient number to hold that position, if the troops under Gen. Roche should be withdrawn.

If the eastern heights cannot be maintained, your Excellency will see the necessity for my withdrawing my troops; and your Excellency will do well to give orders that the Spanish troops under Gen. Whittingham should be withdrawn likewise; and it will be necessary that your Excellency should be prepared to give satisfactory reasons to the government for the loss of this important post.

I would also request your Excellency to consider the measure of weakening the force at Alicante, under another point of view. It appears to

A. G. O.

Cordovilla, 14th Sept. 1812.

1. The officers commanding regiments of cavalry and infantry are directed to send orders to the officers or non-commissioned officers in charge of the baggage and clothing of their regiments, at Lisbon, to make application to the officer of the Q. M. G.'s department at Lisbon, for orders and means to transport to the army the baggage and clothing of their regiments, now required for the officers and troops, it being understood that it is the wish of the Commander of the Forces, that every soldier in the army should receive his clothing at or before Christmas.

2. The applications to the officer of the Q. M. G.'s department, at Lisbon, must contain a list of the articles required to be sent up; specifying how packed, what is the weight of the whole, and if possible that of each package.

3. The officers commanding regiments are requested to inform the Q. M. G. of the names of the officers or non-commissioned officers who are desired to apply for orders, and means to convey the clothing to the several regiments.

4. The officer of the Q. M. G.'s department at Lisbon will receive directions from the Q. M. G. regarding the mode of executing this service, which he will convey to the several officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of the baggage of the regiments at Lisbon; and as a concern of this magnitude can be carried on only by the utmost regularity, the Commander of the Forces declares that any deviation, by any person, from the orders issued on the subject, will be punished according to the sentence of a Court Martial.

5. The regiments whose clothing is at Abrantes, must apply to the Q. M. G., at head quarters, for orders and means of transporting it, specifying in the application what articles of clothing there are, and in whose charge at Abrantes.

be the enemy's intention to collect his army in Valencia, or possibly in Valencia and La Mancha; and I am doing every thing in my power to collect the largest and most efficient body of troops which I can, in order, if possible, to oblige them to evacuate that kingdom, or, at all events, to enable us to maintain the ground which we have acquired.

The views of all ought to be directed to these objects; and certainly nothing will facilitate their execution to such a degree as the maintenance in Valencia on the flank and rear of the enemy of such a post as Alicante, garrisoned by a corps which must secure it, and which is sufficiently strong to take the field, and re-conquer the kingdom of Valencia, in case the enemy should weaken the force which it is expected he will have in that quarter.

I beg your Excellency will consider the suggestions which I have above detailed, and let me know whether you intend or not to withdraw Gen. Roche from Alicante, that I may take my measures accordingly. I assure your Excellency, that I have no object in wishing to keep a strong corps at Alicante, excepting views for the benefit of your country, which at least have the merit of having been maturely considered.

The A.G. to Capt. Peebles, Salamanca.

14th Sept. 1812.

In reply to the circumstance detailed in your letter of the 8th inst., I am to observe that all Courts Martial held at the several depôt stations should be invariably sent to head quarters for the approval of the Commander of the Forces. In reference to the latter part of your letter, it would appear from Nos. 1 and 2 of the G.O. of the 23d May last, that the Commander of the Forces expects that the General officers of the army should make inspections of the depôt stations as opportunities offer; but I know of no officer of that rank having authority to interfere therein.

To the Earl of Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury.

Revilla, 15th Sept. 1812.

I received by the packet by Coruña your letter of the 28th Aug., in which you enclosed the copies of the correspondence which you had had with Lord Somerville, respecting the purchase of the manor of Wellington, and the estate of Wellington Park. I am very much obliged to you for your attention to my interests. It rarely happens that a person in your situation has leisure to attend to his own private affairs, much less to those of any other individual; and it is particularly gratifying to me to find that not only your Lordship, but Mr. Perceval had recollected me when a property was offered for sale which I am most anxious to possess.

When the Prince Regent promoted me in the peerage last spring, and made an addition to my pension, I determined, for the sake of my sons, to lay out all the money I had in the purchase of land in Great Britain, and I directed that inquiries might be made for a suitable purchase for me. I likewise intend to lay out in the same manner the sum of money which His Royal Highness has declared his intention to recommend to Parliament to grant me. The inquiries which have been made have not hitherto produced any favorable result; and I could not make any purchase with which I should be so well satisfied as that on which you have written to me. I am ready therefore to pay the money as soon as I shall receive your answer to this letter. I am rather inclined, however, to wish to receive the estate and manor as a gift from the public as part of the

£100,000, if your Lordship should see no objection; but if there should be any, I shall be too happy to make the purchase out of my private funds.

While writing upon this subject, it occurs to me, that as I propose to lay out all the money which the public will grant me in the purchase of land in Great Britain, it would save me some trouble, and might probably be more advantageous to the public, if the value were granted in land. However, I suggest this to your Lordship, to be attended to only in case there should be no objections.

I beg leave once more to return you my thanks for your kind attention to what would be gratifying to me.

To Lieut. Gen. F. Maitland.

Villa Toro, 20th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 3d, 6th, and 10th inst. In that of the 3d, in which you have returned answers to the queries contained in my letter of the 29th ult., it appears to be the opinion of the Admiral, that the troops can be embarked as long as your extensive line can be maintained; but that the communication with the sea would be difficult and uncertain, and probably only partially practicable, if it should depend upon the lower lines. The opinion of the Admiral concurs with the notion which I had formed on this subject when I instructed you to maintain your position till you should find the communication with the sea to be so seriously menaced as to be in danger of being lost.

It appears to me that as long as you can maintain the castle of Alicante, and the hills to the south, your communication with the sea would be easy and certain. I should hope, therefore, that it would not be impracticable to embark the whole of the troops, after you are of opinion that you can no longer maintain the exterior line.

His Majesty and the public have a right to expect from us that we should place a reasonable confidence in the gallantry and discipline of the troops under our command; and I have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having tried them frequently, they have never failed me; and in a position particularly on the flanks of which the enemy cannot manœuvre with the advantage of a superior cavalry, their success may be relied upon.

With a full knowledge of the defects of the Spanish troops, I feel the same confidence in them when placed on a position, and having the advantage of the co-operation and example of the British troops; and I entertain so little doubt of your success if you be attacked, that there is nothing I wish for so much, for your own honor and the advantage of the cause, as that the enemy should attack you *de vive force*.

If they should proceed by a regular attack upon your field positions, or upon those fortified posts with which they are connected, you will at least have time to estimate your danger, and leisure to make all your arrangements, and embark at the moment such a measure may be necessary.

I assure you that your facilities for embarkation are much greater, and your prospects better, even if left by yourself, than mine were in the year 1810. I advert to this subject in order to inspire you with confidence

G. O.

Frاندovinez, 17th Sept. 1812.

1. Col. Gordon, Q. M. G. of the army, is appointed a Colonel on the Staff from the 25th June last.

in your own situation; which you may depend upon it is so good that I only fear that the enemy will not think of touching you.

Cornet de Lobo is an officer of this army. I shall be obliged to you if you will give him 200 dollars, to be sent to his father by means of a flag of truce from your outposts, together with any money, clothes, &c., which he may have brought with him. Desire him to return and join his corps forthwith, as he may depend upon it that the French will not allow him to see his father. I should have prevented his going if I had known of it. Let me know how I shall repay you the 200 dollars.

We invested this place yesterday, and took by storm last night the horn work, which commands the greatest part of the works of the castle. I doubt however that I have means to take the castle, which is very strong.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 20th Sept. 1812.

I think it proper to send to you a copy of a letter which I have received from Gen. Maitland of the 30th ult., likewise the copy of one of the 2d inst., and the copy of a letter which I have written to him this day.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 20th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 14th, in which you have informed me that you will be at Oropesa on the 18th; and I beg that on the receipt of this letter you will move with all the troops under your command to Toledo. You will throw your cavalry forward in La Mancha; and canton your infantry in Toledo and Aranjuez, taking care that the officers and troops respect the King's houses and gardens.

I enclose you the instructions which I gave to Major Gen. C. Alten when I quitted Madrid.* I have ordered the Major General to place himself under your command; and I beg you to communicate with Gen. Elio, who commands the troops which are under the command of Gen. O'Donell, and with Don Carlos de España.

I can scarcely think it possible that, with such a force as you will have, you will not be able to defend the Tagus; therefore a part of these instructions may not be applicable to your situation. I think it desirable that you should leave the troops of this army in their present situations till you shall find it necessary to order them forward to the Tagus.

I enclose the order which I have sent to Gen. Cooke, regarding the disposal of the troops at Cadiz. I beg you to send an officer to meet Col. Skerrett in Estremadura, with orders to follow your march across and along the Tagus; and to join the troops under your command.

I send a duplicate of this letter to Major Gen. C. Alten, to be forwarded to you, and he will report himself to you. As soon as you shall be established at Toledo, and shall have opened your communication with me through Madrid, you may take off the letter parties ordered to be placed up to Arevalo by my letter of the 8th inst. I order Gen. C. Alten to continue to correspond with me.

It appears that it would be desirable to deprive the enemy of Consuegra, to which I beg to draw your attention.

I request you to order Col. Buchan to return to Elvas with the 5th, 17th, and 22d regts. of Portuguese infantry of the line, and the 3d regt.

* See p. 50.

of cavalry. I did not know there was a 4th regt. of infantry belonging to the garrison. If there is, it should return likewise.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.

Villa Toro, 20th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 8th and 12th, and I am delighted to find that you are come out. I direct this letter to Ciudad Rodrigo, to which place I think it probable that you will come from Castello Branco, as it is scarcely possible that it can meet you at the latter. You will do well to come to head quarters by the military route of Salamanca, Arevalo, Valladolid, &c. Arevalo is a little out of the way; but I have kept our communication by that point, because it answers for communication with Madrid and with Hill, who is, I hope, at Oropesa.

When I found that the King had decidedly passed the mountains into Valencia, I determined to make use of the time which would elapse before I could go to the south (which I then thought it possible I should be obliged to do) in settling our affairs upon the Duero, and in establishing a good communication between us and the Spanish army of Galicia.

The probability that Soult would evacuate Andalusia, of which I was aware before I quitted Madrid, or the certainty that he had raised the siege of Cadiz, and abandoned Seville, which I obtained at a subsequent period, was not calculated to induce me to alter this determination. I was certain that, whenever Soult should connect himself with Suchet and the King, we should be pressed a little on the Tagus, and that it was desirable to remove to a distance all embarrassments existing on this side, and to strengthen ourselves as much as possible in this quarter, preparatory to the events which might be expected on the Tagus.

We passed the Duero on the 6th, and drove the French from Valladolid: on the 7th we pushed them on, but not very vigorously, till the 16th, on which day we were joined by about 12,000 men of the army of Galicia. We then drove the enemy before us to Burgos: on the 17th they retired through the town at night, and have since continued their march to Riobena.*

The castle of Burgos commands all the bridges over the Arlanzon so completely, that we were not able to cross that river till yesterday morning. We immediately drove in all the enemy's posts; and last night took by storm a horn work lately constructed upon a hill within 300 yards of the castle, which has a considerable command over many of the works of the castle. Although we succeeded, the operation was not very well carried on, and I am afraid that our loss is not less than 300 men. After all, I am a little apprehensive that I have not means to take this castle, which the French have strengthened to the utmost of their power. I shall be able to judge better however in a day or two. Although I have here only 4 divisions of infantry and 3 brigades of cavalry, I think that with the Spaniards we are strong enough for any thing the French have or can now bring against us on this side. If I could get this castle, I think I might

* Thus written in the draft of this letter, and also in the great map of Lopez; but Rubena in the *Diccionario Geografico-estadistico* of Miñano, and the *Guia de Caminos* of the Madrid Post office.

take some of the force southward, and I must still endeavor to do so, even though I should not succeed in taking the castle.

I have accounts from Madrid to the 17th. They had not any late accounts of Soult which could be much relied upon; nor does it appear that he had quitted Granada. He had intended to move into Valencia through Murcia; but as the yellow fever prevails in Murcia, I think he will pass by Caravaca to Albacete, from whence he will communicate with the King in Valencia. I have one account stating that he was on the 9th within 9 leagues of Caravaca; but, on the other hand, I have letters from Gen. Elio from San Clemente to the 15th, who does not mention Soult, of whom he must have heard, if he had been on the 9th so far forward as is stated. I have now given you an outline of our situation as far as I am acquainted with it.

Besides Hill's corps I have 3 weak divisions and 2 weak brigades of cavalry, at and near Madrid. But we shall have, I should think, not less than 12,000 Spaniards, besides innumerable guerrillas; indeed we have plenty of that commodity every where; and Ballesteros has 12,000 or 15,000 men, which will be on Soult's left, where are likewise 4000 or 5000 men on their march from Cadiz; and there is an army under Gen. Maitland at Alicante. Upon the whole therefore I don't despair of the continuance of our success through the campaign, particularly if the cavalry expected from England should land at an early period.

To Major Gen. Baron C. Alten.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and I enclose the duplicate of a letter to Gen. Sir R. Hill, which I beg you to peruse and to forward to him by an officer express to Oropesa. If he passes through Talavera, he will probably meet him there.

You will put yourself under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, and will communicate with him as well as with me. Desire your brother to take the command of his brigade.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812, 9 A.M.

I am anxious to confine the enemy a little more to the castle; and I have it in contemplation to take possession this evening of the exterior line of their works. As I understand that Col. Brown* was of great service, at the siege of Salamanca, in keeping down the enemy's fire of La Merced, by the possession of the neighbouring houses, I shall be obliged to you if you will leave him in charge of the troops of the 6th division in the town, and direct him to make arrangements for placing the troops under his command in the houses close to the walls, and for keeping possession, as soon as we shall be prepared to lodge ourselves in the exterior line.

I shall also be much obliged to you if you will look at the posts occupied by the Spaniards, and see whether, by a better connexion of their

* Sir Gustavus Brown, then Major in the 60th regt., and Lieut. Colonel commanding the 9th Portuguese caçadores.

posts with ours, or by a better arrangement of them, we could confine the enemy more effectually than we have hitherto.

To Mr. Heydeck, Professor of Oriental Languages.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 8th inst., and I had before received those which you had written me, to which I did not write an answer, as they did not appear to require one.

I beg leave to return you my thanks for your last letter, and to assure you that I shall be happy to receive from you the communication of any facts, the knowledge of which by me you think interesting to the cause.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I have just received your letters of the 10th and 17th inst. I wish the 1st batt. 1st foot guards to move through Galicia as already arranged; but instead of turning off from the high road at Villa Franca, as directed when the enemy was in possession of Astorga, and it was supposed they would maintain that position, I wish them now to proceed by Astorga on to Benavente. Mr. White must make provision for them till they will arrive at Benavente. At Benavente, or before they will arrive there, a Staff officer of this army shall meet them, and they will receive further orders for their march.

The messenger who takes this, has a letter from the Q. M. G. for the Commanding officer of the 1st batt. 1st foot guards, of which I enclose a duplicate, in case there should be any mistake about that with which he is charged.

We took by storm on the 19th the outwork of the castle of Burgos, with some loss.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 12th. The mistake regarding the Spanish clothing originates in the constant practice of our government in corresponding with two persons on the same subject. This clothing was to be at my disposal and in charge of the Commissary Gen., one of the officers of this army. For what reason then are they to trouble you with it? and it is obvious that with the best intention you and I may give different orders regarding it, and your arrangements may not suit mine. My letter to you of the 8th July referred only to the equipments for 5000 cavalry. My orders to the Commissary Gen. to send clothing to Coruña, and my letter to Adm. Martin to request him to supply shipping for that clothing, referred only to the particular clothing mentioned in the order for the Galician army, and for the guerrillas of Marquinez.

It appears, however, that in consequence of your letter to England, all the clothing for the Spanish army to be at my disposal is to go to Coruña, besides the clothing which I have sent there for these purposes; and besides the equipments for the cavalry referred to in my letter to you on the 8th July. We are at cross purposes, therefore, on this subject. You have sent me accounts of the clothing transmitted from Lisbon to Coruña under my own orders. I want to have the accounts of the clothing sent

there, or to be sent there by the Sec. of State: in consequence of your letter I have disposed of the former. I must know accurately what there is before I can dispose of the latter.

I concur with you respecting licences to vessels under Portuguese colors.

P.S. I enclose an estimate of the value of the supplies to the Portuguese government in this month.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I continued to follow the enemy with the troops under my command till the 16th, when I was joined at Pampliega by 3 divisions of infantry and a small body of cavalry of the army of Galicia, his Excellency the Capt. Gen. Castaños having arrived at head quarters on the 14th. The enemy had on the 16th taken a strong position on the heights behind Celada del Camino, and arrangements were made to attack them on the morning of the 17th; but the enemy retired in the night; and they were driven on the 17th to the heights close to Burgos. They retired through the town in the night, leaving behind them some clothing and other stores, and a large quantity of wheat and barley; and have since continued their retreat to Briviesca, where it is reported that they have been joined by 7000 conscripts. It is likewise reported that the Prince of Essling has been ordered by the local government in France to come and take the command of the army.

The castle of Burgos commands the passages of the river Arlanzon in the neighbourhood and the roads communicating with them so completely, that we could not pass the river till the 19th; when we effected that operation in 2 columns, the 5th division and Gen. Bradford's brigade above, and the 1st division and Gen. Pack's brigade and Gen. Anson's cavalry below the town. Burgos is situated in that division of Spain allotted to the army of the North; and Gen. Caffarelli, who had been here on the 17th, had placed in the castle a garrison of the troops of that army, consisting, as is reported, of 2500 men. The enemy had taken considerable pains to fortify the castle of Burgos; and had occupied with a horn work the hill of San Miguel, which has a considerable command over some of the works of the castle at the distance of 300 yards. They had likewise occupied other parts of the hill with flèches and other works for the protection of their piquets and out-posts.

As soon as the 1st division crossed the Arlanzon on the 19th, the enemy's outposts were driven in by the light infantry battalion of Col. Stirling's brigade, under the command of Major the Hon. C. Cocks, supported by Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade; and the enemy's outworks on the hill of San Miguel, with the exception of the horn work, were occupied by our troops, which were posted close to the horn work.

As soon as it was dark, the same troops, with the addition of the 42d regt., attacked and carried by assault the horn work which the enemy had occupied in strength. In this operation Brig. Gen. Pack, Lieut. Col. Hill of the 1st Portuguese regt., Col. Campbell of the 16th Portuguese regt., Major Williams of the 4th caçadores, Major Dick of the 42d regt., and

Major the Hon. C. Cocks of the 79th, commanding the light infantry battalion, distinguished themselves. The latter, in particular, led the attack of the enemy's posts in the morning, and entered the horn work by the gorge at night. We took 3 pieces of cannon and one Captain and 62 prisoners; but I am sorry to add that our loss was severe, as appears by the enclosed return.

It was impossible to ascertain the exact state of the works of the castle of Burgos till we had obtained possession of the hill of San Miguel; and as far as I can judge of them, I am apprehensive that the means which I have are not sufficient to enable me to take the castle. I am informed, however, that the enemy are ill provided with water; and that their magazines of provisions are in a place exposed to be set on fire. I think it possible, therefore, that I may have it in my power to force them to surrender, although I may not be able to lay the place open to assault.

Since the 19th we have been employed in establishing ourselves on the hill of San Miguel, and in constructing those works which are best calculated to forward our future operations. The whole of the army have crossed the Arlanzon, with the exception of the 6th division and one division of Spanish infantry.

I have accounts from Lieut. Gen. Hill of the 14th. He was then at Truxillo, and had received my orders, and was to be at Oropesa on the 18th. I have ordered him to march to Toledo, and to defend the Tagus; taking under his command the 3 divisions of this army, and Lieut. Gen. Alten's and Gen. D'Urban's cavalry, and Don Carlos de España's division of infantry, which are at and near Madrid.

I have not heard that Marshal Soult has yet left Granada. He was still there on the 8th. Gen. Ballesteros had followed the enemy's movements from the Guadalete, and had been very successful. He was at Loja on the 6th.

The enemy had abandoned Andujar and Jaen; and the line of their retreat was certainly through Valencia; but it is not impossible that, when they shall have heard that I have moved to the North, they will endeavor to pass through La Mancha, which Gen. Hill's position will prevent.

The last accounts I have from Alicante are of the 10th. The King's army and that of Suchet were still in Valencia.

I have no late accounts from Cadiz.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the assault and capture of the Fort of San Miguel, on the 19th Sept. 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	6	5	60	71
Wounded	15	21	297	333
Missing	—	—	16	16

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

I beg to draw your attention to the letters which I transmit this day from Lieut. Gen. Maitland.

You will see that a reinforcement has already arrived for the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and that more are expected. Some time will elapse, however, before that army can be formidable; and if I can bring this siege to a fortunate conclusion at an early period, I don't yet despair of working the French beyond the Ebro, particularly if Sir Home can draw the attention of the army of the North, so as to prevent any large proportion of that body from being brought against us. The worst of our situation is, that the Spaniards can do nothing by themselves; we must have British troops every where, and I am afraid that I must be wherever a serious operation is to be carried on.

Gen. Paget is arrived and on his way up. He will be of great use.

The Spaniards have no cavalry. The guerrillas are almost useless in serious operations, even when with our troops; and we have not enough for the extent of ground we are obliged to occupy, and the system of our operations.

Our loss was much greater on the 19th than it ought to have been; which was to be attributed very much to the inexperience of the — regt. If I had had here some of the troops who have stormed so often, I should not have lost a fourth of the number.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 31st Aug., and for the money. Napoleons will pass here very well.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 21st Sept. 1812.

It is very necessary that the heads of the Commissariat and Medical departments, and the Deputy Paymaster Gen., should attend to the state of the civil departments of this army. We have not at this moment an officer of any one of those departments in reserve; and I am obliged to employ the regimental surgeons to attend the general hospitals, to the great inconvenience of the regiments.

With every regiment in the army deficient in officers, owing to the number of sick and wounded, and those doing duty with the Portuguese service, I am obliged to furnish officers of the army to take charge of money going from one station to another for the service of the civil departments; because there is no officer of either the Pay department or the Commissariat who can be spared to go in charge of the money.

There are many officers of the Pay, Commissariat, and Medical departments, who have gone to England for the recovery of their health, and have never returned to their duty. I shall transmit you a list of their names. The rule which I have adopted in respect to the officers of the Staff, should be applied to them; viz., that if absent on account of sickness for more than 2 months, they should forfeit their Staff pay. It is not reasonable that the public should pay officers Staff pay who are unable to serve.

The heads of civil departments will tell you that there are with this army a number of officers larger than ever before attended any British army; but they forget that our operations are extended infinitely beyond

those of any army that has been sent abroad lately ; and that owing to the nature of the war in which we are engaged, and of the allies with whom we co-operate, they are extended to a much greater degree than might be expected, even in this war. In fact we want officers of the civil departments for two armies of our number, instead of for one. The only mode in which we can be kept complete, is for the heads of departments in England to pay attention to the returns, and to replace officers as soon as they shall learn that those here have fallen sick, or are gone home.

As nearly the whole army is here, I see no reason why the whole of the officers of the civil departments of the army should not be here likewise.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 22d Sept. 1812.

I received this morning your letter of the 12th, and I am happy to find that your general health has been improved by your journey. I have no doubt that the voyage will be of use to you.

I shall be very glad to receive any official complaint, or any complaint which I can notice, of the conduct of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to the French prisoners. In the mean time, I have stopped their pay.

If I should find that the order of the Tower and Sword is prostituted, I shall not wear it, and will recommend to all British officers to follow my example ; and I request you will inform Dom M. Forjaz of this determination, or any other person who will carry it to the Prince Regent.

I have ordered the greatest part of the troops at Cadiz, including the 20th regt., either to join the army through Estremadura, or to proceed to Lisbon, according as Major Gen. Cooke may have it in his power to provide for them. I rather think they will march, as I understand from his letters that they had already moved up to Seville to wait for orders ; so that they must have means.

I have ordered Hill's corps to Toledo, sending back to Portugal the 5th, 17th, and 22d regts., and the 3d regt. of cavalry. Hill talks of a fourth regiment, as one of the garrison regiments which I ordered him to send back ; but I conclude he means a battalion of caçadores, which, whether regiment or battalion, has been halted in Estremadura, and is ordered to Elvas.

I conceive that the time is now arrived when the greatest part, if not the whole, of the Portuguese militia may be disbanded. I should think one complete regiment, and a battalion of caçadores, with the artillery, a sufficient garrison for Elvas ; another regiment might be placed at Almeida, and one at Abrantes, with dismounted cavalry, &c. There might be 2 battalions of militia kept in arms in the North in case of accidents, and every thing else throughout the Kingdom might be disbanded. I should hope that this reduction of expense would enable the government to provide for the pay of the army beyond the frontiers. I assure you that the deficiency of their pay is become a matter of serious importance ; and unless the government can provide for it, we must draw back.

I don't believe we are at all behindhand with the subsidy ; but if we are, it is to the amount of a mere trifle ; and I will not admit for a moment that the irregularity of the payment of the subsidy is any excuse for the irregularity of the payment of the troops. I still insist upon it, that the

Portuguese government have not adopted the measures which they ought to adopt, to raise that revenue from the country which the country is able and ought to be made to pay, whether the subsidy is in arrear or not; and however the right to demand money may increase in consequence of the decrease of the demand for supplies in kind, in consequence of disbanding the militia, I give notice that I cannot increase the advances from the military chest of this army. The Portuguese government had better take an early opportunity of representing this matter to the King's government, and not trouble me upon it when they shall feel the evil.

I have desired Hill to order Col. Diggins to join his corps with his regiment of cavalry. You will see, from my dispatch of yesterday, how we stand. I hope that we may take this place; but I doubt it. I have neither officers nor good troops, the whole of which I have left behind me; and I can undertake nothing with hopes of success without great loss. However, if I can get the place, which the French have made very strong, at an early period, I hope I shall have a fine game before me.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Villa Toro, 22d Sept. 1812.

I received your letter last night. I was on the point of writing to inform you that I should be happy to have the benefit of your assistance again, when I heard from Col. Torrens that you were appointed to the Staff of this army. I shall be very happy to place you in your old situation, which I hope I shall be able to do. But you had better come up to head quarters by Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, and Arevalo. You will hear at the last two where head quarters are; and before I see you, I shall know whether I can place you where you were before.

To Major Gen. Oswald.

Villa Toro, 22d Sept. 1812.

I received your letter of the 14th this morning, and I am happy to find that you are appointed to the Staff of this army. You will do well to proceed from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, and thence to Arevalo and Valladolid to join the head quarters of the army. You will hear at Salamanca or Arevalo where they are.

Plan for the attack of the exterior line of the castle of Burgos.

22d Sept. 1812.

1. Lieut. Col. Brown to take possession of the houses along the south front as soon as it is dark.

2. He is to be supplied with 12 axes, which are to be sent to him by a person who will certainly find him this night.

3. The 400 men of the 1st division ordered to be in readiness, are to move as soon as the moon rises, and to proceed to the flèche immediately on the right, looking from the camp, of the horn work. Lieut. Col. Burgoyne will take care that there is an officer to conduct them to the spot.

4. They are then to take up the ladders and 12 axes, and are to proceed and place themselves under cover of the banks opposite the exterior line of the castle.

5. At 11 P.M. 200 men of this party are to move forward to storm the wall of the exterior line at the place pointed out by officers to be named by Lieut. Col. Burgoyne. The remaining 200 men are to be formed

behind the bank, and are to protect by their fire the advance of the party to storm. The storming party are to consist of 30 men, to carry 5 long ladders, 12 men with axes, and then one officer and 20 men, who are to mount the ladders, to be followed immediately by 50 more as soon as the ladders are planted, and then by the remainder of the party of 200 appointed to storm.

6. At 10 minutes before 11, Col. Brown is to order 130 men of the troops under his command to move out from the houses on the south front of the castle. They are to pass the small ditch, &c., and are to move up to the palisade, which they are to cut down, and open a communication with the storming party, which will move to the front of the line.

7. These men are to protect the right of the storming party, being themselves covered by the palisade; and Col. Brown will direct that a heavy fire may be kept up from the houses to be occupied by his troops on the enemy's interior line.

8. As soon as the enemy are driven from the interior line, and the storming party are established in the guard house, and a communication established with Col. Brown's detachments, the 200 men in reserve behind the bank are to be employed at work in laying open the wall, and in securing the storming party on the ground before morning.

Au Général Don Carlos de España.

Villa Toro, ce 22 Sept. 1812.

Je vous envoie une gazette de Madrid, dans laquelle il est encore une fois question de moi et de l'armée sous mes ordres.

Je vous prie de faire savoir à l'imprimeur de cette gazette, qu'il ne peut pas rendre un service plus important à l'ennemi que de donner des nouvelles sur l'armée alliée, et surtout sur moi. Je sais que les Généraux Français, surtout ceux à la distance, ne savent que ce qu'ils apprennent par les gazettes que le gouvernement et les Cortes sont assez fous pour laisser imprimer partout en Espagne. L'imprimeur à Madrid jugera s'il est convenable de fournir ces nouvelles à l'ennemi. Je ne serais pas du tout étonné si Suchet et Soult se dirigent vers Madrid; et je vous prie de dire à Messieurs les magistrats de la ville de Madrid, et à l'imprimeur de la gazette de Madrid, que si j'y vois encore mon nom, ou la désignation du lieu où je suis, ou d'aucun détachement de l'armée sous mes ordres, je retirerai mes troupes, et je laisserai la ville de Madrid à son sort.

The A.G. to Officers commanding at hospital stations.

23d Sept. 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you that the several Courts Martial hereafter held by your order at the dépôt station under your command are to be approved by yourself, and not sent to head quarters for his Excellency's approval.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Clinton, 6th division.

23d Sept. 1812.

By the direction of the Commander of the Forces I have herewith the honor to enclose you a copy of the pass order of this evening, and agreeably thereto I am to request you will furnish the covering party as therein detailed. It will be necessary (as the covering party is relieved every 12 hours) that they should be in the trenches by 7 o'clock to-morrow morning, passing from your camp to the post occupied by Col. Brown, at the —, where they will be met by an officer of the engineers, who will give them further instructions as to the trench they are to occupy.

Au Gén. Don Carlos de España.

Villa Toro, ce 24 Sept. 1812.

Vous voyez les conséquences des nouvelles publiées dans la gazette du 5. Je l'ai bien dit que vers le 15 nous verrions que les Français de Valence se mettraient en mouvement. Comme ce Monsieur a déjà tant publié, je vous prie de lui faire publier que le Général Hill, avec son armée, est à Tolède, et qu'on m'attend tous les jours; mais rien de plus.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

I have heard of your arrival at Lisbon, and I am happy to find that you are pretty well. I enclose an anonymous letter, which contains some facts regarding Col. Campbell, which probably might as well be inquired into.

We are not going on in a very satisfactory way here; however, if we are lucky in the next 2 days I think I shall take the place.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

I am much in want of 40 barrels of gunpowder, each containing 90 lbs., for the attack of this place; and I should be very much obliged to you if you can let me have this quantity from the ships under your command.

I send with this letter one to the principal Spanish authority at Santander, to request him to supply 20 mules to carry here this quantity of powder, whose hire I will pay on their arrival with this army; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate with this gentleman, and urge him to send the powder without loss of time.

If he will let me know by what road it will pass, and on what day, I will send relays of mules to meet it.

Au Gén. Don Carlos de España.

Villa Toro, ce 26 Sept. 1812.

Je vous envoie l'ordonnance pour le paiement de la seconde moitié du mois de Juillet.

Il faut que je vous dise cependant que je ne suis pas du tout satisfait de la conduite de la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo. J'ai des plaintes de la part de tous les officiers qui ont passé par là dernièrement, de la conduite atroce qu'ils ont tenu envers les prisonniers Français, dont ils étaient l'escorte depuis Ciudad Rodrigo jusqu'à Sabugal; surtout ceux qui étaient prisonniers par des capitulations à Madrid et à Guadalaxara, signées par moi.

G. O.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, from a perusal of the proceedings of a General Court Martial on the trial of Capt. ———, of the — regt., ———, that the orders which he has repeatedly issued to this army, regarding the conduct of officers in quarters and cantonments, regarding their conduct on a march, regarding the inspections of the soldiers' necessaries, and particularly their ammunition, have not been attended to in the ———; and as Lieut. Col. Stewart, their late commanding officer, was very attentive to his duty, the Commander of the Forces is apprehensive that the want of attention to these orders is more general than he has hitherto imagined.

2. He entreats the Commanding and other officers of regiments to peruse, with attention, the G. O. of the army, and to make themselves masters of the duties which those orders impose upon them, and to perform them with strictness and regularity.

3. They may depend upon it that unless the duties, prescribed in these orders, are performed with regularity, the regiments cannot be kept in the order in which they ought to be for the service required from them.

Vous savez, M. le Général, sous quelles conditions j'ai promis de donner la solde aux troupes sous vos ordres ; et vous savez si j'ai agi selon ma promesse. Le fait est que vous avez reçu plus que mes troupes depuis que cet arrangement a eu lieu. Mais je ne donnerai plus d'argent aux officiers et troupes qui n'ont pas de discipline, et qui osent piller et massacrer des prisonniers de guerre avec lesquels j'avais fait capitulation. Les officiers de la garnison n'ont pas fait leur devoir, ou ce malheur ne serait pas arrivé ; et je ne payerai pas des officiers qui ne font pas leur devoir. N'ayant pas fait leur devoir, ils auraient du être punis ; et je ne payerai pas les chefs qui ne punissent pas ceux qui négligent leurs devoirs.

J'espérais pouvoir vous envoyer des rapports officiels sur ce sujet, que vous auraient mis dans le cas de punir ceux qui ont mal agi ; mais je ne les ai pas encore reçus. Je n'ai pas voulu détenir plus long temps la solde de votre division ; mais je vous prie de retenir dans vos mains celle de la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo, jusqu'à ce que je sache que ceux qui ont commis ce désordre ont été punis.

J'ai un hôpital à Ciudad Rodrigo ; on me dit que la ville est si sale, que je crains que d'être obligé de l'en éloigner. Je vous prie d'en dire un mot au Gouverneur.

To His Excellency C. Stuart.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

I have not yet received from Mr. Dalrymple the statement of prices to enable me to answer your letter of the 17th as fully as I could wish ; but having made up my mind upon one point in the question which is the principal one, I think it best to lose no time in writing to you.

The horses would be of no use to the British army, and I believe of none to the Portuguese. The latter can get as many horses as they have money to pay for, from Spain, at a cheaper rate.

If the Egyptian corn can be ground by Portuguese mills, which is I believe doubtful, and that it can be got at all, for goods, or military stores, take it at any reasonable price ; and write to England for the goods ; or I will endeavor to give some of the latter from Portugal and Cadiz.

If the corn cannot be got without *money*, I am afraid we must do without the corn, for we were never so badly off for money as at present. However, if the corn is reasonably cheap, and it can be ground, and Sampayo, or any other, can do any thing in the business, without distressing or rather depriving the military chest of any money, I will come into any arrangement that may be deemed expedient on the subject.

Brito had better go to Madrid ; but you must settle this matter with Sir W. Beresford.

I find that the Portuguese Commissaries refuse some wheat offered to them to supply their last demand. Surely the stomachs of the Portuguese soldiers are not nicer than those of our soldiers ; and Senhor Cardoso cannot suppose that I would allow the soldiers of either nation to eat bad bread ! The truth is, that there is no better wheat than what has been offered to him ; and if it will not answer, we cannot supply their wants. I know the reply, 'Then give us money,' to which I make the usual rejoinder, 'I have none to give.'

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 18th, and I am very happy that you are gratified by my presumption in reminding Lord Castlereagh of your claim to promotion in your line, or to some mark of His Majesty's favor.* I assure you that I did it from a sense of justice to you, which I hope will render the act still more agreeable to you; nor did I think or wish that it should ever come to your knowledge.

I am very happy to find that Lord Castlereagh had thought of you before he could have received the suggestion which I made to him.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

I have received your letters from the 16th to the 21st, and I now enclose my late dispatches, from which you will see how we stand.

We shall see in what form the proposition will be made to me to command the Spanish army, which I shall accept of, if it should be conferred in such a manner as to enable me to be of any service to the cause. At all events I will explain myself fully on the subject.

I strongly recommend to you to withhold all interference in the formation of any new government.

Can you supply Ballesteros with clothing and shoes?

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you can let me have from the squadron under your command at Santander 100,000 lbs. or 150,000 lbs. of biscuit, for which I will send to Santander.

We are not getting on very rapidly, and I don't feel certain that I shall

* Referring to a letter written to Lord Castlereagh on the 18th Aug., 'suggesting the propriety of conferring some mark of Royal favor upon Mr. Stuart.' The draft of the letter is missing. Sir C. Stuart was gazetted Knight of the Bath on the 26th Sept. 1812, but not actually knighted by Lord Wellington till the 17th Jan. 1813.

A. G. O.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

1. From the quantity of musket ammunition called for by the several divisions, since the commencement of the siege of the castle of Burgos, the Commander of the Forces is persuaded that his orders on this subject have not been obeyed.

2. These orders prescribed that the officers commanding companies shall inspect the ammunition of every soldier of the companies at every parade, and see that it is complete. The object of these orders is to prevent the waste or sale of ammunition, and that requisitions may be made on the stores at the moment any deficiency occurs.

3. The stores of musket ammunition are necessarily limited; and the state of them is founded upon the certainty that every soldier in the ranks has at all times in his possession 60 rounds: but this certainty cannot exist, and the stores must be insufficient, if the officers commanding companies neglect their duty, and do not inspect their ammunition at every parade, according to orders; and the consequence is, as happened in a late instance, that before the soldiers are engaged for five minutes, ammunition is wanting, and the stores are unnecessarily exhausted, at a great distance from all means of supplying them.

4. It gives the Commander of the Forces the greatest concern to be obliged to complain so frequently of disobedience of his orders by the officers of the army; but the instances are so constant and so glaring, and so likely to be attended by consequences of the utmost importance, that he should not perform his duty if he did not notice them.

5. He now desires that the Commanding officers of every regiment will report on the back of the daily state, the number of times each day that the regiment or battalion paraded, and that the musket ammunition was inspected at each parade, and whether complete or not. The General officer commanding the division is to report daily, on the back of the daily state from the division, at what hour on the preceding day each regiment had paraded, and that the musket ammunition had been reported to have been inspected, and whether it was complete or not.

succeed, as I have very little artillery and stores for my object; but I hope I may succeed. The enemy appear to be collected at Pancorbo and Miranda.

I send this in the cipher transmitted by Mr. Croker.

To the Earl of Mulgrave, Master General of the Ordnance. Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

I enclose 2 letters which I have lately received from Col. Robe, to which I wish to draw your attention, and to have your opinion on their contents. An officer of the Drivers, Lieut. —, was lately put into arrest for absenting himself without leave, and taking with him horses, mules, and drivers, belonging to the Brigade of Artillery, to which he was attached; and upon the inquiry, which I made into the circumstances of his arrest, it appeared to me that the number of drivers, horses, and baggage mules allowed to an officer of Drivers in this army, was enormous. I therefore desired that inquiry might be made from Col. Robe, whether it was customary in the artillery to provide for the carriage of the officers' baggage, when they received bāt and forage; in answer to which inquiry, the letter of the 10th Sept. was received.

In this army there is no baggage of any officer carried by the public, excepting of those of the Artillery. I believe that the custom of the Artillery service is as stated by Col. Robe; but it appears that the allowance to a Lieutenant of Drivers of one horse, 2 mules, and 2 drivers, is rather more than is necessary, or than what ought to exist.

It appears that the horse is no longer allowed; and one driver as the servant of the officer, and one mule for the baggage of the captain, and one for 2 subalterns, are as much as ought to be necessary, or ought to be given. However, of course I shall make no alteration on this subject till I hear from you.

We have a difficult job in hand, that is, to take a very strong castle well provided with artillery, and with a numerous garrison, without incurring a large loss of men, if possible, and without being provided with sufficient artillery, and without a large expenditure of ammunition. We are getting on, however, and I hope we may succeed. But I wish I could be a little more certain of success. If we do succeed soon, I hope to send the French army beyond the Ebro before the winter is over.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

The operations against the castle of Burgos have been continued, since I addressed you on the 20th; and on the night of the 22d, I directed that an attempt might be made to take by storm the exterior line of the enemy's works, one of the batteries destined to support our position within them having been in such a state of preparation as to afford hopes that it would be ready to open on the morning of the 23d. The attack was to have been made by detachments of Portuguese troops belonging to the 6th division which occupied the town of Burgos, and invested the castle on the S.W. side on the enemy's left, while a detachment of the 1st division under Major Lawrie of the 79th should scale the wall in front. Unfortunately, the Portuguese troops were so strongly opposed that they could not make any progress on the enemy's flank; and the escalade could not take place.

I am sorry to say that our loss was severe. Major Lawrie was killed, and Capt. Frazer, who commanded a detachment from the brigade of Guards, was wounded.* Both these officers, and indeed all those employed on this occasion, exerted themselves to the utmost; but the attack on the enemy's flank having failed, the success of the escalade was impracticable. We have since established ourselves close to the exterior wall, and have carried a gallery towards it; and I hope that a mine under it will be completed in the course of to-morrow. In the mean time our batteries are completed, and ready to open upon the enemy's interior lines, as soon as we shall have established our troops within the exterior lines.

The enemy's army are about Pancorbo, and at Miranda on the Ebro, with their advanced posts at Briviesca. They have made no movement to interrupt our operations.

Marshal Soult left Granada on the 15th, and marched towards the kingdom of Valencia, it is said by Caravaca. Gen. Ballesteros entered Granada on the 17th.

I imagine that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill is by this time at Toledo; but I have not heard from him since he passed the Tagus.

Gen. Elio, who now commands the troops lately commanded by Gen. J. O'Donell, took Consuegra by capitulation on the 22d.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 20th to the 26th Sept. 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	7	2	50	59
Wounded	12	13	264	289
Missing	—	—	—	—

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

I enclose the return which I have received of the medical department in this country, from which your Lordship will see how much we are in want of medical assistance. This want arises entirely from the practice of waiting till the last moment to send out the officers required from the Medical Board.

The returns go to them regularly, but for what purpose it is difficult to say, as no deficiency is ever supplied till the demand is made, and 3 or even 4 months then elapse before a medical officer, whose services are probably immediately required, can reach the army, after a requisition is made.

I likewise beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the practice of the Medical Board in promoting to vacancies in this army. Instead of pro-

* Now Colonel of the Ross-shire militia, son of the late Lieut. Gen. Alexander Mackenzie Frazer. His leg was amputated.

moting the officers on the spot, who deserve promotion highly from their merits and services, officers are selected in England, the Mediterranean, or elsewhere, to be promoted. The consequence is, increased delay in their arrival to perform their duty; and all who do arrive are sick in the first instance.

It would be but justice to promote those on the spot, who are performing the duty; and we should enjoy the advantage, and the seniors of the department at least would have experience in the disorders of the climate, and of the troops serving in this country, to which climate they would have become accustomed.

The juniors of the department only could, generally speaking, be absent from their duty from want of health.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 27th Sept. 1812.

I enclose a memorandum from Dr. M'Grigor regarding his allowance, to which I beg to draw your attention; and I shall be very happy if something can be done for him. He is a most deserving man, and has conducted the department of which he is the head with great success.

You will see by the morning state how we stand in respect to sick. The army in general is more healthy than it was at this season last year; indeed there is no disorder among the old soldiers, and none of them would be in hospital, if we had not had so many wounded during the campaign. But the regiments recently arrived, whether from England or the Straits, are very unhealthy; and the loss by death is almost confined to them. I am afraid that our soldiers are not sufficiently exercised in marching, when at home or in foreign garrisons; and they become sickly as soon as they are obliged to make a march. The non-commissioned officers, and I am afraid the officers, are very bad, and they neglect to attend to the food of the soldiers; and when they first take the field, they are not aware of the necessity of attending to this important point themselves.

We are getting on, but not so rapidly as I could wish; and I wish I could be more certain of final success. It is not easy, however, to take a strong place, well garrisoned, when one has not a sufficient quantity of cannon; when one is obliged to save ammunition on account of the distance of our magazines; and when one is desirous of saving the lives of soldiers. Then, nothing in the way of assault can be done excepting by a British soldier; and we can't afford to lose them at this distance from England and the sea. I shall know in a day or two whether I can take the place, and how soon.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

27th Sept. 1812.

I have laid before the Commander of the Forces the memorial forwarded under cover of your letter of the 17th inst., and I am directed by his Excellency to request a more detailed statement of facts than has been submitted under this memorial. Paymaster — must be called upon to state to whom and by whose order the money, on account of the — dragoon guards, was paid, which has not been accounted for; how much to each person; and how much unaccounted for by the individual to whom the money was paid; as, also, by whose order such sums were advanced.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

27th Sept. 1812.

An escort which was ordered yesterday from the 7th division, consisting of one subaltern, one serjeant, and 20 R. and F., to take charge of the wounded to the rear, not having arrived, and it being of the utmost consequence that these men should be attended by part of the escort as orderlies, independent of the guard that is required for the safety of the cars, I am to request that as the day is so far advanced, you will have the goodness to furnish this escort with the least possible delay; and I propose, as soon as the escort from the 7th division arrives, they should proceed to Pelilla, which is the first day's march, and about 2 leagues from here; and the escort from the 1st division can rejoin to-morrow morning. The escort, on reporting themselves to this office, will receive further instructions.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villa Toro, 26th Sept. 1812.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will have sent to Alicante, for the use of the troops under the command of Gen. Bassecourt, 2500 suits of infantry clothing; and if you can provide him with any equipments for cavalry, I will thank you to supply him with the articles named in the margin.

The A.G. to the Commandant at Ciudad Rodrigo.

28th Sept. 1812.

As a car is now on its route from Lisbon to Rodrigo with the printed G. O. of the army, I am to request that on the arrival of the same at that place, you will forward it with a fresh route to Salamanca, reporting thereon to this office; and in the event of the mules being knocked up, you will be pleased to make application to the Commissary for others. As it is desirable they should arrive as early as possible at head quarters, you will lose no time in carrying the necessary arrangements for this purpose into effect.

To Major Gen. Baron C. Alten.

Villa Toro, 29th Sept. 1812.

I wish that you would employ working parties of the 3d and Light divisions to take up the palisades in the ditch of the exterior as well as of the interior line of the walls in the Retiro; and let them be piled in convenient piles within the exterior line, between that and the interior line. You will give the piles of wood in charge of the Commissary; to be used eventually as firewood. But in case it should be necessary to withdraw the troops from Madrid, and to destroy La China, and the stores, as contemplated in my Memorandum of the 30th Aug., the piles of palisades must be burnt, and they must be formed with a view to that contingency.

The troops employed on this occasion are to receive working money, and you will do well to relieve the party every 6 hours. That is to say, one party to work from 6 till 12, the other from 12 to 6 every day, till the work shall be done. You will give the superintendence of it to some officer.

Inform Don Carlos that I have given you these instructions; which I have arranged with Gen. Castaños.

Au Gén. Don Carlos de España.

Villa Toro, ce 29 Sept. 1812.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 25, et je vous renvoie la lettre, qui était dans le baton, qui a été prise sur votre espion. J'ai perdu le baton.

To Don A. J. de Cortabarría, Civil Commissioner at Madrid. Villa Toro, 29th Sept. 1812.

I have heard with great satisfaction of your arrival at Madrid; upon which I beg leave to congratulate you.

I beg at the same time to offer you my services and assistance in any way in which you may think that I can be of any use to forward your views.

To Don A. J. de Cortabarría.

Villa Toro, 29th Sept. 1812.

I beg leave to recommend to your attention Don Alex. Guillen, who is now at Madrid, and whom I have requested to wait upon you. He is a gentleman of Salamanca, with whom I have long been acquainted, and have had the most intimate correspondence on public affairs; and I have not met in Spain any person with more upright intentions, or possessing such correct views of public affairs as he has. It is really most desirable that his country should have the advantage of his talents; and I had long determined to recommend him to the attention of the person who should be employed in the situation which you fill. He is a clergyman; and I have recommended him to the government for a provision in the church in Galicia, which I hope he will obtain: but this will not prevent him from devoting his talents to the public service under you.

Memorandum.

Villa Toro, 29th Sept. 1812.

The mine to be exploded this night at 12 o'clock.

The covering party in the trenches, which is ordered to be augmented in the evening to 300 men, and the working party, must be moved into the village before the mine is sprung, excepting 100 men of the covering party, who are to remain in the parallel on the right and left.

As soon as the mine shall be exploded, the breach which it will have made must be stormed.

The 100 men who are to remain in the parallel while the mine shall explode, are to be the storming party.

An officer and 20 men are to advance immediately from the right of the parallel to the breach; keeping on their left the trench leading to the breach of the mine.

These 20 are to be supported by 50 more of the 100, which 50 are to advance as soon as the leaders of the first party shall have ascended the breach.

That part of the covering party which shall have been sent to the village before the mine shall be exploded are to return, and form in the parallel as soon as the explosion shall take place, and the storming party must be supported on the breach.

The working party must be in readiness to establish the party on the breach.

The Field officer will take care to tell off his parties according to these orders; and that the officer commanding each party understands clearly what he is to do; where he is to go; and at what time.

In case the enemy should commence a fire from the parapet on the leaders of the storming party, the 80 men which are to remain in the parallel till they shall mount the breach, are to fire upon the parapet so as to keep down the fire of the enemy.

The Field officer of the day, on the hill of San Miguel, is to move a detachment of 50 men into the hollow way between the horn work and

the castle, at about 11 at night. This detachment will move up and make a false attack on the gate leading from the exterior line to the esplanade in front of the castle, as soon as the mine shall explode. Lieut. Col. Brown will likewise keep up a fire from the houses on the enemy's left of the exterior line; and will make a false attack on the church, &c., at the moment of the explosion; and if he can, he will get possession of the house still held by the enemy. He will keep up a fire on the palisades in front of the gateway of the interior line.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Clinton, 6th division.

29th Sept. 1812.

The several enclosures contained in the honor of your letter of the 28th inst., I transmitted for the information of Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, who having submitted the same to the Commander of the Forces, I am directed by his Excellency to acquaint you, that if Major — does not withdraw his letter containing very improper expressions respecting the report made by Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, this officer must be brought to trial before a General Court Martial. The latter part of his Excellency's instructions to me on the subject of this letter, I beg to be allowed to give in his own words: 'I know the Portuguese troops as well as Col. — or Major —, and entertain a high respect for them; but I know the truth, and have been witness of the fact reported by Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, and it is doing no good to the Portuguese troops, or to the service in general, to deny it. I would observe, also, that it is rather too hard upon the British part of the army to put them on all duties in which they are exposed to danger, and that the necessity for this should exist in consequence of the unwillingness of the other troops to perform these duties, and then to conceal the truth, by way of complaint, to the Portuguese troops. The fact was, as stated by Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, that on the latter part of the night of the 25th, or morning of the 26th inst., the work allotted to the Portuguese troops was not performed, and that it frequently happens they don't work well when very near the enemy.'

I am further to request Major —'s answer with the least possible delay, for the information of his Excellency.

To the Master of the *Ellen* transport.

Villa Toro, 1st Oct. 1812.

You will be pleased to deliver to the person who will put this letter into your hands 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, for the use of the Portuguese army, taking his receipt for the same.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 1st Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 22d Sept., and have perused all the enclosures. It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the coasts of Portugal and Galicia should not be secure. I had written to — — on the subject, and have received an answer, which proves how clear it is that in our country it is better to suffer any public inconvenience than to venture to suggest a measure as a remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of inconveniences when they shall be severely felt, and shall not

G. O.

Villa Toro, 1st Oct. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to state that the working parties in the trenches do not perform their duty, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to relieve them every 6 hours.

2. He desires that Lieut. Col. Burgoyne will report to him every morning who commanded the working parties in the trenches during the preceding 24 hours, and whether each of the parties performed the work allotted to it with due diligence.

trouble government with my expectations of them, and with suggestions of remedies or preventives.

I concur entirely with you regarding the proposed measure of selling lands in Portugal. It is, like many other schemes, easily suggested by those unacquainted with the circumstances of the country, but very difficult of execution. If we could prevail upon the Prince and clergy to allow us to sell their property, where should we find purchasers? I don't mean to say that there are not plenty of people in Portugal with money to enable them to purchase; but who believes that this money would be well laid out in the purchase of land in Portugal, under existing circumstances?

The danger of Portugal is lessened, but it is not entirely removed. The fate of that Kingdom may still depend upon the result of military operations, upon which I, who conduct them, would not recommend to any body to rely entirely. If the war in Russia should fail, Portugal may again become the seat of war in the Peninsula. Who would be desirous of having property in Portugal under such circumstances? After all, whether we or the French ultimately succeed in the Peninsula, it does not appear to me that matters are likely to be in such a state in either Spain or Portugal, as to render a purchase very desirable in either country for some years to come.

I don't recommend our government to have any thing to say to the Portuguese paper money. I don't think they could materially raise its exchangeable value in reference to silver, and I am quite certain that they could not extend the sphere of its circulation. In a former letter I have shown you how the British government would be affected, and the risks they would incur, by taking as security for any loan, or for any such operation as the substitution of English for Portuguese paper, the produce of a tax depending upon the continuance of the independence of Portugal. The great fault of these and other schemes of this description is, that the proposers of them have not duly considered the nature of the war in which we are engaged, and its consequences, as well to us as to the natives of the Peninsula, nor the character of our enemy.

I don't believe that there is any great export of specie from Portugal at present. There was a very considerable export during the last year, but then Portugal depended upon this export for articles of the first necessity. I suggested to government to endeavor to procure these articles from the British American provinces, from the Mediterranean, &c., but I don't know that any thing has been done. As long as the American war lasts I fear that the export of specie must continue, unless government should adopt successful measures to supply Portugal with corn, from the British colonies or the Mediterranean.

I have received Mr. Vansittart's papers from Lord Bathurst, to which I shall write an answer, and will send it to you.

I will let you know to-morrow how much of the demand for October will be given to the Portuguese government; but as I told Sir W. Beresford that I think all the Portuguese militia may be disbanded, I think it probable that they will not require so much as they have asked for October.

P.S. I have desired that the Portuguese government may have the supplies required for October; likewise 100,000 dollars of a sum of money

expected from Gibraltar, and 100,000 of another sum expected from England.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Archdall, 40th regt., 4th division.

1st Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ult. and enclosure; but before I can decide upon the point submitted, it will be necessary to ascertain where and when these men were last heard of, or under what circumstances they have been so long absent from their corps. I am sorry it will not be possible to meet the suggestion contained in the latter part of your letter, the Commander of the Forces having approved of the existing instructions to Commandants of depôts; but I should presume the inconvenience you complain of could be remedied by the regimental officer or non-commissioned officer at the depôt furnishing the Adjutant of the regiment with the list proposed.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 2d Oct. 1812.

I have received Gen. Alten's and Don Carlos' reports to the 29th; but the movements and intentions of Soult and the King do not yet appear to me to be quite clear. They have to guard against the allied force collected at Alicante on the one hand, and against Ballesteros, who I learn is to be about Alcaraz, on the other; and one can hardly believe that they will venture to move towards the Tagus in force by the road of Albacete. If they do not move in force, they can effect nothing. If they do, they will expose their interests in Valencia, which is an important resource to them, too great to risk. Yet if they do not purpose to move to the Tagus, one cannot understand why the King should have gone to Almanza.

Supposing the march of both to be towards Cuenca, and thence towards Soria, in order to communicate with the troops on the Ebro, the object might have been accomplished with equal, if not greater ease, by his movement from Valencia by the route of Utiel and Requena. On the other hand, if the object had been to move to the Tagus, much time has been lost by the route taken by Soult, and a vast distance gone by bad roads; and a junction might have been formed with equal, if not greater ease, by the march of Soult direct from La Carolina on Consuegra; and the march of the King by Albacete into La Mancha. However, the next movement will show what is intended.

It is desirable that you should have the banks of the Tagus examined from the junction of the Jarama or Manzanares to the bridge of Sacedon, and even higher. I understand that there are several fords above Fuentidueña, where there is a *barca*, and fords at Villamanrique and at Oreja, and even at Aranjuez in dry weather. I also understand that the ground on the left bank commands that on the right. Below the junction of the Jarama there are likewise fords in dry weather; but the banks on the right of the river command those on the left. You should likewise have the course of the Jarama or Manzanares examined from Madrid to its junction with the Tagus below Aranjuez, as I believe it affords an excellent position.

We are not going on well at all; and although I have not given up all hopes, I am afraid we shall not succeed in taking this castle. It is very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I had only 3 guns, one of which was destroyed, and another much damaged last night.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 2d Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter by Capt. the Hon. P. Bouverie, and have conversed with him on your plans and your means of carrying them into execution.

The great object for me is that you should draw the attention of the enemy, by your operations, from those which we are carrying on on this side, and that you should prevent Caffarelli from detaching troops to aid Marmont's army. It would be desirable for many reasons that you should get possession of Santoña, and also of Guetaria; but I confess that I entertain so bad an opinion of the Spanish troops that I don't think you can rely upon them; and the body of marines which you have with you is not sufficiently large to do much of themselves, or to be a very efficient example to the Spanish troops.

In regard to diversion, I imagine that the season is now too far advanced for you to think of Guetaria again. Your efforts therefore will be necessarily confined to Santoña, respecting which place the enemy are very anxious, for many reasons. You might continue your preparations for the attack of Santoña; and let me know exactly what you would wish Mendizabal and the troops under his command to do, as well while the preparations are in progress, as when all will be prepared for the attack, and during the attack, if you should think it expedient to carry that operation into execution.

I am very much afraid that I shall not take this castle. It is very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I had only 3 pieces of cannon, of which one was destroyed last night, and not much ammunition; and I have not been able to get on as I ought. I have, however, got a mine under one of the works, which I hope will enable me to carry the exterior line; and when that shall be carried I hope that I shall get on better. But time is wearing apace, and Soult is moving from the south; and I should not be surprised if I were obliged to discontinue this operation in order to collect the army.

It is unfortunate that you should have plenty of cannon and ammunition, but that you want good soldiers. I have no want of the latter, but very little of the former. The means of transport, however, required to move a train from the coast or from Madrid, where we have plenty, are so extensive, that the attempt would be impracticable.

I am obliged to you for the powder and biscuit: I shall send for the latter.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 2d Oct. 1812.

The bearer hereof is employed by Gen. Castaños to destroy some of the roads leading into Spain from France, for which he requires 200 *quintals* of gunpowder. I shall be very much obliged to you if you can aid him with this powder, in order to enable him to perform the service on which he is employed.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villa Toro, 2d Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter about Doyle, and I wish it was in my power to do any thing for him, in order to gratify you, but I am afraid that he

cannot get what he wants, viz., the rank of Colonel. Others who have been promoted were not Lieut. Colonels, so that their promotion cannot be a precedent. Besides, to promote Doyle would put him over the head of several deserving officers of this army, among others of Cadogan.

I am sorry to say that we don't get on well: of 3 guns we had, one was destroyed, and another very much damaged last night. The place is really very strong, well garrisoned, and well provided with artillery. I do not yet despair, however.

P.S. Upon referring to the Army List I find that Doyle is next above Cadogan; but still there are several meritorious officers in this army, whom he would pass over, were he to be promoted to the rank of Colonel.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villa Toro, 2d Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th Sept., in which you have enclosed the translation of one of the same date from Don Ignacio de la Pezuela, by which I have been informed that the general and extraordinary Cortes have been pleased to confer on me the command of all the Spanish forces;* for which mark of the confidence of that assembly and of the government, I beg you to express to the Sec. of State my most grateful thanks.

I am most earnestly desirous of doing every thing in my power to forward and attain the legitimate objects of the Spanish nation in their just contest with France; and I feel no objection to taking upon myself the additional labor and responsibility which must attend my exercise of the command of the Spanish armies. But I cannot announce my acceptance of the honor conferred upon me by the Cortes and government until I shall receive the consent of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, for which I shall make an immediate application.

I feel the less regret on account of this delay, because, having long been in the habit of communicating confidentially with the General officers commanding the different corps into which the Spanish army is divided, of making them acquainted with the general view of the operations which I hoped to carry on with the allied British and Portuguese army under my command, and of suggesting to them the line of operations which they should adopt, in order to forward the objects which I had in view, I have invariably received from them the utmost attention, and every support and assistance which it was in their power to give; and I am convinced they will continue the same practice even though I am not invested with the supreme command. The public interests, therefore, can suffer no inconvenience by my reference to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, of the decision on my acceptance of the honor conferred on me by the Cortes.

This mark of the confidence of the Cortes and government, and the terms in which it has been conveyed to me, afford the most satisfactory proof to my mind that those authorities are convinced that in the command with which I have already been intrusted by two members of the alliance, I have done my utmost to forward the general cause of all the allies. It is not necessary to make any professions on this subject; and I hope that in the new and more prominent situation in which I shall be

* See Appendix, No. V.

placed, as the Commander in Chief of the armies of all the allies in the Peninsula, I shall have not only the full support, but the confidence of the Spanish government, Cortes, and nation, that the measures which I shall adopt are dictated by an honest and correct view of what is best for the general cause in which all are so deeply interested.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Pack and Brig. Gen. Bradford.

3d Oct. 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to request you will favor me with the name of the officer who was on duty in the trenches with the working party from your brigade, from 6 to 12 o'clock last night. Also the name of the officer on duty with the fatigue party ordered to parade yesterday evening at 6 o'clock, at the Reserve Artillery park.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, Coruña.

3d Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor to receive and submit your letter of the 26th ult. to the Commander of the Forces, and I am to acquaint you that the Q. M. G. has already sent instructions relative to the march of the troops landed at Coruña. The notification of your appointment as a Lieutenant General on the Staff of this army appears in the G. O. of the 12th Sept., from the 25th Aug. last; and I am to request you will favor me with the names of the officers composing your personal Staff, that they may be inserted in G. O. accordingly.

The A.G. to Major Stovin, A.A.G., 3d division.

3d Oct. 1812.

The enclosed return from the — regt. has been several times sent back to the Commanding officer for correction, and from the inaccuracies still existing therein, I am under the necessity of once more returning it to you. Capt. During having most seriously reported to me the great delay that has been occasioned in the general return of the army, from the great difficulty experienced in obtaining a correct monthly return from the — regt. for August, I am to request you will have the goodness to explain the circumstance to the Commanding officer of that corps, in order that another return for August may be immediately transmitted to this office, the several errors being corrected as already pointed out.

Memorandum for Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, R.E.

Villa Toro, 4th Oct. 1812.

The mine in the exterior line is to be exploded this afternoon at 5 o'clock, P.M.

The 24th regt. is to be employed to storm the breaches made in the exterior line by the explosion of the mine, and by the fire of the artillery.

G. O.

Villa Toro, 3d Oct. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces noticed in G. O. on the 1st inst. the complaints he had received of the working parties, and he is concerned to have again to notice that he has received complaints of the working parties ordered for last night.

4. The Commander of the Forces is concerned likewise to have to notice that the working party ordered last night for the commanding officer of the Artillery, did not perform their duty.

5. All the officers and the whole of the Portuguese detachments absented themselves; and of course when such an example was set by the officers, much was not to be expected from the soldiers.

7. At the same time that the Commander of the Forces notices this misconduct of the working parties, he is happy to make an exception in favor of the Guards, who he is informed have invariably performed this duty, as they have every other in this army, in the most exemplary manner.

8. The officers and soldiers of the army should know that to work during a siege is as much part of their duty as it is to engage the enemy in the field; and they may depend upon it, that unless they perform the work allotted to them with due diligence, they cannot acquire the honor which their comrades have acquired in former sieges.

9. The siege of the castle of Burgos has afforded more than one instance of the fatal effects of the omission of the working parties to perform their duty; and the Commander of the Forces hopes that he shall have no reason to complain of any in future.

The storming party for each breach is to be formed of one officer and 20 men; who are to rush forward to the breaches as soon as the mine shall explode. These are to be supported by 50 men for each breach; who are not to move out of the parallel till they shall see the leading men of the storming parties ascend the breaches. The remainder of the regiment to remain in the parallel, in readiness to support those who shall be in the breach.

The covering party in the parallel of the exterior line must keep up a fire on the parapet, so as to keep down the fire of the enemy. The breaching and other batteries are to enfilade the exterior line, and the second and other lines, so as to support the attack.

Lieut. Col. Brown will fire on the rear of the enemy's new palisade, and will make a false attack from the village; and if possible, get along the wall inside either palisade, which he will break through.

As soon as the storming party shall have entered the breach made by the mine, they are to turn to the left, and break through the palisade, and communicate with the storming party of the old breach.

The working parties and engineers will be prepared to establish the parties in the breaches.

Col. Kelly will tell off the parties for these several services; and they will be ready to rush forward the moment the mine shall explode.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

Col. Sturgeon has been ordered to lay at Almaraz a bridge of the same description with that which is laid at Alcantara; and as soon as it is ready, and quite clear that it will answer your purposes, I wish that the bridge of pontoons which is at Almaraz should be taken up, and that Lieut. Piper should have orders to go with it by Plasencia through the pass of Baños to Salamanca. Let him report his progress to me by every opportunity through the Commanding officer at Salamanca. It will be necessary that you should send a small guard with Lieut. Piper, as far as Salamanca, if he has not one already.

I have received your letters to the 29th. I don't write to Gen. Ballesteros, because I don't know exactly where he is; but I believe he is at Alcaraz. At least I understand he was ordered there.

Tell him, that I think the best thing he can do under existing circumstances, is to hang upon the left flank and rear of the enemy, if they should move by the *débouché* of Albacete towards the Tagus. If they should move towards Cuenca, and the northward, he should come into La Mancha, still holding the same situation relatively with the enemy, and communicating by his own left with your right.

We carried the exterior line of the castle yesterday evening, without material loss. But this is altogether the most difficult job I have ever had in hand, with such trifling means. God send that they may give me a little more time!

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 25th, and I am glad to find that you are better.

I wish that some mode could be discovered of procuring money to pay the Portuguese subsidy without reference to me in any manner. I certainly do every thing in my power to make good the payments; and order money to be issued on this account when any is expected, and long before it is received. At the moment that every service in the army is in arrear, the subsidy alone is regularly paid. There is positively no arrear of the gross subsidy; and having made an estimate in the month of May last of the state of the subsidy, and of the sum which the Portuguese government might expect in money after receiving certain articles in kind, that sum has been exceeded in the monthly payments which have since been made, notwithstanding that the distresses of the army have been such, that I am ashamed to mention what they have occasioned. However, I will never write another syllable about the subsidy to any body. It is no concern of mine; and all that I shall do, as long as the payment is a charge on the military chest, will be to hand over such sums as I think we can do without. I have ordered that 200,000 dollars may be given this month from a sum expected from Gibraltar, and another from England.

It is really necessary, however, that some steps should be taken to insure the application of that part of the subsidy which is paid in money, to the payment of the troops serving with the army of Spain; which expense it could more than cover. 70,000 dollars would have paid the troops with me for a month in August.

Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, behaved very ill; and whether it be owing to the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I can't tell; but they are not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to attribute their misbehaviour to the misery and consequent indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their want of pay. If it be true, as I declare it is, that the subsidy is not in arrears, ought the pay of the Portuguese army to be in arrears at all? Ought it to be in arrears for a longer period than the pay of the British army? That it is so, there is no doubt; and yet Dom Miguel, &c., will produce hundreds of documents to prove this assertion to be false, and contrary to the evidence of all the officers of the army, that the men have the money in their pockets.

It is really deserving your attention to look into this subject, and to insist upon the money being applied in the first instance to this necessary purpose.

I refer you to my dispatch of the 4th inst. I don't know what to say of this d——d place. Our success of yesterday evening has opened a new scene to us; but our final success is still doubtful. Luckily, the French give me more time than I had a right to expect.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

Our mine succeeded, and we took the enemy's exterior line by storm yesterday afternoon with small loss. The 24th regt. behaved admirably well. The powder is arrived, for which I am very much obliged to you. I wish you would let me have, and would send me 40 barrels more.

To Sir J. Banks, K.B., Recorder of Boston.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d Sept., in which you have enclosed the record of the act of the Corporation of Boston, by which they have unanimously presented to me the freedom of the borough.

I beg that you will take an early opportunity of returning my thanks to the Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Councilmen of Boston for this mark of their attention; and that you will assure them of my earnest desire to merit their approbation by a continuance of my efforts to serve His Majesty.

I beg to return you my thanks for the handsome terms in which you have conveyed the sentiments of the Corporation of Boston.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 26th. I suppose the Portuguese government will arrange some mode by which the troops will reap the advantage of the arrangements made with the Spanish Regency, for procuring food in the country; and I hope that till that arrangement is made in a satisfactory manner, you will take care that their commissaries shall be supplied with money. Otherwise, if care is not taken upon this subject, I see very clearly that the provision for these troops will fall upon me.

You may depend upon it that this arrangement is just so much waste paper. The Spanish government have not the power to provide for their own troops; how can they provide for the Portuguese?

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

One of the mines which had been prepared under the exterior line of the castle of Burgos was exploded at midnight of the 29th, and effected a breach in the wall, which some of the party, destined to attack it, were enabled to storm; but owing to the darkness of the night, the detachment who were to support the advanced party missed their way, and the advance were driven off the breach again before they could be effectually supported. The breach effected by the mine was not of a description to be stormed except at the moment of the explosion, and it was necessary to improve it by fire, before the attempt could be repeated. But all our endeavors to construct batteries in the best situation to fire upon the wall failed, in consequence of the great superiority of the enemy's fire. One of the only 3 battering guns we had and 2 carriages were destroyed, and another gun was much injured. In the mean time another mine had been placed under the wall, which was ready yesterday, and a fire was opened yesterday morning from a battery constructed under cover of the horn work.

The fire from this battery improved the breach first made; and the explosion of the mine, at 5 o'clock yesterday evening, effected a second breach. Both were immediately stormed by the 2d batt., of the 24th regt., under the command of Capt. Hedderwick, which I had ordered into the trenches for that purpose; and our troops were established within the exterior line of the works of the castle of Burgos. The conduct of the 24th regt. was highly praiseworthy; and Capt. Hedderwick and Lieuts. Holmes and Fraser, who led the two storming parties, particularly distinguished themselves. I am happy to add, the operation was effected without suffering a very severe loss.

The enemy are still upon the Ebro, and have not made any attempt to interrupt our operations. It is reported they have extended to their left as far as Logroño.

My last reports from the frontiers of Valencia are of the 25th. It is stated that King Joseph was at Almanza, with 15,000 men, to join Marshal Soult, who was on his march through Murcia from Granada. My last letter from Lieut. Gen. Maitland is of the 21st ult. He was about to relinquish the command on account of ill health, and give it over to Major Gen. Mackenzie.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill is on the Tagus, between Aranjuez and Toledo. I have not yet heard what steps Major Gen. Cooke has taken in obedience to the orders which I gave him to send a part of the troops composing the garrison of Cadiz to join Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

By the last accounts I have of Gen. Ballesteros he was at Granada, but he has been ordered to Alcaraz.

I enclose a return of killed and wounded since the 27th ult.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 27th Sept. to the 5th Oct. inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	5	71	76
Wounded	11	10	302	323
Missing	—	—	4	4

To H.R.H. the Duke of York.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose extracts of letters to the Sec. of State, which will make your Royal Highness acquainted with the state of the operations against the castle of Burgos to this day. I beg leave to recommend Capt. Hedderwick, Lieut. Holmes, and Lieut. Fraser of the 24th regt. to your Royal Highness' favor and protection.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 5th Oct. 1812.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch from Sir H. Wellesley, by which I have been informed that the Spanish government have conferred upon me the command of their armies.

The circumstances affecting the decision on this subject have in some degree changed since it was last under the consideration of His Majesty's government, and it is certainly quite impossible that operations can be successfully carried on by the allied British and Portuguese armies, and by the Spanish troops, without some concert among the different divisions of which each may be composed. Indeed, as in the course of the war the Spaniards have lost nearly all their cannon, and all their cavalry, they cannot act generally in bodies separate from the armies of the allies; and

it is expedient, on every ground, that the general command should be vested in one person.

I have not thought proper therefore to decline to accept the offer made to me by the Spanish government, in my answer to Sir H. Wellesley, which I enclose; and as they required to have an answer, I have expressed a disposition to accept the command, if it should meet with the approbation of H.R.H. the Prince Regent. I beg that your Lordship will take His Royal Highness' pleasure on this subject.

I am sorry that I can't say that the Spanish troops are at all improved in their discipline, their equipment, their organization, or their military spirit. I entertain but little doubt that in the same field with our troops they will behave well; and it may be possible, by good management, to prevent a repetition of those terrible disasters to detached corps by which the enemy were enabled to overrun the country, and to bring the contest almost to a conclusion. But the means of effecting this object, and my power over the army, will be much increased, and the army itself will be much improved, by the adoption of measures by His Majesty's government to insure the application of whatever subsidy may be advanced to the Spanish government to the payment of those troops actually employed in co-operation with the allied British and Portuguese army, in operations against the common enemy. It must be observed, however, that unless money can be procured to make good any engagements of this description which may be entered into with the Spanish government, the performance of such engagements will become a burthen upon the military chest of the army, and will so far cramp our operations.

My object, in the latter part of my letter to Sir H. Wellesley, was to guard against the pretensions which the Spanish government might form, to direct the operations of the war, in consequence of their appointment of me to command the Spanish armies.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — regt., 6th division.

5th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to acquiesce in your application for leave to proceed to England, as submitted this morning. I am, however, to remark, that an officer of your rank ought to reflect well, before he takes such a step as to apply to join an army on service, whether it will not be desirable for him, or he may not feel inclined, to leave it before the expiration of the period which he originally requested to remain for, with such army; and I am directed by his Excellency further to observe, that your application is peculiarly ill timed.

To C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.

Villa Toro, 6th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th July last, containing a memorial from the deputies to you, as Commissary Gen., for an increase of their pay; and I beg to acquaint you, that in consideration of the duty performed by officers of that rank, and of the responsibility of their situations, I conceive that it would be expedient to grant them an additional allowance of *per diem* (treasury pay).

A Don F. X. Castaños.

Villa Toro, ce 7 Oct. 1812.

Je ne vous ai pas répondu officiellement sur les opérations du Général Mendizabal, parcequ'il est bien difficile de donner une opinion sur les

opérations d'un corps quelconque, qui n'est pas en état de faire aucune opération. Le Général Mendizabal est à présent tenu en échec par un corps Français à Durango, de la moitié de sa force; et on ne peut pas compter qu'il puisse avoir du succès en quelque opération qu'il entreprenne contre l'ennemi.

J'ai prié le Chevalier Popham de faire tout ce qu'il pourrait pour attirer l'attention de l'ennemi vers la côte. Je crois qu'à présent il ne peut plus rien faire contre Guetaria; mais je l'ai prié de faire des préparatifs pour l'attaque de Santoña; et même de faire l'attaque de cette place s'il le peut. Je l'ai prié aussi de m'indiquer comment il croira que le Général Mendizabal pourrait l'aider, afin que je vous soumette ses idées. Si Popham peut faire cette opération, le Général Mendizabal pourra ou l'aider ou tâcher de le couvrir. Si Popham ne peut pas faire cette opération, alors le Général Mendizabal ne peut pas mieux faire que de se tenir où il est; faire travailler et discipliner ses troupes; et laisser faire des courses par les guerrillas et les troupes légères sur les communications de l'ennemi, et rendre difficile leur subsistance dans le pays.

Le Général Mendizabal doit prendre grand soin de ne pas être battu ni coupé dans les Asturies et la Galice: si l'ennemi s'avance sur lui en force, il doit se retirer sur les Asturies; et si l'armée de la Galice était dans le cas de se retirer et de passer le Duero, le Général Mendizabal doit se porter dans la Galice pour en défendre l'entrée, si l'ennemi se portait de ce côté là. Voilà ce que je pense sur les opérations du Général Mendizabal.

Je vous envoie une lettre qui m'a été donnée hier par le Col. Robe, qui annonce qu'il est arrivé à Madrid un Brigadier d'artillerie Espagnole, pour prendre le commandement du Retiro. Quand j'ai quitté Madrid j'ai fait des arrangemens avec Don Carlos pour renvoyer à Ciudad Rodrigo tous les canons et munitions utiles qui étaient au Retiro; et j'ai ordonné

A. G. O.

Villa Toro, 7th Oct. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that upon the receipt of this order, Lieut. —, of the — regt., proceeding to join the army, in command of a detachment of convalescents from Lisbon, will report whether he gave leave to Ensign —, — foot; Lieut. —, — foot; Ensign —, — foot, and Ensign —, — foot, to absent themselves from the detachment on the march into Santarem, on the 27th Sept. If he did give those officers leave to absent themselves from the detachment on the march, he will report the reason why he did so; if he did not give them leave to absent themselves, he is, on the receipt of this order, to put them all in arrest, if he should not already have performed his duty in this respect.

2. The Commander of the Forces likewise desires that Lieut. —, of the — regt., will report whether he obeyed the G. O. of the 23d May, 1812, Nos. 3, 4, and 5, in regard to the inspection of the necessaries of the soldiers under his command, every day; and if he did, whether he punished any of the 52 soldiers, of 60 under his command, who sold their blankets on the march between Lisbon and Santarem.

3. These orders are to be communicated to Lieut. — by the Commanding officer of any station through which he may pass, who will take care to receive and forward his answer to head quarters.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that officers in command of detachments of convalescents or recruits on their march to join the army, will report to the Commanding officer of every station through which they will pass, the state of their detachments, and whether they have or not obeyed the G. O. in regard to the march of detachments to join the army, particularly those of the 29th May, 13th, 17th, and 24th June, 4th Sept. and 17th Dec. 1809, 1st Dec. 1811, 23d May and 6th Aug. 1812: and these reports are to be forwarded to head quarters, together with the report ordered to be sent from every station of the passage of troops.

qu'on fasse des arrangemens pour détruire tout ce qu'on ne pouvait pas emporter, et le bâtiment de la China, si on était dans le cas d'abandonner Madrid avant que tout ne fut emporté. Je crois que faute de moyens de transport très peu a été emporté encore ; et quoique je ne croye pas qu'on puisse être dans la nécessité d'abandonner Madrid, je ne peux pas en être sûr ; et je suis bien sûr que si on est dans ce cas, tout sera détruit sans faire du mal à la ville, si on laisse l'affaire dans les mains du Col. Hartmann ; mais je n'en serai pas aussi sûr si on la donne au Brigadier Espagnol. Je vous prie donc de décider lequel des deux vous voulez avoir. En peu de jours nous saurons s'il est possible qu'il peut devenir nécessaire d'évacuer Madrid ; et s'il ne l'est pas, nous pourrons donner la place au Brigadier Espagnol pour en faire ce qu'il en voudra.

Je suis très inquiet sur l'état des munitions de votre armée. On m'a dit qu'il y a très peu de coups pour vos 8 pièces de canon. Nous avons ramassé des boulets de 4 que nous pourrions vous donner, pour lesquels vous pourriez prendre de la poudre à Santander. Il est nécessaire aussi de donner un peu d'attention à l'état de vos munitions à fusil. Nous n'en avons jamais avec l'armée plus qu'il n'en faut pour les troupes Anglaises. Les Portugais en portent pour eux-mêmes. Ainsi il faut compter, qu'en cas d'affaire, nous ne pouvons pas vous en donner. Si vous n'en avez pas ce qui est nécessaire, vous ferez bien d'en envoyer chercher tout de suite à Santander, pour lesquelles je vous donnerai un ordre.

Je vois que quelques unes des troupes ont des fusils Français, pour lesquels nous n'avons pas de munitions.

Je serai bien content quand je saurai que l'habillement des troupes est arrivé.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 7th Oct. 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the Portuguese government levy any and what duties on the importation of corn into Portugal.

There is nobody to whom I mention the notable arrangement between the Portuguese and Spanish governments for feeding the Portuguese troops in Spain, who is not amused by it. I am afraid, however, that the Portuguese government rely upon it, and consider it no longer necessary to send money to supply their troops. I have already advanced money to the Portuguese Commissariat ; and I request you to give notice that I shall give no money from the military chest at Lisbon, if I find that this Spanish arrangement is relied upon for the supply of the troops acting in Spain.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Clinton, 6th division.

7th Oct. 1812.

By the direction of the Commander of the Forces, I have herewith the honor to enclose you a report from Lieut. Rea, Acting Engineer, addressed to Lieut. Col. Burgoyne ; and I am to request that Lieut. —, and the party of men so reported, may be sent to work during 6 hours in every 24 hours for the next 4 days, and may be kept to their houses in the cantonments of the regiment during the remainder of the 24 hours. I am further to beg you will apprise the Commanding officer of the — regt., that if this happen again, his Excellency will feel obliged to notice it in the G. O. of the army.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Clinton, 6th division.

7th Oct. 1812.

His Excellency having been pleased to approve of Lieut. Gethin, of the 11th regt.,* serving as an Acting Engineer, I am to request that officer may report himself without delay to Lieut. Col. Burgoyne.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 9th Oct. 1812.

I enclose a letter received last night from Adm. Durham, through Sir H. Popham, which contains bad news. I have a confirmation from the French outposts that something of the kind mentioned has happened.

We have a practicable breach in the second line, notwithstanding that all our guns and carriages are what is called destroyed; and I am now endeavoring to set on fire the magazine of provisions. I can't venture to storm the breach. We have used such an unconscionable quantity of musket ammunition, particularly in two *sorties* made by the enemy, one on the 5th, and the other yesterday morning, that I can't venture to storm till I am certain of the arrival of a supply. I have sent to the rear and to Santander; and we are making some. But I have not yet heard of any approaching. I fear, therefore, that we must turn our siege into a blockade.

I am sorry to say that we lost poor Cocks in the *sortie* yesterday morning. He is on every ground the greatest loss we have yet sustained.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 9th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 5th and 6th. I don't think it yet decided whether the enemy are or not about to move towards the Tagus. If the King or Suchet's troops have gone to Albacete, as would appear by Wisch's report, it is clear that they are about to move in that direction; if they are Soult's troops, this is not so clear; particularly if it be true, as is reported, that the King and Suchet have returned to Valencia. I have reports here that Suchet is going to Aragon, and that the King is expected at Pamplona.

I send you a letter from Adm. Durham, containing bad news. I have a similar report from the French outposts in my front. We have a practicable breach in the second line, notwithstanding that all our guns and carriages are destroyed; and I am now about to set fire to the magazine of provisions. But I am afraid I can do no more. I can't venture to storm, having but little musket ammunition. Our consumption has been enormous, particularly in two *sorties* made by the enemy on the 5th, and yesterday morning; in the last, I am sorry to say, we lost poor Cocks, which has grieved me much.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 9th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 4th and 6th, and I am glad to find that you will be able to remain on the coast during the winter.

We have made a practicable breach in the second line of the enemy's works; and we are now firing hot shot on the magazine, but I am afraid

* This officer also served as an Acting Engineer at the siege of San Sebastian, and in the second assault conducted a Portuguese column to the attack and took the French colour from the cavalier. (See Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's letter to the Marquis of Wellington, 1st Sept. 1813.)

I can't storm for want of musket ammunition. Our expenditure has been beyond all calculation, particularly in two *sorties* made by the enemy on the 5th and yesterday morning.

I sent a fortnight ago to our magazines in the rear, as well as to Santander, for a supply; and if I should have reason to expect a supply from either, I shall storm when the magazine is on fire; if not, I must turn our siege into a blockade.

Let me know exactly what you wish Mendizabal to do, and what troops you wish him to detach towards you, and I will arrange the matter with Gen. Castaños. I shall give you notice if any circumstances should make me move to the south. Soult and the King and Suchet are certainly in motion, but I don't think that the direction of their march is yet decided.

Adm. Durham's news is not satisfactory. I am sure there is some truth in it, as I have reports of something of the kind from the French outposts.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., 1st division cavalry.

9th Oct. 1812.

I have submitted to the Commander of the Forces the return of horses deemed unfit for further service in the cavalry, and belonging to Major Gen. Anson's brigade; and his Excellency has been pleased to direct that they may be accordingly transferred to the Royal Waggon Train. I would, therefore, propose that they should be sent over to head quarters to-morrow morning; and as Lieut. Col. Langley is now at head quarters, he will select such as may be calculated for this service: the remainder can be disposed of in the usual manner.

The A.G. to Major Gen. H. Clinton, 6th division.

9th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that having submitted to the Commander of the Forces the several circumstances detailed in your letter of the 8th inst., his Excellency has been pleased to cancel the orders conveyed in my communication of the 7th inst. relative to Lieut. —, and a party of the — regt.; and the Commander of the Forces trusts he shall have no further occasion to notice the misconduct of any individual during the future operations before the castle of Burgos.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Campbell, and Brig. Gens. Pack and Bradford. 9th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that his Excellency has been pleased to direct that the several officers of your brigade now under arrest, agreeably to the G. O. of the 3d inst., may be released therefrom. At the same time, I am to convey the Commander of the Forces' pleasure that they may be admonished as to their future attention to orders given.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 10th Oct. 1812.

I was aware of the mistake in the date of your first letter of the 6th. I received this morning that of the 6th in the evening, and at the same time letters from Don Carlos of the 7th.

I can't believe that Soult and the King can venture to move forward to

A. G. O.

Villa Toro, 10th Oct. 1812.

1. In consequence of the report from the Purveyor Gen., that the expense attending a soldier's funeral amounts to 5s. 6d., instead of 4s. 8d., which latter sum the officers commanding companies have hitherto paid, they are hereafter to pay 5s. 6d. for each man.

2. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, that notwithstanding his orders of the 14th Sept. 1812, no applications had been received at Lisbon on the 2d inst. by the officers of the Q. M. G. department from the officers belonging to the regiments mentioned underneath, on the subject of the removal of the clothing of their regiments; and those officers stated that they had received no directions on the subject from the commanding officers of their regiments respectively.

attack you in the position on the Tagus, without having possession of the forts in the province of Murcia and of Alicante; unless indeed they propose to give up Valencia entirely. They will in that case bring with them a most overwhelming force, and you would probably be obliged to retire in the direction given to Gen. Alten. I shall of course hear from you constantly, and I should join you on the Adaja.

It will be necessary, however, that you should attend to some circumstances. If you should retire in that direction, it will be necessary to order the new bridge at Almaraz to be taken up and destroyed, if there are not means at hand of carrying it away. If there are such means, it should be removed, the rope work particularly, to Elvas. My pontoon bridge should, if in time, get across the Tietar, and go up to Salamanca; if not in time, it must go round by the bridge of Alcantara, and do the same.

I hear from Brito that the Cadiz troops marched from Seville on the 28th; if that is the case, they ought now to be near the Tagus. If they should not have crossed the Tagus when you shall retire, let them march by Caceres to Alcantara, and proceed thence by Guinaldo and Ciudad Rodrigo. If they should have crossed the Tagus, and should have arrived at or be near Talavera when you retire, let them proceed to Avila, and join your right by Blasco Sancho. I believe there is a road for carriages from Oropesa to Avila, by which they should go, if they should have arrived at Oropesa when you shall have decided to withdraw from the Tagus; or if they should not have arrived at Oropesa, or if there should be no road from thence to Avila, they must be directed to march upon Plasencia, and thence by the Puerto de Baños and Bejar towards the *barca* de Avila. This last mentioned movement, however, must depend upon the state of the Tietar. I believe there is neither bridge nor *barca* on the lower parts of that river, and therefore, if it should not be fordable at the time that Col. Skerrett would have to execute the proposed movement, he might be in a scrape. It is best, therefore, that the bridge at Almaraz should not be taken up, if Col. Skerrett's detachment should have crossed the Tagus, until his movement shall have been decided, in order that, in case he should not be sufficiently forward to join you from Talavera or Oropesa, or that the Tietar should be in such a state as that it cannot be crossed, he may be able to get back across the Tagus, and to make his march by Alcantara.

I write all this, as I always do, to provide for every event, not believing that these instructions are at all necessary. I have at the same time to look after troops joining from England by Coruña.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Villa Toro, 10th Oct. 1812.

I enclose a report from the Q. M. G. of the state of the Waggon train with this army.

I take this opportunity of adverting to a report recently communicated to me by the Q. M. G., regarding the misapplication of the carriages of the Waggon train in this army to carry baggage; together with the draft of an order which Gen. Hamilton proposed should be issued upon this subject, both of which had been laid before H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

I have not issued the order suggested by Gen. Hamilton, because there

is no foundation whatever for the report that the carriages of the Waggon train are misapplied to the purposes of carrying baggage. I have never been able to bring forward a sufficiency of them to carry the sick and wounded of the army; and I am quite certain there is no instance in this army of their having been applied to any baggage, excepting indeed by the officers of the Waggon train themselves, as has recently appeared.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 11th Oct. 1812.

The enemy have made two *sorties* on the head of the sap between the exterior and interior lines of the castle of Burgos, in both of which they materially injured our works, and we suffered some loss. In the last, at 3 in the morning of the 8th, we had the misfortune to lose Major the Hon. C. Cocks of the 79th, who was field officer of the trenches, and was killed in the act of rallying the troops who had been driven in. I have frequently had occasion to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Major Cocks, and in one instance very recently in the attack on the horn work of the castle of Burgos, and I consider his loss as one of the greatest importance to this army and to His Majesty's service.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy, our troops are established within about 100 yards of the enemy's interior line, which we have it in our power to assault; and we have effected a good breach in another part of the same line, and our troops are established close to the breach.

I am sorry to say, however, that the consumption of musket ammunition by the troops has been so large, particularly in the late *sorties* made by the enemy, that notwithstanding that some has been made, and that a supply of powder and musket ammunition has been received from Commodore Sir H. Popham, I can't venture to allow the consumption of ammunition which must take place in the storm of the enemy's works, till I shall be certain of receiving a further supply. I have ordered to Santander the transports which have musket ammunition on board at Coruña, and an officer of the ordnance has been waiting at Santander since the beginning of the month, to receive what is required. I have heard that the vessels sailed from Coruña on the 3d inst., but I have not yet heard of their arrival at Santander. I likewise sent to the magazines of the army in the rear, on the 24th Sept.; but I have not yet heard of the approach of the ammunition. I am obliged to defer any further attack upon the enemy till I shall be certain of a supply. In the mean time we are carrying on our works under ground; and I hope that I shall have another mine in readiness in a day or two; and we are endeavoring to burn the enemy's magazines by the fire of hot shot.

The enemy have not made any movement to interrupt our operations. They are still upon the Ebro, and I understand have received another reinforcement from France.

By the accounts which I have from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, of the 7th inst., it appears that Marshal Soult joined the King on the frontier of Valencia and Murcia, on the 29th Sept. A detachment of Marshal Soult's

G. O.

Villa Toro, 11th Oct. 1812.

1. Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B., having joined the army, is to take the command of the 1st division of infantry.

army occupied Albacete on the 3d inst., and a small detachment of cavalry was as far forward as Minaya on the 6th inst.; but I don't consider the movement to be as yet decided.

I have not yet heard of Gen. Ballesteros having passed the Sierra Morena, or at all of his movements since the 17th Sept., when he entered Granada; nor have I heard from Major Gen. Cooke since he received my directions for the movement of the troops under his command.

I have reports, however, that the troops marched from Seville on the 28th Sept.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded since the 6th inst.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 6th to the 10th Oct. 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	7	4	116	127
Wounded	16	8	268	292
Missing	—	—	18	18

To Lord Somers.

Villa Toro, 11th Oct. 1812.

As I have before had the honor of writing to you respecting your son,* I cannot allow my dispatch to go to England with the melancholy account of the loss which you have sustained, without addressing a few lines to you.

Your son fell, as he had lived, in the zealous and gallant discharge of his duty. He had already distinguished himself in the course of the operations of the attack of the castle of Burgos to such a degree as to induce me to recommend him for promotion; and I assure your Lordship that if Providence had spared him to you, he possessed acquirements, and was endowed with qualities, to become one of the greatest ornaments of his profession, and to continue an honor to his family, and an advantage to his country.

I have no hope that what I have above stated to your Lordship will at all tend to alleviate your affliction on this melancholy occasion; but I could not deny myself the satisfaction of assuring you that I was highly sensible of the merits of your son, and that I most sincerely lament his loss.

The A.G. to Lieut. O'Neil, Valladolid.

11th Oct. 1812.

In reply to the communication I have received from you of the 9th inst., I am directed to remark, that the officers of the Commissariat department cannot be called upon to furnish any thing but what is regularly issued according to the rules of the service. Salt forms no part of the soldier's ration, and consequently no requisition can with propriety be made for it. It is much to be regretted that soldiers should suffer any privation from the want of this article, but there is no

* Major the Hon. C. S. Cocks, 79th regt., killed on the 8th.

way of remedying the evil, but by its being obtained by the soldiers at Valladolid in the same manner as at the other stations of the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 12th Oct. 1812.

I hope that the rain which annoys us so much reaches you likewise, and I should think that you will have the Tagus in such a state as to feel no apprehension in regard to the enemy's operations, be their numbers what they may.

It is quite clear to me, however, that the King, Soult, and Suchet are joined on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from the accounts from Madrid of the 9th, which I have received this day, and from letters from Alicante of the 29th. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that I should raise this siege, and proceed to the south, and I shall do so as soon as the weather holds up a little.

I recommend to you to have the bridge of Sacedon mined, particularly if the rain should have rendered the fords of the Tagus impassable. Have no scruple in destroying the bridge of Toledo, or that of Aranjuez, or any other, if it be at all important to your operations.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 12th Oct. 1812.

I have received this morning your 3 letters of the 10th, and one without date, written after the arrival of the *Surveillante* and *Ellen*.

I have sent to Gen. Castaños respecting the movement of the troops under Gen. Mendizabal towards Santoña. The orders to them shall go this night.

In regard to your own notions, I would beg leave to suggest to you the following considerations: If I should raise the siege of this place, and should move from hence, the movement will be occasioned by the necessity of collecting our forces in Castille, in consequence of the collection of the enemy's forces in the south and east of the Peninsula, and their movement upon Madrid in too great force for Sir R. Hill.

We must expect that I shall be followed by the troops composing what is called the '*Armée de Portugal*,' but I shall likewise be followed by those composing the army of the North, if all apprehension of your operations should cease, in consequence of your removal from Santander or from the coast, of the squadron and battalion of marines.

In your letter of the 10th you mention your intention to return to England, in the case supposed, with the *Venerable* only, and you do not mention the 2 battalions of Marines.

If you were not known to be in that ship, possibly her removal from the coast (the remainder of the squadron and the marines staying at Santander, or elsewhere on the coast) would not be very important; but the enemy, as well as the Spaniards, will be convinced that nothing is intended to be done, even though the marines remain, if you should go away in the *Venerable*; and I apprehend that I shall have upon my hands in Castille more of the enemy than I can well manage.*

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

12th Oct. 1812.

The Commissary Gen. since his arrival at head quarters, having again sub-

* See Appendix, No. VI.

mitted to the Commander of the Forces the several circumstances attending the arrest of Mr. D. A. C. G. —, and it being desirable that no further delay should exist in establishing an inquiry into that officer's supposed defalcation whilst in charge of the Commissariat stores at Abrantes, I am directed by his Excellency to request that the Court Martial now sitting at Lisbon may enter upon this case, so soon as the several parties concerned are fully prepared for the investigation. Prior to an inquiry of such importance, it will be necessary that the Acting Deputy Judge Advocate should prepare and arrange the heads of evidence with the officer of the Commissariat department who is to conduct the prosecution. In a report which accompanies these papers (marked A), it will be seen what line of evidence has been submitted and approved of, as necessary to be adduced in support of the 1st charge; and I beg particularly to impress the necessity of obtaining the testimony of those with whom these contracts were made (reference being had to the several books then in possession of the respective parties). The 4 following charges, I should presume, there would be no difficulty in establishing, from the report of the Board (marked B) which originally assembled to inquire into Mr. —'s store accounts. There appears some doubt in establishing the latter charge; but as his Excellency has determined, upon a general view of the matter, that Mr. — shall be arraigned upon the charges as originally approved, you will be pleased to cause him to be furnished with the enclosed copy of them, Mr. — being made acquainted that his trial will be forthwith entered on at Lisbon.

P.S. The Judge Advocate, with the assistance of the prosecutor, will be enabled to fill up the blank in the 6th charge, prior to the copy being furnished the prisoner.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.

Villa Toro, 13th Oct. 1812.

I enclose the letters received from the south this morning, from which you will see that matters are not pressing there. I likewise enclose one from Gen. Mackenzie, and one from Gen. Donkin, the former containing intercepted letters, which show the state of the enemy in that quarter. I can scarcely doubt of their intention to unite in La Mancha.

I have just received a report that the enemy are in motion in our front. About 1500 infantry and 600 cavalry drove in our piquets at Monasterio this morning. I am going out to the front at Riobena immediately, and shall send word if it be necessary that any troops should move.

To Major Gen. Mackenzie.

Villa Toro, 13th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 29th.

In case the enemy should advance from Valencia into La Mancha, with a view to attack our troops on the Tagus, you must endeavor to obtain possession of the town and kingdom of Valencia. You will march from Alicante, or will embark, as you may think best. The ordnance and stores must of course go by sea, and you will observe, if you march, that you must at all times keep your communication open with the sea.

As you are but ill provided with cavalry, you will take care not to risk an action with a superior force of the enemy, particularly if they should have a superior force in cavalry.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I have not answered your letter of the 2d, regarding the proposal that the Portuguese troops in Spain should be supplied from the resources of the Spanish government. I had already made an arrangement of this description with the Intendant of Salamanca, from which the armies of both

nations had, I believed, derived some advantage (to what amount I cannot tell), before the Intendant, recommended by me, had been displaced. Since that event in the province of Salamanca we have derived no advantage from that arrangement, nor any in other provinces, partly because the Spanish government have to this moment appointed no officers to take charge of their concerns in the provinces, and partly because their own numerous but useless troops eat up every thing. We have not, therefore, and ought not, I think, to expect any great resource for either army from the country, without payment; and I am sure we ought to avoid holding out any hopes to the Portuguese government of such a resource. They shall have, as they already have had, their share of any resource of this kind that may offer.

In answer to your letter of the 4th, I have to mention, that it appears to me to be impossible to adopt the arrangement proposed; viz., to allow Senhor Cardoso to go into the market to purchase corn with our bills. The truth is, that Senhor Cardoso is a very honest man I believe, but he likes meddling in our concerns, and he is anxious to acquire the influence over the corn merchants in Lisbon, which would result from his making purchases for the Portuguese army. I wish there was money to enable Sir C. Stuart to pay the subsidy; but as there is not, it will not answer to allow Senhor Cardoso to go to market with our bills. I don't believe that our Commissariat buy, or have in their possession, bad corn. I don't know why they should, if good corn can be procured, which I believe it can. I am much more inclined to believe that Senhor Cardoso complains without reason, in order that he may attain his *little* object, than that Mr. Pison buys bad corn, and offers it to Senhor Cardoso.

All these questions give me a great deal of additional trouble, which I should be delighted to avoid by any practical arrangement; but I have never yet had any before me, and we must only get on as well as we can, and prevent our inferiors from interrupting the course of the public service by their private views and complaints about nothing. I see, by a letter from Sir C. Stuart of the 6th, that he concurs very much with me in the notions which I have formed of the causes of Senhor Cardoso's complaints.

In regard to money I can say nothing, excepting that I will give what I can. If I am to fix the sum, which will be given monthly, it must be the smallest. I wish I could do more.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

Upon consulting with Mr. Kennedy regarding the purchase of corn in Egypt, he concurs very much in my opinion, that if the corn can be got with goods, it is desirable to have it; but that *we* are not in immediate want, and it is better not to have it than to allow money to be spent in the purchase, which would find its way into the military chest. Kennedy appears to doubt that Sampayo can spend any money in this way which would not find its way into the military chest.

I concur very much in your opinion regarding the cause of Cardoso's complaints of the corn offered to him by Mr. Pison. He wants to have the *little* influence over the corn merchants, and *la petite gloire* which

would result from making purchases in the market. I wish we had money to spare to enable him to make these purchases.

I don't see any inconvenience that will result from your giving Senhor Cardoso, at the market price, any cargoes that may be consigned to your orders, if the Commissariat don't want them. This is a very different arrangement from your bills going into the Lisbon market to purchase corn for Senhor Cardoso, or Senhor Cardoso being allowed to purchase corn in the market with your bills, or those of the Commissary Gen. I am afraid, however, that you will find the concern a very troublesome one.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letters to the 10th, and finding that matters don't press in the south, as they appeared to press, according to the accounts received for some previous days, I continue our operations here, which afford some prospect of a successful termination.

P.S. I think you would do well to send to Ballesteros a copy of the letter from the Minister of War, directing him to take the position at Alcaraz.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I received your letter of the 18th Sept. by the last post. I had already answered the letter which you wrote to me regarding your office, and I told you, that it was not at all inconvenient to me that you should remain in England as long as you should find it convenient, and that I would not hear of your resignation. Goodman is now doing the duty of the office, poor Waters being very ill. Goodman does the business remarkably well; but I hope we shall soon have Waters again, particularly as the hunting season is coming on apace, the hounds are on the road, and I shall want Waters for the earth-stopping business, if not for that of the A. G. He has been very near dying, poor fellow; and what is worse, I hear he has lost all his dogs, including Sevilla.

I have in hand the toughest job I have ever undertaken; but, notwithstanding deficiencies of means of all kinds, I hope I shall succeed yet. If I do, I shall be better satisfied than I have ever been with any success.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me 40 barrels more of gunpowder, as soon as you can with convenience.

There is nothing new from the south. Matters don't appear to press there at all.

To Lieut. Col. Gore, 33d regt.*

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 10th Sept., for which I am much obliged to you; and I am glad to find that you have prospects of getting men to complete the regiment. I should wish, for the sake of the officers, to get men enough to form a 2d battalion; but I am afraid that that is impossible, till I shall have more leisure to attend to the concerns of the regiment than I have had. As well as I recollect, I gave the band a set

* Major Gen. Gore, killed at Bergen op Zoom.

of instruments some time ago; but I have no objection to give them another. You will accordingly order a set, and desire the agents to pay for it on my account. I beg you will order what you think proper and necessary for the regiment in the way of clothing and accoutrements; and I consider you, and not myself, responsible that they shall be in every respect fit for service, as far as depends upon me.

I give you no authority which my predecessor did not give me, and I believe every preceding Lieut. Colonel of the 33d regt.; and I am confident that you will execute the task with the same feeling for my pocket, and regard for my interests, combined with a just sense of what is due to the public and the soldiers, which my predecessors and I felt for the interests of Lord Cornwallis.

I am very anxious that no alteration should be made in the uniform or appointments of the regiment, which is not required by the orders of the army and the regulations of the service. Every thing is now, I believe, as I found it 20 years ago; and if once we begin to alter, we shall have nothing fixed, as there are no bounds to fancy.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send me by post the button which you propose to substitute for that at present worn.

Let me know whether I can do any thing for the regiment, or for any individual in it. I am glad you have got a serjeant major whom you like. But we ought to have serjeants of our own, fit to be serjeants major.

Remember me most kindly to your brother if you should be with him.

To H.R.H. the Commander in Chief.

Villa Toro, 14th Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 16th Sept.; and I assure you that there is no person more anxious than I am to adhere strictly to the rules of the service established by your Royal Highness; and I am highly flattered and grateful for the confidence which your Royal Highness has been pleased to place in me, and for the attention which you have given to any suggestion which I have thought it proper to make to you.

In regard to the two subjects referred to in your Royal Highness' letter, that which your Royal Highness has done was suggested to me by Col. Gordon; and knowing that he had possessed your confidence, and that he was in the habit of communication with the officers at the head of the several departments at the Horse Guards, I consented to his writing to England on those subjects. I saw his letter to your Royal Highness regarding the arrangements of the Waggon train; and as well as I can recollect, I saw a letter which he wrote either to your Royal Highness or Gen. Calvert, regarding the formation into a garrison battalion of the soldiers belonging to regiments in this army invalided for garrison duty at Belem.

I acknowledge that it did not occur to me that those were official communications; and I allowed them to be made by Col. Gordon, only because he had suggested what was proposed to be accomplished, and he appeared to understand thoroughly the arrangements; and because I believed that he was in the habit of writing to your Royal Highness, and to the officers of the General Staff at the Horse Guards. Independently

of my desire to avail myself of your Royal Highness' permission to address myself directly to your Royal Highness on every subject, I am perfectly aware that the Staff officers of the army are attached to me to enable me to communicate my orders to my inferiors, and otherwise to assist me in the performance of my duty; but not to carry on my communications with my superiors; and therefore I should not have allowed Col. Gordon to write even upon the subjects referred to, if I had considered what he was writing at all of the nature of an official communication.

Your Royal Highness may depend upon it that nothing of the kind shall occur in future.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., cavalry.

15th Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that his Excellency has given directions that the French prisoners may leave head quarters this evening at 6 o'clock, so as to pass our posts during the night; and I am to request you will apprise Lord Waldegrave that the prisoners will arrive at the bridge, near Monasterio, at 10 o'clock to-morrow morning, in order that the proposed exchange may be carried into effect. I am further to beg you will order an escort of one non-commissioned officer and 3 dragoons to be furnished, for the purpose of conducting the prisoners to the outposts. I should wish the escort to be at head quarters at 5½ o'clock; or if it would be more convenient, we could send a party of infantry with them to Villa Fria, where the dragoons could take charge of them.

A — —.

Villa Toro, ce 16 Oct. 1812.

J'ai eu le plaisir de recevoir votre lettre du 8 du courant; et je vous prie d'agréer mes remerciemens pour les renseignemens que vous avez eu la bonté de me communiquer sur les événemens qui ont eu lieu depuis mon départ de Madrid.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

I have this day given orders to the Commissary Gen. to send to Coruña, for the use of the Spanish army, 7500 suits of clothing, and other equipments for that number of men; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply with the application which will be made to you by the head of his department at Lisbon for a vessel to convey these stores to Coruña.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

I issue an order this day, disposing of the troops which will arrive under the command of Col. Skerrett, which I request you to have executed. The troops in this direction should come either from Talavera or Avila, or from Talavera or the Escorial. I don't know whether Gen. Cole has broken up our establishment at the Escorial; if he has, your Commissary must take care of their troops till they reach Arevalo. I shall desire the Commissary Gen. to place his establishments again at the Escorial, if Gen. Cole has taken them away.

The rain of these last 2 days must have settled the Tagus for you for some time. What reports have you of that river? Do the upper parts become fordable in the winter season after the rain has ceased? for how many days generally? Let me know when you write what the state of the river is.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

I have received 2 letters from you of the 12th, and 2 of the 14th inst.; and I am sorry to observe that Lord Keith has altered his intentions respecting the squadron under your command, between the 18th Sept. and 5th inst.

I shall not be under the necessity of withdrawing from here, unless the enemy's armies collected in Valencia should move upon the Tagus in too great force for Sir R. Hill. The probability that this will be the case diminishes daily, as our reinforcements are advancing daily from the south as well as from Coruña; and I believe that Ballesteros has taken the position in La Mancha which I proposed for him; which renders the enemy's movement upon the Tagus very improbable.

The possession of Santoña is very important in every point of view, particularly if the possession should facilitate your remaining on the coast. You know best whether you can obtain the possession with the means in your power. If you can't, and if you think that the attempt will draw towards you the enemy's operations, and that you may be obliged to withdraw from Santander, it is much better that the attempt should not be made. What I want is, that your squadron and marines should remain on the coast during the winter, by which they will render me the important service of preventing the enemy from taking the whole army of the North across the Ebro. If we should lose Santander, it is very obvious that you must go to Coruña or home; and either would be a misfortune under our present circumstances.

You will judge from your means whether it is fit to attack Santoña. I wish I could send you a better General than Mendizabal, and better troops than his are; but they are not to be found. I don't see the advantage, however, which would result from Lord Keith's proposal that Gen. Mendizabal should join me. I have more of that kind than I know what to do with.

In regard to my making Santander my post of communication with England, it is quite impossible at present. I should doubt the practicability of the plan at any time, on account of the want of means of transport in the neighbouring country; but it certainly would not answer till the army should be firmly established on the Ebro, or probably farther on.

In consequence of your application of the 17th July to Sir H. Douglas, I have directed Lieut. Col. Bourke to provide Col. Campillo with 1000 stand of arms, and I beg you to let me know if you are desirous that he should receive another supply in addition to the above number. It has not been customary, I believe, to give shoes and great coats to guerrillas.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

In compliance with the desire expressed in your Lordship's dispatch (No. 56) of the 1st inst., I have given directions that Gen. Espoz y Mina may be supplied with 2500 stand of arms, with pouches and belts, and a proportion of ammunition, and 2500 suits of clothing. These articles of equipment will be forwarded to Santander.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d ult. (No. 49),

and I have perused the memorandum it contains from H.R.H. the Commander in Chief, regarding the levy and discipline of Spanish troops by British officers.

I doubt whether it will be possible to overcome the prejudices and remove the disinclination of the Spanish government and officers to receive any assistance from British officers in disciplining their troops. As far as I have observed, they don't admit the superiority of our discipline, and don't attribute to that cause our success. However, if H.R.H. the Prince Regent should consent to my taking upon myself the command of the Spanish armies, I shall take an opportunity of submitting to the Spanish government a proposition on this subject.

If it is expected that this measure should be as successful as one of a similar nature has been in Portugal, it will be necessary to provide for the regular payment of the officers and troops to be thus raised and trained. It is impossible to place any reliance on the Spanish resources; in fact, the abuses of the government and the misfortunes of the country have entirely annihilated them. But I should think that a due application of the British subsidy, if it could be realised in specie, would provide for the pay, not only of this corps, but of the whole effective operating army.

I form this opinion from the expense of the corps of troops under Don Carlos de España, which has been paid under my direction since June last. It consists of 4000 men present for duty, including the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the expense of the pay of the officers and men is 25,000 dollars a month, or 300,000 dollars *per annum*. The million sterling of subsidy would, at the same rate and under the same arrangements, pay 50,000 men under arms; which number I am apprehensive that the Spanish nation will not have in the course of this war.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 17th Oct. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch No. 51, of the 24th Sept., in regard to the Portuguese finances, and I have perused with great attention all the papers which it contains.

Your Lordship may be assured that the only practicable remedies for the deficit in the Portuguese finances consist in augmentations of revenue, to be obtained by reforms of abuses in the collection of the customs of the Kingdom, and in the collection of taxes on income, and of the direct taxes generally, in the great towns of Lisbon and Oporto particularly, and by saving unnecessary expenses.

It is evident to me that the Conde de Funchal* is not accurately informed on the subject on which he has written. I have given every facility in my power to prevent frauds on the Portuguese revenue, under the cover of importing stores for the army, from a knowledge that His Majesty is essentially interested in the prosperity of the Portuguese finances; and in point of fact no stores are admitted duty free, unless I request His Majesty's minister at Lisbon to make application to the government for an order to the Custom house to pass goods in that manner.

Since the year 1810, I have never applied for an exemption from

* Senhor de Sousa Coutinho, then Portuguese Minister at the Court of St. James's.

duties, excepting for clothing or stores actually imported for officers or regiments belonging to the army; or on account of the public, for the army at large.

I don't apply for an exemption of duties for articles brought to Portugal for sale on speculation. Frauds however may be committed by masters of transports, and of other vessels resorting to Portugal on account of the public; but to prevent these frauds is one of the objects of my repeated remonstrances to the local government of Portugal to reform the Custom house.

I know that the taxes upon income, and the direct taxes in Lisbon and Oporto, were very ill collected; and no measure has been adopted by the government which has satisfied my mind that it was a remedy to the existing abuses. I proposed for the consideration of the government, to be applied to the large towns, the system which prevails in England, with some alterations, particularly a publication of the returns of income which should be made by different individuals, in order to obtain greater accuracy from those who should make them. But the government declined to adopt what I proposed, and there the matter rests; and as far as the produce of the taxes on income and of the direct taxes would affect the deficit, I believe it remains as it was.

It rests with the government and not with me to see that strangers pay the taxes upon income, and the direct taxes; and I hope they will be more successful with this description of persons than I know they are with the Portuguese possessors of large capitals.

In regard to savings, I have desired Marshal Sir W. Beresford to send to their homes all the militia, excepting the few absolutely necessary for the interior duties; and I have not failed to urge the suppression of the naval expenses of the government.

I don't know that there is a larger Staff to the Portuguese army than is required. It is certainly true, however, that for want of money, the Portuguese army is very ill equipped with many essentials for service; and that I am frequently much embarrassed by their wants. Much of what appears under the head of military expense, consists in pensions to widows, to retired officers, &c. &c.; the provision for these classes provided by the country, viz., the produce of the revenue of the military orders, being applied to purposes different from those for which those orders were originally endowed. I believe that the hospitals are much better arranged, and that they are managed with more economy by the persons employed by Marshal Sir W. Beresford, than they were.

I have no knowledge of 'frauds or extortions' on the country; or 'violence on the magistrates,' committed by the officers of the Commissariat of the British army; and if the Conde de Funchal has any knowledge of such acts, I hope he will make them known to me in detail. If he has not, I hope that he will have no objection to make known the authority he had for making so serious a charge in a public document.

It is perfectly true, that owing to the poverty of the government, 'exactions and violence' (but not 'frauds' as far as I have any knowledge) have been practised by the officers of the Portuguese Commissariat; but to remedy these evils is one of the objects of my repeated remon-

stances to the Portuguese government in regard to their finances, and other measures.

It appears now that the favorite measure of the Portuguese ministers, viz., a loan in England, is abandoned; and recourse is to be had to the sale of the lands of the Crown and of the Church, rather than to enforce the adoption of the only measures which can relieve the finances.

I have already had before me a proposition for the sale, or rather transfer, to the creditors of the *Junta de Viveres*, of the lands of the Crown; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alentejo; and I pointed out to government the great improbability which existed, that any body would take these lands in payment of their claims; and the injury they would do to the public credit by rendering such a scheme public, if it were not likely to be successful.

My opinion is, that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital, who entertains or who ought to entertain such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula as to lay out his money in the purchase of the lands of the Crown. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to ruin, by a fresh incursion of the enemy; and even if any man can believe that Portugal is secure against the incursion of the enemy, and his estate and person against the violence, exactions, and fraud of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, even according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies.

There could be no objection to trying the experiment of offering some of the estates of the Crown for sale; and it will be seen whether I have or not formed a correct judgment on this subject. I think it more than probable that the holders of small farms under the Crown have the means, and would purchase at the full value, the fee simple of their several farms; but I should think the produce from this resource would not be very large. If the Prince Regent of Portugal consents, however, the experiment of the sale of the Crown lands, in large parcels as well as in small, to the landholders, might be tried.

Although, if this measure succeeds, it is probable that it will keep back some specie which would find its way into the British military chest, I don't recommend that payment for these purchases should be taken in paper exclusively. I don't think that any measure which can be adopted will have the effect of raising the exchangeable value of the Portuguese paper money, as long as the British Commissary at Lisbon continues to pay in paper money the drafts made upon him by the Commissary Gen. at headquarters, making an allowance for the discount. The receiver of the paper, who resides possibly in a distant province of Portugal, is interested in exchanging it for money at any rate; because he cannot pass it in the country, the law on this subject not being executed, excepting in the large towns.

In regard to the sale of the lands belonging to convents and the Church, I earnestly recommend that it should not be attempted. 1st; The same objection exists as to the sale of the Crown lands, viz., the want of purchasers. 2dly; Nothing would render the measure palatable to the

Church; and it might be expected that the influence of the Church would be exerted against the allies, instead of operating, as it has done hitherto, most powerfully in their favor. 3dly; The measure is useless, if the sale of the Crown lands should succeed; and it certainly will not succeed if the other should not. At the same time the attempt will alienate the good wishes of a numerous and very powerful party in Spain, as well as in Portugal. 4thly; It must be observed, that if the measure should be successful, and should be *honestly* carried into execution, it will entail a considerable burthen on the finances, viz., 5 *per cent.* on the purchase money, for the ecclesiastical owners of the estate; which the sale of the Crown lands will not.

The best mode of obtaining for the state, eventually, the benefit of the estates of the Church, would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices; and in the course of time the Pope might be brought to consent to the sale of these estates, for the benefit of the state; or the state might assume the possession of them, the ecclesiastical corporation which held them being extinct.

I am however of opinion, that it is not disadvantageous to Portugal and Spain, that large portions of the land should be in the hands of the Church. The bishops and monks are the only proprietors who live on their estates, and spend the revenues of them among those by whose labors those revenues have been produced; and till the habits of the great landed proprietors on this subject shall change, the transfer of the property of land from the Church to laymen will be a misfortune to those countries.

I propose to send Sir C. Stuart a copy of this dispatch.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Villa Toro, 18th Oct. 1812.

The 20th regt. had been ordered to march with the other troops, and I expected that they had marched before I received your letter expressing a wish that they should return into Portugal, and I have now posted them in the Light division in Beckwith's brigade.

If you wish to send any other regiment instead of them, I can have no objection, excepting the — regt., which can't be in a state fit for service, or at all complete. Indeed, it would appear to be necessary to relieve the 20th regt., as they have no mules for the carriage of officers' baggage, of ammunition, or provisions; and the whole of the concern falls upon our departments, so that the 20th regt. must be either supplied with mules, or relieved.

* Memorandum to Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, for the attack of the enemy's second line.

Villa Toro, 18th Oct. 1812.

1. The enemy's second line is to be attacked this afternoon at 4½ o'clock.

2. The mine under the church of San Roman is to be exploded at that hour; and Lieut. Col. Brown will immediately order an officer and 20 men of the troops under his command to rush forward, and establish them-

* The several arrangements for assaulting or escalading were written by Lord Wellington on the ground, after looking at the breach or point to be escaladed; and usually, as one side of the paper was filled, it was handed to his Military secretary, Lord FitzRoy Somerset, or other Staff officer, to be copied, and was immediately distributed.

selves on the breach which the mine shall have made. An officer and 50 men will be in readiness to support these.

3. Col. Brown will have the effects of the mine well reconnoitred; and if he should find that it is practicable to enter the second line after his troops shall have been established on the emplacement of the church, he will order them to do so; and establish them within the second line, communicating by his left with the troops which shall attack the second line from the piles of shot.

4. If Col. Brown should find that he cannot enter the second line, he will keep a fire on it from the emplacement of the church.

5. 6 ladders of 18 feet long must be sent to Col. Brown.

6. The troops of the 6th division, cantoned in Burgos, must be under arms to support the attack upon the second line, if it should be necessary.

7. When the mine shall explode at $4\frac{1}{2}$ o'clock, a camp color will be displayed on the hill to the west of the castle; which is to be the signal for the attack on the other parts of the line.

At 4 o'clock, the parallel along the parapet of the 1st line must be fully occupied.

8. When the signal shall be made, an officer and 20 men, who must previously be placed in the sap leading to the palisade in front of the gate of the second line, are to rush forward and drive the enemy from behind that palisade, and follow them into the covert way.

9. The sap must be immediately reoccupied by an officer and 30 men, who are to protect the rear and right flank of the detachment which shall have entered the covert way.

10. At the same time, an officer and 40 men, 18 of them carrying ladders, must rush forward from the left breach in the first line to the shot piles, and thence to the line in front of the shot piles, where they will descend the ditch, which they will pass, at the places where the palisades have been destroyed by our shot. They are then to scale the line at that point.

11. An officer and 50 men are to be in readiness at the trench in the first line, to rush forward to the shot piles as soon as the first party which shall have gone there shall have advanced from thence. These troops are to support the storming party; and are to move on from the cover of the shot piles as soon as they shall find the head of the storming party established on the parapet of the second line. These men are to carry with them 3 ladders.

12. 50 men must be in readiness to move up to the shot piles, as soon as the 50 ordered in paragraph 11 shall have moved forward to the escalade. These are likewise to carry 3 ladders.

13. As soon as the party shall have succeeded in the escalade, they are to turn to their left, and communicate with those who shall storm the breach in the second line.

14. As soon as the party shall have escaladed the line, the 30 men ordered into the sap are to endeavor to force the gate of the second line; and if they should succeed, to communicate by their left with the party which shall escalade.

15. 350 men of the relief for the trenches this evening must go down under the command of a field officer, so as to be in the trenches at 3 in the afternoon. As soon as they shall arrive, the whole of the covering party now in the trenches, which shall be on the left, are to go down to the right; and the left of the trenches and horn work shall be occupied by the relieving party.

16. When the signal shall be made that the mine is sprung, an officer and 20 men are to rush forward from the advanced trench to storm the breach.

17. 50 men are to be in readiness to follow these, and are to move out as soon as the head of the first detachment shall have ascended the breach.

18. 100 men are to be in readiness in the advanced trench to support the storming party in the breach. But they are not to leave the trench till the storming party shall be established on the breach; and then only in case support should be wanted.

19. When the storming party shall enter the breach, they must turn along the parapet to the left, and drive the enemy from the stockade which he has there established.

20. The troops formed in the parallel along the parapet of the first line, and in the trenches under the horn work, must keep up a fire during the storm on the enemy's third line and the castle, so as to keep down the fire of the enemy.

21. Lieut. Col. Burgoyne will convey these orders to the field officer in the trenches; and he will see that they are carried into execution according to the intentions of the Commander of the Forces on the right. Lieut. Col. Sturgeon will convey these orders to the field officer commanding the relief for the trenches ordered by the 15th paragraph, to be there at 3 o'clock; and he will see that all the arrangements ordered are made, and that the intentions of the Commander of the Forces are carried into execution on the left.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villa Toro, 18th Oct. 1812.

The great inconvenience which I have experienced in the attack on the castle of Burgos, in consequence of the want of musket ammunition, and the probability which exists that our operations will continue to be carried on at a distance from our former magazines, have induced me to review the state of the ordnance establishments with this army, and to suggest to your Lordship an augmentation of them.

This army has never had with it an equipment of ordnance at all consistent with its numbers, even though the establishment should be calculated for the British troops only. But besides the British troops, there are nearly equal numbers of Portuguese troops in each division of which the army is composed; and in the campaign of 1810, and the commencement of 1811, we had a considerable number of Portuguese guns (9 brigades of 6 guns each), and a large body of Portuguese artillery with the army. But the financial difficulties of the Portuguese government, and the irregularity of their system, have caused the destruction of nearly all the animals attached to draw these guns; and the equipment failed first in the quantity of ammunition necessary to be brought into the field to

be useful, and afterwards in the draft for the guns themselves; and the service of one brigade after another has been discontinued, till at last there has been no Portuguese ordnance with this part of the army in this campaign, and only one brigade with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill. In the mean time, the British ordnance has not been proportionally increased; and your Lordship will find, that in the battle of Salamanca the French army had more than twice the number of pieces of ordnance that we had.

We have since that battle been joined, and are in co-operation with various bodies of Spanish troops, which are in some cases, if not in all, very inadequately supplied with ordnance; and as your Lordship is aware, the Spanish finances are by no means in a state to form such an equipment of ordnance as even their armies would require. The dependence of the allied armies in the Peninsula, therefore, must be almost exclusively on the British artillery; which, as I have above informed your Lordship, is not adequate to the numbers of the British army alone.

I have, in the course of this year, brought under the consideration of the Sec. of State different scales for the establishment of the ordnance with this army, in proportion as I have found it absolutely necessary, and in my power to increase the number of the pieces of cannon with the army. The first, of the 16th April, was calculated for 5 brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders, and 4 troops of horse artillery.

I then submitted to your Lordship on the 18th Aug. the scale for an establishment of 7 brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders, and 4 troops of horse artillery; and of one brigade of heavy ordnance to attend the army.

I have since ordered to the army one brigade of 9 pounders from Cadiz, which will make the number with the army 8 brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders; and my firm conviction is, that we ought to have 10 brigades of 9 or long 6 pounders, 4 troops of horse artillery, and one brigade of heavy ordnance: this would make 90 pieces.

I enclose the scale of establishment of horses, &c., required for these guns and their ammunition, &c.

The musket ammunition of the army is carried upon mules; and a sufficient number is attached to each division to carry the ammunition which is required for the ordinary consumption of the British troops in the division. There is, besides, a large quantity carried on mules in the reserve of the artillery, to supply extraordinary demands. Besides this supply for the British troops, the Portuguese troops have a proportion of mules attached to each regiment to carry the supply of ammunition which they require.

There were established in different situations on the frontiers of Portugal depôts of musket and gun ammunition equal in amount to the quantity carried by the mules with the troops; so that any extraordinary consumption could be supplied at any moment without difficulty or inconvenience. It is obvious, however, that in consequence of the removal of our operations to a greater distance from the Portuguese frontier, this resource will not answer; and notwithstanding the pains which I have taken to induce the Generals of the Spanish army, and the Commanding officers of the Portuguese regiments, to take measures to supply the wants of their own troops, it is very obvious that they will, in the end,

fall upon our resources. It is necessary, therefore, to provide for the carriage of a large supply of musket as well as of gun ammunition, to be near the army; and I have the honor to enclose a scale of an ordnance establishment required for this purpose.

Since I have had the honor of commanding His Majesty's troops in the Peninsula, I have never made any demand upon the government, but have always considered it my duty to do the best I could with the means placed at my disposal; being certain that the government were desirous of making them as large as circumstances would permit. As the same desire still exists in the ordnance, as well as other departments, I should wait till government should deem it expedient to increase our means of this description; but finding those at my disposal to be very inadequate to the numbers even of the British army, and by no means sufficient in a view to the circumstances in which we are placed, I think it proper to bring the whole subject under your view.

I beg leave to mention that we have at Lisbon the quantity of ordnance required to complete this equipment, excepting the iron guns, the whole of which, I informed your Lordship on the 10th June, that I had sent to Gibraltar to be put in a state of repair for the Sicilian army.

I find that there was a mistake in the reports of practice, on which was founded my demand of 24 pounders, in my letter of the 18th Aug.; and I should wish to have iron 18 pounders of 37 cwt., 8 feet long, instead of 24 pounders of 30 cwt., and 6½ feet long.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 11th to the 17th Oct. inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	1	27	28
Wounded	4	3	66	73
Missing	—	—	—	—

Memorandum for Gen. Pack, for the blockade of Burgos. Villa Toro, 20th Oct. 1812.

1. While the enemy shall be in force in front of the army, Brig. Gen. Pack will take charge of the blockade of Burgos, keeping possession of the ground which has been acquired during the siege. He will have under his command, besides his own brigade, the 24th and 58th regts., Col. Brown's battalion of caçadores, the 11th, 53d, and 61st regts., and the Spanish battalions of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which are in the town of Burgos.

2. The guns, howitzers, and ammunition now in the trenches, are to be brought down this night, for which purpose a working party of 200 men must be ordered for this evening at 5 P.M.

3. Orders will be sent to Col. Robe regarding the disposal of the artillery and ammunition.

4. Orders will likewise be sent for the 11th, 53d, and 61st regts. to go round and occupy the bivouac lately occupied by the brigade of Guards.

5. Brig. Gen. Pack, and all the troops under his command, will be in readiness to march at a moment's notice, with the exception of 500 men, in their due proportions of English and Portuguese troops, to relieve the trenches at the hour of the next relief, and Col. Brown's battalion of caçadores, and the two battalions of Spanish infantry. The officer who shall take Gen. Pack his orders will show him the road he is to march.

6. When Gen. Pack shall move, he is to give charge of the blockade to Col. Brown, who will concert his measures with Lieut. Col. Burgoyne to preserve all the ground gained.

7. Gen. Pack will settle with the Commandant of the Spanish troops, to take some of the duties in the town, now taken by the caçadores.

8. All the avenues from the town to the castle should be barricaded.

9. One of the French guns and an howitzer might be left in the right hand battery, in order to give the enemy a shot occasionally, and to check sorties. An officer and artillerymen of the reserve must remain for this purpose.

10. The Engineer officer must load the mines in the horn work, and these mines must be sprung, if by any accident it should be necessary to withdraw from the trenches.

Memorandum for Col. Robe, R.A.

Villa Toro, 20th Oct. 1812.

1. The guns and howitzers now in the batteries are to be moved down this night, with the exception of a French gun and howitzer, to be left in the right hand battery, to give the enemy a shot occasionally, and to check *sorties*.

2. Those howitzers which are serviceable, with their ammunition, must be sent to Riobena.

3. The 18 pounder guns, with their ammunition, and the unserviceable howitzers, are to be sent as soon as they shall be brought down, through Quintana-dueñas as far as the neighbourhood of Villalon. They are there to halt, 200 yards short of the village, where they will not be seen from the castle of Burgos.

4. The reserve ammunition of the field train should be sent this evening to the same place; and to-morrow morning before daylight it should march by Tardajoz to Frandovinez.

The A.G. to the Commandants of Hospital stations.

20th Oct. 1812.

Several of the dépôt stations of the army having experienced much inconvenience from not having any funds to supply the necessary comforts for the convalescent men, with a view to remedy this inconvenience, as also to insure a regularity in the accounts of the station under your command, I enclose you herewith a form of account for your guidance, and propose that a certain sum should be advanced monthly for the exigencies of the dépôt, as also to afford the sick officers a proportionate advance for the relief of their necessities. The several regimental vouchers are to be regularly, each month, forwarded by you to the Paymasters of the respective regiments, who are to account with the Dep. Paymaster Gen. for the sums so advanced; and you will, on no account, fail to forward the accounts of your dépôt to the Dep. Paymaster Gen. between the 24th and 1st of every month, transmitting the vouchers for the same period to the Paymasters of corps, as before directed.

To Brig. Gen. Pack.

Riobena, 21st Oct. 1812, 1½ p.m.

I am sorry to say that I am afraid that I shall be obliged to give up our position here, in consequence of the intelligence which I have received from Gen. Hill of the movements of the enemy in the south; and unless I should receive a contradiction of the intelligence, I propose to march this night.

As soon as you shall receive this letter you should send off the baggage of the troops with you by Quintana-dueñas and Villalon to Frandovinez. If I should go I shall send you word; and in that case you will march when the moon shall rise, and will go into the town, entering it by the side of the trenches, of which you will keep possession, as well as of the trenches, till 5 o'clock in the morning. You will then march with the troops under your command by the high road of Valladolid to Frandovinez.

The troops in the trenches should evacuate the horn work first. They should then evacuate the other part of the trenches, and they should proceed along this side of the river to Villalon, where they will cross and join you. Your brigade, the Spanish infantry, and Col. Brown's battalion should be across the bridge before the trenches are evacuated, leaving of the latter only the sentries necessary to prevent the enemy from coming out of the castle.

At a particular moment to be fixed, shortly before 5 o'clock, at which the last of the trenches are to be evacuated, the mines in the horn work must be exploded by an officer, who must be mounted and ride away.

P.S. Let the troops belonging to the 1st division, excepting those in the trenches, join the division as it shall pass Gamonal, and let those of the 6th division, excepting Col. Brown's battalion, do the same.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Villa Fria, 21st Oct. 1812.

I have received your several letters of the 17th and 18th inst. The enemy moved forward on the 18th, and have since collected in my front in very large numbers. They advanced yesterday evening with 3 divisions of infantry and a considerable body of cavalry, probably with the object of reconnoitring the position which we occupy; but upon my moving down some troops to attack them, they retired in some haste to the ground about Fresno.

I am inclined to believe that the whole of the troops of the '*Armée de Portugal*' and the army of the North which are disposable have been collected for this operation; but they don't appear disposed to make any serious attack upon us.

By the letters which I have received from the south, it seems evident that Soult, contrary to my expectations, is about to move on Madrid with the whole of the troops in Valencia and Murcia; and as the weather, which has been so very bad in this part of the country, has not been so to the south, the fords of the Tagus are unfortunately all passable. I have besides learnt that Gen. Ballesteros, who was ordered to take up a position at Alcaraz, has not moved from Granada. Under these circumstances, if I don't in the course of this evening receive any accounts from Sir R. Hill which should induce me to believe that the enemy are not marching upon the Tagus, I propose to raise the siege of Burgos, and withdraw across the Arlanzon.

I shall not, therefore, want the guns which you were so kind as to send to Reynosa; and I forward by this opportunity orders to Capt. Pack to return with the equipments under his charge to Santander.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Frاندovineز, 22d Oct. 1812, 11 A.M.

I have received your letters of the 19th, 1 P.M.

Our affairs in this quarter stand thus: On the 18th in the afternoon we stormed the breach in the second line of the castle, and at the same time escalated it; and a mine sprung at the same moment with good effect. Unfortunately we could not support the storm sufficiently in time, and our troops were beat off. We lost above 100 men in killed and wounded. The Guards and Hanoverians behaved remarkably well.

On the same day the enemy moved forward, and attacked our outposts in strength, and the 2 armies have been opposite to each other from the 18th till last night. They made a great reconnaissance with 3 divisions and some cavalry on the evening of the 20th, in which some of them were very roughly handled by the Chasseurs Britanniques; and I made a movement with our left, under Sir E. Paget, which induced them to move back rather more quickly than they had advanced. Unluckily it was too dark to take any advantage of their error or our movement.

The 2 armies continued opposite to each other all day yesterday; and having received your letter of the 17th in the morning, I determined to raise the siege last night, and to move towards you. This I have effected, and the troops are now on their march, and we shall be this day at Celada del Camino.

Let me hear from you constantly. If their movement on your side is decided upon Cuenca, I conceive that those in my front will go to Lerma or Aranda de Duero, leaving the army of the North behind. I am certain that the '*Armée de Portugal*' will not follow us if left alone.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cabezón, 26th Oct. 1812.

I have been so much occupied by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th inst., that I have not been able to write to your Lordship. The operations of the siege of the castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state in which they were when I addressed your Lordship on the 11th inst. until the 18th. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from Santander, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of San Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line should be stormed that evening, at the moment this mine should explode; and that at the same time the line should be attacked by escalade.

The mine succeeded, and Lieut. Col. Brown lodged a party of the 9th caçadores and a detachment of Spanish troops of the regiment of *Asturias* in the outwork. A detachment of the K. G. L. under Major Wurmb carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalating

G. O.

Dueñas, 25th Oct. 1812.

Major Gen. Oswald will join and take the command of the 5th division of infantry, during the absence of Lieut. Gen. Leith on account of his wounds.

the line ; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these 2 last detachments from the third line and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.

It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion ; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, those troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line ; and I had the satisfaction of seeing, that if I could breach the wall of the castle, we should carry the place.

Sir H. Popham had succeeded in an experiment which he had tried for the removal of guns from Santander for the siege of Santoña ; and knowing our wants of ordnance and stores, and that our battering guns and carriages had been destroyed by the enemy's fire, he sent two 24 pounders and stores from Santander, and I intended, as soon as they should arrive, to endeavor to breach the wall of the castle.

In the mean time, another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of San Roman, of which we remained in possession.

The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry and 6 squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca, to reconnoitre our outpost at Monasterio. They attacked the piquet at the bridge in front of the town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair Lieut. Col. the Hon. F. Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely ; and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.

I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the castle of Burgos with the '*Armée de Portugal*,' reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable ; and they did advance in considerable force against the post of Monasterio, on the evening of the 18th. Lieut. Lyznewskey, of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a piquet in S^{ta} Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy ; and he was taken with his piquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burgos side of the town.

I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared, by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavoring to raise it ; and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Riobena and Mijaradas, and the left at Soto Palacios. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio.

They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about 10,000 men, to drive in our outposts from Quintana-palla and Olmos. The former withdrew by order ; but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow

upon the enemy, I requested Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank; which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio; and our posts were replaced in Quintana-palla.

On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir R. Hill of the 17th, in which he acquainted me with the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th inst., and Gen. Ballesteros, although he had entered Granada on the 17th Sept., had not assumed the position in La Mancha which he had been ordered to assume by the Spanish government, at my suggestion.

The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.

I had desired Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage, and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making. I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 21st, and moved the whole army back towards the Duero.*

I felt severely the sacrifice I was obliged to make. Your Lordship is well aware that I never was very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered that success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack on the first line, made on the 22d or the 29th, had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were very limited; but it appeared to me that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.

I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards. During the latter part of the siege, the weather was very unfavorable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the Artillery and Engineer departments, Lieut. Col. Robe, and Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, and Lieut. Col. Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance, and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the 3 18 pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the 8 pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ult., in the storm of the horn work, not having cattle to move them.

The enemy were not aware of our movements, and did not follow us till late on the 22d, when 10,000 men encamped on this side of Burgos.

The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with

* See Appendix, No. VI.

the light cavalry at Estepar and Buniel. We continued our march the following day; the right of the army to Torquemada, the left to Cordovilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of the two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Col. Halkett, and of Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry; and Major Gen. Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo, to give them support; the whole under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton. Don J. Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of guerrillas heretofore commanded by the late Marquinez, in the hills on the left of our rear guard.

Major Gen. Anson's brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above 3 hours by the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.

The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerrillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major Gen. Anson's brigade, and 4 or 5 squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and Lieut. Col. Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major Gen. Bock's and Major Gen. Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully; and our rear guard was hard pressed. The enemy made 3 charges on the 2 light battalions of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these 2 battalions. They suffered no loss, and I can't sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of Col. Halkett, who commanded them.

The exertions and conduct of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and Staff attached to him, throughout this day, were highly meritorious; and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Capt. Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and left at Villa-muriel; and the 1st batt. 1st Guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major Gen. Oswald, in the absence of Lieut. Gen. Leith, on account of indisposition.

I had directed the 3d batt. of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut. Col. Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major Gen. Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion

with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made Major Gen. Pringle and Brig. Gen. Barnes attack these troops, under the orders of Major Gen. Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal; and Major Gen. Don M. de Alava was unfortunately wounded while urging on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy.

I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuergra.

The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Dueñas. I propose to halt here to-morrow.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 18th to the 21st Oct. inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	4	3	89	96
Wounded	10	4	160	174
Missing	—	—	4	4

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Cabezón, 27th Oct. 1812, 9 P.M.

I have received your letters to the 26th. It is not necessary that I should now enter into an account of our retreat. We halted the day before yesterday at Dueñas, and this day at this place; but the enemy are infinitely superior to us in cavalry, and from what I saw to-day, very superior in infantry. We must retire, therefore, and the Duero is no barrier for us. If we go, and we cannot hold our ground beyond the Duero, your situation will become delicate. We certainly cannot stand against the numbers at present opposed to us in any situation, and it appears to me, therefore, to be necessary that you, as well as we, should retire. The only doubt which I entertain is respecting the road which you should take, and that doubt originates in the insufficiency of this army to stop the army opposed to it a sufficient length of time to enable you to reach the Adaja.

I propose to remain on the Pisuergra to-morrow, if I can, and as long as I can upon the Duero, and then to retire by Arevalo. God knows whether I shall be able to remain on either river, and if I cannot, your retreat should be by the valley of the Tagus; if I can, we should join as proposed by former letters. If I can remain on the Pisuergra to-morrow, I shall cross the Duero on the 29th, and I think it probable that I shall be able to prevent the enemy from crossing in full force till the 1st, in which case I shall arrive at Arevalo on the 3d.

You will not receive this letter till the 29th: you will arrive at the Escorial probably on the 31st, at Villa Castin on the 2d, and at Arevalo on the 4th. If you should find it necessary to retreat sooner, so much the better, as this arrangement, which is much more likely to fail on my side than on yours, will be more easily accomplished.

If I should not be able to hold my ground as long as I expect, either on the Pisuerga or the Duero, I shall apprise you of it at the first moment, and shall suggest your line of retreat; but this will be difficult, as you have a large body of cavalry opposed to you, and your march, as proposed, at least as far as Villa Castin, would have been secure, whereas that by Talavera, &c., will not till you shall cross the Tagus.

Don't order the bridge at Almaraz to be taken up, or destroyed, till you shall be certain that you will not require it.

In respect to the Spaniards, let Don Carlos' division, Morillo's and Penne Villemur's, retire with you; desire Gens. Elio, Bassecourt, and Villa Campa to join Gen. Ballesteros by the bridge of Toledo, if you should have left that entire, or by that of Talavera, or that of Arzobispo, if you should not; and desire the Empecinado to go to his old ground about Guadalaxara. Tell them all that we shall soon be able to set matters on their legs again, but that it is impossible for the British army to resist the armies of the North; the Centre; of Soult; the '*Armée de Portugal*;' and part of that of Suchet; in co-operation at the same moment.

I send to Major Hartmann to desire that he will destroy the stores, &c., at Madrid. I shall let you know the result of every day's proceedings, and my expectations for the next.

P.S. I don't reply to your letter of the . The Jarama appears to me to be the most advantageous line, although liable to be turned both on the right and left.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cabazon, 28th Oct. 1812.

Since I wrote to you on the 26th, I have had an opportunity of seeing the enemy's whole army, as they placed themselves opposite to us on the Pisuerga yesterday. They are certainly in very great strength. The '*Armée de Portugal*' have received a reinforcement of 10,000 men (including cavalry) from France; and I have reason to believe that there are 2 divisions of infantry now with this army, belonging to the army of the North. The cavalry of the army of the North is certainly with the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and they have at least 5000 good cavalry.

I don't think that I am sufficiently strong to contend with this army thus reinforced. I have here only 4 weak divisions of British and Portuguese troops, and 3 very weak brigades of cavalry.

There are with this army 12,000 Spanish troops of the army of Galicia, including about 600 cavalry, and the cavalry under Don J. Sanchez.

G. O.

Cabazon, 28th Oct. 1812.

1. Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie is appointed to command the 7th division of infantry.

2. Brig. Gen. Barnes will command Major Gen. Hay's brigade in the 5th division of infantry till further orders.

I was sorry to observe, however, in the affair of the 25th, that although the Spanish soldiers showed no want of spirit or of disposition to engage with the enemy, they were totally unable to move upon them with the regularity and order of a disciplined body, by which alone success can be hoped for in any contest with the French. We must depend upon ourselves, therefore; and the difference of numbers, from what I saw yesterday, is much against us.

Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to desire Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, and to join me, if possible, on the Adaja. It is absolutely necessary that I should cross the Duero; and if the enemy should follow me with his whole force, which is probable, I cannot expect to be able to maintain myself, and I shall be obliged to retire towards the Tormes. In this case Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill would be exposed to the evil which I raised the siege of Burgos to avoid, thinking it possible he might be obliged to retire, and be attacked by a superior army in front, and by another in his rear. This misfortune would be more certain if any accident should unfortunately happen to the troops under my command.

By accounts from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to the 26th inst., I find that the enemy had approached the Tagus with their left, and had moved their right upon Cuenca. He does not state the force they have with them, but I should imagine not less than 50,000 men; and, as far as I can judge, there are not less than 40,000 now opposed to this army. Both armies are infinitely superior to ours in cavalry and artillery, as well as in total numbers. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has with him about as many Spanish troops as there are with this army, but I believe they are equally unused to order and discipline.

Under these circumstances, I acknowledge that I have no expectations that I shall be able to maintain myself very forward in Castille, if the enemy should be able to keep this large body collected.

Your Lordship will recollect that I have always been of opinion that, as far as the allied British and Portuguese army was concerned, the discontinuance of the blockade of Cadiz and the evacuation of Andalusia would be misfortunes, however important as political events. The reason is, that in consequence of those events, these armies are opposed to larger bodies of the enemy than they were before, at the same time that they don't receive proportionate assistance from the Spanish troops, owing to the state in which these troops are found.

If Gen. Ballesteros had moved into La Mancha, as he was desired, I don't believe the enemy could have ventured upon the march towards the Tagus, nor do I believe they would have attempted to interrupt the siege of Burgos; an operation which I have reason to believe was ordered by the King from Valencia, and is connected with his movement towards the Tagus. If they had moved towards the Tagus, they must have detached to observe and check Ballesteros, and their force against Sir R. Hill would have been diminished, and I might have drawn reinforcements from him. It is fortunate that I was induced to raise the siege of Burgos, and to retire to the Duero, upon learning the state of affairs on the Tagus, as it is obvious that my force is far inferior in numbers and composition to

that of the enemy ; and the result of a battle, fought to save the siege, might have been very doubtful.

No event of importance has occurred since I addressed your Lordship on the 26th. The enemy formed their cavalry in the plain on our front yesterday ; they have cannonaded different parts of our line, without doing us any injury, excepting that Lieut. Col. Robe, of the Royal artillery, was wounded severely, but not dangerously, yesterday.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Boecillo, 29th Oct. 1812, 5½ P.M.

We crossed the Duero this day, having destroyed all the bridges on the lower Pisuerga. The enemy are in march towards Tordesillas, where I destroyed the bridge last night. That of Toro will have been destroyed this day, I hope.

I am anxious to hear from you, after the receipt of mine of the 27th.

I propose to place myself to-morrow in front of Tordesillas, to prevent the enemy from coming over the Duero there.

To Earl Bathurst.

Boecillo, 29th Oct. 1812.

You will be anxious to receive an answer to your letter of the 22d Sept., on the subject of sending us guineas. If the guineas should come, you may depend upon it that they shall be applied strictly as the law directs ; viz., in the payment of the ordinaries of the service ; that is, the pay of the officers and troops. It will be a relief to us to receive the money to be so applied ; almost as great as it would to receive an equal sum in silver, to be applied to any service.

In regard to the rate at which they must be paid to the troops, I rather believe that they ought to be paid as one pound one shilling ; and let the troops dispose of them as they please. It would be rather curious to pay the troops in dollars at 4s. 6d., which are worth 5s. 6d., and afterwards to pay them guineas at one pound, because they are supposed not to exchange for more in Portugal or Spain. However, I will consider of this point before the guineas arrive.

We crossed the Duero this day, having destroyed all the bridges on the Pisuerga.

The enemy are marching on Tordesillas.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 30th Oct. 1812, 10 P.M.

The enemy are collected at and about Tordesillas, and last night obtained the bridge of that place by the misconduct, I believe, of the Brunswick corps. The army are formed in front of the enemy, and I hope that the latter cannot pass the Duero till you shall be near me.

Let me know particularly how you get on ; whether you are followed closely, by whom, and by what numbers.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

Sir C. Stuart will show you my letter of this day and the accompanying dispatches, and you will see what a scrape we have been in, and how well we have got out of it. I say we have got out of it, because the enemy show no inclination to force the passage of the Duero. I have the army posted on the heights opposite the bridge of Tordesillas, of which they

have possession. The bridge of Toro is destroyed, and I hope that of Zamora; and at all events they cannot cross at either before Hill and I shall join, when they will probably feel no inclination to cross.

In answer to your letter of the 10th Oct., I mention that I have no intention to deprive the Portuguese army of the 35,000 dollars. I will take them in payment, and lend them again, in order to insure the government sending up another sum to repay me.

The 3d cavalry keep up Hill's communication with Elvas, as the Guides do mine. But Hill will of course order them off the communication as soon as he shall join me.

I am sorry to find that your wound is not healing as it ought. You must have patience. Poor Alava's was in a bad way this morning. Bleeding came on, and Gunning was not to be found; he soon stopped it, however, and he is now doing well.

The government will certainly depute you to invest Sir C. Stuart with the Order of the Bath. A person receiving a deputation cannot depute another.

P.S. I rather think the enemy are gone into cantonments. They are very few in my front; 5000 are gone towards Toro, and the greater number towards Valladolid.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

The dispatches which I send you will show you in what manner I have been occupied for the last fortnight, and will account for my not writing to you.

I think my junction with Hill on the Adaja is now quite certain; and that I have got clear, in a handsome manner, of the worst scrape I ever was in. Caffarelli's troops are certainly here; and the enemy have at least 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. I have not 20,000 British and Portuguese. Amongst the British are all the foreign troops in the army; and I have not 1500 English cavalry; and only 24 pieces of artillery. I was shocked when I saw how the Spaniards fought on the 25th; and when I saw the whole of the enemy's army, it was very clear to me that they ought to eat us up. I detained them two days on the Carrion, three on the Pisuerga, and they don't appear inclined to pass the Duero at all. Hill will be at Arevalo on the 3d or 4th.

From your account of the duty on corn, I think we ought not to pay it on the corn imported by our Commissariat, or purchased from an importer.

I have referred your letter of the 22d to the Commissary Gen., in regard to the transfer of your corn to the Portuguese Commissariat. He appeared to think there would be difficulty in arranging the matter in the mode you propose. But I will inquire further.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

The enemy crossed the Carrion on the 26th and 27th, and formed their army on the heights near Cigales on the last of those days, opposite our position on the left of the Pisuerga, and their advanced guard about 2 miles in front of their main body, and half that distance from Cabezon.

On the 28th they extended their right, and endeavored to force the bridges of Simancas and Valladolid; the former of which was defended by Col. Halkett, with his brigade of the 7th division, and the latter by Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, with the remainder of the 7th division. At length Col. Halkett, being hard pressed, blew up the bridge. He at the same time detached the Brunswick light infantry regiment to Tordesillas, towards which quarter the enemy detached troops on the evening of the 28th. As soon as I found that this was the case, I thought it proper to break up from the Pisuerga, and to cross the Duero; which object was effected without difficulty on the 29th inst. by the bridges of Puente de Duero and Tudela.

The bridge of Tordesillas was destroyed on the enemy's approach to that town on the evening of the 28th; and I had sent orders to the regiment of Brunswick Oels to take post on its ruins in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from repairing the bridge. I had the mortification, however, of learning, on the night of the 29th, that this regiment had been obliged to abandon its post; and as I had seen the enemy's whole army in March towards Tordesillas on that evening, it was obvious that no time was to be lost.

I therefore marched the army at an early hour yesterday morning to their left, and posted the troops on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, immediately opposite and near the bridge of Tordesillas. We found the bridge nearly repaired on our arrival; but the enemy have made no attempt to pass it; and they have now no large assembly of troops in this neighbourhood.

I learn that some of them marched last night towards Valladolid, and others towards Toro. I have destroyed the bridge at Toro, and I understand that it cannot be repaired for some days; and it is obvious that the enemy cannot prevent the junction of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's corps with mine; and it is probable that when that shall be effected they will not be anxious to cross the Duero.

I have received letters from Lieut. Gen. Hill to the 29th. The Tagus was every where fordable, and the enemy had passed a small body of troops over at Fuentidueña. Sir R. Hill collected his troops on the Jarama, thinking that that river afforded the most favorable line for defence. He was likely to receive my orders to move upon Arevalo on the 29th.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 22d to the 29th Oct. inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	4	14	109	74	127
Wounded	45	35	442	65	522
Missing	8	12	223	59	243

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 31st Oct. 1812.

You will see that the — regt. got us into a bad scrape, from which, however, we have extricated ourselves; and I consider my junction with Hill now to be secure. I assure you, that considering the numbers of the enemy (among whom is Caffarelli's infantry, as well as his cavalry), the state of the Spanish troops, the great proportion of foreign troops in the divisions which I have with me, and their general weakness, and the weakness of our cavalry, I think I have escaped from the worst military situation I was ever in.

In answer to your letter of the 1st, I have to mention that, under Lord Liverpool's orders, I do recommend foreign officers (Portuguese and Spanish) for the medal; but I don't think it ought to be conferred on the — —.

The A.G. to Dr. Dickson, Purveyor to the Forces.

31st Oct. 1812.

A report having been received from the senior Chaplain to the army, of the manner in which the dead bodies are brought to the grave at the depôt at Santarem, I am to request you will give the necessary directions to the Deputy Purveyor at that station, that the dead may hereafter be buried in conformity to the orders of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

The A.G. to the Rev. J. Allott, Lisbon.

31st Oct. 1812.

No official notification having been received at this office of the appointment of the Rev. Mr. Mills to the staff of this army, he cannot consequently be attached to a division. The necessary directions have been given to the Purveyor to the Forces that the dead at Santarem may hereafter be interred agreeably to the existing orders on that subject.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord F. Somerset, Military Secretary.

31st Oct. 1812.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to submit to your Lordship the enclosed letter from the Commanding officer of the 50th regt., in order that Capt. — may be sent out to this country, and account for his continued absence from the corps to which he belongs.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

31st Oct. 1812.

I have the honor to acquaint you that the Commander of the Forces accedes to Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., proceeding to England, that officer having given in his resignation.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

I did not write to you last night, as I had nothing particular to tell you. The enemy are very quiet in our front. They have sent a division, or possibly two, to Toro, where they are repairing the bridge which we destroyed. This will take time, as the span of the arch is more than 50 feet: it took more than 6 days last summer. Some of their troops have gone towards Valladolid, but I have not heard of their appearing on the upper Duero. I have not yet heard from you since you received my letter of the 27th, which I know had passed Madrid.

Have you given the orders about taking up the bridge at Almaraz? That should be done now, particularly if you have passed the Escorial.

Send an officer into the valley of the Tagus, to observe the enemy's movements in that quarter.

To Commodore Sir H. Popham.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

I received last night your letters of the 24th and 26th, and I am very sorry that you see cause to be dissatisfied with the Governor of Santander, and with Gen. Mendizabal. I have nothing to say to any Spanish officer, and it is impossible for me to apply a remedy to the inconveniences of which you complain. I shall mention them however to Gen. Castaños.

It will be unfortunate if Mendizabal should not have moved for the attack of Santoña, according to the orders which Gen. Castaños assured me had been given to him. We have all the disposable force of the army of the North in our front, indeed altogether more than I can manage; and there never would have been so good an opportunity for an attack, as the present moment affords.

The Spaniards, however, have acted as they chose themselves ever since I have known them; and I have learnt to bear with patience evils and disappointments for which there is no remedy.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Sec. of State; and I beg you to lay such parts of them as you may think proper before the Spanish government, for their information. I beg you also to take that opportunity of expressing to them the grateful sense I entertain for the cordiality with which his Excellency Gen. Castaños and the officers under him have co-operated with me.

The Spanish troops have invariably manifested a disposition to engage with the enemy; and in an affair of the cavalry on the 19th ult., the Spanish cavalry under the Conde de Fiquelmont were very successful, and destroyed many of the enemy, and took many horses and prisoners. The infantry likewise, in the affair of Villa-muriel, on the 25th, manifested a disposition to engage with the enemy.

The truth, however, ought to be known to the government; and I must say that the army of Galicia is not in the state of discipline in which they ought to be before they are brought to a contest with the enemy; or which could gain for them either the confidence of their allies or of themselves. In the affair at Villa-muriel, they could neither advance nor retreat in order. Their movements were made *à la débandade*; and if I had not ordered a movement on the enemy's flank by the British troops, not only the enemy would not have been driven across the Carrion, but they would have carried the heights above Villa-muriel, on which the Spanish troops were posted. It may be depended upon, that order and discipline alone can insure any solid success against the enemy with whom we are engaged.

I had an opportunity of seeing the enemy's whole army on the 27th Oct. on their march across the plains to Cigales, and it appeared to me to consist of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, with an immense train of artillery. To oppose these troops, I have not more than 20,000 British and Portuguese troops; and there were 12,000 men, including 600 cavalry, in the army of Galicia. It is obvious, however, that, in their present state of discipline, I cannot reckon upon these troops in a field of battle. I should have been obliged to continue my retreat therefore; and my

communication with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, and his retreat, would have been cut off.

Under these circumstances, I thought it proper to order that General to retire from Madrid upon Arevalo, there to join with me, sending the troops under Gen. Elio, Gens. Bassecourt and Villa Campa, and Gen. Freyre, to join Gen. Ballesteros.

I beg you to explain to the Spanish government, that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, and the allies on the Tagus, are as much inferior in force to the enemy opposed to them as I am to the enemy opposed to me, the enemy having brought all their forces to bear upon the centre of Spain, with the exception, I conclude, of a part of Suchet's army left in Valencia. I imagined that they would adopt this plan when I wrote to you from Valladolid on the 9th Sept.; and it is very unfortunate that Gen. Ballesteros did not take the position at Alcaraz which he was ordered to take by the Minister at War, in consequence of my suggestion. If he had, the enemy could not have moved against Gen. Hill; and I might have drawn a reinforcement from his army to this, still keeping possession of Madrid.

Under present circumstances, I think it not improbable that I may not be able to retain much of Castille; but it may be depended upon, that I will do every thing in my power.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

You will see, by the dispatches forwarded on this occasion, that we have been in a difficult situation. I had no notion that the enemy could have been so much reinforced, particularly in cavalry, or that the army of the North could come so far down this way. I expected something better also from the army of Galicia; but they are really in such a state, that it is not possible to expect any thing from them. Under these circumstances we have made a handsome retreat; but it was quite impossible to leave Hill at Madrid any longer.

I shall attend to what you say about Palmella and Camac.

The plans for raising brigades and for supplying the armies are nonsense.

I am very much afraid that the little experience which the country have had of the government of the Cortes, has done that body no good. They are very unpopular every where, and in my opinion deservedly so. Nothing can be more cruel, absurd, or impolitic, than their decree respecting the persons who have served the enemy. In fact, it deprives the state of some of the ablest and most honest of its servants, and submits to an inquiry the conduct of persons who have rendered the most important services of a secret and therefore an invidious nature.

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking and talking of any other subject but Spain. How it is to end God knows!

Buonaparte was at Moscow the 19th Sept. The Emperor of Russia deceived Lord Cathcart and the people of Petersburg, and pretended that the battle of Mojaisk was in his favor, and, strange to say, the truth was not known at Petersburg on the 20th, although Buonaparte was at Moscow, and Moscow burnt on the 14th; a courier being usually only 2½ days on

the road. The French in our front have two reports: one that the Russians are making peace; the other that Buonaparte is marching to Petersburg.

I think you had better not show my letter to Lord Bathurst of the 28th to the Spanish government. The substance of it is in my dispatch to you of this date.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Rueda, 1st Nov. 1812.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received an answer, which I enclose, from Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to the proposition contained in your letter of the 22d Oct., respecting the transfer of grain consumed, and the mode of settling the account, from which you will observe that Sir R. Kennedy consents to what you propose.

The A.G. to Capt. Johnston, 3d dragoons, Arevalo.

1st Nov. 1812.

A report having been made to the Commander of the Forces of the number of stragglers from the army on the route between Arevalo and head quarters, as also belonging to parties of convalescents on their march from Salamanca to the army, I am to request you will give the necessary directions that patrols may be furnished from any parties now at Arevalo for the purpose of taking up all soldiers straggling from their regiments or detachments in the vicinity of that town; and such of these men as are not fit to join the army are to be collected at Arevalo, in order to their being sent back to Salamanca. Those who are well are to be kept at Arevalo, till an opportunity offers of their being regularly marched to head quarters. You are authorised to appoint a steady serjeant to act as Provost, who is to have the usual power to punish all men whom he may find in the act of committing excesses; and you will be pleased further to report to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, any irregularities or particular misconduct on the part of individuals who may be absent from the army at or near Arevalo. Capt. Wood, of the Adj. Gen.'s department, will deliver this letter, and who has been sent by his Excellency to collect generally all the stragglers from the army.

The A.G. to Capt. O'Kelly, 11th foot.

1st Nov. 1812.

I have received the Commander of the Forces' directions to express his regret at the length of time you have been kept under an arrest, without the circumstances of the service having admitted of your trial being entered on. It was his Excellency's original intention that an early investigation should have taken place upon the charges exhibited against you;* but the unforeseen and continued absence of the material evidences has also contributed to prevent this being carried into effect. Under this view of the case, as also from the late departure from the army of Major Gen. Campbell and Lieut. Col. Lord Blantyre, two of the principal evidences, there appears but little prospect of the existing difficulties being surmounted by an early opportunity presenting itself for the trial being commenced. I am, therefore, to convey his Excellency's pleasure that you may be forthwith released from your arrest, and return to your duty. In the event, however, of your still wishing to be arraigned before a General Court Martial upon the charges preferred, his Excellency can have no objection to the measure being resorted to; and, of course, you will receive the usual form of acquittal, should no evidence appear to support the allegation.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 2d Nov. 1812, 8 A.M.

I received last night, after I wrote to you, your letters of the 31st at noon. All remains quiet in my front; and unless I should hear from you in the course of the day that you are pressed, I shall not march to morrow.

* On the punishment, by the Provost Marshal, of a private of the Foot Guards, and a private of the 42d regt., by order of Capt. O'Kelly, commanding at Abrantes.

I think that you had better not direct your march upon Arevalo; but from Villa Castin on Blasco Sancho, where there is a good passage over the Adaja; thence you can go to Fontiveros. If the head of your column has gone to Arevalo, it does not signify, and the tail can go as above pointed out.

Let me hear the disposition of your march.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

2d Nov. 1812.

In reply to your letter of the 14th ult., covering an application from Capt. —, of the 1st light batt. K.G.L., relative to a deduction being made from his *bât* and forage, in consequence of his not being actually in command of the company to which he belongs, I am to acquaint you that under the circumstance of an officer being absent on duty in this country from his corps, and not deriving a pecuniary benefit therefrom, no deduction of the nature alluded to can be admitted. At the same time, Capt. — is called upon, equally with other officers of similar rank, to keep effective the *bât* mule, and be liable to the incidental expenses attached to the charge of his company, under which view the *bât* and forage allowance is granted to officers in command of companies.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 3d Nov. 1812.

I have just received your letter of yesterday, at 5 P.M., and I conclude that, in consequence of mine of yesterday morning, the rear of your corps, at least, will have marched upon Blasco Sancho.

We are all quiet on this side. The enemy have repaired the bridges of Toro and Tordesillas, but have shown no inclination to pass either. It is reported that Caffarelli's 2 divisions have returned to the North; but of that I have no certainty. If it be so, I conclude that the preparations to cross the river are made to be taken advantage of when the troops of the armies of the Centre and of the South approach us. Under these circumstances, you become the guide of our movements, at least for the present. Unless you should be pressed by the enemy, I recommend you to halt a day upon the Adaja at Blasco Sancho or Arevalo, keeping your cavalry well out upon the road towards Villa Castin, to give time for stragglers, baggage, &c., to come up; and give me timely notice of any movement towards you, or in the valley of the Tagus.

If you should be pressed by the enemy, you will move upon Fontiveros, giving me the earliest intelligence of the circumstances which induce you to move. If you should move from the Adaja, take care that all our stores and people (including my hounds at Arevalo) move off.

Send me all the intelligence you get from Madrid or the Tagus.

To the Conde de Villariego.

Rueda, 2d Nov. 1812.

I have just now had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 1st inst. from Avila.

It gave me the greatest concern to be under the necessity of collecting the allied army in Old Castille, the result of which measure was the evacuation of Madrid. The fact was, that after I had made every effort in my power to obtain possession of the castle of Burgos, but in vain, I found myself attacked by the '*Armée de Portugal*,' reinforced by 12,000 men, and the army of the North, the two together consisting of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry; to which force I had not sufficient troops to oppose myself.

It was then necessary to draw reinforcements from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill; and Gen. Ballesteros not having at this moment arrived in La Mancha, it was impossible to leave Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill upon the Tagus with a reduced force without incurring the risk of losing his army as well as the capital. It was necessary therefore that the whole force should move.

In answer to your Excellency's letter, I recommend that you and the civil authorities of New Castille should cross the Tormes; and that you should let me know in what town you will place yourself, that I may take the earliest opportunity of apprising you of any change of circumstances. The enemy in my front are stronger than the troops under my command; while those opposed to Gen. Sir R. Hill are much stronger than he is. It is possible that, notwithstanding the advantage which we now enjoy of being joined, we may not have it in our power to strike an important blow against either, before they likewise will be in communication, and will co-operate, on account of the local circumstances of their situation. This being the case, it may be necessary for us to fall back still farther; and you and the civil authorities might be exposed in Avila. At the same time I beg you to understand that every thing that is practicable shall be done to preclude the necessity of any further retrograde movement.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me any intelligence you may receive of the enemy's proceedings at Madrid, and of the force collected there, &c.; and particularly whether any force is detached towards Gen. Ballesteros in La Mancha.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 3d Nov. 1812.

The messenger Myers arrived here yesterday morning early, with your letters of the 13th ult.

I think it will be very desirable that Sir J. Murray should be sent to Alicante, to command the troops on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, in case Lord W. Bentinck should not arrive to assume the command of them himself.

I think it will be advisable that you should alter your dispatch, No. 60, of the 12th Oct., omitting the last paragraph; as it will not be convenient to apply the guineas solely to the payment of the troops.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 3d Nov. 1812.

I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger (Myers) to Coruña, to inform you that the army have continued in the position in which I placed them on the 30th Oct., and the enemy have made no attempt to pass the Duero.

The bridge of Tordesillas is repaired, and they are employed in the repair of that of Toro. Their troops are extended along the Duero, from the latter place to Valladolid.

In the mean time, the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will arrive this day and to-morrow on the Adaja. The General received my orders to break up from his position on the Jarama on the 29th, and he intended to carry them into execution on the morning of the 30th. He had intended

to destroy the Puente Larga, but the mine failed; and the enemy having collected a large body of troops between the bridge and Aranjuez, they immediately attacked our post on the bridge, but were repulsed, with considerable loss, by the 2d batt. of the 47th regt. and a detachment of the 95th, under the command of Col. Skerrett. I have not received the returns of our loss on this occasion; but I understand it is about 40 men. No officer was touched. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill speaks in high terms of the conduct of the troops.

These circumstances delayed the march from the right of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's position till the evening of the 30th; and he has since continued it, without being at all molested by the enemy.

The building called La China in the Retiro, and all the guns, stores, &c., which that work contained, which had not been carried away, were destroyed before the troops were withdrawn from Madrid.

The Spanish divisions of Don Carlos de España, and the Conde de Penne Villemur, are with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

I had recommended that the detachments of the 2d and 3d armies, under Gens. Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecourt, and Freyre, should cross the Tagus at Toledo, or Talavera, or Arzobispo, and should join Gen. Ballesteros; but I am not certain that this recommendation has been attended to. I have not yet heard that Gen. Ballesteros has entered La Mancha.

A small body of the enemy's troops were at Val de Moro on the 31st, and entered Madrid at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 1st inst.

By a letter from Gen. Mackenzie to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, dated at Alicante on the 23d Oct., it appears that the enemy had kept but a small force in the kingdom of Valencia, under Gen. Harispe, which was extended from Caudete to Alcira upon the Jucar; the works of the city of Valencia being dismantled and destroyed, and the city itself abandoned by the French troops and their adherents.

From the tenor of Gen. Mackenzie's letter, I judge that he proposes to attack the force under Gen. Harispe; and he has already pushed forward his posts to Alcoy and Concentayna.

I have no accounts upon which I can rely that Marshal Suchet has accompanied the King's march into the centre of Spain with any large portion of his army; but it is so reported, and the letter above referred to, from Gen. Mackenzie, tends to confirm the report. The advanced posts of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill have seen the regiment of Cuirassiers which belong to the army of Aragon.

I have accounts from the North, stating that Longa has taken a convoy, escorted by 300 men, near Vitoria.

I learn likewise that the post at Santoña is much distressed for provisions; and I hope that Sir H. Popham may have been able to make his attack upon that place.

These events will probably oblige Gen. Caffarelli to withdraw his troops from our front.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Rueda, 3d Nov. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 5th and 7th Oct., for which I am

much obliged to you. I shall act as you recommend regarding the settlement of my affairs.

I beg to return you my best thanks for your kindness to my sister, respecting whose comfort I am indeed much interested.

You will see in my dispatch to Lord Bathurst how we stand. I don't know how the French can contrive to keep together the force which they have brought against us; but as we have got together they cannot do us much harm, and sooner or later they must separate, and we then shall resume again the upper hand.

At all events, although the evacuation of Madrid is a material deterioration of the campaign, its effects on the contest in the Peninsula are still most important.

To the Rt. Hon. the Judge Advocate General.

Rueda, 4th Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial, of which the late Major Gen. Le Marchant was president, on the trial of Lieut. ———, of the Royal Waggon train, upon which I request you to take the pleasure of H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

There is an irregularity, in point of form, in the proceedings of this Court Martial, to which I beg to draw your attention. The proceedings had been closed, and the sentence agreed to, and copied fair, but had not been signed by Major Gen. Le Marchant when he was killed. When I was informed of this circumstance, I wrote the enclosed letter to Lieut. Col. Dalbiac, the next senior officer of the Court Martial, directing him to sign the proceedings in presence of the members of the Court. Owing to the situation of the army, the Court could not then be conveniently assembled; and Lieut. Col. Dalbiac being sick, I have now ordered that its proceedings might be signed by Major Gordon, the next in seniority to Lieut. Col. Dalbiac.

The A.G. to Major Stovin, A.A.G., 3d division.

4th Nov. 1812.

I am under the necessity of again returning you the states of the — regt., which, notwithstanding every effort to get them corrected, have been sent back with the same errors still existing therein. The Commanding officer must be sensible that if the 9 R. and F. alluded to are kept on the strength of the detached companies, they must not be taken on those at head quarters, and so *vice versa*. These inaccuracies prevent the general returns of the army being made up in sufficient time for transmittal to England; and I am persuaded you will readily perceive that the other delays, incidental to the service we are employed in, are quite sufficient to retard the performance of this most necessary duty, without the additional one of being necessitated so frequently to send back the returns of regiments for correction. As the Adjutant of the — regt. appears so little conversant in the nature

G. O.

Rueda, 4th Nov. 1812.

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3. The Commander of the Forces desires that Cornet ——— may be reprimanded for his conduct, before the officers of his corps, to be assembled in the camp this afternoon at 4 o'clock; and that the officers of the ——— may be informed that the Commander of the Forces is much displeased with their conduct. He regrets that the time of the other officers of the army should be taken up in inquiring into and passing sentence upon the improprieties of behaviour of a set of men whose neglect of duty must be obvious to every person who sees the establishment placed under their charge.

4. He requests Lieut. Col. ——— to take measures to insure attention on the part of the officers to the men and horses in their charge.

of returns, I am further to request he may be sent over to head quarters for instruction the first favorable opportunity.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 5th Nov. 1812, 9 A.M.

Lord C. FitzRoy delivered me your letter of 2½ P.M. at 10 last night. I am doubtful whether, in consequence of my letter of the 3d by Churchill, which you must have received shortly after Lord Charles left you, you will have halted or marched. If you should have halted this day, I conclude that you will march to-morrow.

I sent the 5th division of infantry, and Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, to Alaejos this morning, the enemy having appeared in that quarter from Toro; and I propose to move to-morrow to La Nava del Rey. If your troops at Arevalo should have marched, or having halted this day should march to-morrow upon Madrigal, or Fuente el Sol, we shall be tolerably well connected. I shall write to you as soon as I shall know what you have done this day. I don't think it clear that the enemy is following you in force. I conceive the 4 regiments and 2 battalions to have been sent only to see what you were doing.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Rueda, 5th Nov. 1812, noon.

I received, about 2 hours ago, your letter of 2 this morning. I think you had better make a movement to-morrow morning, and place your troops behind the Trabancos river, behind Flores de Avila. I propose to place this army behind the same river at Castrejon, Carpio, &c.

Don't allow the enemy to come too near you with a small advanced guard. Move upon them immediately, and make them keep at a proper distance.

To Earl Bathurst.

Rueda, 5th Nov. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 11th Sept., regarding the claims of Mr. —, as late — of the —, which I have referred to Marshal Sir W. Beresford for his consideration, and I enclose an extract of his answer.

Mr. — left the army without leave, as well as I recollect, in the month of August, 1809; and I beg leave to remind your Lordship that an officer or soldier guilty of that offence, in all services, forfeits all arrears of pay which might be due to him. But, supposing your Lordship should be inclined to treat Mr. — with favor, and to allow him to receive his arrears prior to his absence without leave, I should imagine that you would not extend your favor so far as to give him pay after the period at which he quitted.

Mr. — can have no claim, under the regulation, to the bāt and forage money issued to the army in September, 1809, having previously gone away from it.

I should wish to see Mr. —'s appointment to command at Almeida, or at Alcantara. There was a senior officer at Almeida, when he was there, as far as I have any knowledge; and I know that if he ever commanded at Alcantara, it was a fault, rather than a service for which he ought to be rewarded. He had no order to command there.

If your Lordship desires it, I will give my warrant for the issue of the whole, or of any part of Mr. ——'s demand; but if I were to exercise my own judgment on this demand, and to be responsible for my decision, I would not issue my warrant for the payment of any part of the demand.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Castrejon, 6th Nov. 1812, noon.

I have just arrived here, and received, about an hour ago, your letter dispatched at 9 last night. I am going to take my quarters at Torrecilla de la Orden, about 3 miles in the rear. I propose to march in the morning early to Pitiegua, so as to cover the road from Toro to Salamanca. The enemy were moving in strength towards Toro last night, and if they have passed there in force, they are behind our left flank; but I think they are not in force at Toro yet.

I think you had better march at an early hour, and pass Peñaranda, and encamp either at Nava de Sotro-val, and along that river, or at Coca, Tordillos, and Peñarandilla, farther in the rear, as you may think proper.

As you are before me, I think you had better not cross the Tormes to-morrow, if you can avoid it without suffering inconvenience; but if it should be inconvenient, or you are likely to suffer from waiting, you had better cross the Tormes at Alba.

Have you any account of the enemy moving in the valley of the Tagus? or whether the King has stopped at Madrid? or what force has followed you? It appears last night nothing but cavalry.

You, of course, send orders to Don Carlos. Order the Royal infantry, and any other troops or departments belonging to this part of the army, to cross the Tormes, at Alba, to-morrow.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Pitiegua, 7th Nov. 1812, 2 P.M.

Fremantle * has delivered me your letter of this morning.

The enemy did not move after us at all yesterday, but ordered 10,000 rations for this day at Rueda. I have not yet heard that any have moved from Toro.

I shall take up the position in front of Salamanca, however, to-morrow, and you will do well to march in the morning upon Alba de Tormes.

I wish that the 3d, 4th, Light, and Don Carlos' divisions of infantry, and Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, should join this part of the army as soon as may be expedient. They will have but a short march to-morrow to Alba de Tormes, and might move on as far as Calvarrasa de Arriba, or the woods thereabouts, to which place I will send them further orders.

You might canton the 2d, and Gen. Hamilton's and Morillo's divisions in Alba de Tormes, keeping the Light cavalry out in front; and Slade's brigade in the rear of the town. Occupy the castle of Alba with 200 men, which I understand commands the bridge effectually. Have the neighbourhood of Alba examined, and see whether there are any fords, which must of course be closely watched.

I don't know whether the ford of Huerta is now practicable; if there should be little water in the river it certainly is, as the bottom is good. I know there is another good ford at Encinas de Abaxo, and I shall be

* The late Major Gen. Fremantle, C.B., K.C.T.S., &c.

obliged to you if you will have them both examined early to-morrow, and let me have the report of them.

P.S. An officer is just arrived from Alicante. He says the force which arrived from Valencia is stated to be 45,000. About 20,000 are following you. The King went into Madrid the 3d inst., and it was supposed was to remain there. There were no troops moving in the valley of the Tagus. Gen. W. Clinton, who now commands in Alicante, tells me on the 29th, that Suchet is near him with 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. There cannot be many of his army here.

Duplicate P.S. Nov. 8, noon. If you should not have received and acted upon the original of this letter, you might move the 3d, 4th, Light, and Don Carlos' divisions, and Gen. Alten's cavalry, upon Salamanca to-morrow morning early, instead of Calvarrasa this afternoon.

I have not heard of the enemy's movement to his right; if so, it must be to join with the '*Armée de Portugal*.'

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Pitiegua, 7th Nov. 1812.

Capt. Hely, of the 53d regt., who was taken prisoner at the commencement of the campaign, having been left by the enemy on the 30th July at Valladolid, on his parole not to serve until exchanged, I request that you will carry his exchange into effect, by sending any French officer of his rank, who may be a prisoner in England, to France in exchange for him.

I likewise beg that you will send to France M. Belvere, *Directeur des services réunis de l'Armée Française*, who is now on his parole at Dartmoor. He was taken prisoner in April, 1811, and was promised his liberty by Gen. Castaños; but by some accident or other he was sent to England, and it was not recollected that he had been promised leave to return to his country.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Pitiegua, 7th Nov. 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 31st. I am glad to see that the Portuguese finances, particularly the customs, are in so flourishing a condition.

I recommend to you to buy more corn; if not wanted for the consumption of the army, we can sell it in the market, and the amount can be lodged in the military chest.

You will see the news in my dispatch.

To Earl Bathurst.

Pitiegua, 7th Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 12th Oct. regarding Gen. Nugent.

It is scarcely necessary to consider what we shall do with our army after the French withdraw from Spain; as that event is not at present very probable, unless Buonaparte should be so pressed in the North as to be induced to weaken his force. We have at present in operation against us, at least all the troops which were in the Andalusias, and the armies of the Centre and North, besides the '*Armée de Portugal*,' without any effective addition to our force, excepting the little garrison of Cadiz.

My opinion is, however, that if we should get the French out of Spain,

and the war should continue, we should carry on our operations on the southern frontier of France. I think so because we should have the hearty co-operation, and probably the direction, of a Spanish and of a Portuguese army, besides our own; and our means would be much greater than they would be on any other scene, would be applicable at a much earlier period, and would, moreover, be applied on the most vulnerable part of France.

In regard to all schemes in Italy and the North of Europe, founded on this army: 1st; I would observe that you must reckon that 6 months would elapse, after you should decide on the measure and should issue your orders in Downing Street, before the army would be fit to engage in an operation in the new scene: 2dly; It would be but a small army, incapable of acting alone; at the same time that it would not be easy to connect it with any other: 3dly; It must not be expected that any of the Powers in the North of Europe would give us the direction and management of their concerns, as we now have of those of the Portuguese, at least, if not of the Spaniards. The Powers of the North would willingly avail themselves of the bravery of our troops; they would share in our riches, partake of the plenty in our camps, which our good arrangements and money should procure for us; but they would share with us nothing but their distresses. Believe me, that you could not keep a British army long in a state of efficiency under such circumstances.

As for Italy, I have never seen any ground on which I could venture even to think of a military operation in that country. However, as I said before, unless I can beat Soult, the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and the army of the North united, we have no chance at present of getting the French out of Spain. I think Buonaparte will at last give up Spain; but that is a different question, not worth discussing now.

P.S. I see that Ballesteros and the Cortes are fighting, instead of the former moving into La Mancha as he was ordered.

To Earl Bathurst.

Pitiegua, 8th Nov. 1812.

The enemy repaired the bridge at Toro at a much earlier period than I expected, and by their possession of that bridge, and of that of Tordesillas, would have had an easy mode of collecting a large force behind our left flank, if I had attempted to effect my junction with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill on the Adaja, with a view to any operation against the enemy's force advancing from Madrid. On the other hand, a considerable body of the enemy made their appearance in the Guadarrama pass, and arrived at Villa Castin on the 4th; and if I had moved Sir R. Hill along the Adaja to join with this army in its position in front of Tordesillas, the enemy would have had the shortest line to the Tormes by Fontiveros, if they had preferred to march in that direction, to following the march of Sir R. Hill's troops.

The junction in front of Tordesillas would besides have answered no purpose. We had no means of passing the Duero, and it was very clear that the enemy would not attempt to pass as long as we remained in our position. I therefore desired Sir R. Hill to continue his march by Fontiveros upon Alba de Tormes; and as soon as I found that he was sufficiently

forward, I broke up (yesterday morning) from the position, which I had held in front of Tordesillas since the 30th of last month; and I am in march towards the heights of San Cristoval, in front of Salamanca.

The enemy has not pressed at all upon the rear of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill; nor have those on the Duero followed the march of the troops under my command. I conclude that the two corps will unite, which in consequence of the situation of the Duero I could not prevent.

The two corps of this army, particularly that which has been in the north, are in want of rest. They have been in the field, and almost constantly marching, since the month of January last; their clothes and equipments are much worn, and a short period in cantonments would be very useful to them. The cavalry likewise are weak in numbers, and the horses rather low in condition. I should wish therefore to be able to canton the troops for a short time, and I should prefer the cantonments on the Tormes to those farther in the rear.

I don't know exactly what the force of the enemy is. The '*Armée de Portugal*' have about 36,000 men, of which 4000 are cavalry. As far as I can learn, they received in September and October reinforcements, amounting to 14,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, and I account for the army being only 36,000 men by allowing for the sickness of the conscripts. The army of the North have 10,000 men, of which 1200 are cavalry.

I have received several reports that Gen. Caffarelli had returned to the north with the troops under his command, but none on which I can rely. A person who brought me a letter from Sir H. Popham, and passed through Torquemada, saw 3000 infantry on their march towards Burgos on the 4th, but he says that no other troops had passed or were expected.

It is difficult to judge of the exact extent of Soult's force. It is reported that the enemy brought from Valencia to the Tagus from 40,000 to 45,000 men; and I should consider that to be rather below the number which the armies of Andalusia and the Centre could bring into the field, without any of the troops of the army of Aragon and Valencia. Soult is particularly strong in good cavalry, and there are several regiments of cavalry in the army of the Centre.

I am inclined to believe that none of the troops, excepting probably some cavalry of the army of Aragon and Valencia, have moved to the Tagus.

It will still remain to be seen what number of troops can be brought to operate against our position; as, unless Madrid should be again abandoned to its fate by the King, arrangements must be made to resist the attacks which it must be expected that the Spanish troops under Gen. Elio and guerrillas will make on that city, even though Gen. Ballesteros should not move forward in La Mancha. I propose, therefore, to wait at present on the Tormes till I shall ascertain more exactly the extent of the enemy's force; and if they should move forward I will either bring the contest to a crisis in the position of San Cristoval, or fall back to the Agueda, according to what I shall consider at the time to be best for the cause.

Gen. Ballesteros was still at Granada on the 20th Oct., and it was reported had no intention of moving.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Gen. W. Clinton, who has come to Alicante to take the command, dated the 29th Oct., from which I observe that but few, if any, of Suchet's troops have moved forward to the Tagus.

I don't understand why it is necessary for Major Gen. Clinton himself to have possession of the castle of Alicante in case he should move forward, excepting it is that he suspects the Governor of treachery, and he thinks that in case of misfortune his retreat would not be secure.

I enclose likewise the copy of my letter to Major Gen. Mackenzie,* to which that of Major Gen. Clinton is a reply.

I understand that the King entered Madrid on the 3d inst.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 9th Nov. 1812, 2 A.M.

By the reports of 5 in the afternoon which I have received from Lieut. Bobers, of the 1st hussars, it appears that the enemy are moving in force on the fords of Huerta and Encinas, and I believe the troops are Soult's. I have not heard of any movement from the Duero in any quarter.

I think that you will do well to move in the morning to your left, to Machacon, with the 2d division, excepting one British brigade, leaving Hamilton's division and that brigade at Alba. Take Slade's brigade and the Spanish troops and Portuguese cavalry with you, leaving Long's brigade looking out in front of Alba. Have a good garrison in the castle of Alba. You should not load the mine of the bridge, because we must keep a communication with the garrison. If the enemy should attempt to cross either of the fords of Huerta, fall upon the first who cross.

I order my troops to remain at Calvarrasa de Arriba in the morning, till I shall see how matters turn.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 9th Nov. 1812, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 6 P.M.

I am just come in from the front. The enemy have two divisions of infantry and some squadrons of cavalry at Pitiegua and Cabeza Velloso, which came from Toro yesterday, and I saw a body of infantry at Morisco, Babila-fuente, Huerta, (one battalion) San Morales, the total force of which I could not tell; but, from the baggage at Babila-fuente, I should suppose them to be a division. There were 6 squadrons of cavalry skirmishing with Pack's brigade at Aldea Lengua, and there might have been 4 more squadrons between that and Babila-fuente.

All reports agree that the fords are not now practicable. Indeed there is a considerable increase of water in the river; and the best proof that they are not practicable is, that the people of the country have their cattle grazing on the left bank. I am certain that if the fords were practicable, the enemy would pass the river, rather than attack us on the heights of San Cristoval; as it is, I am doubtful. And as we have not on our position, or near to it, as many troops as we require, I propose to move the troops now at Calvarrasa de Arriba into Salamanca early to-morrow morning.

* See p. 117.

If the fords are not practicable, you might move the 2d division, &c., into Calvarrasa de Arriba and de Abaxo, Pelabravo, Machacon, or back upon Alba de Tormes, observing the fords with piquets.

I have never been at Alba, and shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what garrison ought to be in the castle. I should think 200 men. If the river falls, so as to be fordable by all descriptions of troops, all I shall wish is to put in a Spanish garrison, to prevent the enemy from using the bridge in case of an action, as they did before. As long as their movements are uncertain, it would be expedient to have a garrison of a better description. If you think it necessary to occupy the town of Alba, to prevent the enemy from crossing the bridge, what number should there be?

I have just received your letter of 4 P.M. You may depend upon it that the river is not fordable for troops, otherwise the cattle would not have been left on the banks; and all the peasants I saw of Huerta say it is not so, and not likely to become so. However, it is easy to have it marked this night, and you will know whether it will rise or fall before morning. But, as the thing is doubtful, I shall move to Salamanca, in the morning, only the Light and Don Carlos' divisions and Gen. Alten's cavalry.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 9th Nov. 1812, 9½ P.M.

I have just received your letter of 6½ P.M. If the enemy can pass the Tormes at too many fords, and in too great force for you, your troops and those at Alba (excepting the garrison) must fall back on the heights of Arapiles, taking care to keep the village of Calvarrasa de Arriba on your right, as you retire; and to occupy that village, and the height behind the convent, or ermita de N^a S^a de la Peña, and giving me the earliest intelligence of this movement, as I must collect the whole of the army on the same ground. Have this ground reconnoitred. I acknowledge, however, that I am not aware of the necessity for this movement in the existing state of the river, which is represented to be scarcely fordable for cavalry, and not for infantry or artillery. How is the bridge of the Tormes then to be forced, having the castle on one side, and a body of infantry on commanding ground on the other?

The consequence of blowing up the bridge under these circumstances would be the loss of the garrison in the castle, which would lose heart upon seeing all communication with them cut off; and nothing would be gained as to defence, if I am correct in the notion, that between the castle and infantry on the left bank, the bridge cannot be carried, the river not being fordable for infantry.

The destruction of a bridge is a measure of great importance, in reference not only to the enemy's operations, but our own. I am not quite certain that if you were to lodge the powder in the mine, with the intention of exploding it only at the last moment, and that you should defend the left of the bridge, as I am convinced it would be defended, the enemy would not explode the mine for you, in order to be certain at least of your garrison in the castle.

Upon the whole I am convinced that your situation depends upon the

state of the fords and the use the enemy can make of them. If they are as I believe them to be, the enemy may make a desperate attack upon Alba de Tormes and the bridge, but must be defeated in that object; and they are liable to be attacked on this side. If the fords are practicable easily for cavalry and artillery, and at all for infantry, and are numerous, you must retire, as I told you above, if the enemy should attempt to pass in force, leaving the garrison in the castle.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 10th Nov. 1812, 4½ P.M.

I am very sorry that I did not meet you at Alba, and still more so that I did not see the large force which Col. Gordon tells me was collected in front of the town. However, the post is a very good one, and held by good, determined troops; and it is my opinion that the enemy can do them no harm. Indeed, I should doubt their attacking them, and I think they are come there to try the fords. By all accounts, these are not practicable for troops. When I call a ford practicable for troops, I don't mean to say that a single horseman cannot get over; but that cavalry, infantry, and artillery cannot. The river has certainly fallen since yesterday evening; but I believe no infantry soldier can pass now, even if a cavalry soldier can; and small piquets guarding the fords, and charging resolutely the first men who pass, or firing upon them, if they are piquets of infantry, will effectually prevent the passage of the fords.

I wish that Gen. D'Urban had mentioned where, and at what hour he passed yesterday, the 9th, as the river rose considerably in the afternoon, and is higher now than it was yesterday morning. I understand that it has not fallen since morning.

If the fords above the town are practicable, and those below not; or if the former are more practicable than those below, it would be expedient to move Gen. Slade's, and Gen. D'Urban's, and Penne Villemur's cavalry to the nearest woods to join Hamilton's position, keeping piquets on the fords as far as Huerta. The first people who pass must be vigorously attacked.

P.S. I beg you will send some musket ammunition to Alba de Tormes, for Major Gen. Howard's brigade.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 10th Nov. 1812, 10 min. before 8, P.M.

I have just received your letter of 6 P.M. It is my opinion that the enemy cannot take the town of Alba; and that it ought to be maintained as long as the force now in it, reasonably supported, can maintain it; if the fords don't become in a state that the enemy's infantry and artillery can pass them, and their cavalry in many places with ease. I gave Gen. Hamilton no instructions. He told me that you had instructed him to maintain his post, of which I entirely approved.

Recollect that I must have timely notice of all that passes at Alba; otherwise the troops on the Arapiles will be in a worse situation than those now at Alba.

P.S. If you will refer to my instructions, you will see, that although the town of Alba should be evacuated, it is in my opinion, not necessary to retire from the Tormes.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 11th Nov. 1812, 6 P.M.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I have given to a Spanish officer for you; which officer commands the detachment which I have prevailed upon Gen. Castaños to send to garrison the castle of Alba. You might as well have all the arrangements made for his reception this night. You might also have the mine prepared and loaded. I expect that the officer and detachment will be at Calvarrasa de Abaxo this night; and you should immediately send him to his station.

If you should withdraw from the Tormes, and from Alba before the Spanish garrison arrives, I believe, that upon the whole, it will be best to withdraw the English and Portuguese garrison from the castle, blowing up the bridge at the same time that you evacuate the town; as I fear that we could not expect our soldiers to march through the country as the Spaniards would. If, however, the Spanish garrison should arrive before you withdraw from the Tormes under your instructions, they must occupy the castle.

P.S. I am still inclined to believe that the fords are not practicable for infantry and artillery, and some not for cavalry; although some are, certainly.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 11th Nov. 1812.

The bearer of this letter is Major Josef de Miranda, of the Spanish service, who goes in command of 300 men, who are eventually to form the garrison of the castle of Alba de Tormes.

It will be necessary to increase the quantity of provisions in the castle to 10 days for 300, instead of for 200 men; and to leave there 50,000 rounds of musket ammunition, instead of 25,000 rounds.

As it is determined to hold the town, if possible, as long as we can remain upon the Tormes at all, I think it would be desirable to put this gentleman in charge of his post with his garrison as soon as he shall arrive with his troops; and measures must be taken to feed them daily, as long as you remain on the river, in order to keep up the stock of provisions.

You will give him instructions to maintain himself in his post as long as the army shall remain in this neighbourhood; if possible, for the full extent of the 10 days for which provisions shall be left for him.

If any misfortune should happen, or the army should be obliged to quit this part of the country, he is then to evacuate his post, and to march with the troops under his command either towards the Sierra, and thence into Portugal, or towards Miranda de Douro, and thence into Portugal, or any other road that he may think proper.

When you shall get the Spanish garrison within the castle, I think you might complete the mine in the bridge, and explode it when the town shall be evacuated by our troops, that is to say, if possible, when you should be under the necessity of retiring from the Tormes.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 11th Nov. 1812, 9½ P.M.

I have received your letter of 6 P.M. I don't think the enemy will attempt to pass in the existing state of the river. However, the 3d and

4th divisions are still at Calvarrasa de Abaxo, at your command, if you should require their assistance.

P.S. The report from the deserters this day is, that every thing is moving to the enemy's left.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Salamanca, 11th Nov. 1812.

I beg you to lay the papers enclosed in the accompanying letter from Major Gen. Peacocke before the Portuguese government; and that you will be so good as to let them know that the prisoner therein alluded to shall be placed at their disposal, if they wish to have him tried by the civil laws of the country.

The A.G. to General Officers commanding Divisions.

11th Nov. 1812.

In order to prevent the accumulation of sick at Salamanca, I have received his Excellency's directions to request that such as are necessarily removed to the rear from the division under your command may be forwarded on the divisional mules to Ciudad Rodrigo direct.

The A.G. to the Commandants of Ciudad Rodrigo and Celorico.

12th Nov. 1812.

It being the opinion of the Commander of the Forces that several men proceed to the depôts in the rear under the plea of sickness, though with little or no real ailment, I am to call your most serious attention to this subject, and to request that, in concert with the senior Medical officer at the depôt under your charge, immediate inspections may be made on the arrival of the apparently convalescent cases, in order that such as have thus absented themselves from their duties in the field may be restored to their divisions without loss of time. You will be pleased to appoint officers to conduct these parties to the army in proportion to their strength, reporting to me in all such cases for the information of his Excellency.

To Dcm M. Forjaz.

Salamanca, 14th Nov. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th inst., in which you have enclosed one written by order of the Governors of the Kingdom to the Conde de Funchal, regarding a new mode of finding funds for paying the subsidy to Portugal, upon which their Excellencies desire to have my opinion.

No arrangement could be so satisfactory to me as one which should relieve the military chest of the British army from the burthen of its payments to His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, to enable him to perform His Majesty's engagements to the Portuguese government; but I acknowledge that I don't conceive that the scheme proposed would answer the end in view.

1st; Any scheme of this description must interfere with the supplies of money for the military chest of the British army of the Peninsula; and I don't believe His Majesty's government would be disposed to listen to such a scheme, unless it should appear that under the existing system the performance of His Majesty's engagements had been neglected.

2dly; I assert that the performance of His Majesty's engagements has not been neglected. I will prove that in money and in kind the Portuguese government have to this day received more than the subsidy; every thing else is in arrear. The pay of the officers and soldiers of the army, and of the transport service, are in arrear, for 5 months the former,

for a year the latter ; debts are due to all classes and descriptions of persons, excepting to the Portuguese government alone, to whom I assert that not only nothing is due, but that the subsidy is overpaid. In point of fact, a loan of money is never received from any quarter that a proportion of it is not given to His Majesty's minister for the use of the Portuguese government ; and very lately I borrowed a sum of money at Madrid (under a very inconvenient engagement which I preferred, to repay it in a month), and gave the greater part of it to relieve the distresses of the Portuguese troops in the field which had been neglected by the government, notwithstanding that large sums had been paid in subsidy. This money has only now been repaid into the chest of the British army. I wish that the Portuguese government had performed their engagements, and had given to the cause a well-equipped army of 30,000 men, in return for the subsidy which they have received from His Majesty.

3dly ; It does not appear to me that the government have at all weighed or digested the scheme for the payment of the subsidy in London, the details of which they appear to consider very easy to arrange ; and they have left them to the Conde de Funchal. I would beg leave just to point out to them that the difference between the market price and the mint price of bullion in England is now, if I am not misinformed, about 25 *per cent.* ; and they would lose in the receipt of the subsidy such a proportion of that sum as the rate at which they now receive the dollar approaches to the mint price of bullion. If they now receive the dollar at 4*s.* 6*d.* sterling, they would lose the whole 25 *per cent.* on the subsidy, or one quarter of its amount ; if they now receive the dollar at 5*s.*, the loss would be about 15 *per cent.*

4thly ; I have reason to believe that the scheme is impracticable without taking so much specie out of the military chest of the British army, as must be attended by the consequence of recalling the army.

I have never been made sensible of the inconveniences, excepting to myself personally, of the mode of paying the subsidy now in practice, which have been so frequently complained of. Notwithstanding the existing prosperity and credit of Great Britain, great difficulty is experienced in procuring specie for a large foreign expenditure ; and the greatest inconvenience has been felt in His Majesty's dominions from the efforts which have been made in this manner in the cause of the Peninsula. In order to overcome these difficulties, and to obviate some of the inconveniences attending the realization of His Majesty's aid to the powers of the Peninsula, it was proposed, and the Portuguese government were distinctly informed, when the increased subsidy was granted, that a part should be given in kind. That is to say, that those articles of military equipment and stores which the Portuguese government required, and which could be purchased in England at a cheaper rate than in Portugal, should be supplied at the rate of their cost ; and that provisions should be supplied in the same manner from the stores of the army. The reason for making this arrangement was, that the former might be purchased in England without an expenditure of specie ; and the latter in the Peninsula by bills on His Majesty's treasury, with a condition that they should not be negotiated in the Peninsula.

It might have been expected from the allies of Great Britain that they would cheerfully adopt and carry into execution an arrangement which His Majesty had a right to dictate as the condition on which he would grant any aid ; but instead of that, the Portuguese government have never ceased to complain that they do not receive as much money as they wish, totally forgetting that they have received more in money and money's worth than His Majesty has ever consented to grant them ; and instead of assisting, as they ought, they have rejected, or have rendered nugatory, every proposition which has been made to them to facilitate the means of increasing the specie in the military chest of the army.

Your Excellency is mistaken in supposing that the £100,000 estimated as the amount of the pay of the British officers in the Portuguese service is exclusively for their British pay ; it is for their Portuguese pay ; and I can't recommend to His Majesty's government that any increase of subsidy should be granted to the Portuguese government on any ground.

If the government will be in earnest in respect to the finances, they have ample means at their command to cover the deficit for the military expenses ; and they will be enabled to relieve the poorer description of people from many burthensome and oppressive, though unproductive taxes. I don't consider the scheme, however, of selling quit-rents, &c., belonging to individuals, by grants from the Crown for their lives or others, in order to raise a loan to be employed in the liquidation of paper money, to be one of the legitimate means in the power of the government to ameliorate their finances ; even though an attempt should be made to conceal the manifest arbitrary injustice and attack upon private property of this scheme, under the cloak of a purchase from the owner by the grant of an *apolice*.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 15th Nov. 1812.

I have been out all the morning, and have only now received your letter of 12 at noon. You must have the motions of the corps which has marched up the river well observed ; and it might be expedient, if the enemy should not cross the Tormes in the night, to remove the 4th division to the edge of the wood near the top of the hill (and on the right of the road looking to Alba), at day-light in the morning, in order to be in readiness to protect Gen. Hamilton's eventual evacuation of Alba de Tormes, and his withdrawing from the river. The 4th division will in this position not be much farther from you than they are at present.

I saw the *chevalets* at Huerta. I don't believe they are to be used to construct a bridge ; nor have I seen or heard of any collection of force at any point, such as the enemy must have in order to pass the river. I can't observe any reduction of force at any point. All the troops mentioned by the Conde de Penne Villemur, in his letter to you, are those of the 5th and 8th divisions of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and are in front of Pack's brigade at Aldea Lengua.

The French evacuated Madrid on the 7th. I don't yet know where the troops have gone.

Au Gén. Giron.

Aldehuela de la Boveda, ce 16 Nov. 1812.

Le Gén. Comte de Belveder m'a fait savoir que l'ennemi était en avant

de lui; et je l'ai prié de marcher demain matin à 4 heures au lieu de 7 heures; et j'ai fait des arrangemens pour avoir de la cavalerie à son arrière-garde demain. L'ennemi s'est aussi montré en force sur la route de Matilla; mais nous ferons notre marche demain avec facilité.

Je vous prie de faire mes complimens au Général.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir E. Paget, K.B.

Head quarters, 19th Nov. 1812.

I did not hear of your misfortune till more than an hour after it had occurred, nor was I certain of it till the enemy attacked our rear guard, and the firing had continued for some time, and I found you were not on the field; and you will judge of my concern by the sense which I hope you feel I entertain of the cordial assistance which I received from you during the short time that you have been with us. I can't account for your misfortune, excepting that you were alone, and could not see the approach of the enemy's cavalry.

That which must now be done is to endeavor to obtain your exchange. I have no French General officer in the Peninsula; but I beg you to make it known to the King, and to the Duc de Dalmatie, that I will engage that any General officer they will name shall be sent from England to France in exchange for you. If you should find that there is any prospect of your being exchanged, I recommend to you to endeavor to prevail upon the King not to send you to France. It is not necessary to enter into the reason for giving you this advice. If the King, or the Duc de Dalmatie, will not name an officer to be exchanged for you, the sooner you are sent to France the better.

I send you some money, £200. I will take care of your friend Marlay. You cannot conceive how much I regret your loss. This is the second time that I have been deprived of your assistance, at an early period after you had joined us, and I am almost afraid to wish to have you again; but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your being liberated, and shall see you with us.

P.S. Let me know your wishes on any subject, and they shall be carried into execution.

G. O.

Aldehuela de la Boveda, 16th Nov. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding divisions will take measures to prevent the shameful and unmilitary practice of soldiers shooting pigs in the woods, so close to the camp and to the columns of march, as that 2 dragoons were shot last night; and the Commander of the Forces was induced to believe this day on the march, that the flank patrols were skirmishing with the enemy.

2. He desires that notice may be given to the soldiers, that he has this day ordered 2 men to be hanged who were caught in the fact of shooting pigs; and he now orders that the Assist. Provosts may attend their divisions on the march, and that they will do their duty, as well in respect to this as other offences.

3. The number of soldiers straggling from their regiments, for no reason excepting to plunder, is a disgrace to the army, and affords a strong proof of the degree to which the discipline of the regiments is relaxed, and of the inattention of the Commanding and other officers of regiments to their duty, and to the repeated orders of the army.

4. The Commander of the Forces considers the Commanding officer of any regiment, from which there are men absent on a march, to be responsible; and he now desires that the Hon. Lieut. Gen. Cole will put in arrest the Commanding officer of the — regt. for having allowed soldiers to straggle from the ranks of the — regt., on the marches of yesterday and this day.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

The troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill crossed the Tormes at Alba on the 8th inst., and those under my command took the position on the heights of San Cristoval de la Cuesta on the same day; Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and Brig. Gen. Bradford's Cabrerizos, on our right, and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba with Major Gen. Howard's brigade of the 2d division, leaving Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes to support those troops, while the 2d division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta, and the 3d and 4th divisions remained at Calvarrasa de Arriba in reserve.

On the 9th, the enemy drove in the piquets of Major Gen. Long's brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and Major Gen. Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with 20 pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

I enclose Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's * report to Sir R. Hill of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th, the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river in front of Sala-

* Lieut. Gen. Hamilton to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Alba de Tormes, 11th Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to report the steps I have taken to carry into effect your instructions for the defence of this place, which I am happy to say have obliged the enemy to withdraw the greatest part of the force opposed to us; and I feel almost confident we shall be able to retain our position as long as you may deem expedient.

I yesterday garrisoned and provisioned the castle, and by the exertions of Capt. Goldfinch, of the Engineers, it is put into as good a state as circumstances will admit; he is continuing strengthening it. Capt. Goldfinch has been of great assistance to me.

I have appropriated to each regiment a district of this town, and the Commanding officer has barricaded the streets and buildings in a very judicious manner. Brigadier Da Costa and Campbell's brigades are in our position on the left bank of the Tormes. Brig. Gen. Campbell reports his having caused the enemy some loss, in their attempt to pass a ford near his position.

Lieut. Col. Tulloh has made so good an arrangement of his two brigades of guns, that, united with the position of the two brigades of infantry on the left bank of the Tormes, I consider my flanks secure.

Early yesterday morning Major Gen. Long, commanding the cavalry in front, reported that the enemy were advancing in great force; I was therefore induced to retire the cavalry.

About 10 o'clock the enemy appeared on the heights in considerable force of cavalry, and a few infantry, covering, as I conceived, a reconnaissance of several officers of rank. About 2 o'clock the enemy's force was increased to 15 squadrons, and 6000 infantry, and 20 guns, including six 6 inch howitzers, which immediately commenced firing, and continued until it was dark. The enemy's light troops advanced close to the walls we had hastily thrown up; but from the cool and steady conduct of the 50th regt., Col. Stewart; 71st regt., Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan; and the 92d, Col. Cameron (Gen. Howard's brigade), the enemy dared not attempt the town.

About 8 o'clock in the evening, I was repeatedly informed that the enemy's infantry was considerably increasing, which induced me to order 3 battalions of Brig. Gen. Da Costa's brigade into town, leaving his other battalion for the protection of the fords. The enemy

manca; and, on the 14th, the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about 2 leagues above Alba.

I immediately broke up from San Cristoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, I moved with the 2d division of infantry, and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill with the 4th and Lieut. Gen. Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the 3d division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge. In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious

during the night withdrew their artillery, and I have left a small force of cavalry and infantry, who kept up a smart fire. I have to regret the loss of a considerable number of men, but which I trust you will not deem great, when you consider the heavy and incessant fire of artillery for so many hours. The loss of the Portuguese was while on duty this morning, and I have real pleasure in reporting their steady and animated conduct.

I feel much indebted to Major Gen. Howard, who rendered me every possible assistance, as also to every officer and soldier of his excellent brigade, for their steady, zealous, and soldier-like conduct.

To Capt. Pinto Saavedra, my A. A. G.; to Capt. Watson, Royal dragoons, A. Q. M. G.; and to Capt. Bunbury, my aide de camp, I consider myself obliged, for their prompt execution of my orders.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, and trust we shall not have many more casualties.

Return of the killed and wounded of the army, in the defence of Alba de Tormes, on the 10th and 11th Nov. 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	—	21	21
Wounded	3	4	85	92

that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted, for me to think of attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in 3 columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river to-morrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear guard, consisting of the Light division, under Major Gen. Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.

The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather, which, since the 13th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget, who was taken prisoner on the 17th. He commanded the centre column, and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval, and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that Sir Edward was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.

In my dispatch of the 7th inst., I communicated to your Lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learnt that Gen. Caffarelli, with the army of the North, certainly remained joined with the '*Armée de Portugal*.' King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th inst., and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castille; and Col. Don J. Palecca took possession of that city.

Your Lordship will have seen Gen. Ballesteros' letter of the 24th Oct. to the Regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the government given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the Regency and Cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies. Gen. Virues, who succeeded to the command upon Gen. Ballesteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th inst.

The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but more probably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were

cavalry; and as the '*Armée de Portugal*' alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces.

I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which 4000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and, although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case they must have attacked me in the position of San Cristoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favorable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.*

It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy's intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yeltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of Marshal Soult's letters to the King in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged, that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

The result of the campaign, however, though not so favorable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been if I could have succeeded in the attack of the castle of Burgos, or if Gen. Ballesteros had made the movement into La Mancha which was suggested, is still so favorable, that this operation appears out of the question.

The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the two former of these places (particularly the first-mentioned) are neither in the state of defence nor garrisoned as I should wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked.

I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in Old Castille, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from that part of the army which was under my immediate command, on its march from Burgos, from the 22d to the 29th Oct. The

* See Appendix, No. VI.

difficulty of making up this return accurately has occasioned the delay in transmitting it.

* * * * *

I have the honor also to enclose the return of the killed, wounded, and missing, to this date.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 20th Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 15th. I have never known a Knight of the Bath made that he was not knighted and invested with the Order by some person authorised for that purpose by the Crown; but upon this point I may be mistaken, and you should inquire from England without loss of time.

Although you may have the insignia, and may be appointed a Knight of the Bath, nobody can knight you or invest you with the insignia that is not duly authorised, nor can a person authorised depute another.

I have not received the authority, which I should think would have been sent to Beresford, as he is at Lisbon. If the messenger brought you the insignia, it is just possible that the same messenger may be now on the road with the authority to me to invest you; and if it should be so, or if I should receive the authority by any channel, I will apprise you of it, and will appoint time and place to meet you for the performance of the ceremony.

To the Junta of Cataluña.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 20th Nov. 1812.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th Sept., and I beg leave to thank you for the flattering terms in which you have announced your satisfaction at the progress made by the army under my command during the last campaign. If your Excellencies have read the proclamation which I issued at Madrid, you will have seen that I then doubted the possibility of retaining all the ground we have gained. The attempt which the enemy made to bring the allied army under my command to unequal battle has been frustrated; and I trust that I have had the good fortune of being useful to the gallant efforts of the municipality of Cataluña, which I shall always endeavor to assist.

To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 20th Nov. 1812.

I am sorry again to have to apprise you of your brother's misfortune at a period almost as early after he had joined us as I had upon a former occasion. He was taken prisoner by the enemy, unhurt, as I am informed, on the 17th inst. I acknowledge that I can't exactly account for the mode in which he was taken. He commanded the centre column of the army on its march from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Hill the right; the Spaniards were on the left. The country was woody, but open, and the cavalry was ordered to march between the two columns of British infantry.

The roads were very bad, and the rivulets much swelled, and there was some delay in the march of the centre column in the morning; and the right crossed the Huebra before the head of the centre reached that river.

The cavalry had been encamped near the right, and followed their movements, and the enemy's cavalry were consequently on the flank and rear of the centre when the head of the centre column reached the Huebra.

Some squadrons of Portuguese dragoons had been thrown out to keep the communication with the centre, which they did very insufficiently; and as soon as I saw the mistake, I ordered up Sir W. Erskine's division of cavalry to protect the march of the centre column; and the last time I saw your brother I requested him to halt the 7th division on a height about a mile from the Huebra, till the Light division, which was the rear guard, should come up.

I had come up from the rear to the head of the 5th division at this time, which immediately preceded the 7th; and when I passed the latter, there certainly was no interval in the column.

The badness of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets had however afterwards occasioned an interval, and your brother, with his usual anxiety, rode alone to ascertain the cause of it, having sent Marlay with information to the Light division, that they would find the 7th halted and cavalry at hand to give them assistance. On his way to the 7th division he was taken, either on the road, or in the wood through which it passed.

From the account of a French officer to one of ours on that afternoon across the Huebra, I am inclined to believe that his want of sight was the immediate cause of his being taken. He said that a non-commissioned officer had knocked off his hat, but had not hurt him, and that he then surrendered himself. As he was remarkably well mounted, there is no doubt that he might have got away, either before receiving this blow, if he had been able to see the enemy, or afterwards if he had been able to see his way. But his want of sight is a terrible disadvantage. The interval between the 5th and 7th divisions could not have been more than half a mile, and the French could not have been on or near the road more than 5 minutes.

I need not tell you how much I am annoyed by this misfortune.

I have desired him to tell King Joseph and Soult that I will engage that any person they shall name shall be sent to France in exchange for him. I have recommended him to go to France, if he should find that neither is disposed to name a person to be sent in exchange for him, as I think it probable that his chance of exchange will in that case be better there; he will live more comfortably than in Spain, and will be more in the way of hearing and receiving assistance from his friends. I have sent him money and his clothes, and some stores, &c. &c.

To —, Esq., late Lieut. — dragoons.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 21st Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 9th Oct.

You are much mistaken if you suppose that any thing which occurred to you in this country was occasioned by any feeling of irritation on my part, or any thing but a desire to uphold the discipline and subordination of the army.

I was very sorry that you fell the victim of great and persevering indiscretion and misapplication of very good talents; and I am happy to find that you are sensible of your error, and desirous of beginning your

career again with a determination to avoid the conduct in future which has occasioned your misfortunes.

It is quite impossible that you can be restored to your rank in the service; and I wish you would consider well, whether, at your time of life, with your talents and your prospects in other professions, it is worth your while to serve as a volunteer in a regiment of dragoons, in order eventually to be appointed a Cornet, thence to continue to rise as an officer. At all events, it will be necessary that you should have the permission of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief to serve even as a volunteer.

The A.G. to Col. Gordon, Q.M.G.

21st Nov. 1812.

I have duly laid before the Commander of the Forces your memorandum containing a representation relative to Lieut. —, of the — regt., as also the statement I had the honor of receiving from you yesterday expressive of the harshness of Lieut. Col. — towards that officer; in reply to which, I have received his Excellency's directions to observe, that the Commanding officer of the — regt. has no right to order Lieut. — to join, if he be attached to the Q.M.G.'s department by order from head quarters. I have, however, to convey his Excellency's opinion, that it is positively contrary to the King's orders, and has not been the practice, except in the cases of Lieut. — and Lieut. —, to attach officers who are subalterns to the Q.M.G.'s department, and Lieut. — should join if his Commanding officer has expressed a wish to that effect. In regard to the servant, it appears to the Commander of the Forces a point of regimental practice and order. If a subaltern officer of the — regt. is not usually allowed to take a servant with him from the regiment, Lieut. — should not have taken the man in question; if, on the contrary, such an indulgence is allowed usually in the —, it strikes his Excellency that Lieut. Col. — has been harsh towards Lieut. —.

To Senhor José Clementi.

Freneda, 22d Nov. 1812.

In regard to the Capitaõ Mor of Zibreira, I beg that you will tell him that he has been guilty of the greatest crime of which any individual in modern times can be guilty; viz., he has aided the French in invading his native country, in which they committed horrors till then unheard of: it is not surprising, therefore, that his countrymen and the government should be much displeased with him, and that I should experience the greatest difficulty in persuading them to pardon him.

I can undertake this difficult task upon only one condition, and that is, that the Capitaõ Mor shall render some important services to his country and her cause. I know that he is a person trusted and employed by the enemy; and if he will give me early and accurate intelligence of all that comes to his knowledge, and by these means serve his country, I will endeavor to obtain his pardon, and to restore him to the bosom of his country; otherwise he must not expect that I shall attempt it.

You will find out the mode of transmitting me his letter, and state what the messenger should be paid, which I will invariably pay.

Memorandum for Capt. Todd and Lieut. Piper.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

Capt. Todd has been ordered to take up the bridge at Almaraz, and to carry to Badajoz or Elvas that part of it for which he has conveyance, and to destroy that part for which he has not conveyance. It is concluded that he has obeyed these orders, but he has not reported. If he has not

obeyed the above-mentioned orders, he is to obey them forthwith. If he has obeyed them, he must report.

Lieut. Piper was first ordered to take up the pontoon bridge, and to proceed with it to Salamanca as soon as Capt. Todd's bridge should be ready.

He was then ordered by Lieut. Head,* on the 6th inst., to halt on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, whenever he should reach that road. He was then ordered on the 12th inst., by an officer of Guides, to proceed directly to Badajoz, if the order should find him south of the Tagus; or directly to Castello Branco, if the order should meet him on the north side of the Tagus.

There has been no report from him since the 31st of last month, when Capt. Todd's bridge was not ready, and he had not of course received the order of the 6th inst. This order is now sent to him by the south of the Tagus, and if he has not already moved from the Tagus, he is to move upon the receipt hereof, and to take the bridge by Badajoz to Elvas.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Sec. of State, of which I request you to communicate such parts as you may think proper to the Spanish government.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from the Sec. of State, from which I understand that H. R. H. the Prince Regent approves of my acceptance of the command of the Spanish armies.

I request you therefore to signify this approbation to the Spanish government, and to request them to signify to me their pleasure respecting the period at which I shall take upon myself the command.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 2d. I perfectly recollect Señor de la Vega in England, and I entertained a great respect for him; and he may depend upon it that I shall always be happy to forward his views in favor of any individual.

I shall attend to his wishes in favor of Señor Argüelles, if it should ever fall in my way to be of use to him.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

I have received your letters to the 12th: you will see that the French are excessively strong, and, considering how we are composed, more than a match for us. We suffered a good deal from the weather on the march; and our troops require some rest and refitting, before they can undertake any active operation again. I am sending the Galician army into Galicia.

If matters remain quiet, I think I should do some good by going to Cadiz for a little while, and I have some thoughts of going there. Let me know as soon as you can, whether you could send any *tiros* from Cadiz to meet me at Badajoz or Merida, and on the road from those places, to draw my

* Now Sir Francis Head, Bart., late Governor of Upper Canada.

carriage. This would greatly facilitate and expedite my journey. Don't mention to any body that I have thoughts of going to Cadiz.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 2d, regarding clothing for Gen. Downie's Legion.

There is no clothing for cavalry at Lisbon; but I will order clothing to be sent to Alcacer do Sal, for Gen. Downie's effective strength of trained soldiers, whenever he shall signify to me their numbers.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. O'Lawlor, Spanish service.

22d Nov. 1812.

In transmitting you the accompanying communication, I have received his Excellency's directions to request you will write to the Marques del Palacio, acquainting him how very much obliged the Commander of the Forces feels for the notice he has taken of the irregularities committed by the party in question, and for having sent the officer a prisoner to Elyas. His Excellency will feel additionally obliged in the Marques del Palacio specifically stating what crime the officer and party committed, and what evidence there is of it, and where to be found, in order that a General Court Martial may be assembled for the trial of the officer alluded to. You will be pleased to return the enclosures, being originals.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 23d Nov. 1812.

I received by the last post your letter of the 27th Oct. When one army is so inferior in numbers to another as ours is to the French army now assembled in Castille, its operations must depend in a great degree upon those of its opponent. It is impossible therefore for me at this period to point out what line I shall follow. The enemy having abandoned Madrid, and having given up all their communications with the north, solely with a view to collect a still larger force against us, there is no diversion which would answer at present to effect an alteration in our relative numbers, even if I could depend upon the Spaniards to do any thing. But I am quite in despair about them. The only man among them who ever did any thing (Ballesteros) is gone; and I am apprehensive that it will be quite impossible to employ him again. But even he never did more than give employment for a short period to one or at most two divisions of the enemy's army. Then there is another circumstance which must be attended to, and that is the situation of our own army. It has been actively employed since the beginning of last January, and requires rest. The horses of the cavalry and artillery in particular require both that and good food and care during the winter; and the discipline of the infantry requires to be attended to, as is usual in all armies after so long a campaign, and one of so much activity.

I believe that the enemy require repose as much if not more than we do; and that their immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them; but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to have a winter campaign, and if the weather should continue as severe as it has been since the 15th of this month.

I believe that I have underrated rather than overrated the enemy's force.

They say themselves at Salamanca that they have 90,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry; and their demand for provisions from the country is 140,000 rations daily. I think they have 90,000 men altogether, including from 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. The morning state will show what we have.

It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy's armies. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their own advantages induces the best intentioned among them to deceive; and no individual will ever allow that the French have more men than he has seen himself. The numbers of the army now in Castille have been stated to me at 15,000, and at almost every number from 15,000 to 90,000. I have never found myself mistaken in my estimate of the numbers of the enemy, when I relied upon the returns, making a reasonable abatement for losses during the period elapsed since their date. The only occasion on which I have been seriously mistaken was at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country; and was induced to believe that Sir H. Popham's operations would continue to give employment to Caffarelli. But I afterwards found that the '*Armée de Portugal*' had been very largely reinforced in cavalry as well as in infantry, to a larger amount even than I stated in my dispatch to Lord Bathurst, as it was 31 battalions instead of 23, as I stated, and the 130th regt. There were besides two divisions of infantry, and from 1000 to 1400 cavalry of the army of the North; and most certainly when I saw the whole drawn out near Cigales, they were not less than 45,000 men, of which 5000 were cavalry. Soult has 6 divisions of infantry, and 16 regiments of cavalry. The gross numbers of his army last April were 65,000. He has since sustained no great loss excepting the garrison of Badajoz, 5000 men. But I strike off from his gross strength, for losses, sickness, and men on his strength who were employed principally in the siege of Cadiz, 25,000 or 30,000, including the garrison of Badajoz; and I believe his army consists of 35,000 men, of which from 4000 to 5000 are cavalry. The army of the King, when it quitted Madrid in August, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men, including *Juramentados*, and an Italian division belonging to Suchet's army, under Gen. Palombini, and the 16th regt., likewise belonging to Suchet. Supposing the King to have lost by desertion, or to have sent away, all the *Juramentados*, and that the troops belonging to Suchet's army were left in Valencia, there will still remain the French troops of the King's guard, 5000 men, about 3500 more French and German infantry (I know the numbers of the regiments), which belong to the army of the Centre, and from 2000 to 3000 good French cavalry. I believe all this put together will amount to 90,000 men.*

What are our prospects against this army? At present none certainly. In the spring, as soon as the green forage shall appear, I shall be able to take the field with a very large British and Portuguese force, probably larger than we have yet produced, and more efficient I hope in cavalry and artillery. I have sent the army of Galicia home; and I hope advantage will be taken of the winter to do something with them; but unless some changes are effected I shall certainly be disappointed. There are besides, applicable to the *guerre* in Castille, the Spanish army lately

* See Appendix, No. VI.

under the command of Ballesteros, and the troops under the command of Elio.

If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cadiz for a short time, to endeavor to put matters upon a better footing, at least as far as regards the armies of Galicia, and that lately under the command of Ballesteros, which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprise the government of the inconvenience and danger of the system on which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy; and of the inefficiency of all the persons selected for public trusts; and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of the provinces with the maintenance of such people. It is useless to trouble your Lordship with a detail of these facts; but I can only say that, if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms. After this detail of facts, your Lordship will see that it is very useless to trouble you with my opinion of what ought to be done after the French shall leave the Peninsula, more particularly as I have already communicated that opinion to Lord Bathurst.

From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results, than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use of the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, and should have remained in possession of Castille and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October, or if Ballesteros had moved upon Alcaraz as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.

The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial on the 22d Sept.; and if they had, we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line because

——, the field officer who commanded, did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed, in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

I see that a disposition already exists to blame the government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them. The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such excellent roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon 50 or 60 mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. —— is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about 100 barrels of powder, and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition, which he sent us. As for the 2 guns which he endeavored to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 25th Nov. 1812.

I have the honor to inform you that His Majesty's government have sent from England a certain sum of money in guineas for the payment of

G. O.

Freneda, 25th Nov. 1812.

3. It is very desirable that the General officers of the army, and the Commanding officers of regiments of cavalry and infantry, should endeavor to economise the forage and other resources of the country, otherwise they must expect that the troops and horses will suffer very serious privations during the winter.

4. The Commander of the Forces has taken the precaution of having the grass mowed and saved as hay in many parts of the country in which the troops are now or may be cantoned, which resource is ample for the food of all the animals of the army during the winter, if duly taken care of and distributed under the regulations of the service.

5. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn, however, that much of what was thus provided in this part of the country has been already wasted or trampled upon and destroyed, and in particular 35,000 rations of hay, which were at Espeja, and of which Lieut. —— took possession, has been destroyed.

6. He entreats the attention of the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments to these orders, as they relate not only to the hay provided by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, but to the forage and other resources of the country.

His Majesty's troops, which guineas I propose should be issued to the troops at their current value in England, viz., each at the rate of one pound one shilling sterling.

Dollars are now issued to the troops each at the rate of 4*s.* 6*d.* sterling, which is the Mint price in England; and the guinea will therefore, in reference to dollars, be worth four dollars and four-sixths of a dollar.

The dollar has been stated by an edict of the Portuguese government to be worth 800 *reis* metal; and the guinea, by the same rule, ought to be worth 3733 *reis* metal.

I have so frequently failed in the applications which I have had occasion to make to the Portuguese government for their interposition for the relief or convenience of His Majesty's service, that I hesitate in requesting you to apply to the government to issue a decree fixing this value as that of the guinea in reference to the Portuguese currency; but it is so desirable that there should be no misunderstanding on this subject, that I venture to solicit you to request the Portuguese government to fix the current rate of the guinea in Portugal at 3733 *reis* metal.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 25th Nov. 1812.

The greater part of the enemy's force, which had crossed the Tormes, have retired across that river, and it is reported have directed their march towards the Duero. It is also reported that the King is gone to fix his quarters at Valladolid, and that those of Marshal Soult are to be at Salamanca.

A part of the troops which had moved to the Huebra returned towards Salamanca, and others which had advanced to Tamames returned to the Tormes and towards the Escorial by Los Santos. The road to the Puerto de Baños passes by that place, and it is reported that the enemy are about to march that way; but I have no reason for giving credit to this report.

I must admit, however, that I have lately received but little intelligence from the country. The decree of the Cortes, which required every person to justify his conduct who had remained in the country occupied by the enemy, has obliged many who were heretofore instrumental in acquiring and transmitting intelligence, to fly from their homes, lest they should be punished by the enemy; and I have not yet had time to establish fresh channels of communication.

The army are cantoned on both banks of the Upper Agueda, and between the Agueda and Coa; and I propose to extend the cantonments still farther, when I shall be certain of the enemy's destination. Many men who were missing have returned to their regiments; but I am sorry to say that several who had straggled from their regiments, and strayed behind, have died from the extreme severity of the weather and the want of food which they experienced, all the villages having been plundered, by the soldiers who first passed to the hospitals, and abandoned by the inhabitants.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 25th Nov. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Oct., enclosing one from Sir C. Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, of the 3d Oct. in regard to

an arrangement which had been made between the Spanish and Portuguese governments, for the supply of the troops of the latter with provisions and forage from the Royal magazines in Spain, upon which you are desirous of having my opinion.

It is very difficult to understand from Sir C. Stuart's letter precisely what was intended by the arrangement, excepting that the Portuguese government should have a plausible excuse for not sending money to provide for the supply of their troops in Spain; as I observe that Sir C. Stuart includes meat in the arrangement.

The fact is, that there are no Royal magazines in Spain, and the crown possesses no cattle whatever.

The crown of Spain does possess certain estates in different parts of the country, and has a right to the tenth of the produce of certain other estates; and when I entered Spain in the month of June last, I agreed with the Spanish authorities that the rent of these estates and the dues to the Crown should be received in kind, and should be handed over to the British Commissariat, at the current price of the day, in such proportions as were not required by the Spanish armies.

We did receive some supplies under this arrangement during the campaign, and the Portuguese army likewise: the account is now in a train of settlement; and the value of what was received will be payable to the Spanish government.

It will probably be difficult to distinguish what was received by the Portuguese troops from the estates of the crown of Spain, from what was delivered to them from other sources, and to be accounted for as subsidy; and it may not be possible to allow what they have received from the crown of Spain to be carried to account against the supposed debt of the Spanish to the Portuguese government.

I say supposed debt, because in point of fact, since the year 1810 inclusively, the burthen and expense of feeding all Spanish detachments which have passed through Portugal, have fallen upon the British Commissariat. I believe therefore that if there exists any account or any debt from one government to the other, the Portuguese government is the debtor.

At all events, as the supplies received from the estates of the crown of Spain, by the Portuguese departments, probably first passed through the British Commissariat, it will be reasonable that if the British Commissariat should be obliged to pay for them, their value should be carried against the British subsidy to Portugal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Nov. 1812.

I enclose some good news. From all accounts I judge that the enemy are not moving by Baños, but are crossing the Tormes, and I have commenced the movements of my troops, and I have desired the Q. M. G. to write to you to recommend that you should commence yours, in order to take up your cantonments in the province of Coria, through the Pass of Perales.

I have desired the officer to return to Alcantara with the bridge, and you will send him your orders to lay it; if you should like to use it, you must give him a day's notice of your wanting it.

The Alagon and Tietar are good barriers for your front, but you should observe well what passes on the north side of the Puerto de Baños. I believe there is only one bridge on the Alagon at Monte Hermoso.

P.S. I believe the 9th light dragoons should be sent towards Elvas, and probably the Portuguese dragoons likewise, but I shall hear from you on this subject.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Nov. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 19th inst.

If Capt. Mackenzie is unable to perform the duty with which he is charged, another officer shall be appointed to perform it. I shall make inquiry on the subject.

I never yet applied to the Portuguese government to make any arrangement to facilitate the transaction of business by the departments of this army, that they did not create difficulties.

In regard to the duties on corn, the facts are just these. The Commissary purchases corn with his bills upon the Treasury, with the condition that the bills shall not be negotiated at Lisbon. He can continue this practice, and can insist on the condition, if the duties on the corn are remitted. If they are to be paid, he must either give some money from the chest, or he must allow a part of the bills to be discounted at Lisbon, otherwise the seller of the corn has it not in his power to pay the duties.

There is another reason also why I wish that the people of the corn market at Lisbon should have nothing to say to our concerns. Experience has taught me to entertain the worst opinion of every description of Portuguese *employés*, and I think it desirable that those in the corn market should not have that knowledge which the payment of these duties would give them of the state of our stores. It is my opinion, as it is that of the Commissary Gen., that the possession of this knowledge would very materially affect prices in our dealings with the importers of corn, from time to time.

This last reason may be imaginary, but the first is conclusive; and if the government don't agree to give up the duties, I must refer the subject to His Majesty's government.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Hamilton, Portuguese division.

26th Nov. 1812.

The object of the daily state to the Commander of the Forces is completely defeated, from the states in some of the divisions of the army being so long in arrear. In that which was presented to his Excellency this morning, no state appears received from the Portuguese division under your command since the 3d inst. I am, therefore, to request you will call upon those officers with whom this inattention arises, in order that further steps may be taken to enforce obedience to the orders issued.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Freneda, 27th Nov. 1812, 10 P.M.

I was about to write to you last night, to tell you that I had ordered the troops to their cantonments, and to request you to come over here for a day, on your way to Lisbon. I find, however, that I am too late.

We can't take the field in this part of the country till the end of April, or beginning of May. We may be obliged to take it earlier to the south-

ward. However, I hope that when we shall take the field, it will be in great strength and condition.

There are various cavalry arrangements upon which I wished to speak to you; but I must now talk them over with Elley, whom I shall send for to come here for a few days.

I shall write to Adm. Martin to give you a passage. Wishing you a pleasant voyage, and the early re-establishment of your health, and that I may soon have the benefit of your assistance again, believe me, &c.

A M. La Fond, A. D. C. du Gén. Maucune. Au Quartier Général, ce 27 Nov. 1812.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 23 Nov., et je prendrai des mesures pour que la demoiselle Hernavissa Isidro, prise par les troupes de Don J. Sanchez, puisse rentrer à Salamanque chez ses parens.

To Capt. Gen. the Duque del Parque.

Freneda, 27th Nov. 1812.

Gen. Sir R. Hill has communicated to me the letter addressed to him by the Chief of the Staff of the 4th army on the 10th inst., from which I learn that the 4th army, under the command of your Excellency, was likely to arrive at Val-de-peñas on the 17th inst.

From the last letter from Gen. Vives, I had reason to believe that the 4th army would not pass Jaen.

I have now to inform your Excellency that the enemy having assembled on the Tormes the whole of the disposable force of the army of the North, of the '*Armée de Portugal*,' and of the armies of the Centre and of the South, under King Joseph, and having crossed that river on the 14th inst., I was under the necessity of retiring, and I crossed the Agueda on the 19th inst.

The enemy have since withdrawn across the Tormes, and a part of their forces have withdrawn towards the Duero; but the army of the South, and I believe the army of the Centre, have moved towards the Tagus, and it is probable will cross that river.

I apprise your Excellency of this circumstance, in order that you may be prepared to withdraw into the Sierra; and to take such position with the troops under your command as will enable you to subsist them with facility during the winter, at the same time that you will be out of reach of the enterprises of the enemy.

It is my opinion that Gen. Elio, with that part of the 2d and 3d armies which is disposable, should keep in communication with your Excellency, and that those troops should, equally with those under the command of your Excellency, keep themselves out of the reach of the enemy's enterprises during the winter.

It is impossible for me, at this distance, to point out to your Excellency more than a general principle for your operations. On a future occasion I shall have the honor of writing to you more fully.

I enclose the duplicate of a letter which I have written to Gen. Elio,* which I request your Excellency to peruse, and beg you to forward, with a copy of this letter.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 27th Nov. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving a letter from Col. Darling of the 22d

* Missing from the drafts of the Duke of Wellington's papers.

Oct., enclosing one from Major — of the — regt., referring to a prior conversation on the wants of the 2d batt. — regt. of officers, and requiring that the Captains of the — regt. belonging to the 2d batt., and doing duty with the 1st batt. in this country, should be ordered to join the 2d batt. in England.

Major — forgot to mention, either in the letter or the conversation, that according to the return of the 24th Oct., there are 2 Captains, — and —, belonging to the 1st batt. — regt., doing duty with the 2d batt. There were 8 Captains, including Cpts. — and —, belonging to the 2d batt., 12 Lieutenants, and 4 Ensigns, doing duty with the 1st batt. — regt., according to the last returns.

There are not *too many* officers doing duty with any regiment in this army; but of all regiments, from what I have seen lately of the state of its discipline, I should consider the — least able to spare any officers; and I would therefore beg leave to suggest that His Majesty's regulation in regard to the relief of the officers of a battalion on service should be enforced in regard to the officers of the 2d batt. — regt., serving with the 1st batt. in this country, before Cpts. — and — are allowed to depart from the 1st batt.

To Officers commanding Divisions and Brigades.

Freneda, 28th Nov. 1812.

I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions and brigades.

But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the General and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit, of the officers of the army ; and I am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments ; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions ; and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

These are the points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The Commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments ; and they must endeavor to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority ; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they well know that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

The Commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented, in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the

French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army. The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

You will of course give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and the division should march 10 or 12 miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be dry.

But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the General and Field officers must be to get the Captains and Subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

Au Général le Baron Maucune.

Au Quartier Général, ce 29 Nov. 1812.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 25; et je vous suis bien obligé des bontés que vous avez eues pour le Gén. Paget.

J'envoie mon aide de camp, Col. Gordon, pour recevoir les lettres que vous voulez m'envoyer; et je vous prie de me faire savoir la somme d'argent que vous avez avancée au Gén. Paget, afin que je prenne des mesures pour vous la rendre.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 29th Nov. 1812.

I have desired the Commissary Gen. to send to Coruña 5000 suits of clothing for the use of the corps of Spanish troops under Gen. Porlier; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will provide a ship for the conveyance of this equipment to that port.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Keane, 60th foot, 3d division.

29th Nov. 1812.

Your letter addressed to the Military Sec. relative to Lieut. —, of the — regt., has been referred to me; and I have received his Excellency's directions to acquaint you, that in consequence of that officer's neglect of duty when in charge of a detachment on route to the army, a General Court Martial will be ordered to investigate the circumstances, so soon as the same can be conveniently assembled. I have, accordingly, enclosed a copy of the charges under which Lieut. — is to be tried, and request that officer may be placed in arrest, preparatory to his trial being entered on.

To Gen. Vives, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

I have sent to Don Carlos de España a warrant for the sum of 23,292

dollars, being for the pay of the officers and troops under the command of Don Carlos de España and yourself, for the month of August; and another warrant for the sum of 9,128 dollars, being for the pay of the officers of the division of Don Carlos, and belonging to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the month of September. I have sent this last in order to enable the officers to equip themselves as they ought to be.

I have continued to advance this money, notwithstanding that I have no scruple in declaring that I am by no means satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops composing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, particularly in respect to the mode of performing the duties which they have been called upon to perform, in escorting prisoners, &c.

I hope that such transactions will not occur again; and that when I shall have an opportunity of reviewing the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, which I propose to do at an early period, I shall find all the troops in a good state of discipline, and their arms, accoutrements, and clothing in good order.

It is my opinion that the whole of Don Carlos' division ought now to be in the garrison and suburbs of Ciudad Rodrigo; that there should be

G. O.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has directed that those non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the infantry and artillery who were present at the siege of Burgos, and those who were present with their regiments in Spain, between the 15th and 19th Nov., as well Portuguese as English, shall receive a pair of shoes gratis from the Commissary.

2. The officers commanding regiments will accordingly make requisitions for these shoes.

3. Many soldiers are probably already provided with the required quantity of shoes: the officers commanding regiments will make a list of the names of these soldiers, and will have this list lodged with the Paymaster Gen., in satisfaction of the demand of the Commissary Gen., for as many pairs of shoes last delivered to the regiment as there will be names in the list.

4. The soldiers whose names will be in these lists, are not to be charged for a pair of shoes each man last received by them from the Commissary, in their accounts with the Captain of their company.

5. Of course the requisitions for shoes under this order are not to include the names of those who will be included in the lists adverted to in Nos. 3 and 4.

6. The shoes which will be required under these orders, will be delivered between this time and the 1st Feb. next.

7. The Dep. Paymaster Gen. has received directions to pay the balances due to the regiments on their estimates to the 24th Aug., and the Paymasters of regiments will attend him accordingly; those of regiments in the Light division and Gen. Alten's cavalry, on the 2d Dec.; those of regiments in the 3d and 4th divisions, on the 4th and 5th Dec.; those of regiments in the 7th division, on the 6th Dec.; and in the 6th and 1st divisions, Gen. Bock's, Gen. Ponsonby's and Gen. Anson's cavalry, on the 7th and 8th Dec.

8. Money will be transmitted to the Assist. Paymaster Gen. with Lieut. Gen. Hill, to enable him to make payment to the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, to the same period.

9. The Commander of the Forces requests that the Commanding officers of regiments will give particular directions to the officers commanding companies to complete the men under their command with necessaries upon the receipt of the balances due on the estimates to the 24th Aug.

10. The Commander of the Forces desires that when the troops will arrive in the cantonments to which they are now marching, a regimental hospital may be established for each regiment, to which the sick may be sent belonging to each regiment.

11. Dr. McGrigor will transmit directions respecting the removal of those who may require it to general hospital.

16. Great inconvenience arising in consequence of surgeons leaving their regiments for the purpose of paying into the military chest the hospital surpluses, or receiving therefrom the amount of deficiencies, it is directed in future, that the Paymaster shall settle their accounts at the time they receive the subsistence of their respective regiments.

10 rounds of ammunition for each piece of ordnance in the outworks; that there should be an officer and 20 men in each of them every night; and an in-line piquet in the fort of 200 men every day, in readiness to move to any point which may be threatened.

The officers on guard in the outworks must have orders to hold their posts to the last extremity.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

I did not receive your letter of the 28th till last night. The fact is, that by some means or other the precaution which I had taken in the summer to provide for the army 35,000 rations of hay at Espeja was defeated; and I am sorry to say that this occurs so frequently, owing to the mode in which we are in the habit of allowing our soldiers, bât men, and followers to go on, that it does require notice and serious attention. Possibly, nay, probably, the mischief was done before the Guards went to Espeja; as I have generally observed that they do less of this kind of mischief, and are more regular in all their duties and in every respect, than the other troops.

The utter contempt of the authority of a Portuguese guard is one of the evils of which I complain. It is not in the nature of the Portuguese to oppose any thing in the shape of an Englishman; yet Portuguese, and even Portuguese militia, must be used on these services. British officers would think it rather extraordinary if British soldiers were scattered all over the country as guards over hay stacks or magazines. Indeed, if they were, I doubt their doing their duty as it ought to be done.

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

Being desirous of effecting the exchange of Major Jozé Joaquim Talaya, of the Portuguese Engineers, who was taken by the enemy at Campo Maior, and permitted to return to Portugal on his parole, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send a French officer of his rank to France in exchange for him, and transmit to me the cartel, in order that I may forward it to Major Talaya, and authorise him to serve again.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 30th Nov. 1812.

Some white breeches cloth, which was sent from England for the use of the 45th regt., and was afterwards sold at Lisbon, as it was not required for the soldiers, having been seized by the officers of the Portuguese customs, I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay before the government my request that this cloth should be released, on the amount of the established duties on English goods being paid into the Custom house.

Au Gén. Dumouriez.

Fréneda, ce 30 Nov. 1812.

Je vous ai bien dit, mon cher Général, de ne pas voler trop vite; je croyais bien aux chances qu'il y avait contre moi; et malgré les apparences qu'il y avait alors (au mois de Septembre) en ma faveur, je craignais les résultats d'une jonction générale de la force de l'ennemi dans la Castille, qui, je l'avais toujours dit, me forcerait à me retirer. Il y avait deux événemens qui pouvaient empêcher ce fâcheux résultat. L'un était la prise

de Burgos, pour laquelle j'ai bien travaillé ; mais la place était trop forte, et mes moyens trop rétrécis : mais je l'aurais prise si j'avais eu quelques jours de plus, ou si j'eusse eu, au commencement du siège, les succès que j'aurais dû avoir en quelques attaques de vive force. L'autre était l'arrivée de Ballesteros, à la fin du mois de Septembre, dans la Sierra d'Alcaraz, où il lui fut ordonné de marcher, à ma suggestion, par le Ministre de la Guerre : mais les malheureuses jalousies et les intrigues, comme vous l'aurez vu, l'ont empêché, et son corps d'armée n'est pas encore où il eut dû être au mois de Septembre. Quand je dis que deux événemens auraient empêché ma retraite de la Castille, et auraient forcé l'ennemi de se retirer sur l'Ebro, je dois ajouter *si on pouvait compter du tout sur les opérations militaires des armées Espagnoles*. Malgré que l'Armée de Portugal fut beaucoup renforcée et jointe avec l'Armée du Nord, les deux formant ensemble 10 divisions, ou au moins 40,000 infanterie et 5000 cavalerie, et que je n'avais que 4 divisions Anglo-Portugaises, et 12,000 Espagnols, et très peu de cavalerie, je n'ai pas décidé sur la retraite du Gén. Hill jusqu'à ce que j'eusse vu mes Espagnols engagés avec l'ennemi ; et alors j'ai vu trop clairement qu'on ne pouvait pas s'y fier, et que, si on m'attaquait, je serais battu, et le Gén. Hill, et la cause perdue. Alors j'ai ordonné sa retraite, et, malgré que l'ennemi avait les ponts du Douro que le régiment de Brunswick perdit, je les ai détenus sur le Douro pendant 8 jours que le Gén. Hill prit pour sa marche.

Il faut que je vous dise un secret, qui est que, pour une manœuvre militaire, Ballesteros ne vaut pas mieux qu'un autre ; et que je ne pouvais pas compter sur ses opérations, même s'il fut arrivé à la position indiquée, beaucoup plus que l'expérience m'a montré que je pouvais compter sur celles de l'armée de la Galice. Mais, malgré que les trois quarts de ce qu'on lit des actions de Ballesteros fussent mensonges, il est vrai qu'il a toujours attiré l'attention d'une, et quelquefois près de deux, divisions de l'armée de Soult en Andalousie, et il aurait sûrement fait la même chose dans la Sierra de Alcaraz ; et ou Soult ou le Roi ne se serait pas avancé sur le Gén. Hill, ou le Gén. Hill leur aurait été supérieur ; et j'aurais pu tirer de son corps des renforts Anglo-Portugais pour me tenir sur le Douro.

En tout cas, la prise de Burgos et l'arrivée de Ballesteros à la position de Alcaraz pouvaient seules nous donner la possession des Castilles pendant l'hiver ; et je crois que j'ai bien fait de faire tout en mon pouvoir pour avoir cet avantage.

L'ennemi a rassemblé sur le Tormes toute sa force, ayant abandonné Madrid et ses communications avec la France. Ils avaient au moins 90,000 hommes, dont 12,000 de cavalerie. J'ai resté 8 jours en avant d'eux ; et si la pluie qui a tombé le 15 eut tombé le 13 ou le 14, nous aurions gardé les cantonnemens du Tormes. Mais quand ils ont passé cette rivière en force, et qu'ils se sont mis sur nos communications, il fallait ou les attaquer, ou faire la retraite. Ils étaient trop fort et trop bien postés pour être attaqués, et j'ai marché tout de suite. Mais, malgré que nous n'ayons pu garder les Castilles, notre campagne n'a pas été mauvaise, et nous sommes dans une position à en faire une bonne l'année prochaine.

On m'a fait Commandant en Chef de l'armée Espagnole ; et je compte

bien travailler pendant l'hiver, non seulement pour remettre notre armée de ses fatigues et des effets de la dernière campagne, mais pour tâcher de tirer quelque parti des armées Espagnoles.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812, 9 A.M.

I have received yours of the 29th this morning. I have no objection to your giving furloughs to the Portuguese soldiers in the 6th division, in moderate numbers at a time, and in their turn; but it must be understood and positively stated, that if any man does not return to his time, none will be allowed to go in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

Fremantle delivered to me last night the letters which you had received in regard to the enemy's movements towards the Puerto de Baños. I don't exactly understand their movements on the Upper Tormes. It appears to me that they have taken up their cantonments in the province of Avila, and that their advanced guard is on this side of the Tormes; and that the troops of the advanced guard are those of whose movements we hear so frequently. I don't think they will come down to Plasencia. If they do, it will probably be in large force, and the movement must be connected with those of the troops about Salamanca. I don't think, therefore, that you will be disturbed in your cantonments, particularly as you will be well covered by the Alagon.

But if you should find the enemy collect in too large force for you on the Estremadura side of Baños, and it should be necessary for you to retire, you must retire upon Castello Branco. It will be necessary, in that case, to direct the officer at the bridge of Alcantara to march away with the bridge to Marvaõ, and to direct all the boats, &c., to be taken up on the river. I shall be obliged to you to send to the officer at the bridge, and see what assistance he requires either to lay it, or to take it up, or to remove it; and have that assistance given to him by the nearest troops, and by your commissariat.

I hear there is a band of robbers between Truxillo and Merida, who are playing the devil. If you have sent Penne Villemur across the Tagus, desire him to destroy these people.

A. G. O.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments to the G. O. of the 8th and 27th May, in regard to the transmission of soldiers' letters to England.

2. The object of these orders, to which the attention of the Commander of the Forces has been called by H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, was to insure the delivery in England of the letters for which the soldiers paid the postage in this country.

3. The following reports from Lieut. Col. Scovell, and Mr. Reynolds, will show that this object has been defeated, in consequence of the slovenly manner in which these orders have been carried into execution.

Frequent complaints are made by the agent for packets at Lisbon, on the irregularity of sending soldiers' letters: 1st; That letters are sent without lists, and that the lists do not accompany the letters: 2d; That the lists are not signed by commissioned officers: 3d; That the letters are sent loose, instead of being tied up in packets with the lists.

4. The Commander of the Forces begs that more attention may be paid to this subject in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

Since I wrote to you this morning, at 11 o'clock, I have received a letter of yesterday, from Blanckley, from Monforte, who says that the enemy are moving every thing from Bejar and elsewhere towards the Puerto de Congosto and Avila. I am inclined to believe this.

I have another letter of the 29th, at 4 in the evening, from a clergyman at Batuecas, near Alverca, who says the enemy were moving on Plasencia. Blanckley was, however, so certain of the truth of his intelligence, that he was about to go towards Baños and Bejar himself.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

It has been stated to me that the horses of the Life Guards have landed at Lisbon in very bad condition; and I have been informed that the men have come unprovided with currycombs or brushes.

As these articles are essentially necessary on service in this country, in which it has been found that attention to the cleanliness of the horse's coat tends essentially to the preservation of his health and condition, I beg you will desire the Commanding officers of the 2 regiments of Life Guards to take immediate measures to have the soldiers supplied with currycombs and brushes; and that I rely upon them to make every exertion in their power to restore the condition of their horses.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

Notwithstanding that Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton has been serving with the army, his wound is still open, and it is necessary that he should return to England. I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will give him a passage in a man of war.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 1st Dec. 1812.

I have just received your letter of the 27th Nov. Very great inconvenience is felt at head quarters from Senhor Sodré's absence; and if he is to go to Brazil, somebody must be employed here to perform the duty which he has performed hitherto.

I can have no objection to his going to Brazil, if he thinks such a voyage will be of advantage to him; but I beg that it may be clearly understood by him, by the Local government, and by the Prince, that Senhor Sodré is not deputed by me in any manner; and that he is not charged even with a message from me.

I don't understand why the 200,000 dollars were not paid to the Portuguese government in dollars as I ordered. I ordered a second 100,000 to be given in November, and Mr. Kennedy tells me that he likewise ordered the 200,000 for October to be paid in immediately. I propose to try to give 200,000 in November.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812, 9½ A.M.

I received in the night a letter from Blanckley, dated Monforte, at 10 P.M. the 30th Nov., in which he confirms the report communicated to you in my letter of yesterday afternoon; and he says that the whole of the enemy's force has passed the Tormes, and moved towards Arevalo.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 28th Nov., and although there are other points on which I have to write to you, and on which I have proposed to write this day, I shall not delay to answer that letter immediately. The way in which I have always considered your situation in the army, was as Marshal of the Portuguese army, and of course next in command to myself, as long as I should be in a situation to exercise any command at all.

An officer has been from time to time appointed second in command to this army, upon whom it was the intention of the King's ministers that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command of the army.

I imagined that it had been explained to, and understood by, the Portuguese government, when you were sent to command the Portuguese army, that the officer appointed to command the British army was to command both; and I was not aware, till there was a discussion with the Regency upon this point, I believe in the beginning of 1811, that this point had not been explained, and that I commanded the allied army as Marshal General. This point not having been explained, it follows of course either that the British General officer, second in command, must, in the event of my being deprived of the command, be made Marshal General; or the awkwardness must occur to which you refer, in regard to your own situation; or you must take the command of the allied army, and not the General officer sent out by government specially for the purpose of taking the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it.

I have always felt the inutility and inconvenience of the office of second in command. It has a great and high sounding title, without duties or responsibility of any description; at the same time that it gives pretensions, the assertion of which is, and I believe you know I found them in one instance to be, very inconvenient. Every officer in an army should have some duty to perform, for which he is responsible; and I understand a General officer commanding a division or larger body of troops to be in this situation. The second in command has none that any body can define; excepting to give opinions for which he is in no manner responsible, and which I have found one at least most ready to relinquish, when he found that they were not liked in England.

Having made known these sentiments to Lord Bathurst, Sir E. Paget was lately sent out with the explanation that he was coming as a Lieut. General in this army, but that government looked to his succeeding to the command, in case circumstances should deprive me of it; so the matter would stand in respect to any General officer who should now be sent out to fill his situation. In regard to your own situation in the army, what I have always felt was, that you had too many duties of a general nature to perform, and it was necessary to refer to you too often, to charge you with the details of command; and excepting on the occasion on which I requested you to take the command in the Alentejo in 1811, (which Hill had held,) during his absence, I have not desired you to take upon you such details.

The convenience of the service might however lead to a different decision, and I have always felt that you were ready to take upon you any duty which might be imposed upon you whenever it should be necessary. From the contents of this letter you will observe that the conversation between us to which you refer, as having passed immediately previous to the battle of Salamanca, related on my part to the situation of the next in British rank to me, solely in the event of any circumstance depriving me of the command; as I never entertained a doubt, particularly after the decision of the Commander in Chief, in which I entirely concurred, that you took your rank next to me in the allied army as Marshal.

I shall send your letters to the Sec. of State by this post, though I wish some parts of both were altered.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, in relation to his rank in the allied army, to which I beg to draw your attention.

The Commander in Chief having decided, upon reference to him in the year 1809, that officers in the service of His Majesty and the Prince Regent of Portugal should rank with each other according to the dates of their several commissions; there is no doubt whatever that Marshal Sir W. Beresford, holding the rank of a Marshal, ranks next me in the allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal General in the allied army.

His Majesty's government have thought proper from time to time to appoint a General officer to be second in command to the British army, senior in rank in the British service to Sir W. Beresford, on which officer it has been the intention of His Majesty's government that the command of the allied army should devolve, in case any circumstance should deprive me of the command.

It does not appear, however, that any explanation in regard to command has ever been had with the Portuguese government, in order to remove the awkwardness which Marshal Sir W. Beresford notices; and in point of fact I command the allied army now as Marshal General of the Portuguese army. In case circumstances should deprive me of the command, therefore, either the second in command of the British army must be made Marshal General likewise, or Marshal Beresford must quit the army at a moment when his absence might be interpreted to his disadvantage; or he must assume the command of the allied army, and not the officer selected by His Majesty's government as the person on whom they wish it should devolve.

In case government should think proper to send any General officer out to replace Lieut. Gen. Sir E. Paget, it is desirable they should advert to the circumstances affecting his situation, stated by Marshal Sir W. Beresford.

To the Hon. Berkeley Paget.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I enclose 2 letters from your poor brother. I have not received that one which he says he wrote to me from Matilla; nor has he received one which I wrote to him and sent to him with £200. The latter was sent to the outposts of Soult's army, whereas he was with the '*Armée de Portu-*

gal. He is gone towards France, and you must try to get him exchanged. As he does not acknowledge the receipt of it, I conclude that he has not got the first money we sent him on the day after he was taken. He will be badly off therefore with his 24 doubloons, unless you take some measures to supply him in France. It is just possible that the French officer will send the money after him.

There is a letter from him for Lord Uxbridge, which will go to England by this mail.

To Gen. Vives, Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I have received a complaint from Major Napier of the 43d regt., stating that a soldier of the artillery of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo stabbed with a knife in the belly a soldier of the 43d regt. on the 29th of last month. The soldier guilty of this offence is known to the Major of the artillery of the garrison, having been pointed out to him by Major Napier; and as offences of this nature have been committed too frequently lately, I request that the offence of this soldier may be investigated in the most solemn manner, and that he may be punished according to law, if he should be found to deserve punishment.

I am concerned to have to mention to you that Major Napier complains that the Major of the artillery, instead of doing every thing in his power, as was his duty, to discover and bring this offender to punishment, did every thing in his power to elude the discovery of the offender, and to screen him. If this be true, it is not astonishing that offences of this description are frequent.

But if it be true, the Major of the artillery is highly criminal; and I beg that he may be put in arrest, and may be brought to trial 'for having omitted to do every thing in his power to discover a soldier of the artillery of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 29th Nov., who had stabbed a soldier of the 43d regt. in the belly.'

Major Napier shall attend to give evidence before the Court which will be appointed to try the Major of the artillery, at any time and place which shall be named.

I beg to refer your Excellency to the letter which I wrote to Don Carlos de España, on the 28th May, when I consented to advance the pay of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo from the military chest of this army; and by which you will see that it depended upon the attention to discipline of the officers and troops; and that no person was to receive pay who should not be actually doing duty.

The Major of artillery cannot be supposed to be performing his duty when he is in arrest; and I request that your Excellency will retain in your hands the sum of 3000 reals set down in the estimate for his pay for two months, until I shall be made acquainted with the result of his trial.

To Gen. Don Carlos de España.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I am concerned to inform you that the Commanding officer of the 14th light dragoons has informed me that Lieut. Manuel Pastor of the *cazadores de Castilla* cut down a dragoon of the 14th regt., at San Felices el

Grande, with his sword, on the 28th Nov.; this dragoon having done nothing to offend him. As circumstances of this kind have occurred very frequently lately, I beg that this officer may be put in arrest and brought to trial.

Your Excellency will recollect that when I consented to advance the pay of the troops under your command from the military chest of the army, it was on condition that the troops should be disciplined, and kept as soldiers ought to be; and likewise that no person should receive pay who did not perform his duty. I leave your Excellency to decide how far the troops under your command can be called disciplined.

It is certain, however, that when Lieut. Manuel Pastor shall be in arrest, he cannot be supposed to be performing his duty; and therefore I request that the sum of 900 reals, being the amount of his pay for two months, for which you have a warrant in your possession, may be detained in your hands, till I shall be made acquainted with the result of the investigation into his conduct.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

It is probable that government may be desirous of sending more men and horses to this country, and I am anxious that the whole should arrive before the spring equinoctial gales. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send back the horse ships and transports, &c., as soon as the horses and men they shall have brought may be disembarked; of course unless you should have received directions from the Admiralty for the disposal of them in a different manner.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I have received a long letter from Sir R. Kennedy, with which I will not trouble you, respecting the effect of an order which you have lately given Mr. Pipon, to give Mr. Sampayo bills upon the Treasury in exchange for certain Commissary paper in his possession, at the rate of exchange of the day. I am concerned that you did not write to me on this subject, as Sir R. Kennedy complains that the conduct of Mr. Pipon in this instance is directly in disobedience of his orders, given with a view to the amelioration of our finances, which effect they had already in some degree produced. It is better that upon all these occasions we should incur the inconvenience of a little delay, and allow matters to go through their regular channel.

I acknowledge that my opinion of Mr. Sampayo is a little shaken by this transaction. I consider the purchasers of our Commissariat bills and debts as the worst enemies we have in the Peninsula; and there is no person in the Peninsula who knows so well as Mr. Sampayo that I entertain this opinion. I suspected, unjustly, that he purchased our debts incurred on the expedition to Oporto, in the year 1809, and he knows that I ordered the then Commissary Gen., Mr. Murray, to pay him the last of all our creditors. He afterwards convinced me that he had been a contractor under Mr. Rawlings, and I ordered that he might be paid immediately; but I explained to him, and he perfectly understood, the mischief he would have done us as a purchaser of our debts.

Mr. Sampayo is employed as our broker, and he has besides had contracts for the supply of various sums of money on private bargains. Surely if he had money he should have put it in the chest, and should not have speculated in our debts. But then he says he sold corn for these securities. That is just as bad. The securities were never intended to be transferable; and they are our worst enemies, and the worst enemies of the Portuguese government also, who at all aid in making them so.

I am not astonished at the determination of the Commissary Gen. no longer to employ Mr. Sampayo as a broker, if he does not clear himself of the charge of speculating in our debts.

P.S. Will you send the enclosed letter to Madeira by the first opportunity?

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I beg leave to recommend to your protection the family of the late Major Wurmb, K.G.L., who fell at the siege of Burgos. I understand that they are very numerous, and totally unprovided for.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

I enclose, to be laid before the Commander in Chief, a letter from Major Gen. Walker relative to the loss of his baggage on the day subsequent to the capture of Badajoz.

I am so fully aware of the outrages committed by the troops at the time, and of the very unfortunate situation in which the Major General was placed by the plunder of every thing he was possessed of, at a moment when he was rendered incapable of attending to his own concerns by the severity of his wounds, that I am induced strongly to recommend the case to his Royal Highness' favorable notice, although it is evidently not customary to grant compensation for losses to be attributed solely to the irregularities of the soldiers.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

Although I have not yet any intelligence upon which I can rely of the exact position of the enemy's armies, I am certain that the whole have crossed the Tormes, with the exception of very small posts in front of Salamanca; and I have ordered the whole of the allied army into cantonments, those under Sir R. Hill in the province of Coria, and the remainder in the province of Beira, on the Douro and Mondego, with the exception of the Light division and Lieut. Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry, which remain on the Agueda. The whole of the troops will be supplied throughout the winter without difficulty; and are in situations in which they can receive the clothing and other equipments which they require.

The last accounts from Gen. Elio state his intention of being in Alicante on the 9th ult. Some detachments of his army were in Madrid. The Duque del Parque, who now commands the troops lately under the command of Gen. Ballesteros, was on the 22d at Villa Nueva de los Infantes.

The army of Galicia have crossed the Duero, and have moved into

Galicia; and the troops under Don Carlos de España have gone into the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and those under the Conde de Penne Villemur and Gen. Morillo have crossed the Tagus at Alcantara into Lower Estremadura.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 2d Dec. 1812.

You will see by my dispatch how I have disposed of the army. I am quite convinced that I have adopted the only measure which will set us to rights, and I hope in a short time to hear of great improvements.

I propose to take the field with the largest body I can get together as early in the spring as the green forage will be on the ground. I shall be obliged to you therefore if you will take measures that all the horses, reinforcements, recruits, ordnance, &c., which you propose to send to the army, may sail from England by the 1st Feb.

I propose to go to Cadiz as soon as I shall be quite certain that the French are settled for the winter, and in what shape. I have much to arrange with the Spanish government. I shall not be long absent from hence, and indeed not many days absent from some of the posts of the army.

I write to Adm. Martin not to detain any transports or horse ships one moment after they shall have disembarked those men or horses which they shall have brought.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 3d Dec. 1812.

I enclose the copy of my last dispatches. I am certain that the French have all retired across the Tormes, but I don't yet know to what positions, as I can get but little intelligence. I propose, however, to set out for Cadiz in a few days, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will have *tiros* placed for me at Fuente Cantos, one half way between Fuente Cantos and Seville, and one at Seville. Send a messenger to meet me on the road by Badajoz and Valencia de Alcantara, to let me know whether I shall find the *tiros*; and where.

I shall write to the Minister at War to-morrow, and shall send you a copy of the letter.

P.S. I shall take my own carriage.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

You will see from the Q. M. G.'s paper how the troops will be distributed in cantonments, where I propose that, if possible, they should remain during the winter. If I am not disturbed beforehand, it is my

G. O.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces refers the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments to the orders which have been frequently issued for the regulation of hospitals and depôts.

2. It is quite impossible for an officer in command of an hospital station to perform his duty if he is to receive orders from every officer who passes near the station.

Memorandum. The services of Lieut. — and Lieut. — are no longer required in the Commissariat department, and they will return to England after having delivered in all their accounts at the Commissary Gen.'s office; and Messrs. —, —, and — are hereby warned that further inattention to their duty will occasion their removal from their employment in the Commissariat.

wish to assemble the army and to move forward as early in April as there will be green forage; that is to say, if we should be strong enough to move forward at all. I therefore wish that the recruits, convalescents, and every thing which the troops require, should be with their regiments by the middle of March. I shall be glad if you will make arrangements accordingly. It is best, indeed, that every thing should be sent to the regiments as soon as possible; but I mention the middle of March as the period at which every thing ought to be complete.

You will see that I have sent D'Urban's cavalry into Tras os Montes, with which disposition he appears well satisfied. Campbell's and Diggins' will go into the Alentejo. I have not seen M'Grigor since I received your letter, but I will speak to him respecting Mr. Burrows, whose assistance you wish to have.

To Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

In consequence of the excessive number of men of the — regt. absent from their regiment on the march of the 15th and 16th Nov., and of the reports which I had received of the habitual want of discipline of the — regt., I gave orders that the Commanding officer of that regiment should be put in arrest, with the intention of bringing him to trial before a General Court Martial for gross neglect of duty, in having allowed the officers commanding companies so far to neglect theirs, as to allow so many men to quit the ranks of their companies on the march.

I have since found, by a correspondence which Lieut. Gen. the Hon. L. Cole has put into my hands, that this officer was Col. —; and although I am of opinion that the reasons alleged in that correspondence by Col. — afford no justification whatever for his conduct, or for the neglect of the officers of the regiment, but that, on the contrary, Col. —'s letters prove that the officers of the — regt. were guilty of a further neglect of duty, of which I was not aware till I read the letters, viz., that the soldiers of the — did not cook on the evening of the 14th Nov., I am disposed to release Col. — from his arrest.

I desire that he may be released, because I am in hopes that the circular letter which I addressed to the General officers commanding divisions on the 28th Nov. will have its due weight on the mind of Col. —, and of the officers under his command in particular, and on the army in general; and that Col. — and the officers under his command will see that officers commanding and doing duty in regiments have important duties to perform in their cantonments, in their camps, and on marches, besides the regular attendance at parades; and that they will hereafter perform those duties, and prevent the recurrence of the evils, of which, in the — regt. in particular, I have too much reason to complain.

To Sir R. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812, 9½ A.M.

I have perused Mr. —'s report regarding the great coats and tents. I consider what he says to be very unsatisfactory regarding both these objects. If articles of public store arrive to the charge of a particular commissary in bad order, from wet, for instance, it is quite a novel doctrine to say that he has performed his duty by putting them in a place

where they could receive no injury; and that the injury they received was on the road, before they came to his hands. Surely it is the duty of a Commissary in charge of stores to endeavor at least to preserve them for the public service; and if they have received injury from wet on the road, to have them dried. In this case of the tents and great coats, head quarters were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the state of these stores ought to have been reported. There were at Ciudad Rodrigo, at the same time, hundreds of convalescents; and an application from Mr. — to the Commandant would have got him all the assistance he wished for. This is a very bad business altogether.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Mr. — to deliver to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo 10 of the tents which are there; and, at all events, let us have those remaining dried and properly taken care of in the stores.

I observe that Mr. Bissett is still in Portugal. It is necessary that he should obey the orders of the Sec. of State, and go to Gibraltar.

I ordered, in the month of May last, that tin camp kettles should be provided for the troops; and I know that orders were given that they should be made at Lisbon and at Oporto. I believe they were made; and, as well as I can recollect, Mr. Dalrymple told me at Burgos that there were a considerable number at S. João da Pesqueira. There are none in the return of stores you gave me the other day, excepting about 1000 at Lisbon, Coimbra, and Valada. Indeed, the whole concern of our Q. M. G.'s stores requires amendment; as is obvious from Mr. —'s having on the 19th returned 15,000 great coats at Ciudad Rodrigo, whereas only 10,000 had been ordered there, and he had really only 9500.

It is very desirable that this concern should be put upon a proper footing, and that I should get regular periodical returns of what is in store at each place, made out alphabetically, and specifying whether for the Portuguese, Spanish, or British army.

I observe, by the returns, that there are in the stores at Lisbon, bayonet belts for infantry, 45,150; gun slings, 45,112; pouch belts, 45,143; pouches, 45,148. I should wish to know whether these stores were sent out for the Spanish, Portuguese, or British army: whether they are made of buff or black leather. At all events, I should wish that 10,000 of each should be brought round to Oporto, or Figueira, as soon as possible; and that the buff, if there should be any in store, should be brought round in preference to the others.

Pray let me know what orders you have given for bringing the clothing up to the several regiments of the 1st division from Lamego; Col. Stirling's brigade from Lamego; the 7th division from Figueira; the 3d and 4th divisions from Abrantes; Gen. Anson's and Gen. Ponsonby's brigades from Figueira; Gen. Alten's brigade, &c.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 18th Nov., in which you have enclosed the copy of the decree of the Cortes, by which I have been appointed to command in chief the Spanish armies; and I beg leave again to express my acknowledgments for the confidence

which has thus been reposed in me; and the Cortes and government may rest assured that I will omit nothing which depends upon me to forward the just cause of the Spanish nation.

Your Excellency and the government have a right to expect from me an accurate representation of facts as they shall appear to me; and you may depend upon it that I will perform this duty.

I am concerned to have to inform you that the discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state; and their efficiency is, consequently, much deteriorated. Neither officers nor troops having been paid for months, nay, some for years, it cannot be expected that the troops should be in very good order, or that there should exist much subordination in the service. But circumstances have come to my knowledge, and under my view, lately, which show that the evil has taken deep root; and that it requires a stronger remedy than the mere removal of the causes, viz., want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, which have originally occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate from want of pay, provisions, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period of time, but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which have been well clothed and regularly paid by my directions, and have, to my knowledge, seldom, if ever, felt any privations for more than a year, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended upon as soldiers, as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. I can assure your Excellency, that the officers of the army in general (with some exceptions of officers, General and on the Staff, as well as attached to regiments) take but little pains to apply a remedy to these evils; and, upon the whole, I am sorry to acknowledge to your Excellency, that I consider that I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little promising as that which was ever undertaken by any individual.

I certainly was not aware, till very lately, of the real state of the Spanish army, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself with such an Herculean labor as its command; but having accepted the command, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising; but will exercise it as long as I shall possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it upon me. It will be necessary, however, that the government should arm me with powers to enable me to perform this task. It is my opinion,

1st; That officers should be promoted, and should be appointed to commands, solely at my recommendation.

2dly; That I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving such punishment.

3dly; That those resources of the State which are applicable to the payment, or equipment, or supply of the troops, should be applied in such manner as I might recommend.

4thly; In order to enable me to perform my duties, it will be necessary that the Chief of the Staff, and such limited number of the Staff officers of the army as may be thought necessary, should be sent to my headquarters; and that the government should direct that all military reports

of all descriptions should be sent to me; and I shall, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

The division of the Spanish territory into districts, and the appointment of an army to each district, was a wise arrangement; and I should propose that it should continue. But it must be observed, that it is a most expensive and burthensome arrangement to the public.

For instance, Castille and Estremadura are the territory of the 5th army; and, besides Capt. Gen. Castaños, who is most usefully and deservedly employed, there is a Captain General with a large staff in Estremadura, and a Captain General with a large staff in Castille. There are not in the former province as many troops as will form the garrison of Badajoz; nor in the latter as many as will form the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The large staff in Castille is not only useless, but destructive of the resources by which troops could be maintained. Then in the same manner the 2d and 3d armies do not, altogether, compose 2 divisions, and yet they have attached to them all the staff, military as well as civil, of two complete armies.

The 7th army in like manner is composed almost entirely of bands of guerrillas; and the only corps that I know of in Spain that at all approach in numbers to the size of armies are the 4th and 6th.

I would propose to your Excellency that the Capt. Gen. Castaños should continue, as he is at present, the Captain General of the 5th, 6th, and 7th armies, with the staff attached belonging to one only of those armies, viz., the 6th, and that all the rest, of every description, civil as well as military, should be recalled by the government, excepting only such officers as Gen. Castaños should think proper to retain for the performance of the duties in the provinces of Castille and Estremadura.

An arrangement of the same description ought to be applied to the 2d, 3d, and 4th armies; but I should wish to defer to make any proposition regarding these armies till I shall have seen more of the detail of their state.

I should wish also to defer to a future opportunity, to draw your attention to the alterations which the existing state of the country requires should be made in the powers of the Captains General of the provinces, and the Intendants respectively. We must not conceal from ourselves that there is but little authority of any description whatever in the provinces which have been occupied by the enemy; and even that little depends on the exercise of military power. It is vain to expect that a gentleman called an Intendant will exercise the power to realise the resources of the country for the state, or even for the military, without the assistance of a military force; which military force, in the existing state of the army, will destroy more than its efforts would produce, even supposing that the military chief should be at all times disposed and ready to assist in supporting the civil authority of the Intendant.

I am aware that it is wrong in principle to invest military men with civil powers; but when the country is in danger, that must be adopted which will tend most directly to save it; when the enemy is in the country, that must be done which tends most directly to drive him out, what-

ever may be the constitutional principles which may be invaded by those measures. I throw this out at present for your consideration, reserving myself to a future time to make a distinct proposition on this subject.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

I enclose the draft of my letter to the Minister at War. There is nothing new.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 4th Dec. 1812.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to the difficulties in the construction of a *jetée* on the Tagus at Junqueira. The object in constructing this *jetée* is to facilitate and expedite the landing of provisions and stores; in which object it would appear that the Portuguese government are interested, if they are at all interested in facilitating the defence of the country.

It is a military object; and I have always understood, and have known, that private property of all descriptions, corn, trees, horses, cattle, carts, houses, &c., have been seized by embargo when required for military purposes, generally without payment; but whether with or without payment, every thing has been seized that is required by the Portuguese army, without consulting the inclination of the owner.

Probably the government are of opinion that the same rule ought not in reason to be required to be applied to the wants of a foreign army, however necessary the assistance of that foreign army to the defence of the country, and although that foreign army are willing to pay for what is required. However, as I differ in opinion with the government upon this subject, I request that, if the refusal to force Senhor Caldas to supply the wood required, for payment, is persisted in, you will bring this case under the consideration of His Majesty's government. I shall certainly bring it under the consideration of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

5th Dec. 1812.

I have laid before the Commander of the Forces the accompanying communication from the Acting Dep. Judge Advocate at Lisbon, expressive of the difficulties that still exist in proceeding on the trial of Mr. D. A. C. G. —. As his Excellency has already unequivocally decided that Mr. — shall be arraigned upon the charges originally framed, I am to request that the blank in the 6th charge may be filled up by the Dep. Judge Advocate, on referring himself to the report of the Board held to investigate Mr. —'s store accounts. If Mr. — can satisfactorily account for these deficiencies, or prove their expenditure, he will doubtless receive that acquittal to which he has the claim; but the general conduct of Mr. —, while in charge of the dépôt at Abrantes, has equally impressed the Commander of the Forces and the Commissary Gen. that he has been guilty of bad practices which imperiously demand public inquiry.

To S. Hunter, Esq., Dep. Paymaster General.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

Dr. M'Grigor has represented to me the great inconvenience felt by the officers of the Medical staff, in consequence of their being unable to receive their pay at the several hospital stations at which they are employed, even at the late periods at which the Staff pay, paid from the ordinaries of the army, is issued to the army at large, there being at those

hospital stations no branch of the pay department. It has, therefore, appeared to me to be expedient to direct that the Purveyor Gen. of the hospital shall give in an estimate every 2 months of the Staff pay due to the whole medical department attached to this army, wherever stationed, with the exception of that part of it at Cadiz; and that a warrant shall be made out in the name of the Purveyor Gen. to enable him to receive the Staff pay of the whole department for whom he will have estimated; for which sum he will give his receipt in triplicate. He will then issue their pay to the several officers entitled to receive it, taking their receipts in triplicate, which he will forward to the office at Lisbon, when his receipt will be returned.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

According to your Royal Highness' former directions, I have given directions that the privates of the 24th regt. and of the 2d batt. 38th regt. should be transferred to the 1st battalions of those regiments respectively, and that the skeletons of those 2 battalions should be sent to England.

I have directed that the effectives of the Queen's regt., the 24th, 30th,

G. O.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

2. The Commander of the Forces desires that Mr. ———, of the Commissariat, may be put in close arrest for having caused to be tried and flogged, in the market place of Sabugal, a Portuguese inhabitant of Maçal do Chão.

5 to 14. The Commander of the Forces having received an order to transfer the 2d batts. of the 4th and 38th regts. into the 1st, the following arrangements are to be made for that purpose: The private men belonging to the 2d batts. 4th and 38th regts., in Portugal and Spain, are to be transferred into the 1st batts., and are to be distributed into companies in the 1st batts., with the exception of men deemed unfit at present for service in the field. All men missing from the 2d batts. are to be kept on the strength of the 2d batts. The transfer is to be made immediately, and the officers commanding companies in the 2d batts. are to draw pay for them up to the 24th inst., and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding companies in the 1st batts., to whose companies their men will be transferred under this order. When this transfer shall be completed, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and staff of the 2d batts., and such private men as remain, are to proceed by route furnished by the Q. M. G. to Lisbon, preparatory to their embarkation for England. The Commander of the Forces having received an order to transfer the 2d batt. 4th regt. into the 1st, the following arrangements are to be made for that purpose:

* * * * *

15. The Commander of the Forces requests the Commanding and other officers of the 2d batt. 4th regt. and 2d batt. 38th regt., and those parts of the regiments which will still belong to these battalions, will accept his thanks for their services since they have been under his command. The Q. M. G. will give a route for the march of the 2d batt. 4th regt. and 2d batt. 38th regt. to Lisbon, and will apply for a passage for those regiments to England.

17. The Commander of the Forces desires that all the effective privates on the returns of the Queen's regt., 2d batt. 24th, 2d batt. 30th, 2d batt. 44th, 2d batt. 53d, and the 2d batt. 58th regts. shall be transferred into 4 companies of those battalions respectively, into which 4 companies those privates are to be equally distributed.

18. Men deemed unfit for service in the field, and men on the strength of those battalions respectively, returned missing, are to belong to the 6 companies from which the effectives are to be transferred.

19. The officers commanding the companies from which the men are to be transferred, are to draw pay for them to the 24th Dec. 1812, and are to account in the usual manner with the officers commanding the companies to which the soldiers will be transferred under this order.

20. These transfers are to be made as soon as possible after the receipt of these orders; and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, still belonging to the companies of the several battalions from which the transfer will have been made, are to be sent to Lisbon, where they are to embark for England.

21. The Commanding officers and Staff of the 2d batt. 24th, 2d batt. 30th, and 2d batt

44th, 53d, and 58th, should be transferred into 4 companies of each of those battalions, and that the officers and non-commissioned officers of those companies from which the privates have been transferred should be sent home. I have formed the 4 companies of the Queen's and the 4 companies of the 53d into a battalion; the 4 companies of the 24th and the 4 companies of the 58th into another; and the 4 companies of the 30th and the 4 companies of the 44th into another. I enclose a copy of the orders which I have issued upon this subject, from which your Royal Highness will see the detail of the arrangement.

My reason for adopting this arrangement is, that I have for the service in this country the whole number of men of which these provisional battalions will be composed, all of whom are seasoned to the service and climate. Experience has shown that they could not be replaced by three times their numbers brought from England, or any other part of the world. However, if your Royal Highness disapproves of the arrangement, it will be easy to break up these battalions, and to send the officers and men home, upon receiving your Royal Highness' orders to that effect.

If your Royal Highness should approve of the arrangement, I should wish to extend its principle to the 51st and 68th regts., and to send home

53d regts. are to remain with the 4 companies of each of those battalions, into which the privates of the 6 companies will be transferred under these orders.

22. The Commanding officers and Staff of the Queen's, 2d batt. 44th, and 2d batt. 53d regts. are to return to England with the 6 companies of those battalions, from which the privates will be transferred under these orders.

23. The 2d batt. 31st and 2d batt. 66th, formed into a provisional battalion, under the orders of the 6th June, 1811, are to be the 1st provisional batt.

24. The 4 companies of the Queen's and 4 companies of the 53d are to be the 2d provisional batt., and are to be commanded by Lieut. Col. Bingham, of the 53d regt.

25. The 4 companies of the 2d batt. 24th, and 4 companies of the 2d batt. 58th, are to be the 3d provisional batt., and are to be commanded by Lieut. Col. Kelly, of the 24th regt.

26. The 4 companies of the 2d batt. 30th, and 4 companies of the 2d batt. 44th, are to be the 4th provisional batt., and are to be commanded by Lieut. Col. Hamilton, of the 30th regt.

27. The Staff of the 2d batt. 53d, 2d batt. 24th, and 2d batt. 30th, are to perform the duties of the several provisional battalions to which they will be attached.

28. The Commanding officers of the 2d, 3d, and 4th Provisional batts. will, in their daily and weekly states, and monthly returns, to the Adj. Gen. in Portugal and Spain, account only for the men present in Portugal and Spain, specifying to what regiment they belong.

29. The Commanding officers of the 2d batt. 53d, 2d batt. 24th, and 2d batt. 30th, will, in their returns to the Adj. Gen. at the Horse Guards, return 6 companies from each of those battalions respectively detached in England, accounting for their strength.

30. The Commanding officers of the 4 companies respectively of the Queen's, 2d batt. 44th, and 2d batt. 58th regts. are to send regular weekly states to the Commanding officer of their battalion in England, accounting for their strength; and the Commanding officer of the Queen's, 2d batt. 44th, and 2d batt. 58th regts., are, in their returns to the Adj. Gen. at the Horse Guards, to return the 4 companies of their several battalions detached in Portugal, accounting for their strength.

31. The General officers commanding divisions and brigades, in which these several battalions are serving, are requested to superintend the execution of these orders. They will see that the companies which are to remain in this army are complete in efficient officers and non-commissioned officers, and in all their equipments.

32. The mules attached to the 2d batt. 4th, 2d batt. 38th, the Queen's regt., 2d batt. 58th, and 2d batt. 44th, for the carriage of the intrenching tools of those battalions respectively, are to be handed over to the Commissaries of the several brigades in which those battalions have been serving.

39. The Q. M. G. will send routes for the march of these several battalions to join the divisions to which they are attached under these orders, as soon as the troops to whom they refer will have received their clothing.

the officers and non-commissioned officers of 4 companies of each of those regiments. I should wish, however, as those are light regiments, still to keep them as separate battalions, each consisting of 6 companies, in this country:

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

I enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Lieut. Col. Jackson,* who is now doing the duty of A. Q. M. G. with Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's detachment. He is called from that duty to perform that of a mounted officer with a battalion of Guards.

I have always been in the habit of considering the wish of one of their Royal Highnesses respecting their regiment as a law, and have acted accordingly, when it has not militated with His Majesty's regulations. I beg you, however, to represent to the Commander in Chief that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill has informed me that he shall feel the greatest inconvenience from the want of the assistance of Lieut. Col. Jackson; and I certainly don't know where I shall find an officer qualified to replace him in that situation. It might not be difficult to find one to replace him as a mounted officer with the Coldstream Guards.

I have frequently mentioned to you the great inconvenience which I felt from the constant change of officers in charge of every important department, or filling every situation of rank or responsibility with this army. No man can be aware of the extent of this inconvenience who has not got this great machine to keep in order and to direct; and together with the British army, the Spanish and Portuguese concerns, the labor which these constant changes occasion is also of the most distressing description. No sooner is an arrangement made, the order given, and the whole in a train of execution, than a gentleman comes out who has probably but little knowledge of the practical part of his duty in any country, and none whatever in this most difficult of all scenes of military operation. Nobody in the British army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an amusing novel; and the consequence is, that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into execution (and in this country the poverty of its resources renders them all complicated), every gentleman proceeds according to his fancy; and then, when it is found that the arrangement fails (as it must fail if the order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters to rights, and thus my labor is increased ten fold.

The officers on the Staff of the British army are effectives in regiments; and considering that it is most important to every army to have good and efficient Staff officers, I don't know that the Colonels of regiments have any right to interfere to prevent the appointment of officers to the Staff from their regiments, or to occasion by their influence the relinquishment of their offices on the Staff when they think proper. If they have this power of interference, it is one which may very materially affect the public interests, and it ought not to be exercised lightly or with caprice. At the same time I admit the necessity of keeping regi-

* Lieut. Gen. Sir Richard Jackson, G.C.B.

ments well officered, but I should wish to know who is more interested in keeping regiments well officered than the officer who commands the army?

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 6th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 3d. The charges against Capt. — are so serious, that I cannot allow him to go unpunished, unless he should give in his resignation to quit the service forthwith. I have ordered him in arrest.

I am very much afraid that I cannot give Major MacGregor the Majority of the Veteran Battalion.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 8th Dec. 1812, 4 P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 7th. I was in hopes I had put your troops in a plentiful country. I knew that part of it had supplied the consumption of Marmont's army last year, from July to December, and that in this year they had not a single soldier near them. I likewise recollected the fertility of the same country in the year 1809, and I knew that there was plenty of barley, at least about Zarza, in this year.

However, all that I can say is, that I placed the army in cantonments for its convenience, and in order that the horses might recover their condition, and the men their discipline, and it is nearly a matter of indifference to me where they are cantoned. If the province of Coria and Plasencia cannot supply even the straw wanted for your infantry, and the few cavalry which I suppose you must keep with you, you must then go elsewhere; and when I shall learn this is decidedly the case, I will point out the place for your cantonments.

If the 13th dragoons and Gen. Slade's brigade cannot be supplied where they are, they had better cross the Tagus at Alcantara, and stay either in Estremadura south of the Tagus, or cross the frontier and go to Portalegre. If they cannot live there, they must go to Lisbon. But some exertion must be made by the officers of the cavalry to prevent the waste of forage wherever they go.

I have got 3 divisions of infantry, and 3 brigades of cavalry, with their artillery, well cantoned and supplied in the valley of the Mondego, which is neither of half the extent or fertility, or so well peopled, as the valleys of the Tietar and the Alagon, nor is there one town of 40 houses in the whole extent of it. But I must do the General officers of the cavalry the justice to say that they are desirous of overcoming, and not of making difficulties.

I don't agree with the Conde de Penne Villemur that Soult's troops have not gone to Oropesa. They have certainly gone there and to Arzobispo, and are about to look for food south of the Tagus.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Elley, A.A.G., cavalry.

8th Dec. 1812.

I have received the Commander of the Forces' directions to acquaint you, in reply to a letter I had the honor of receiving from Lieut. Col. Rooke, covering an application from Major Gen. — for permission to proceed to Lisbon, that his Excellency is sorry to refuse any leave asked by a General officer, but that if Major Gen. — persists in requiring the leave, his Excellency will accede to its

being granted. The Commander of the Forces had hoped that the General officers of the army would have manifested a desire to attend to the objects held out to their serious attention in his Excellency's circular of the 28th ult., and the Commander of the Forces does not see any reason why Major Gen. ——'s steward could not attend him in his cantonments.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

8th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th inst., covering an application from Major Gen. —— for leave to visit Oporto; and having submitted the same to the Commander of the Forces, I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency is sorry to refuse any leave asked by a General officer; but that if Major Gen. —— persists in requiring the leave, his Excellency will accede to its being granted. The Commander of the Forces had hoped that the General officers of the army would have manifested a desire to attend to the objects held out to their serious attention in his Excellency's circular of the 28th ult.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

I am glad to find from your letter of the 3d that the arrangements of D'Urban's cavalry, and the cantonments of the army in general, will have been satisfactory.

I did not move the 20th regt., as I wished to be in some strength hereabouts, and meant it should wait till relieved; but I have now desired that it may move as soon as the weather shall be a little settled.

I don't see why the 22d should remain at Merida.

P.S. It would probably be best, under existing circumstances, not to put a regiment of militia in Almeida, but to keep the three disposable for the garrisons in Alentejo.

I thought of a regiment of the line for Almeida, to save calling out the militia; and if we can carry the war forward again, as I hope we may, we might then put the militia regiment in Almeida.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812, 4 P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 8th. When I wrote to you to retire, if necessary, upon Castello Branco, it was in the notion that the enemy might be too strong for you in your front. I had no idea that the provinces of Coria and Plasencia would not feed your troops; if I had entertained such an idea, I should not have directed them for relief on Lower Beira. They should have crossed the Tagus at Alcantara, and gone from thence into Estremadura and the Alentejo.

I am not astonished at Major Tulloh's being unable to get his carriages into Idanha a Nova. Let him go immediately with the Portuguese artillery wherever he pleases. As for the British artillery, it may remain where you please, in any place where the horses and men can be fed. In regard to forage, officers are much mistaken if they suppose that any town in the Peninsula, however large, will furnish forage for a large

G. O.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

3. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers commanding divisions and brigades will call the attention of Commanding officers of regiments to the delays in sending in the states, returns, and other information called for from the different regiments. Even those matters are neglected in which the officers of the army are themselves most interested. And the Commander of the Forces has not yet received the answers from all the regiments to the circular letter, written by his directions, requesting that recommendations might be sent from the several regiments for commissions in the 13th Veteran battalion.

number of animals for a length of time. The horses of a brigade of cavalry, or even of a brigade of artillery, must be separated by 20 or 30 in each village. They should be cantoned with the infantry, and by this mode all would get good stabling and forage, even in a country which it might be supposed would produce none.

However, I should prefer that the horses should go even to Lisbon, than that I should be disappointed in my hopes of having the cavalry in good order early in the campaign.

I imagine you are mistaken in supposing the bridge at Alcantara not to be ready. There is a letter from the officer in charge of it, of the 4th inst., in which he says, that it was then ready to be laid down. It would require only 12 hours to lay it down when you should give orders for it.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812, 10 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I entertain no doubt whatever that you have done and will do every thing in your power for the good of your division.

If matters turn out only tolerably well during the winter, I hope to be able to take the field very early with a very large army; and I am very anxious that you should be back at an early period. As business requires your absence, the sooner you go the better, and come back as soon as you can. In regard to your going to the Mediterranean, I confess that I don't think the service on that side of the Peninsula is very promising at present.

I had a letter yesterday from your brother, and I saw one from Lord W. Bentinck to Sir H. Wellesley. Your brother was so much inferior in strength to Suchet, particularly in cavalry, that he had not been able to take the field. Lord William states his intention to send 5000 men, British, Italian, and Sicilian, to the coast of Spain, and to come himself to take the command. This will make his numerical force equal to Suchet's in Valencia, as it is stated by your brother; but not equal to what is stated in the returns which I have. In those returns, however, Poles are included, who probably have been drawn away for the war in the north. But still, supposing the numbers nearly equal, the want of cavalry is a great drawback. I would therefore recommend this scene to you, rather than that on the eastern coast. When you go, as Pakenham will be relieved from the charge of the 3d division, I propose to send him to take care of your's till you return.

P.S. When you wish to go, make an official application for leave, stating how long you wish to stay.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

Just to show you what a Portuguese complaint is, I enclose one which I received from the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal against Mr. — of the Commissariat, whom I ordered into close arrest for his conduct; and an officer went over from hence to inquire into the circumstances preparatory to Mr. —'s trial.

As soon as the Juiz de Fora found that the matter was to be seriously noticed, he wrote the enclosed letter of the 7th inst.; and in the mean time

I understand that he has been constantly living with Mr. —, and the officer of whom he complained.

P.S. Since writing the above, I find that the Juiz de Fora has given Mr. — a certificate of his good conduct, and stating his wish, and that of the inhabitants, that he should return to Sabugal.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

I beg to submit to your Lordship's consideration the application of Ensign —, of the — regt., to receive the pension granted to Ensigns for the loss of a limb, although, at the period when he received the wound which rendered amputation necessary, he had not a commission, but was serving as a volunteer in the — regt., and is therefore by the regulation not entitled to the allowance which has lately been granted to officers in his situation.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose a return of field equipment required for the use of the army under my command; and I beg that your Lordship may be pleased to cause the different articles to be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be possible.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 9th Dec. 1812.

Nothing has occurred since I addressed you on the 2d inst. Some of Marshal Soult's troops arrived in the valley of the Tagus on the 3d inst.

The Spanish troops were still at Madrid in the end of last month.

By a letter from Major Gen. W. Clinton from Alicante, of the 8th Nov., I learn that he had not thought his force sufficiently strong to attack Marshal Suchet, and he was still at Alicante.

Accounts from the north of Spain state that Gen. Caffarelli had returned with the troops, which I informed your Lordship in my letter of the 7th ult. had been seen passing Torquemada on the 4th Nov. It is reported that he has since gone to France with the division of the Imperial Guard, which still remained in Spain under his command.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letters of the 6th, and I am glad that you concur in the disposition of D'Urban's cavalry. Campbell is gone into the Alentejo, and I yesterday desired Hill to send Major Tulloh's artillery to Elvas and Estremoz, where he proposed it should be sent.

I am much obliged to you for the American news. If Buonaparte has any money, he will send out a fleet if he is wise. But he has no money.

I am glad that your ideas and mine agree about your military situation. It is certain that government have always thought it necessary to have an officer here, selected by them to succeed to the command, in case I should be deprived of it; and there are some of the government so partial to old practice and precedent, that they don't like a departure from either, in not calling this officer *second in command*. This officer might have been very useful in the days of councils of war, &c.; it may look well in a newspaper to see that such a General officer is 'second in com-

mand.' But there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that this office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it gives the holder pretensions which can't be gratified except at the public inconvenience.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to government on this subject, with yours.

I don't know, and indeed I don't believe, that government have any distinct idea upon this subject; but I happen to know that they did not consider ——— as second in command at the battle of Salamanca.

Matters being quiet here, and having put every thing in train for the re-equipment of the army, I am about to go to Cadiz to see what I can do there, and what is the real situation of affairs. I propose to get into fortune's way, if I should be able to assemble an army sufficiently strong; and we may make a lucky hit in the commencement of next campaign. But it is obvious that we can't expect to save the Peninsula by military efforts, unless we can bring forward the Spaniards in some shape or other; and I want to see how far I can venture to go, in putting the Spanish army in a state to do something. In your life you never saw any thing so bad as the Galicians; yet they are the finest body of men and best movers I have ever seen.

God knows the prospect of success from this journey of mine is not bright, but still it is best to try something.

The 20th regt. will march as soon as the weather is a little settled.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812, 6 P.M.

I have received yours of 6 P.M. yesterday evening. I doubt the French having arrived at Truxillo in time for the Alcalde at Brozas to hear of this event on the 8th in the evening. If they have gone there, it can be only a small detachment.

I propose going to Cadiz; and as you will command the troops in this quarter in my absence, which will last about 3 weeks, it is desirable that I should see you.

I leave this on the morning of the 12th, and shall be at Moraleja that afternoon, where I shall be happy to meet you on that day.

P.S. If you mean to dine at Moraleja, you had better bring your things, as I shall have nothing with me.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

I enclose a letter which Gen. Alava has received regarding the conduct of an officer of the Commissariat, who was in charge of cattle passing at Payo, and is said to belong to the 2d division of the army.

You will see that his name is said to be Stourk, but Sir R. Kennedy does not know of any person of that name in the department. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire what person of the Commissariat passed lately at Payo with cattle to the 2d division of infantry; and send to Payo to have him identified, and let him be put in close arrest, and let me know his name, that I may have charges brought against him without loss of time.

The officer of the Staff Corps referred to is I believe Lieut. Reid, who was lately sent from hence to survey the course of the Tietar.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I will speak to Mr. Kennedy respecting Mr. Sampayo's concern. I have always entertained the best opinion of Mr. Sampayo, and have given my consent to several arrangements proposed by him, solely because I relied implicitly on his integrity.

I may be wrong in my notions respecting the circulation of our Commissariat bills; but I have been at least consistent in entertaining them. From what I mentioned in my letter of the 2d, you will observe that I entertained them in the first year I was in the Peninsula. You will find them again in my letter of the 22d April last, regarding the payment of a debt to Messrs. Alcock and Co., on account of some bills which they had purchased; and I am now quite certain that if our debts and the Commissariat bills had never been purchased by the *sharks* at Lisbon, our finances would now have been in a much better state; at the same time that the people of the country, those who have really supplied us with something for our money, would have received more value for their commodities than they have received.

There is no person better acquainted with these opinions, whether true or false, than Mr. Sampayo; and it is not astonishing that I should have been shaken by his having had any concern in such transactions. However, I am willing to believe he did what he thought was right and proper, more particularly as he says that Mr. — knew that he acted as he did; and I shall speak to the Commissary Gen., and will endeavor to remove any bad impression he may have received on the same subject. I must observe, however, *en passant*, that Mr. — has shown himself in this instance again to be so stupid as to be quite unfit for the situation in which he is placed.

I am sorry that the bills on the Treasury having been exchanged for the Commissariat bills, and the transaction being closed, you did not allow it to remain as it was.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 10th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 6th, for which I am much obliged to you. Government appear to be at last making a serious effort to get the better of the American navy, which might as well have been made before.

If Buonaparte is wise, and has money, he will send out a large fleet. He has no money, however, and he must have found before now that a fleet cannot be equipped and maintained, as he maintains his armies, by requisitions on the unfortunate country which is made the seat of war.

Col. Gordon, the Q.M.G., has requested me to apply to you to facilitate his return to England in a ship of war. I must mention to you that I have received very particular directions from government, not to apply for a passage in a man of war for any officer whose return is not occasioned by the public service. That is to say, that government is not to be put to the expense of an officer's passage in a ship of war, unless the public service should have rendered his return necessary.

Whenever an occasion of this kind occurs, I shall apply to you officially, stating the cause of the return of the officer to England, and you will grant the passage or not, according to the convenience of the service, for which the public will defray the expense. But many officers have occasion to go for other reasons besides those caused by the public service; and they are anxious to go in a ship of war. It may be in your power to facilitate their being gratified in this respect, either by recommending them to the Captain who may be going or otherwise; and if it is, I shall be much obliged to you. If it is not, they must go by the packet, as the government will not defray the expense of these passages. I shall always apply for these as I now do for that of Col. Gordon, apprising them at the same time, as I have him, that it is very probable that you may not have it in your power to gratify their wishes. I mention this because I find that Adm. Berkeley is in a scrape for not attending to the distinction between officers going home on the public service, and officers going home on their private concerns; on an occasion, however, in which the distinction was quite clear.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Bradford, Portuguese brigade.

10th Dec. 1812.

In the general daily state of the army, which was this morning presented to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, no state appeared to have been received from your brigade since the 26th Nov. last. As the orders of his Excellency are completely defeated by inattentions of this nature, I am to request you will call upon the officer, whose duty it is to make out this state, for his reasons for this neglect, that I may have it in my power to give the same explanation to the Commander of the Forces.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter and enclosures which have been received from Gen. Le Cor, complaining of the conduct of Lieut. Col. —, of the Portuguese artillery, and other officers, in regard to taking forage at Idanha a Nova, in consequence of which I have given the order, of which the enclosed is a copy, to have those officers put in arrest.

I enclose, likewise, the copy of the crime charged against Lieut. Col.

G. O.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

1. The Commander of the Forces has received a report that, notwithstanding his repeated orders upon the subject of forage, and particularly that of the 25th Nov. last, and notwithstanding the evident necessity which exists that the forage which has been provided for the troops should not be wasted, the — light dragoons, Lieut. Col. —'s Portuguese brigades of artillery, and Capt. —'s brigade of British artillery, went into the town of Idanha a Nova on the 5th inst.: in consequence of the irregular manner in which the officers of the troops allowed their men to forage, a considerable quantity of forage, which had been provided for the army, was wasted and destroyed.

2. The Commander of the Forces, finding that he cannot prevail upon those officers to obey his orders, and to attend to the conduct of those placed under their command and charge, by remonstrances, and by pointing out to them the consequences of their inattention to their duty, desires that the Commanding officer of the — light dragoons, Capt. —, and Lieut. Col. —, may be put in arrest for disobedience of orders; the two former by the A. A. G. attached to the 2d division of infantry, and the latter by the officer of the Staff attached to Lieut. Gen. —'s division.

3. The corps of Guides is in future to consist of the following establishment:

Capt.	Lieuts.	Cornets.	Q. M. serj.	Serj. major.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Farriers.	Privates.
1	6	6	1	1	16	16	6	150

—; and I request you to give directions that he may be brought to trial for this neglect of duty.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812, 11 A.M.

I enclose letters which I have received regarding the conduct of Lieut. Col. —'s and Capt. —'s artillery, and the — light dragoons, at Idanha a Nova, in regard to forage. This conduct occasions the difficulty in cantoning the troops in any country during the 2 or 3 months of the winter, 3 brigades of artillery and a regiment of cavalry get together in one place; and in one day they destroy four times the quantity of forage for which they give receipts.

I have ordered a General Court Martial to be assembled in the 2d division of infantry, before which I request that the Commanding officer of the — light dragoons and Capt. — may be brought, on charges of which the enclosed are copies; and I beg that the Adj. Gen. attached to the 2d division may prosecute them.

The complainants at Idanha a Nova must be called to give their evidence before this Court Martial.

I likewise enclose the charge against Lieut. Col. —, which I request may be sent to him by the staff officer attached to Gen. Hamilton's division.

To Major Gen. H. Clinton.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812, noon.

I have received your letter of the 8th. The G. O. of the 4th inst. was not intended to refer to you. The Q. M. G. mentioned to me what you had done at Celorico, and I approved of it.

The Commanding officers of regiments are naturally jealous of the general hospitals; and they were in the habit of sending orders occasionally to the men of their regiments in hospital, and occasionally to the Commandants at the hospital stations, to send particular men to join their regiments. General officers adopted the same practice; and, in consequence, nobody was responsible either for the march of the men from the hospitals at the proper period of their recovery, or for the conduct of the soldiers on their march to join their regiments. The orders were therefore given that nobody was to interfere with men in hospitals excepting the Commandant.

It is impossible in drawing up a G. O. to foresee every case which ought to be excepted from its general provisions; and the case of the passage of a division to the rear, by an hospital station still left in front, is not provided for. However, the General officer commanding a division would, as you did, communicate with the officer commanding the hospital station, and take away with him only those men of whose departure the Commandant should approve. But after you had passed, orders were sent to Major Cimitiere by General officers of all ranks and descriptions, as well as by Commanding officers of regiments, and adjutants, and even serjeant majors, and not only to Major Cimitiere, but to the officers in charge of the sick and convalescents under his command, and in some instances even to the sick themselves. This is the irregularity to which I referred in the G. O. The fact is, however, that I ought to have given

an order that the convalescents should join their divisions as they passed Celorico. But it is impossible to think of every thing.

To His Excellency the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Don E. Mexia, the Intendant of the province of Castille, in which you will observe a relation of the practical evils resulting from the appointment of a Captain General and Staff to this province.

The Intendant of the army (there being no army) has seized the grain and money which the Civil Intendant of the province had destined for the consumption of the troops in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and has applied these articles, I conclude, for the support of the staff of the army of Castille established at Freixo. I hear the *Lanceros* have seized and sold another portion, which they had been appointed to escort to the garrison.

I enclose the copy of the answer which I have written to Don E. Mexia regarding the supplies received by the army under my command.

To Don Estevan Mexia.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 7th inst., which I have forwarded to the Minister at War, to be laid before the Spanish government.

The allied British and Portuguese army under my command has, generally speaking, been subsisted from its magazines since it crossed the Agueda. If it has received any supplies from the country of Argañan, I conclude they have been paid for; and I don't suppose it is intended that the allied British and Portuguese army shall not enjoy the resources which the country affords, paying for the same.

In regard to the assistance you demand for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, I answer that I will give no assistance in provisions to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo or to any Spanish troops while in Spain, being quite convinced that the country is well able to supply the wants of all requiring supplies, if the abuses are remedied to which you adverted in your letter. The remedy does not rest with me.

In answer to that part of your letter in which you require payment for the supplies received from you on the part of the government by the British army in the course of the campaign, it is only necessary that the account of the amount of those supplies should be settled in order to be paid for, either to you or to the government, according to my promise made to you at the commencement of the campaign.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I propose to leave this place to-morrow morning, and to sleep at Moraleja; on the 13th at Alcantara; 14th at Valencia de Alcantara; 15th at Badajoz; 16th at Fuente Cantos; 17th at Seville; 18th at Cadiz.

Possibly you may find it convenient to meet us at Seville, as we shall have many matters to talk over. I have no notion of any thing likely to interrupt this proposed route, but I shall dispatch a courier to you if there should be any thing. I enclose the draft of a letter to the Minister

at War, with its enclosures. I bring nobody with me excepting Alava and Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I set out for Cadiz to-morrow, and I shall be at Moraleja the 12th, Alcantara the 13th, Valencia de Alcantara 14th, Badajoz 15th, Fuente Cantos 16th, Seville 17th, Cadiz 18th.

I shall be very much obliged if you will send any letters that may come from England, or that you may have occasion to write to me, by a messenger direct to Badajoz, with directions to follow me from thence by the high road of Seville to Cadiz.

I propose to return here after staying a few days at Cadiz by the same road.

I have directed Sir R. Kennedy to give the Portuguese government 200,000 dollars in the course of December.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 11th Dec. 1812.

I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the case of Paymaster —, of the — foot, about whom I had the honor of writing to you on the 18th Aug. last.

Having been directed by H. R. H. the Commander in Chief to cause Mr. — to settle his outstanding accounts, I desired Lieut. Col. — to place him in arrest, and order him forthwith to comply with his Royal Highness' commands; but finding that the Paymaster delayed doing so on the plea that the papers which related to the accounts in question were in England, I subsequently gave directions to his Commanding officer to prefer charges against him, to which I received the enclosed answer from Lieut. Col. —; by which it appears that he is not in possession of the documents necessary to enable him to draw up the charge.

I am, therefore, under the necessity of bringing the subject under your Lordship's consideration; and I beg to be favored with your commands as to the mode of proceeding with Mr. —.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

11th Dec. 1812.

It being in the contemplation of the Commander of the Forces to remove Lieut. Col. Carr Royal to the command of the depôt at Coimbra, in consequence of the great increase of sick at that station, I am to request you will, without loss of time, remove a Captain from Belem, qualified to assume the command duties of the Santarem depôt, until the arrival of the officer whom the Commander of the Forces has appointed to be the future Commandant thereof. As Lieut. Col. Carr Royal has received directions not to leave Santarem until the arrival of the Captain from Belem, you will perceive the necessity of immediate attention to this arrangement.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Royal, Santarem.

11th Dec. 1812.

I have received the directions of the Commander of the Forces to acquaint you, that in consequence of the great increase of sick at Coimbra, and from the more important duties of that depôt, an arrangement has been made to remove you to the command thereof. Capt. Brown, at Belem, has received directions to send up a Captain adequate to the temporary charge of the Santarem depôt to relieve you there, till the arrival of Capt. Kingdom, who is to be the future Commandant thereof. On the arrival of this officer from Belem, you will be pleased to lose no time in proceeding to Coimbra, putting him in possession of all official papers, &c.,

and other documents connected with the duties of the depôt; and Capt. Kipping has received directions to hand over to you the entire charge of the Coimbra depôt, so soon as you may reach that station.

The A.G. to Capt. Kipping, Coimbra.

11th Dec. 1812.

From the great increase of sick at the Coimbra depôt, the Commander of the Forces has thought it necessary that a Field officer should have the command there, and has in consequence directed that Lieut. Col. Royal shall proceed from Santarem for that purpose. On his arrival at Coimbra, you will hand over to him all the papers, orders, &c., connected with the duties of the station, and further directions will be sent you as to your future destination.

The A.G. to Dr. M^cGrigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

11th Dec. 1812.

Agreeably to the directions of the Commander of the Forces, the following arrangement has been made in the command of the depôt stations of Santarem and Coimbra. Lieut. Col. Carr Royal, on being relieved by a Captain from Belem, who is to have the temporary charge at Santarem, is to proceed to Coimbra; and Capt. Kipping, on handing over to him the charge of that depôt, is to join his regiment. So soon as the Rodrigo station is broken up, Capt. Kingdom will receive orders to proceed to Santarem as Commandant.

The A.G. to the A.A.G. 6th division.

12th Dec. 1812.

In returning the accompanying states, I have received his Excellency's directions to observe, that from the number of men returned in the column of 'deserted,' and the subjoined memorandums, it does not appear that these men can properly be denominated under this head. It is not the custom in the army that men who are supposed to have been taken by the enemy should be returned 'deserted,' nor is any G. O. known on the subject. On occasions like the last retreat, and where it may be probable that men were taken by their own want of exertion in some instances, and in others by inability to get away, it would be rather severe to return the whole deserted, unless orders from the Commander of the Forces were specially given to this effect. The column of 'missing' was added to that of 'prisoners of war' for the express purpose of enabling Commanding officers to account for men absent in an action or on a retreat, that are supposed to have fallen into the hands of the enemy. I am, therefore, to request the Commanding officers of the regiments alluded to may receive directions to make the necessary alterations in their states, agreeably to the instructions sent them from this office.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Moraleja, 13th Dec. 1812.

As I have learnt from Hill that the passage through Estremadura is not quite safe, I have written the enclosed letter to Gen. Victoria, in order to have the 3d regt. of cavalry placed on the road. I shall be obliged to you if you will have measures adopted for their supply in Estremadura. I shall do what I can for them as I pass Badajoz.

P.S. I was detained at Payo yesterday by the swelling of a river, by which I have lost a day; and I shall not be at Badajoz till the 16th.

Au Gén. Victoria.

Moraleja, ce 13 Déc. 1812.

Je suis en route pour aller à Seville et Cadiz; et je compte passer par Badajoz le 16. Comme on me dit qu'il y a plusieurs voleurs en Estremadure et en la Sierra Morena, je vous prie, aussitôt que vous recevrez cette lettre, de faire marcher le 3^{me} régiment de dragons par les marches régulières à Fuente Cantos, où ils attendront nouvel ordre de ma part. Si tout le régiment n'est pas rassemblé à Elvas, vous aurez la bonté de faire marcher la partie du régiment qui sera à Elvas, et les détachemens suivront. Je prévien le Marquis del Palacio pour qu'il n'y

ait pas de difficulté pour le passage du pont de Badajoz. Vous aurez soin de pourvoir à la nourriture des hommes et des chevaux, pendant qu'ils seront en Estremadure.

Je vous prie de faire passer une copie de cette lettre au Maréchal Conde de Trancoso.

Au Gén. Elio.

Moraleja, ce 13 Déc. 1812.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 27 Nov.

Je vous ai écrit en triplicata par la voie du Duque del Parque; et je vous renvoie à cette lettre pour la connaissance de mes sentimens sur l'état des affaires.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Moraleja, 13th Dec. 1812.

I write just to let you know that I was detained yesterday at Payo by the swelling of a rivulet in the Puerto de Perales; and if the rain continues, I must expect to be detained again. I can't now arrive at Seville till the 18th, nor at Cadiz till the 19th.

To Col. de Lancey, D. Q. M. G.

Moraleja, 14th Dec. 1812.

I have settled with Sir R. Hill that he shall remain at Coria as long as the weather continues as it has been lately; and he will go to Guinaldo if the rivers should become fordable. He wishes you to come to him. The remainder of the Staff is to remain at head quarters.

I omitted to mention to you, that Gen. Alten had reported that a battalion of British infantry could be accommodated at Guinaldo, and furnished with bread at the rate of 4 *reals* a ration. Inform the Commissary Gen. of this circumstance; and if he thinks this price will suit him, let one of the battalions of the Light division which are badly cantoned at Nave d'Aver and Fuentes, go to Guinaldo when the weather shall clear.

I shall be very anxious to learn what has been done in the distribution of the great coats from Celorico; and of the blankets, when they arrive there. The 51st regt. appeared to me to be much in want of great coats, and should be supplied immediately, if they have them not of their own. The Commissary Gen. omitted to state how many he had delivered to each regiment in the Light division. This must be accurately reported to the Sec. at War, in order that the expense may be charged against the regimental great coat funds.

I enclose an order, which I beg you to give to the Adj. Gen. to be circulated. I missed my road on the 12th from Ligiosa, and went to Guinaldo instead of Puente de Villa. We were detained that night at Payo by the swelling of a rivulet, and did not arrive here till yesterday. But the lumbago is not worse.

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Dec. 1812.

1. During the absence of the Commander of the Forces from head quarters, all reports and applications are to be made, as usual, to the heads of the several departments of the army, who will remain there.

2. These reports and applications will be forwarded immediately to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, who will give such orders thereupon, or forward them to the Commander of the Forces, as he may think proper.

3. The head of the Q. M. G. department will proceed to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's head quarters.

The A.G. to Capt. Marlay, D.A.A.G., Lisbon.

16th Dec. 1812.

I beg to enclose you a communication I have received from Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G. of the 1st division; and I beg you will acquaint me whether, as he is led to suppose, the 1st and 2d volumes of the printed G. O. were with that part of Sir E. Paget's baggage which was sent to him or not. In case they were not, I am to request you will send them to this office as soon as possible, that they may be handed over to the General officer now in command of the 1st division of infantry.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Albuquerque, 18th Dec. 1812.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has given me your letter of the 10th, but I don't exactly understand the arrangement which you propose. You say that the Commissariat departments and contractors might be allowed to receive and keep in their service all those persons 'who are not actually deserters, who did not belong to the troops of the line.'

From the subsequent part of the letter, I imagine that you mean to prevent the departments from taking into their service, excepting as clerks or persons of trust and confidence, any who are liable to be called to serve in the line under the recruiting laws. Let me know whether the last or the first is your intention.

I have been 3 days longer on my journey than I intended, owing to the fall of rain, which has swelled all the torrents, and I am now detained here by the swelling of the Gevora. I hope, however, to get to Badajoz this evening.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

18th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor to receive and submit your letter of the 11th inst., together with its enclosures, to the Commander of the Forces, by whom I have been directed to acquaint you that his Excellency considers it a very serious matter to bring an officer before a General Court Martial for his conduct during the period he has exercised a command, on charges brought forward by an individual under his command, which appear to his Excellency not wholly unconnected with private motives. As Lieut. Col. — has asked for a previous Court of Inquiry, his Excellency thinks it but fair that one should be granted, and requests you will be pleased to cause it to be assembled in your division, of which Major Gen. Anson is to be President, to investigate the charges brought forward by Capt. — against Lieut. Col. —.

The A.G. to Col. Le Mesurier, Governor of Almeida.

18th Dec. 1812.

The enclosed papers I have had the honor to lay before his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, and am desired to refer the same to you, and to say that provided you are satisfied with the apology made by Lieut. Col. —, his Excellency acquiesces in the matter being dropped.

To Col. de Lancey, D. Q. M. G.

Albuquerque, 19th Dec. 1812.

I received last night your letter of the 16th. I enclose a G. O., which will provide for the great coats. The distribution might have been better, but it must answer, as it is made.

We have been detained here 2 days by the swelling of the Gevora and neighbouring streams, having been before delayed and put out of the way by others. However, I hope the delay will not be inconvenient to the public service.

P.S. Forward the enclosed to Goodman to be published.

To Capt. —.

Alburquerque, 19th Dec. 1812.

When I appointed you to take charge of the prisoners of war at Lisbon, I was in hopes that you would perform your duty, and that I should receive no more such complaints as the enclosed. I now desire that you will go to the place where the prisoners of war are confined, and see that a remedy is applied to the complaints of the writers of the enclosed; and that you will send me, without loss of time, directed to head quarters, a certificate from these same officers, that you have done your duty by them.

P.S. Those officers, who it appears are deserters, must be kept separate from the prisoners, and treated with proper attention.

To Mrs. —.

Alburquerque, 19th Dec. 1812.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 10th, and I assure you that I feel no inclination to act harshly by Capt. —. I must inform you, however, that under a recent regulation it is impossible for the Commanding officer of the — to make, or for me to forward, a recommendation that Capt. — might be permitted to exchange; and without such recommendation it is not probable that the exchange should be allowed. I don't see what can be done, therefore, excepting that Capt. — should give in his resignation, or take his trial before a General Court Martial.

I am much concerned that you are in a situation to be distressed by these circumstances, but I am quite unaware in what manner it is possible for Capt. — to avoid quitting the service or standing his trial.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, 3d division.

19th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor to submit your letter, together with its enclosure from Lieut. Col. —, of the — regt., to the Commander of the Forces; and have received his Excellency's pleasure that he acceded to the Lieut. Colonel's request, provided the Governor of Almeida should be satisfied with the apology, in consequence of which I have communicated with the Governor of Almeida on the subject, and beg to enclose his reply for your information. In compliance, therefore, with his Excellency's instructions, I am to request you will be pleased to release Lieut. Col. — from his arrest.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I arrived here only this day, having been detained on the road by the swelling of the rivers.

I am by no means satisfied with either Capt. —, whom I have not seen, but who is gone to Merida to destroy the bridge without orders that I know of; or with Capt. —, who appears to me quite incapable of executing such a trust as that of the charge of the works of this place. I beg therefore that both may be relieved from hence without loss of time, and that you will send here an officer on whose judgment and discretion you can rely to execute the trust reposed in him.

To Lieut. Piper, R.E.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I beg that upon the receipt of this letter you will send to Lisbon for a return of the number of pontoons, with carriages, &c., complete, of the different sizes, now at that place. I likewise request you will ascertain the size of the copper pontoons, taken from Badajoz, now at Elvas; and

that you will make yourself acquainted with the number of them which have carriages fit for service, and balks and trestles.

You will likewise ascertain whether they can travel upon the carriages of the tin pontoons now at Elvas; and whether the balks, trestles, and anchors of those pontoons will answer for the copper pontoons taken from Badajoz. You will be prepared to report to me on all these points on my return to this place in 10 days from this time.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I don't know what you have done or what has been determined respecting your Riband. I am inclined to believe that it is not necessary for you to be invested, and that this form is imposed only upon us military men. However, if you are to be invested, and I should be authorised to invest you, and if circumstances should enable me to go to Lisbon, I have no objection to go there on my return, which I expect will be about the 10th Jan.

But observe that I am anxious not to go to Lisbon, excepting for this object. If I am to go to Lisbon, I wish you would order 6 horses or mules for my carriage to Estremoz. One relay of the Prince's saddle horses might be at Monte Mór o Novo, one at Vendas Novas, and one at Pegões. I shall leave the carriage at Monte Mór o Novo, to go across to Abrantes. Alava and Lord FitzRoy Somerset are with me, and we shall want 6 horses for ourselves and servants, and 2 for our baggage at each stage.

P.S. If I should go to Lisbon to invest you, you must order a feast and a ball, and invite the whole town to assist at the ceremony.

I arrived here only this day, having been *en voyage par terre et par mer*; and detained two entire days at Alburquerque. I find that the English messenger Williams has passed by.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

When I saw Sir R. Hill lately, under whose command the 31st and 66th regts. have been, he mentioned to me, that he thought it would be advisable to extend to those battalions the arrangement which had been carried into execution in respect to other battalions of this army, formed into provisional battalions; that is to say, that 4 or 6 companies of each should be sent to England.

I am unwilling to adopt this arrangement till I shall learn your Royal Highness' sentiments regarding that already submitted to you; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether your Royal Highness approves of its being extended to the 31st and 66th regts.

I am of opinion that it would be advantageous to send home 4 companies of each of the 51st and 68th regts.; keeping them, however, still as separate battalions, as they are Light, and I request your Royal Highness will let me know whether this arrangement meets with your approbation.

To Earl Bathurst.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship that 10,000 great coats for

the use of the British army should be sent to Lisbon without loss of time.

To Visc. Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

Adm. Berkeley has sent me a message respecting his pay being stopped on account of his having ordered a passage to England for the late Gen. Craufurd, in a gun vessel, in the commencement of the year 1811. I had received orders some time before not to apply for a passage for any officer who was not returning to England on the public service, and as Gen. Craufurd not only did not go on the public service, but contrary to my inclination, though with my consent, I did not apply for a passage for him at the expense of the public.

I perfectly recollect, however, that nearly about the same time many General and other officers were returning to England; and the Admiral had allowed them to go in a troop or store ship then about to return. I also recollect to have requested him to facilitate to Major Gen. Craufurd the means of returning to England in a ship of war, meaning that he should allow him to go in that vessel. Major Gen. Craufurd had, however, delayed his passage till after that vessel had sailed; and when he did determine to go, and waited upon the Admiral with my letter, it is not improbable that the Admiral understood that I applied for a passage for the General at the public expense; whereas I only intended to apply that his return to England might be facilitated in a ship of war in the same manner as the return of others was at that time about to be facilitated, without any expense to the public.

Under these circumstances, I trust that your Lordship may think it proper to recommend that the Admiral may receive his pay, which has been stopped.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I enclose some letters which I have received from Dr. M'Grigor, regarding certain promotions made by the Medical board. I entirely agree with Dr. M'Grigor in opinion, that it is no encouragement to those who are performing their duty with the army in this country to see that when by their merits and exertions they have attracted the notice of their immediate superiors, and of the officers under whose command they are serving, and have been recommended for promotion, others have been preferred to them, who have quitted the arduous service on which these have remained, probably to solicit from the Medical board the promotion which these have been found to deserve by their exertions. The officers promoted by the Medical board (one of them, Mr. Higgins, I know is) are meritorious; but neither deserve promotion equally with either Dr. Tyce or Mr. Guthrie.

I have frequently made you acquainted with my sense of the inconvenience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in every branch of the service in this country. One of the principal causes of these changes is the practice of going to England to apply for promotion, which ought to be acquired by service here; and I acknowledge that I don't see the utility of my forwarding the recommendations of the heads

of departments of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to these recommendations are to be preferred the claims and applications of those who quit the service here to go home to make them.

To Earl Bathurst.

Badajoz, 20th Dec. 1812.

I arrived here this day on my way to Cadiz, having been detained many days on the road by the swelling of the rivers. I propose to be at the head quarters at Freneda early in January.

I heard last night from the head quarters at Freneda of the 17th, and from Sir R. Hill's quarters at Coria of the 18th. Nothing particular had occurred since I quitted that part of the country, and there has been no alteration in the situation of affairs since I addressed your Lordship on the 9th inst.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

22d Dec. 1812.

Your letter of the 11th inst., enclosing one of the same date from Col. —, containing an application for leave of absence to proceed to England during the period the army remains in quarters, has been submitted to the consideration of the Marquis of Wellington, and his Excellency has been pleased to direct that the following answer may be transmitted to you, for the information of Col. —: 'That his Excellency will refer the application of Col. —, by the first opportunity, to the Commander in Chief. That it is his Excellency's opinion that there is, at least, as much for an officer of Col. —'s rank to do while the army will be in cantonments as at any other time; and that if Col. —'s business could be delayed till now, it must be still further delayed; and finally, that if Col. — goes, he must make up his mind to resign his command in this army altogether.'

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

22d Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 17th inst., enclosing an additional charge preferred by Capt. —, of the — regt., against Lieut. Col. —, of the same regt.; in answer to which, I take the liberty to suggest, that as the Commander of the Forces has (subsequently to the date of your letter) decided that the charges preferred against Lieut. Col. — by Capt. —, in the first instance, should be investigated before a Court of Inquiry, this additional charge should also be investigated by the said Court of Inquiry.

P.S. Enclosed I have the honor to return the additional charge against Lieut. Col. —, contained in your letter of the 17th inst.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Seville, 23d Dec. 1812, 6 A.M.

I received your letter by Williams, the messenger, and the duplicate of it by a Portuguese messenger on the road between Badajoz and this place; and you may depend upon my going to Lisbon for the purpose of investing you with the Bath, unless I should receive intelligence which should render it necessary for me to return immediately to head quarters, in which case I shall apprise you, and you had better come to me. I shall be at Cadiz to-morrow.

G. O.

Freneda, 23d Dec. 1812.

1. The Commanding officers of regiments are requested to send to the Q. M. G. returns of the new great coats in the several regimental stores in the Peninsula, beyond the numbers required to complete with new great coats the regiments under their command respectively.

2. The Commanding officers of regiments in the 2d, 4th, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions, will transmit these returns, after the regiments under their command respectively will have received the great coats lately ordered by the Q. M. G. to be issued to them.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 1st division infantry. 24th Dec. 1812.

Your letter of the 14th inst., addressed to Capt. Goodman, respecting the signature of divisional daily states by the General officer commanding, having been put into my hands on my arrival here, I do myself the honor of replying to it. I find, on inquiry, that the signature of the A.A.G. serving with the divisions of the army has been deemed sufficient; and it appears to me that No. 5 of the after G. O. of the 27th Sept. 1812, requires merely a report signed by the General officer commanding the division, stating at what hour the preceding day each regiment of the division had paraded, and that the musket ammunition had been reported to have been inspected, and whether it was complete or not. This is merely my own interpretation of the order alluded to, which I beg leave to offer to your better judgment.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 25th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 24th inst., in answer to that which I had the honor of addressing you on the 4th inst.

The government and Cortes have done me the honor to confer upon me the command of the Spanish armies; and at the same time that they have thus manifested to the world the confidence they repose in me, they have imposed upon me the performance of duties, for which I am responsible not only to Spain, but to my own country and to the world.

It is impossible to perform these duties as they ought to be performed, unless I shall possess sufficient powers; and I request that you will inform the government that if they do not feel themselves authorised, or have not confidence in me to trust me with the powers which I think necessary, I beg leave to relinquish the command of the Spanish armies which has been conferred upon me.

I stated distinctly what the powers are which I required.

1st; That officers should be promoted and should be appointed to commands solely at my recommendation. In this request I do not refer to the regular regimental promotions under the 25th title of the *Ordenanzas*, which *Ordenanzas* I require should be obeyed in every article, but to the extraordinary promotions which the government are in the habit of conferring upon officers for extraordinary services. I required that no promotion of this description, nor appointment of any description, should be made to any command, whether in chief or of a division, or to any other of any description, excepting at my recommendation.

2dly; I required that I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving of such punishment. The reason for which I required this authority was, that I saw from the nature of the *Ordenanza*, that it was next to impossible to assemble a Council of War for the trial of any officer; and that if such Council of War could be assembled, the proceedings were likely to be of such duration as to defeat the ends of justice and of all punishment, which in an army must be an early example. The power of dismissing an officer from the service must exist in all armies, independent of the mode of cashiering him by trial; but I admit that there may be reasonable objections, founded on the opinions of individuals, against intrusting the exercise of this power to myself. I insist upon it, however, that in the existing state of the Spanish

army, the power itself, and the exercise of it, are necessary ; and I require from the government that they should take into consideration, and attend to my recommendations, to dismiss officers from the service, when I may find it necessary to lay them before them.

3dly ; I required that the resources of the state which are applicable to the payment, or equipment, or supply of the troops, should be applied in such manner as I might recommend. The reason for which I made this request was, that I was aware that the resources of the government are not in their present state very sufficient for the maintenance and support in the field of all the troops now appearing as effectives on the returns of the Spanish armies ; nor are the whole of those troops in a state of efficiency or discipline to oppose the enemy in the field. I shall be responsible, and must be allowed to judge which of the troops shall be so employed, and which shall not ; and all I desire is, to be allowed to recommend that the financial and other resources applicable to military purposes, may be applied to the support of such particular corps as I might point out. If the government does not comply with this request, I shall certainly be in the unpleasant situation of giving commands to troops, which commands the troops cannot obey.

4thly ; I required that, in order to enable me to perform my duties, the Chief of the Staff, and such limited number of the Staff officers of the army as might be thought necessary, should be sent to my head quarters ; and that the government should direct that all military reports, of all descriptions, should be sent to me ; and that I should, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

I consider myself as the Commander in Chief of the Spanish armies under the government, with whom I am to correspond, through the medium of your Excellency. No officer, according to the *Ordenanzas*, should address himself to the government, excepting through me, and the answer and orders of the government should reach him through the same channel. The Chief of the Staff would be the channel through which I should receive the reports of the army, and should convey to the army the orders of the government and my own.

This mode of transacting business is conformable to the common practice of all armies, and the adoption of it is essentially necessary in that of which it is desired I should take the command.

I beg to have a decided answer from government on all these points at an early period. I have come to Cadiz with a view to arrange with your Excellency various objects for the benefit of the service, and my stay must necessarily be limited, under any circumstances ; and I must set out upon my return to my head quarters in the course of a very few days. At the same time I beg that you will inform the government, that whatever may be their decision on all or any of these points, my desire to serve and advance the cause of Spain will remain the same ; and that whoever may be my successor, or whatever may be the nature of the arrangement for the command of the Spanish armies, I shall always be found ready, as I have ever been, to co-operate with, and to assist with my counsel and suggestions, any officer who may be employed to direct the whole or any portion of the Spanish forces.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I have received a letter of the 2d inst. from the Sec. of State, in which he informs me that he has directed you to send the 2d batt. 11th regt. to Malta, in case I should not have required you to send the 2d batt. 9th regt. to the Tagus, under the former directions of the Earl of Liverpool.

I have made a reference to the Sec. of State on these directions; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will delay sending the 2d batt. 11th regt. to Malta till I shall have received his Lordship's answer to this reference.

The Sec. of State has likewise informed me that he has sent to Gibraltar, to wait for orders, 2 squadrons of the Brunswick hussars; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that these troops may proceed to Alicante, and place themselves under the orders of the officer commanding the troops at that place.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I write just to tell you of our arrival here on the 24th at mid-day. I shall leave this as soon as I can, but it is possible that I may be detained longer than I intend; and I think you will do well to delay ordering the preparation of the feast till you hear that I have, or am about to set out, when I will write to you. The horses, however, might be placed on the road; and I request you to desire Mr. Pipon to facilitate their being fed while at their stations, by orders to our Commissaries.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

While on the road here, I received your Royal Highness' letter of the 2d inst., and I am very much obliged to your Royal Highness for sending the hussars.

Experience has shown us in the Peninsula that a soldier who has got through one campaign is of more service than two, or even three, newly arrived from England; and this applies to the cavalry equally with every other description of troops. Under these circumstances, if it should meet with your Royal Highness' approbation, I should prefer to keep as many of the old regiments as I can with the army, reducing the establishments of those which could not mount more than two complete squadrons to that number, and to send home the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 3d squadrons.

I propose to return to the army in the course of a few days, and shall be prepared to carry into execution either your Royal Highness' orders, or to send home the 3d squadrons of the inefficient regiments, as your Royal Highness may think proper; but I have thought it proper to take the earliest opportunity of bringing the subject under your Royal Highness' consideration, in order that horse appointments may be sent out for all the regiments. They are much wanted by nearly every regiment in the Peninsula.

My wish and intention is to take the field as early as possible, and that every thing for the army should leave England early in February.

To Visc. Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I received yours of the 4th on the road to this place. The Admiralty must be the best judges how far it was practicable for Sir H. Popham to remain on his station with his battalions of marines.

As I propose to take the field again as soon as the green forage appears on the ground, I certainly should have wished him to remain at Santander during the winter; and if, as is stated, some of Caffarelli's troops are gone to France, I think it not improbable that he would have got possession of Santoña. But the stay or departure of Sir H. Popham must necessarily depend on the state of the weather and the season, of which, of course, the Admiralty must be a better judge than I can be.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch, No. 77, of the 26th Nov. in regard to the båt and forage of the 2 battalions of marines under Majors Williams and Malcolm, and that directed by Capt. Malcolm, of H.M.S. *Rhine*.

It has been usual to grant the allowance of båt and forage to officers of the navy and marines engaged in operations on shore in co-operation with the army, and under the directions of the Commander in Chief of the army.

Although the operations carried on on the north coast of Spain, by detachments from the squadron under the command of Commodore Sir H. Popham, were not in immediate co-operation with the army, or under my direction, they were still of essential service to the army, and appear to me to have been of greater extent, and of a different description, from those operations which have been occasionally carried on by His Majesty's ships acting alone.

Under these circumstances I conceive that the båt and forage allowances ought to be granted to those battalions of marines, and to Capt. Malcolm and the officers of H.M.S. *Rhine*, according to the rates fixed for officers of corresponding ranks in the army, by His Majesty's Regulations.

As båt and forage is an allowance granted to enable officers to defray the extra expenses which they are likely to incur during a campaign, which expenses are generally incurred on taking the field, it appears to me that the duration of the period during which Capt. Malcolm was in the field ought not to affect the decision on this question.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 28th Nov., No. 79, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that a description and a report on the practice of Mr. Roebuck's ordnance may be sent to me, in order that I may be enabled to judge of the expediency of giving them to the Spanish troops to be used in the field.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I have received your dispatch, No. 83, of the 2d inst. In my opinion it is more necessary to reinforce the army under my command than it is

to reinforce that on the eastern coast of the Peninsula. Notwithstanding the pains which I am taking to get it forward in strength, we shall still be weaker in numbers than the enemy in Castille; while the army on the eastern coast of the Peninsula (which, after all, cannot quit the coast for want of the due equipments, and unless you should modify or recall the orders by which it is governed) is as strong, if not stronger, in good infantry, than that opposed to it, and is deficient only in cavalry. If those troops are to take the field on a great scale, quitting the eastern coast, it would be much better that they should be incorporated in the army under my command, as a measure which would be more efficient against the enemy, and would save expense.

I therefore write to Gen. Campbell to desire him to suspend the execution of your Lordship's orders to send away the 2d batt. 11th regt. till I shall receive the answer to this letter, when I shall draw to Portugal the 2d batt. 9th regt., or send the 2d batt. 11th regt. into the Mediterranean, according to your determination. I send directions for the Brunswick hussars to proceed to Alicante.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 26th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter, marked 'private,' of the 23d Nov., and I have spoken to my brother on the subject of it, and have settled with him a mode of inquiry by which we shall discover whether there is or not any ground for the complaints against Col. —.

On some of the points there can be none. The quality and quantity of the clothing sent out are fixed by the government, and the hussar dresses referred to are, I believe, those of Fernan Nuñez' regiment, and have been fixed by the Prince Regent himself. Col. — is a military agent, and I always thought him one of the best. He is of course responsible for the due distribution of the articles sent to him to be distributed to the Spanish troops; and I shall send your Lordship the result of the inquiry, in order that, if there should be any real ground for complaint, Col. — may be punished as he shall deserve.

There is evidently, however, in the letter from the complainant, a desire to make the most of his subject; or he would have omitted some of his topics, such as the allusion to the pampered state of the troops under the command of Whittingham and Roche, which are paid by us and taken care of by British officers, in comparison with the state of other Spanish troops on the same service who don't enjoy either of those advantages. The substance of this complaint is against the Spanish government for not taking better care of these other Spanish corps; and would rather tend to show that Whittingham and Roche did apply the money intrusted to their distribution to the purposes for which it was given to them. The whole subject shall, however, be investigated.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 27th Dec. 1812.

In reference to the discussion which I had the honor of having with the Regency this day, on the 3d article contained in my letter to your Excellency of the 25th inst., and in explanation of the system which I wish to see established under that article as connected with the finance, I

request you will submit the following propositions to the consideration of the Regency.

I am inclined to believe that the organization of the armies ordered, on the 4th Dec., is not the most convenient for the service. The sphere of the 3d army, as now organized, embraces objects entirely incompatible with each other. It would be impossible for the General and staff of that army to conduct its duties on the Duero and in La Mancha. I would propose to the government that the army in Catalonia should be, as now, the 1st army; the 2d, 3d, and 4th, the 2d army; the 5th, 6th, and 7th, the 3d army; with the army of reserve in Andalusia and Galicia.

I would beg leave to propose that the resources of Catalonia, and those parts of Aragon free from the yoke of the enemy, should be allotted for the support of the 1st army; that the resources of the kingdom of Murcia, New Castille, Granada, Jaen, and that part of Valencia free from the yoke of the enemy, should be allotted to the support of the 2d army; that the resources of the kingdoms of Cordova and Seville should be allotted to the support of the army of reserve in Andalusia; and that the resources of Estremadura, Old Castille, Galicia, Leon, and the Asturias, should be allotted to the support of the 3d army, and of the army of reserve in Galicia.

I had the honor of laying before the government, in my former letters of the 4th and the 11th inst., my sentiments on the practical evils, resulting from the system which had been adopted in all the provinces of the Kingdom, of separating the military from the political authority, and the financial from both; or, in other words, the system of appointing different persons to exercise the military and political authority, and to perform the financial duties in the provinces, each independent of the other.

Experience has shown that, wherever there exist authorities independent of each other, they must clash, and the service must suffer, unless their acts should be vigilantly controlled by the superintending authority of the government. I shall not contend for the expediency of the contrary practice in a well regulated state, but it cannot be expected that any province of Spain should be in a state fit to be governed according to the best principle, viz., the separation of the local authorities. Even in countries where these systems and principles are perfectly understood, and have been put in practice for centuries, and of which the tranquillity has not been lately disturbed by a foreign enemy, it has frequently been necessary to place the political and military authority in one hand. How much more necessary, therefore, must it be in provinces just recovered from the usurpation of the enemy, in which the authority of the government is imperfectly established, with which the government has but little if any communication, to provide against the clashing of independent authorities in the administration of the local affairs? I would recommend, therefore, to the government, that the General officers commanding the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies, and the army of reserve in Andalusia, should be the Captains General of the provinces, the resources of which will be allotted, as above pointed out, for the support of the armies under their command respectively, holding the political as well as the military power

of those provinces in their hands. They should select, to command in the provinces and places from which they will be absent, such officer as they shall approve of. The Captains General will of course be responsible for all the acts done by themselves or those officers who will act under their orders.

The civil and military power in these provinces being thus provided for and connected, the next measure will be to connect the finance in the several provinces with the army which its produce is destined to support.

1st; I recommend that there should be an Intendant General appointed to each of these armies, which Intendant General shall be at the head of the financial department, as Intendant General of each province, at the same time that he will be the Intendant General of the army.

2dly; That there shall, besides, be an Intendant for each province, who shall be under the direction of the Intendant General of the army, and of all the provinces the resources of which are allotted for its support.

3dly; That the Intendant General of the army and provinces, and the Intendants of the provinces respectively, shall report all their proceedings, and send an account of receipts and disbursements to the Treasury, at the seat of government.

4thly; That no payment of any description shall be made without a warrant, under the signature of the Captain General of the army, to be supported by the resources of the provinces, for which warrants the Captain General is to be held responsible.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 27th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 4th Dec. I have written to Torrens regarding the Q. M. G., and regarding the General officers of the cavalry.

I propose to alter the organization of the cavalry if I should get rid of — —, and to have only one division under Sir S. Cotton; and to do the duty of the detached corps by detachments of brigades.

I am much obliged to you for sending the officers.

Au Comte d'Erlon (Lieut. Gén. Drouet).

Au Quartier Général, ce 28 Déc. 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 1^r Déc., et je vous assure que j'accepte avec plaisir l'offre que votre Excellence m'a faite pour adoucir les maux de la guerre par des échanges, de tems en tems, de prisonniers de guerre.

Il paraît que M. Arscott est officier payeur du 3^{me} dragons; et j'écris en Angleterre, par une occasion qui s'offre en ce moment, pour faire renvoyer en France, en échange pour M. Arscott, M. le Capitaine Bénédict, du 50^{me} régt. d'infanterie, pris au Retiro. Je prie votre Excellence d'avoir la bonté de faire envoyer M. Arscott aux avant-postes de l'armée Française afin qu'il puisse me rejoindre.

M. Shaw, aussi, est officier payeur du 4^{me} dragons; et j'écris en Angleterre pour prier que le Capitaine Franjon, du 28^{me} légère, soit envoyé en France en échange pour lui; et je prie votre Excellence de permettre que M. Shaw accompagne M. Arscott.

To W. Adam, Esq.*

Cadiz, 28th Dec. 1812.

I have received your letter of the 2d Nov., in regard to your son Col. Adam. I don't think it likely that the detachment of the Sicilian army serving in the Peninsula will be joined to the army under my immediate command; but if that event should take place, in such a manner as to render it expedient that the separate staff of that detachment should be discontinued, I shall be happy to avail myself of the assistance of Col. Adam in the army under my command in the manner you wish.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Lord F. Somerset, Military Secretary.

28th Dec. 1812.

I beg of you to lay before the Marquis of Wellington the enclosed letter from Lieut. Gen. Cole, and its enclosures from Col. —, who made application some time since for leave of absence to proceed to England. As the Marquis of Wellington, in the answer he directed to be sent to the application of Col. —, observes that he will forward it for the consideration of the Commander in Chief, I have thought it right to send the enclosed letter, by which it appears that Col. — wishes to withdraw his former application for leave of absence.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cadiz, 29th Dec. 1812.

I received only last night your letter of the 17th, and I am sorry that you have had any trouble respecting the billeting of our officers.

The fact is that our orders are made very strict, purposely in order to ensure civility on the part of the officer to his landlord, that he may get what he really wants in that manner. If there were not reason to hope that what is wanted would be got by civility, the order was too strict and must be altered, particularly in respect to the use of the kitchen fire. But I believe there must be some official communication with the government before the order can be altered, and it will require some consideration to alter it as it ought to be.

In regard to the ladies, they have certainly no *right* to be lodged in billets; but it would be cruel to deprive them of that accommodation. I don't believe I can authorise their having this advantage by an order; and the point can be settled only in communication with the government. If the matter could be allowed to go on, as it is now, I would write a letter to Peacocke to be circulated among the ladies, which would give them a little advice on this subject, and make them better behaved.

I rather think I referred Pack to you for leave, letting him go if you should have no objection.

Sir C. Stuart will have told you that I shall see you soon, and therefore I shall not enter upon affairs here. I think I have done some good; and I have a prospect of doing more. I propose to leave this if I can on Monday.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 29th Dec. 1812.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 1st inst. (No. 81), directing me to communicate to you my wishes regarding the destination of a supply of clothing and accoutrements for 50,000 men, which it is intended to have sent to the Peninsula in the ensuing year, and I beg to

* Afterwards Commissioner of the Jury Court in Scotland, father of Adm. Sir C. Adam and Lieut. Gen. Sir F. Adam, K.C.B., &c.

acquaint your Lordship in reply, that I consider it will be best for the service that of the above number equipments for 40,000 men should be forwarded to Lisbon, and for 10,000 men to Cadiz.

SPEECH IN THE CORTES.

Cadiz, 30th Dec. 1812.

I should not have requested to be permitted to pay my respects in person to this august body, if I had not been encouraged to make the application by the honor which the Cortes conferred upon me on the 27th inst., in sending a deputation to congratulate me on my arrival in this city; a distinction which I attribute to the favor and partiality with which they have on every occasion received the services which it has fallen to my lot to render to the Spanish nation.

I beg leave to repeat my acknowledgments to the Cortes for this honor, as well as for the various marks of their favor and confidence which I have received; and to assure them that my efforts shall be unceasingly directed to forward the just and interesting cause of the Spanish nation.

I shall not take up, with further professions, the time of this assembly, upon the wisdom, discretion, and firmness of whose conduct, under the will of Divine Providence, the result of all our exertions depends. Not only your own countrymen have their eyes fixed on you, Gentlemen, but the whole world is interested in the success of your endeavors to save this nation from the general wreck; and in the establishment within it of a system of government founded on just principles, which shall promote and secure the happiness and prosperity of your countrymen, and the greatness of your country.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. Barnes, 7th division.

31st Dec. 1812.

I am to request you will have the goodness to return to this office the two volumes of printed G. O. which were lent to you at Villa-toro by the officer then at the head of this department, the instructions of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces being exceedingly particular in regard to these books.

ADDRESS TO THE SPANISH ARMY.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

The army have been already informed that the Command in Chief of the armies of Spain has been conferred on the Capt. Gen. Lord Wellington, Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. Although this is the first time that his Excellency has the honor of addressing the army as its Commander, he has long been acquainted with its merits, its sufferings, and its state; and in taking upon himself the exercise of a command so highly honorable to him, he wishes to assure the General officers, officers, and troops, of his earnest desire that his arrangements may tend to enable them to serve their country with advantage, and that while under his command the honor of their profession may be advanced.

It is necessary, however, that at the same time that the utmost attention will be paid by the government to what will tend to the comfort of the soldiers and the convenience of the officers of the army, the discipline established by the Royal *Ordenanzas* should be maintained; as without discipline and order, not only is an army unfit to be opposed to an enemy

in the field, but it becomes a positive injury to the country by which it is maintained. The Commander in Chief trusts, therefore, that every effort will be made by the General and other officers to enforce and maintain in every particular the discipline ordered by the Royal *Ordenanzas*; and he assures them that, at the same time that he will be happy to draw the notice of the government, and to extol their good conduct, he will not be backward in noticing any inattention on the part of the officers of the army to the duties required from them by the Royal *Ordenanzas*, or any breach of discipline and order by the soldiers.

Aux Géns. Castaños, Duque del Parque, O'Donell, Copons, et Elio. Cadiz, ce 1 Jan. 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir deux lettres que j'ai reçues du Ministre de la Guerre, par lesquelles et par l'ordre du jour d'aujourd'hui vous verrez le mode dont les armées sont organisées, la manière dans laquelle les affaires militaires se traiteront, et les mesures décidées, ayant en vue d'obtenir du pays des moyens pour le maintien des troupes.

Je vous prie aussitôt que vous aurez reçu cette lettre de mettre l'Intendant Général de l'armée sous vos ordres en communication avec les Intendants des provinces, de —, * et vous tâcherez de réaliser autant qu'il vous sera possible le maintien des troupes sous vos ordres. En cas que vous trouviez que les Intendants des provinces, ou les *ayuntamientos* chargés du recouvrement des contributions, ne font pas leur devoir, vous aurez la bonté de me le faire savoir pour l'information du gouvernement; et si les personnes chargées de la partie politique ou fiscale de l'administration doivent avoir l'aide du militaire, vous la donnerez, ayant le plus grand soin de prévenir le désordre des troupes et les dégâts.

En cas qu'on puisse réunir quelques moyens pécuniaires, je désire qu'ils soient employés de préférence à la solde des troupes; et que les sommes en caisse, quel que soit leur montant, soient distribuées en proportion des demandes des différentes classes d'officiers, sous officiers, et soldats dont l'armée est composée.

J'ai raison de croire que jusqu'à ce que le système développé dans les lettres ci-incluses puisse procurer quelques moyens, qu'il sera au pouvoir du gouvernement d'envoyer une somme d'argent pour être à votre disposition, † et cet argent doit être employé exclusivement à payer la solde des officiers et troupes réglées à présent sous les armes.

Vous aurez la bonté de prendre garde, par le moyen des pouvoirs donnés par l'article du décret de *las Cortes*, que les sommes d'argent qui passeront par les mains de l'Intendant Général de l'armée, soient employées exclusivement au maintien des troupes sous vos ordres.

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

Gen. Drouet, who commanded the French army (called) *de Portugal*,

* Copons; Cataluña.

Elio; Valencia, Murcia, Castilla Nueva.

Duque del Parque; Granada, Jaen.

Castaños; Estremadura, Castilla Vieja, Galicia.

O'Donell; Sevilla, Cordova.

† Gen. Copons, 50,000 duros; Gen. Elio, 50,000 ditto; Duque del Parque, 100,000 ditto; Gen. O'Donell, 100,000 ditto; Gen. Castaños, 100,000 ditto.

having offered to allow Mr. Arscott, Paymaster of the 3d dragoon guards, and Lieut. Shaw, acting Paymaster of the 4th dragoon guards, to return to the British army, if I could procure the exchange of these officers with Capt. B  noit of the 50^{me} r  gt. de ligne, and Capt. Franjon of the 28^{me} l  g  re, now prisoners in England, I beg to acquaint you that I have agreed to this proposition, and I will thank you to have it carried into effect, by sending Capts. B  noit and Franjon to France, in exchange for Messrs. Arscott and Shaw.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will favor me with the regular certificates of exchange, in order that Messrs. Arscott and Shaw may be released from their parole, and return to their duty with their respective regiments.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

I arrived here on the 24th inst., and I expect to be able to set out on my return to the army on Tuesday next.

Nothing particular has occurred since I addressed your Lordship from Badajoz on the 20th of last month. It appears that King Joseph has removed his head quarters to Madrid, from the palace of La Granja, near Segovia, and that those of Marshal Soult are at Toledo; and some of the cavalry of the army under his command had been extended into La Mancha. The Spanish troops under the Duque del Parque had in consequence retired; but I understand that they have since resumed their positions in La Mancha.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

I have received the thanks of the Houses of Parliament for the battle of Salamanca; and I enclose the list of the names of all the General officers who were present in the action, with a cross opposite the names of those which have been omitted on this occasion. This omission must have been accidental; and I defer to publish the vote of thanks to the army till it can be rectified.

To Earl Bathurst.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Cooke, in regard to the foreign battalion of recruits at this place. I have ordered to Lisbon 2 companies of it belonging to the Chasseurs Britanniques; and I shall be glad to know whether you would wish that these 2 companies should be replaced by a similar number of men drawn from the enlisted deserters at Gibraltar.

I expect to be able to leave this place on Tuesday, and I hope I shall have done some good in the way of organization; but I am not yet certain. I will write to you fully on the whole subject as soon as I shall get away; in the mean time, I believe my brother writes by this occasion to Lord Castlereagh. If all should continue quiet, I propose to pass by Lisbon, principally with a view to give the Order of the Bath to Sir C. Stuart; and likewise to have some communication verbally with the government there; which will delay my return to head quarters till the middle of this month.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Capt. Smith of the Engineers,* in regard to his claim to be promoted to be a Brevet Major. From all that I have heard of his conduct at Tarifa, I have reason to believe, that if it had been made known to me, in detail, at the time the action occurred, I should have recommended him for promotion. It is now too late, probably; but if it should not be so, I shall be glad if he is promoted.

I have been detained here longer than I expected, and all my arrangements are not yet effected. But I hope I shall have done some good by my visit to this place, and that I shall be able to set out on my return on Tuesday.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, 3d division.

1st Jan. 1813.

The Commander of the Forces, on quitting Freneda, left directions that on the arrival of Major Gen Colville with the 3d division, you should proceed to the 6th division, for the purpose of commanding that division during the absence of Major Gen. H. Clinton, who has proceeded on leave to England. As a considerable delay must unavoidably occur between the time when Major Gen. Colville will have reported his arrival with the 3d division, and the receipt by you of the official notification for your temporary appointment to the 6th division, I take the liberty of proposing to you to proceed to join the 6th division on the arrival of Major Gen. Colville. I beg you will have the goodness to notify to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, the day on which you will have joined the 6th division.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

1st Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that the Commander of the Forces, on quitting Freneda, was pleased to direct that on your arrival with the 3d division, Major Gen. Pakenham should proceed to the 6th, for the purpose of commanding that division in the absence of Major Gen. Clinton. When it shall be known at this office that you shall have arrived with the 3d division, the provisional appointment of Major Gen. Pakenham to the 6th will appear in G. O.; but to avoid delay as much as possible, I have this day written to the Major Gen. to propose to him to proceed to the 6th division, on your arrival with the 3d, without waiting for the G. O. announcing his removal, which I hope will meet your approbation.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Stewart.

Cadiz, 2d Jan. 1813.

I received your letter of the 9th Dec. 2 days ago, and I take the earliest opportunity of replying to it. I found the organization of our cavalry in 2 divisions to be very disadvantageous in the last campaign, and I propose to alter it, if I can; and to have but one corps of cavalry under Sir Stapleton, from which detachments should be made to perform the cavalry duty with the detached corps of the army. Under these circumstances, although it might be more agreeable to you to take a gallop with the hussars, I think you had better return to your office.

I have come here to try 'to organise the poles,' which appears to be a work something of the same kind with that which Dumouriez describes so well in his life. I have made some progress; but the libellers have set to work, and I am apprehensive that the Cortes will take the alarm, and that I shall not be able to do all the good I might otherwise. I shall leave this on Tuesday.

* Major Gen. Sir C. F. Smith, K.C.B., &c.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 2d Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving yesterday your letter of the 1st inst.*

In the letters which I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency on the 4th and 25th Dec., I apprised you of the expediency that the Chief of the Staff, and a limited number of the officers of the Staff, should be sent to the head quarters of the army, in order to perform the duties of their several stations under my directions. I request, accordingly, that orders may be given that the Chief of the Staff, and the Inspectors General of cavalry and of infantry, may place themselves under my directions, and may prepare to move to head quarters.

As soon as they are under my directions, I shall arrange with them the

The Minister at War to the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

Cadiz, 1st Jan. 1813.

The Regency of the Kingdom, desirous of showing to your Excellency the high confidence which the Spanish nation feels for the distinguished services which you have done, and are doing, in favor of their cause, and having considered, with all attention, the paper which your Excellency was pleased to address to me under date of the 25th of last month, in which, after expressing your gratitude for the distinction which the Cortes and government had conferred upon you in confiding to you the command of the national armies, you state the powers which your Excellency thinks it indispensable that you should be intrusted with, in order to discharge the duties which the appointment of Commander in Chief imposes upon you, in a manner which may correspond to the end your Excellency desires, his Highness has been pleased to command that I should answer your Excellency's propositions in the following terms:

1st Proposition. See p. 219.

2d Proposition. See p. 219.

3d Proposition. See p. 220.

4th Proposition. See p. 220.

With respect to the 1st proposition, his Highness is resolved that, in extraordinary promotions, to which extraordinary merits and services may give rise, your Excellency shall recommend to the government the officers whom you may consider it proper to promote either to a command in chief or of a division, or any other whatever. Except in these extraordinary cases, the *Ordenanza* shall be exactly observed in promotions, for which purpose the inspectors shall reside at head quarters, where they will be able to inform themselves of the merit and conduct of the respective officers.

Concerning the 2d proposition, his Highness has been pleased to command me to inform your Excellency that the *Ordenanza* does not allow of any officer being dismissed from the service without a trial; but that your Excellency will have the power, as Commander in Chief, to suspend him, and likewise to separate him from the army, informing the government after having done so, in order that they may take the proper measures accordingly.

With respect to the 3d proposition, his Highness has commanded me to state to your Excellency that the resources which the state may apply for the equipment, arming, and support of the troops, shall be applied by the Intendant General as your Excellency shall dispose, and in the manner which shall appear to be most advantageous.

And, with regard to the 4th proposition, his Highness has determined that your Excellency shall name the Chief and number of officers for your staff, and the individuals of whom it is to consist, for the approval of his Highness: the remaining part of this proposition, relative to your Excellency's correspondence with the armies through the Chief of the Staff, and the other particulars, being acceded to.

The Regency, therefore, considering that your Excellency being intrusted with the powers above mentioned, are those which depend upon the faculties and authority of the Regency, those obstacles will be removed which may prevent the distinguished zeal of your Excellency from acting with the liberality and energy which you desire in the cause of Spain.

number of officers necessary to enable them to perform the duty of their several departments with the army, and the mode in which those duties of their departments respectively shall be performed at the seat of government during their necessary absence from hence; upon which subjects I shall have the honor of making a report to your Excellency.

The A.G. to the Officer commanding the — regt., 6th division.

2d Jan. 1813.

The enclosed weekly states of the regiment under your command, of the 1st, 8th, and 15th Dec., being incorrect, were sent to the officer doing duty as A.A.G. with the 6th division for correction; and he having returned them to this office still incorrect, I am under the necessity of transmitting them direct to you, in the hope of better success. In doing so, I must beg of you to consider the very serious inconvenience to this department, and the delay in making up the

The Minister at War to the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

Cadiz, 3d Jan. 1813.

The Regency of the Kingdom has commanded me to forward to your Excellency the official letters which the secretaries of the General and Extraordinary Cortes have written to me under this day's date:

'In a letter dated the 31st ult. you inform us, by order of the Regency, that the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, in a conference which he had with his Highness on the same day, informed him that he had come to Cadiz for the purpose of representing in person to the government the actual state of the armies, with respect to their discipline, clothing, arming, and pay, and every thing relative to their existence in the field; and that, besides the notes which he addressed to him on the 4th and 11th ult. upon this subject, he stated the same circumstances by word, and in presence of Generals Don F. X. Castaños and the Conde de la Bisbal, in another conference; that as the moment of opening the campaign was approaching, a moment certainly most important to the country, and that it was necessary that he himself should leave Cadiz, and the time most pressing, it would be desirable that the Cortes should name a commission for the purpose of hearing, in the presence of the Regency, what he himself and the said Generals may have to propose upon the subject, communicating with the government upon it, in order to carry into effect whatever measures the Cortes may adopt.

'Upon hearing your official letters, the Cortes could not fail to observe that, the object of the conference being to treat of the actual state of the army, with respect to its discipline, clothing, arming, and pay, and every thing that relates to its existence in the field, all these points belong to the authority of the executive power; and that it appertains to the Regency, in discharge of his duty, and in the exercise of the powers which he possesses, and which have been granted to him, to take all the measures proper for establishing military discipline in the armies, for providing them with clothing, arms, and pay, and any thing else necessary for their existence in the field, having, as his Highness has, at his disposition, all the lawful means and resources of the state, and besides the power of proposing to the legislative body, in the manner and form which the constitutional laws themselves establish, any project, plan, subsidy, or new contribution whatever, which, after those which at present exist are well managed, and the superfluous expenses reduced, may be sufficient to supply the deficit which there may remain for fulfilling the objects essential and necessary to the public service.

'The Cortes do not see what direct part they can take in the arrangement of the objects proposed without overturning the established order; and they therefore are of opinion that the conference upon these points, far from being useful, would paralyse the action of the government, from whose zeal they expect that (dedicating themselves, in preference to every thing, to purify the administration of the abuses which the general confusion, and other minor causes, have introduced into it) they will attend to the organization of the armies until they shall be put into a state to act with advantage in defence of the country, and that the Generals who may direct them shall have no motive for complaint, nor any thing to desire in this respect, which was the object of the order which was communicated to his Highness under date of the 30th of last month.' Which I have the honor to communicate for your Excellency's information.

general states of the army, which must inevitably arise from inaccuracies in the regimental states, especially when the army is so widely dispersed as it is at the present moment. Your return of the 1st Dec. is incorrect in itself; but that of the 8th is incorrect, even admitting the preceding one of the 1st to be correct. I beg you will, with the least possible delay, cause fresh states for the 1st, 8th, and 15th Dec. to be made out, and transmitted direct, instead of being sent through the usual channel.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

2d Jan. 1813.

The Commanding officer of the 92d regt. has represented to the A.A.G. attached to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's corps of the army, that Corporal W. Raymond, of that regiment, is now employed as a Commissary's clerk at Abrantes. As the orders of the Commander of the Forces expressly forbid the employment of soldiers in like capacities, I request you will be pleased to call upon the officer at the head of the Commissariat department at Abrantes for an explanation of the circumstances, which I beg you will have the goodness to forward to me for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

To Major Gen. Campbell, Alicante.

Cadiz, 4th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letters, and those of Major Gen. Clinton, to the 22d Dec.

You appear to be aware of the effect produced on the enemy's situation by the measure of putting the allied British and Portuguese armies in cantonments for the winter. It is unfortunate that the necessity for this measure existed; but the disparity of numbers was so great, and so much to our disadvantage, that I could not keep the field in Castille in November; and not being able to keep the field, it was better that I should place the allied army in cantonments, in which it was likely they would recover their strength and efficiency, even though the enemy should by this measure enjoy the advantage of which he has availed himself.

It is evident, however, that till the allied British and Portuguese army under my immediate command shall again take the field, no operation of any consequence can be undertaken by any of the allied corps in other parts of the Peninsula. In the mean time I have come here to endeavor to organise the Spanish armies, and to come to an understanding with the government regarding the means of their support in the field; and upon my return to head quarters, in which direction I shall set out in a day or two, I shall send you directions respecting the operations which you are to undertake when the campaign shall commence, and the period at which you are to undertake them. If, however, before you shall receive the directions, you should consider yourself sufficiently strong, and circumstances should enable you to strike an important blow against the French force opposed to you, or against their possessions on the east coast, I beg that you will strike it.

I have directed that 2 squadrons of the Brunswick hussars, expected at Gibraltar, may proceed to Alicante, to place themselves under your command.

I enclose copies of the letters written by the Adj. Gen. to the Governor of Gibraltar and yourself, in regard to the clothing of the troops under your command.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 4th Jan. 1813.

I enclose a report from the Inspector General of Infantry, proposing

the mode in which the business of his department shall be conducted at the head quarters of the army, and at the seat of government, which I beg you to lay before the government, and to urge the government to appoint Brig. Gen. Don Gaspar Blanco to be Sub-Inspector General of Infantry, and to take charge of the office at the seat of government.

It is also desirable that Gen. Don T. O'Donoju should receive his official appointment of Inspector General of Infantry.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 4th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a report from the Chief of the Staff, Gen. Wimpffen, in which he proposes the mode of transacting business at head quarters, and at the seat of government; and the number and names of officers to be appointed to proceed to head quarters, and the number to remain at Cadiz; which I request you to lay before the government for their approbation.

Au Duque del Infantado.

Cadiz, ce 4 Jan. 1813.

Je vous envoie un mémoire qui m'a été donné ce matin par la Marquesa de Alcañices, avec laquelle je crois que vous savez que j'étais en correspondance suivie avant que je ne fusse entré à Madrid au mois d'Août dernier. Elle me dit que celui qui a écrit ce mémoire est un de ceux qui lui a rendu le plus de service dans ces temps là; et je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez avoir la bonté de le prendre sous votre protection, et de l'employer ou comme il le désire, ou de telle autre manière qu'il puisse être utile à la nation.

To Lieut. Gen. O'Donell, Conde de la Bisbal.*

Cadiz, 5th Jan. 1813.

Having referred to the Inspector General of Infantry and of Cavalry the notes on the back of the return which you sent to me on the 1st inst., stating the want of officers in the several battalions under your command, I enclose the report of the Inspector General of Infantry on the subject.

I have addressed the Minister at War on the 2d, 4th, and 8th paragraphs in the enclosed letter; and have requested that the proportion of officers may be posted to the battalion of Cadiz without loss of time, in order that there may not be wanting officers to take charge of, and instruct the recruits when they shall join.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 5th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose extracts from a return sent to me on the 2d inst. by Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal, complaining of the want of officers in the several battalions under his command; and extracts from a report made by the Inspector General of Infantry on these complaints.

I request your Excellency will urge the government to expedite the nomination of the 7 officers, as proposed by the Inspector General for the

* Gen. H. O'Donell had been created, by the Regency of Spain, Conde de la Bisbal, for his conduct at La Bisbal, near Gerona. He, however, always signed Conde del Abisbal.

Voluntarios de Navarra, and to have removed from the battalion of Seville the supernumerary chiefs.

I likewise request you to urge the government to authorise the Inspector General of Infantry to post to the battalion of Cadiz the usual proportion of officers, in order that there may not be wanting officers to receive, organise, and instruct the recruits when they shall join, as is expected.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 6th Jan. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will recommend to the Regency that Lieut. Ballamar Valdes Argüelles may be promoted to be an Intendant, as I understand it is the intention of the Capt. Gen. Castaños to recommend that this gentleman may be appointed the Intendant General of the army under his command.

The A.G. to Mr. Egerton, Military Library, Whitehall, London.

6th Jan. 1813.

I have sent you by this mail the G. O. of this army from the 1st Jan. to the 4th June, 1812, for the press; and hope to be able, by the next packet, to transmit those for the remainder of the year, which will complete the volume. As his Excellency the Commander of the Forces is desirous of having this volume completed without delay, I have judged it best to send you that part of the year's orders now transmitted without waiting for the remainder, that you may be preparing the press and materials for the completion of the whole, without loss of time. The type, paper, and binding will, of course, be exactly similar to the former volumes; and I beg your usual attention to any little inaccuracies of grammar or punctuation which may have escaped observation here. I also request you will forward as soon as convenient your account, with the customary receipts, for printing the third volume, in order that I may have the same liquidated.

The A.G. to the A.A.Gs. of divisions.

6th Jan. 1813.

Inaccuracies in the regimental states, transmitted to this office, have become so frequent as to cause considerable delay in making out the general returns of the army; in addition to which inconvenience, the labor of those persons employed in that particular line at the Adj. Gen.'s office is very much increased. With a view, therefore, to arrive at a greater degree of accuracy in the regimental states, and thereby to diminish the inconveniences above stated, I have found it necessary to cause a form of brigade state to be made out, which I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith. I am to request that you will require from the Brigade Majors, in the division to which you are attached, brigade states agreeably to the enclosed form, to be transmitted to you on the 1st, 8th, and 15th of every month, along with the weekly states of the several regiments composing the brigade. These brigade states are to be signed by the Brigade Majors respectively, who will thereby render themselves responsible for the accuracy of them; and I am further to desire, that after having yourself duly examined and proved the brigade states, you will countersign them with your own signature, and transmit them, together with the regimental weekly states, to this office.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 7th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this day, enclosing the decree of the Cortes, dated yesterday, upon certain propositions laid before the government by me.

G. O.

Freneda, 7th Jan. 1813.

2. General officers in command of divisions are reminded of the half yearly inspection returns and confidential reports for the half year ending 25th Dec. 1812; and it is requested that the same may be transmitted to the Adj. Gen.'s office with as little delay as possible.

In my letter of the 27th Dec. I proposed that the 2d, 3d, and 4th armies should be formed into one, to be denominated the *second* army; but I apprehend that, although it may be convenient to make this arrangement hereafter, existing circumstances render it expedient to defer it for the present. I would therefore propose that the 2d and 3d armies should be the *second* army, the 4th the *third* army, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th the *fourth* army.

I conclude that the government will appoint the General Commanding in Chief the 1st army to be Captain General in Catalonia; the General Commanding the Army of Reserve in Andalusia to be Captain General of Seville and Cordova; and the General Commanding in Chief the 4th army to be Captain General in Estremadura, Old Castille, and Galicia, according to the recommendation contained in my letter of the 27th Dec. The alteration now proposed for the formation of the 2d, 3d, and 4th armies, will render necessary a corresponding alteration in the nomination of the Captains General of the provinces of Valencia, Murcia, New Castille, Granada, and Jaen; and I would beg leave to recommend that the General officer commanding the 2d army may be Captain General in the provinces of Valencia, Murcia, and New Castille; and that the General officer commanding the 3d army may be Captain General in Granada and Jaen.

I have nothing further with which to trouble the government relative to this decree, excepting to entreat them to have an estimate formed as soon as possible of the expenses of the several armies, and to allot from the revenues of the several provinces the means of defraying them.

I am convinced that the government is disposed to take the lead in all the measures which have for their object to render efficient the armies in the field in this critical moment of the affairs of Spain and of the world; and I earnestly entreat them to order that nine-tenths of all that may be collected in the provinces, the resources of which are allotted for the support of these armies respectively, may be set apart for the support of each till the government shall have had more leisure and opportunity to ascertain the actual expense of each, and the means which each province can afford. Under this arrangement it will be possible to commence to act immediately under the decree of the Cortes of the 6th inst.

I beg leave to enclose a letter from the Marques del Palacio, which shows the distress to which the garrison of Badajoz is reduced.

To Major Gen. Whittingham, in the service of Spain.*

Cadiz, 8th Jan. 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has communicated to me your letters of the 25th, 29th, and 30th ult. (Roche 31st); and as he has been so kind as to leave to me, in a great measure, the decision on the application of the pecuniary funds applied by Great Britain for the support of the cause of Spain, I am anxious that you should be made acquainted with the principles on which I am desirous that they should be disposed of in future. The corps of troops under your command in the Peninsula is one of those which I am desirous should be *paid* out of these funds.

* A similar letter, with some omissions and alterations, was also addressed to Major Gen. Roche.

I believe that the regulations of the Spanish service provide that troops absent in hospitals, which are the only troops which ought to be absent from their duty in time of war, should not receive pay : and whether this is the regulation or not, it is my intention that no pay shall be given from this fund to any officer or soldier who is not performing his duty during the period for which the pay is issued.

The clothing, arms, and accoutrements for your corps being supplied by Great Britain, it is unnecessary to incur any expense from this fund on these heads ; and the fund can afford none for provision, hospitals, or means of transport, which, as well as pay to absent officers and soldiers, if any is due, must be supplied by the Spanish government in the same manner as for other Spanish troops. The pay, therefore, for the General and other officers, and soldiers of your division, present and doing duty, is what alone will be supplied from this fund.

You will be so kind as to send to Sir H. Wellesley on the 20th of every month an estimate of the sum required to pay the officers and troops under your command for that month, on the principle above pointed out ; and when the pay for the month shall be received, either by the produce of a bill or otherwise, you will distribute it in the due proportion to the persons entitled to receive it, taking their receipts, which will be your discharge for the sum received. You will, however, adopt every measure in your power to ensure the due issue to the officers and troops of the sums destined for each, according to the regulations of the Spanish service.

You will appoint Capt. Foley to be the paymaster of your division, and to carry on the detail of the service above pointed out under your direction and responsibility ; and as the whole of the payments directed to be

The Minister at War to the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

Cadiz, 8th Jan. 1813.

The Regency of the Kingdom, in conformity with all that your Excellency has been pleased to state in your letter of yesterday respecting the regulation proposed for the armies in operation, with regard to authorising the Generals in Chief of the same, as Captains General of the provinces in the district in which they may be placed, and respecting the application of funds for their maintenance and subsistence, has commanded me immediately to inform your Excellency, for your information, that, until the proper orders may be issued :

1st ; That the armies in operation shall be composed and denominated as your Excellency points out, in which there is no difference from what has been arranged in the circular of the 4th of last Dec., excepting in the uniting the army before called the 5th to that which is the 4th, and in the command of Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños.

2dly ; That the Generals in Chief named to the command of the four armies of operation, and the General of the army of reserve in Andalusia, should likewise unite the office of Captains General of the provinces in which they are situated, in the very manner which your Excellency proposed.

3dly ; That the nine tenths of all the revenue of the provinces, the produce of which may be assigned to the subsistence and maintenance of the armies, shall be set apart and devoted to the interesting object of their destination, until the statements of the expenses of the different armies, and of the state of produce of the different provinces, being taken into consideration, measures more conformable may be taken for providing for the same.

The letter which your Excellency has been pleased to enclose to me from the Marques del Palacio, pointing out the great want of provisions in the fortress of Badajoz, has been transmitted to Gen. Castaños, that, as General in Chief of the 4th army, he may take proper measures to remedy this difficulty.

made, are to be made in arrear, you will take care that he keeps no money in his hands; but that the payments to the officers and troops are made as soon and in proportion as the money is received.

I am anxious that your division should not be in the field more than 6000 men; but as I am aware that in order to keep up that number it may be necessary that you should have a *depôt* at Alicante, I shall expect and shall make provision, therefore, for your receiving pay for 7000 men, besides those in hospitals, for whom pay will not be drawn from this fund as above stated.

In regard to other points in your letters, it is scarcely regular for me to reply to them. The allied force in the kingdom of Valencia having once been landed there, and the King having arrived on the frontier of Valencia in the month of August with the army of the Centre; and the high road from Alicante to Madrid having been fixed upon as the point of junction of the troops under Suchet and the King on the one hand, and of Soult on the other, the allied force in Valencia has not been misapplied, or mismanaged, nor are any of the events of the campaign which occurred latterly to be attributed to their conduct.

If I am right in this conjecture, it will not be denied that this force ought not to be brought into a forward or exposed situation, in order only to enable a part of it to receive forage and provisions with more convenience and in greater plenty. If we make war with inferior numbers and less efficient troops than our enemies, we must make up our minds to limit our operations and our advantages; and we must not incur great risks for small objects.

If, therefore, the country on the north-west of Alicante, within the command of the force there, cannot afford provisions and forage for the troops, they should be extended to the south-west; or some of them, the infantry particularly, sent to some other part of the coast where they could be subsisted with facility, till their services should be required.

Au Lieut. Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Cadiz, ce 8 Jan. 1813.

J'ai arrangé mes affaires de quelque manière avec la Régence et les Cortes, et je vous envoie copie de la lettre que j'ai reçue hier de la première. Je leur ai répondu en les priant de donner pour les armées neuf-dixièmes des produits des contributions du pays; et quand j'aurai la réponse, que j'attends aujourd'hui, je partirai, et j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir à Puerto de S^{ta} Maria. J'y serai peut-être demain, mais sûrement le jour après.

Je crois que l'arrangement fera assez bien; et, en attendant qu'il produise quelque chose, j'ai arrangé avec mon frère de faire une avance à chaque armée sur les subsides.

To the Minister of Grace and Justice, Cadiz.

Cadiz, 9th Jan. 1813.

Having already conversed with your Excellency on the merits and services of Don Alexo Guillen, late of Salamanca, in the course of the operations of the war in that part of the Peninsula, I beg leave to recall to your Excellency's recollection the subject of these conversations, and earnestly recommend him to your Excellency; and I request that you

will propose to the government the mode in which he can be employed with advantage to the public and to his own interests.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Xerez, 10th Jan. 1813.

I beg that you will inform the Regency that since I had the honor of conferring with them yesterday I have conversed with the Conde de la Bisbal, in regard to the removal of the army of reserve from Puerto de S^{ta} Maria and Xerez to Seville, and the neighbourhood of Cordova; and I have the honor of enclosing a letter which I have received from that General, containing his reasons for submitting this proposal to me, in which I concur entirely.

It appears to me, likewise, that the troops stated by the Gen. Conde de la Bisbal as being in the Isla de Leon, and remaining there after the reserve under his command shall have marched, will with the British troops on the Isla and in Cadiz answer all the military purposes which can be in view in keeping a garrison on the Isla; but as there may probably be other reasons why a part of the infantry of the army of reserve should be kept in this neighbourhood, I beg leave to submit the proposition of the Conde de la Bisbal to the consideration of the government, and to recommend its adoption in the whole, if the government should not think it inconsistent with the public interests; and at all events that it should be adopted as far as the government may approve of it.

As I am upon my journey, and some days may elapse before I can receive the pleasure of government upon this proposition, I beg your Excellency will communicate it direct to Gen. Conde de la Bisbal, and will forward me a copy of it.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Xerez, 10th Jan. 1813.

Before I left Cadiz I omitted to communicate personally with your Excellency regarding those parts of the dispatches and reports to your Excellency which should be published, and those which should be kept for the information of the Regency alone.

It is obvious that it may be necessary to keep parts of every dispatch from the knowledge of the public for some time, and therefore I shall take the liberty of marking in the margin of every dispatch, for the information of the public, those parts of it, and of its enclosures, which it shall appear to me ought not to be made public, as I have on this day the dispatch regarding Col. Longa's affair of the 30th Nov., and its enclosure.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Xerez, 10th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a report received from Gen. Mendizabal of an affair, apparently well conducted, and of considerable importance, by Col. Longa, which I request you to lay before the government.

I will hereafter, when I shall have ascertained the nature and consequences of this affair, address the government upon the recommendation of Gen. Mendizabal that Col. Longa should be promoted to be a Brig. General.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Xerez, 10th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from the Conde de la Bisbal, in which he recommends that Don Francisco Laborda may be the Intendant General of the army of reserve under his command, and that Don Ramon Aldasoro, now performing that duty, may be employed at Seville in the situation now filled by Don F. Laborda. I beg you will lay this recommendation before the Regency.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Xerez, 10th Jan. 1813.

I have to apologise for having written you several dispatches this day in the English language, and on paper of a small size, but none of the Staff are with me at present, and I have with me no paper of a large size; and I hope your Excellency and the government will excuse me.

I request your Excellency will send any orders you may have to direct to me under cover to Don F. Bárcenas, Director of the Posts at Badajoz, till I shall arrive at head quarters, as he has communication with the English and Portuguese posts, and will forward them to me.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Badajoz, 13th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 10th inst., in regard to the duties to be paid to the corn factory at Lisbon, on the purchase of corn imported to the Tagus by the British Commissariat. In the year 1811, I made an arrangement that the duties on importation into Portugal should not be remitted on any articles for the British army, unless I should apply for such remission; and whatever new rule the Portuguese government may adopt on this subject, I request that you will not attend to any applications for remissions of duties, by any authority in the British army, which are not made by me.

I shall continue to apply for the remission of duties to the corn factory, on the purchases by the British Commissariat, of corn imported for sale to the Tagus, because I conceive that these purchases don't interfere in any manner with the corn factory; and because the payment of the duties, supposing the factory to be entitled to them, would produce more inconvenience and embarrassment to the military chest, and of course to the Portuguese government, from the dependence of the payment of the duties on the state of the military chest, than the factory would derive advantage from the duties.

Under these circumstances, I shall continue to request you to apply for a remission of these duties; and if you should find the Portuguese government determined to refuse to attend to my application, I request you to refer the subject to His Majesty's government. I likewise request you to refer it to Lord Strangford, in order that the Prince Regent of Portugal may know in what manner his Royal Highness' orders are attended to, that the local government in Portugal should attend to my suggestions.

I am likewise of opinion that, as the Portuguese government are so little considerate in respect to the convenience and interests of the British government and of the army, with which the interests of Portugal are so intimately connected, it is proper that they should be made to feel that they are indebted to the British government and its servants, not only for

military assistance, and the military situation of the country at the present moment, but for the daily subsistence of the people committed to their charge. With this view I shall propose to you a mode of disposing of the grain which will hereafter be imported into Portugal in consequence of your arrangements, which will put an end to these discussions.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Badajoz, 14th Jan. 1813.

I arrived here last night from Cadiz, having settled tolerably to my satisfaction all the objects for which I went there.

Finding every thing quiet in front, I set out this morning for Lisbon, in order to invest Sir C. Stuart with the Order of the Bath, which ceremony I shall perform on the 17th; and I propose to set out for head quarters on the 18th. I shall be at Abrantes on the 19th, Niza the 20th, Castello Branco the 21st.

As soon as you receive this letter, give directions that the dragoons placed on the road between this and Zarza la Mayor may be taken off; and I request you to send all communications you may have to make to me by the post road to Lisbon. Let De Lancey be ready to set out for head quarters when I shall write that I have set out from Lisbon; as, although I intend to set out on the 18th, it is not impossible that I may be detained beyond that day.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Estremoz, 14th Jan. 1813.

I have just arrived here, and propose to proceed on my journey tomorrow morning; and I shall be at Lisbon on the 16th.

As far as I can understand Senhor Sodré, it appears to be expected by the government that I shall stay at Lisbon longer than I have any intention of staying, or indeed can stay. My wish is to wait upon the Regency, and to invest you with the Order on the 17th, and to set out on my return to the army on the 18th. I should wish to invest you, as usual, before dinner; that there should be many of the principal people present, who should be invited to dinner, and that there should be a ball and supper in the evening, to which all the society should be invited. I hope that, for all this, you will have given the preparatory orders.

You will dispose of the rest of my time as you may think proper; but as I think there are symptoms of the enemy's moving, I can't stay at Lisbon one day after I have invested you with the Order.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Celorico.

14th Jan. 1813.

Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector Gen. of hospitals, having completed his inspection of the hospitals in and near Celorico, at Mangualde and Viseu, has addressed a letter to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, in which appears the following observation: 'At Celorico the relapses are very numerous, from the depôt to the hospital; and I am of opinion that these would be greatly diminished if, as at some other stations, the Commandant was enabled to provide a warm breakfast, as well as vegetables and salt for dinner, to every man in the depôt.' When I had the honor of conversing with you at Celorico regarding the details of the hospital station, I understood that what Dr. M'Grigor here points out had already been adopted; and I am so persuaded that an arrangement so evidently beneficial and conducive to the entire re-establishment of the convalescents could not have escaped you, that I send you the foregoing extract, merely with a view of affording you an opportunity of transmitting to me an explanation which shall

serve as an answer to Dr. M'Grigor's observation, and which I should be glad to lay before the Commander of the Forces at the same time that I shall submit Dr. M'Grigor's letter to the consideration of his Excellency.

The A.G. to Capt. Peebles, Viseu.

14th Jan. 1813.

Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector Gen. of hospitals, in a letter addressed to me for the information of the Commander of the Forces, has represented the necessity of providing the convalescents with a warm breakfast, and a small portion of vegetables and salt for their dinner, which it would appear, from Dr. M'Grigor's statement, has not been done at Viseu for want of the necessary funds. I am now to request that you will make arrangements, as soon as possible, for providing the convalescents at the depôt at Viseu with a warm breakfast, and vegetables and salt for their dinner, as Dr. M'Grigor proposes; and should there be a deficiency of money in hand for the exigencies of the service of the depôt, which I do not apprehend to be the case, as I have not received any representation from you on the subject, I am to desire that you will report the same to me, in order that a requisition may be made on the Paymaster Gen. for a supply of money for the service of the depôt.

The A.G. to Commandants of Hospital stations.

15th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith printed copies of the G. O., which have been issued from time to time by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, relating to the conduct of detachments on the march, and the duties required of officers in command of such detachments. When these copies will have been nearly expended, you will be pleased to send due notice thereof to the Adj. Gen.'s office, in order that a timely supply of fresh copies may be forwarded to you. I avail myself of this opportunity to request, that when any detachment shall be about to march from the station under your command, you will direct the officer who shall be appointed to the command of it, to peruse these orders with the greatest attention; and should any doubt arise in his mind as to the import of any particular order, you will explain the same to him, so that when he shall set out upon his march, he will be fully acquainted with every particular duty which will be required of him whilst the detachment shall be under his charge.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lisbon, 18th Jan. 1813.*

I left Cadiz on the 10th inst., having arranged every thing tolerably well and nearly as I wished, and I arrived here on the 16th. Having been travelling constantly from the 10th to the 16th, and feasting ever since, I can't transmit by this mail an account of affairs at Cadiz. I set out for head quarters, however, to-morrow morning; and as soon as I shall arrive there I will let you know what I have done, and the state of affairs there in general. In the mean time, I know it to be my brother's intention to send all the documents home to Lord Castlereagh.

There is nothing new. The French appear to be preparing for a movement, but nothing has positively moved yet. Our army is gaining strength.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Lisbon, 19th Jan. 1813.

As it is considered necessary that Lieut. Gen. Leith should return to England for the recovery of a wound received at the battle of Salamanca,

* Lord Wellington was greeted with acclamations on his arrival at Lisbon. The investiture of Sir C. Stuart with the Order of the Bath took place at the Roçio, where a feast was prepared by the Regency, after which Lord Wellington went to the theatre of San Carlos, where his reception was enthusiastic. (See Appendix, No. VII.)

I shall be much obliged to you if you will, on an opportunity offering, provide him with a passage in a man of war.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lisbon, 19th Jan. 1813.

I omitted in my letter of yesterday to inform you that, upon receiving intelligence of the state of affairs in Russia, as acknowledged by the French themselves, in the 29th bulletin, I judged it expedient to send Gen. Count Nugent * to Vienna to inform the Emperor of the exact state of affairs in Spain, and of my expectation that I should at least be able to give employment to between 150,000 and 200,000 French troops in the next campaign.

The packet is coming in, and I wait till it arrives.

The A.G. to Capt. Craig, D.A.A.G., Lisbon.

19th Jan. 1813.

Lieut. Col. Scovell has handed to me your letter of the 14th inst., in which he is informed that Major Gen. Peacocke received directions some time ago from the Commander of the Forces to discontinue the enlistment of deserters into any corps. I request you will inform Major Gen. Peacocke, that upon inquiry here I have been informed that these directions were not intended by his Excellency to extend to the Corps of Guides, and that accordingly there can be no objection to the enlistment of deserters into that corps.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Niza, 22d Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th Dec., and I take the earliest opportunity of replying to it. In regard to ———, I only hope that nothing will be done to him to injure his feelings.

I don't exactly comprehend that part of your letter which relates to the removal of ———, ———, ———, and ——— from this country. I don't understand what responsibility attaches to the removal of officers from situations which they are supposed incapable of filling, particularly from situations of comparatively subordinate rank. Odium may attach to the person who removes them without otherwise providing for them; but I don't believe that either His Royal Highness or I could ever be called upon, as public men, to account for the removal of any of them.

I feel strongly, and others under my command feel still more strongly, the inconvenience of being obliged to employ some at least of the officers above mentioned; but, in every letter which I have ever written upon a subject of this description, I have protested against any thing harsh being done to the officer who I wished should be removed. I have not by me at present the copy of my letter to you upon the subject of these officers, and I can't be certain that it did not contain the same request, and I keep His Royal Highness' orders by me till I shall see whether it does or not. If it does not, I beg to refer the order for his further consideration, and to request that none of these officers should be removed unless His Royal Highness has it in his power to employ them on the home Staff or elsewhere.

I don't mean to alter my report of them in any degree when I state that I believe them all to be zealous in the service; but in my opinion,

* Count Nugent, in the service of the Emperor of Austria.

and in the opinion of those under me, and who are more immediately in communication with them, they are not fit for their situations; at the same time I wish they should not be removed unless they can be otherwise provided for. I beg that it may be understood that I am ready to bear all the responsibility or odium which can attach to the person who causes their removal.

I am entirely responsible for the appointment of one (—— —) to command a division of cavalry. In regard to the others, I have nothing to do with it. They were sent to this country from England.

In regard to the latter part of your letter, respecting 'the difficulty of setting aside these General officers from serving with the army in the field, who have creditably risen to high rank,' it is impossible to reconcile it with the former part, in which you talk of the responsibility, or rather odium, attaching to the removal of officers found or supposed to be incapable of performing service in the field. I request that General officers should not be sent out; and when those are sent out whom I conceive not to be fit for their situations, I request that they may be removed. I am then to bear the responsibility or odium of their removal.

What a situation then is mine! It is impossible to prevent incapable men from being sent to the army; and when I complain that they are sent, I am to be responsible. Surely the responsibility or odium for the removal of such persons ought to attach to 'the difficulty of setting them aside,' and not to the person to whom it belongs officially to represent that they are not capable of filling their situations.

I am on my return to head quarters, where I shall arrive on the 25th.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

P.S. Since writing the above I have perused the copy of my letters to you of the 2d and 6th Dec., and I observe that I did not recommend that the General officers mentioned should be otherwise provided for if removed. I therefore propose to suspend till further orders the execution of His Royal Highness' orders in regard to all these General officers, excepting —— —.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have to mention to you that I found the road from Castello Branco to Alpedrinha, close to the latter town, to be absolutely impracticable for wheel carriages; and I was informed its state was owing to the neglect of the magistrates in repairing it. You are aware that this road is one of the great communications used by the troops along the frontier; and I beg leave to recommend that the Camara of Alpedrinha may be called before the Special Commission to answer for this neglect.

Generally speaking, the roads throughout Portugal are in a very bad state, particularly in the neighbourhood of the towns and villages. Their state is to be attributed very much to the practice of throwing the stones from the walls on each side of the road into it, from whence they are never removed. Many roads are almost entirely blocked up, and are much injured by this practice; and it is very desirable that the attention of the magistrates should be called to the subject, and that they should be

directed to repair the roads, and at least one league's distance from the several towns and villages.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, containing a report from Capt. Meacham, the Commandant of British Hospitals at Abrantes, on the murder of a serjeant and a soldier of the 9th light dragoons by a banditti which infest the road from Abrantes to Alter do Chão.

I request you to draw the attention of the Governor of Alentejo to this circumstance, and to order him to take measures to get the better of the banditti in question by means of the Ordenanza and militia of the province now at their homes.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I arrived here yesterday evening. Before I quitted Lisbon I omitted to ask you to give a commission in either the 3d or 13th regts. to José D. Pinto, who has been recommended to me. His brother, Manoel J. Pinto, is already *alferes* in the 10th regt.; and I have been applied to to recommend him for a lieutenancy in one of the same regiments, which I should be obliged to you if you can arrange.

As Fane is coming out, it will perhaps be desirable that Sousa, who formerly attended him, and whom I saw at Abrantes, should be ordered to Lisbon.

When I was at Abrantes, Lobo requested me to draw your attention to the miserable state of Capt. ———, of the 5th regt. of cavalry, under sentence of a General Court Martial for misbehavior in an action under the command of Madden. It appears that he is the only one of the party whom you have not pardoned; he, probably, least deserved pardon.

To Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which your Lordship is President, on the trial of privates ———, ———, and ———; and I beg that your Lordship will forward the recommendation of the prisoners for mercy separate from the judicial sentence of the Court.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have to request that you will give directions that the Regiment de Watteville may be assembled at Cadiz as soon as may be convenient.

This regiment will shortly be embarked from thence for another service, respecting which you will hereafter receive further orders.

The 2d batt. 67th regt. are to remain at Carthagená.

To the Rev. Dr. Curtis, Rector of the Irish College at Salamanca.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I received only yesterday, on my return to this place, your letter of the 9th Jan. I should wish to converse with you on some of the points to which it relates; and, if you will do me the favor of coming over here some day, Gen. O'Lawlor tells me he will lodge you; and I shall be happy to see you at dinner, and we can converse on the subject of your letter.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in regard to an affray which lately occurred at Punhete between some inhabitants of the town and a party of British soldiers, in which one of the inhabitants lost his life, in consequence of which I have ordered Lieut. — into arrest; and I beg to know what the Portuguese government wish should be done with him.

I likewise enclose papers received from Col. Ross of the 20th regt., in consequence of a complaint forwarded by you of the conduct of a detachment of the 20th regt. at Villa Franca. I have ordered that Lieut. —, of the 20th regt., may be put in arrest, and I beg to know what the Portuguese government are desirous should be done with him.

I likewise enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on an affray in the town of Zibreira, between the inhabitants and a detachment of the 28th regt., in consequence of which a child lost its life; and I beg to know what the Portuguese government are desirous should be done with Lieut. —, corporal —, and private —, who are all in confinement.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the —, in which you have informed me that the government propose to take into consideration, and will act as may be expedient in regard to, the proposition I made on the part of the Conde de la Bisbal, that Don F. Laborda should be made Intendant General of the Army of Reserve, and Don Ramon Aldasoro should fill his place.

As the office of Intendant General is one of the utmost importance to an army, I earnestly recommend to the government that they should attend to the recommendation of the Conde de la Bisbal on this subject.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make application to the government to have admitted into the school of the artillery Don Juan M. de Teran, who is a young gentleman connected with a very respectable family at Badajoz, for whom I entertain a great regard.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th Dec., in regard to the length of the period which had elapsed during which Capt. Kelly, of the 11th regt., was in arrest.

Capt. Kelly was Military Commandant at the Hospital Station at Abrantes, and was put in arrest in the month of August, 1811, on the complaint of Major Gen. H. Campbell, and of Lieut. Col. Lord Blantyre, for having ordered the Assist. Provost at Abrantes to inflict a corporal punishment on a soldier of the Guards, and on one of the 42d regt., for selling their necessaries.

It was not possible to collect the witnesses against and on behalf of Capt. Kelly from that time forward, and at last I released him from his arrest on the 1st Nov. by the enclosed letter, in consequence of the return to England of Major Gen. H. Campbell; Lieut. Col. Lord Blantyre

having gone before. I, at the same time, offered to bring Capt. Kelly to trial before a Court Martial if he wished it.

I enclose the copy of an order which I had issued on the 1st Nov., 1811, defining the duty and authority of the Provost of the army, and that of officers over the Provost and his Assistants.

I am sorry to say, that owing to the difficulty of getting together the witnesses on any trial before a General Court Martial, the instance of Capt. Kelly is not the only one of an officer having been in arrest during a great length of time.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the complaint of Mr. —, a tradesman at Lisbon, against quarter master —, of the — regt., lately gone to England for the recovery of his health; and I request you to lay my request before H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, that Mr. — may be sent back to this country as soon as he shall have recovered his health.

I beg that you will return the enclosed papers.

To — —, Esq.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter, dated the 30th Dec. 1812, in which you advert to a promise stated to have been made by me, that I would forward to the Earl of Chatham, then Master General of the Ordnance, an application that an annuity to the widow of the late Gen. — should be continued to his two granddaughters.

If I made such a promise, I think it probable I performed it; that is to say, that I forwarded the application. But if I did not take the pleasure of the Lord Lieutenant upon the subject, and did not forward the application, it is probable I never made such a promise; and most certainly I have no recollection of having made it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I arrived here yesterday evening. I received at Lisbon your letter of the 16th Dec. I acknowledge that I do not conceive there is any probability of an insurrection in France or Holland, which would render desirable the presence of the young Prince of Orange in the latter country; and I consider it so advantageous to him to remain with the army for some time longer, that I should do him a great injury if I were to send him home. Unless I should hear of an insurrection in France or Holland, or should receive an order to send him, I shall say nothing on the subject of his return to England to the Prince of Orange.

I see that Lord Temple has given notice of a motion in the House of Commons after the holidays, respecting the affairs of the Peninsula, which is intended, I conclude, to collect all the independent parties in one attack upon the government. If I were in England, I should certainly do the government the justice they deserve; and I hope, that let who will be the assailants, the government will feel no scruple in making every use of my letters to you and Lord Liverpool in their own defence; particularly parts of a private letter to Lord Liverpool of the 23d Nov. and a dispatch to yourself on the Sicilian expedition of the 3d Aug. last.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 26th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 6th, regarding the correspondence with Sir W. Beresford, on his rank in this army. I don't think that the question is understood in England; and the objects, as well of Sir W. Beresford as of myself, are misunderstood. In the year 1809 I had a correspondence on the relative rank of British and Portuguese officers with the late Commander in Chief, who decided on the 10th July on queries put to him by me on the 7th June, that British and Portuguese officers were to rank with each other according to the dates of their several commissions; and that British officers holding superior Portuguese commissions, were to rank in the allied army according to the dates of those commissions, their British commissions being dormant, although their rank in the British service should be progressive. I refer you to this correspondence, which, although it does not refer to the commission of the Marshal, is, in my opinion, decisive on the question of his rank, and directly contrary to the practice stated by His Royal Highness to prevail in the Austrian service.

With this decision the question comes to be decided, who is to command the allied British and Portuguese army in the Peninsula, in case I, the Marshal General, should be deprived of it by any of the accidents of the service: Marshal Sir W. Beresford, or a Lieutenant General of the British army, sent out by the British government specially to take the command in case of the occurrence of this event? The statement of the question is sufficient to decide it. The Marshal bears the higher commission, and according to the deliberate decision of the late Commander in Chief, he must take the command; unless the British government should come to some understanding with the Portuguese government, that the officer whom they will send out shall take the command of the allied army, in case I should be deprived of it. If such an agreement should be made, it will, of course, preclude the operation, in regard to the command of the army, of the principle broadly laid down by the late Commander in Chief, and invariably acted upon in respect to all the other ranks of the army.

What Marshal Beresford and I ask for, is a settlement of the question; not in his favor, if government should deem it expedient that it should be otherwise; but that he should not be in the awkward predicament of being obliged to claim the command of the army against the wishes of his own government, or of quitting the army at a critical moment, in case of the occurrence of the event for which it is intended to provide. I cannot state positively, but I don't think he has any intention to retire, if the question should be decided against his rank; I know that I would not retire, and I shall exert all the influence I can possess over his judgment to induce him to remain. But the point must be settled between the two governments, if it is intended to depart from the principle laid down by the late Commander in Chief, in his letter of the 10th July, 1809.

In my opinion the office of second in command of an army in these days, in which the use of councils of war has been discontinued, and the Chief in command is held severely responsible for every thing that passes,

is not only useless, but injurious to the service. A person without defined duties, excepting to give flying opinions, from which he may depart at pleasure, must be a nuisance in moments of decision; and whether I have a second in command or not, I am determined always to act according to the dictates of my own judgment, being quite certain that I shall be responsible for the act, be the person who he may, according to whose opinion it has been adopted. One person in that situation may give me a little more trouble than another; but substantially I must be indifferent as to whether it is the Marshal, or any of the Lieutenant Generals who have been named on the occasion. I must be out of the way when any one of them should be called upon to act in command; and, excepting that feeling which every man must have for what is to occur after he is gone, which is not of a personal nature, I can have no preference to one officer over another as my successor.

It is perfectly true that government have always provided a successor for me in the command of this army; and notwithstanding that I was aware of the decision of the Commander in Chief on the relative rank of British and Portuguese officers, I never doubted about the succession of that officer to the command when I should be gone. The discussion how he was to take the command, Marshal Beresford being with the army, was never entered into; and it has occurred now, only because Marshal Beresford conceived himself interested in it, and that the interval between the capture of Sir E. Paget, and the arrival of his successor, was a proper moment for him to bring it to a decision.

The opinion which I have entertained, that as long as I remained in command of the allied army, Marshal Beresford was next to myself, is, as I have shown, consistent with the decision of the late Commander in Chief, and it is not inconsistent with the appointment of a British Lieutenant General to take the command of the army, to the exclusion of Marshal Beresford, when I should be removed from the command. It is not my business to start difficulties in the way of the arrangements of government, and of the Commander in Chief, particularly on such a point as the appointment of a successor to myself; but when the difficulty is started by another person interested, I must give my opinion to government, and I must say that they will place Marshal Beresford in an awkward situation if the case should occur, unless the decision of the late Commander in Chief should be altered, and the question should be settled with the Portuguese government.

I think His Royal Highness is mistaken in regard to the inferences he has drawn from some of the facts which have occurred here. Marshal Beresford was not removed from the command in Estremadura, because I considered Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill the senior officer. Marshal Beresford took the command on the south of the Tagus when Sir R. Hill was obliged to go to England for the recovery of his health, as a kindness to me, and a convenience to the service; it being, as well as I can recollect, desired on his part, but perfectly understood between us, that Sir R. Hill should resume his command as soon as he should return to the army. Sir R. Hill was originally appointed to that command because he was locally situated more conveniently than others to exercise it; and there were then, and

have always been, with the army 2, if not 3, General officers, his seniors, not having a detached or so large a command.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813, 4 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 26th; and there does not appear to me any reason for Byng's going to the hospital at Alter do Chão. I shall order that establishment to be discontinued as soon as Dr. M'Grigor returns to head quarters.

I wish you would have an eye upon the enemy's proceedings in the Sierra de Francia. I am very anxious to prevent them from plundering that district.

Au Lieut. Gén. Baron Maucune.

Au Quartier Général, ce 27 Jan. 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 6 Janvier, par laquelle vous m'annoncez que vous avez consenti à laisser rejoindre l'armée le Lieut. Royal, du 61^{me} régt., qui a eu le malheur de perdre une jambe par suites de blessures qu'il avait reçues. Je prie votre Excellence d'agréer mes remerciemens pour vos bontés envers le Lieut. Royal, et de recevoir l'assurance que je saisirai avec plaisir toute occasion de faire ce qui peut vous être agréable.

Au Lieut. Gén. Baron Maucune.

Au Quartier Général, ce 27 Jan. 1813.

Quand le Général Sir E. Paget a passé par Salamanque, votre Excellence a eu la bonté de lui faire avancer une somme d'argent, qu'il m'a prié de vous faire remettre. Je lui avais en même temps envoyé une somme d'argent aux avant-postes de l'armée Française, de laquelle j'espérais que votre Excellence aurait pris celle que vous lui aviez avancée; mais, par une lettre reçue du Quartier Général de Valladolid, je vois que la somme d'argent que j'avais destinée au Général Paget lui avait été envoyée. En attendant, je ne me souviens plus de l'exacte somme que votre Excellence a eu la bonté de faire avancer au Général Paget; et je vous prie de me la faire savoir afin que je puisse vous la rembourser.

Au Lieut. Gén. Baron Maucune.

Au Quartier Général, ce 27 Jan. 1813.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 20, dans laquelle vous m'en avez envoyé une de M. le Général Reille, et deux autres, pour lesquelles je vous suis bien obligé.

Je vous envoie une lettre que je vous prie de faire parvenir à M. le Général Comte Reille.

Au Lieut. Gén. Comte de Reille.

Au Quartier Général, ce 27 Jan. 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 6 Janvier; et comme la réponse que j'ai écrite à la lettre que M. le Général Comte d'Erlon m'avait fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 1 Décembre est arrivée aux postes Français à Ledesma le 10 Janvier, j'espère que votre Excellence l'aura reçue peu de temps après que vous avez pris la peine de m'écrire sur le même sujet.

Votre Excellence y aura vu que j'avais consenti à l'échange proposé des Capitaines Franjon et Benoît pour les Officiers Payeurs, Shaw et

Arscott; et j'ai aussi l'honneur d'annoncer à votre Excellence que je consens à l'échange proposé de M. le Lieut. Huet, pris à Badajoz, à présent au dépôt de Llangollen, pour le Lieut. Keogh, du 57^{me} régt., à présent retenu au Quartier Général de votre Excellence. Je vous prie de faire envoyer le Lieut. Keogh, ainsi que MM. Shaw et Arscott, aux avant-postes de l'armée Française.

Je saisis cette occasion d'assurer votre Excellence de ma haute considération.

To the Earl of Mulgrave, Master General.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Robe, from which you will see that his wound is of a nature to prevent, for the present at least, his services in this country.

I beg leave earnestly to recommend him to your favor and protection. He commanded the British artillery in the battles of Roliça and Vimeiro, and during the latter part of the last campaign, in which he received his wound. He has always made himself useful, and has been distinguished; and he well deserves any favor which your Lordship may be able to confer upon him.

As it is possible that Col. Robe may return, and I have reason to be satisfied with the intelligence and zeal of Col. Fisher, I am not desirous that that officer should be superseded. His health is not very good, but I hope he will last out.

To Visc. Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Cooke in regard to the services of Capt. Carroll during the late blockade of Cadiz; and a letter which the General has likewise put into my hands, in regard to the merits of Capt. Pell,* of the *Thunder* bomb, on the same service.

I assure your Lordship that when I was at Cadiz all descriptions of persons concurred in their praises of these officers, and of those under their command; and I therefore take the liberty of drawing your attention to their merits during a most harassing service of nearly 3 years' duration.

To the Rt. Hon. W. W. Pole.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I received your letter of the 23d Dec. in regard to the Parliamentary grant, and one from Lord Liverpool of the 22d, in which he sent me a copy of the Act of Parliament, and the copy of a letter from Lord Somerville respecting the purchase of Wellington Park. I enclose the copy of the answer which I have written to Lord Liverpool this day.

As I must have Wellington Park, I am desirous to have more land in Somersetshire, if possible in that neighbourhood; and I think a sacrifice ought to be made for that object; but if I can't get land there at a tolerably reasonable rate, it is a matter of indifference to me where it is situated.

I had thoughts of adding to the Parliamentary grant the sum I proposed to lay out in land when Parliament granted me my second pension, which

* Captain Sir W. O. Pell, R.N.

is about £40,000, I believe; but this arrangement might be inconvenient to the trustees for the Parliamentary grant. It may, however, be otherwise; and if you should find it so, let me know it, and I shall give directions accordingly to Messrs. Coutts.

I enclose a letter from Coutts with the particulars of an estate to be sold in Wiltshire: they don't say for what price. Supposing that nothing can be got on reasonable terms in Somersetshire, you will be the best judges whether this purchase can or ought to be made out of the Parliamentary grant, or by that and my own money united.

I have sent Messrs. Coutts a power of attorney to receive the interest on the Parliamentary grant.

To the Earl of Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I received your letter of the 22d Dec., with the Act of Parliament, and the letter from Lord Somerville, regarding the Wellington estate, which I hope the trustees will purchase.

It is very desirable that the remainder of the Parliamentary grant should be laid out in a purchase in Somersetshire, if possible in the same neighbourhood, and some sacrifice ought to be made with a view to that object; but the trustees will be the best judges on this point; and if an estate cannot be got on tolerably reasonable terms in that part of the country, it is a matter of indifference to me in what part of England it is situated; and of course it is desirable that the greatest interest should be got for the money. I had thoughts of adding the money which I proposed to lay out in land to the Parliamentary grant, in order to make a larger and better purchase; but as the estate to be purchased by the trustees must be under the provisions of the Act of Parliament, and the other would not, this arrangement might embarrass them. However, as it may be otherwise, I shall write to my brother on the subject; and I think the sum which I could lay out in land would be about £40,000. This, however, must be charged with the settlement on Lady Wellington.

I am really quite ashamed of troubling you with these details; and I am astonished that you should be able to attend to the private affairs of any individual, and very grateful for your friendship for me.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I enclose the copy of an intercepted letter which has recently come into my hands, which deserves attention.

You see what Gen. Thouvenot says of the blockade of Santoña.

I earnestly hope that your operations upon the northern coast will be commenced as soon as ever the season will permit; and I hope that we may be able to get hold of that important post.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch, No. 88, of the 30th Dec., in regard to the equipment of artillery, respecting which I addressed your Lordship on the 18th Oct.

I am concerned that I should have made any requisition a compliance with which is likely to be injurious to the interests of the country, and to

interfere materially with the home service. If it is so, the ordnance establishments of the country, however high, are too low for the strength of the army; as the equipment of ordnance, stated in my dispatch of the 18th Dec., is infinitely lower than that of any army now acting in Europe, of the strength of the British part of the allied army under my command alone, and below the scale which I have ever read of for an army of such numbers. It must, besides, be observed, that in the 90 pieces of ordnance which I have required, 6 battering pieces are included, with their equipments.

Notwithstanding that the requisition is low, compared with the strength of the British army only, I admit that a requisition for an ordnance establishment for an army must depend very much on the nature of its operations, on the nature of the country in which they will be carried on, and on the probability that the enemy will be strong or weak in that particular arm.

I have lately received the return of the ordnance equipment for the French armies, of Portugal, the Centre, and the South, for the next campaign, to which armies the allied army under my command will be opposed. I have the honor to enclose a copy of the return; and your Lordship will observe, that without including battering guns, these armies will have in the field 120 pieces, and 781 ordnance carriages, including guns, drawn by 5259 horses. I hope that, after having seen this return, your Lordship will not deem the requisition forwarded in my letter of the 18th Oct. to be unreasonably large.

As the Portuguese army can supply artillerymen, and we have in Portugal the guns, with the exception of the 18 pounders, which there can be no difficulty in supplying, I should hope there could be no difficulty in purchasing in England the number of horses required for the equipment, either to be sent out directly, or to replace those in the brigades in England, which might be sent to this country; and in collecting a sufficient number of drivers for the horses. By this mode of supplying the requisition, only a momentary inconvenience would be felt in the home service, which would be kept complete in the field artillery deemed necessary for the home establishments.

I am much obliged to your Lordship for having ordered out another troop of horse artillery; but, adverting to the calibre and size of the guns used by the horse artillery, I was not desirous of increasing that description of force with the army beyond the 4 troops now with it; and I should wish to be permitted to apply the horses of the troop now coming to draw guns of larger calibre.

Your Lordship may depend upon my endeavoring to do the utmost with the force, whatever it may be, which His Majesty's government may intrust to my direction; and I shall bear in mind the impossibility of reinforcing it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I returned here on the 25th inst. It does not appear that the enemy have made any material alteration in the position of their armies since I have been absent from head quarters. The three armies, of Portugal, the

Centre, and the South, are united in Castille, under the command of King Joseph, whose head quarters are now at Madrid. The army of Portugal is under the command of Gen. Reille, who has recently been brought from the army of the North, and has his head quarters at Valladolid. The army of the Centre is under the command of the Comte d'Erlon, who was employed heretofore in the army of the South, and had commanded the army of Portugal for a short time since the allies retired from the Tormes; his head quarters are in the neighbourhood of Madrid; and the army of the South is commanded by Marshal Soult, whose head quarters are at Toledo.

The army of the South has recently been drawn together in the neighbourhood of the Tagus; the divisions of that army, which were in the province of Avila, having moved towards Toledo, and having been replaced in Avila by the 1st division of the army of Portugal. I imagine that this movement is intended principally to enable the enemy to realise the enormous contributions which they have required from Castille.

I have not received any recent intelligence upon which I can rely of the state of affairs in the north of Spain. Gen. Mina appears actively employed against the enemy in Navarre; and he and Col. Longa have done them great mischief. The latter destroyed 600 men and took 2 pieces of cannon, in an affair with the enemy on the 30th Nov.

My last accounts from Alicante were of the end of December, at which time a part of the reinforcement expected from Sicily had arrived; and Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck was expected.

The allied British and Portuguese army occupy the cantonments in which they were placed in the beginning of December; and I am happy to be able to report that I have every reason to hope that we shall be able to take the field at an early period of the season in greater force than we have yet been able to bring forward on any occasion.

The Spanish troops are also all in cantonments; and I trust that the arrangements which have been adopted, with a view to provide for their subsistence, will enable us to bring into the field some efficient Spanish corps at the period at which it will be expedient to open the campaign.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch, No. 90, of the 4th inst., in regard to the 2d batt. 58th regt.

I have reduced the establishment of that battalion in this army to 4 companies, and have sent the officers and non-commissioned officers of 6 companies to England, and have submitted the arrangement for the approbation of the Commander in Chief.

I am desirous, if possible, not to reduce this army in old soldiers. One soldier who has served one or two campaigns, will render more service than two recently sent from England; at the same time that, probably, if the old soldiers of this army were sent to other climates, they would be found equally inefficient with the recruits sent out here. On these grounds I propose to delay carrying into execution your Lordship's orders in the dispatch referred to, till I shall have received the Commander in

Chief's decision on the organization of the weak second battalions of this army, referred to His Royal Highness 6 weeks ago.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 27th Jan. 1813.

My brother will have sent to Lord Castlereagh the copies of my correspondence with the Spanish government, and of the decree of the Cortes in regard to the arrangements to be made for the organization of the Spanish armies; the degree of power with which I should be intrusted; and the measures to be adopted to provide for their subsistence; and I shall not trouble you with these papers.

It is impossible to understand what has passed without being aware of the interior state of Spain, and of the confusion which exists in consequence of the old abuses; the French usurpation; the establishment and existence of the guerrillas; the decrees of the Cortes, and the weakness of the government: to which add the operations of a foreign, and the extortions of a Portuguese, army. After providing for the organization of the army in my own hands, and the degree of power which I was to have over it; in which there was but little difference of opinion between the government and me, after they understood that I was in earnest; my object was to establish some authority in the provinces, which should exercise the powers of government, should superintend the realization of the resources of the country, and should be responsible for their application to the service of the army. It was agreed that the resources of certain provinces should be applied to the support of certain armies, and I proposed:

1st; That the Commanders of these armies should be the Captains General of the provinces, the resources of which were to supply the wants of the armies under their command respectively, thereby bringing the military authority into one hand; and that the Captain General of each province should be, as he had always been in Spain, the *Xefe Politico*. Before I go further I must mention that this arrangement does not militate with any article of the written constitution. Indeed it was so acknowledged by the members of the committee of the Cortes, who conversed with me upon it. I don't know what is the meaning of a written constitution, if we are afterwards to be told of intentions, &c. &c. which are not expressed. But if the proposition is contrary to the written constitution, the Cortes are daily witnesses, in Cadiz, of the infringement of the constitution, where the military governor is the *Xefe Politico*.

2dly; I proposed, in order to bring the financial system under the view of the Captain General, that the Intendant General of the army should be the Intendant General of each of the provinces of which the resources were allotted for its support; and that the Intendants of the provinces should act under his directions according to the system of Old France in the days of Louis XIV.; and that nothing should be issued from the military chest excepting under the orders or warrant of the Commander of the army, in order to put a stop to the scandalous waste of resources which exists in all these countries, as will be seen by an examination of the accounts of Galicia and Portugal.

I got on tolerably well till unfortunately the trumpet of alarm was

sounded in a libel in one of the daily newspapers, respecting the danger to be apprehended from the union of powers in the hands of military officers at the suggestion of a foreigner; and then I could get the Cortes to do nothing more than you will see in their decree of the 7th inst. It appears to me, however, that this decree goes sufficiently far to enable me to act. I saw enough of the state of affairs at Cadiz to be quite convinced that I should not be able to prevail upon the Cortes to do more; and I had no alternative excepting to resign the command, which I was aware would have had the worst effects, at that moment, in Spain, as well as throughout Europe. If the system is not fairly acted upon by the government, or for any reason whatever should fail, it will always be time enough to resign the command; and affairs cannot be in a worse state than that in which I found them, or than they would have been if I had resigned when the Cortes modified my proposition. In the mean time I have the merit of having submitted to the Cortes; and if the system should fail, the responsibility will rest with them, and I have given them to understand that I shall take care to let Spain and the world know why it has failed. I trust, however, that it will not fail, and that I shall still be able to place in the hands of the Generals of the Spanish armies those powers which must secure the resources of the country for the troops.

It is impossible to describe the state of confusion in which affairs are at Cadiz. The Cortes have formed a constitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture, viz., to be looked at; and I have not met one of the members, or any person of any description, either at Cadiz or elsewhere, who considers the constitution as the embodying of a system according to which Spain is, or can be, governed. They, the Cortes, have in terms divested themselves of the executive power, and have appointed a Regency for this purpose. This Regency are in fact the slaves of the Cortes; yet Cortes and Regency have so managed their concerns as that they have no communication or contact, excepting of that kind which our Sovereign has, by speech or message to Parliament, or the Parliament by address to His Majesty; neither knows what the other is doing, or what will be done upon any point that can occur. Neither the Regency nor Cortes have any authority beyond the walls of Cadiz; and I doubt whether the Regency have any beyond the walls of the room in which they meet. Each body, I know, suspects the other, notwithstanding, as I have above stated, the Regency are the creatures of the Cortes. The Regency suspect that the Cortes intend to assume the executive power; and the Cortes are so far suspicious of the Regency, that although the leading members admit the expediency, nay necessity, of their removal from Cadiz, the principal reason alleged for remaining there is that they know the people of Cadiz are attached to them; but that if they were to go elsewhere, to Seville or Granada for instance, they are apprehensive that the Regency would raise the mob against them!!!

I wish that some of our reformers would go to Cadiz to see the benefit of a sovereign popular assembly, calling itself 'Majesty'; and of a written constitution; and of an executive Government called 'Highness' acting under the control of 'His Majesty' the assembly! In truth there

is no authority in the state, excepting the libellous newspapers ; and they certainly ride over both Cortes and Regency without mercy.

I am astonished at the patience of my brother, and that he has been able to do any thing with such people. I am quite certain that if I had not threatened them with my resignation, and had not kept aloof from all questions excepting those relating to my immediate business at Cadiz, I should have done nothing. It appears to me, however, that we must not allow these people to go to ruin as they are doing. Hitherto, having been confined within the walls of Cadiz, and the whole of Spain having been occupied by the enemy, their follies have been of little importance ; but they will now become a serious misfortune in proportion as the military misfortunes of France will increase the means of communication of the Cortes with the country. Several of the leading members with whom I conversed are aware of the folly of the constitution, and are desirous of changing it, but don't know how to set about the change, and are terribly afraid of the Cadiz newspapers. In fact, if we allow matters to go on as they are, we shall lose the benefit of all that we have done, even if the result of the war should be to force the French to evacuate Spain ; and I propose to try if I cannot prevail upon some of the leaders to propose an alteration of the constitution, so as to connect the legislative assembly with the executive government, as our Houses of Parliament are, by the ministers of the Crown being members.

This will be one step towards putting the machine of government in motion ; and it may be followed by other improvements essentially necessary for the establishment of any government, or for the preservation of any system of order in the country.

You will have seen that I have taken for the military, nine tenths of all the resources of the country ; that is to say, all the resources, as I should imagine the civil expenses (not of collection, but connected with collection) would take one tenth. Then I have told the government that the British subsidy must be applied exclusively to defray military expense ; and that they must allow me to dispose of it. So that, in fact, they have nothing. My brother and I agreed that it would be very desirable that he should be allowed to assist the government with from £200,000 to £400,000, in addition to the subsidy of one million sterling, in the course of the current year, in case it should be necessary. I shall be much obliged to you if you will mention this to Lord Liverpool. He may depend upon it that my brother will not give them one shilling unless it should be necessary.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 21st, for which I am much obliged to you. The packet arrived at so late an hour on the 19th, and our shirts being at the wash, *as usual*, we did not leave Lisbon till the 20th, and we arrived here on the 25th. I enclose you the copy of my dispatch of yesterday. I have sent one to the same purport to the Minister at War. I likewise enclose a letter to Lord Bathurst regarding affairs at Cadiz.

To Major Gen. Campbell, Alicante.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has transmitted me the copies of a correspondence with Gen. Whittingham regarding the wants of the troops under his command, and under the command of Major Gen. Roche, including a letter from yourself of the 10th inst. to Gen. Whittingham; and the copy of a letter from Sir Henry to you.

I entirely approve of your declining to supply the wants of the Spanish troops; and I beg you to continue the same conduct, excepting in a case of urgent necessity, in which you may be convinced that it is impossible to procure provisions for the troops by any arrangement; and that the deficiencies experienced have not been occasioned by the want of foresight and of arrangement of Commanding officers and heads of departments.

I enclose you copies of the letters which I have written to Gens. Whittingham, Roche, and Elio, on this occasion; and I beg that it may be clearly understood by all parties that I prefer to go without the assistance of Spanish troops, to taking upon the departments of the allied army the detail and expense of feeding them.

To Lieut. Gen. Don X. Elio.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

I have received reports of the wants of the divisions of troops under the command of Gen. Whittingham and Gen. Roche respectively, now acting with the allied British and Sicilian corps, stationed at Alicante.

As these troops are, and have been for some time regularly paid, an advantage which I am sorry to observe has not for some time been enjoyed by other troops of the Spanish army, these wants ought not to exist. But I request your Excellency to give directions to the Intendant General of the 2d army under your command, to take measures to supply the wants of both these divisions; one of which, that of Gen. Roche, belongs to the 2d army.

It is to be understood, however, that both divisions are to continue to act, till further orders, with the allied British and Sicilian corps at Alicante.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has transmitted me a letter from Major Gen. Whittingham on the distresses felt by the troops under his command as well as under yours, for the want of provisions. It is quite impossible that the British authorities can take upon themselves to supply with provisions the Spanish troops; and if means cannot be found by the Spanish authorities to supply the wants of these troops, we must do without them, and they must be disbanded; and the pay hitherto given to them shall be applied to pay others.

I write to Gen. Elio, to whose corps the division which you command belongs, to request that he will order the Intendant General of the 2d army to provide for it; but it is to be understood that it is still to be connected in operation with the allied British and Sicilian corps now at Alicante.

I have to observe on these complaints from you and Gen. Whittingham of the wants of the troops under your command, that excepting a small division of infantry in this neighbourhood, the troops under your command respectively are the only Spanish troops in the Peninsula which to my knowledge have received any pay for months past. The troops under your command have received their pay regularly; and I know enough of soldiers to be aware that when any troops receive their pay regularly, they cannot be in the state of imminent distress represented. It has never been the custom in the Spanish service to give a full allowance of provisions to the troops when they receive their pay; and we must not introduce into the service of Spain innovations, the expenses of which the finances of the government and the resources of the country cannot bear.

I have written to Gen. Elio, to request that he will desire the Intendant General of the 2d army to take measures to supply the division under your command with the provisions which may be necessary; but if the troops under your command cannot find subsistence in Murcia, or posted as I proposed to you in my letter of the 8th inst., they must be removed to Majorca, and you will apply to the officer commanding the allied British and Sicilian troops at Alicante for transports for that purpose, leaving at Alicante or the neighbourhood such particular troops, and in such numbers, as the General officer commanding the allied British and Sicilian army may think proper to require. It must be understood, however, that those troops only belonging to your division, which will serve in the Peninsula, will be paid by British funds in future.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., in regard to the wants of the troops under Gens. Whittingham and Roche; and I enclose letters for those officers and Gen. Elio, and one for Gen. Campbell, which contains copies of all the others, which I request you to peruse. I beg you afterwards to forward all these letters to Alicante.

I am in hopes that my letters to Gen. Whittingham and Gen. Roche of the 8th inst. will have settled these difficulties, which, in fact, ought not to exist. But, if they should not have done so, the measure adopted by you, of requesting Gen. Campbell to assist these troops with provisions, appears expedient, and will have removed them entirely.

It is necessary, however, that Gen. Whittingham and Gen. Roche should exert themselves to prevent their recurrence, and should see that the pay given to their men so regularly is laid out on their subsistence.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 28th Jan. 1813.

In enclosing for the consideration of the Commander in Chief the accompanying letter from Lieut. Col. Fisher, containing a memorial from the second Captains of the Royal artillery, I request that you will be pleased to inform His Royal Highness that I have every reason to be satisfied with their conduct, and that I shall be happy if their application should be favorably received. Some of these officers commanded com-

panies of artillery in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, and several have now charge of brigades of foot or troops of horse artillery.

The A.G. to Capt. Vincent, D.A.A.G., 6th division.

28th Jan. 1813.

The application of Ensign and Adj. —, 11th regt., for leave of absence for one month to proceed to Lisbon on private affairs, enclosed in your letter of the 27th inst. (which application is herewith returned, together with Lieut. Col. Newman's letter in which it was enclosed), having been submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, his Excellency was pleased to remark that 'an Adjutant ought never to leave his regiment.' His Excellency at the same time directed me to inquire what are the private affairs which have occasioned the application of Ensign and Adj. —. I am to desire therefore that you will require a more detailed statement from that officer, which you will transmit to me for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

28th Jan. 1813.

It having been represented by me to the Commander of the Forces that Capt. —, of the 40th regt., commanding a detachment of that regiment, on the march from Belem to join the army, had neglected to comply with the G. O. of the 7th Oct. 1812, relative to the march of detachments; and it appearing also from the return of necessities wanting to complete the detachment on its arrival at Coimbra (which return having been forwarded by the Commandant at Coimbra has been laid before the Commander of the Forces) that the G. O. of the 23d May, 1812 (No. 3), were not complied with, his Excellency was pleased to direct that Capt. —, on his arrival with his regiment, should be placed under arrest. I am to desire therefore that you will give the necessary directions for placing Capt. — under arrest, and that you will be pleased to acquaint me when this order will have been complied with, for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. Cole complaining of the oppressive conduct of the magistrate of S. João da Pesqueira towards the muleteers attached to the 4th division of the allied British and Portuguese army, and a letter from Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie complaining of the neglect of the magistrate of Mello to furnish supplies and means of transport for the 7th division of the allied British and Portuguese army. I beg leave to recommend that these persons may be called before the Special Commission to answer for their conduct.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 22d. It will be impossible to get Austin promoted by brevet at present, notwithstanding that I entertain the best opinion of him. If he is to be promoted, it must be to the Lieut. Colonelcy vacant by the removal of Browne, if that removal has really taken place. Neither will it be possible to promote Prior, unless to a vacancy among your 24. You will choose, therefore, whether you will promote Arbuthnot and Prior or Austin.

I should be very glad to recommend both Austin and Prior when there should be an opportunity; but I should only be refused if I were to try the experiment now.

To Major Gen. J. Vandeleur.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you

are President, on the trial of Dep. Assist. Commissary Gen. —; and I request you to send the recommendation of him separate from the sentence.

To Major Gen. Hay.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

Lord Aylmer has communicated to me your letter of the 6th inst. regarding the proceedings of a Division Court Martial, of which Lieut. Col. Miles, 38th regt., was President, on the trial of certain soldiers for making away with ammunition. Having once revised the proceedings of the Court Martial, you are obliged to confirm its sentence; and you will do well to dissolve the Court.

I request you, however, to draw the attention of the Adj. Gen. of the Forces to the proceedings of this Court Martial, when you will forward them to be laid before the Commander in Chief, in order that His Royal Highness may be made acquainted with the conduct of the officers composing the Court. I have ordered that a note may be taken of their names.

To Lieut. Col. Dickson, R.A.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 25th. I agree to the terms proposed by the Portuguese seamen for the pontoon train; that is to say, that they shall have 5 testoons *per diem* each, and a ration, the same as our soldiers; 4 pairs of shoes in the year; 2 jackets, 2 pairs of trousers, and one great coat in the year.

The officer of the Portuguese navy to attend these seamen shall have any pay the Admiral will fix.

Let me know when the pontoons will be ready to set out from Lisbon, in order that I may send orders for them to commence their movement.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I enclose the paper transmitted in your letter of the 24th inst. I have given directions to the A. Q. M. G. of the 5th division, cantoned at Lamego and in the neighbourhood, to go over to Pezo da Regoa, and to order Mr. — to remove forthwith from the house belonging to the Wine Company, and to request the Juiz de Fora at Pezo da Regoa will allot another quarter for him, the worst that can be found in the town.

To Don Andres Angel de la Vega, Infanzon,* Cadiz.

Freneda, 29th Jan. 1813.

I enclose you the extract of a letter from King Joseph to Napoleon, which was in cipher, and which we have deciphered, which is well deserving your attention and that of your friends in the Cortes. It is in few words, but it contains a text upon which much may be written.†

I am not an advocate for King Joseph's judgment, or for his veracity; but, although we rarely find the truth in the public reports of the French government or of their officers, I believe we may venture to depend upon the truth of what is written in cipher; and we may believe at least that

* A Deputy in the Cortes, of great and acknowledged merit.

† 'Les habitans préfèrent aux théories des Cortes les ordres d'un souverain de votre maison.'

Joseph thought that he was making an accurate representation to his brother of the sentiments of the people of Spain. Unfortunately I know, as I believe I told you, not that this representation is accurate (that is to say, that the people of Spain don't prefer the house of Napoleon to the theories of the Cortes), but it is so far true as that the people don't like those theories.

You have no Executive government; and the people feel that that which you have established as such has neither authority to control them nor to protect them. You have a Legislative assembly, which has proclaimed itself supreme, and has divested itself of all interference with the Executive government; yet the Executive government is its creature; at the same time that, by a refinement of theory, it is not possible either that the Legislative assembly should have a knowledge of the measures of the Executive government, or that the Executive government should know what are the feelings and the sentiments of the Legislative assembly. The government and the assembly, instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of government is at a stand. To this add that the whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz, of all others the least enlightened and the most licentious.

All countries which begin as yours did, incur some risks of failure; and I acknowledge that I was in hopes that the blockade of Cadiz would have at least this good effect, that it would allow time and opportunity for the fever of theory in the Cortes to evaporate; and that, when the communication with the interior of Spain should be opened, the Cortes would have passed through the ordeal of inexperience, and that Spain would eventually have the advantage of a free constitution and of an enlightened government. We have still to look out for these blessings; and, unfortunately, I am apprehensive that the Cortes have immersed themselves to such a degree in theory, that they cannot be looked for under the existing system.

I have certainly nothing to say to your system of government, and I never interfere in concerns with which I have nothing to do. I will fight for Spain as long as she is the enemy of France, whatever may be her system of government; but I cannot avoid seeing and lamenting the evils which await the country if you do not retrace your steps, let what will be the result of the military operations of the war; and I make you acquainted with my private opinion, as a person of whose judgment I entertain a high opinion, leaving it to you to make such use of it as you may think proper. But I am not one of those who discover faults without proposing remedies; and I now tell you what in my opinion you ought to do.

1st; You ought to establish the Regency permanently, with all the powers allotted by the constitution to the King, in the hands of one person. This person ought to be of the blood Royal, if it should be possible to find one, whether male or female of the blood Royal, capable of exercising the office; if not, it should be the person in the country of the highest authority from character, conduct, &c. The Regent should be

assisted by a Council of Regency, consisting of 5 persons, to be chosen by himself from the members of the Cortes, or otherwise, as he should think proper. The Council of Regency, if members of the Cortes, should receive no salaries for the performance of this duty. One of them should superintend the Department *de Estado*; another that of the *Interior y Ultramar*; another that of *Gracia y Justicia*; another that of *Hacienda*; and another that of *Guerra y Marina*. These persons should be responsible each for the department under his superintendence; and the whole Council for the general operations of the government. The Council would, of course, attend the Cortes in their places.

By these measures you would give authority and respect to the government; you would connect the offices of the government together, and the government with the Cortes. You may depend upon it that the same benefits will not be produced by the attendance of the ministers in the Cortes, and by giving them the faculties of joining in the deliberations of the Cortes. In that situation they will not have the influence over the assembly which ought to belong to their character, their talents, and their situation; and, if the members of the Cortes resemble in character and sentiment the members of the House of Commons, not only will ministers in that degraded situation possess no influence, but they will be despised and shunned, and intercourse with them avoided, as if they were the means of communicating an epidemical disorder. You may depend upon it, therefore, that you will never have good and able ministers, and will never connect the Executive government with the Cortes as it ought to be, till those who administer the government are members of the Cortes, whether they administer it as a Council of Regency, or as ministers at the head of departments under the constitution.

2dly; The next thing to do will be to repeal the 110th Article of the Constitution, which prevents deputies from being re-elected. Indeed that appears to be necessary at all events, if it is intended that there should be any experience in the future Cortes; and likewise the 129th and 130th Articles, if it is supposed that these Articles would prevent the Council of Regency, being members of the Cortes, from recommending to the Regent persons for offices. But they ought to be repealed eventually, at all events, if those are the Articles which now prevent the Regent or King from choosing his ministers from the members of the Cortes.

3dly; I would recommend to you to repeal the whole of the 7th Chapter of the Constitution. The Council of State, as thereby established, answers no good purpose, either of a Council for the Executive government, or of a balance between the Executive government and the popular assembly. If the government, as proposed to be established under the Constitution, should ever really come into operation, which I believe to be impossible, the Council of State, which cannot be responsible, must come in collision with the minister of *Gracia y Justicia*, who is responsible; and in the mean time the country must suffer by the nomination of bad bishops and bad judges by the intrigues of the Council of State. But the greatest objection which I have to the whole system established by the Constitution is that, in a country in which almost all property consists in land, and there are the largest landed proprietors which exist

in Europe, no measures should have been adopted, and no barrier should have been provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence to which it is at all times liable, but particularly in the progress of revolutions. The Council of State affords no such guard; it has no voice in legislation; it cannot possess the confidence of, and it can have no influence over, the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by the establishment of an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and you may depend upon it that there is no man in Spain, be his property ever so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly.

The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies would on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more: it unfortunately happens too frequently that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

You should, therefore, either turn the Council of State into a House of Lords, or make a House of Lords of the Grandees, giving them concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and you should leave the patronage now in the hands of the Council of State in the hands of the Crown.

By these measures you will give your government some chance of standing, and your country some chance of avoiding further revolutions. This is not to be expected, even under the most successful result of the war, unless some measures are adopted of the kind of which I have above sketched the outline.

I have written you a very long letter, which at least shows that I take an interest in the future welfare of Spain. I should be sorry if, after all, you were to fail in establishing a system of government founded on principles of justice, which should secure the liberty of your country, and should again fall under the degrading despotism from which you have had a chance of escaping. But you may depend upon it that, whatever may be your wishes, and however good the intentions of the greater number of persons of whom the Cortes is composed, this misfortune will happen to you if you are not guided by experience and by the example of those countries in which freedom exists, instead of by the wild theories of modern days.

I send this letter to my brother, who will give it to you.

P.S. I have written to you in English, because I write in this language with more ease; but, if you should answer me, write in Spanish, which I can read perfectly.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercrombie, 28th regt., 2d division. 29th Jan. 1813.

Your letter of the 14th inst., addressed to the Hon. Col. O'Callaghan, having been transmitted to me by Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, I have been directed by his Excellency to request that you will come over here to Freneda, and that his Excellency will be glad to meet your wishes by employing you in the way which may be most agreeable to yourself.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 30th Jan. 1813.

I received your letter of the 25th last night after I had written to you on the subject of the promotion *vice* Browne. The mail has been gone these two days; but I shall send your official letter home, on the promotion, by the next.

You will have heard that we got on famously on our journey; and I am much obliged to you for our security, &c.

The A.G. to Col. Lambert, 1st Foot Guards, 1st division.

30th Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 26th ult., stating the inconvenience to which the service of the 2d batt. 1st Guards is exposed by any delay which may arise in sending home from this country officers of the regiment who may become effective in that battalion, and requesting authority to send home all such officers without waiting for the sanction of the Commander of the Forces; when his Excellency was pleased to remark that your representation may be well founded, but that, being responsible for keeping the regiments of this army complete in officers, his Excellency cannot allow any to go away without his previous sanction.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I received last night your letter of the 11th inst., and I send this to Sir C. Stuart to Lisbon, to be delivered to you upon your arrival. I was happy to learn from Lord FitzRoy Somerset that you were able to return to us; and I hope that we shall be able to make a good campaign of it.

Affairs are exactly in the state in which they were at the end of November. I think that if there is any change, Soult has collected more of his army on the Tagus, about Toledo; but he has made no movement which could at all indicate his object; neither has any movement been made on this side. I propose to take the field as early as I can, and, at least, to put myself in Fortune's way.

Many of the regiments are already very healthy; others, particularly the new comers, remarkably otherwise. We have, as usual, lost many men in the last 2 months of cold weather; but the troops are all well cantoned, and I hope that a continuation of rest for a month or two in the spring will set us up entirely. I hoped to take the field with 70,000 British and Portuguese. I think I shall have 40,000 British, and possibly 25,000 Portuguese; and I shall be better equipped in artillery, and much stronger in cavalry, than we have yet been.

I have been at Cadiz, where I have placed military affairs on a better

G. O.

Freneda, 30th Jan. 1813.

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Which sentence has been confirmed by His Excellency the Commander of the Forces.
8. In consideration of the good conduct of the 1st hussars on every occasion, and of the character given to — by his Commanding officer, Lieut. Col. Arentschildt, the Commander of the Forces is induced to pardon him.

footing than they were before, in the way of organization; and I have provided some means to pay and subsist the armies; and we are beginning with discipline. I am not sanguine enough, however, to hope that we shall derive much advantage from Spanish troops early in the campaign. O'Donell is certainly an able and well intentioned man, of whom a great deal is to be made.

I believe that, upon your arrival, you had better direct your steps towards this village, which we have made as comfortable as we can, and where we shall all be happy to see you. The hounds are in very good trim, and the foxes very plentiful.

Major Hope shall be in either of the departments you choose. You know that Stanhope and Cathcart are both in the Q. M. G.'s department; and I beg you will choose whom you will have with you, whether of those already in the department, or to be appointed.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose an account, to the 24th Dec., of the money sent by you for the use of the Spanish troops serving in this part of Spain. Of the balance remaining in the hands of the Commissary Gen., I have ordered 100,000 dollars to be issued to Gen. Castaños for the use of the 4th army since I quitted Cadiz; and I am about to order the issue of another month's pay, about 25,000 dollars, to the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

According to the arrangement settled with you, I propose to provide for the payment of the garrison of Badajoz, as well as of Ciudad Rodrigo, the expense of which will probably in some degree exceed that of Ciudad Rodrigo. The money still remaining at my disposal, however, will probably last for 2 months longer.

I likewise enclose an account received from the Commissary Gen. of some of the supplies received from the Intendant General of the province of Salamanca, for the use of the allied army, from the Royal demesne, &c. You will observe that 15,000 dollars have been paid to the Intendant General on this account: there remains a balance on this account of 5788 dollars; and I request you to inquire from the Spanish government what they wish to be done with this balance, as likewise with whatever may appear to be due on the settlement of further accounts.

I likewise enclose the original estimates on which the payments were made to the troops under Don Carlos de España, and the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I enclose a letter for La Vega, which I request you to peruse, and to give to him.

I likewise enclose you a bulletin which I have received from England, and a paper of the 16th, which will show you the state of affairs in Poland. I think there are some facts adverted to in the report of the Duc de Bassano to the Emperor, laid before the Senate, which are worth an ounce of gold a letter.

I have been appointed Colonel of the Blues, *vice* the Duke of Northumberland, resigned.

I likewise enclose a declaration against America.

To Messrs. Greenwood, Cox, and Co.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I received last night your letter of the —, containing a statement of my account to the end of last year, which is very satisfactory.

You will have heard that H. R. H. the Prince Regent has appointed me to be Colonel of the Blues, an honor as unexpected by me, as it is gracious on the part of His Royal Highness. I don't know whether the power of attorney which you already have from me will enable you to take charge of the agency of the Blues; but if it should not, as I wish to appoint your house to be the agents of the Blues, I beg that you will send me the regular power of attorney.

I must inform you, however, that, upon reading one of the Reports of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, I observe that the Colonels of regiments are considered responsible for the agents whom they may appoint to transact the business of their regiments; and although I must always contend against the justice of this Report by the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, considering that the War Office alter the system of military accounts according to their daily caprice, and give their own orders to the agents, I do think it necessary, and I believe it is usual, for the Colonel of a regiment to require security from the agent of his regiment for the due performance of his duty towards the public, and to indemnify the Colonel from loss in transactions in which he cannot be a gainer.

As long as my late regiment, the 33d, were in India, the transactions between the agents and the public were confined nearly to my own concerns, as a *contractor for clothing*; and as Colonel of the regiment, I could not ask security for the performance of these transactions: but if the favor of the Prince Regent had not removed me from the 33d, I should certainly have required that your house should secure me and my family from loss in the transactions of that regiment with the public, after their extension by the arrival of the regiment from India. It is much more necessary in the case of the Blues.

Although I am writing to an old acquaintance and friend, I write to you as I would to any other man upon business, and I state with precision what I think. I have every reason to be satisfied with the mode in which your house have done my business; but I am abroad, and am likely to spend my life on foreign service. I cannot know what passes at home. I have known many instances of the most prosperous houses failing, and I know enough of the nature of the business between the War Office and houses of agency, to be astonished that more don't fail. I have children, and I am determined not to involve myself or them in the intricacies of public accounts if I can avoid it. Under these circumstances, I request you to state whether it is usual for the agent of a regiment to give security to the Colonel to indemnify him from all loss; and if it is, I request you to name the securities for your house as agents for the Blues.

In regard to other matters, I request you to settle all my affairs in re-

lation to the 33d regt. in the manner which will be most beneficial to the regiment, and most liberal towards my successor. All the tradesmen are, I conclude, paid. I beg that you will employ for the Blues the same persons who were employed by the Duke of Northumberland, and let every thing go on as it has been hitherto.

To Col. Gordon, Q. M. G.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 13th, and the enclosures don't surprise me; as, both from what I observed of your state of health during the time you were with the army, and what Dr. M'Grigor and Mr. Gunning told me when you were at last obliged to quit us, I was quite certain that you would not be able to return for the next campaign. The truth is, that your health is, if possible, too robust; and I was frequently apprehensive that you would have had fever in the hot weather. Indeed, it was probable that you were saved only by the painful disorder which at last obliged you to go home. I sincerely hope that you may soon recover.

I beg to take this opportunity of returning you many thanks for the assistance you gave me while with this army.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 13th Jan., in which your Royal Highness has informed me that the Prince Regent had been graciously pleased to appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal regiment of Horse Guards, upon the resignation of the Duke of Northumberland.

I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to His Royal Highness for the repeated marks which I have received of his grace and favor, more particularly for this last instance of both; and I can only assure him of my devotion to his service. I am convinced that, on all the occasions on which I have been so highly favored, I have been much indebted to the favorable representations which your Royal Highness has made of my services; and I beg that your Royal Highness will accept my most sincere thanks.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 31st Jan. 1813.

I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th.

I concur entirely in all your opinions respecting appointments to the Staff; and it may be depended upon that I shall never allow officers to be appointed to the Staff from regiments by which they are required for regimental duty.

In regard to your letter of the 14th, and your official letter regarding medical promotions, I perfectly recollect to have recommended Mr. Higgins; and I believe I mentioned that circumstance in the representation which I forwarded regarding Mr. Guthrie and Dr. Tyce. Don't suppose that that representation was ever intended to refer to His Royal Highness in the most distant manner; it was intended for the Medical Board, of whom, between ourselves, I entertain the very worst opinion.

I have proofs that every promotion is a matter of application and in-

trigue. I shall send home, by the next post, the papers which I have received from ———, in regard to his promotion, in which you will see that this gentleman was excited by * * * * to prevail upon Sir T. Graham to prevail upon me to recommend him to be promoted to a situation which * * * * did not think he ought to fill, and to which he refused to appoint him. What is all this but intrigue and attention to private applications, instead of to claims grounded on public services? Then, can it be supposed that I can be the victim of their doings without complaining? But I solemnly protest against being supposed to make any complaint of His Royal Highness for any thing, excepting that he should attend to such people as the Medical Board.

What interest can I have in these concerns, or what can I have to say to any of these medical officers? I never saw Dr. Tyce in my life; and till I saw Mr. Guthrie the other day in the hospital at Belem, I don't believe I ever saw Mr. Guthrie, although, from his reputation in this army ever since it came here, I intended to have made him surgeon to head quarters when Mr. Gunning was promoted, if he had not been recommended for promotion in another manner.

I have written to His Royal Highness to thank him for my appointment to be Colonel of the Blues. I believe there never was so fortunate or so favored a man.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, 3d division.

31st Jan. 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to sanction the appointment of Lieut. Jackson, of the 83d regt., to act as your aide de camp during the absence of Capt. Spottiswoode; and the appointment will appear in the G. O. of this day accordingly. His Excellency, in giving his sanction to this appointment, directed me to signify to you, that as you will now have *two* extra aides de camp upon your establishment, he trusts, on the arrival of Capt. Spottiswoode, one of them will be directed to join his regiment.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Sir R. Hill, commg. the Household cavalry.

31st Jan. 1813.

In answer to your letter of the 27th inst., addressed to the Commander of the Forces, enclosing an application for leave of absence to Lieut. ———, of the 1st Life Guards, to proceed to England, I have been directed to signify to you his Excellency's assent to this application. Lieut. ——— may therefore proceed to England on leave of absence for two months accordingly. His Excellency at the same time observed, that as the regiments of Life Guards had notice for several months before they were sent out to this country, all affairs of a similar description to those of Lieut. ——— ought to have been settled; and that the request of Lieut. ——— is granted only because the 1st Life Guards has been reported fit for service, and that his Excellency thinks there is time for Lieut. ——— to return.

The A.G. to Lieut. Piper, Royal Engineers, Elvas.

1st Feb. 1813.

A correspondence which has recently taken place upon the subject of an accusation preferred by you against Mr. ———, of the Commissariat department, in charge of the pontoon train under your orders, of having let out bullocks to a farmer in the neighbourhood of Monforte, having been submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, I have been directed by his Excellency to desire that you will state to Mr. Routh, Dep. Commissary Gen., what proof you have of Mr. ———'s misconduct. Mr. Routh will be instructed what steps are to be taken thereupon.

The A.G. to Dep. Commissary Gen. Routh, Elvas.

1st Feb. 1813.

A correspondence respecting an accusation preferred by Lieut. Piper, of the Royal Engineers, against Mr. — (which correspondence had been transmitted to me by the Commissary Gen. for the information of the Commander of the Forces), having been submitted by me to the consideration of his Excellency, I have been directed to call upon Lieut. Piper to state to you what proof he has of Mr. —'s misconduct. His Excellency desires that you will examine this proof, and report upon it to me for his information; and should you find any ground for the charge, you will put Mr. — under arrest.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I enclose a further complaint from Lieut. Gen. Cole, of the conduct of the magistrates in the neighbourhood of S. João da Pesqueira. I have desired Gen. Cole to specify names and particulars of conduct against others, besides the Juiz de Fora of Alejo, who I request may be brought before the Special Commission.

I have likewise desired Lieut. Gen. Cole to employ armed parties to protect his foragers, making the officers commanding them responsible for their conduct; and to call upon the magistrates of the district by proclamation, to perform their duty in aiding to supply the troops with forage, and in repressing the disposition of the people in that part of the country to oppose the military.

To Sir E. Littlehales, Bart.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. —, who, as well as I recollect, is an army broker in Dublin. He recommends a gentleman to me to be appointed an ensign, who may be very fit, for what I know of him; but I don't think I ought to take the recommendation of the army broker without knowing more of the gentleman, more particularly as there was some objection to the person he before recommended to me, and who has since been superseded. I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will inquire about Mr. * * * *, and let me know who and what he is; whether he is fit to be an officer in His Majesty's service, and above all, whether Mr. — gets any thing for his recommendations; because if he does, I may as well put a stop to that trade entirely.

I likewise enclose a letter from Lord Dunsany, recommending Mr. P. G. Plunkett, a relation of his, for an ensigncy. As well as I recollect Lord Dunsany's handwriting, this letter is written by him; but, having been taken in by a Mrs. —, who forged Lord Fingall's handwriting, I don't like to answer Lord Dunsany till I am certain that he wrote the enclosed letter; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know.

G. O.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

3. * * * *

Which sentence has been confirmed by the Commander of the Forces.

4. The Commander of the Forces is induced to pardon —, —, and —, at the recommendation of the General Court Martial; but he does so much against his inclination, as a greater outrage and breach of discipline than was committed by these soldiers has seldom come to his knowledge. They are to be released from confinement, and return to their duty with their regiment.

5. The Commander of the Forces begs that without loss of time, requisitions may be sent to the Commanding officer of the artillery, for arms wanting to complete the several regiments, and to the Q. M. G. for buff accoutrements wanting to complete.

If there does not appear any occasion to apply to himself, his relation shall have an ensigncy as soon as I can give him one.

I hope that you and Lady Elizabeth and your family are quite well. We are all well here. George has been with me lately, and he and March are in very good health.

Remember me most kindly to the Duke and Duchess, and all the family.

To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th Jan., in regard to the existing state of the Irish College at Salamanca. I earnestly recommend to you to bring that state, and the claims which you conceive the Irish have upon the revenues of the college, in case it should not be re-established, under the view of the Spanish government.

To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th Jan., in regard to your own claims on the Spanish government.

When you think it proper to go to Cadiz to present yourself to the government, I will recommend you to their notice and attention, as I conceive you deserve; and when you go to Ireland, I shall be happy to give you letters of introduction and recommendation to the principal persons there.

To Señor Josef Pavia.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 29th Dec. It is impossible for me to recommend any person to be an officer in the Spanish army against whom the government could have any objections; and I must, therefore, beg leave to decline recommending you till you shall have removed the objections which the government may have against you.

To Col. Bunbury, Under Sec. of State.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th Jan. You are not aware, probably, that there are 2 squadrons of each of the 1st and 2d hussars in England at present, who could receive any recruits to be now got from Germany; and before I adopt any arrangements in respect to the cavalry, I wait for the answer of the Duke of York to a letter which I wrote to him on the 26th Dec.

I prefer having one officer or soldier who has served one or two campaigns to having two or three who have not, and I should be very unwilling to part with the officers of the 2d hussars. It is true that, according to the plan proposed, the men and horses of the 2d hussars are to be transferred to the 1st hussars; but I am afraid that they would make that regiment too strong.

I wish that on all these points, the Sec. of State and the Commander in Chief would send me positive orders. I take only a limited view of them; one referable to the convenience of the army under my command, and the benefit of the service in the Peninsula. They must necessarily take a larger view; and I can only say, that what they order shall be obeyed,

coûte que coûte; but that, if they leave matters to my judgment, I shall never do any thing which, in my judgment, may be prejudicial to the service here. It would make matters much more easy, if they would send me positive orders.

I would beg leave to suggest to the authorities in England, the expediency of forming the deserters from the enemy's army now at Lisbon, who should be willing to enlist, into a temporary battalion. This battalion, as well as that at Cadiz, should be placed on a better footing. A major should be appointed to command it; and there should be an adjutant to it, to do the duty of adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster; and an officer for each company, the 3 seniors to be captains, and the others subalterns.

There are several German deserters at Gibraltar, who might be formed into a battalion in the same manner. We might thus make these people of some use. They are now a burthen. I think there are not less than 1000 of them at Lisbon, detained, I believe, under an order from the Admiralty, to Adm. Berkeley, in the days of Mr. Yorke, to send no more home.

I am very much obliged to you for the news.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I have received two letters from His Royal Highness of the 13th Jan., in regard to the provisional battalions which I had recently formed; and in regard to drafting horses from certain regiments of heavy dragoons into others, to which I delay to send answers, until I shall have received His Royal Highness' commands upon a letter which I addressed to him on the 26th Dec., which I have reason to believe that he had not received when he wrote to me on the 13th Jan.

His Royal Highness and I, unfortunately, take a very different view of these questions: he, one referable to the whole army and the general service of the empire; and I, one referable only to the convenience of the army under my immediate command, and the benefit of the particular service in the Peninsula intrusted to my charge. His Royal Highness must be right; but I wish that, being so, he would give me a positive order. He may depend upon it, it shall be obeyed. But when he conveys to me his wishes and his suggestions, and leaves it to my discretion to carry them into execution, or not, he must excuse me if I take my own view of the case, however limited, and act according to my judgment of what will be best for the particular service intrusted to my charge. The service in America, the Mediterranean, or at home, are not my concern, and cannot, nor ought not, to enter into my consideration in any case; and when any thing is left to my discretion, that discretion must be guided by my view of what is best for the service here.

I am of opinion, from long experience, that it is better for the service here to have one soldier or officer, whether of cavalry or infantry, who has served one or two campaigns, than it is to have two or even three who have not. Not only the new soldiers can perform no service, but by filling the hospital they are a burthen to us. For this reason, I am so unwilling to part with the men whom I have formed into the provisional

battalions; and I never will part with them as long as it is left to my discretion.

I am sure I am right on this subject; and if any body doubts it, let them look at the state of the 4th, 5th, 38th, 39th, and 82d regts. with this army, compared with others. Yet these are the regiments of the best reputation in the service: some of them, the 2d batt. 4th, 82d, and 39th, have come from climates not dissimilar to that in which they are now serving; but it is the service in the field, to which neither officers nor men are accustomed, and for which training and habit are required.

The same is the case in regard to the cavalry, and indeed it is stronger; and if I were now to choose, I should prefer by far to give the horses of the fine regiments of English hussars to the old regiments here, and keep the officers and soldiers of the latter.

It must be observed, however, that in regard to drafting horses, great care must be taken, in allotting them to regiments, not to overhorse any. Too many horses are worse than too few. In my opinion, an allowance should be made for 10 dismounted men in every 100, which would allow for serious cases of sickness of men who might be unable to take care of horses. If His Royal Highness, therefore, wishes that the horses should be taken from the regiments of light and heavy dragoons, to mount others on this service, I beg him to send me his orders, and they shall be obeyed, leaving it to me to fix upon the regiments to be drafted (always excepting those lately sent out), and those to which the horses shall be allotted. If he leaves it to my discretion, however, to draft the horses or not from any old regiment, that is to say, any that has served one campaign, I tell you fairly, that I think it ought not to be done, and entertaining that opinion I shall not do it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 2d Feb. 1813.

I think it proper to transmit to your Lordship the enclosed letter from Don Diego Correa, containing a complaint of the conduct of Lieut. —, of H.M.S. —, with certain original papers, in order that such steps may be taken thereupon as your Lordship may think proper.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bradford, A.A.G., 4th division.

2d Feb. 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 30th ult., submitting the wish of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole to receive the sanction of the Commander of the Forces to the practising the recruits lately arrived in firing ball cartridge, and proposing to expend 10 rounds per man, I have been directed by his Excellency to signify to you his approval of the same. His Excellency moreover desires that immediate requisitions may be made to replace the ammunition which will be thus expended.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

2d Feb. 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 31st ult., containing Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's request that the guard at present in charge of the pontoon train (composed of non-commissioned officers and soldiers belonging to the corps of the army under the Lieut. General's command) should be relieved, I have received his Excellency's command to signify to you, in answer, for the information of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, that his Excellency will hereafter give orders respecting this guard; that the pontoon train is now, or will be shortly, in movement; that it would be inconvenient to remove

the guard at present; and that they are, however, so near their regiments that the Commanding officers can have no difficulty in looking after them.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

2d Feb. 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter and enclosure respecting the difficulty experienced in obtaining long forage from the country, for the animals attached to the division under your command, I have been directed by his Excellency to inform you, in answer, that he has already written to request that the magistrate of whom you before complained should be called before the Special Commission; and that his Excellency again writes to desire that the magistrate of Alejo may be called likewise; and that if you will describe particularly any magistrate who does not do his duty, either in supplying the troops, or in preventing outrages by the inhabitants, his Excellency will take care that he shall be punished. In the mean time the troops must have forage; and his Excellency begs that you will issue a proclamation in the district, stating that any opposition on the part of the people to the taking the forage, on the regular receipts for which payment will certainly be made, will be punished; and, if necessary, you will send armed parties to protect your foragers, making the officer in command of those parties responsible for their conduct.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

2d Feb. 1813.

In reference to Lieut. Col. D'Oyly's letter of the 10th ult., conveying the recommendation of your Lordship of Capt. Winnett, 68th regt., as Brigade Major to Brig. Gen. Barnes's brigade, I have the honor to inform you that, having submitted the subject to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, I have received his Excellency's command to desire that your Lordship will be pleased to appoint an officer to *act* as Brigade Major to Brig. Gen. Barnes's brigade. I have been further directed by his Excellency to inform your Lordship that there are now two supernumerary Brigade Majors on the establishment of this army, and that he cannot appoint others.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th Dec., in regard to the transportation to a Portuguese settlement of ———; and I have to inform you that I have no objection to his being so transported.

G. O.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

2. * * * * *

Which sentence has been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

3. The Commander of the Forces has upon more than one occasion exhorted the officers of the army and those gentlemen belonging to the civil departments to use in their intercourse with each other, whether on the business of the public or in their private concerns, that language and those manners by which gentlemen of education ought always to be distinguished; and as the public service must suffer by a departure from the conduct prescribed, he is determined that he will never pass unnoticed any instance that may come to his knowledge of conduct such as that of which Mr. — has been found guilty. This person, however, may think himself very fortunate that the sentence of the Court has been so lenient. A different view of the evidence on the first charge, or a different mode of drawing that of which he has been found guilty, would have rendered his dismissal from the service necessary under the Articles of War. The Commander of the Forces hopes, therefore, that he will take warning by what has occurred, and that he will in future conduct himself on all occasions as a gentleman ought.

4. This reprimand is to be read to Mr. — by the Commanding officer at the station at which Mr. — may be, in presence of the officers and troops, to be paraded for that purpose. His suspension from rank and pay is to take place from the 1st inst.

5. In the perusal of the trial of Mr. —, the Commander of the Forces has observed that Staff Surgeon — has had in his service a soldier, —, of the 3d dragoon guards, for which Mr. — is to be put in arrest; the charge against him will be sent to him by the Adj. Gen.

6. Lieut. —, of the — light dragoons, is to be removed from his situation as Commandant of the dépôt at Alter do Chão, as soon as he can be relieved, for having suffered this dragoon to be in Mr. —'s service, contrary to the repeated orders of the army.

If the government should determine to transport him, I beg to be informed thereof, that I may order that he may be struck off the strength of his regiment.

To J. C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose for your consideration letters which I have received from Dep. Assist. Commissary of Accounts Adams, and Dep. Assist. Commissary of Accounts Booth, requesting me to recommend them for promotion. Both these gentlemen have at different periods been attached to head quarters, and have performed the duty which devolved upon them in a manner highly creditable to themselves and much to my satisfaction.

I therefore beg leave to recommend their services to your notice and attention ; and I shall be happy if it should be in your power to promote Mr. Adams, who now has charge of the department at Cadiz, to the rank of Dep. Commissary Gen., and Mr. Booth to that of Assistant in the department.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

Since I addressed your Excellency this day, I have received the enclosed reports from Col. Longa, from which it appears that, since the affair reported in my letter to your Excellency of the 10th Jan., Col. Longa has had a very serious affair with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Miranda, in which he took 221 prisoners, having killed 543. This affair appears to have taken place in the beginning of December.

I likewise enclose the account of his capture of Salinas de Añana, with 6 officers and 246 soldiers of that garrison, at discretion, on the 10th Jan., which is referred to in my other dispatch.

Au Gén. Dumouriez.

Freneda, ce 3 Fév. 1813.

J'ai reçu, il y a quelques jours, votre lettre du 27 Déc. ; et comme je n'ai aucune opération militaire à vous décrire, ou à raisonner avec vous, toutes les troupes des deux côtés étant en cantonnemens, je vous écris quelques mots sur ce que vous me dites du Duc d'Orléans.

Ce Prince, que je ne connais que de réputation, et pour lequel j'ai le plus grand respect, a mal débuté en Espagne. Appelé, je crois, ou au moins encouragé à venir, par la Régence de Castaños, pour commander une armée, *composée la plupart de Français*, que, dans leurs songes, le gouvernement Espagnol comptait faire marcher sur la frontière de la France, il a été débarqué à Tarragona, où on m'a dit qu'il fut très mal reçu. Il s'est rembarqué, et il est venu à Cadiz.

Il avait des personnes auprès de lui fort indignes de sa confiance et fort indiscrètes, qui, le jour même de son arrivée, ont commencé à parler du bien que cela ferait à la nation Espagnole que le Duc d'Orléans en fut fait le Régent. Enfin *las Cortes* s'assemblaient, et leur premier acte fut d'envoyer dire au Duc de s'en aller en 24 heures ; et après, quand le Duc est allé à l'Isla à cheval, tout seul, je crois, pour leur présenter ses respects, *las Cortes* lui ont fait dire de s'en aller tout de suite ; et elles ont fait dire au ——— d'être préparé à les protéger par la force. Vous croyez

que le ——— favorisait les vues de ce Prince ! Eh bien ! je vous dis qu'il s'est fait un mérite des préparatifs qu'il avait faits, ce jour-là, pour protéger et faire obéir les ordres de *las Cortes*.

Je sais très bien qu'on vous a dit, et que le Duc le croit, que tout ce que lui est arrivé, a été produit par les intrigues des Anglais. Pour moi, je ne savais pas même que le Duc était à Cadix quand il fut renvoyé. Pour mon frère, je sais qu'il a prêté au Duc ce que lui est arrivé ; et lui a conseillé d'être sur ses gardes ; mais, à dire le vrai, on nous soupçonne de beaucoup de choses dans lesquelles non seulement nous ne nous sommes jamais mêlés, et même dans lesquelles les Espagnols ne nous permettraient pas de nous mêler.

Mais je déclare que, si j'avais désiré perdre le Duc d'Orléans en Espagne, je n'aurais rien fait que de le laisser continuer le chemin dans lequel il était malheureusement entré ; et j'aurais cru que je ne pouvais le sauver de sa perte qu'en m'opposant, comme Anglais, à sa marche. Mon frère a fait ce qui convenait à son devoir ; il lui a prêté son malheur, et ne s'est jamais mêlé ni pour ni contre ses vues.

J'ai souvent regretté le malheur qui est arrivé au Duc d'Orléans. C'est un Prince estimable par son caractère, ses grands talents, et sa réputation ; qui aurait pu faire beaucoup pour cette malheureuse contrée. Mais je vous assure que la faute n'est pas la nôtre.

To Col. A. Gore, 33d regt.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

Before you receive this letter, you will have heard that H. R. H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards, an honor entirely unexpected by me. I don't know who is to be my successor in the 33d regt.

Although highly gratified by the honor which has been thus conferred upon me, as well as by the manner in which it has been conferred, I can't avoid feeling a regret at one of its circumstances, viz., that I should be separated from the 33d regt., to which I have belonged, with so much satisfaction to myself, for more than 20 years.

I beg that you will take an opportunity of informing the regiment of the sentiments with which I quit them, and that though no longer belonging to them, I shall ever feel an anxiety for their interest and honor, and shall hear whatever conduces to the latter with the most lively satisfaction.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I enclose the copy of my dispatch of this day, which contains the only news I have. I likewise enclose the Gazette of the 17th Jan., sent to me from Coruña, which contains the detailed accounts referred to in the bulletin of the 16th, which I sent to you the other day. I don't think they entirely bear out the bulletin.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

When I was lately at Lisbon, Mr. Aston delivered me the letter which your Royal Highness had been pleased to address to me ; and I had the pleasure of seeing him more than once while I was there.

I hope that your Royal Highness will permit me to avail myself of the

opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your commands regarding Mr. Aston, to return your Royal Highness my warmest thanks for the numerous favors which your Royal Highness has conferred upon me.

Not only have all the means which the resources at the disposal of your Royal Highness could command been given to support the efforts making in this country, under my directions, but I have been encouraged in every manner to act with confidence in the support of your Royal Highness; and I have been favored and rewarded to a degree not only far beyond my deserts, but far beyond what any subject has yet been by his Sovereign.

I can evince my gratitude for such favors only by devoting myself to serve and to forward the views of your Royal Highness with the same zeal which first attracted your notice.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

Lord Aylmer has communicated to me your letter to him in regard to Capt. — of the — regt.

This officer having been on his march from Lisbon to join the 2d division of the army in the month of December, 1811, in command of a detachment of convalescents in charge of treasure, struck and beat a soldier of the — regt., by name — —, at Villa Franca, on the Tagus, and it was reported had hurt him so severely, that the soldier had been sent to the hospital.

The soldier complained by letter to his Commanding officer of the conduct of Capt. —, and stated the names of the witnesses who would prove the truth of his story. Capt. —, on the other hand, charged the soldier with mutiny, and particularly with having challenged him to fight.

I thought it proper to order Capt. — into arrest upon this complaint, which was brought before me for the first time, as well as I recollect, in the month of April, 1812; but it was impossible to bring him to trial, as — —, the principal witness, was in the hospital at Lisbon, and others of the witnesses likewise in hospital at other places. — — never having been able to join his regiment from Lisbon, has since been invalided for garrison duty; and has lately been sent home by Major Gen. Peacocke, I conclude inadvertently, in charge of French prisoners. Having ordered that Capt. — should be brought to trial when the army lately went into cantonments, and inquiry having been made for the witnesses, I find that many, whose appearance is necessary for a fair trial of the case, are absent from their regiments at different hospitals.

I am sorry to have again to observe that the case of Capt. — is not singular. It happens too frequently that officers remain in arrest for an unreasonable length of time, on account of the impossibility of collecting the witnesses necessary to be produced at a trial; and recent trials have shown that the consequence of this apparent injustice is impunity for very serious offences.

I have frequently represented to His Majesty's government the defect of the Mutiny Act in this respect, and I have recommended that General Courts Martial might be enabled to receive written testimony. I am informed that this remedy is to be adopted; but I am much concerned that the Commander in Chief should have had occasion to notice the cases of

Capt. — and Capt. —. A knowledge, however, of the detail of the jurisprudence of this army would show other instances of similar hardship, and would tend to prove still more clearly the expediency, on other grounds, of the proposed amendment of the Mutiny Act.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

In consequence of your letter of the 31st Dec., stating the necessity of the immediate return to England of Adj. —, 4th batt. K. G. L., I beg to acquaint you that I have desired the Commissary Gen., under whom he is now serving, to cause this order to be obeyed without loss of time, notwithstanding that it appears, by the enclosed letter from Sir R. Kennedy, his immediate return to England will be attended with considerable inconvenience.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, containing his opinion on certain papers, which are likewise enclosed, which had been given into my hands at Cadiz by — —, in regard to his claims to be promoted to be an Inspector of Hospitals.

You will observe that * * * * urged — — to have application made to me by Sir T. Graham, in order that I might apply for this promotion, in which case it would be granted.

As far as I have any knowledge of — —, his exertions have been very meritorious, and his services most useful at Cadiz; and, adverting to the situation in which he was placed at Cadiz by the late Commander in Chief, the allowances granted to him, and the hopes held out to him by the head of the Medical Board, although afterwards disappointed, I consider him entitled to my recommendation of his claims to the favorable consideration of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Brevet Lieut. Col. — of the — regt., reporting the death of Lieut. Col. —, and enclosing his own memorial, and that of Capt. —, the senior of his rank in the —th.

Although I generally recommend officers for vacancies in regimental succession, I cannot avoid to take this opportunity of requesting you to submit to the Commander in Chief my opinion of the services of Brevet Lieut. Col. Craufurd of the 9th foot, who has never been absent from his regiment, and has always conducted himself in a manner to entitle him to my entire approbation.

I beg you therefore to submit to His Royal Highness the name of Lieut. Col. Craufurd for the Lieutenant Colonelcy in the —th, vacant by the death of Lieut. Col. —.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 3d Feb. 1813.

I have not heard of any alteration in the position of the enemy's corps in front of this army since I addressed your Lordship on the 27th ult.; and the allied armies all remain in the same positions, with the exception

of one division of the army of reserve in Andalusia, which has been moved to Seville.

The enemy in the north have obliged Gen. Mendizabal to retire from Bilbao; and the blockade of Santoña has been raised in consequence of the departure of Commodore Sir H. Popham from the coast with his squadron.

I hear, by intercepted letters, that Col. Longa has lately, on the 10th Jan., taken the enemy's garrison at Salinas de Añana, but I have not yet received the official reports of this feat.

My last accounts from Alicante are of the 3d Jan., at which period the reinforcements expected from Sicily had arrived; but Lord W. Bentinck was not expected till the latter end of the month.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Celorico.

3d Feb. 1813.

I am directed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to request your attention to the following directions, regarding the march of recovered men from the several hospital stations to their regiments:

1. An officer will shortly arrive at Celorico with the recovered men from the general hospital at Ciudad Rodrigo, of the following divisions: 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th.

2. An officer from the 1st division will likewise shortly arrive at Celorico with the recovered men from the general hospital at Viseu, for the following divisions: 2d, 6th, 7th, and Light.

3. An officer from the 6th or 7th divisions will likewise shortly arrive at Celorico with the recovered men from the general hospital station at Coimbra, for the following divisions: 2d and Light.

The officer of the Light division alluded to in No. 1 will wait at Celorico for the men of the 2d and Light divisions coming from Coimbra and Viseu; and on their arrival he will proceed with them on the route to the Light division, leaving the men of the 2d division at Freneda.

The officer of the 1st division alluded to in No. 2, coming from Viseu, will wait the arrival at Celorico of the men of that division coming from Ciudad Rodrigo; and on their arrival he will proceed with them and such men of that division at Celorico as may be fit to march.

The officer of the 6th or 7th division alluded to in No. 3 will take charge of any men of the 6th or 7th divisions who may be fit to join on his arrival at Celorico, and of the men of those divisions coming from Viseu and Rodrigo.

An officer of the 7th division will be directed to proceed forthwith to Celorico to take charge of such men as may now be fit to join of those divisions. This officer will have no connexion with any of the foregoing arrangements.

On the day following that on which you will receive this letter, you will cause the officer of the 92d reported fit for duty to march with the recovered men of the 2d and Light divisions. On his arrival at Freneda he will report himself for instructions regarding the disposal of the men belonging to the Light division.

P.S. Officers from the 3d, 4th, and 5th divisions will be directed to proceed to Celorico to receive the men of their divisions at that station fit to march, and those which will arrive from Ciudad Rodrigo.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Royal, Coimbra.

3d Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that officers of each of the following divisions have been directed to proceed to Coimbra for the purpose of taking charge of and of marching to their divisions the men who have been reported fit to march: 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th divisions. A Captain of the 7th and subaltern of the 6th division will likewise be ordered to Coimbra to take charge of and to march on the route to Celorico the men of the following divisions reported fit to march: 2d, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

3d Feb. 1813.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that your Lordship will be pleased to cause the necessary steps to be taken, as follows, for the march of recovered men from the several hospital stations: An officer to be sent forthwith to Celorico to take charge of and march to the division the recovered men of the division now at that station. A Captain from the division to be sent to Coimbra to take charge of recovered men at that station belonging to the 2d, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions; a subaltern officer of the 6th division will assist him in this duty, and will be ordered to report to him at Coimbra. The men of the 6th and 7th divisions coming from Coimbra will of course be left with their divisions; but the Captain of the 7th division will proceed to Celorico with the men of the 2d and Light divisions, and will deliver them over to the Commandant, receiving from him at the same time the recovered men of the 6th and 7th divisions, which (it is expected) will have arrived from Viseu and Ciudad Rodrigo at Celorico.

The A.G. to Major Gen. C. Allen, Light division.

3d Feb. 1813.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to cause a subaltern officer of the Light division, attended by one serjeant and one corporal, to proceed to Ciudad Rodrigo, and to receive the whole of the men at that station reported fit to march. Those belonging to the Light division will join their corps respectively; those belonging to the 2d division of infantry are to be left at Freneda; and he will proceed with the remainder to Celorico, where he will receive further instructions from the Commandant.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. M. Pakenham, 6th division.

3d Feb. 1813.

I am directed to desire that you will be pleased to cause the necessary steps to be taken, as follows, for the march of recovered men from the several hospital stations: An officer to be sent forthwith to Celorico to take charge of the men of the divisions fit to join, and to march them to the divisions; a subaltern officer to proceed to Coimbra to assist in taking charge of recovered men at that station belonging to the 2d, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions; at Coimbra he will report himself to a Captain of the 7th division, who is to proceed to that station on the same duty.

The A.G. to the Officers commanding the 3d, 4th, and 5th divisions.

3d Feb. 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to cause an officer of the division under your command to proceed to each of the hospital stations of Coimbra, Celorico, and Viseu, to receive and to march to the division men belonging to it who have been reported fit to march by the Commandants of those stations respectively.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1813.

I beg that you will send, of the 10 guns expected, three 9 pounders and three 6 pounders to Gen. Mina, with their ammunition, which is, I believe, 50 rounds for each gun, carried upon the limber, and all the equipments complete; and two 9 pounders and two 6 pounders to Longa, equipped in the same manner. Send an artilleryman with each equipment; and request that the artilleryman may be sent back to Coruña as soon as he will have shown how the guns, &c., are to be arranged.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1813.

When I was at Cadiz, you will recollect that I had some conversation with Mr. Gordon, Mr. Duff, and you, in regard to a scheme for raising money for the use of the army by loan. This subject had long been under the consideration of the King's government, and at last they gave

their consent in letters, of which I enclose copies, marked A and B, that money should be raised in this manner.

I considered their first scheme impracticable, and remonstrated against it; and since Lord Bathurst has been Sec. of State, I have prevailed upon him to consent to an alteration of it. I enclose his letter upon the subject, marked C, and likewise one of the parchment certificates, the copy of a certificate on paper, showing the mode in which the certificates will be filled up, and a memorandum, showing the operation of the whole proceeding, D, E, F. You will judge how far these certificates will answer for raising money on loan at Cadiz, with the alterations in the conditions as originally held out, marked in red ink in the memorandum.*

I must observe, however, that if sums are to be raised at Cadiz on these certificates, it will be absolutely necessary to refer to head quarters to procure them. There would be no difficulty in sending to Cadiz blank certificates, signed by me, and countersigned by the countersigning officers, which should be filled up under your authority by the persons who should manage this concern at Cadiz, when any sum of money should be borrowed; but you will observe that registers must be kept, that reports must be made to the Commander in Chief, that handwritings must be examined, &c.: and it will therefore be necessary, I am afraid, that we should issue the certificates here, after we shall have received intelligence from Cadiz of the sums being either lodged or ready to be lodged on account of them.

I don't conceive that there will be any difficulty on account of the high rate of interest at Cadiz. It would certainly be desirable to raise the money at the fixed rate of 5 *per cent.*; but I shall have no scruple in authorising the advance in the way of premium of any sum beyond the interest of 5 *per cent.* for the term of the loan, in order to make up the interest to that sum which it may be necessary to give at Cadiz. It is desirable, however, to limit this sum to be given as much as possible.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will show these papers to Mr. Gordon and Mr. Duff, and any other of your monied friends at Cadiz, and ascertain whether we can borrow any money upon these certificates. I entirely agree, however, with every body who has considered this subject, that it is infinitely better to obtain money upon bills than upon loans; and I shall be obliged to you if you will keep this opinion in your mind throughout your transactions on this subject.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 4th Feb. 1813.

I have omitted to inform you that, since my return here, I have spoken to the Commissary Gen., Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to the mode of raising our money at Cadiz, in case any misfortune should happen to poor Duff. He concurs in opinion with you and me: 1st; that we must employ some merchant at Cadiz in these transactions who is well known to the trade of that town, and of good character among ourselves: 2dly; that we

* *Remarks in red ink in the Memorandum.*

'The sum of the rate of interest may be omitted, and the rate beyond 5 *per cent.* may be paid in premium, to be deducted from the principal when advanced.

'After "at head quarters or at Lisbon," insert "or at Cadiz."'

ought not to employ — — — : and 3dly ; that we ought not to employ * * * *, according to the account you have given of him. Either you or we, therefore, should settle this matter with the Treasury as soon as possible, as I fear that poor Duff will not long be of this world ; and I beg you will let me know whether I shall write to Lord Liverpool, or that you will.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 1st, and I am glad to find you are doing so well.

In regard to the Order of the Tower and Sword, Dom M. Forjaz should acquaint me with the names of the British officers on whom his Royal Highness has conferred it, in order that I may apply to the Prince Regent for permission for them to accept it. I will then settle about their title.

Let me know, when your clothing arrives, where that for each regiment is to be found, that I may march them down for it.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

In consequence of the very serious complaint transmitted to the Portuguese government by the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal, of the conduct of Mr. — — —, a Commissariat clerk, which was drawn in terms of exaggeration, and from which it would appear that a gross outrage and insult had been committed to the sovereignty and dignity of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, which complaint was afterwards forwarded by you to me, I directed that that person should be tried by a General Court Martial ; and, notwithstanding that the conduct of the Juiz de Fora had appeared to me to be very extraordinary in dining and associating with that person, after he had made so serious a complaint of him, and in afterwards endeavoring to screen him from justice, I directed that he might be summoned to attend as an evidence on the Court Martial, which was assembled for his convenience in this neighbourhood.

I enclose the report received from the Dep. Judge Advocate on his conduct, from which you will perceive that he did not attend, and that he said he did not mean to attend there.

This is not a singular instance of similar conduct. Very lately, after the delay of a year, during which an officer was kept in arrest for an insult to the Corregidor of Guarda, because the Corregidor and his evidences could not be got to attend the Court Martial, I had a Court assembled at Mello, only 4 leagues from Guarda, for the trial of this officer, and the Corregidor and his witnesses were summoned to attend. But they did not choose to attend, and the officer was acquitted.

When a complaint of the conduct of any officer or soldier is made to me, I invariably do what is my duty ; which is, to put the officer or soldier in confinement, and the complaint in the course of trial. But the trial cannot go on, nor the complaint be substantiated, unless the witnesses attend the Court Martial to substantiate their complaint on oath ; and I am sorry to say that, although the Portuguese authorities and people are ready enough to complain, they will never come forward as they ought to

prosecute, and prove the truth of what they have stated in their original declaration.

The government will be the best judges of what ought to be done with this Juiz de Fora. For my part, I had been induced to recommend him to the notice of H. R. H. the Prince Regent; but, having observed in this late instance how very little anxious he is to vindicate what he must have considered, from his complaint, the injured honor and dignity of his Sovereign, I beg leave to withdraw my recommendation; and I request that the government will suspend the publication of any order which may come from Brazil for his promotion, till His Royal Highness shall have had under his view the circumstance stated in this letter.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

I had the honor of receiving last night your Royal Highness' commands of the 11th Jan., in answer to my letter of the 26th Dec.; and I send this to Lisbon immediately, in hopes that it will be in time for the packet of Sunday. I have sent for Col. Elley, and will proceed immediately to draft the horses from the weakest of the regiments of light and heavy dragoons; and I hope to be able to report my proceedings on that subject to your Royal Highness by the next post.

I beg to inform your Royal Highness that the Sec. of State has suggested that I should draft both men and horses from the 2d hussars to the 1st hussars; whereas your Royal Highness has suggested that I should draft horses only; and I beg to have orders upon this point.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 5th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 2d, and, as I told you in my letter of yesterday, I propose to write to the Sec. of State respecting the rank and title of the Knights of the Tower and Sword as soon as I shall receive the list of them. They cannot accept the order, nor assume a title, without the permission of the Prince Regent.

I received some time ago an answer from Lord Bathurst, enclosing a memorandum from the Duke of York, regarding your letter on your rank. Neither was definitive; and it was obvious to me that the question was not understood in England: and as you are, to a certain degree, a party interested in the decision, although you have always considered it very fairly, I did not think it proper to send to you, nor do I now send to you what I received on the subject, which consisted in a private letter from Lord Bathurst, enclosing a memorandum from the Duke of York.

I enclose you my answer to Lord Bathurst, from which you will see the description of argument contained in the memorandum. The letter contained nothing but expressions of apprehension (equally noticed in the memorandum) that the British Lieutenant Generals senior to you in the army would not serve, if this point were decided in your favor. I could say nothing upon this point, though I take the notion of the gentlemen at home to be very erroneous upon it; and you will see that the course of my reasoning on the question must leave this point entirely out of consideration. I will show you these letters when we meet, whatever may be the decision; in the mean time, it is but justice to Lord Bathurst

to tell you that he concludes his letter by saying that in his opinion the reasoning is entirely in your favor.

You will see that I have put the question in my letter on the ground on which you wished yourself to place it; and it will not be easy to decide it against you. If it is decided against you, it must be by an arrangement with the Portuguese government, to which you must always be a party.

In whatever way it may be decided, I recommend to you not to be induced to resign. What we have here is *the* army. You cannot be in any other than a distinguished situation, whatever may be the decision which the government may come to; and I earnestly recommend to you not to relinquish it. However, there is no occasion for being in a hurry to decide. I only beg that you will not decide upon relinquishing the command before you shall know what the decision is, and the mode in which it is brought about.

You will see, from the course of the reasoning in my letter, which I enclose, that the Duke's memorandum goes to charge me with a preference founded on partiality, to which part of my letter is a reply.

P.S. Pray return the enclosed when you shall have read it. Our friend ——— has evidently spoken to your friends as loosely on this subject as he does on others. There is positively no decision upon it.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. M. Pakenham, 6th division.

5th Feb. 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you a warrant from the Commander of the Forces, appointing you to be President of a General Court Martial ordered (by the G. O. of this day) to assemble on the 15th inst. at Cea, for the trial of such prisoners as may be brought before it: but as unforeseen circumstances may arise to prevent the assembly of the Court on the appointed day, the date of the assembly has been left blank in the enclosed warrant; and I am to request that you will be pleased to cause the blank to be filled up when the Court will assemble. I have also the honor to transmit a warrant for the appointment of an Acting Dep. Judge Advocate at the same General Court Martial; a blank has been left for the name, which blank I request you will be pleased to fill up with the name of such person as you may judge eligible to perform that duty. The Dep. Judge Advocate General at head quarters will communicate with the Acting Dep. Judge Advocate upon all points relating to matters which will be brought under the consideration of the Court.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

5th Feb. 1813.

Having had the honor to lay before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 30th ult., and its enclosure from Lieut. Col. Kelly, commanding the 3d provisional battalion, stating the difficulties under which he labors regarding the mode in which the regiments composing the provisional battalion are to muster, draw pay, and settle their accounts with their agents, I have been directed by his Excellency to return your Lordship the following answer, for the information of Lieut. Col. Kelly. His Excellency, after having perused the letters of your Lordship and Lieut. Col. Kelly, acknowledges that it appears to him there ought to be no difficulty on the subjects in question, under the G. O. of the 6th Dec. 1812. By reference to No. 30 of the G. O. of that date, the 4 companies of the 58th regt. remaining in this country are a detachment from the 2d batt. of that regt., the head quarters of which are at home. The musters and returns of these companies are to be made, and their pay to be drawn from the Paymaster Gen., according to the mode pointed out in His Majesty's Regulations for a detachment from any battalion whatever. The Staff officers of the 2d batt. 24th regt. are, under the 27th No. of the G. O. of the 6th Dec. 1812, to perform the duties of

the 3d provisional battalion; but it is no part of the duty of the Paymaster of the 24th regt. to draw the pay of the companies of the 2d batt. 58th regt. under the G. O., nor of the Adjutant of the 2d batt. 24th regt. to make those returns of the companies of the 2d batt. which they are obliged to make, as being detached from the head quarters of the battalion. All that he has to do is to make out those returns of the 2d batt. 58th regt. which must be made of them as forming a part of the 3d provisional battalion. If Lieut. Col. Kelly and Capt. Stone will read His Majesty's Regulations, they will experience no difficulty in the execution of any part of this arrangement. His Excellency was pleased to add that he has nothing to say to the insufficiency found by Lieut. Col. Kelly in his allowance for stationery.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d this evening, regarding D'Urban going to Lisbon. I am quite convinced that there is no foundation for the notion and report that you are to be recalled; and you will probably be of the same opinion when you shall have read the letter which I wrote to you last night, and its enclosure. I detain the letter to D'Urban, therefore, till I shall hear further from you, as it would be unfortunate if he were disturbed just now, unless his presence should be absolutely necessary to you.

I am very glad to hear of Hamilton's promotion, and I beg you to congratulate him from me.

I beg you will make the exchange of the 11th for the 12th caçadores when you please. I shall announce it to the division.

I hope the account of your brother's action is true. I have been very uneasy about the American naval successes. I think we should have peace with America before the season for opening the campaign in Canada, if we could take one or two of these d—d frigates.

To Sir R. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures from Sir C. Stuart in regard to the purchase of corn in Egypt. It would have been better, certainly, if the corn could have been got for the barter of military stores; but, as it could not be procured in this manner, it is worth having for money at a cheap rate, particularly if the money is not to be advanced immediately from our military chest. You had better correspond immediately with the authorities at Malta about paying for this corn. Return Sir C. Stuart's letter; and, as you are at Lisbon, communicate with him on this subject.

P.S. Pray make arrangements for giving the Portuguese government 200,000 dollars, either in money or paper, in this month of February.

To Major Gen. the Hon. G. Anson.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d this morning. I am sorry that you think of leaving us; but I will by the first post make the application which you are desirous should be made to the Duke of York to give you employment on the Home staff.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1813.

I enclose some English and French gazettes of the 20th Jan. It is reported in London that the Prussian states are about to follow the example

of the Spaniards, and to nominate a Regency for the government of the Kingdom as long as the King shall be in the power of the French. This intelligence, if true, gives the solution of the terms of Gen. Yorck's convention.

I wrote to you the other day respecting borrowing money at Cadiz; but the enclosures are not ready, and the letter will not go by this post.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 6th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d regarding the purchase of corn in Egypt, and I entirely concur with you that the corn is worth having at a cheap rate, even though it is to be paid for in money; particularly if the money is not to go immediately out of our military chest. Sir R. Kennedy is at Lisbon, and I have requested him to communicate with you upon this subject, and with the authorities at Malta respecting payment for the corn.

I have likewise desired him to make arrangements to pay the Portuguese government 200,000 dollars in the course of February, 1813.

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville, 3d division.

6th Feb. 1813.

In answer to your letter of the 29th ult., covering an application for leave of absence for 3 months to Lieut. Col. Forbes, 45th regt., to proceed to England on private affairs, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to signify to you that he grants the leave required, but that he gives it very unwillingly, and desires that no application may be made for a renewal.

To Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1813.

I received your letter of the 30th this morning; and I enclose you the copy of one which I have written to the Minister at War on the subjects to which it relates, which I hope will tend to remove the real inconveniences which you detail. I request you to report in detail the names and the particular neglects and omissions of which any of the *employés* in Seville and Cordova may have been guilty; in order that I may have them punished by the government.

We shall never do any good unless we punish those who neglect their duty.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 7th Feb. 1813.

As the Chief of the Staff has not yet arrived at head quarters, I have delayed to bring under the consideration of your Excellency several matters which require the decision of government; but I consider the enclosed letter, which I received this morning from Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal, to be so important, that I do not delay to trouble your Excellency upon it.

I have the honor to enclose the draft of the letter which I wrote to the Conde de la Bisbal on the 9th Jan., from which you will perceive what orders I gave to the General officers commanding the several armies, in order to carry into execution the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan., and the intentions of the government as communicated to me by your letter of the 8th Jan.

I am concerned to observe, however, that the government have omitted

to give corresponding orders to the several Intendants of the provinces; consequently, that it is not understood by the Intendants of the provinces to which of the armies the resources of those provinces are to be allotted; nor the relation in which they stand to the Intendants General of the armies under the decree of the Cortes; nor the proportion of the resources of the provinces allotted by the government under their letter to me of the 8th Jan., to be applied exclusively to the support of the armies under the responsibility of the General commanding the army, according to the 11th article of the decree of the Cortes. Accordingly, I request your Excellency to urge the government:

1st; To inform the Intendant of each province of the marching of the army to the support of which the resources of the province are to be allotted under the arrangement made with me by the government.

2dly; To acquaint the Intendants of the provinces of the relation in which they stand with the Intendant General of the army which the resources of the province under their charge are destined to support.

3dly; To acquaint the Intendants of the provinces that they are to hold at the disposition of the Intendant General of the army, and of the General of the army to be supported from the resources of the provinces, nine tenths of those resources, according to the intention announced by the government in their letter to me of the 8th Jan.

These general instructions to all the Intendants will remove the difficulties and embarrassments adverted to by the Intendant of Cordova in his letter to the Conde de la Bisbal, in consequence of the calls of the 3d army; but as soon as I shall learn from your Excellency that the orders above referred to have been given, I shall give orders to the Duque del Parque to recall his detachments of the 3d army from the kingdom of Cordova, and to cease making requisitions upon that kingdom.

I entertain no doubt that the government will give these orders without loss of time, in conformity with the decree of the Cortes, and with the arrangement which they made with me when I was at Cadiz.

In regard to other points in the letter from the Conde de la Bisbal, I have already written to you on the 26th Jan. to urge the appointment of Señor Laborda, the gentleman recommended by the Conde de la Bisbal to be the Intendant General of the army of reserve under his orders. There can be no individual in the Kingdom more interested than the General of an army that the Intendant General of the same should be one capable of performing the duties of his situation; and I earnestly urge the government not to take upon themselves the responsibility of refusing to attend to the recommendation of a General officer of a fit person to fill an office of such importance.

I have requested the Conde de la Bisbal, in my answer to his letter of the 30th Jan., to specify the names of some of those of whose conduct he thinks he has reason to complain, on account of their slowness or apathy in the performance of their duty; and when he shall do so, I will lay those names before the government, in hopes that the persons may be punished as their faults shall deserve.

I now come to a part of the letter of the Conde de la Bisbal, which I acknowledge has given me considerable concern; viz., that part stating

that Gen. Abadia, who commands a division of the army of reserve, has been ordered to Cadiz by the government.

In repeated conversations, and by letter, I conceived that I had come to a clear understanding with the government, that their orders to their army, and to every part of their army, were to be conveyed through me; and that the reports from their army were to reach them in the same channel.

Not only the orders to Gen. Abadia to go to Cadiz have not gone through me, but I was not even informed of such a circumstance; and this General officer, contrary to all military rule, and to the particular arrangement made with me, has been taken from the command of his division without my knowledge, or that of his immediate superior. It is by practices of this kind that the Spanish army has been brought to the state in which all Europe laments to see it.

I have been more particular in noticing this point, because it is not the single instance in which the government have departed from the arrangement made with me since the arrangement has been made, upon which I intended to address them as soon as the Chief of the Staff should arrive.

I shall now say no more upon this or any other instance which has hitherto come to my knowledge, hoping, that as the government must be convinced that I required that these arrangements should be made, in order that I might exercise the command which had been conferred upon me with advantage to the public, they will adhere to them in the same spirit and the same views with which they adopted them; and that as I am to be responsible for their military concerns, they will leave to me the management of them.

I hope that it is not necessary for me now to protest, after the repeated interviews I had with the government, that they will always find me disposed to concur with them in any measure they may think proper to propose for the support or for the convenience or honor of the government.

The A.G. to Major M'Pherson, Town Major, Lisbon.

7th Feb. 1813.

Having referred to the D. Q. M. G. your letter of the 27th ult., regarding the allowance of forage to which you are entitled as Town Major of Lisbon, I have been informed by him that the Town Major of Lisbon is entitled to draw forage as an Assistant in the Adj. Gen.'s or Q. M. Gen.'s department.

The A.G. to Capt. Dashwood, D.A.A.G., 6th division.

8th Feb. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 5th inst., covering an application for leave of absence to Ensign and Adj. —, — regt., I have the honor to acquaint you that, having submitted this application to the Commander of the Forces, his Excellency was pleased to remark, 'That of all others a Staff officer can never have leave of absence.'

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Pakenham regarding Capt. Mackworth. Let me know exactly what you wish should be done respecting Capt. Mackworth.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Freneda, 9th Feb. 1813.

It appearing that the sentence of the enclosed Court Martial is, at pre-

sent, in part illegal, by exceeding the powers given by the Mutiny Act to the Court, I return the proceedings for the purpose of revision.

By the 20th section of the Act, upon which this sentence must be founded, the Court is enabled to sentence a deserter to any *one* of the following three *distinct* punishments:

1st; 'To service in such country, or place, or places abroad, or otherwise, and in such regiment, or regiments, or corps, as His Majesty shall please to direct.' That is, to general service.

2dly; 'To service for life as a soldier.'

3dly; 'To service for any term of years beyond the period for which such non-commissioned officer or soldier shall have enlisted, and to a forfeiture of all, or any part, of the benefit or advantage, as to increase of pay, or as to pension, or discharge, which might otherwise have accrued to such non-commissioned officer or soldier from the length or nature of the service.'

But the Court is not authorised to pass the cumulative sentence of any *two*, or more, of these three distinct punishments, which in this case it has done, namely, *general service, and for life*.

By the 6th section, the marking with the letter D, as described there, may be added to any *one* of the former three punishments.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. D'Ogby, A.A.G., 7th division.

9th Feb. 1813.

Having submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 7th inst. and enclosures (herewith returned), conveying an application from Capt. —, — regt., to proceed to Lisbon on leave of absence for 2 months, I have been directed by his Excellency to return the following answer, which is given in his own words: 'I wish officers would recollect that they have public duties to perform, and not put me to the disagreeable necessity of reminding them of them by making these requests.'

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

9th Feb. 1813.

On the arrival at Coimbra of a detachment under the command of Capt. —, of the 40th regt., which had marched from Belem on the 30th Dec. 1812, it was ascertained that almost every man had made away with several articles of necessaries, and that a proportion of the ammunition and field equipments in possession of the soldiers were also deficient. A list of deficiencies of this detachment having been transmitted to me by the Commandant of the hospital station at Coimbra, I conceived it to be my duty to lay it before the Commander of the Forces, and his Excellency, conceiving that deficiencies to such an extent could only have occurred in consequence of neglect of the G. O. relating to the march of detachments, was pleased to direct that Capt. — should be placed under arrest. This was done accordingly, and Capt. —, in his justification, has addressed a letter to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, which having been transmitted to me by the Lieut. General, has been submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, who has directed me to forward it to you. His Excellency desires that you will communicate the contents of this letter to Capt. Brown, Commandant of detachments at Belem, and that you will call upon him for a detailed statement of the circumstances under which the detachment in question marched from that station, in which he will particularly notice whether Capt. — was put in possession of the whole of the G. O. issued from time to time relating to detachments on the march; and as Capt. — asserts that the men of his detachment were deficient in several articles of necessaries on marching from Belem, a list of which is annexed to his letter, the Commandant of detachments at Belem will transmit with his statement a list of the articles of necessaries and field equipments which each man had in his possession when the detachment marched off from Belem. The statement of Capt. Brown, and the list of necessaries and field equipments,

you will be pleased to transmit to me, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, with the least possible delay.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 7th inst., still without intelligence of your brother. In regard to your clothing, I wish you would let me know here where it will be, and at what time for each brigade, &c., including Hamilton's, in order that we may send these troops from hence to move towards it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have only just now received your letter of the 7th. I have no idea of the enemy coming to Plasencia; and if they do, one would believe that it would be in force, but of this you must be the best judge on the spot; and I beg that you will understand that I wish you to prevent them from plundering Plasencia, if you can do it with safety to the troops under your command: you must therefore secure a passage over the Alagon.

To Col. the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you were President, on the trial of — —, of the — regt., and the letter which you have written to me, recommending that soldier to mercy by the desire of the Court.

The proceedings of the Court don't afford a shadow of doubt that this soldier deserted; and having deserted, served in the enemy's ranks. Indeed, if he had not so served, he could not, from the particular circumstances of the action, have been taken in the battle of Salamanca. After being taken, he did every thing in his power to conceal himself, and denied all knowledge of his comrade of the — regt., who happened to be in the hospital at Santarem, and recognised him. These facts, all proving his guilt, are perfectly known, at least to the regiment to which this soldier belongs; and yet the Court Martial, having found him guilty, and passed a sentence of death, have recommended that I should pardon him.

The foundation of this recommendation must be, his former good character; and the excuse made for his desertion from his regiment, in the severity of the officer commanding his company. In respect to the former ground, it ought to have its effect, if the evidence was not clear that the crime of which the prisoner was accused was committed to its fullest extent. In respect to the latter, it really affords no ground for pardoning this soldier. If his officer had been severe, he had means of redress; and, indeed, it appears by the proceedings of the General Court Martial, that this officer had been reprimanded by the Commanding officer of the regiment for his severity. But whether he had or not, the severity of an officer can never be admitted to afford grounds for pardoning a soldier convicted of desertion to, and of serving with, the enemy.

I wish, therefore, the Court to reconsider their recommendation of this soldier for mercy; and particularly to consider the task which they throw upon me, whose duty it is to uphold the discipline and efficiency of the

army, by forwarding such a recommendation upon such a case. If they persist in making it, I shall certainly attend to it; but I must say, that this case of — — is the most clearly proved of any that has yet come before me of premeditated and almost undenied desertion to the enemy, and of subsequent service in his ranks; and that it does become necessary, for the sake of example, that General Courts Martial should take serious notice of a crime of this description, so proved, in an army in which, among other crimes, desertion is so prevalent.

To Major Gen. Baron Bock, K.G.L.*

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 7th inst., and you will see by the letters which Col. de Lancey will have sent you, which are copies of those I wrote to Sir S. Cotton last year on the subject of mules for the portable forges, that you and I don't differ materially in respect to the carriage of those machines by mules, instead of horses. All that I desire is, when I give a mule to carry a forge, to have a horse in the ranks.

I can't consent, however, to hire mules for this service. The hire of a mule is a dollar a day, besides his food; and the forges of a regiment would require 12. The expense of the establishment would be too great; and the inconvenience of furnishing nearly 300 mules for this service, besides for all the others for which the cavalry require mules, would be so great, as not to be compensated by the convenience of having the portable forges. If, therefore, the purchase of mules will not answer, I must revert to the forge cart.

I should think, however, that the business of saddling and loading a mule with a forge is not a trade of such intricacy that our dragoons can't learn it; and if pains are taken to teach it to them, and care is taken that they do as they are taught, that they take care of these mules, and above all don't load them with women, and with baggage besides forges, I shall not be under the necessity of giving up this useful establishment, in order to resume the forge cart.

I wish you would send Cathcart over here with the states of the accoutrements and horse appointments of the cavalry as soon as possible.

To the Conde de Villariezo.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I had the honor of receiving yesterday the letter which your Excellency did me the honor of addressing me from Cordova (without date), enclosing the copy of one to the Regency of the 25th Jan. last. I have perused the letter with the attention which every thing deserves which comes from your Excellency, and I am much concerned that your Excellency should have been placed at Madrid in a situation which was disagreeable to your feelings; and that you should be still more displeased with the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan. 1813.

Your Excellency must be aware of the nature of the decrees of the Cortes. Neither the government, nor an individual like myself, has any thing to say to them, excepting to obey them; and much as I lament that the decree to which you have adverted has been disagreeable to your Excellency's feelings, it is not my duty to justify its provisions; and if it

* Commanding the cavalry.

were, the representation which your Excellency's letter contains of the disagreeable situation in which your Excellency found yourself at Madrid, would afford ample topics for that purpose.

If, however, it should be in my power in any manner to forward your Excellency's views, or to give scope to the exercise of your Excellency's zeal for the cause of your country, I shall be very happy.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst. I don't exactly recollect whether I received your letter of the 21st, in which you enclosed the copy of your dispatch to Lord Castlereagh, before or after I had written to Lord Bathurst mine of the 27th Jan.; I rather think after, because if I had received it before, I should have taken more pains to show that what I had proposed to the Spanish government was not inconsistent with the constitution.

The truth is, that I always suspected that the discussion on this subject, having once begun, would not be confined to the Spanish newspapers. Our newspapers have already got hold of it; and if Cobbett takes it up, it is not unlikely to get into Parliament: I wish, therefore, to acquaint Lord Bathurst with my view of the question, that Ministers might be prepared to state it in Parliament.

It is unlucky that you and I have taken a different view of the subject; but if it is to come into Parliament in any way, it is most fortunate that I wrote to Lord Bathurst as I did, as now, of course, the Ministers will not grant your letter if it should be called for.

I am quite certain that your view of the subject is erroneous. 1st; There is not a word in the constitution bearing upon the subject. 2dly; Mexia and La Vega, in their conference with me, the former particularly, acknowledged that there was nothing inconsistent with the constitution in what I had proposed. 3dly; The practice in Cadiz itself, under the eyes of the Cortes, is exactly in conformity with what I proposed. And, 4thly; If I am not misinformed, the Cortes refused, not a fortnight before I went to Cadiz, to divide the civil and military powers in America.

Of course we must be unpopular in Cadiz if we allow such blockheads as ——— to write letters in the name of the government, and to pledge the authority of his government to treaties with the American colonies; and if we act in relation to Spanish America on the principle of smuggling merchants, instead of as a great nation, we must be unpopular. But so far from being unpopular in Spain, or that any thing I have done is unpopular, there is not an authority in the country of any description, whether civil or military, that has not written to congratulate me, and express their satisfaction at my appointment.

I have written to the government respecting their omission to give orders respecting the Intendants.

I believe Doyle ought to be paid as a Spanish General, as well as the others.

I have written to you respecting Costello, and have sent you the papers regarding loans.

To the Commissioners of Transports.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

Comte Reille, who has succeeded Gen. Drouet in the command of the French army (called) of Portugal, having allowed Cornet Thummel of the 2d hussars, K.G.L., who was taken prisoner on the 15th Nov., at Salamanca, to return to the British army, I shall be much obliged to you if you will send to France in exchange for him M. Pierre Tallandier, *sous-lieutenant de la garde Impériale*.

I take this opportunity of acquainting you that Mr. Arscott, Paymaster of the 3d dragoon guards, and Lieut. Shaw, acting Paymaster of the 4th dragoon guards, to whom my letter of the 1st ult. referred, have returned to the British army.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

Lieut. Col. Elley, the A. A. G. of the cavalry, has not been able to come to me as I had expected; but I have had the returns made out, which I enclose, that will show the exact state of the cavalry in men and horses at the present moment, upon which I have founded the measures that I propose to adopt to carry into execution your Royal Highness' orders to draft certain regiments to complete others in horses.

No. 1 is the state of the cavalry according to the last morning state received, with the exception of the brigade of Household troops, and those detachments of the English hussars which, I am informed, have arrived at Lisbon.

No. 2 is the state of the same regiments, showing the number of men to be mounted, and the number of horses in each.

It is more inconvenient to have too many horses in a regiment than it is to have too few. The 11th light dragoons, for instance, have 45 horses more than they can mount; and the consequence of leaving those horses in their possession would be, that 45 mounted men, who would otherwise be in the ranks, must be left out of the ranks to lead them.

In order to avoid this surplus of horses, I have calculated that every man present for duty and on command must have a horse. I am aware that some of the latter have not each a horse, such as those men attending upon the depôts of sick horses, attending at the dépôt at Belem to take charge of horses expected from England, bätmen to General and Staff officers, and men attending upon wounded and sick officers sent to the rear. But on the other hand some of the sick present are not so ill as that they cannot ride; and it appears to me upon the whole that the nearest approximation to the demand of a regiment of cavalry for horses is to calculate upon one for each non-commissioned officer and soldier present, and fit for duty, and on command. I calculate the sick horses present and absent in the number to supply the demand; because these require the attendance, if not of a man for each horse, at least of one for two.

According to this calculation your Royal Highness will see, by return No. 2, that we have 6245 men to be mounted, and 5175 horses; leaving a deficiency of 1070 horses.

I propose to draft horses from the 4th dragoon guards, which have 341 men to be mounted; the 9th light dragoons, which have 370 men to be

mounted, and the 13th light dragoons, which have 415 men to be mounted, which will make a total of 1126 men. This will reduce the number of men to be mounted from 6245 to 5119. This number of men will be provided with 5175 horses.

I wait your Royal Highness' order to draft the 2d hussars, K. G. L.; whether to draft both men and horses, or horses only.

I enclose Nos. 3 and 4, the states of the Household troops, made out on the same principle with those of the other regiments of cavalry, from which it appears that they now want 89 horses to complete. But your Royal Highness will observe that these regiments have very few sick; and it is probable that hereafter it will be found that they are sufficiently mounted; and at all events the horses to be drafted from other regiments will not suit them.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I enclose the translation of a letter from Count Münster to Col. Arentschildt, which the latter has put into my hands, in which I am convinced the writer must be mistaken.

His Royal Highness could not have meant to express that Col. Arentschildt's promotion depended upon my recommendation. If it does, I certainly cannot give it too readily, or too heartily, to express my sense of his merits. At all events I shall be very glad if this point is explained; as I shall be sorry that Arentschildt should think that he does not get his promotion because I don't recommend him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

As it is possible that the events of the next campaign may render it necessary for the army to undertake one or more sieges in the north of Spain, and as all the heavy ordnance and stores attached to this army were sent round to Alicante in the month of June last, for the service of the troops expected from Sicily, I beg leave to recommend that the ordnance and stores contained in the enclosed lists should be embarked in transports and sent to Coruña, to be at my disposal as soon as may be convenient; and that twice the quantity of each article may be in a state of preparation in England, to be shipped when I shall report that they are necessary.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Cooke, and one from Rear Adm. Cockburn, in regard to the claim of certain officers of the navy employed as agents of transports, and of certain officers of marines, employed in escorting stores on the expedition of the troops at Cadiz to Huelva in the month of August last.

Bât and forage being an allowance given to officers of the land service to enable them to meet certain expenses attending their service in the field during a campaign, I thought it proper to inquire whether the services performed by the officers of the navy were out of the strict line of their duty as officers of the navy; and your Lordship will observe the answer which Rear Adm. Cockburn has given on that point.

I must observe, however, that if an agent of transports can claim *bât* and forage for landing in order to perform his duty of agent of transports as at Huelva, he may claim it upon every other occasion on which troops may be landed from transports. The same argument will apply to the officers of marines employed with the parties of marines in the escort of stores to the troops on their advance.

There is no doubt but that officers of the army would have received the allowance called *bât* and forage, if they had been employed in this manner; and the question appears to me to depend entirely upon the determination of government, whether officers of the navy and marines, being employed on shore with the army, are to receive the allowance called *bât* and forage on every occasion in which they shall be employed on shore with the troops. On which I beg to have the orders of government.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a list of officers belonging to His Majesty's service, on whom H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has recently been pleased to confer the Order of the Tower and Sword, in different degrees, some in His Royal Highness' service, and others serving in the British army in the Peninsula. I likewise enclose a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State to the government of Portugal on this occasion.

I request your Lordship to lay these papers before H. R. H. the Prince Regent; and to request His Royal Highness' permission for these officers to accept the honor thus conferred upon them by H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

As I observe that a letter which I wrote to the General officers commanding divisions of this army on the 28th Nov., regarding the state of discipline of their several divisions, and the means of restoring the discipline of the troops, has been published in the daily newspapers in England, I think it proper to send your Lordship a copy of it.

I believe there is no officer in the army who is not aware of the necessity of the adoption of some measures to restore its discipline; and I am only afraid that those which I have recommended are not sufficient for the object.

Scarcely a post arrives that does not bring an account of some outrage committed by a British soldier on the inhabitants of Portugal; and I am sorry to add that there are too many instances of the revenge of these people on the soldiers of the army.

I enclose your Lordship a report which has recently been made to me of the march of a detachment in charge of ordnance stores from Lisbon to Coimbra. I don't send this report because there is any thing extraordinary in the outrages which have been committed by the soldiers of this detachment, but only because the report of them is comprised in a short compass, and your Lordship will be enabled to see at one view the nature of them, and the difficulty of applying a remedy under the military law as it now stands.

The Commanding officer at Lisbon was certainly in fault, and it is contrary to the orders of this army, to send a detachment of 40 men unless under an officer.* But I must acknowledge that if an officer had been sent with this detachment, he would not have been able to keep such men in order; particularly under the difficulties of persuading the Portuguese to go the distance of from 100 to 150 miles on foot through a country which is almost a desert, (through which they are afterwards to return,) to give evidence before a British Court Martial of the injury they have received.

The soldiers who committed the outrages of which I now lay the report before your Lordship, are not the old soldiers of the army, who might be supposed hardened by the commission of former crimes; but they are either recruits lately arrived from England, or men come from Cadiz.

I repeat, that these disgraceful outrages must be committed, unless: 1st; Courts Martial have the power of receiving written testimony: 2dly; the number of members to constitute a Regimental or Detachment Court Martial is diminished: and 3dly; the power of the Provost Marshal of the army is legalised, and his establishment extended.

These measures go to punishment; but the only effectual measure, to prevent both crime and punishment, is to improve the situation and the character of the non-commissioned officers of the army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have reports to which I give credit, that the Italian division of infantry commanded by Gen. Palombini, which belongs to Marshal Suchet's army, but which joined King Joseph before he retired from Madrid in the month of August last, and afterwards returned into Castille with the troops in the end of October, has recently marched to the northward; accompanied by the Polish light horse, armed with lances, which had hitherto belonged to the army of the South. I have not yet heard that these troops had passed Burgos.

No movement of any description has been made by any of the armies since I addressed your Lordship last.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

When I received your Lordship's dispatch, apprising me that you intended that Watteville's regt. should go to America, I directed that the whole of it might be collected at Cadiz immediately, as I considered it advantageous to the regiment to be brought together for a short period before it should embark for America; and no inconvenience was likely to result from leaving the 2d batt. 67th regt. alone at Carthagen, till it should be convenient to send there Dillon's regt. I see that this regiment forms part of the corps at Alicante.

I now enclose your Lordship an extract of a letter from Gen. Cooke, from which you will see that Watteville's regt. are much in want of clothing.

I am very glad to find that you are going to reinforce Sir G. Prevost, and I only hope that the troops will go in time; and that Sir George will

* See vol. iii. p. 293. G. O., Abrantes, 13th June, 1809, No. 4.

not be induced by any hopes of trifling advantages to depart from a strong defensive system. He may depend upon it that he will not be strong enough, either in men or means, to establish himself in any conquest he might make. The attempt would only weaken him, and his losses augment the spirits and hopes of the enemy, even if not attended by worse consequences; whereas by the other system, he will throw the difficulties and risk upon them, and they will most probably be foiled. If they should be so, and they should receive a check at sea, their arrogance will be lowered a little, which will give me more satisfaction than any thing that has occurred for a length of time, and they will be obliged to ask for peace.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

In your letter of the 13th Oct. you tell me that the Horse Guards intended to propose to the Treasury an increase of Dr. M'Grigor's pay, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what has been done on that subject.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

Marshal Beresford has written to me on the subject of the mode of appellation to be assumed by the Knights of the Tower and Sword, upon which I believe it is necessary that the gentlemen of the Heralds' office should decide. The Knights of the Order of Maria Theresa of the lowest class have assumed the title of *Sir*, whether by authority or not, I don't know; and it would appear that the Knights of an Order conferred upon them by a Sovereign, with the permission of their own Sovereign, ought to assume the title equally with Knights created by their Sovereign. However, I know nothing about the matter; and I only request that as so many of them have been made Knights upon this occasion, the proper authorities in England will settle in what manner they are to be addressed.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th Feb. 1813.

I have lately received intelligence that the enemy have destroyed the remaining colleges and other large buildings which were at Salamanca, in order to use the timber as firewood; and there is great reason to apprehend that, if we should be able to carry forward the operations of the war in the next campaign, we shall suffer much from the want of large buildings for our hospitals.

It is impossible to place the British soldiers in the houses of the inhabitants of any town; and from the month of June forwards, it will be impossible to lodge the sick and wounded in tents, at first on account of the heat, and afterwards on account of the rain and cold. I therefore beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the enclosed letter from Dr. M'Grigor, in which he recommends that portable hospitals should be sent from England, of the same description with those heretofore sent to the West Indies, and with those either sent, or intended to be sent, to Walcheren in the year 1809.

I would recommend that they should be calculated to hold 4000 men; that they should be sent to Oporto, with one or more persons belonging to

the Storekeeper's office, in charge of them, who should understand the nature of them, and the mode of erecting them; who should have superintended their stowage in the transports; should superintend their disembarkation at Oporto; and should be responsible for their being complete in all their parts at the station at which they should be required.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — regt., Light division.

10th Feb. 1813.

It appearing by your returns that 2 soldiers of the battalion under your command are employed as servants to Assist. Commissary Gen. — and Staff Surgeon —, which is contrary to the G. O. of this army, I have to request you will forthwith order these 2 men to join their regiment, and acquaint me, for the information of his Excellency, how it happened that you could grant such an indulgence to the above named officers, which is in direct disobedience of his orders.

To Col. Longa.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1813.

I have received your several letters, and I sincerely congratulate you upon your success. I have forwarded your reports to the government.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what you have done with your prisoners, sending me the receipts of those to whom you delivered them.

The government have sent me some papers relating to complaints which have been forwarded to Cadiz against you, upon which I shall take another opportunity of writing to you.

There is nobody better acquainted than I am with the difficulties of the situation in which you have been placed, and with the manner in which you have conducted yourself, and the benefits which the nation has derived from your services; but I recommend to you to be very cautious and just in all your proceedings.

The country must support the troops which it is necessary to employ against the common enemy; but the country has a right to expect that the burdens imposed shall be imposed with equality, and that they shall be faithfully applied to the purposes for which they are imposed; and, above all, that when they have paid large contributions for the support and maintenance of troops, they shall not be harassed by additional requisitions, and by plunder, and the other consequences of the indiscipline of the troops.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 11th Feb. 1813.

I send the list of officers for the medal of Salamanca, in hopes that it may catch the Tuesday's mail at Lisbon.

You will observe that I have recommended Major Gen. Alava, and Brigadier O'Lawlor, two Spanish officers, who have long been attached to head quarters, and whose services I have frequently reported, for medals on this occasion. Gen. Alava has since been wounded. I likewise propose to recommend Don Carlos de España, and the division under his command, on the same principle as the Portuguese officers, as soon as I shall get an accurate list of them. I think it will do good to give them the medal.

If your Lordship should grant the medal to Gen. Alava, I beg to

mention that he has been in the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and at the battle of Salamanca, all of which should be inscribed on the medal. Gen. O'Lawlor has been at the same, and at the siege of Badajoz. Indeed Alava was present at the storm of Badajoz, but not during the siege, as he had not returned from Cadiz, to which place I had sent him with the account of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The Spanish officers must of course have the permission of their own government to accept these medals.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1813.

I received yesterday a letter from Lord Bathurst, from which I judge that every thing in regard to your situation in this country has been settled to your satisfaction, by the consent of Sir T. Graham.

I received yesterday your letter of the 8th inst., and I write this day to Adm. Martin, to request he will assist you with vessels to send your clothing to the Mondego, as well as Oporto.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1813.

I received yesterday a letter from Beresford of the 8th inst., in which he adverts to a conversation which he has had with you, in regard to sending to the Mondego and Oporto the clothing for the Portuguese army, in vessels employed by the British government.

Excepting the store ships, which I believe it is desirable should be sent to England as soon as possible, I don't know of any immediate necessity for the return of any others; and I shall be obliged to you if you can make it convenient to give the Portuguese army the assistance of any transports or store ships to carry their clothing to the Douro and the Mondego, as I fear much of it will be damaged if it should be sent in the vessels usually employed by the Portuguese government in these services.

Au Capt. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 12 Fév. 1813.

Je crois que cette lettre vous trouvera à Badajoz; et je serai bien aise d'avoir de vos nouvelles, pour savoir combien de temps vous comptez y rester, les arrangemens que vous ferez pour le commandement de la réserve, et les mouvemens que vous comptez faire de votre personne après que vous aurez fini vos affaires en Estremadure.

J'ai envoyé au Commissaire Anglais à Elvas 20,000 *duros*, pour être à votre disposition; et 80,000 sont dans les mains du Colonel Bourke à Coruña pour le même objet.

Quand vous serez à Badajoz, je vous prie de donner un peu de votre attention aux affaires d'habillement des troupes en Estremadure.

J'ai donné l'ordre le 14 Juin dernier, pour que 5000 habillemens complets fussent envoyés à Alcacer do Sal, pour être donnés au Marques de Monsalud; outre cela j'ai donné l'ordre le 2 Août pour 1400 habillemens complets au même endroit, pour le régiment de Doyle; faisant un total de 6400 habillemens. Je voudrais bien qu'il y eût 6400 de bonnes troupes! Voulez vous avoir la bonté de demander ce qu'on a fait de ces habille-

mens? car j'ai encore une réquisition du Marques del Palacio pour 2800!

Il faut aussi faire attention à l'habillement de l'armée de Galice. J'ai donné 12,000 habillemens complets le 2 Août, 1200 le même jour pour Marquiñez, et 5000 le 17 Oct., et puis 5000 le 28 Nov. pour la division de Porlier. Je vous envoie la demande que le chef d'état major en Galice m'envoie à présent. Je serais tenté de croire, qu'avec les restes des 12,000, qui n'ont pas été livrés à la troupe (c'est à dire, s'ils n'ont pas été perdus), les 1200 de Marquiñez, et les 5000 qui sont encore à la Coruña, l'armée de la Galice sera bien habillée. Je vous prie de me faire savoir ce que vous en pensez. Je tâcherai de faire avoir les autres objets demandés pour l'armée de Galice.

Je compte faire un réglemeut sur cette affaire d'habillement; car la troupe Espagnole en détruit plus que toute autre, faute de soin; et il faut en rendre responsable les capitaines des compagnies.

Je voudrais aussi causer avec vous sur les secours que je pourrai donner à la division de Morillo, et aux troupes de Penne Villemur, et à la garnison de Badajoz, en addition au secours que je continue à donner aux troupes de Ciudad Rodrigo, et à la division de Don Carlos. Cet arrangement diminuerait de beaucoup la dépense de la 4^{me} armée en Estremadure, et vous pourriez appliquer les ressources de cette province, lesquelles sous les circonstances actuelles doivent être assez grandes, pour maintenir l'armée en Galice. Mais je ne sais pas si je pourrai arranger ceci avant que je ne vous voie. En tout cas, je vous prie de m'envoyer un état du montant de la solde du corps de Morillo, de la cavalerie de Penne Villemur, et de la garnison de Badajoz.

Mes souvenirs au Gén. Giron, et à tous vos Messieurs.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 12th Feb. 1813.

We received yesterday a mail from England, with papers to the 27th Jan. It appears that the Russians have entered the Prussian frontier, and, it is said, have arrived at Königsberg. There is a proclamation of the Emperor, and another of Kutusoff, stating their intention to restore the monarchy of the Great Frederick in its ancient splendor.

Lord Bathurst tells me, among other things, that they hope to prevail on the Crown Prince, with his Swedes, to take the field early in the campaign. It would appear that there is scarcely any French army left, except that in our front.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

12th Feb. 1813.

Having submitted to the Commander of the Forces the application enclosed in your letter of the 9th inst., for leave of absence to Brig. Major — to proceed to Lisbon on regimental business, his Excellency has directed me to remark, in answer thereto, that Staff officers cannot have leave of absence, and that every affair can be settled as well with the army as elsewhere. The papers relating to Brig. Major —'s leave of absence are herewith returned.

The A.G. to the Officer commanding Brunswick Oels corps, 7th division. 12th Feb. 1813.

I have been instructed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to direct Major De Dornberg, of the Duke of Brunswick's corps, to

repair forthwith to England, it being the intention of government to employ him in the north of Europe.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division of infantry.

12th Feb. 1813.

Having submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces the letter of Major —, of the — regt. of light dragoons, dated 5th Feb., enclosed in your letter of the 10th Feb., I have been directed to desire that you will communicate to Major — the following observations of his Excellency upon the subject of Major —'s letter. It appears to the Commander of the Forces that the evidence of Lieut. Col. — will bear in no manner upon his case; he is in arrest because complaint was made to the Commander of the Forces of a gross outrage and disobedience of his Excellency's orders committed by the regiment under Major —'s command at Idanha a Nova. Whatever may be the internal regulations of the — light dragoons, the Commander of the Forces does, and always will, consider the Commanding officer of any regiment responsible to him that all the orders issued by him are obeyed, and that due order is preserved; unless he (the Commanding officer) should bring to punishment those whom he must employ in the performance of regimental duties, the Commander of the Forces knows of no other mode in which discipline in an army can be preserved. Major — may certainly choose to remain in arrest until the evidence of Lieut. Col. — and Lieut. — can be got for him; but he will recollect it is his own choice.

To Brig. Gen. Inglis.

Freneda, 13th Feb. 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of private — — of the — regt.; and I beg to inform you that the recommendation of the Court must be by letter separate from the proceeding. On the recommendation itself, I must beg the Court to advert to the fact that the prisoner has been convicted on the clearest evidence of striking his officer. I am not aware that any provocation can justify, or even palliate, such an offence; but, if there is such a one, it does not appear by the proceedings to have been proved on this trial in any manner. I therefore request the Court to reconsider their recommendation.

To Col. Fisher, R.A.

Freneda, 13th Feb. 1813.

I enclose some papers received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing the proceedings on an inquiry into a report from the British Ordnance storekeeper at Abrantes of the robbery of the British stores at that place on the night of the 11th Sept.

I concur very much in the opinion of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, that, if there is not reason to suspect the Ordnance storekeeper himself of making away with the stores, he is chargeable, at least, with neglect; and I beg that another officer may be appointed to relieve him, and that he may never again be employed in this army.

I wait for your report on these papers before I order any further measures.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 13th Feb. 1813.

I received last night your letter of the 9th in regard to the Order of the Tower and Sword for Adm. De Courcy, and the circular letter of government upon that subject.

It is my opinion that you had better leave it to government entirely to decide: 1st; Whether you are or not considered in the service of the

Prince Regent of Portugal in the view of the circular letter from Lord Castlereagh ; if you are not so considered, and you are not permitted to accept the order : and 2dly, that the refusal should proceed from the government.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

Having referred to the Inspector of Hospitals your letter of the 1st inst. containing a petition from the Nuns of the convent of S^{ta} Anna, at Coimbra, I beg to enclose the copy of the letter which Dr. M^cGrigor has written on the subject, by which it appears to be his intention not to occupy the building referred to longer than it is absolutely required for the service of the sick and wounded.

Memorandum to Señor —.

14th Feb. 1813.

Write to —, and tell him that, as he came here on the business of the army, it is proper that the reasonable expenses of the journey should be paid, and they shall be paid as soon as he will let me know the amount.

That I always understood that he and others, friends of the Marquesa de Alcañices, assisted the army by getting intelligence for it, as the mode in which they could best serve the cause of their country. That I should have thought of offering them payment for these services as little as I should have thought of claiming pay for similar services myself; and I considered the only expense to be incurred was the real *bonâ fide* expense of procuring and transmitting the intelligence.

That I beg to have a positive answer whether I have been mistaken or not on this point. If I have been mistaken, I desire to have a positive statement of what he and his friends require as payment for their future services, and an estimate of the whole expense to be incurred in procuring and transmitting this intelligence. I shall then be able to judge of the expediency of defraying the expense of such intelligence as they can send.

If I have not been mistaken, I desire that he and his friends will put themselves in communication with —, and transmit the intelligence they may procure through the channels which — will point out; by which arrangement much expense will be saved.

Although I conceived, and do consider, that persons in his situation ought to serve their country in this manner without payment (and that, indeed, no gentleman would ever acknowledge that he was paid for such services), yet it is very possible that he and his friends may be in want of assistance. If that is stated, I shall not be backward in giving it to them; but it must be clearly understood to be on the score of good will, and not in payment for services of this description.

G. O.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires to have on the 3d March, from the several regiments of the army, a nominal list of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers returned sick absent in the state of the 1st March, specifying, as far as is known to the regiments, in what general hospital each man is, and at what period he was sent away from his regiment.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

I have to request you to lay before the Portuguese government the papers I have the honor to enclose, relative to the murder of private ———, of the — regt., in the neighbourhood of the village of Villar; and I trust that exertions will be made to bring to justice the perpetrators of this crime.

To ———, M.P.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 11th Jan. by Col. Grant; and I shall be very happy to do every thing in my power to forward his views in this country.

As I have long ceased to think of home politics, it cannot be said that I am of a party different from that to which any other person belongs. I serve the country to the best of my ability abroad, leaving the government at home to be contended for by the different parties as they may think proper.

I am not an adequate judge whether the existing government have or have not done every thing in their power for the Peninsula. This I know, that they have done a great deal; and a great deal has been effected; and I read of their being blamed for events with which, as an honest man, I must say they had, or could have, nothing to do.

To C. Greenwood, Esq.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 26th Jan., and I have already communicated to you my intention to employ the same tradesmen for the Blues as the Duke of Northumberland. Let the expense of the band be paid as it has hitherto been by the Duke; but I shall speak to Elley or Hill upon the subject, as it would be absurd in me to incur permanently such an expense because the Duke of Northumberland did.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

Mr. Mackenzie has arrived here from the Mediterranean, and has informed me, that having been in communication with Adm. Greig on the part of the Emperor of Russia, that officer had informed him, and had authorised him to inform His Majesty's government, that the Emperor of Russia was disposed, and, even under the pressure under which he labored at the time, had it in his power, to send to the Peninsula a body of Russian troops to serve under my command, at the expense of Great Britain.

Mr. Mackenzie will explain to your Lordship the particulars of his communications with Adm. Greig; the ground he has for believing that the Admiral was authorised to make this communication, and that the Emperor will be enabled to carry into execution his intentions.

I think it proper, however, to acquaint your Lordship at the earliest period with my sentiments on this subject.

I should certainly recommend to the Emperor to employ all his means in the north of Europe, on the same grounds that I recommend to H. R. H. the Prince Regent and his allies in the Peninsula, to employ all theirs in the Peninsula. But it may happen, as is represented by Mr. Mackenzie,

that His Majesty the Emperor has more troops than he can find the means of employing in the north of Europe, (because the active employment of troops must always be limited by the means at the disposal of the government which employs them,) and he may have at his command a disposable force which it may be in his power to detach to the Peninsula. If this should be the case, I earnestly recommend to your Lordship to accept the offer to the amount of 15,000 men.

There can be no doubt that this number of troops (of Russians particularly) would have the most decisive effect on the next campaign. Even if 1000 or 2000 only were sent, it would show the power of the Russian empire; the inclination of the Emperor towards the cause of the nations of the Peninsula; and the measure would have the best effects, as well on the enemy and his few partisans in these countries, as on all the good patriots.

I need not say how much I am flattered by the disposition of the Emperor to place his troops under my command; which I attribute to his sense that I have served His Majesty zealously in this country. If, however, the Emperor should carry this intention into execution, I beg leave to recommend not only that the Emperor of Russia should place them under my command, but that he should accept of my services (with the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent) as a General officer in his service, of rank senior to the General officer who should be sent in command of his Imperial Majesty's troops; and that although the discipline and interior economy of His Imperial Majesty's troops should be carried on under the direction of the General officer who would come to the Peninsula with them, all reports, &c. regarding them and their operations should pass through my hands.

I mention this now, because, having for some years commanded an allied army composed of very discordant materials, and having had the good fortune of having preserved the utmost harmony among them, I am anxious that in case His Majesty the Emperor should be disposed to carry this intention into execution, his views should not be frustrated by want of attention to the occurrence of one of those accidents which experience has shown are too likely to occur in the employment of allied troops in the same scene of action.

I request your Lordship to observe likewise, that the introduction of Russian troops into the Peninsula is quite a new feature in the war. I entertain no doubt that neither of the allied governments will entertain the slightest objection to the measure; and that they will feel the obligation which they owe to the interest which the Emperor of Russia will manifest in this manner in their just cause.

But it is absolutely necessary that they should be consulted on the introduction of the troops of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia into the Peninsula; and in order that His Majesty's government may have the earliest information on this subject, I propose to take the first opportunity of informing the allied governments of Spain and Portugal of the offer conveyed by Mr. Mackenzie, in order that they may make known their sentiments upon it at an early period through His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz, and Minister at Lisbon.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

As the best mode of apprising the Spanish and Portuguese governments of what is in agitation in regard to the Russian troops, I propose to send them copies of my letter to your Lordship on that subject of this date.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th Feb. 1813.

Mr. Mackenzie, who is going to England to make a communication to your Lordship in regard to the employment of Russian troops in the Peninsula, informs me that he has not the honor of being known to you; and I beg leave to introduce him to you, and to recommend him to be employed in carrying into execution the measure in contemplation, if the government should determine upon it.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

14th Feb. 1813.

Referring to the statement of Capt. —, of the Royal artillery, enclosed in your letter of the 7th inst., I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to signify to your Lordship that his Excellency is by no means satisfied with the explanation of Capt. — of his own conduct, with that of the officers sent with the foraging party, and particularly with that of the serjeant and party. All that the Commander of the Forces can say is, that if the people of Famalição are not satisfied on the subject of their forage, bullocks, &c., in the course of one week from this time, the Captain, officer, and serjeant shall be brought to trial before a General Court Martial.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Celorico.

14th Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th inst., stating the inadequacy of £150 per month to the furnishing the convalescents with a warm breakfast and salt; in answer to which I am directed to observe, that I was not before aware that any specific sum had been fixed upon for these purposes. If you should find that the sum of £150 is inadequate, you must make a requisition on the Paymaster Gen. for a remittance to a larger amount per month, taking care always to regulate your demands according to the number of convalescents to be provided for, so as not to leave any considerable sum in hand at the expiration of the month.

The A.G. to T. Dunmore, Esq., Dep. Commissary General.

14th Feb. 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 13th inst., and its enclosures from Mr. — (herewith returned), I have been directed by his Excellency to signify to you, in answer, that his Excellency will accept of Mr. —'s resignation, but that it must be stated in G. O. I take the liberty of suggesting to you that it will be necessary for Mr. — to transmit to you an official resignation of his situation in the Commissariat department, which resignation I beg you will forward to me for the purpose of being laid before the Commander of the Forces.

To the President of the Spanish Regency.

Freneda, ce 15 Fév. 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir qu'un agent diplomatique du gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a passé ici à son retour de la Méditerranée, et m'a informé qu'il est chargé par un agent de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie d'offrir au gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique le service d'un corps Russe dans la Péninsule, pour être à la dépense de Sa Majesté Britannique, et pour servir sous mes ordres.

La meilleure manière de faire savoir à la Régence tout ce que je sais et ce que je pense sur cette offre, est de vous envoyer la traduction de la lettre que j'ai écrite la-dessus au gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique;

par laquelle vous verrez que j'ai recommandé au gouvernement Britannique d'accepter l'offre jusqu'au nombre de 15,000 hommes, si les gouvernemens alliés de la Péninsule y donnent leur consentement.

Je saisis donc la première occasion de faire savoir cette offre à la Régence ; et je la prie de communiquer la-dessus avec l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Cadiz ; et, en cas que la Régence voye quelque raison pour que les troupes Russes n'ayent pas permission d'entrer en Espagne, elle la communique, sans perte de temps, à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique. J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que j'écris pareillement au gouvernement Portugais.

Je vous ai adressé directement sur ce sujet, parceque, comme il est important que ni l'offre ni la décision du gouvernement soient connues, je n'ai pas cru de mon devoir de mettre cette affaire dans le cours ordinaire de la correspondance.

[Letters to the same effect were written to Dom M. Forjaz, to Sir H. Wellesley, and to Sir C. Stuart.]

The A.G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. M. Pakenham, 6th division ; and Major Gen. Hay, 5th division. 15th Feb. 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a letter addressed to his Excellency, and at the same time to signify to you his desire that you will send to him a state of the several regiments composing the division under your command at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 21st Nov. last, in order that his Excellency may give directions that the losses sustained by the irregularities of the troops may be paid for, and the sum may be stopped in its due proportions from the subsistence for the month of November of the officers and soldiers composing the several regiments in the division.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1813.

I enclose you an extract of Lord Bathurst's letter regarding the command, from which you will see that the business is settled as you supposed it would be. However, being settled, I don't conceive that it is any business of yours to inquire in what manner, or on what principles.

As far as I have any knowledge of the sentiments of the King's ministers, I believe them to be well disposed towards you ; and the omission to which you advert, unaccountable as it is, must be attributed to that kind of negligent, slovenly mode of doing business, which is too common among public men in England. I don't believe Murray has any thing to say to them. I am sure he can have no influence over them.

G. O.

Freneda, 15th Feb. 1813.

6. * * * * *

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

7. In consequence of the recommendation of the General Court Martial of Lieut. —, Ensign —, and Ensign —, the Commander of the Forces is induced to remit the punishments of those officers awarded by the sentence of the Court ; but not from concurring in any manner in the opinion of the Court, that their cases at all deserved this indulgence. The duties of the army cannot be carried on if the officers do not make it their business to know, and carry into execution strictly, the orders which have been issued for the performance of those duties ; and notwithstanding the recommendation of the Court Martial, it appears by their own sentences, that Lieut. — and Ensign — disobeyed not only the G. O. of the army, of which they ought not to have been ignorant, but the verbal orders of their General given to them on the spot ; and that Ensign —, after having disobeyed a G. O., and having been warned of this irregularity by the Assist. Provost attached to the division, persisted in his disobedience.

I write to the Admiral about a passage for Hamilton. Do you mean to call Amarante to take his command?

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1813.

It has been recommended that Lieut. Gen. Hamilton should return to England for the recovery of his health; and as he has lost his health in the service, I shall be much obliged to you if you will order him a passage on board one of His Majesty's ships.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 16th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Dr. M'Grigor, recommending 6 medical gentlemen belonging to the Portuguese service to be promoted to be Staff surgeons.

In case these gentlemen should be promoted, I propose that they should continue to do duty as Staff surgeons with the Portuguese army, and that they should continue to be paid as such on that establishment.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 13th, in regard to the enlistment of men of the 4th and 10th regts. for 4 years.

The law must be carried into execution if the soldiers require it; but they should be clearly informed, before they avail themselves of this law, that they are liable to be called upon immediately to serve again, under the ancient laws of the Kingdom; and that it would be better for them to continue to serve throughout the war, when they should have their discharge, and that they should be no longer liable to serve under the ordinary recruiting laws.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

I have received this morning your letter of the 15th. Although I have the honor to belong to one of the regiments of Guards, I confess that I don't understand the origin and principles of what are called privileges of these corps, by which knowledge alone it is possible to decide with consistency on questions of the description you have brought before me.

When the Guards were in the field with King William, and King George II., they were a part of His Majesty's household, and under the immediate direction of His Majesty, or of officers belonging to the corps of Guards, specially appointed by the King for that purpose. I believe that the campaigns under those monarchs are the origin of the privileges of the Guards, as they are called; and the customs introduced on those occasions have been adhered to when the Guards have been on duty over His Majesty's person on the home service.

One of these customs or privileges has certainly been, that the Guards in brigades have been commanded by an officer belonging to the corps of Guards; but they have generally been in divisions with troops of the line, as at present; and both on the Continent in 1793 and 1794, and in this country, a General officer not belonging to the Guards has commanded the division.

Although it may be argued, from the practice of the days of King William and King George II., and of the home service of the present day, that no officer but one of the Guards had a right to inspect the soldiers' account books ; and it is not improbable that the Lieutenant Generals not belonging to the Guards, who have commanded the divisions in which the Guards have been incorporated on different services in the late and present war, have not had occasion, or have not thought it necessary, to inspect those accounts, I don't see any reason to doubt that it is the duty of the Lieutenant General to inspect those books if he thinks it necessary ; that this inspection is enjoined by His Majesty's regulations, and no exception is made, or apparently intended, in favor of the Guards, or of any other troops.

If Major Gen. Howard and the officers of the 1st regt. of Guards have submitted the books of the 1st regt. to your inspection, I should think there can be no doubt upon the subject ; and that upon communication with the Commanding officers of the 2d brigade of Guards, they would consider the matter in the same light. But if there should be any further doubt on their minds, the best measure to be adopted would be to have the case put in such a state as that I may lay it before the Duke of York, who, as Commander in Chief of the army, and as senior Colonel of the Guards, is the most proper person to make a decision upon it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

In answer to that part of your letter of the 27th which refers to arms for the Spaniards in the course of the current year, I have to inform you that if you will send 50,000 stand of arms in the course of the year, they will, in my opinion, supply the wants of all the allied armies. We have, at present, a large number in our different stores.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Gen. M'Leod to Col. Fisher, informing him that 100 of the artillery horses, intended for this army, had been sent to Alicante for the use of the troops there.

We shall be very incomplete indeed in the number of horses necessary for the equipment which we ought to take into the field ; and we can find no substitute for them here.

I doubt very much that the resources of the British government are capable of equipping two armies for the field in the Peninsula, as they ought to be ; and the attempt will only tend to cripple this army, upon which every thing depends, and which ought to be well equipped in order to be able to effect any thing, without doing much good to the other. The army on the eastern coast must necessarily be confined to the coast in its operations. It may do a great deal of good if the army from this side can hold its ground at all in the interior of Spain. But if all the resources of Great Britain were applied to equip the army on the eastern coast, it is quite impossible that it should effect any thing unless the army on this side is so equipped, and in such strength, as to be able to keep the field.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Major Gen. Peacocke, containing the report of the capture and ransom of the *Canada* horse transport by an American privateer, with a detachment of the 18th light dragoons and other troops on board; upon which I request to receive your Lordship's directions.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th Feb. 1813.

Since I addressed your Lordship last, I have received reports that the Polish cavalry, which I reported had marched to the northward, and certain other bodies of cavalry (*gendarmes*), which belonged to the army of the North, have gone into France. The Italian infantry had not proceeded farther than Vitoria, but it was expected that it was going to France likewise.

Marshal Soult has lately taken the horses from the officers of the infantry and of the civil departments of the army, in order to mount cavalry.

No movement of any importance has been made since I wrote last. The troops cantoned along the Tormes crossed that river in the course of last week, and moved forward to the Yeltes and Huebra; and those on the Upper Tormes and Endrinal on the road from Baños to Salamanca, principally with a view to plunder the country, situated between the outposts of the two armies, of cattle, of which the enemy are much in want. The flocks had, however, been generally driven off; and the objects of this expedition were accomplished in a very trifling degree. The enemy threatened the Sierra de Francia and Bejar; but Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill having by my desire attended to these points, and strengthened his posts at Baños and in the Sierra, they retired again across the Tormes.

Au Lieut. Gén. Baron Maucune.

Au quartier général, ce 18 Fév. 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer 24 onces d'Espagne, la somme que vous avez eu la bonté d'avancer au Gén. Sir E. Paget.

To Major Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1813.

I have perused the proceedings and sentence of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of ———, of the Royal artillery drivers; and, having attentively considered the evidence in reference to the charge, and to the Articles of War, it appears that there never was a case more clearly proved of unprovoked mutiny, unmitigated by drunkenness, and attended by violence against the authority of an officer in the execution of his duty; and, having adverted to the frequency of this crime in this army, it is my opinion that the soldier who has been found guilty of it by the Court Martial, of which your Lordship is President, ought to suffer the extreme penalty which the wisdom of the Legislature has annexed to the crime of mutiny. Under these circumstances, I consider it my duty to desire that the General Court Martial will revise the sentence.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter for Whittingham, which I request you to peruse and forward.

I find that 3000 sets of horse appointments are on their way to Cadiz for the Spanish army; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will not allow them to be distributed till you shall hear further from me.

To Major Gen. Whittingham.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has transmitted to me your letter to him of the 3d Jan. in regard to your holding the office of Inspector of the division of Spanish troops under your command, and to the abuses and inconveniences to which your troops would be liable in case your expectations in this respect were disappointed; and having conversed with the Chief of the Staff and with the Inspectors General of Cavalry and Infantry on this subject, I have been informed by each of those officers that it was particularly settled with you, that when the troops under your command should serve in the Peninsula, they were to come under the control of the Inspectors' office, and were to have Inspectors attached to them in the same manner as other troops.

This being the case, it remains to be considered whether, adverting to the inconveniences to which you refer, it is proper I should now exempt the troops under your command from this control. Upon this point I have to observe, 1st; that I hope to be able to prevent the abuses of which you complain, as well as others: 2dly; that even if I should not succeed entirely, it is not worth while to enter into the disputes and complaints which a partial departure from a system long established in the Spanish army would occasion.

I have therefore desired the Inspectors General of Infantry and Cavalry to appoint deputy Inspectors for your division, and I beg you to submit to their control.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 19th Feb. 1813.

I request your Excellency to draw the attention of the government to the two copies which I enclose, of letters received from the Intendant General of the 4th army, which show in the clearest manner that, to the 9th inst. (that is one month after the period at which I left Cadiz, expecting that all the arrangements which I had settled with the government for the organization, the subsistence, and the eventual efficiency of the armies would be carried into effect), not one point of those to be settled by the government had been adverted to.

I am aware that these letters have been written to your Excellency and the Minister of *Hacienda*, and they have already come under the notice of the government; but I wish to draw their attention again to them, in order to press upon the government the necessity of calling to account those of its servants who, by neglecting their duty, have exposed the government itself to the most serious responsibility for the failure of all the measures adopted by the Cortes to

render the armies efficient at the approaching commencement of the campaign.

I repeat that officers and soldiers without discipline or subordination are worse than useless ; and that discipline and subordination cannot be established in any army that is neither paid nor fed ; and that the Spanish officers cannot be paid nor fed, unless the government shall carry into execution the measures which were arranged with me under the decree of the Cortes of the — Jan.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 21st Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Halkett, containing an account of the losses sustained by a quarter master of the 2d light batt. K.G.L., on his passage through Portugal, between Santarem and Abrantes, in consequence of a robbery.

I beg that you will lay this letter before the government, and that you will do me the favor to ascertain whether there are any means of recovering the loss from the district.

At all events it is desirable that the government should adopt early and energetic measures to force the magistrates in the Alentejo and Portuguese Estremadura to perform their duty, and to get the better of the bands of robbers by which every road in the country is infested to such a degree that travelling is unsafe, and the robbers may be said to be in possession of the country.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 21st Feb. 1813.

Not having received a copy of your Lordship's circular letter of the 24th April, 1812, to commanding officers of regiments, stating 'that, agreeably to long established practice, non-commissioned officers and privates, losing their necessaries when made prisoners of war, have no claim against the public on account thereof in cases in which they remain in captivity upwards of 4 months ;' I beg to request that I may be favored with this letter, in order that I may act upon it, and give the necessary instructions to the Board of Claims.

G. O.

Freneda, 21st Feb. 1813.

2. * * * * *

3. The Commander of the Forces trusts that this example will have the effect of deterring other soldiers from committing similar outrages ; and that they will all be convinced of what has frequently been made known to them in the G. O. of the army ; viz. that they cannot commit a crime of this description without being discovered ; and that if no other mode of discovery should exist, one of the accomplices in the guilt never fails to give evidence against his accomplices.

4. If this discovery is certain, the punishment is equally so ; and the Commander of the Forces again declares his determination to carry into execution whatever may be the sentence of a Court Martial on any soldiers found guilty of such wanton and disgraceful outrages.

5. Mr. —, of the Commissariat department, having been put in arrest for setting fire to a house, and other improprieties of conduct at Payo, but having since satisfied the inhabitant of Payo, whom he had injured, by paying a considerable sum of money, and the inhabitant of Payo having requested that Mr. — might be pardoned and released from his arrest, the Commander of the Forces has granted this request, and directs that Mr. — may be released. He hopes, however, that what has passed on this subject, and the heavy loss sustained by Mr. — in consequence of his misconduct, will induce him and others to beware how they are guilty of such conduct in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1813.

I received this morning yours of the 21st, and I congratulate you upon Col. Harrison's success.

I don't know what kind of post Bejar is; but, as it appears by your letter of 5 P.M. that the enemy were moving on this side of the Tietar, I think you had better be light at Bejar and in strength at Baños. As our intelligence is good, you would always have time to reinforce the post at Bejar from Baños; but if, on account of the movements of the enemy on the Tietar in force, it should be necessary to withdraw both, you might find it difficult to withdraw that from Bejar if it was too strong.

I doubt your being able to procure, either at Elvas or Abrantes, the quantity of 3 inch rope you require; but you may send for it, and write to the Governors respectively to say that I beg they will supply the quantity if they have it in store. But it must not be taken from the rope bridge at Elvas, or the pontoon bridge or bridge of boats at Abrantes.

In case the *petite guerre* on our outposts should continue, I propose to draw up another division to the front, which will enable me to give effectual support to your posts in the Sierra.

To Don Caro Manuel, Minister of Gracia y Justicia.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1813.

The gentleman who will have the honor of delivering this letter to your Excellency is Dr. Curtis, the Rector of the Irish College at Salamanca, whom I beg leave to recommend to the Regency as one who is highly respected throughout Castille, as one who has always performed his duties in the high situation in which he was placed, with honor to himself and advantage to the country, and who is sincerely attached to the just cause in which Spain is engaged, of which he is a victim. He will explain to your Excellency the views which he entertains for the benefit of the institution over which he has long presided, and of the religion which he professes; and I beg leave to recommend him to your attention.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., No. 1, in regard to the complaint which I had made of the conduct of certain magistrates in omitting to attend when summoned as witnesses at Courts Martial.

I am certainly a little surprised that this opportunity should be taken for the remark in the concluding part of Dom M. Forjaz' letter; and I am obliged to you for having repelled the insinuation which it contains. It is not the first time that such remarks have been made; but they shall not prevent me from following the course which I conceive it is proper I should follow.

I imagine that the government are under a mistake when they suppose that the magistrates of Guarda, of Sabugal, &c., were summoned to attend Courts Martial in their capacities of magistrates. The magistrate of Guarda was beaten, and complained as an individual; and, according to the usual practice of the country, would not give testimony of the fact on oath when it came to judicial inquiry. The magistrate of Sabugal com-

plained of an insult to the sovereignty and dignity of his Prince in most inflated language, but not judicially. Although he had been witness of the transaction of which he complained, when called upon to give his testimony before the tribunal at which the government desired the person complained of should be tried, he refused to attend!

The consequence in both the cases was that the persons accused were acquitted for want of evidence. I complain of these omissions, and of the injury they do to the discipline of the army; and in answer I am accused of insolence in the mode of conveying the summons; and I am told that it is beneath the dignity of a magistrate to attend any Court to give his testimony, as if this was not the common duty of every individual in every state, be his station what it may!

I am ready to admit that, however a British army may be unfortunately necessary for the defence of Portugal, a British Court Martial is not recognised by the laws of that Kingdom; and, strictly speaking, no person in Portugal is bound to attend its summons. If the government had stated this answer, I should have understood it, and should have acquiesced in its truth and justice; but I should have requested you to point out to the government the necessity (for the sake of the discipline of the

G. O.

Freueda, 22d Feb. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to notice the disobedience of his orders, and those of Major Gen. Peacocke, as reported in the following letter from the Major General:

Major Gen. Peacocke to the D.A.G.

'Lisbon, 16th Feb. 1813.

'I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship, that having, for the reasons therein stated, found it necessary to give out the annexed Garrison Order, it has been in many instances unattended to, and particularly in the course of this month, in those stated in the accompanying return. As his Excellency, when in Lisbon, expressed himself disposed to issue a G. O. for the promotion of the regularity sought in this branch of the service, I take the liberty of making this communication.'

Extract from the Garrison Orders, Lisbon.

'Lisbon, 10th Dec. 1812.

'As the inconvenience so severely felt by officers on their arrival at Lisbon, in receiving billets upon houses already occupied, arises solely from officers not returning their billets to the Town Major on their leaving Lisbon, the Town Major will immediately have a book in his office, in which all officers are hereby directed to have their names inserted the day before they leave Lisbon, from which the Town Major will make a daily extract, which he will transmit with his signature to the Billet minister for his information and guidance. This order to be affixed in the office of the Town Major, and shown to officers on their applying there for a billet; and, as it can have no object but their convenience, the Major General trusts that he shall not have to notice any infringement of it.'

'List of Officers who have quitted Lisbon since 1st Feb. 1813, for the army, and have not entered their names at the Town Major's office, agreeably to the Garrison Orders of 10th Dec. 1812:

*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*

2. The Orders of the Commander of the Forces are those of the 20th Oct. 1809, with which every officer must be acquainted, as they are referred to on every billet issued at Lisbon.

3. They are again published for general information. (See G. O. 20th Oct. 1809, and G. O. Lisbon, 14th March, 1809, repeated.)

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4. The Commander of the Forces is concerned to be obliged to notice such repeated disobedience of orders on every subject. It might have been expected that, in a case in which the convenience of the officers themselves was the object of the orders issued, they would have been obeyed; but the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments may depend upon it, that until they enforce obedience to every order, and see that the officers under them understand and recollect what is ordered, these subjects of complaint must exist.

British army, in which this country is so materially interested, and of the peace of the country) that some means should be devised of enforcing the attendance of persons of all descriptions as evidence at a British Court Martial.

I can have no communication with any authority of the Portuguese government on any concern relating to the British army, excepting through His Majesty's minister; and, if I am to understand that it is intended that no person shall attend a Court Martial as a witness upon its summons, excepting under a Portuguese authority, I must give orders that lists of Portuguese witnesses, when required, shall be invariably transmitted to me; and, in addition to the subjects on which I have to trouble you, I must request you, from time to time, to have orders transmitted to them by the government to attend the Courts Martial of the British army. I hope the orders or summons will then be conveyed with due civility, that the witnesses summoned will attend, and that persons guilty of breaches of discipline and order will not be acquitted, after the confinement of more than a year, for the want of the testimony of the injured person who made the complaint against them.

I beg to know whether the Portuguese government are prepared to adopt this arrangement.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 22d Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter (No. 2) of the 18th inst. I beg leave to recommend to your protection, as His Majesty's minister in Portugal, the persons mentioned in my letter to you of the 26th Jan., whom it appears to be the intention of the Portuguese government to try according to the Portuguese law.

I am ready to deliver them over to any persons whom the government may make known to me, through you, as the proper persons to receive them into custody; but I hope that you will take measures to prevent their prolonged confinement before they are brought to trial for the offences of which they are accused.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 22d. I beg you not to allow ——— to alarm himself out of Bejar, particularly after having fought for and retained the possession: it is desirable for many reasons to maintain it, if it can be maintained without unreasonable risk or loss.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1813.

I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of ———, of the Royal Artillery drivers; and I beg to inform you that the recommendation of the Court in favor of the prisoner must be by letter, separate from the proceedings.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 23d Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the Spanish newspaper called the *Conciso* of the 8th inst., and I beg to refer you to the statement, page 4, containing the speech of the Minister of *Hacienda*, of the 7th inst., particularly to the words I have marked, stating, as a reason for the omission to form

magazines, that 'the English seized all the effects which the French abandoned, and the government was deprived of those resources.'

The *Conciso* is generally considered to contain an authentic account of what passes in the Cortes, otherwise I should not think it necessary to trouble you on the subject of the speech of the Minister of *Hacienda* to the Cortes, notwithstanding that it is understood, and I have always been in the habit of considering, that what the minister of any state declares officially to the Popular assembly of that state must be strictly founded in truth; and that this statement of the Minister of *Hacienda* is directly the reverse of what I have stated to my government with the knowledge of your Excellency, and, I believe, of the Spanish government, as being what I conscientiously believed to be the truth.

The Minister of *Hacienda* must have been possessed of some official information on which he founded the assertion above referred to; and it would be desirable to obtain a knowledge of that information. But, according to my knowledge, so far from the English having 'seized all the effects which the French abandoned,' I asserted, and reported to the Sec. of State, that every thing taken from the French at Ciudad Rodrigo, at Badajoz, at Salamanca, at Madrid and the Retiro, at Valladolid, and even in the battle of Salamanca, had been made over to the Spanish authorities. Notwithstanding the statement of the Minister of *Hacienda*, I repeat this assertion, and I beg that it may be conveyed to the Spanish government; and I don't consider it to be any exception to the truth of this assertion that a few French carts found in Ciudad Rodrigo, and the boats and pontoons found in Badajoz, were taken from the former by the permission of the Capt. Gen. Castaños, and from the latter by the permission of the Marques de Monsalud.

Not only were the effects abandoned by the French not seized by the British army, but the deficiency of the magazines in the places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz was replenished from the stores of the British army; and there is in fact, at this moment, no magazine of provisions in either place that does not belong to the British army, and no military stores that were not acquired by the gallantry of the British army, or stored in those places by its Commissaries.

If, after this assertion, there is any doubt upon these subjects, I beg to refer to the respectable officers employed by the Spanish government to reside at my head quarters, who are as well acquainted with all transactions of this nature as I am.

I believe that at Burgos the enemy abandoned a magazine consisting of 700 *fanegas* of grain of different kinds, part of which was plundered by the guerrillas, and the remainder was divided equally between the troops under Gen. Castaños and myself.

In regard to supplies from the country in the last campaign, the allied British and Portuguese army received none, whether belonging to individuals or to the government, for which payment was not made on the spot, or has not since been made, or for which debts are not due of which the accounts are at this moment in a train of settlement. I had lately a communication with your Excellency upon this subject which proves the truth of this fact.

I am by no means desirous that the Minister of *Hacienda* should contradict the statement which he made to the Cortes. It is sufficient for me if my own government and country are convinced that I have stated officially what is true. I am desirous, however, that in future the ministers of the Spanish Regency should, when they notice the conduct of myself, or of the army under my command, confine themselves to those facts their information on which may be founded on official documents.

23d Feb. 1813.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

Having had the honor of submitting to the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 19th inst. and enclosures, on the subject of a complaint preferred by the Juiz de Fora of the village of Freixo against the — regt., I have been directed to communicate to you the orders and sentiments of his Excellency thereupon in the following terms, which are those made use of by his Excellency upon the occasion: 'Inform Gen. Cole that it appears to me from his letter of the 19th inst., that the Juiz de Fora of Freixo is a very unaccommodating person, and a very improper one to fill such an office in the existing circumstances of the country, and that I shall complain of his conduct to the government; but that in all these cases it is absolutely necessary that we should appear blameless; and that I am sorry to observe that in the two instances in which he complains of the conduct of the Juiz de Fora of Freixo there was a positive disobedience of the orders of the army. Portugal and Spain are countries in which the authority of the civil magistrates is as well understood, and, excepting in times of confusion (and I am sorry to add by the officers and soldiers of the British army), as strictly obeyed, as in our own country; and without adverting to the breach of the orders of the army, I should wish Major — and Lieut. — to consider what would have happened to both, and what to Lieut. Gen. Cole and myself, if an officer in our own country had gone to billet his regiment on a village in which there was a resident magistrate, and taken upon himself to mark the houses of the village without the consent of the magistrate, and had even quartered officers by his own authority on the magistrate's house against his consent. To add to all this, the Major transmits the Lieutenant's report of the impertinence of the manner of the magistrate. If such conduct can be deemed correct, all orders and regulations are useless. It is better that the British army should take the country into their own hands, and let it be torn to pieces by the private soldiers as they may think proper. But if protection of the country means any thing, it means protection of its laws and magistrates against our own people disposed to violate or insult either, as well as against the common enemy, and support of our own orders, calculated not only for this object of protecting the laws and supporting the civil magistrate, but for the benefit and good order of the army. It is impossible for me to pass over the conduct of Lieut. —; he must satisfy the magistrate of Freixo, or he must be brought to trial before a Court Martial for disobedience of orders. If he acted in obedience to the orders of Major —, his commanding officer, then Major — must be brought to trial.'

23d Feb. 1813.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

The Commander of the Forces has directed me to transmit to you the enclosed letters and other papers relating to Capt. —, — regt., some time since in command of a detachment which marched from Belem to the army, and at the same time to request that you will be pleased to point out to Capt. — the impropriety of his conduct in not attending the parade of his detachment at Belem on the evening before its march, by which omission the report was occasioned, unfounded in point of fact, that the men were sent off incomplete in necessaries. The Commander of the Forces has further directed me to signify to you that, in the hope that Capt. — will pay more attention in future, his Excellency will take no further notice of what has occurred. Capt. — is to be released from arrest.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter of the 15th inst., and its enclosures, which I have received from the Capt. Gen. Castaños, which I request you to lay before the Regency, from which the Regency will observe the inconveniences resulting from the delay in carrying into execution the measures agreed upon with me before I quitted Cadiz.

I beg you particularly to draw the attention of the Regency to the letter from your Excellency of the 15th Jan. last, to the Marques del Palacio, copied in the letter from the Marques to the Capt. Gen. Castaños.

I now beg leave to refer your Excellency to my letter to your Excellency of the 25th Dec. 1812, in which I informed your Excellency as follows;* to which your Excellency, in your letter of the 1st Jan. 1813, was pleased to reply.

I believe there is no person who will read these extracts, and the letter of your Excellency to the Marques del Palacio of the 15th Jan., who will not be convinced that the arrangement intimated to the Marques is inconsistent with the arrangements made by the government with me.

I am convinced that it must have been an oversight; but I am anxious to have the opinion of the government, either recalling or confirming that letter, at an early period.

The object which I had in view in every thing I proposed to the government, was to have in my hands the power of performing duties for which I was to be responsible. It is impossible for me to be responsible for the Marques del Palacio.

I would, besides, observe to your Excellency, that the letter of your Excellency of the 15th Jan. is not less inconsistent with the arrangement made with me than it is with the spirit at least, if not with the letter, of the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan. Under that decree the Commander in Chief of the 4th army was to be Captain General of Estremadura; and under the *Ordenanzas*, and the old practice of the service, and particularly under the arrangement made with me, it rests with the Captain General of the province, who is responsible to government and to me, to take care that there is a proper person to command in the province.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 15th inst. this day. It is not my wish to continue a correspondence of the kind of which that letter forms a part.

I am sincerely desirous of forwarding the views of the government in every respect, and of serving them in the manner which may be most agreeable to the Regency; but I would observe to your Excellency that much of the cause for this description of correspondence would cease, if your Excellency would communicate to me directly the orders and wishes of the government, whatever they may be; or if their execution should be of so pressing a nature (which can seldom occur) as that it is necessary for the government to order that they might be sent direct to one of the officers under my command, it is desirable that your Excellency should at the same time communicate to me copies of them.

* See p. 219.

I mention this, because I see that orders were sent by your Excellency, on the 6th Feb., to the Conde de la Bisbal, and, I conclude, to other General officers commanding armies, containing various arrangements for the movement, the organization, and discipline of different regiments of cavalry, infantry, &c. &c.

Your Excellency will at once perceive the inconvenience of this mode of conducting the business of the army, when you advert to the letters which I have recently and this day addressed to you for the information of the government, particularly on the subject of the organization and discipline of the cavalry. Your Excellency will observe that I had already turned my attention to the state of that arm, and had proposed measures for its reform to the government, to be gradually carried into execution, and according as circumstances permitted; and I had ordered the movement of Gen. Freyre's corps of cavalry, with a view to these reforms, and to the re-equipment of men and horses in various respects. I had other plans in contemplation for the reform of other corps of cavalry belonging to the armies; but not only is it impossible for me to act on these or any other plans, if your Excellency continues to send the orders of the government direct to those under my command, but your Excellency must perceive that I cannot be deemed in any manner either the Commander in Chief of the army, or at all responsible for it.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the Rev. Mr. Allott's report of the progress of the Children's Schools which have lately been established at Belem; and I beg to acquaint you that, when I was at Lisbon in the month of January, I took an opportunity of visiting the schools, and found them in excellent order.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I beg leave to recommend that the clothing for the regiments composing this army, whether due at Christmas, 1812, or at Christmas, 1813, may be sent to the Tagus before the equinoctial gales in September next, and that it may be packed in bales or cases, each weighing 90 lbs., with a view to its more easy conveyance on the backs of mules.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

Some doubt having arisen regarding the construction of your Lordship's circular letter of the 19th Oct. last, on the subject of the allowance of bāt and forage money, I take the liberty of referring you to the enclosed paper, containing the copy of that letter, and a memorandum from the D. Q. M. G., to the different queries to which I will thank your Lordship to favor me with a reply as soon as may be convenient.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

After the enemy had retreated across the Tormes, as reported in my last dispatch to your Lordship, and their troops had taken up their cantonments, those on the Upper Tormes collected again on the 19th inst. from Piedrahita, Puente del Congosto, El Barco, and Avila; and on the

morning of the 20th, a body of about 1500 infantry and 100 cavalry, under the command of the *Général de division*, Foy, endeavored to surprise, and attacked Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's post at Bejar, consisting of the 50th regt. and 6th caçadores, which troops were under the command of Lieut. Col. Harrison of the 50th. The surprise did not succeed; and the enemy were repulsed with loss, and pursued for some distance by the 6th caçadores, under Major Mitchell.

I enclose Col. Harrison's report,* from which your Lordship will observe that the Colonel mentions the good conduct of the 50th regt. and 6th caçadores.

In consequence of the enemy's recent movements between the Tormes and the Agueda, and their attack upon the post at Bejar, and the better to enable me to check them in future, I propose to move up another division of the allied British and Portuguese army to the front, which can be done without inconvenience to any of the objects for which the troops were placed in cantonments.

The enemy have lately collected at Benavente about 5000 or 6000 men, from their garrisons on the Duero; and made in the last week an incursion beyond the Esla towards Puebla de Sanabria, but I have not yet heard the result. There has been no other movement that I have heard of.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford, containing a requisition for arms and appointments for the Portuguese troops.

When I wrote to your Lordship last week upon this subject, I did not calculate upon the demand for the Portuguese army amounting to more than half the amount, or 10,000 stand of muskets. It is desirable, therefore, that the supply of arms for the Peninsula, throughout the year, should be 60,000 stand of muskets instead of 50,000, as stated in my last letter.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch of the 27th Jan., in regard to the formation in this army of a Staff Corps of cavalry under the Adj. Gen., for the purposes of police; and although I have not received the orders with which H. R. H. the Commander in Chief states in his letter to your Lordship that he intends to honor me, I propose to proceed forthwith to form the 2 troops of this corps which it is intended should be attached to the army in this country.

* Lieut. Col. Harrison to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Bejar, 20th Feb. 1813.

I have the honor to report to you, that a little before daybreak this morning, our piquets were attacked, and after some smart firing were obliged to fall back; but, on being reinforced by some companies of the 50th regt., and 6th caçadores, the enemy were driven back, leaving some dead: they retired across the bridge on the road to Congosto, and were for some time followed by Major Mitchell with the 6th caçadores, to whom I am much indebted for the assistance he has afforded me on this occasion. I beg leave also to mention Capt. Moraz, of the 6th caçadores, who particularly distinguished himself in checking the progress of the enemy's advance, and was slightly wounded. I have every reason to be satisfied with the good conduct of the officers and men of the 50th regt., and 6th caçadores, who compose the garrison of this place.

At the time I took the command of this army in April, 1809, I formed a corps of horsemen then denominated 'the Corps of Guides,' which was placed under the command of an officer of the Q. M. G.'s department. It consists chiefly of foreign deserters from the enemy's army, and is officered by Portuguese, generally students of the University of Coimbra. The object in the formation of this corps and its duties, at first, were to make inquiries about, and to reconnoitre roads; to provide interpreters between the common village guides of the country and the leaders of columns of troops on their march; and to circulate orders and other communications between the different divisions of the army and head quarters.

In proportion as the numbers of the army have been increased, and their operations have been extended, and the resources of the country in means of communication have been diminished, this corps has been augmented; and in the last campaign all the communications between the army and the frontier of Portugal; all those with Madrid and Gen. Hill's corps, as well while on the Tagus as while in Estremadura, were carried on by the Corps of Guides placed in stages on the roads.

The nature of the disorders committed by our soldiers, and the time of their committing them being generally on their removal to or from general hospitals, suggested to me the expediency of using the Corps of Guides in aid of the police under the Provost, on the roads on which they should be placed for the communications in the next campaign; and with this object in view I directed a further increase of the corps at the close of the last campaign.

It is my opinion that these measures will not be the less necessary, even though the Staff Corps of cavalry should be formed in this army.

1st; Our English non-commissioned officers and soldiers are not very fit to be trusted alone, and out of the view of their officers, in detached stations at a distance from the army, as the soldiers of the Guides are for months together, without occasioning any complaint.

2dly; When the Staff Corps shall have supplied the orderlies for General officers, and those men necessary for the police of the different divisions of the army, and for the principal hospital stations, it will not be sufficiently numerous to perform the duties of police on the great communications of the army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th Feb. 1813.

It is desirable that 20,000 sets of black accoutrements should be sent to Lisbon as soon as may be convenient for the use of the Spanish army.

I likewise request your Lordship to send out horse appointments to Lisbon for 4000 cavalry for the Spanish army, in addition to the 4000 already arrived at Coruña.

To Major Gen. Campbell, Alicante.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 12th inst., regarding the conduct of the 2d Italian regt., and I entirely concur in all the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and firmness of your conduct. I am prepared likewise to approve of whatever you shall determine, upon de-

liberation, regarding the future fate of the men of the regiment, whether to be formed into a regiment again or not; or if so formed, whether to be kept as part of the army or sent back to Sicily.

The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion, that they are very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners, notwithstanding the repeated orders of government upon the subject. The consequence is, therefore, that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers can desert from it, that they don't go off in numbers; and in the Peninsula they carry to the enemy the only intelligence which he can acquire. With this knowledge, I seldom, if ever, use the foreign British troops of this army on the duty of outposts; and whatever you may determine regarding the 2d Italian regiment, I recommend the same practice to your consideration.

There is nothing new on this side of the Peninsula. The armies are nearly in the stations which they took up in the end of November.

To P. C. Tupper, Esq., Consul at Alicante.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has forwarded me your letter of the 16th inst., in which you inform him of the arrival at Alicante of 40 mules taken from the enemy, presented to me by Don Asuncion Nebot. As I have not an opportunity of writing to that chief, I beg that you will tell him how much I am obliged to him for his attention. I have heard of his successful endeavors against the enemy with the utmost interest, and I sincerely congratulate him upon them; and I shall be happy to be able to communicate with him more closely.

I am much obliged to you for having given over the mules to the service of the British artillery, where I beg they may remain.

I take this opportunity of expressing my sense of the services which you have rendered to the interesting cause in which we are all engaged, in the different situations you have filled on the eastern coast of the Peninsula. I have read your accounts of transactions there with the utmost interest, and I sincerely wish you success.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1813.

His Majesty's government have lately sent out to this country certain sums of money in guineas to pay his troops, which I have issued to the troops at their current value in England, viz., £1. 1s. sterling; dollars are issued to the troops at the rate of 4s. 6d. sterling each, which is the Mint price of dollars in England; and the guinea therefore, in reference to dollars, is worth 4 dollars and four-sixths of a dollar.

The dollar is worth 20 *reales vellon*; and the guinea, according to the same rule, ought to be worth 93 *reales vellon*, and 12 *maravedis*.

Some difficulty, however, has occurred in circulating guineas in Spain at this rate of exchange, which is certainly their intrinsic value; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will bring the subject under the consideration of the Spanish government, and request them to issue a procla-

mation to authorise the circulation of guineas in Spain at the rate of 4 dollars and four-sixths of a dollar, or at 93 *reales* 12 *maravedis*.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote to His Majesty's minister at Lisbon on this subject,* in order to procure their circulation in Portugal, with his answer, and the copy of the proclamation of the Portuguese government after an issue of the guineas by the Portuguese mint.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 25 Fév. 1813.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 22, et les lettres officielles qui l'accompagnent. J'écrirai des réponses officielles à celles-ci; mais en attendant j'ai lu le mémoire du Gén. Giron, que je trouve excellent. Il fonde ce qu'il propose sur ce qu'exige le bon sens; qui est cent fois meilleur règlement que tout autre. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait quelque chose à trouver à redire dans tout le mémoire; mais comme j'ai dit là haut, je vous y donnerai une réponse officielle.

Pour ce qui regarde les habillemens des troupes en Estremadure, je verrai si je peux vous en donner; je crois cependant que toute la provision de l'année dernière est finie, et celle pour cette année n'est pas encore arrivée. D'ailleurs vous en avez besoin, je crois, en Galice, où je travaille avec Salvador pour mettre les choses sur un bon pied; et je crois qu'en ce qui regarde armemens, habillemens, et équipemens de soldat, l'armée de Galice sera bientôt mieux que jamais.

J'ai en main une réforme pour la cavalerie, et, en idée, une pour l'infanterie qui j'espère fera un bon effet. Les Français seraient bien étonnés, et il serait drôle, si, après tout, nous avions une armée Espagnole pour la campagne prochaine! Je crains seulement pour les finances.

J'ai ordonné à M. Routh de payer à votre ordre les 20,000 duros qui sont à Elvas. Que voulez vous qu'on fasse des 80,000 qui sont à la Corrogne?

Je crois qu'en tout cas il faut que nous payions les garnisons de Ciudad Rodrigo et de Badajoz, dans le sort desquelles nous sommes si fortement intéressés, et les troupes aussi qui serviront de concert avec notre armée. Si nous ne payons pas les dernières, il y aura beaucoup de mécontentement, et de la désertion. Mais je ne désire pas limiter mes secours à ces troupes seulement. Si on peut trouver du numéraire, j'aurai assez pour donner de la solde à 50,000 hommes, dont environ la moitié serait appropriée en payant les troupes que je vous ai déjà proposées avec celles d'Alicante.

Je suis bien fâché de ce qui est arrivé à ——. Pour moi, j'entends tant de choses sur tout le monde que je n'en crois jamais que la moitié: mais je ne crois rien de ce qu'on dit de ——. Cependant sa réputation est vraiment mauvaise; et je crois que ce serait une injustice de le faire servir auprès de notre armée dans laquelle on parle bien mal de sa conduite à Madrid. Je crois qu'il ferait mieux de servir dans l'armée de Galice.

J'ai écrit à la Régence sur l'affaire du Marques del Palacio. J'espère que nous nous entendrons à la fin; mais les choses n'ont pas été bien jusqu'à présent. Je serais fâché d'être obligé de donner ma démission;

* See 25th Nov. 1812, p. 175.

mais vraiment je le ferai, si on n'agit pas avec moi, comme j'agis avec tout le monde, c'est à dire, de bonne foi, et selon l'arrangement convenu.

Je n'ai aucune nouvelle de Cadiz sur la politique, mais je serais tenté de croire que les affaires vont durer telles qu'elles sont, au moins pour quelque temps.

Je suis fâché d'avoir de si mauvaises nouvelles sur les affaires de finance d'Estremadure. Il faut espérer que cela ira mieux.

Je vais demain faire la revue des troupes à Ciudad Rodrigo.

P.S. Je vous prie de faire mes complimens à la Manuela de Caldera, et à la Payno.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 25th Feb. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 18th. That which I was apprehensive would come into discussion in Parliament, was the difference of opinion it was stated in the Spanish newspapers that I had with the Cortes; and the grounds for and view of that difference taken by the libellers at Cadiz. However, that apprehension is probably groundless; and at all events I have not, nor shall I write another line upon the subject, without sending it to you.

I wish you would state officially your objections to the proposed mode of raising money, and specifically the plan proposed instead of it. Have you conversed upon this plan with the person whom Mr. Gordon brought to me? It appears to me that nothing can be fairer than this plan to all parties; but I am by no means wedded to it, and I must say that I have not yet given even one security in payment of our enormous debts. I shall write to Adm. Martin respecting the trade with San Sebastian. I write to Gen. Campbell and Mr. Tupper, by this occasion, letters which I send open for your perusal.

You don't mention the receipt of my letter to La Vega, and I therefore send a duplicate of it. I informed you of the conversation I had at Cadiz with the Portuguese minister regarding the claims of La Carlota to the Regency: I held precisely the same language at Lisbon to the Portuguese government and ministers; and I rather understood from the latter that the Prince Regent, although desirous of having the claims of his family to the succession recognised, did not wish that Carlota should be Regent; at least, that he had never intimated such a wish. I think that if this was known at Cadiz, it would settle her claims for ever.

There is nothing new. I have been obliged to write strongly to the government on the delay of their measures for the settlement of the army, and on their departure from their arrangements with me: I hope I shall by fair means bring them to rights; if not, I must resign the command.

P.S. I don't write to Nebot, but leave it to Tupper to write to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1813.

I write to let you know that an expedition is talked of at Salamanca, to the Sierra, of 8000 men, to be collected from the Tormes. This may not be true, but it is as well to attend to the report so far as not to undo your arrangements, if you can keep there without material inconvenience. I think likewise, that if the green forage has begun to appear on this side of the

Tagus, you might bring the Royals, or 3d dragoon guards, to Zarza or Moraleja.

I have ordered the 4th division to this side of the Coa, and shall observe closely what passes. Do you observe what passes on the side of the Tietar and Alberche. We must save these Sierras, and keep the pass if we can without material risk or loss.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1813.

I have had a conversation with Lieut. Col. Fisher and Col. Dickson respecting our and your ordnance arrangements for the next campaign.

I shall be perfectly satisfied if you can equip one 9 pounder brigade (new pattern), and one 6 pounder brigade, to be with Hamilton's division, and one 9 pounder brigade (new pattern), to be in our reserve. I will take from you, and will pay for the use of the British artillery equipments, all the draft mules you will have over and above that complement, which shall be delivered to us fit for service.

We must have a company of Portuguese artillery in our reserve, besides the artillery attached to the brigades with Hamilton and in our reserve.

I should wish all the ammunition with these brigades to be on carriages; and I recommend to you to apply the carriage or pack mules you have collected for the gun ammunition, to carry musket ammunition or provisions.

We want *only* 1500 horses or mules to complete our artillery equipment to what is absolutely necessary to draw it. However, I believe I shall get them before the time comes for opening the campaign. The taking your 9 pounder brigade into the reserve will save us 170 horses; but we shall still want the 1500.

To Major Gen. Hay.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1813.

I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of — —.

If the latter part of what is contained in the sentence is considered by the Court as a recommendation of — —, it must, according to the Standing orders of the service (of which it is extraordinary that I should have occasion to remind the General Court Martial), be conveyed in a letter separate from the sentence.

Au — —.

Freneda, ce 27 Fév. 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 23 de Badajoz. C'est au Général Castaños, et non pas à moi, qu'il appartient de faire les arrangemens de la 4^{me} armée, pour lesquels je n'ai rien à faire, que de voir s'ils ne sont pas contraires au bien du service.

J'ai toujours eu lieu d'être content de votre service pendant que vous serviez de concert avec cette armée; mais, à vous dire le vrai, je crois que vous ne devez pas vous y remettre; et que vous ferez mieux de vous poster à l'armée de Galice.

Vous savez que je suis dans l'habitude de dire mon avis franchement; et si mon feu ami le Marques de la Romana était ici, je lui dirais la même chose.

To Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1813.

I shall be glad to learn from you how you find yourself, and whether your wounds are getting better, and are likely to enable you to take an active share in the next campaign.

You will have seen the result of my letter to the government in consequence of your reports to me. Matters appear to me now to be in a state that we shall be able to make the experiment whether any thing can or cannot be got from the country on account of the legitimate government. You will likewise have seen that the gentleman whom you had recommended has at last been appointed Intendant General of the Army of Reserve.

I have written to the government on the subject of your last letter to me ; and I trust that I shall at last have put an end to the interference of the government in concerns in which they renounced all direct interference by their arrangement with me.

You will have seen that I have directed Gen. Freyre's cavalry to assemble on the Guadalquivir, with a view to their re-equipment, and to save the horses from starving at the present moment. I have in contemplation, indeed I have already commenced, a re-organization of the cavalry in the old established regiments of the service, which I propose to carry into execution, by degrees, as circumstances will permit ; which arrangement I hope will eventually restore that arm in the Spanish armies. I have likewise in contemplation an improvement of the organization of the infantry, upon which I should wish to have your opinion.

The regiments now consist of one battalion, having a Colonel, Lieut. Colonel, and Major ; and 8 companies, each company having one Captain and 4 Subalterns, and an establishment of 150 men. The objection I have to this organization is :

1st ; That, if a regiment should be complete, it consists of too many men to be manageable, particularly by officers themselves not very well trained to discipline.

2dly ; There are in every regiment of infantry at present a very large proportion of men, either from youth and weakness, or from age and infirmities, not fit for the active duties of the field ; and all these, in the event of the regiment marching to the field, would become a burden to the army.

3dly ; There are duties to be performed, or garrisons to be occupied, in each of the districts allotted for the support of the armies. Indeed, it is not quite clear to me that any contributions will be realised without military assistance. All these duties might be performed by the men above referred to, if properly organised.

4thly ; The regiments, as now formed, have no reserve. A regiment takes the field, and if, by the fatigues of the service or the casualties of war, its numbers should be reduced, it must go bodily to garrison ; whereas, by the organization which I propose, it will always be possible to keep it up in a respectable state for service.

What I should propose is that each regiment should consist of 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 1 Major, and 12 companies, each of 100 men, and 1 Captain and 3 Subaltern officers. The regiment to be formed into 2 battalions, each battalion of 6 companies, and the Colonel and Lieutenant

Colonel, or Colonel and Major, to be with the 1st battalion; the Lieut. Colonel or Major, as the arrangement might be, with the 2d. In case the regiment should not consist of 1200 men complete, it should have only 10 companies, of which 6 in the 1st and 4 in the 2d battalion.

The regiment would thus become much more manageable in manœuvre. If the Commander of the Army should have any occasion to leave any troops in his district, he would have the facility of leaving the least disciplined and weakly men of the regiments under his command, who would be in a state of organization to perform some service. The 2d battalion of a regiment left behind in cantonments would be a reserve for the 1st, and would furnish it with trained recruits to keep up its numbers.

The 2 battalions of the same regiment should always belong to the same army; and it would of course rest with the Commander in Chief of the Army whether he would or not take both into the field. If he should do so, they would of course act together in the same brigade under the command of the Colonel, but in separate battalions. Generally speaking, however, I would recommend to leave the 2d battalion in cantonments, and to have the 1st battalion only in the field.

I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me your sentiments on this scheme.

The office of Inspector General in the Spanish army is a very ancient one, which, as at present exercised, does not appear to be very useful, although it might be very much so. I propose to try what I can do on this point, and whether I cannot get the most able officers of rank in each army appointed the Inspectors, really to perform the duties of the office. This, with the frequent reviews and inspections by the General officers of the army, will aid in restoring discipline and appearance, which is very important.

There is nothing new on this side. The enemy appear to have quitted the Upper Tormes since their affair with our troops at Bejar on the 20th. But I suspect that they want to get hold of the Sierra, and I have collected a few troops to prevent them. We are tolerably strong, and I shall certainly assemble the troops as soon as the green forage appears.

P.S. I write to you in English, because I write that language with most facility; but I can read Spanish perfectly, and beg that you will use that language in your reply which will be most convenient to yourself.

To the Rt. Hon. the Judge Advocate General.

Freneda, 27th Feb. 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial on the trial of — —, Dep. Assist. Commissary Gen., and the recommendation of that gentleman, upon which I request you to take the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

I have to inform you that — — is under arrest upon another charge, on which, to save time, his prosecutor has offered to admit all he has stated he wishes to prove by calling the Commissary Gen., Mr. Bissett, from Gibraltar, and other witnesses who cannot conveniently be assembled at this trial. He has since declared he wishes to prove more; that Mr. Bissett must appear, however inconvenient to the service; and that he protests against being tried, unless all the witnesses are present.

You will observe the opinion of the General Court Martial, that ——— is not a person in a sane state of mind; and if His Royal Highness should be pleased to attend to the recommendation of the Court Martial in his favor, I humbly beg leave to recommend that it should be on condition of his resigning his situation in His Majesty's service.

To Brig. Gen. Inglis.

Freneda, 28th Feb. 1813.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of Dep. Assist. Commissary ———; and I must request the Court to revise both their proceedings and sentence.

In regard to their proceedings, the Court should ascertain the amount due to the public, and not refer to any other authority whatever. In regard to the sentence, it appears to me to be extraordinary that the Court should have found the prisoner guilty of disobedience of a positive order in making purchases at all; that they should have found him guilty of making purchases at extravagant prices; and should have by their sentence awarded that punishment which is attached to embezzlement, and yet should have acquitted the prisoner of 'fraudulently and wilfully misapplying the public monies.'

I should wish the Court to consider whether the disobedience of the orders of his superior officer by Mr. ——— is not sufficient at least to constitute the wilful misapplication of the public money; and whether, considering the difficulty of proving the positive receipt of profit in a transaction of this description, it ought not to be taken into consideration by the Court, together with the general color of the transaction itself, to induce the Court to attach to it those terms of infamy which undoubtedly belong to it.

If the Court don't think proper to alter their sentence as above suggested, I have then to inform them that I doubt the legality of that part of their sentence which goes to make Mr. ——— pay a sum of money to the public. Upon this point I beg leave to refer the Court to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, in which they will see that the power to sentence the payment of a sum of money found to be due depends upon the finding of the guilt of *embezzlement*.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 1st division.

28th Feb. 1813.

Referring to the P.S. to your letter of the 25th inst., regarding Ensign ———, — regt., now under arrest in consequence of a transaction which occurred at Punhete in the month of December last, in the course of which transaction a Portuguese inhabitant lost his life, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to signify to you, in answer, that the case having been referred to the Portuguese government by his Excellency, with a request to be informed whether it was desired by the Portuguese government that Ensign ——— should be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, as for a military offence, on charges to be grounded on the circumstances which came out upon the examination taken at Punhete; or that he should be delivered over to the civil authorities of the country, to be tried according to the laws of Portugal: the Portuguese government has thought proper to adopt the latter mode of proceeding. A further communication has been made by order of the Commander of the Forces, to ascertain where, and to what authority, Ensign ——— is to be delivered up; and when an answer will have been received, his Excellency will give directions what steps shall be taken thereupon. Ensign ——— in the mean while is to remain under arrest.

To Major Gen. Whittingham.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your several letters to the 1st Feb., by the Chief of the Staff of your division, who arrived here yesterday.

In answer to your letter of the 26th Jan., I have to inform you, that Capt. Grey being employed on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, on the service of the regiment to which he belongs, I cannot allow him to serve in the Spanish army.

I have settled with the Inspectors General of Cavalry and Infantry, that you shall be appointed the Inspector of both arms in the division of troops under your command; and you will carry on that duty according to the orders and regulations of the Spanish government.

I have settled with the Inspector of the Cavalry to draft the hussars of Aragon, and the regiment of Cuenca, into the regiments of Almanza and Olivença. This draft will make those regiments over complete in men; but you will dispose of the horses as you may think proper among the trained men of the regiments as already formed, and the others you will have trained either in Spain or Majorca, until I shall send orders for the disposal of them.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d Feb.

The division of troops under the command of Gen. Whittingham belongs to the army of Majorca; that under your command belongs to the 3d army; but it is for the present detached from that army, for the purpose of co-operating with the allied British and Sicilian corps at Alicante. I don't propose to make any alteration in this arrangement.

I have written to Gen. Elio, to request that he will direct arrangements may be made for the supply of the troops under your command, and those under the command of Gen. Whittingham. I understand that the troops under your command, as well as all others of the Spanish nation, are in the service of His Catholic Majesty; and they are neither your property, nor that of any other Spanish General officer. They will be attached to those under your command or not, as may be convenient to the service, and not otherwise; and I beg that the complaints on this subject, and the requests that certain troops may be called back to your division, may not be repeated.

This reasoning applies to the hussars of Fernando VII., equally with the regiments of Aragon and Burgos; and I am surprised that so much time has elapsed since the clothing and appointments for that regiment have arrived in Spain; and that the regiment should not yet have received either.

I write by this occasion to Gen. Elio, to desire that the regiment may be placed in a convenient situation to receive its clothing and appointments from Alicante, which I desire may be delivered to the Commanding officer of the regiment when he shall call for them, and that the regiment may afterwards be disposed of, according to orders which shall go from hence.

To Lieut. Gen. Don X. Elio.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

The Chief of the Staff will have made you acquainted with the motives

which induced me to order a part of the cavalry belonging to the army under your command to move to the Guadalquivir; and I have to inform you that the same motives have dictated the orders which I send by this occasion, in regard to the hussars of Aragon, and the regiment of Cuenca, and in regard to the hussars of Fernando VII.

I can assure your Excellency, however, that it is not my intention to

G. O.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

1. The Commanding officers of regiments of infantry are immediately to make requisitions on the Commissaries attached to their several brigades for tin camp kettles, to be substituted for the iron camp kettles hitherto in use with the troops.

2. The numbers are to be one for every 6 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The Commissaries are to take care that each kettle is provided with a good bag; and the kettle of each mess is to be carried on a march alternately by the men of the mess, instead of on a mule, as heretofore.

3. The Commissary Gen. will give directions that the Commissary with each division may always have with the division a store of 50 camp kettles with bags; the Commissaries of divisions are to make a weekly return of this store to the General officer commanding the division, who is requested to see that this article of equipment is kept complete.

4. The iron camp kettles in use with the 1st, 3d, and 5th divisions are to be put in store at Oporto; those of the 2d division at Castello Branco; those of the 4th and Light divisions at Almeida; those of the 6th and 7th divisions at Figueira.

5. The Commissary Gen. will give directions that the iron camp kettles when sent into store may be put in a state of repair, and may be provided with cradles, &c., so as to be fit for use again.

6. It is the intention of the Commander of the Forces that the mules hitherto provided by the Commanding officers of companies of infantry for the carriage of camp kettles shall hereafter be applied to the carriage of tents for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

7. In order the better to enable the officers commanding companies to perform this service, the Commander of the Forces has ordered, that in addition to the sum of 8*l.* 5*s.* forage money, received for this purpose in the winter, b*ât* and forage allowance, a sum of 10*l.* b*ât* money shall be received by each Commanding officer of a company of infantry. The Commanding officers of regiments of infantry are to send in their estimates to the D. Q. M. G. for their allowances for the winter b*ât* and forage, now in the course of payment.

8. It is expected, however, that in consideration of the allowance granted for this service, the officers commanding companies will have an animal sufficient for the purpose. The General officers commanding brigades are requested to attend particularly to this part of the equipment of the regiments under their command, and are to report any deficiency which they may observe.

9. Whatever may be the strength of a company, the mule provided by the Captain is to carry 3 tents, with their poles, vins, &c., which tents are to be disposable under the direction of the A. Q. M. G. attached to the division, for the purpose, however, only of giving cover to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

10. The mule provided to carry the tents for the soldiers must be employed solely on that service, according to the orders heretofore issued in regard to camp kettle mules.

11. The Commander of the Forces has frequently had occasion to complain, that notwithstanding he has ordered the issue of tents for the officers of the army, staff as well as regimental, they have omitted to take them from the stores; and afterwards, when it has been expedient to encamp the troops, the greatest inconveniences have been experienced, as well by officers, staff and regimental, as by the soldiers.

12. The Commander of the Forces now requests that the General officers and staff, and the Commanding officers of regiments, for themselves, the regimental staff, and the officers of companies, will make requisitions on the Q. M. G. for the number of tents they require for officers during the ensuing campaign to complete to the numbers allowed, as well as in exchange for any rendered unserviceable by wear; and the Q. M. G. will apprise them where these tents will be procured. If they do not send for them, they must do without tents; as those provided for non-commissioned officers and soldiers must be applied to that purpose only.

13. The Q. M. G. will likewise apprise the Commanding officers of regiments of infantry at what place they will procure the tents for the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

14. When officers will arrive at Lisbon from England and elsewhere, Major Gen. Peacocke will apprise them of the necessity that they should have tents; that is to say, one for each field officer, one for the officers of each company, one for the Adjutant and the Quarter Master, one for the Medical staff, and one for the Paymaster; and he will authorise the issue of tents accordingly from the public stores, which must be carried by the officers themselves.

weaken the corps of troops under your command. I hope to be able to render it as efficient as you could wish before the campaign shall commence, and that you will have those opportunities of distinguishing yourself, of which you are desirous.

A Don M. Pedreña.

Au quartier Général, ce 1 Mars, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 20 Fév. J'ai pris des informations sur les réclamations que vous faites sur la laine qui a été prise pour le service du siège de Burgos ; et j'ai trouvé que nous vous sommes redevables pour une quantité de laine que, d'après votre lettre, monte à 46 ballots. Je vous prie de me faire savoir le prix de cette laine, et je vous assure que vous en serez payé.

Pour ce qui regarde le blé, la toile, et l'argent, je crois que ces objets ont été donnés à l'armée du Général Castaños, et pour ceux-là je ne peux pas être responsable.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 1st March, 1813.

The regiments of infantry, *Pontevedra* and *El Principe*, belonging to the 4th army, and now stationed in the neighbourhood of Coruña, are, according to the last accounts, composed generally of men who, having heretofore deserted from the service, have been brought back to it ; and they are generally natives of the provinces of the north of Spain.

As I know it is the wish of the Regency to reinforce the troops in Catalonia, I have requested the British Admiral at Lisbon to send transports to Coruña ; and I propose to order that these two regiments may be embarked in them, and sent as soon as possible to Catalonia.

In case the government should entertain any objections to this measure, I beg to hear from you upon it without loss of time ; that if necessary, I may be able to prevent the embarkation of the troops.

To Sir R. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Freneda, 2d March, 1813.

I beg that you will send to Coruña by the first opportunity, to be at the disposal of Lieut. Col. Bourke, 1800 Flanders kettles, 5000 wooden canteens with straps, 16,000 turnscrews with worms, of the stores at Lisbon in your charge, for the use of the Spanish army.

I have written to Adm. Martin, to request him to send some transports to Coruña, and these articles might go by that opportunity.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 2d March, 1813.

There are in Galicia, in the neighbourhood of Coruña, 2 Spanish regiments of infantry, that of *El Principe*, and that of *Pontevedra*, consisting in the whole of 2000 men, which it is expedient should be sent from Coruña into Catalonia ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether it will be convenient to you to send transports to Coruña to take them round. If you can, I request you to send them to Coruña as soon as may be convenient to you ; taking to Coruña certain stores, for which the Commissary Gen. will make the usual application for conveyance.

On the arrival of these vessels at Coruña, it is desirable that the officer in command of them should not mention for what purpose he is sent to Coruña; and that he should be directed to communicate with Lieut. Col. Bourke at that place, and to follow the directions he will receive from that officer in regard to the embarkation of the troops, and the period of his sailing.

To Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, 2d March, 1813.

I have considered with the utmost attention the letter of your Excellency of the 22d Feb., enclosing one of the 14th Feb. from Don P. A. Giron, Chief of the Staff of the 4th army, and a memoir and other documents from that officer, in regard to the organization to be given to that army, under existing circumstances, which do the highest credit to the sense, the diligence, and ability of that officer.

Having referred these papers to the consideration of the Chief of the Staff, I enclose his report upon them, and I now proceed to make you acquainted with my opinion, and with the measures which I wish you to adopt.

I concur entirely in the opinion of Gen. Giron, that the organization of the 4th army must not be framed according to any technical rules supposed to be fixed, but should be adapted to circumstances. It is my opinion, however, that he has not carried that wise principle as far as it is expedient that it should be carried, in the measures which he has proposed for your Excellency's consideration.

The armies of all the allied nations are now in quarters of refreshment, and they may be considered as on the defensive. But this state will soon be changed; and whatever form of organization we may give to the 4th army, the mode in which the several parts of which it is composed will then be employed, and the situation at that time of the several countries from which the resources of the 4th army are to be drawn, become objects to be considered, and should be considered, in reference to the organization of the army.

That part of the 4th army now in Estremadura must necessarily, a part of it, form the garrison of Badajoz, and be employed in aid of the civil and financial authority of the government; and that part of it which will take the field must necessarily co-operate with the right of the allied British and Portuguese army. That part of the 4th army now in Castille must necessarily form the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and support the civil authority in Castille; while those troops which are disposable for the field, must necessarily co-operate with the left of the allied British and Portuguese army. This statement of the circumstances in which the troops composing the right wing of the 4th army are likely to be placed, will tend to show that it is expedient to carry still further than Gen. Giron has proposed, the principles which he has himself established. For this extension further reasons will be found in the measures to be adopted for the exercise of the command in the provinces of Estremadura and Castille, during the absence of your Excellency from those provinces. In fact, the General officer commanding the right wing as proposed to be formed by Gen. Giron, would be absent, it is to be hoped, at least from Estremadura equally with your Excellency; and this province, so inte-

resting from the resources which may be expected from it, would remain without a military commanding officer, on whose exertions every thing depends under the existing system.

To these considerations are to be added those relating to expense, referred to in the memorandum from the Chief of the Staff; and upon the whole, I recommend you to arrange this part of your command, which is totally disconnected from the rest, in the following manner:

1st; That you should appoint a General officer to command in Estremadura, and another in Castille for the present, as far as the Tormes, under the orders of your Excellency.

2dly; That in order to save expense, and the employment of additional Staff officers, these General officers should be, one, the acting Governor of Badajoz, and the other, the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. But if your Excellency should not deem this expedient, it is desirable that those Governors and their garrisons should be under the orders of the General officers whom you should appoint to command in Estremadura and Castille respectively.

3dly; That the brigade under the command of Gen. Morillo, and that in Castille, hitherto under Don Carlos de España, should be considered as detached for a particular purpose, and, for the moment, from the 4th army, equally with the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

4thly; That the cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur should be considered as a brigade of cavalry instead of a division as proposed; and that this brigade, as well as the troops under Don Julian, should be considered as detached, in like manner with the infantry. These detached brigades, and the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, will have the several Staff and Commissaries attached to them; the latter of course under the direction of the Intendant General of the 4th army.

This arrangement will suit the circumstances of the moment, whether referring to the territory, the troops, or the prospects of the campaign; while, if circumstances should enable the armies to connect more closely, it will be easy to join the detached parts of the 4th army to the main body. It has, besides, the advantage of saving an unnecessary expenditure of money in Staff and Commissariat officers.

Having thus disposed of the right wing of the 4th army, as proposed by Gen. Giron, I come to what he calls the centre, which is, in fact, *the army*; and I conceive that that part of it which has hitherto been the 6th army, and the division of Porlier, and the cavalry under the Conde de Fiquelmont, should be the right wing of the 4th army, and the troops of the 7th army the left wing.

It is my opinion that the right wing should consist of 3 divisions of infantry; of which the infantry of the late 6th army should compose 2, and the division of Porlier the 3d; and the left wing, of 3 divisions composed of the troops heretofore of the 7th army, as proposed by Gen. Giron.

The next point to be considered is the General officers and Staff for these wings, their relation to each other, and to your Excellency; and to the territories from which the resources are to be drawn by which these troops are to be maintained.

The General officers and Staff of the former 6th army would naturally form that of the right wing, under the direction of the Staff of the 4th army attached to your Excellency; and the General officers and Staff hitherto attached to the 7th army would form that of the left wing, under the same directions; and each with the diminutions which the alteration in the organization of the armies may have rendered practicable. In regard to the command of these wings, at least of the right, it is a consideration entirely for your Excellency's convenience.

It might be convenient to your Excellency to have a second in command to assist you in the management of all the various concerns confided to your superintendence; or it might be convenient to appoint a particular officer to command the right wing and another the left wing, under your Excellency's directions; or to keep the command of the whole of the 6 divisions of which the 4th army will be composed in your own hands, and those of the Chief of the Staff of the 4th army.

In whatever way you will decide this point, and I would rather recommend the adoption of the division of command by wings, I would suggest to you that Gen. Giron should be your second; or that he should be appointed to command the right wing of the army; or that he should continue to assist you, if you should adopt the plan last proposed as the Chief of the Staff.

If you should adopt the mode proposed of dividing the army in wings, it would be desirable that you should name the General officer commanding the right wing to be your deputy in Galicia, Leon, and Asturias; and the General officer commanding the left wing in the Provincias Vascongadas.

I believe that I have now gone through all the points referred to in Gen. Giron's letter and memoir; and have given you my opinion, and communicated my wishes upon them.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 2 Mars, 1813.

Je vous envoie un mémoire en Anglais, sur un plan d'organisation pour l'infanterie, que je vous prie de vous faire traduire en Français ou en Espagnol, par le Capitaine Mallet, et je vous serai bien obligé de me donner votre opinion là dessus aussitôt que vous le pourrez.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Stopford.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I received in due course your letter of the 2d Feb., to which I delayed to write an answer till Mr. Sodr  should arrive, whom I expected daily; as I wished to refer to my correspondence with the Prince Regent before I should reply to you. He, however, like others, had his engagements at Lisbon, and arrived here only yesterday; and having referred to my papers, I find that I omitted your name in the list which I sent to Brazil of those on whom I thought His Royal Highness might with propriety confer the Order of the Tower and Sword.

Why I omitted it, excepting that you were not with the army at the time I wrote upon this subject, and your name was not on the list which I had before me, it is impossible for me at this moment to account for; but certainly not with any intention of mortifying you; and still less with

that of casting *a slur* on your character. Indeed, I hope that this mode of considering an omission which can easily be rectified, is only a *façon de parler*; and that you will think no more of it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 13th Feb., from Gibraltar, and I shall be very happy to have your assistance on the other side of the Peninsula.

The season is not yet sufficiently advanced to enable us here to take the field, and till we can do so in strength we should only lose the corps employed in partial attempts elsewhere. I hope soon, however, to be able to collect the army; and I shall send you instructions as to the part you are to act. I am inclined to believe that your operations must necessarily be connected with the fleet or the coast, and must be much of the same description with those carried on by me in the first campaign, that of 1808 in Portugal. There is nothing new in this part of the world.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I enclose you the copy of the letter from Sir C. Stuart, and of the note of the Portuguese minister in regard to the employment of the Russian troops in Portugal, which you will communicate, if you deem it expedient, to the Spanish government.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I think it proper to enclose, for the notice of government, a letter which has been sent here by 2 persons in my confidence at Salamanca, being the account of what passed at a meeting of the *Ayuntamiento* of that town assembled under the direction of the *Corregidor* appointed by the enemy, as it tends to show that the enemy have reverted to the plan of assembling the Cortes, which they had in contemplation in the last year.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Col. Bunbury, containing Gen. Leigh's request, that I should apply to the Commander in Chief to recommend that the Buffs should be permitted to wear 'Douro' on their colors. As this regiment distinguished itself particularly in the passage of that river, I beg you will submit the proposition to His Royal Highness' favorable consideration.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Campbell, giving an account of the conduct of the 2d Italian regiment at an outpost at Xixona, which had induced him to detain that regiment and re-embark it; and the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Gen. Campbell on that subject.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

I enclose the last daily state, in which are not included the hussar brigade, nor D'Urban's cavalry.

There are at least 2000 Portuguese infantry returned on command who are on furlough with their friends, and will be present for duty; and there will be some reinforcements for the Portuguese army from the depôt at Mafra. I think, likewise, that I shall have some more men from our hospitals. But we are already stronger than we have ever been since I have commanded the army; and I hope in every respect more efficient.

We want, however, 1500 horses to complete the equipment of the artillery (that is without spare), for which I asked in October; after turning the last troop of horse artillery which arrived into a 9 pounder troop, and substituting a Portuguese brigade of artillery for a British brigade in the reserve. I don't hear of more than 800 horses coming out, of which 100 have been given to the troops at Alicante, as I have understood, and lately informed your Lordship. But we are purchasing mules and doing every thing in our power to render this equipment complete.

I have been doing every thing in my power to get on the Spanish army; and I must do the officers the justice to say that I have reason to believe they do every thing in their power. I have much reason, however, to complain of the delays and conduct of the government on various points connected with the army since I quitted Cadiz; upon which I have written to them in such terms as, I hope, will bring them to their senses. We have large bodies of men well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and in a certain state of discipline.

It is still doubtful whether I can realise any resources from the country, so as to be able to make any use of these troops as an army in the field. Indeed I am afraid it is almost hopeless, and the chief reliance is upon that part of the British subsidy not already appropriated, for any effectual aid from the Spanish army. I calculate that I have appropriated half of it, or £500,000. It is very doubtful whether we shall realise more, or even that sum without material inconvenience to the military chest of the army. I shall, however, do every thing in my power, aided by your Lordship's monthly £100,000, which you will observe has been of such use to us, that not only has the produce of our bills been greater since we have received this supply regularly, but what is still more extraordinary, I don't believe you have received any complaint of want of money for many months.

Although I believe the Spanish army are generally clothed, and they ought not to want clothing for at least a year, I think it would be advisable to let us have clothing for 100,000 men, instead of for 50,000, in the year 1813. You may depend upon it that none shall be issued, the issue of which can be avoided; and I have it in my power to control this concern in any way I please. By sending the 100,000 suits this year, I shall have time to distribute and send them to the different armies when wanted. I enclose a list of the articles sent last year, and have marked those which may, with great propriety, be omitted in future.

I am inclined to think that we should do very well, nay much better, without the military agents; and I shall be glad to know whether there is any objection to my informing them that they are no longer to be employed as such, in case I should continue to think they are of no use. I believe that Col. Bourke ought to be continued, but none of the others.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 3d March, 1813.

The enemy have made no movement in this part of the country since I addressed you on the 24th ult. It is generally reported throughout the country that they propose again to attack our post at Bejar, but I have not heard of any movements or preparations which give any ground to believe that such a design is entertained.

I have not yet received the details of the operations of the enemy's corps, which I reported in my last had crossed the Esla. It is reported that they surprised the Spanish fort at Benavente, and moved forward as far as Villa de Ciervos, towards Braganza. They retired from thence, but I have since heard they had returned on the 26th to Villa de Ciervos. These accounts are not official, but I have sent to have the details.

Memorandum for the A.A.Gs. of divisions.

4th March, 1813.

The D. A. G., with a view of saving time to the A. A. G., and of diminishing the consumption of stationery, conceives it to be expedient to direct that the G. O. shall not as heretofore be entered in a book in the handwriting of the A. A. G., but that the printed copies which are distributed to the A. A. G., with the signature of the senior officer of the department at head quarters, shall be carefully preserved and bound up together in the form of books, making a separate volume for every period of 4 months; that is to say, from the 1st Jan. to the 30th April; from the 1st May to the 31st Aug.; from the 1st Sept. to the 31st Dec. The foregoing regulation is to be understood as taking effect from the 21st Sept. 1812, the period when the printing of the G. O. commenced; and all the G. O. which may have been entered in a book in the handwriting of the A. A. G. subsequent to that period may be destroyed. The printed G. O. from the 21st Sept. to the 31st Dec. 1812 are to be bound together in one volume.

In order that it may be ascertained at the Adj. Gen.'s office that all the G. O. have been carefully preserved and bound together as directed, the volumes of G. O. will be required to be sent in for inspection soon after the expiration of each period of 4 months.

The foregoing regulations apply equally to Majors of Brigade; and the A. A. G. will in like manner call for the volumes of G. O. of the Brigade Majors in their respective divisions soon after the expiration of each period of 4 months, to ascertain that the G. O. have been carefully preserved and bound up together.

To Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 5th March, 1813.

I have received your Excellency's letter of the 21st Feb. in regard to the promotion of Capt. Don Juan Mendieta, of the regiment of *Voluntarios de España*; and your Excellency may depend upon my earnest desire to procure the promotion of those officers who shall, by their good conduct, attract the attention of the General officers under whose orders they are serving; and that I shall take an early opportunity of endeavoring to forward your wishes in regard to Don Juan Mendieta.

It is very important to restore and maintain the authority of the Royal *Ordenanzas* on the subject of promotions as well as on other points; but I hope that it will not be inconsistent with a due observance of these, to forward the promotion of those officers who, by their conduct, attract the attention of the General officers under whose orders they are serving.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 5th March, 1813.

I have received your Excellency's orders of the 19th and the 22d Feb., the first directing that Brigadiers Don Pascual Liñan and Don Josef

Zaldivar should be sent to —, and the last directing that the 1st batt. of Spanish guards, serving in the 3d army, and now at Granada, should be sent to Puerto de Sta Maria.

Your Excellency will see, by the reports transmitted to your Excellency by this occasion, that I have obeyed the orders of the government in respect to the Brigadiers General.

I am not acquainted with the employment of Brigadier Liñan in the 4th army. Brigadier Zaldivar now commands that division of the 4th army which is in Castille; Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, being absent by leave of the Regency, and Brigadier Carroll being absent on account of sickness. But I conclude that the necessity of calling these officers to Cadiz was urgent, and, notwithstanding that this division now remains without a General officer, the order of the government is obeyed.

I don't exactly understand, by the terms of your Excellency's letter regarding the Spanish guards, whether you have or not sent orders to this corps to march; but at all events I have sent them the orders. I have likewise sent orders to the Conde de la Bisbal to give directions that they may be provided for on the march. I have received no reports, nor has the Chief of the Staff, of the bad state of this battalion; and, as it is in Granada, where it ought to be well provided for, and, I understand, has been lately clothed, I am astonished that it should be in the state represented to the Regency; and I am equally surprised that such a report on any corps of the army should have reached them by any channel excepting by that appointed by themselves, and should have been deemed so authentic as to induce them to act upon it.

I beg leave to remind your Excellency that this is the third regiment of infantry, making in the whole about 3000 men, which have been drawn from the armies on that side of the Peninsula, by orders direct from your Excellency, without any reference to my opinion. I likewise beg leave to remind your Excellency that, when you think proper to send orders direct to the troops of one army to march into the district, the resources of which are allotted to the support of another army, it is necessary to apprise the General officer commanding that army of the passage of such troops, in order that he may give directions that they may be provided for; and that, in case such troops are to remain permanently in such district, it is necessary in order that they may be transferred to the army for whose subsistence the resources of the district are allotted. If these measures are not adopted, the troops must continue to exist by plunder and other irregular means; and the advantages expected to result from the measures which I had the honor to propose to the government will not be realised.

I wait the directions of the government to order the battalion of Spanish guards to be transferred to the Army of Reserve.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

6th March, 1813.

I am directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will cause to be transmitted to this office without delay the register (if any such is kept by the Commandant at Belem) of all men sent home invalided from the period of the establishment at Belem to the 1st of this month; and should it appear that no such register has been kept, I request to be furnished with all returns or other documents in your possession from which accurate information can be obtained

of the names, regiments, and companies or troops of men so sent home, with the periods to which their accounts were settled respectively, from the period above stated to the 1st of this month.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

The mail has just arrived and brought the enclosed letters to announce that you are made a Knight of the Bath, of which I received an intimation some time ago. I beg leave to congratulate you on this well-deserved honor. The box containing the insignia is here, and I will invest you with them with the greatest satisfaction on any day you will come over here. We are not very roomy at Freneda, but we ought to have present the General officer and Staff of your division, and some of the Commanding officers of regiments.

I am not quite certain that it would not be best to adjourn head quarters to Ciudad Rodrigo for the occasion.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d inst., with its enclosure from Dom M. Forjaz, containing the request of the Portuguese government that the persons concerned in the outrage committed at Punhete should be tried by a British Military Court; and I have to request that you will return to me the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held for the investigation of this case, which I transmitted to you in my letter of the 26th Jan. last.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will draw the attention of the Portuguese government to the state of the arrear of pay due to the troops which form the operating army, and urge them to adopt some decisive measures to bring it up more nearly to a par with the arrear to our troops. We are now paying up to the 24th Nov., whereas the Portuguese troops have not received farther than June; and yet the subsidy is paid regularly; indeed, it is the only payment not in arrear.

The greatest inconvenience, indeed serious evils, were the consequences last campaign of the deficiency of regular payments to the Portuguese troops, which will be aggravated in the next campaign if some decided measures are not adopted to apply a remedy to the evil. I should wish the government to apply the remedy themselves; and I suggest to them, 1st; to abolish the *Junta de Viveres* totally, and to put a stop to the payments still making in the most extravagant and shameful manner by, or on account of that infamous board: and, 2dly; to raise the direct taxes, as I proposed to them last year, in Lisbon and Oporto.

I have ascertained that the sum required to pay the officers and troops

G. O.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

3. Orders are likewise given for the payment of 165 days' *bât* and forage money to the army, including the addition ordered on the 1st March, 1813, to that of Captains of companies of infantry.

4. The Commander of the Forces requests that the General officers will see that the mule equipments of the regiments in their several brigades are completed according to those orders.

actually employed in the field amounts to between 150,000 and 160,000 dollars monthly; and, if the Portuguese government don't adopt arrangements to satisfy me that this sum shall be paid in every month, I must state the matter to my own government, and to the Prince Regent, and must adopt other measures which are in my power to secure the regular payment, at least on a par with our troops, of the officers and soldiers of the Portuguese army composing the army in the field.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 7th March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which the Chief of the Staff has received from the Chief of the Staff of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia. I beg that you will lay this letter before the Regency, and that you will do me the favor to explain to them that their orders cannot be obeyed as I wish to see them obeyed; that confusion must continue to exist in the military service; and that the chain and system of military subordination must be broken in upon, unless your Excellency should communicate to me, and to the Chief in command of the troops, the orders which the government are under the necessity of sending immediately to any portion of the troops.

Upon this point I beg leave to call your Excellency's attention to the 4th paragraph of my address to your Excellency of the 25th Dec.;* and to your Excellency's answer of the 1st Jan. 1813.

I conclude that the government propose to adhere to what was therein arranged; and I should be glad to know their sentiments on this point. I am perfectly aware that on many occasions it may be absolutely necessary, on account of the distance at which I am from the seat of government, that the government should send orders direct to particular portions of the troops; and your Excellency will observe that I myself proposed to government, by my letter from Xerez of the 10th Jan. 1813, that the orders of government to the Conde de la Bisbal, for the movement of the Army of Reserve, should be sent direct. But this practice should be limited by the necessity for it; as the discipline and subordination of the army, nay, the support of the authority of the government itself, and the obedience to their orders, depend upon their adherence to the military rule of every army, viz., that the communications of the head to the inferiors should be made through the channel of their chiefs.

I understand from your Excellency's letter of the 15th Feb., that the government has given in charge to Gen. Abadia the superintendence of various arrangements for the preparation of certain troops for an expedition beyond the seas. It would put an end to all these difficulties and discussions, and would facilitate and secure the execution of the orders and intentions of the government upon this point, if your Excellency would do me the favor to signify to the Conde de la Bisbal, and to me, what officers and corps are to be placed at the disposition of Gen. Abadia for this purpose; and that, on every occasion in which it should be necessary for the government to give orders direct to any inferior officer or to the troops, you would be pleased to apprise me of them, as well as the General officer commanding the army to which they belong.

* See page 220.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 1st division.

7th March, 1813.

In reference to your letter of the 14th ult., I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to signify to you that he has endeavored to frame a G. O. regarding the mode of settling the accounts of the soldiers where the pay of the army may happen to be in arrear beyond the period contemplated in the G. O. of the 24th Jan. 1810; but that his Excellency can think of no expedient which is not liable to greater inconvenience than any that are likely to arise from the custom which appears to prevail in the 1st division, of carrying forward the debts and credits of the soldiers to a general account, and striking a balance when an issue of pay is made to the troops. Hitherto no practical inconvenience appears to have resulted from this custom; but his Excellency has directed me to signify to you that if you can suggest any mode of obviating such inconveniences as may arise from a continuance of it, he will willingly take the same into his consideration.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 1st division.

7th March, 1813.

I have the honor of informing you that the Portuguese government have thought proper to decide that Ensign — shall be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, in preference to a trial before a tribunal of the country, as stated in my letter to you of the 28th ult., when the papers relating to the transaction in which Ensign — appears to have been engaged at Punhete shall be returned from Lisbon. Charges against that officer will be preferred by the Dep. Judge Advocate Gen., and I shall have the honor of communicating with you further on the subject.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 4th and 5th, and I concur entirely with you regarding the conduct of the Marquez de Borba. I have already written to Sir C. Stuart regarding the arrears due to the Portuguese troops; and, if I should not find that efficient measures are adopted to bring their pay at least on a par with that of our own troops, whom we are now paying to the 24th Nov., I must give the monthly subsidy in future here to the Paymaster of the Army for that purpose.

To Col. the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of Lieut. —, of the — regt.; and I request that the Court will revise both proceedings and sentence.

In respect to the proceedings, it appears to me that as the Court thought proper to consider and forward the written testimony not on oath brought forward by the prisoner, they ought equally to have taken into consideration, and to have forwarded the letters of the Marques del Palacio, and the written testimony *on oath*, in favor of the prosecution.

In regard to the sentence, I beg the Court to observe that the foundation of all the G. O. against which Lieut. — has been found guilty of offending, has been a desire on my part to prevent the committing of outrages by the soldiers, in consequence of which outrages many had lost their lives in the contests with the people of the country in defence of their property.

It is in the power of an officer in the command of a party, such as was under Lieut. —'s orders, to prevent outrages of the description proved to have been committed by his party; a plain and distinct line of conduct is traced for him in the G. O. for every case that can possibly occur; and he is, and must be considered responsible for the conduct of the party.

I would just beg the General Court Martial to consider whether a reprimand from the Commander of the Forces can be considered by any body as a punishment for such offences as were committed by this party; whether such a sentence can be considered as giving support and weight to the G. O. of the Commander of the Forces, or is likely to produce such an effect upon the minds of the officers of the army in general, as to operate as an example and render others more attentive; or the effect which the G. O. had in view, viz., to prevent the inhabitants of the country from taking the law into their own hands, and from revenging upon the soldiers the outrages which the soldiers commit.

I would beg the Court likewise to observe, that without the aid of their sentence, the complaints of the Marques del Palacio, supported by written documents, on oath, were sufficient grounds for me to reprimand Lieut. —, without giving them the trouble, or taking up the time of the public by trying him; and as they have found him guilty, I consider it my duty to recommend that they should pass such a sentence as will operate as an example to others, and shall convince the allied nations that an appeal is not made to a British General Court Martial in vain.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I received by the last mail from the Earl Bathurst; and I request you to carry into execution his Lordship's orders regarding the 2d batt. 9th regt., according to the state in which you may consider it to be.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I enclose an extract of a letter of the 2d Feb. from the Earl Bathurst, received by the last post; and I beg that you will be so kind as to send foreign recruits to Cadiz according to the arrangement proposed by his Lordship, if you should be able before next November.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter with its enclosures which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Sir G. L. Cole, in regard to the murder of a British soldier.

I am concerned to add, that several instances of the same kind have occurred lately in that part of Upper Beira, and much disinclination has been shown on the part of the magistrates to give that assistance to the army which every army requires.

It is very desirable that the government should adopt some decisive measures on these subjects.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 18th Jan., in regard to — — —, — — —, — — —, and — — —, 4 soldiers of the — regt.

These soldiers were part of a guard who, when escorting treasure from Lisbon and Badajoz in the year 1809, robbed the money-chest of £2500 sterling. Shortly after the robbery was committed, 2500 dollars were found in the possession of the prisoners; but no proof could ever be obtained that they had robbed the military chest, although I, and those

who considered the subject with me, never entertained the slightest doubt upon the subject.

For this reason I did not think it proper to bring these persons to trial before a Court Martial. They must have been acquitted, and they would have had a claim to the money which had been found in their possession. As the robbery by the soldiers of the guard of the money and other articles under their charge was but too common a practice, I did not deem it expedient to hold forth to the army this example of the success with which such an outrage to such a serious extent might be committed with impunity.

Although I cannot now lay my hands on the copy of the letter, I recollect to have applied to the authorities at home for orders in what manner to proceed in this case; but never having received any, and the Commanding officer of the — batt. — regt. having applied that the men might be released and might join the battalion when the battalion went home, I gave orders accordingly. I now request to have orders what I am to do with these men; and particularly whether I am to restore to them the money taken from them and locked in the military chest in the year 1809.

I enclose various letters from Lieut. Col. —, and other papers on this subject, including the report of the Deputy Judge Advocate of the 27th Feb. 1810, on the chance of convicting the offenders of this robbery.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 9th March, 1813.

In answer to your letter of the 3d Feb., in regard to the detention in this country of the second battalions, and their formation into provisional battalions, I can only repeat to you what I have said to Col. Torrens, viz., that when His Royal Highness, or the government, shall send me an order upon any subject, they will invariably find it obeyed with the utmost celerity; but if they leave the execution of their wishes to my judgment, they must expect that I shall exercise a judgment upon the subject; and that with every desire to act as they wish, I shall not adopt a measure which is in my opinion prejudicial to the service in this country.

Every day's experience has proved to me that one soldier who has served one or two campaigns in this country is worth two, if not three, newly sent out; and it further appears, that it signifies but little from what part of the world regiments come, as those from Gibraltar, Ceuta, Cadiz, and the Mediterranean, are equally inefficient with those from England and Ireland. The second battalions, some of which have now been four years in this army, are the best troops we have, and will render good service in the next campaign in the way in which I have organised them. It could not be expected from me that I should send away nearly 2000 of these soldiers, at a moment when every man is an object, the period of sending them away being left to my discretion. But let the orders that they shall be sent come from the quarter in which they ought to originate, and they shall be obeyed with alacrity; and you shall hear no complaints of their ill effects.

I hope that your Lordship and His Royal Highness will understand that I am not at all desirous of throwing any difficulties in the way of the

execution of the plans formed at home for the service at large ; but that when a point is left to my judgment, it can be exercised only upon the effects which the execution will have on the service in this country.

The A. G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division.

9th March, 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to refer to you the enclosed letter, addressed to his Excellency by Doña —, and to request that you will be pleased to inquire whether or not it is true, as stated, that Lieut. — made use of a private and serjeant of the — regt. to assist him in carrying off the young lady therein alluded to. His Excellency at the same time directed me to signify to you that if Lieut. — did carry off the young lady, he has been guilty of a military offence of a serious nature, and that he must at all events be put under arrest, and shall be tried either by the Portuguese law or a military tribunal ; and his Excellency desires that strict inquiry may be made how it happened that Lieut. — stayed behind on the days stated in the complaint, whether by leave or otherwise.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 10th March, 1813.

The Sec. of State having communicated to me the intention of His Majesty's government to send the 29th regt. to Cadiz, I have to request that on the arrival there of this corps, you will cause the 59th regt. to be embarked in the transports which shall have conveyed the 29th from England, and send them round to Lisbon.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 10th March, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 5th, to which I shall reply in a day or two. It appears to me that the Cortes and government have outdone themselves in the affair of the Russian troops in Spain.

I am afraid they did not send you a correct copy of my letter to Lord Bathurst. I have desired Lord FitzRoy to write to Mr. Vaughan on the subject.

We have received letters and papers from the 6th to the 19th Feb. I am to have Lord Buckingham's Blue Riband.

There is nothing new from Russia, no intelligence having been received for 20 days ; but it appears by the French accounts, that the remnants of their army are on the Oder with a part at Posen ; the Russians on this side the Vistula, but the pursuit not very active.

Buonaparte is reconciled to the Pope ; on what precise terms is not stated ; but it appears that he has ceded the territory of the Holy See, in full sovereignty.

In a Madrid paper I see that it is stated that the ecclesiastical affairs of Spain will soon be arranged under the mediation of the Pope ! This is very important.

There is nothing else of any importance. There is a curious letter from the Princess of Wales to the Regent. The votes in both Houses on the American war were unanimous.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 10th March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose, for your Royal Highness' consideration, the copies of some letters which have passed between Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, and me, and the Commanding officers of regiments of

Foot Guards, in regard to a question in which these officers conceived the privileges of the Guards are concerned.

I confess that I don't understand the subject; and, at all events, the question having been raised by those officers, and they having continued of the same opinion upon it after they had been made acquainted with that which I had been induced to form, it is absolutely necessary that I should lay the subject before your Royal Highness, and request your Royal Highness will procure a decision upon it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th March, 1813.

I have received several accounts that Gen. Caffarelli and Marshal Soult had been recalled from this country, the former from the command of the army of the North, the latter from that of the army of the South. I have reason to believe that the former has been relieved from his command by Gen. Clausel, and has gone to France with those troops belonging to the Guard which still remained in the army of the North. These have been relieved in the North by the Italian division of Palombini, which, in former dispatches, I reported to your Lordship had marched to the northern parts of Spain. It is likewise reported that Marshal Soult had set out on his return to France, and had passed Madrid and Segovia.

A large draft has been made from the artillery in this country to be sent to France; and likewise one of 12 men from each battalion of infantry; and it is understood that these troops form the escort of Marshal Soult. Marshal Soult is relieved in his command of the army of the South by Gen. Gazan.

I have received reports that a reinforcement of troops, amounting to about 4000 men, had entered Spain, and had arrived at Burgos.

The enemy have made no movement of importance since I addressed your Lordship last. The expedition beyond the Esla was merely for the sake of plunder.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th March, 1813.

I have just received a letter of the 5th inst. from my brother, a copy of which, he tells me, he intends to send to England, and which will probably be received about the same time with this, in which you will see that the Spanish government and Cortes have outdone themselves in their conduct respecting the Russian troops.

It luckily happens that it is most probable that the Emperor of Russia would not have it in his power to carry into execution his offer, as, if what I read in the newspapers of the state of his army be true (and indeed it must be expected that his army would suffer from their extraordinary exertions during the winter), he can have no more men, whose services would be worth having, than he would require for himself. Although I did not expect that the Spanish government would hesitate about accepting the offer of Russian assistance, and that it could be possible that they would decline it, I think that, upon the whole, it is fortunate that the subject was brought under their consideration as it was brought, and at the earliest period.

I have not seen the Cadiz newspapers beyond the 24th of last month,

but the subject was then talked of in the Calle de Atocha; and I doubt not that, between that day and the 5th March, the newspapers took a tolerably active share in the discussion.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Freneda, 11th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures which I have received from Col. Torrens, from which you will perceive that there exists a committee in the — regt., which I suppose is the committee for the management of the concerns of the mess; but you will see that it extends its attention to other matters, with which it ought to have no concern; and that the existence of such a committee, with such objects, and under such circumstances, is justly considered to be improper, and injurious to discipline.

I have always considered that there is no greater incentive to the performance of duty in every situation, and that nothing upholds discipline and good order in a regiment to a greater degree, than the sentiments and spirit of the officers belonging to it. No man dares to neglect his duty, or to conduct himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, if he knows that his brother officers will notice his misconduct with their disapprobation, or that it will be attended by the loss of their esteem; and I am convinced that I should carry into execution the intentions of the Commander in Chief in a very inadequate manner, if I did not guard myself against the notion that the existence of such sentiments, and such a spirit, is disapproved of at head quarters or by me. The existence of such a spirit among the officers of a regiment is very different from what appears in these papers as the proceedings of the committee existing in the — regt.

In the former case, every officer judges and acts for himself, and he discourages misconduct or neglect of duty by his opinion and demeanor towards those guilty of either. He does not bend his opinion even to that of a whole mess, which I am sorry to say experience has shown sometimes acts in the spirit and on the principle of combination; much less does he shape his conduct according to the opinion of a committee of that mess.

It is obvious that the existence of such a committee, taking upon themselves to advert to such circumstances as it appears have been considered by the committee in the — regt., must be prejudicial to subordination and to discipline, and that even the corps of officers themselves cannot with propriety act as this committee has acted.

I beg you to inquire into the circumstances adverted to in the enclosed papers, and to call before you the officers of the — regt., and point out to them the danger and impropriety of their mess committee, or even their mess, continuing such conduct; and you will inform the Commanding officer that I shall consider him responsible if any thing of the kind should occur in future, unless he should report the conduct of those who shall disobey my orders, and those of the Commander in Chief.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 11th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter received from Sir W. Beresford regarding the balance existing in the hands of the collectors in different parts of the country. I

knew of this evil before ; and as long ago as January, in the year 1810, I wrote to the government respecting it.

We must prevail upon our friend the Marquez de Borba to let us know the real state of the revenue, and of the actual receipts, and of the balances in the hands of the several collectors. If he does not give us this information, I must mention the subject to the Prince Regent. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will talk to him upon it.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 11th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st March, in which, by the orders of government, you have enclosed representations from the Intendants of the provinces of Toledo and La Mancha, in regard to the contributions which the enemy have it in contemplation to levy from certain villages in those provinces.

Your Excellency will have seen, from my dispatches to your Excellency since I have been appointed to command the Spanish armies, that the allied British and Portuguese army, having been actively engaged in operations in the field from the month of January to the end of the month of November, 1812, required some rest ; that the troops required clothing and equipments of different descriptions, the whole of which they have not yet received ; and that, above all, it was impossible to employ the army actively in the field in this part of the Peninsula till the green forage should appear for the support of the horses and animals attached to the army.

I have therefore considered it proper to keep the Spanish troops on the defensive till the allied British and Portuguese army could take the field, even supposing the Spanish troops were now in a situation to take the field. But, although a sufficient time has not yet elapsed to enable me to enter into details upon this point, I am now sufficiently informed to be able to assure your Excellency that there is not a single battalion or squadron in a situation to take the field ; that there is not in the whole Kingdom of Spain a depôt of provisions for the support of a single battalion in operation for one day, nor a shilling of money in any military chest. I have not yet received the report of the mode in which the system for the support of the armies, adopted by the Cortes in January, and lately ordered by the government, has operated ; but, unless it should succeed, it is very obvious that we cannot hope for the permanent operation of any Spanish corps.

Under these circumstances, I have had to consider of the expediency of taking any steps on the representations forwarded to me by your Excellency. The nearest troops to the points stated to be threatened by the enemy are those under Brigadier Morillo, certainly more numerous than those of the enemy threatening those points. But 1st ; I must inform your Excellency that the troops under Brigadier Morillo cannot be moved from their present situation, having neither money nor provisions.

2dly ; I have to inform you that, if I should think it proper, as a military measure, to move forward the troops under Brigadier Morillo, I should think it necessary to provide for his being supported by some other corps of troops, in case the enemy should reinforce their troops,

threatening the points referred to in the provinces of Toledo and La Mancha.

The troops which would naturally support Brigadier Morillo are those of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the Conde de la Bisbal, whose discipline and organization would thus be prematurely interrupted, even if it should be supposed that they have money and provisions to enable them to move from their present cantonments, which supposition is, I believe, directly contrary to the fact.

The consequence, then, of moving troops to save a few villages likely to be plundered by the enemy, would certainly be, immediately, very inconvenient, and might prove fatal in the ensuing campaign to the efficiency of the troops employed on such service.

One of the misfortunes attending the existing war in the Peninsula is the necessity of sacrificing the interests of individuals to the cause of the nation, and to the great object of its ultimate salvation; and I have entered into detail, as far as I am able, in my answer to the government upon this subject, because I am certain that they will receive many complaints of the same kind, and that many individuals who are not protected will think that they might be so.

All that I can say is, that the armies are each of them as far forward as I think they can be, in a view to their subsistence, to the receipt of their equipments, &c., and to their mutual support; and that I cannot consider it advisable to risk the loss of such a body of men as that under the command of Brigadier Morillo, for example, for the sake of endeavoring to save a few villages in La Mancha and Toledo from plunder; or to render it certain that I should receive no assistance from the Conde de la Bisbal's corps in the next campaign, by moving them forward now, without magazines of provisions, or money to buy them, to support Brigadier Morillo in his operations for the protection of a few villages from plunder.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief. Freneda, 11th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letters of the 16th and 17th Feb., which shall be strictly obeyed. I was induced to delay the drafting of the 3 regiments, respecting which I wrote to your Royal Highness, till the 20th Feb., till I could be certain that the horses would have forage on their movement, and till I could get accurate returns of the state of the horse appointments; but the orders have been given for drafting the 4th dragoon guards, the 9th and 11th light dragoons, instead of the 13th. The 11th light dragoons were locally situated more conveniently for delivering the horses to the other regiments; and, having been very sickly lately, I considered it most expedient to draft them. The horses of these regiments will complete the 3d and 5th dragoon guards. The Royals and 4th dragoons, the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 16th light dragoons, will give about 50 horses to the 1st German heavy dragoons. The 3d dragoons have already 28 horses more than they can mount. The 1st hussars want only 13 horses; and the 1st German heavy cavalry want 70 horses.

I wait for your Royal Highness' orders for drafting both men and horses from the 2d hussars; and, in case your Royal Highness should approve of

that measure, which indeed was ordered by the Sec. of State, I should propose to draft from them a sufficient number of men to complete the three squadrons of the 1st hussars, and all their horses to be distributed among the other regiments of cavalry. I should likewise propose to do the same with the 2d German heavy dragoons, to complete the 1st regt.; and to send the remainder of the men and officers of the 2d dragoons and 2d hussars home to England.

If, however, your Royal Highness should disapprove of my drafting the men, as well as the horses, of the 2d hussars, I propose immediately to draft the horses only from those regiments. The other regiments will, however, certainly have more horses than they can mount. Upon this point I have to add, in addition to what I stated in my letter to your Royal Highness of the 10th Feb., that each regiment has 12 mules attached to it to carry its portable forges, which mules perform the service which would otherwise be performed by horses, and they ought to be reckoned as so many in addition to each regiment.

One of the provisional battalions shall return to England as soon as the 2d batt. 59th regt., which has been ordered from Cadiz, shall arrive.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Peacocke, Lisbon.

11th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of submitting to the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 7th inst. and enclosure (herewith returned), regarding the disorderly conduct of certain deserters from the enemy at the Castle of Lisbon; and his Excellency has directed me to signify to you his desire that the offenders may be made to suffer solitary confinement on bread and water for a term or terms proportionate to the nature of the offences.

To Col. the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan.

Freneda, 12th March, 1813.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of private ———, of the — regt., for desertion; and, having adverted to the disgraceful prevalency of this crime in the British army, and to the circumstances attending the desertion of this soldier, I consider it my duty to request the Court Martial to revise their sentence on his trial, and to sentence the extreme punishment which the law has allotted to his crime.

It is always with very great regret that I trouble a General Court Martial; but it cannot be expected that crimes will be prevented by punishments, or discipline maintained in an army, unless the examples of the consequences attending the commission of these enormous offences should be of a nature to operate on the minds of the soldiers in general.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Freneda, 12th March, 1813.

I have received your three letters of the 14th ult. You command a division of Spanish troops, which is an integral part of what is called the 2d army, and which must so remain till I shall give orders to the contrary. If you dislike your situation, or make any further difficulties about obeying the orders you receive, or fail to carry on the service, you must either resign your command, or, in the latter case, I shall recommend to the government that another officer may be appointed to it.

This division of the 2d army is, however, attached at present, for the

purposes of the service, to the Anglo-Sicilian corps, which disembarked at Alicante last autumn; and I have no doubt that Gen. Elio will give every facility in his power to enable the division to perform its duty as it ought in that situation.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Freneda, 12th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 14th ult., on the subject of 40 mules which have been lately sent to Alicante, and consigned to the care of the British Consul, by Nebot, a guerrilla chief; and, in reply to your request that they should be appropriated to the service of the artillery attached to your division, I have to acquaint you that, as these mules were presented to me by Nebot, they are my property, and I have given them to the British artillery attached to the Anglo-Sicilian troops at present at Alicante.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Freneda, 12th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th ult. on the subject of the nature of the original establishment of the corps of troops under your command; and, in reply to it, I beg to refer you to the letter (No. 1) which I have this day written to you.

I am perfectly aware of your merits; but I cannot allow you or any other officer to consider yourself independent of the regular authorities of the army in which you are serving.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Freneda, 13th March, 1813.

I have this morning received your letters of the 10th and 11th. I have always intended to remove you to the 2d division as soon as Sir T. Graham should arrive, and I have no reason to believe that there will be any difficulty in so doing.

I am sorry to receive so bad an account of my friends the Guards. I had thoughts of sending the 1st brigade to Oporto, which will, I think, do them most good.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 13 Mars, 1813.

Je vous envoie une réponse officielle par cette occasion sur l'organisation des troupes en Galice, et sur la cavalerie de Penne Villemur. Soyez sûr que je ne presserai aucune réforme, et qu'on verra qu'on ne perdra rien en force, mais, au contraire, qu'on gagnera dans celle dont je me mêlerai.

Je ne vois aucune raison pour laquelle vous ne disposeriez pas de Salvador comme vous voudrez; et vous n'avez qu'à dire comment vous voulez disposer de lui, et je l'arrangerai. C'est jeter un tel homme par la fenêtre que de le mettre à l'Armée de Réserve de la Galice, qui n'existe pas, même sur papier.

Je ne veux rien entreprendre dans les affaires qui ne m'appartiennent pas. Le gouvernement doit savoir mieux que moi si le Ministre de la Guerre leur sert; et c'est leur affaire, et non pas la mienne.

Je suis très content du chef de l'état major, qui me paraît un homme

fort sage et discret ; et qui ne se mêle que de ses propres affaires, qu'il fait très bien.

Je suis bien aise de ce que vous me dites du père du Général Giron ; et je vous prie de le féliciter de ma part. Pour ce qui est de l'avancement de Giron, je vous parle comme si vous n'étiez pas son oncle, et je vous assure que j'ai la meilleure opinion de ses talens ; et je suis bien sûr qu'il ira loin dans la carrière militaire. Mais il ne m'est pas possible de demander son avancement à présent sans demander celui des autres, ses anciens, ou ses contemporains. Je ne suis pas insensible aux avantages qu'il y aurait pour le Commandant en Chef qui commencerait sa carrière en demandant une promotion d'officiers Généraux ; mais j'avoue que je préfère avoir ces avantages dans l'armée Espagnole comme je les ai eus dans d'autres armées ; c'est à dire, en faisant strictement mon devoir envers le public, aussi bien qu'envers les officiers et les soldats de l'armée.

G. O.

Freneda, 13th March, 1813.

1. The horses of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the 4th dragoon guards are forthwith to be drafted into the Royal dragoons and 3d dragoon guards, in the proportion of two thirds into the Royal dragoons, and one third into the 3d dragoon guards.

2. The horses of the 4th dragoon guards are to be formed 2 deep, and each file to be numbered. Similar numbers are to be placed in lots in a hat, from which an officer from the Royal dragoons is to draw 2 lots, and an officer from the 3d dragoon guards one lot, until the whole will have been drawn. The horses in the files having the corresponding number are to belong to the Royal dragoons and 3d dragoon guards respectively.

3. The Commanding officers of the Royal dragoons and 3d dragoon guards are to take from the 4th dragoon guards such numbers of sets of horse appointments as will be necessary to complete the number of horses they will have in their regiments respectively, as soon as this arrangement will be carried into execution, for which a settlement is to be made by the Commanding officers on the part of the respective Colonels, according to the mode pointed out by His Majesty's Regulations.

4. As soon as the horses will be drafted from the 4th dragoon guards, the regiment is to be marched to Lisbon, and embarked for England.

5. The horses of the 9th light dragoons are to be drafted into the 13th light dragoons and 14th light dragoons, of which the former regiment is to take two thirds, and the latter one third.

6. The horses of the 9th light dragoons are to be formed in files, and numbered, as above ordered for the 4th dragoon guards, and lots disposed in a hat in a similar manner ; and an officer of the 13th light dragoons is to draw 2 numbers, and an officer of the 14th light dragoons one number, till the whole number of horses will be drawn for ; and the horses in the files marked with the similar numbers are to belong to the regiment whose officer will have drawn the lot.

7. The Commanding officers of the 13th light dragoons and 14th light dragoons respectively, are to take from the 9th light dragoons such numbers of sets of horse appointments as will be necessary to complete the number of horses they will have in their regiments respectively, as soon as this arrangement will be carried into execution, for which a settlement is to be made on the part of the respective Colonels, according to the mode pointed out by His Majesty's Regulations.

8. The horses of the 9th light dragoons intended for the 14th light dragoons are to be brought to Niza by the men of the former regiment, where parties of the 14th are to meet them.

9. As soon as the horses will be drafted from the 9th light dragoons, that regiment is to be marched to Lisbon, and embarked for England.

10. The horses are to be drafted from the 11th light dragoons in the following regiments, and in the following manner :

11. Major Gen. Bock will be pleased to inspect the horses of this regiment, and allot two thirds of the horses of the largest size to mount the heavy dragoons.

12. The remaining one third are to be allotted to the 12th light dragoons and 16th light dragoons.

The horses for these regiments, viz. one third for the former regiment, and two thirds for the latter, are to be formed, numbered, and drawn for in the same manner as ordered for the drafting of the 4th dragoon guards and the 9th light dragoons ; and the Commanding officers of the 12th and 16th light dragoons respectively are to receive such horse appoint-

Sous ces circonstances, je désire beaucoup ne pas demander de promotion à présent.

P.S. J'ai des nouvelles de Londres que le Prince Régent m'a donné l'Ordre de la Jarretière.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 13th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter and its enclosures from Lord Bathurst, in regard to an inquiry into the sale of stores destined for the Spanish army by ——. Have you received any answer regarding the inquiry which it was agreed you were to make on the letter on the same subject which I received from Lord Bathurst when I was at Cadiz?

There is nothing new. It is reported that King Joseph is quitting Madrid, and is about to establish his head quarters at Valladolid. I believe this report, as I find from Valladolid that Reille has removed from the palace there, which is in a state of preparation for some other person, and

ments as they will require from the 11th light dragoons, settling for them in the manner above pointed out.

13. The two thirds of the number of horses in the 11th light dragoons, selected for the heavy dragoons, are to be disposed of as follows: the 5th dragoon guards are to receive 100, the 4th dragoons 80, and the 1st heavy dragoons of the K. G. L. the remainder of the horses of the regiment.

14. The two thirds of the horses of the 11th light dragoons, allotted for the heavy dragoons, are to be placed in files and numbered in the same manner as ordered for the horses of the other regiments ordered to be drafted, and similar lots placed in a hat, which are to be drawn by an officer from the 1st heavy Germans, the 4th dragoons, and 5th dragoon guards, till the whole number will be disposed of.

15. Each of these regiments are to take from the 11th light dragoons such numbers of horse appointments as will complete the number of horses they will have in the regiments respectively when this arrangement will be carried into execution, for which a settlement is to be made in the manner above ordered.

16. As soon as the horses will be drafted from the 11th light dragoons, this regiment is to be marched to Lisbon, and embarked for England.

17. General officers who have orderlies from the 9th and 11th light dragoons, and 4th dragoon guards, and all men with horses belonging to these regiments on duty, are to be sent to join them forthwith.

18. Major Gen. Bock is requested to superintend the drafting of the 11th light dragoons, and to fix the time and place at which it shall be carried into execution; Major Gen. Slade that of the 4th dragoon guards, and Major Gen. Long that of the 9th light dragoons; and the General officers will apprise those concerned of the time and place fixed upon, and will report the execution of these orders in detail to the Commander of the Forces.

19. The men and horse appointments belonging to the 1st heavy Germans, Royal, and 4th dragoons, 3d and 5th dragoon guards, 12th, 13th, and 16th light dragoons, now at Lisbon, are to be sent to join their regiments respectively without loss of time.

20. The Q. M. G. will send to the 14th light dragoons a route for the march of the detachment of that regiment to Niza, to receive the horses from the 9th.

21. The Commander of the Forces returns his best thanks to the 4th dragoon guards, 9th and 11th light dragoons, for their services in this country. The measure of drafting their horses from them has been adopted as one of utility to the whole of the cavalry, and the Commander of the Forces regrets exceedingly that it has been found necessary to adopt it, and that he should be deprived of the assistance of any of these brave troops; but he trusts that they will soon be re-mounted and re-equipped, and that, if necessary, they will join the army again in increased strength.

22. The Commander of the Forces having received the orders of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief to form in this country 2 troops of the Staff corps of cavalry to be employed in the duties of the police of the army, and in others of a confidential nature, directs that the Commanding officers of all the regiments of cavalry in this country will report the names, to the Adjutant Gen., of the non-commissioned officers and privates who will volunteer to serve in this Staff corps, and whose characters are of a description that their Commanding officers can recommend them.

23. Serjeants in the Staff corps of cavalry will receive each 1s. *per diem* extra pay, corporals 8d., and privates 6d.

that quarters are prepared for Reille at Tordesillas. It appears that they are all confoundedly alarmed at our position in the Sierra.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Piper, 4th Foot, 5th division.

13th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst. and its enclosure, conveying the voluntary offer of ———, of the 4th regt., to serve in any corps His Majesty may be pleased to appoint. In answer to which I beg leave to refer you to the Regulations of 1811, where the mode of proceeding is pointed out (under the head of 'commutation of punishments') in similar cases. From these Regulations it appears that it will be necessary that the soldier, who may be desirous of extending his services to avoid punishment, should in the first instance be tried before a Court Martial. When the form shall have been complied with, the application will, if you think proper, be submitted to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces. I beg leave to observe, that the application should be transmitted to this office through the regular channel of the General officer commanding the brigade and General officer commanding the division.

To the Officers, Knights of the Tower and Sword.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to appoint you a Knight (———) of the Order of the Tower and Sword; and, having requested the permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland for you to accept this honor, the Sec. of State has answered me as follows: 'Having laid before H. R. H. the Prince Regent the lists accompanying your Lordship's dispatch, No. 10, of the British officers upon whom the Portuguese government has been pleased to confer the Order of the Tower and Sword, I have received His Royal Highness' commands to desire your Lordship will communicate to those officers the Prince Regent's gracious permission that they should accept this honorable mark of distinction, and bear the insignia of the Order.'

I have at the same time to inform you that, having requested the directions of the Sec. of State whether the officers who should be permitted to receive this distinction were to take the appellation borne by English knights, his Lordship has answered me in the negative, unless they should be knighted by His Majesty's authority.

G. O.

Freneda, 14th March, 1813.

2. The various orders which have been issued at different times by the Commander of the Forces to prevent the misconduct and outrages committed by the soldiers of the army on their marches through the country, have been generally occasioned immediately by some disaster which had occurred, and by the fall of one or more soldiers in contests with the inhabitants for the protection of that property of which the soldiers were desirous of depriving them. The Commander of the Forces therefore trusted that his repeated orders on this subject would have been obeyed, and particularly as they contain directions for the adoption of a line of conduct applicable to every case which can occur, which, if adopted, must prove a remedy for the evil, and must prevent the outrages complained of and their consequent misfortunes.

4. The Commander of the Forces trusts, however, that the officers of the army will consider the objects of the orders, the neglect of which is now under consideration, and will find motives for attending to them in their desire to save the lives of their men, which might be wanting in the example now before them of the consequences of a neglect of those orders.

5. * * * * *

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

6. In consequence of the recommendation of the General Court Martial, the Commander of the Forces pardons Mr. Staff Surgeon ———, and he is to be released from his arrest and to return to his duty.

I enclose a letter from the Prince Regent of Portugal, and the insignia of the Order of the Tower and Sword.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th inst., enclosing one of the 5th Feb. from Gen. Baron de Eroles; and I have to inform you that, in regard to the point stated by Gen. Baron de Eroles, I have adopted the following arrangements:

First; I have given directions that arrangements may be made for removing from Catalonia, Gen. Milans, Brigadier Porras, and the *Auditor de Guerra*, Sala, the detail of which I shall hereafter have the honor of laying before your Excellency.

Secondly; All matters relating to the armies managed by the civil authorities being, by the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan. 1813, under the direction and management of the Captains General of the several provinces, I have called upon those officers for returns of the state of the levies of recruits in the several provinces; and as soon as I shall receive these returns, I shall have the honor of proposing to the Regency the allotment of recruits to the army of Catalonia. In the meantime, I have heard that there are 8000 recruits in Galicia, and it is advisable that the Regency should take measures to provide means to transport to Catalonia half of that number from the ports in that kingdom. I beg to know from your Excellency what measures are adopted on this subject.

The government have before them my proposition to transport to Catalonia the regiments of *Pontevedra* and *El Principe* from Galicia, the means of transport for which troops are already gone to Coruña, and are waiting for orders to be given subsequently to your Excellency's answer to my letter of the 1st inst.

I have written by this occasion to the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty at Cadiz, to request him to assist the troops in Catalonia with clothing as far as may be in his power. The government know best whether any assistance in corn can be sent to Catalonia from Cadiz. I am quite certain that, under existing circumstances, and till the civil administrations shall be better organised, it will be quite impossible to send any corn for some time from the provinces not occupied by the enemy.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th and 12th of March, No. 1 of the former date, and Nos. 1 and 2 of the latter.

I beg to inform you that the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal did not make his complaint judicially, but as an individual; and, in order to prove the case before the competent tribunal, it was necessary that he should be examined before the General Court Martial by which Mr. Thompson was tried, and acquitted, as I believe, for want of the evidence of the Juiz de Fora.

That of which I complained in my letter of the 22d ult. was, not only that an accusation should have been brought forward by the government, apparently uncalled for, and certainly unfounded, 'that the magistrates were called upon to attend upon the Courts Martial of the British army in a manner inconsistent with the rules of politeness,' but that it should

be contended that, when summoned to attend the British Courts Martial, they were not bound, nay, according to the law, ought not to attend. I admitted that a British Court Martial could have no jurisdiction or authority in Portugal, excepting by courtesy; and I proposed that, to get rid of all these difficulties, I should apply to you, and you to the government, to order the attendance upon Courts Martial of those persons whose evidence might be necessary.

In answer to this proposition, the government have sent the note of Dom M. Forjaz of the 4th March, and the *Alvara* of 21st Oct. 1763, from which it appears that, according to the 9th clause, the Portuguese Court Martial is bound to receive as evidence the written testimony forwarded to them by a magistrate.

I now beg that you will inform the Portuguese government that a British Court Martial cannot receive written testimony, unless in extraordinary cases of which they are witnesses, which cases I cannot take upon myself to define; and therefore the *Alvara* of Oct. 1763, and the *Portaria* of the 9th March, 1813, enclosed in your letter No. 2 of the 12th March, extending to British Courts Martial the *Alvara* of Oct. 1763, are quite inapplicable to our situation, or to the difficulties of the question.

I now beg leave to submit to your consideration, and that of the Portuguese government, the copy of a letter of the 11th March, from Major Gen. Long, the President of a General Court Martial, assembled for the trial of serjeant —, of the — light dragoons, for misconduct at Monforte in respect to billets, the complaint respecting which had come from the government through you.

You will see in Major Gen. Long's letter an account of the conduct of the Juiz de Fora, when called upon to answer a question put to him by the Court, apparently most important for the conviction or justification of the serjeant under trial; and, from your knowledge of the English law of evidence, which, as far as I can judge, is the best general rule for the discovery of truth, by which Courts Martial ought to be guided, you will see how impossible it is for any Court Martial to proceed to any sentence, excepting that of acquittal, upon such defective information as that which this Court have before them, without the testimony of the Juiz de Fora.

I beg you to draw the attention of the Portuguese government to the facts stated in Major Gen. Long's letter as applicable to the *Alvara* of Oct. 1763; and as I have brought under the consideration of the British government the expediency of enabling Courts Martial to receive written testimony when on foreign service, and as this subject will probably come under the consideration of the Legislature in the course of this session of Parliament, I recommend that if the Portuguese government should not be disposed to adopt some measures to oblige the inhabitants of Portugal, magistrates as well as others, to attend Courts Martial when summoned, you should forward this correspondence to His Majesty's government, in order that they may see how this matter stands in this country.

In regard to the Juiz de Fora of Monforte, however, I must request you to draw the attention of the government to his conduct in a very particular manner. I don't believe that the law of Portugal would justify him in refusing to give evidence before a Portuguese Court Martial on

the points on which he refused to give evidence before the British Court Martial, of which Major Gen. Long was President; and considering that he had himself made the complaint against the serjeant under trial, and that the Court had assembled at Monforte for his convenience, and that of the other witnesses in the trial, courtesy at least should have induced him to answer the questions put to him, and to treat the Court with politeness, and at all events not with insolence.

It is impossible for me to form a decided judgment whether, in point of Portuguese law, this Juiz de Fora was right or wrong in refusing to answer these questions, but of this I am quite certain, that in his conduct towards the Court Martial, in shutting them out of the place appointed by himself for their assembly, he treated them in a manner in which no Court ought to be treated; and if the Governors of the Kingdom don't think proper to notice such conduct, I beg that you will bring the subject under the consideration of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, as I shall under that of H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

I now come to the consideration of your letter, No. 1, of the 12th March, and its enclosure of the 10th March from Dom M. Forjaz, containing a complaint of the same magistrate of Monforte, against the Commanding officer of the 13th light dragoons, for confining and punishing a native of Portugal for buying corn from a soldier. The records of the Portuguese government, and the orders of this army, will show that I have not been unwilling to notice complaints of this description, and to bring them to inquiry, and those complained against to punishment, if they should be found to deserve it; but I must be excused from taking any further notice of these cases, which is really useless in a view to justice, and only tends to bring into contempt the complaints of the government and my authority, till some satisfactory arrangement shall be made respecting the necessity of giving testimony before a Court Martial, and some measures shall have been adopted by the government to mark to the public their sense of the conduct of the magistrate of Monforte.

I lament as much as the government can that these questions should have arisen. It cannot be very agreeable to me to have to consider and write upon them; and those are responsible for the discussion of them who, knowing the necessity there is for the assistance of a British army in the defence of the country, have by their conduct given rise to them, and have brought matters to such a state as that if there should unfortunately exist a necessity for continuing the army in Portugal during another season, it is more than probable that, notwithstanding all my efforts to prevent the misfortune, there will be serious conflicts between the magistrates and people on one side, and the troops of both nations on the other.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

A considerable sum of money is about to be sent to Lisbon for the use of the army, in pagodas, with directions from the Treasury that they may be re-coined at the Portuguese mint, into Portuguese coins.

I have requested Sir C. Stuart to have an assay made of them at the Portuguese mint and that he will take measures to ascertain the length of

time which will be required to re-coin the whole sum. I have likewise requested him to send a few of the pagodas to you at Cadiz; and I request you to have them assayed, to ascertain the sum they will produce in Spanish 8 and 4 dollar pieces; also the length of time which will be required to re-coin them to the value of £150,000.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what quantity of clothing you have still in store. I want to send 6000 complete suits to the army of Catalonia, and about 4000 to Alicante, for Elio's army. I have only 2000 at Lisbon, but these are wanted for Estremadura.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 15th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 8th. It appears to me that the Cortes have again outdone themselves in their proceedings on the change of the Regency. I never have known a shoeblack dismissed in such a style! This proceeding will do them a great deal of harm.

—— must have mistaken Sir J. Murray; and I can adopt no proceeding in regard to the Sicilian levies, on what he says.

The A.G. to Major ——, — light dragoons.

15th March, 1813.

In reference to a complaint which has been preferred against you by the Juiz de Fora of Fundão, grounded on the circumstance of his house having been searched for hay by your orders, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to signify to you, that as he would be sorry to find himself under the necessity of resorting to any harsh measures towards an officer of your rank and standing in the service, he desires that you will satisfy the Juiz de Fora of Fundão regarding the subject of his complaint, so as to render any further steps unnecessary; and I request that you will be pleased to acquaint me when this shall have been done, for the information of the Commander of the Forces.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received the notification of the approbation of the Prince Regent that the officers in His Majesty's service, and others of His Majesty's subjects in the service of the Prince Regent of Portugal, on whom His Royal Highness had recently conferred the Order of the Tower and Sword, might accept the same, and wear the insignia.

I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written upon this subject to the several officers of the British army upon whom this same honor had been conferred.

To Major Gen. Baron Bock.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of corporal ——, ——, ——, and ——, of the —— regt., and likewise on the trial of ——, ——, and ——, of the —— regt., which I return to you, and request that the proceedings and sentence of both may be revised.

In regard to the first mentioned trial, the Court have admitted in their proceedings a statement put in, and sworn to by Lieut. ——, containing much matter not of his own knowledge, and in fact applicable to other

cases, instead of allowing him to refresh his memory by his paper made out at the time of the transaction, and making him tell his own story. This paper is besides separate from the proceedings, and unsigned.

The proceedings of the Court Martial have not been signed by the acting Judge Advocate.

In regard to the sentence, that on — and — is illegal. The General Court Martial have not the power, either by the Mutiny Act or Articles of War, to pass a sentence that a soldier shall serve for a period of years, or for life, beyond the seas, for any crime excepting desertion. This sentence, therefore, must be altered.

Observing, likewise, the disorders committed by the party to which the soldiers belonged on their march from Lisbon to Coimbra, and that —, who was acting corporal, has been found guilty of a most atrocious offence, and that — has been found guilty, as well of that offence as of mutiny, I hope that the Court will consider it necessary to make an example of these soldiers, and to sentence the full punishment which the law allows.

In regard to the proceedings on the other trial, it is required by the General Regulations of the service that those of each separate trial should be headed by the names of the President and members of the Court, which has been omitted, and the Judge Advocate has omitted to sign the proceedings.

There is the same objection to the sentence as to that on the other trial under consideration, with this additional objection, that it is contrary to law to sentence restitution in cases of felony. This remark does not apply to the money found on the prisoners.

I hope likewise that the Court will consider it necessary to make an example of these offenders, and to sentence a punishment to the full extent allowed by the law.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from the Sec. of State; and I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of sending to England the transports referred to by the Transport Board, and of retaining in their stead others of a smaller size, which may be sent from England.

To — —, Esq.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I had the honor of receiving by the last post your letter of the 24th Feb., and I am very much obliged to you for the details into which you have entered regarding the means of obtaining intelligence for this army. In general we have not been deficient in that respect; but as it is always desirable to obtain as much as possible, I could have wished you had gone into still further details respecting the mode of obtaining intelligence at Paris, which is, I believe, very difficult; and respecting the execution of your plan of communicating it by a newspaper; and respecting the facilities of receiving such newspaper in this country.

In England it is not impossible to communicate intelligence by a newspaper. Indeed the contents of all the newspapers are intelligence to the enemy, upon which I know that plans of operations have been formed;

and it appeared upon a trial for treason, some years ago, that very detailed information was conveyed to the enemy in this manner. But I don't see how this could be done in France, where the press is under such extraordinary restrictions. Then, if the information could be obtained and inserted in a newspaper in France as proposed, it appears to me to be quite impossible to receive it at the head of this army, excepting by England.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have given directions that 500 of the 4000 sets of cavalry clothing and appointments should be landed at Coruña, and the remainder sent to Lisbon, where 500 more are to be landed, and the remaining 3000 then to be sent to Cadiz; and I have assembled the body of the Spanish cavalry on the Guadalquivir to receive them.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter, and its enclosure, which I have received from the Sec. of State, in regard to the re-coinage at Lisbon of a sum of money expected from England in pagodas.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have these pagodas assayed at the Portuguese mint, in order to ascertain what they will produce in Portuguese coins; and if you will send a few of them to Cadiz, in order that Sir H. Wellesley may have them assayed at the Spanish mint, as it may be desirable to have them converted into Spanish instead of Portuguese coins.

I also request that you will have it ascertained how long it will take to convert the whole into Portuguese coins.

To the Earl of Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I request you to take an early opportunity of returning my most grateful acknowledgments to H. R. H. the Prince Regent, for the fresh mark of his favor which your Lordship has informed me it is His Royal Highness' intention to confer upon me, by sending me the Blue Riband vacated by the death of the Marquis of Buckingham. I hope that His Royal Highness believes that I am grateful for all his favors, and that I shall endeavor to prove my gratitude by continued zeal in his service.

I likewise request your Lordship to accept my thanks for your favorable representation and recommendation of my service to His Royal Highness, to which I am much indebted.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 24th Feb., in regard to the medals, and I concur entirely with you regarding all the improvements you propose on the subject. You have provided a remedy for a difficulty which I could never get over in a way at all satisfactory to myself. I likewise agree with you in the propriety of having a cross with 8 bars, or a star with 8 points, for those who are entitled to more than 7 distinctions.

I am not certain that it would not be best that all General officers, as well as others, should wear the medal or cross at the button hole till they

should receive the last distinction. It is very awkward to ride in round the neck.

According to the new principle, I believe that Gen. Alava and Gen. O'Lawlor ought to have the cross instead of a medal, and I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will so arrange it.

P.S. Alava's name is Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Ricardo de Alava. O'Lawlor's, Brig. Don José O'Lawlor.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 16th March, 1813.

I have read your clause to enable Courts Martial to receive written testimony, and it is my opinion that not only the words included by you in the brackets must be omitted, but the following proviso, that the witness shall not be capable of attending.

The crimes which give us most trouble are those committed by soldiers belonging to detachments on a march, and generally at a distance from their regiments, or any station at which they can be tried. For instance, the soldiers respecting whom I sent you the inquiry lately, committed the crimes for which they are to be tried at every stage on the road from Lisbon to Coimbra, a distance of about 130 miles. They were halted at Coimbra, because, the cavalry being by accident in that neighbourhood, it was possible to try them there; otherwise, to join their regiments, they would have gone 100 miles farther. But still, if the presence of the accused should be necessary when the written deposition is taken, we must have detachments with officers travelling backwards and forwards in charge of prisoners to be present at the taking of depositions against them, and these prisoners would have had to march from 100 to 200 miles. It is obvious that in many cases they would have to go much farther; and in some cases, such as retreats, in which the grossest outrages are committed, of which written depositions might be procured, it must be impossible to send the prisoners to be present at the time they are taken.

Then the other proviso will render the whole clause nugatory. I believe it seldom happens that a witness is not *capable* of attending a Court; at all events it is not very easy of proof. I believe likewise that a Court Martial, like every other court, is bound at present to receive the best evidence which can be procured, and that if it can be proved that a witness cannot attend, and his written deposition is produced, it must be received. The evil for which I want a remedy is, that owing to the distance from the seat of the jurisdiction, the inconvenience of attendance to the witnesses is so great that they prefer suffering the injury to incurring it; and they will not attend, and the guilty escape punishment; not that they are not capable of attending.

Then there is another very serious consideration on this subject, upon which I have desired Sir C. Stuart to address the Sec. of State, and that is, the objections made by the Portuguese magistrates to attend Courts Martial as witnesses, to substantiate complaints against British officers and soldiers. I have had frequent discussions with the Portuguese government, through His Majesty's minister, on this subject, particularly lately; and they have, upon a proposition of mine that all summonses of witnesses to attend a British Court Martial should proceed from the government,

passed a *Portaria*, placing our Courts Martial on the same footing as Portuguese Courts Martial; and they have sent me the *Alvara* of October, 1763, which regulates the mode in which Portuguese Courts Martial are to obtain the evidence of persons not military.

From this it appears that a Portuguese Court Martial is bound to receive as evidence the written deposition sent to it by a magistrate, and this clause is construed to include his own. In several instances lately, therefore, the magistrates have refused to attend to give evidence against officers and soldiers of whom they had complained; disputes of a disagreeable nature have ensued; and, in fact, the jurisdiction of British Courts Martial is at an end as to all cases of this description. It is obvious that either the one country or the other must alter its law.

I wish that somebody would look over the proceedings of Courts Martial of this army, and they would see in what a state that jurisdiction stands. There is nobody knows it better than Mr. Larpent, who is a most valuable addition to the Staff of this army.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Royal, Coimbra.

16th March, 1813.

I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith the proceedings of two medical boards on 344 men belonging to different corps at the general hospital station at Coimbra, reported to be fit subjects to be invalided; and I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that these men may be removed to Lisbon for the purpose of being disposed of as recommended by the boards. It is extremely desirable that the whole of the invalided men should, if possible, be removed to Lisbon by sea, and I am to desire therefore that you will ascertain, by reference to Capt. M'Nab, whether any, and to what extent, shipping for this purpose can be provided at that port, concerting with him the necessary measures of detail in regard to the removal of the invalids from Coimbra to Figueira, and from Figueira to Lisbon. It will be necessary, at all events, that the worst cases, and such men as have lost a leg, should be sent round to Lisbon by sea; and if it should appear that a sufficiency of transport accommodation is not to be had at Figueira at present, men of the above descriptions must be detained at Coimbra until the means of removing them by sea shall be in readiness at Figueira. Such of the invalids (exclusive of the worst cases, and men who may have lost a leg) as cannot be accommodated on board of transports now at Figueira, are to proceed by land to Lisbon, for which purpose routes will be transmitted to you by the Q. M. G. on application from you for that purpose, stating the number that will march. It will be necessary that the invalided men proceeding to Lisbon should be placed in charge of a proportionate number of officers; those who will be removed by sea will of course require a smaller proportion of officers than those, if any, who will have to march. I apprehend that you will be enabled to furnish a sufficient number of officers for this service at the station: if not, I request you will inform me what number of officers will be required in addition to those which can be furnished at the station.

To Lieut. Col. Sherlock, 4th dragoon guards.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I have received this morning your letter of the 16th inst., which I confess has surprised me not a little, as I thought I had explained sufficiently in the G. O. for drafting the regiments of cavalry, that the arrangements had been made much against my inclination. It is useless to say more, than to assure you that I have contended against it to the utmost extent, and, till it was *positively ordered*, I did not carry it into execution.

I assure you that I have not served so long without knowing the difference between soldiers who have served, and those who have not; and as the Commander of the army, I should certainly prefer to take the horses

from the latter to taking them from the former; but if my superiors are of a different opinion, or prefer a different course, it is my duty to obey. I am responsible for the selection I have made of the regiments whose services are to be 'rejected,' not by me, but by the orders of my superiors; and I hope that I have selected those regiments, the loss of whose services in the Peninsula will be the least disadvantageous here, and to whom a return to England is most necessary.

If I have erred in my judgment, I am sorry for it; but I must say that I am responsible to no person in this country, and to none but my superiors, for what I have done on this occasion.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 5th March, in regard to the formation of a depôt of instruction for the cavalry at San Carlos.

An institution of this description is always, in the abstract, useful; but there are various points connected with the establishment of this institution upon which it is impossible for me to give an opinion, till I shall know the sentiments of the government upon various subjects which I have laid before them.

Your Excellency has ordered this institution to be formed without consulting my opinion, and without transmitting the orders of the government through me, although, of all other points in every military establishment, those relating to technical discipline have always been reckoned the peculiar province of the Commander in Chief.

Your Excellency has ordered corps of cavalry to join this new institution without consulting my opinion, or transmitting the orders of government through me, which corps of cavalry I had destined for other services. You have appointed a commandant and other officers to the institution without consulting my opinion, or receiving any recommendation from me or any other officer upon the subject.

I beg again to refer the government to my letters to your Excellency of the 4th and 25th Dec. 1812, and to your Excellency's answers of the 24th Dec. and 1st Jan. 1813, and to receive a final decision from the government whether they propose to adhere to their engagement, solemnly entered into with me after repeated discussions, or whether they do not; and I beg to have decisive answers to my letters noted in the margin,* to which no answers have yet been received.

I now tell your Excellency that I propose to take the field at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army at the earliest possible moment, and that I have every reason to believe that, in consequence of the delays by the government in issuing the orders consequent to the arrangement settled by me at Cadiz, complained of in my letter of the 7th Feb., and in consequence of the interference of the government in every military arrangement contrary to their engagements, I don't believe that any Spanish corps will be in readiness to move till late in the season, if any should be in a state to move at all.

* One of 7th Feb.; two of 24th ditto; one of 1st March; one of 5th ditto; one of 7th ditto; and two of 15th ditto.

As appertaining to this subject, I enclose the copy of a letter received from the Chief of the Staff of the army of reserve, in regard to officers belonging to corps in the army of reserve being detained in the depôt of the cavalry at the Isla, without the knowledge of the Conde de la Bisbal, of myself, or of any other military authority.

I have other complaints of the same purport from the Conde de la Bisbal, of orders sent by your Excellency to troops under his command without any communication to him, and of his ignorance whether these and others are or are not under his command, upon which I can give him no answer, not having received from your Excellency the slightest intimation of the movement of the corps, of the objects in moving them, or of any circumstance regarding their movement.

I repeat to your Excellency that it is quite impossible that any military establishment can go on in this manner; that it is essentially necessary that the government should adhere to one uniform mode of proceeding, and channel of communication with the army, which has been settled by their engagements with me, as the only mode by which regularity and military efficiency can be insured, or their own authority preserved; and I earnestly entreat them to decide finally whether they will or not adhere to those engagements.

To Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th inst., and I am much obliged to you for having sent me the information contained in your letter, regarding the wants of the troops under your command.

I have ordered the Duque del Parque to move all the troops of the 3d army out of the province of Cordova; and I have ordered that inquiries might be made regarding the squadron del Pedroche.

I must delay giving answers on the other military points referred to in your letter, till I shall know whether the government propose to adhere to their engagements with me, and to carry on the military service as it ought to be carried on, or to continue to move corps by direct communication from the Minister at War, without reference to the ordinary channels of military subordination, to the common rules of discipline, or to the solemn engagements made with me after repeated discussion.

In regard to the subject of finance, referred to in your Excellency's letter, I wish that the Intendant had gone into still further details, and had stated the amount of the produce of each branch of the revenue of that part of the kingdom of Seville left under his management; the produce of that part which he has mortgaged to feed the troops till the end of March; and for what period he had mortgaged it. It is desirable to have the same reports on the produce of the province of Cordova, setting against that produce the expenses of the troops of the 3d army.

If any circumstance prevents the produce of the revenue from being realised as it ought to be, the Intendant of the army should report it to your Excellency, as well as to the Minister of *Hacienda*, in order that Government may be applied to for a remedy.

Your Excellency will observe that, under the orders of government, nine tenths of the produce of the revenues of Cordova and Seville are

applicable to the maintenance of the army under your command, and that it is highly important to your Excellency to know the exact produce of these nine tenths, because you will observe that, under the 11th article of the decree of the Cortes, you, as Commander in Chief of the army, are held responsible for the expenditure, and none of the money allotted for the army ought to be issued from the chest without your sanction. The Intendant, therefore, ought not to have mortgaged the produce of the *Aduana* without your consent.

I don't mean to cast blame upon this arrangement, of the details of which I have no knowledge, and it may be very proper; but I advert to it to point out to your Excellency the control which you possess, and ought to exercise, over the financial system of the army under your command.

In regard to the levy of the horses and mares, I beg to refer you to the 2d article of the same decree of the Cortes, in which you will see that the civil authorities in the provinces of which you are the Captain General are subordinate to you in all matters relating to the military; and it rests with you to give them such orders as you may think proper, in order to enforce the levy of the horses and mares. I recommend to you, however, in conformity with the wishes of the government, to exercise this power with discretion and moderation.

I shall write to you again shortly in regard to the movement of your troops, of whose progress in discipline I am happy to receive so good an account. In respect to their early movements, much will depend upon the realization of the resources.

I have written to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz regarding the state of the stores of clothing and arms there; and as soon as I shall receive his answer, I hope to be able to make arrangements for the supply of your wants of those articles.

To Lieut. Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter of the 5th inst., which I have received from the Minister at War, in regard to the draft made by order of your Excellency of the men from the 2d regt. of Malaga to the regiments of Campo Maior and of Catalonia; and I likewise enclose the regulation of government of the 4th Dec. 1812, from which you will observe that this act was a departure from it.

I don't by any means question the propriety or necessity of the act itself, of which I entertain no doubt; and I am convinced, that if your Excellency had adverted to the enclosed order, you would not have adopted the measure without their previous consent, through the regular authority. I beg leave at the same time to point out the necessity of considering well every measure that is adopted on every subject, and whether it is consistent with law and regulation.

Unless we should adopt and adhere to this practice, and unless we should ourselves set the example of obeying strictly the orders of our superiors, we cannot expect that our inferiors will obey ours, and all the foundation of our hopes of restoring the service to its former state of discipline and order will vanish.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I have received your Excellency's letter of the 5th March, regarding the conduct of the Conde de la Bisbal, in drafting soldiers from the 2d regt. of Malaga into the regiments of Campo Maior and of Catalonia; and having perused the regulation of 4th Dec. 1812, this conduct certainly militates with it.

I have written to the Conde de la Bisbal, to desire that he will attend strictly in every respect to the regulation; but I beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that I can have no authority over the army, and that it is totally out of my power to give that support which I wish to give to the orders of government, if your Excellency, as the Minister at War, does not adhere to military principles, and to the engagements of the government with me in your communications with the army.

To Lord Somerville.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, which I received by the last post; and I take this opportunity of also thanking you for the share you had in the kindness towards me of Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool, in securing for me the estate of Wellington Park. It appears to me that every thing that your Lordship proposes should be done there is most judicious, and I conclude that you have given directions about making the road, the planting, and the letting of the land. You have not mentioned the name of the person whom you have recommended to Mr. Litchfield as the man of business; but I will write to my brother on the subject, and desire he may be employed.

I am very much obliged to you for your kind intentions to take a look at my concerns in Somersetshire at times, and I only hope that you will make the use you please of every thing belonging to me there. I am happy to tell you that your friend Mr. Head and his brother* are going on remarkably well; the former is much esteemed by his superiors, and you may depend upon my attending to him when there shall be an opportunity of promoting him, and he shall have been a sufficient length of time in the department.

P.S. I wrote to Pole fully some time ago, in regard to further purchases in Somersetshire; and I shall write to him this day in regard to the purchase you mention for £3600 on the same manor.

To the Hon. W. Wellesley Pole.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I received only by the last post your letters of the 28th Jan., and I trust that long before this you will have received mine of the 27th Jan.

I have a letter from Lord Somerville, in which he tells me that the two manors of Wellington Park are contracted for to most responsible tenants, for £1000 *per annum*, from Ladyday next, woods included. I conclude that this contract must be carried into execution by a lease signed by myself, unless I should give a power of attorney to you or somebody else to sign leases for me during my absence. I have written to Lord Somerville, and he will talk to you upon this subject, as well as regarding the purchase for £3600 of another estate in the same manor, which I think

* Sir G. Head and Sir F. B. Head, Bart.

desirable. But if the trustees have settled to purchase any other estate, either with or without the assistance of my own money, I will purchase this estate myself.

Lord Somerville has likewise recommended to Mr. Litchfield a man of business in Somersetshire, whose name he does not mention in his letter to me; but I conceive that I cannot do better than employ any person he recommends.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose, for your Lordship's information, the extract of a letter from Major Gen. Cooke, reporting the arrival of the detachments of De Watteville's corps at Cadiz, and stating that the whole of the corps is now assembled there.

Your Lordship will also perceive, that the clothing which I reported in my letter of the 10th ult. that the regiment much required, had not reached Cadiz on the 10th inst.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 17th March, 1813.

Marshal Soult has continued his march to the northward, with the detachment of drafts from the troops on the Tagus; and it is reported that he has passed the Douro on his way to France. The enemy have withdrawn the greater number of their detachments from La Mancha, and some of the troops of the army of the South are in movement through the Sierra, by which Castille is divided from Estremadura, towards Avila, in which town a division of that army is expected. I believe that this movement has been occasioned by the position of our troops in the Sierra de Bejar. There has been no other movement of importance. The enemy's troops which had crossed the Esla have retired again.

Since I addressed your Lordship last, I have received reports from Col. Longa, that he had taken the fort of Cubo, near Pancorbo, on the 25th Jan.; and on the 13th Feb. he had surprised at Pozo de la Sal a detachment of the division of Palombini, under that General, and had killed or wounded 16 officers, and above 200 soldiers.

To Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, 18th March, 1813.

In answer to that part of your letter of the 5th inst. which relates to the causes for forming the disposable infantry of the army of Galicia into 13 corps, and for the removal of 3 chiefs, and for the appointment of 3 officers to be Commandants of regiments, I enclose a report which I have received from the Inspector of infantry.

I have therefore given directions that Don Ignacio Balanzat, Don Josef Miranda, and Don Salvador Valencia, may be recommended to be Lieutenant Colonels of the 3 regiments named by your Excellency; and I will further recommend, that Colonels may not be appointed to those regiments for the present.

G. O.

Freneda, 18th March, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces has great pleasure in publishing the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons, expressing their approbation of the conduct of the General officers, officers, and soldiers of the army in the late battle at Salamanca.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Hill, commg. the Household cavalry. Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether it would now be inconvenient to the Household Brigade of cavalry to move from their present cantonments to make room for the Hussars.

I have not written to you since I have had the honor of being appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards, Blue. I hope that you and the officers of the regiment will believe that I am very sensible of the honor which has thus been conferred upon me; and that I shall be most happy to take an early opportunity of forming an acquaintance with the regiment.

I hope that in the mean time you will let me know if I can do any thing which can be of use to the regiment, or to any individual belonging to it.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 15th and 16th inst., and I am very sorry to hear of your accident.

You had better allow those of the vessels which can go, to sail with the clothing which they have on board which is not damaged.

As for Leite and Victoria, do as you please about them. I sent their papers, particularly those of the former, to you, because I did not choose to have any thing to do with them, excepting by your desire. Leite says that I recommended him upon a former occasion; but I am sure I have no recollection of such recommendation, excepting in a dispatch to my own government, in which I may have mentioned the accommodation he gave to our hospitals in the first year; and it is not impossible that Villiers may have copied that paragraph of my dispatch, and given it to him.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

The mother of the lady carried off by ——— of the — regt., having complained to me of his conduct, and having desired my assistance to remove her daughter from the disgraceful situation in which she is now placed, I consented to grant it, on the condition of a promise on her part that the daughter should not be ill treated, and above all, should not be confined in a convent.

I enclose the letter from the lady, in which she makes the engagement as above pointed out; and I beg that you will call upon ——— to restore the young lady to her family. If he should decline to do so upon your order, I beg you to put him in close arrest, and then to take measures to remove the young lady from his power into that of her family at ———; as I cannot allow any officer of this army to be guilty of such a breach of the laws of Portugal as to carry away a young lady, and retain her in the cantonments of the army, contrary to the wishes of her parents and relations.

I beg you to return the enclosed letter.

If you should find it necessary to place ——— in close arrest, you will release him as soon as the young lady shall be with her relations at ———; but you will inform ——— that he has my positive orders not to cross the Coa.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 19 Mars, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 12, et je vous suis bien obligé de vos réflexions sur l'organisation proposée pour l'infanterie. Votre plan est sûrement le meilleur, c'est celui des Français, et celui sur lequel toute l'infanterie du monde devrait être formée ; mais malheureusement, il ne sied pas aux circonstances du moment, et je crois que la seule chose que nous puissions faire, c'est d'adopter celui que j'ai proposé.

Je doute très fort que vous trouviez convenable de faire l'arrangement que vous proposez pour les troupes de Castille et d'Estremadure. En tout cas je vous conseille de faire un arrangement qui soit permanent pour le commandement des places, et de ces deux provinces en votre absence, pour lesquelles vous devez voir par le décret de *las Cortes* que vous seul êtes responsable.

Il est certain que les ressources ne vaudront rien si on change le commandement à chaque instant. J'ai écrit au gouvernement sur l'affaire du Marques del Palacio le 24 Fév., mais jusqu'à présent je n'ai reçu aucune réponse. J'ai écrit pour en demander une, encore une fois, par l'extraordinaire qui porte cette lettre. Mais je vous répète que vous êtes responsable pour la province d'Estremadure, et si vous n'approuvez pas le Marques del Palacio, vous n'avez qu'à l'envoyer promener, et je vous soutiendrai.

Il est temps de penser à faire un corps de cavalerie pour l'armée de Galice pour la campagne prochaine. Qu'est devenu celle du Comte de Fiquelmont ? Je crois qu'elle est en Estremadure ou en Andalousie ; et il faudrait la faire marcher de ce côté ci, et à travers le *Tras os Montes*, pour rejoindre l'armée à l'ouverture de la campagne. Répondez moi de suite là dessus, afin que je donne les ordres nécessaires. J'ai fait un régiment du régiment de Lanciers de Don Julian ; et je compte faire encore un régiment de Lanciers du régiment d'Almanza. On me dit que le chef est bon, et qu'il y a quelques bons soldats qui ne font rien à Brozas. Mais il faudrait ôter du corps de Penne Villemur les soldats pour le régiment d'Almanza ; et le régiment d'Almanza, ainsi reformé, pourrait aussi se joindre à l'armée de la Galice.

Pour ce qui regarde la solde des garnisons de Badajoz et Ciudad Rodrigo, et des troupes destinées à servir plus immédiatement avec notre armée, il ne peut y avoir aucune difficulté que cela passe par votre entremise. Mais je dois insister pour que ces troupes soient de celles payées par le subsidé Anglais, puisque notre position dans le pays dépend si essentiellement de la sécurité de ces points importants que nous avons gagnés pour l'Espagne. Il ne sera pas difficile d'arranger tout ceci quand j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

Having lately adverted to the formation of the infantry, it has appeared to me that its organization is very defective, and that it might be materially improved without any increase of expense ; and in some cases a saving would result from the change. I enclose a memorandum containing my reflections upon this subject, which I request you to lay before the government, upon which I request their orders.

I likewise enclose an estimate of the expense of a regiment of infantry formed, as at present, into 8 companies; and formed as proposed into 2 battalions of 6 companies the one, and 4 the other; or into 2 battalions of 6 companies each.

MEMORANDUM.

The regiments now consist of one battalion, having a Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major; and 8 companies, each company having 1 Captain and 4 Subalterns, and an establishment of 150 men. The objection I have to this organization is, that if a regiment should be complete, it consists of too many men to be manageable, particularly by officers not themselves very well trained to discipline.

2dly; There are in every regiment of infantry, at present, a very large portion of men, either from youth and weakness, or from age and infirmities, not fit for the active duties of the field; and all these, in the event of the regiment marching to the field, would become a burthen to the army.

3dly; There are duties to be performed, or garrisons to be occupied, in each of the districts allotted for the support of the armies. Indeed, it is not quite clear to me, that any contributions will be realised without military assistance. All these duties might be performed by the men above referred to, if properly organised.

4thly; The regiments as now formed have no reserve. A regiment takes the field, and if by the fatigues of the service, or casualties of war, its numbers should be reduced, it must go bodily to garrison; whereas by the organization which I propose, it will always be possible to keep it up in a respectable state for service. It is besides to be observed, that there are in every regiment officers not fit for active service, and who ought to be removed; but for whom government cannot at present provide the pensions to which they are entitled. These officers might serve in the 2d battalions.

What I should propose is, that each regiment should consist of 1 Colonel, 1 Lieut. Colonel, 1 Major, and 12 companies, each of 100 men, and 1 Captain and 3 Subaltern officers. The regiment to be formed into 2 battalions, each battalion of 6 companies, and the Colonel and Lieut. Colonel, or Colonel and Major, to be with the 1st battalion; the Lieut. Colonel or Major, as the case may be, with the 2d battalion. In case the regiment should not consist of 1200 men complete, it should have only 10 companies; of which 6 in the 1st, and 4 in the 2d battalion.

The regiment would thus become much more manageable in manœuvre. If the Commander of the army should have any occasion to leave any troops in his district, he would have the facility of leaving the least disciplined and weakly men of the regiment under his command, who would be in a state of organization to perform some service. The 2d battalion of a regiment left behind in cantonments would be a reserve for the 1st, and would furnish it with trained recruits to keep up its numbers, for which services the officers not fit for active service in the field must be deemed equal, if they are fit for any thing.

The 2 battalions of the same regiment should always belong to the

same army; and it would, of course, rest with the Commander in Chief of the army, whether he would or not take both into the field: if he should do so, they would of course act together in the same brigade under the command of the Colonel, but in separate battalions. Generally speaking, however, I would recommend leaving the 2d battalion in cantonments, and having the 1st battalion only in the field.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I return some of the papers on the payment of the Portuguese army, which I acknowledge I cannot comprehend. I am only quite certain of the fact, that although the subsidy is regularly paid, the troops in operation are not paid even to the day to which ours are. I am certain that there are means in the country of paying up all the arrears, but there must be a thorough reform in the mode of doing business at the *Erario*, and the collectors must not be allowed to retain balances in their hands.

I send you a Court Martial this day, which will show you how little ground there was for the complaint of the magistrate of Monforte against the serjeant of the — light dragoons. I believe that these magistrates frequently complain when there is but very little cause; and that they are much disappointed when any attention is paid to their complaints. I am afraid, likewise, that they do a great deal of mischief in setting the inhabitants of the country against the soldiers. You see in the proceedings of this Court Martial, how desirous the inhabitants were to accommodate the soldiers in their houses, particularly those with whom, or whose regiment, they were acquainted.

I have invariably found their conduct the same; and although I am afraid the soldiers don't repay this kindness in all instances as it ought to be repaid, the cause of complaint is not always so glaring as it is represented by the magistrate; and a little moderation on his part would, in almost every instance, put an end to any disagreeable feeling which might exist.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of serjeant —, of the — regt. of light dragoons, complained of by the Portuguese government for improper conduct at Monforte.

I beg that the Court Martial may be laid before them, in order that they may see the degree of ground there was for the complaint; and how far the Juiz de Fora was justified, according to the Portuguese law, in refusing to give evidence to the Court Martial, and in treating them as he did.

I beg that these proceedings may be returned to me.

To H. S. H. the President of the Regency in Spain.*

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

On the 15th Feb. last I addressed a letter to the late President of the Regency, in which I informed him that a gentleman had passed through here on his way to England, conveying to His Majesty's government an offer on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, of the service of a body of Russian troops in the Peninsula at the expense of Great Britain;

* The Cardenal de Borbon.

and I enclosed to the President a translated copy of my letter to the Sec. of State, Lord Bathurst, on that subject.

I have now to inform your Highness that I have received a letter this day from Lord Bathurst, in answer to mine of the 14th Feb., in which he informs me, that upon communication with Count Lieven, His Russian Majesty's Ambassador in London, he finds either that Mr. Mackenzie, the gentleman who communicated the intelligence to me, misunderstood Adm. Greig, His Imperial Majesty's agent, with whom he communicated in the Mediterranean, or that Adm. Greig misunderstood his instructions, as His Imperial Majesty never intended to offer the services of his troops in the Peninsula, and has at present no corps disposable for that service.

I take the earliest opportunity of conveying this information to your Highness.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Lord Bathurst, one with enclosure from Sir C. Stuart, and one from Mr. Mackenzie, regarding the offer conveyed by the latter of the service of Russian troops in the Peninsula; from which you will observe either that Mr. Mackenzie misunderstood Adm. Greig, or that Adm. Greig exceeded his instructions.

I enclose you likewise the draft of a letter which I have written to the President of the Regency on this subject. Gen. Murray brought me the letters from Lord Bathurst and Mr. Mackenzie, and left London on the 7th. He says that Count Lieven, being a friend of Greig, had expressed great anxiety that no circumstance regarding this transaction should reach the Emperor's ears, as he is quite convinced that Greig misunderstood his powers when he made the offer of the Russian troops to serve in Italy, and that it was positively never the Emperor's intention that they should be offered for Spain.

I have no objection, if you should think it proper, to your showing all these letters to Señor Labrador, and to your stating to him that it is desirable that the transaction should not reach the Emperor by any diplomatic correspondence from Cadiz. Indeed, it is probable from what I see has passed on that subject in the Cortes, that the Spanish government will not be desirous of entering on the subject with Russia.

You will see from my letter to Lord Bathurst of the 14th Feb., that I was not quite certain of Greig's authority, or of the power of the Emperor to carry into execution the offer, supposing it had ever been made. But supposing Greig to have been authorised, and that the Emperor could carry his scheme into execution, I wished not to lose the services of these troops in the Peninsula in the next campaign by the delays of *la marche des affaires* in the English cabinet, and at Cadiz.

I knew that those in the former, who are ready to oppose every thing, would say, 'don't accept this offer, or take any measure to realise its benefit, till you shall be sure that the powers of the Peninsula will consent to receive the troops;' and that in the latter there would be the usual delays, and I thought it as well that the whole subject should proceed *pari passu*.

I don't conceive that the discussion in the Cortes has done us any harm;

and at all events our conduct in this instance affords another strong proof of our fair and open dealings, and of our respect and deference for the independence and feelings of our allies.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I have much reason to complain of the Spanish government in all their transactions with me, and I enclose you a letter which I have written to the Minister at War referring to others of which the dates are in the margin, which I wish you would see, in order to learn the exact nature of the cause I have to complain of them.

I wish, likewise, that you would see the Cardinal de Bourbon, or whoever is really at the head of affairs, and represent to him how desirous I am of carrying on the service of the army in the manner that shall be most honorable, advantageous, and agreeable to the government; but that the engagements with me must be strictly carried into execution, if it be wished that I should retain the command. If that is not wished, it is only necessary to hint a desire that I should resign; or what is tantamount, to fail to perform the engagements entered into with me, and I will resign with much more pleasure than I ever accepted the command.

To John Bell, Esq., Lisbon.

Freneda, 19th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 15th.

I beg that you will ascertain how much I am indebted to the government for income tax, or any other demand on my pension up to the 13th Nov. 1812; that you will pay the amount out of the sum now in your hands, and that you will pay the remainder into the military chest as a voluntary gift on my part.

To Major Gen. Baron Bock.

Freneda, 20th March, 1813.

I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of serjeant —, to have the names of the members, &c., inserted at the commencement of the proceedings on the trial.

I likewise return the proceedings on the trials of Hospital mates —, —, and —, for the same reason; and in order that the Court may revise their sentence.

These three gentlemen were charged with a drunken riot at Coimbra, of the existence of which there is undoubted evidence on the face of the proceedings; and yet, because none of the facts charged are proved against one of the three, the Court have thought proper *honorably* to acquit him! I should wish the Court to consider whether it is possible that there can be any honor in the conduct of any man in a riot by a drunken party of which he is one. His conduct may have been an exception to that of others, but it is quite impossible that it should be honorable.

In regard to the sentence upon the other gentlemen: 1st; In respect to their guilt, there remains no doubt upon my mind that they were guilty of all the facts charged in both the charges, according to the evidence as recorded; but upon this point the General Court Martial who

heard the evidence must be more capable of forming an opinion than I can be.

2dly ; In respect to the punishment, I have to observe, that there is nothing to prevent the Commander of the Forces from reprimanding gentlemen guilty of such unbecoming conduct without the aid of the sentence of a General Court Martial ; and it is very certain that the example of such a reprimand is not likely to deter others from the conduct of which these gentlemen have been found guilty, nor to prevent the necessity of troubling a General Court Martial again.

3dly ; To put an Hospital mate at the bottom of the list of Hospital mates in the Peninsula is no punishment whatever. These gentlemen, as far as I know, assume no command over each other, nor do they rise by seniority ; and it must be obvious to every body who will read this sentence, that the object of the General Court Martial was to discover a new description of punishment for these offences, which, in fact, is no punishment at all, and cannot have the effect intended to be produced by bringing a case of this description to trial, viz., to prevent others by example from committing a similar offence.

I earnestly recommend to the Court Martial, therefore, to pass such a sentence upon these gentlemen as will convince them and others that they must conduct themselves with propriety, or that they will suffer serious inconvenience for their conduct.

At all events, whether the Court alter the nature of their sentence or not, it is absolutely necessary they should so far alter it as to omit the word *severely* previously to reprimanded.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 20th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th.

I did not intend to charge the Marquez de Borba with any improper conduct in mine of the 11th, but only with concealment of the operations of the *Ærario*, which in my opinion is very prejudicial to the service of the Prince.

As far as I can understand the returns transmitted to me, which I enclose, it appears that the *Ærario* does receive regular returns of the state of the balances in the hands of the several collectors of the revenue ; but these returns afford but a very inaccurate notion of the state of the balances in their hands at any particular time, because they are not made sufficiently often. For instance, the collector at Braganza sends his return on the 1st of the month of the balance on that day. A week will elapse before the *Ærario* can receive it ; and even if the order for the disposal of it be issued immediately, another week will elapse before it can be received by the collector. In the mean time he will have accumulated in his hands the balances collected in a month, from which he can expect to be called upon to pay only those collected in a fortnight. In England the collectors in the country return their balances, and, if they can get Bank of England notes, pay them in by the post of every night ; and, in my opinion, the collectors in Portugal should be made to return their balances by every post, and then it is obvious that by the *Ærario* attending to send orders to pay them to the army treasurer by the return of post, the most distant of

them could have in their hands only the balances collected in 10 days, supposing the communication by post to be twice a week, and the length of each communication to be 7 days.

I see on the face of these returns an account of balance sufficient to pay the army for at least half a month; and as allowance may fairly be made for an accumulation of as much more balance in the hands of each collector from the date of the last return, it may fairly be stated that the collectors have at this moment in their hands a sufficiency to pay the army for a month.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Freneda, 21st March, 1813.

I enclose you a letter which I wrote on the 2d inst. to Adm. Martin, and his answer of the 6th, in regard to certain transports sent from Lisbon to Coruña with stores, and their disposal afterwards.

It is intended to send to Catalonia the regiments of *Pontevedra* and *El Principe*; and Gen. Salvador, who is charged with all the arrangements respecting the embarkation of these regiments, has been directed to communicate with you upon them; and I request you to put him in communication with the officer in charge of these transports, and to facilitate by every means in your power the early embarkation of the troops.

When the troops shall be on board, you will request the officer in charge of the fleet of transports to take them round to Minorca. He will from thence communicate with the officer commanding His Majesty's ships on the coast of Catalonia; and, in concert with the Commanding officer of the troops, who is directed to communicate with the Spanish General officer commanding in that province, he will ascertain and fix upon the most convenient situation for the disembarkation of the troops.

The place fixed upon will probably be Villa Nueva; but that must depend upon the state of affairs in the province at the time, of which I can form no judgment at this moment; and I only request that the officer in charge of these transports will not hurry the disembarkation of the troops before the officers on shore shall be prepared to receive them, and to secure their junction with the other troops in Catalonia.

The Spanish troops in the transports are to be victualled in the same manner with those of His Majesty.

To Lord Eldon, the Lord High Chancellor.

Freneda, 21st March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letters of the 5th Dec. and 5th Feb. last, in which your Lordship enclosed the resolutions of the House of Lords, expressing the approbation of their Lordships of the conduct of the General officers, officers, and troops under my command, in the service of Portugal, as well as in His Majesty's service, during the late campaign in the Peninsula; but more particularly in the battle of Salamanca.

I have had the satisfaction of communicating to those concerned, this honorable testimony of their good conduct, and reward of their services; and I request your Lordship to convey to the House my grateful acknowledgments for the favor with which they have viewed my conduct, and the high honor which they have conferred upon me by their approbation.

I likewise request your Lordship to accept my thanks for the handsome terms in which you have conveyed to me the sense of the House of Lords.

[A letter in similar terms to the Right Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.]

To the Earl of Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury. Freneda, 21st March, 1813.

I omitted in my letter of the 16th to tell you that I should of course resign the Order of the Bath; and when I shall receive the Order of the Garter, I shall give directions that the insignia of the Order of the Bath may be disposed of as the statutes of the Order direct.

To Earl Bathurst. Freneda, 21st March, 1813.

Gen. Murray arrived here on Thursday with your letters of the 6th. You will have observed from mine of the 14th Feb., that I was not quite certain of Mr. Mackenzie's authority, and that I concurred entirely in the opinion which you communicated to Gen. Murray that it would be best that the Emperor of Russia should make his efforts in the north of Europe, and we ours in the south. I thought it, however, not impossible, as was represented by Mr. Mackenzie, that the Emperor of Russia had disposable troops which he might think he had not the means of employing in the north of Europe, and he might have been disposed to send them here. The object of my letter was to apprise your Lordship of my opinion of the advantages which the cause would derive from such employment of such a disposable force of Russians; and I adopted the measures which I did adopt in regard to the allied governments, in order that there might be no unnecessary delay, and that if we were to have the troops we might have them in time to be of some use.

In regard to the German troops, adverted to in the communications to Sir J. Hope, I should be very sorry to have them, and I should prefer spending the money they would cost on as many Spaniards.

I have considered the paper sent to me by desire of Count Münster, and I acknowledge that from all I have heard and read of the schemes of insurrections in Italy, I don't conceive there is the slightest foundation on which any rational man would venture to embark a single soldier.

From what I know of the French system of government, I entertain no doubt of its being very oppressive; and that all thinking men in any country in which it is established must be desirous of getting rid of it. But the question amongst these must always be, in what manner, and at the expense of what exertions; and there are many, probably the majority of this class, who would prefer to trust to the chapter of accidents to involving themselves and their country in the dangers and losses of a general insurrection; and by far the greater majority of the people in those countries, particularly those in easy circumstances, would prefer to pass their lives quietly under any system of government, however oppressive, to making any sacrifices, or any exertions, in order to get rid of it. I believe this to be the case in Italy; and I have not seen any proof of the existence of a general desire to get rid of the French government; nor have I ever been able to learn the names of any principal men, or ever to discover that in any particular town there existed men of talents and influence who had any thing to say to this supposed insurrection. I cannot, therefore, think

that it would be desirable, or that I ought, to send from Spain the Sicilian corps, with a view to such a scheme of operations.

The question of insurrection in any country must always be one of great doubt; but it appears to me that if such a measure should be adopted by any country, at any time, it ought to be adopted by Germany at present. It appears that the people cannot be in a worse situation than they are; their enemy is humbled, and there is a formidable and victorious army on the frontier ready to give support to their efforts. But those who are about to involve their country in these troubles, must not imagine that their task is an easy one, or that the contest, or its evils, will be of short duration. They little know the character of their enemy, and have studied his conduct but little, if they don't expect a most vigorous contest, if once they draw the sword and are not prepared, as he is, to endure every thing, and to go to all extremities to attain their object.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B., 4th division.

21st March, 1813.

Referring to a memorandum which has been addressed to you by the Q. M. G. regarding the repairs intended to be made in the village of Escalhão, with a view to the establishment of a general hospital there, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that you will be pleased to cause Lieut. Stanley, of the Royal Staff corps, charged with the superintendence of the work, to be furnished with such assistance in workmen and parties of fatigue as he may require; and that you will cause sufficient guards to be posted in the village to protect the work whilst in progress, and afterwards to take charge of the houses which shall be prepared for the reception of the sick until taken charge of by the Medical department.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Freneda, ce 22 Mars, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 17 Mars. Résistez aux *empeños**, non seulement du Duque del Infantado et de Mosquera, mais de tout le monde; et nommez ceux que vous croyez pouvoir le mieux servir la patrie, et je vous soutiendrai en tout.

Je n'entends rien à ce qu'on a fait à Cadiz, et je ne sais pas ce qu'on y fera. En attendant, il faut que nous fassions nos arrangemens bientôt pour l'ouverture de la campagne; et il serait fort à désirer, si le Général Giron doit commander l'armée de la Galice, qu'il y passe sans perte de tems. Je vous ai déjà écrit sur la marche de la cavalerie du Comte de Fiquelmont de ce côté là. J'ai écrit au gouvernement sur les finances, où je vois bien que nous manquerons. J'attends les détails que j'ai demandés aux officiers commandans des armées pour faire mettre cette partie sous les yeux de 'las Cortes.'

Par un rapport que j'ai reçu de la Galice, je vois que la troupe là n'a pas reçu de solde de longtems.

Ne serait il pas bon d'envoyer un ordre pour la disposition de l'argent qui reste à vos ordres dans les mains du Colonel Bourke? J'ai fait dire qu'on prit sur cet argent pour payer un mois de solde aux régimens de Pontevedra et del Principe; et je le ferai remplacer.

Je tâcherai aussi de faire passer encore de l'argent en Galice pour cette

* *Empeño.* In general this word means the demand of a promise to grant a request, without knowing what it is.

armée. Ils ont tout pour leur équipement. Envoyez moi un rapport officiel sur l'état de vos finances aussitôt que vous pourrez.

The A.G. to Major —, — light dragoons, 2d division cavalry. 22d March, 1813.

Having had the honor of submitting to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces your letter to me of the 17th inst., I have been instructed to signify to you in answer that it is always very unpleasant to his Lordship to order officers in arrest, and that he does so only in cases which, in his judgment, render it necessary for the public service; that his Lordship is much concerned when a necessity exists for keeping officers in arrest, but the military law must be blamed for that evil, and not him, who has done every thing in his power to have it altered; that you must see that it is quite impossible for the Commander of the Forces to command the attendance of Lieut. Col. — and of the — — on your trial, two witnesses called for by yourself, and declared to be absolutely necessary for your defence; that having placed you in arrest on a complaint from a Portuguese magistrate, which in another case appears to have been exaggerated, his Lordship is anxious to bring you to trial, in order that you may have the benefit of the sentence of a General Court Martial on your case; and that you can be brought to trial only in this country, the orders of the Commander in Chief positively forbidding that officers should be sent home with charges undecided upon hanging over them. That under these circumstances it rests with you to decide whether you will stand your trial forthwith without the benefit of the evidence of Lieut. Col. — and — —, or wait the indefinite period at which it will be possible to procure their testimony; or, should you prefer it, the Commander of the Forces has no objection to release you from arrest.

In addition to the foregoing communication, which is conveyed in the precise terms made use of by the Commander of the Forces, I beg leave to add, as from myself, in reference to that part of your letter which states that you have not received any communication that can enable you to form an opinion respecting the time that the arrival of Lieut. Col. — and — — in this country may be expected, that it was not in my power to furnish you with any information which could enable you to form an opinion of the probable time of the arrival of these officers in this country. Your request to obtain the advantage of their testimony was referred to the decision of the Commander in Chief, and it was for His Royal Highness to decide whether any or what steps should be taken thereupon.

To Major Gen. Houstoun.

Freneda, 23d March, 1813.

I received, by the last post, your letter of the 10th Feb. I was much concerned when you left us in the year 1811, and should have been happy if you could have remained with us. I am very sorry, however, that there is now no vacancy for you to fill; indeed we have more General officers than I know how to dispose of.

Au Ministre de la Guerre, Cadix.

Freneda, ce 23 Mars, 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer l'extrait d'une lettre reçue du Chef d'Etat Major de l'Armée de la Galice, et l'extrait d'un rapport du Chef d'Etat Major de la 4^{me} armée, par lesquels votre Excellence verra l'état des troupes en Galice et Estremadure, et leurs souffrances, faute de subsistances et de solde.

J'en ai reçu de pareilles des Généraux de toutes les armées, mais non-officielles; et pour cette raison je ne peux pas les mettre sous les yeux du gouvernement.

Le gouvernement peut s'assurer que, si on ne prend pas des mesures efficaces pour réaliser les revenus de l'état, et pour les appliquer aux dépenses de l'état, le tems qu'on a passé, et les peines qu'on s'est donné pour rassembler des troupes, et pour les discipliner, seront perdus. Ni

la discipline ne peut se perfectionner, ni les troupes rendront elles aucun service, si elles ne sont ni payées ni nourries; et le résultat de l'effort qu'on a fait pour lever une armée sera qu'on aura rendu malheureux beaucoup de monde, en les arrachant à leur familles, sans que la cause en retire aucun avantage.

Comme je vous l'ai dit déjà, je ne suis pas en état encore de vous faire un rapport officiel sur cette partie du service; mais on m'écrit de partout qu'il n'y a pas assez d'activité dans l'intendance des provinces. Puisqu'il y a quatre ans que l'ennemi s'est retiré de la Galice, et qu'on y a fait toujours depuis un commerce très étendu et lucratif en bestiaux; et qu'il y a un an que l'ennemi n'a pas étendu ses courses en Estremadure, il paraîtrait qu'il y a quelque cause pour cette imputation, si neuf-dixièmes des revenus de ces provinces ne sont pas capables de donner même la solde d'un mois aux troupes qui y sont établies. Je suis tenté de croire aussi que le système de contribution directe, établi par la loi, est trop compliqué pour le moment.

En tout cas le sujet est d'une telle importance à la nation Espagnole que je crois de mon devoir d'y attirer l'attention du gouvernement à la première occasion qui sera en mon pouvoir; et je répéterai mes observations aussitôt que je pourrai vous envoyer des rapports officiels.

The A.G. to Major —, — light dragoons.

23d March, 1813.

I have had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 17th inst., and I have been directed to assure you that it was by no means the wish or intention of his Lordship to adopt any harsh measure towards you regarding the complaint preferred against you by the Juiz de Fora of Fundão.

The A. G. to Major Gen. Hon. E. M. Pakenham, 6th division, and Major Gen. Hay, 5th division.

23d March, 1813.

In my letter of the 15th ult. I apprised you that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces had received a complaint from certain inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo of the extent of damage done to their gardens by the troops of the 5th and 6th divisions encamped near there at the period of the retreat of the army in the month of November last. The facts substantiating the extent of the damage, its value in money, and the period at which it was done, have been brought under the view of the Commander of the Forces by the magistrates of the town of Ciudad Rodrigo, and there remains no doubt whatever upon these facts. The Commander of the Forces feels no disposition to blame what occurred on this occasion, excepting the mode in which it was done. It may have been desirable and even necessary that the soldiers should have the vegetables out of these gardens, but the orders and practice of the army point out the mode in which they ought to have been taken. Regular rooting parties should have been formed, and an arrangement should have been made for ascertaining the quantity and value of what was taken by each party, and for giving compensation to the owner. If this had been done, each individual would have paid exactly for what was received; as it was not done, it is necessary to adopt a scale by which each individual present with the divisions on the 21st Nov. will pay the value of the damage done to the proprietors of the gardens in proportion to the amount of his pay. I have now the honor of informing you that I have been directed to communicate to the Dep. Paymaster General the orders of the Commander of the Forces to deduct from the amount of the estimates for the month of November last of the several British corps concerned, the sums charged against them respectively (in a statement which has been made out by his Lordship's command), as far as this may be found practicable. The value of the loss sustained is taken from an estimate certified by the civil authorities of the district in which the damage occurred; and the amount to be contri-

buted by each corps respectively is proportioned to its numbers in officers and men present, as they appear in the daily states of the 5th and 6th divisions of the 21st Nov. last. But as casualties to a considerable extent have occurred in the two divisions subsequent to that period, in consequence of the formation of some of the corps into provisional battalions, the departure of others from the country, &c., it will be found impracticable to recover the full amount of the sums charged against each corps in the statement above alluded to. It will be necessary therefore to recur to the scale of charges in the statement for individuals of each rank, from the field officer to the R. and F., and to make the deduction from the account of each officer and soldier included under the head of 'present' in the daily state of the 21st Nov., with the exception of the officers and men who have been settled with and are gone to England, belonging to corps which have been formed into provisional battalions, or sent home; for it is obvious, in regard to those officers and men, that it would be difficult in most cases, and impossible in some, to recover from them what they ought justly to contribute under this arrangement. I have likewise the honor to inform you that steps will be taken to cause a deduction to be made in like manner from the estimates of pay for the month of November last of the Portuguese corps attached to the 5th and 6th divisions. I request that you will be pleased to cause the contents of this letter to be communicated to the several Commanding officers of regiments and corps in the 5th and 6th divisions, in order that they may issue the necessary instructions to their respective paymasters towards carrying the intentions of the Commander of the Forces into effect. A copy of the statement of charges, as far as it affects the several corps composing the 5th and 6th divisions, is herewith transmitted for your information.

The A.G. to S. Hunter, Esq., Deputy Paymaster General.

23d March, 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you, by order of the Commander of the Forces, a statement of the charges to be made against the several British corps therein named, on account of the damage done by the soldiers of the 5th and 6th divisions to the property of certain individuals in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 21st Nov. last. The charges against each corps have been calculated upon a scale which has been established for each rank, from the field officer to the R. and F., in reference to the total amount to be charged against the two divisions, and the numbers of each rank for which the charge is made are taken from the daily states of the divisions of the 21st Nov. last. The Commander of the Forces has directed me to request that you will cause to be deducted from the amount of the estimates for the month of November last, of the several corps concerned, so much of the amount charged against each of them respectively in the enclosed statement as it may be found practicable to recover by charges against the accounts of individuals of the several ranks who are included as present in the daily state of the 21st Nov. last. I have communicated to the General officers commanding the 5th and 6th divisions the pleasure of the Commander of the Forces upon this subject, and have requested them severally to cause the paymasters of corps composing the divisions under their respective command, to be made acquainted with the contents of my letters to them, in order that the paymasters may be enabled to furnish you with an account of what it may be practicable to recover towards the amount charged against these two divisions.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 21st. I propose that the British troops should lay aside either blankets or great coats this year; and I have not yet decided which. I believe, however, the latter: but I propose to put them in tents. I would recommend to you, therefore, not to give out your great coats till the end of the season.

I have ordered Hamilton's division to Abrantes for their clothing, and the brigade in the 7th division to Raiva for theirs. This business is going on as you wish.

I am glad to hear that your wound is so well as not to prevent your travelling.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 15th inst., in which your Excellency has informed me that you have, by desire of the Regency, ordered the regiment of *Fernando VII.*, and the hussars of *Aragon*, into the province of Seville, Gen. Don Josef San Juan not having received any orders from me respecting these regiments.

I did not forget these regiments, although I did not send them orders to move into the province of Seville.

The fact is, that the clothing and appointments belonging to the regiment of *Fernando VII.* are at Alicante, where they had been detained by Gen. Roche. I have since sent orders to Gen. Elio, on the 1st March, to send this regiment to the neighbourhood of Alicante to receive its clothing and appointments, and the regiment is afterwards to join the 2d army. Positive orders are sent to Gen. Roche to deliver the clothing and appointments.

The hussars of *Aragon* have been ordered to move towards the same point, with the intention of drafting them into the regiments of *Almanza* and *Olivença*.

Your Excellency will observe how much the service is interrupted from the practice adopted by your Excellency of sending orders direct to the troops, contrary to the positive engagement entered into by the government with me, and to the military practice of all countries. These troops were destined to commence their military operations at an early period; and I repeat to your Excellency, that every military plan must be deranged if you continue this practice.

I have addressed this letter to you in English, as I have not by me the facility of writing it in Spanish; and I wish not to lose the earliest opportunity of writing to you on this subject.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I have this day received your letter of the 12th inst., in regard to the raising money by loan upon certificates, of which I heretofore sent you the form and explanation. I am concerned that it is supposed that these will not answer, as I am not authorised to borrow money on certificates of any other description, or any other terms than those stated.

I am concerned to find also that there is no prospect of procuring money at Cadiz for the payment of the subsidy to Spain, unless from the funds hitherto allotted for the support of His Majesty's troops. These funds have hitherto been very insufficient for this object, and will certainly not be equal to defray the additional expense now to be placed on them.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 24th Feb.

I have made all the arrangements for drafting the horses from the 2d hussars, thinking that, after the draft made from the 9th and 11th

light dragoons, and 4th dragoon guards, horses would still be wanting for some of the regiments; but by the reports received from some of the Commanding officers, I find that they cannot mount the numbers which I had allotted to them from the drafts; and I therefore delay the measure for a few days till I can receive reports from the several regiments of the exact numbers received by each, and what number of men there will remain in any regiment dismounted.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

Gen. Murray has mentioned to me that he wishes that Capt. Kelly * of the Life Guards, now employed in some situation in the Military College, should be allowed to join this army, in order to be employed on the Staff of the Q. M. G., and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make application to His Royal Highness for permission for him to come here.

The appointment of Arentschildt to be aide de camp to the Prince Regent has put him over the head of De Lancey in this army, and I should be glad if you would consider whether it would be possible to apply to his situation in the department the rule which prevails in respect to the D. Q. M. G. of the army, and the D. Q. M. G. in Ireland, viz., that when an officer is made aide de camp to the King over his head, he gets the rank of Colonel.

I enclose a paper of memorandums which De Lancey has put into my hands, which shows that he has not been much favored; and I have to say of him, that he was at the head of the Q. M. G.'s department during nearly the whole of the last campaign, and in the battle of Salamanca; and that he always rendered me the greatest assistance, and gave me every satisfaction.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

Having, in consequence of the directions of the Sec. of State, made arrangements for carrying into execution the wishes of the Commander in Chief for the formation of a police corps of two troops, to be denominated the Cavalry Staff Corps, I have to request that you will submit to His Royal Highness' favorable consideration the names of the undermentioned officers for appointments in the above corps:

Brevet Lieut. Col. G. Scovell,† from the 57th regt., to be Major Commandant. To be Captains of troops: Lieut. Lewis During, from the 15th light dragoons; Lieut. J. Gitterick, from the 12th light dragoons. To be Cornet: James Rooke, gent.

I shall hereafter transmit my recommendation of officers for other commissions in this corps.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Sir H. Wellesley, in regard to the negotiation of loans for sums of money at Cadiz, on the certificates which were sent to me last year; and on the prospects of

* Afterwards on the Adj. Gen.'s staff in India, where he died. He had distinguished himself at the battle of Waterloo.

† Major Gen. Sir G. Scovell, K.C.B., Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.

raising any money at Cadiz to pay the subsidy sum in any other manner than on the funds hitherto destined for the support of His Majesty's army.

I likewise enclose the copy of my answer.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

The army of the South have continued their movements to the northward, and they have now but few troops in La Mancha. They have not passed the mountains; and it appears that they are concentrated between Talavera de la Reyna, Madrid, and Toledo. The army of the Centre have moved towards the Duero; and I have a report that the King quitted Madrid on the 17th inst., to which I give credit, although it is not from an authentic source.

The troops on the Tormes have not moved; nor have I heard of any other movement of importance.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 24th March, 1813.

I see in the newspapers a report that there is in London a Frenchman employed on a negotiation for the exchange of prisoners, to which I earnestly recommend to your Lordship not to consent.

1st; If what is reported of the number of officers and soldiers taken by the Russians be at all true, you may depend upon it that Buonaparte will find it difficult to form another army, unless he should get back the old officers and soldiers who are prisoners either in England or in Russia.

2dly; They have very few officers or soldiers of ours whom it is an object to us to get back. They have scarcely any Portuguese; and I would not give one French officer or soldier, such as I sent last year to England, for 100 Spanish officers and soldiers, such as they have in France. I doubt their having so many Spaniards as they pretend they have in different papers which I have read on the subject; but of this you may be very certain, that whether they have them or not at present, Spaniards of all ages and sexes will not be wanting when the exchange agreed upon is to be carried into execution; as, if they have not in their prisons what are called soldiers, they will make a sweep of the country, and carry off as many as will be required to release all the French soldiers who may be in confinement in England.

The A.G. to Capt. McNab, R.N., Figueira.

24th March, 1813.

Invalided men from the several divisions of the army, and from the hospital stations of Celorico and Viseu, are now proceeding to Coimbra on their way to Lisbon; and the Commander of the Forces being desirous that they should be removed by water from Figueira to Lisbon, I am to request that you will communicate with Lieut. Col. Royal, Commandant of Coimbra, regarding their removal to Figueira, and with Lieut. Cleyson, of the Royal navy, agent of transports, who will receive instructions from the Q. M. G. for providing the necessary accommodation for them on board the vessels employed on the public service to navigate between the port of Figueira and the Tagus. I am further to desire that you will regularly transmit to the A. Q. M. G. at Lisbon returns of invalids embarked at Figueira for Lisbon, stating the day of embarkation.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B.

Freneda, 25th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 22d inst.; and being satisfied myself

of the validity of the promise made by the mother of the young lady who has been carried off by — — —, of the — regt., I don't conceive that doubts entertained by any other person ought to prevent or delay the execution of the directions which I gave on that subject.

In regard to — — —'s inclination to marry the young lady, I cannot but observe that he has it in his power, whenever he pleases, to compensate in that manner the injury which he has done to the family; and it is no excuse that the influence of the family has prevented the clergy in the neighbourhood from performing the ceremony. That influence could not extend to the clergy in Spain, from which country — — — is distant but a few miles.

— — — has been guilty of a gross breach, not only of the laws of Portugal, but of the laws of his own and of all civilized countries; and if I should be called upon by the government, as I most probably shall, to deliver over — — — to the Portuguese tribunals, to be dealt with according to the Portuguese law, I shall most undoubtedly comply with their desire.

I can't but observe upon — — —'s complaint 'that he is to be placed at the disposal of a foreign tribunal,' that the notion is too common among the officers and soldiers of the army that they are not obliged to obey the laws of the country in which they are acting; or, in other words, that they may act as they please, and may commit such outrages as they think proper, provided they don't offend against the Mutiny Act and Articles of War.

I can't, however, admit of such a doctrine; and — — — will be an instance that the laws of the country must be obeyed, if the Portuguese government shall desire that he may be delivered over to the tribunals of that country.

I beg that the directions contained in my letter of the 19th inst. may be carried into execution.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. McDonald, 13th Royal Veteran battalion. 25th March, 1813.

I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith for your information and guidance a copy of a letter addressed to the Marquis of Wellington by the Adj. Gen. to the Forces, conveying the commands of H. R. H. the Prince Regent regarding the formation and establishment of the 13th Royal Veteran battalion. I have likewise the honor of transmitting to you nominal returns of invalids belonging to different corps serving in the Peninsula reported fit for garrison duty who are to be taken on the strength of the 13th Royal Veteran battalion from this day, the 25th March. The greater part of these men are now at Belem, and will be delivered over to your charge upon application by you to the military Commandant at that station. The remainder are at different hospital stations in this country; and I have to request that in all points relating to the removal of the latter to Belem, and to the details connected with the accounts of the soldiers composing the 13th Royal Veteran battalion, you will be pleased to correspond with the Commandants of the general hospital stations and the Commanding officers of the several regiments from which these soldiers have been removed into the 13th Veteran battalion. The whole of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers named in the accompanying nominal lists are to be taken on the strength of the 13th Veteran battalion from this day, the 25th March, and are to be accounted for in the returns of the regiment. Such of the men in the accompanying lists as are returned at Belem must be returned 'present,' as being at the head quarters of the regiment; and all those, without exception, not returned at Belem must be

returned in the returns of the battalion 'on command.' Hereafter, as accurate information shall from time to time be received by the regiment regarding the absent men, you will be enabled to account for them under their proper heads. The officers are to be accounted for in the returns according to the information which you may be able to obtain respecting them. Capt. Craig, D. A. A. G. at Lisbon, will furnish you with the forms of returns required by the Adj. Gen.'s department, on application to him for that purpose.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 26th March, 1813.

They have omitted to send a riband with which to wear a badge of the Order of the Tower and Sword to the Knights; the consequence of which is, that I saw one yesterday with the cross hanging to a red riband. I wish you would mention this to Dom M. Forjaz, and have it arranged that there may be sent to me, with a letter for each Knight and Commander, a riband of the proper color for the Order.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 26th March, 1813.

I have received yours of the 23d, and I am very sorry to learn the fate of the *Java*.

I conceive from the hand, and from the word *Usted** written thus, that the anonymous letter you enclosed is written by an Englishman; and I think I have before seen the hand of the direction. But it does not appear to me that there is any mischief in the letter. It is the universal practice of the world to accuse all men of ambition, who are a little prominent in station or in talents; and I don't know that such an accusation does much harm, if no such views are entertained.

To Sir R. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 26th inst., and I am much concerned to find that the army are likely to suffer the inconvenience of your prolonged absence from it. I still entertain the intention and hope that I shall be able to put the whole army in the field on the 1st May; and it is much more important that you should be at head quarters at the present moment, than at that at which the troops shall move, as their being able to move at all equipped as they ought to be, will depend upon the directions to be given now to bring to a conclusion the different arrangements before directed. The absence of the Commissary Gen., however, is always excessively inconvenient to the public service, and I cannot but lament the necessity for it a second time in so short a period.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

I received yesterday your letter of the 17th. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know who will command the troops at Cadiz, &c., when you go to England.

If that officer should be one whose discretion can be depended upon, I can have no objection to your going, excepting that in the last paragraph of your letter you say that you would abandon all idea of the application, if there should be any idea of your being called into a more active

* It is written *vmd* in Spanish, being the short of *vuestra merced*, but it is pronounced *usted*.

situation. As far as I am concerned, I should consent to your going, on the ground that it is necessary for your health, which I am aware has suffered considerably, provided there is an officer to replace you on whose discretion I can rely ; but if I am to understand by the last paragraph that you can perform the duty of a more active situation, which I don't think you can, I should then object to your quitting the important situation in which you are placed.

So far for my opinion. But I must inform you that the government attach great interest to the command at Cadiz ; and although I may recommend, I cannot allow you to quit the station without their consent, unless in a case of extreme urgency, and I should provide an officer to perform your duty in your absence, on whose discretion they, as well as I, could rely.

I have thought it best to explain myself clearly to you upon this subject, in order that if you should make your application for leave, you may receive the answer in time to get away from Cadiz before the commencement of the hot weather.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, ce 28 Mars, 1813.

J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 23 de ce mois sur celle du 17, que je vous ai adressée par les ordres du Ministre de la Guerre, sur les mesures que vous aviez prises à l'égard du régiment 2 de Malaga.

Je n'étais pas persuadé que les mesures que votre Excellence avait adoptées à l'égard du régiment de Malaga étaient contraires aux *termes* de l'ordre du 4 Déc. de 1812 ; mais je n'avais aucun doute qu'elles étaient contraires à *l'esprit* de cet ordre. Il me paraissait aussi que le régiment 2 de Malaga ayant été formé sous les ordres et sous les yeux du gouvernement, il aurait été expédient de remettre aux vœux du gouvernement les mesures que votre Excellence se proposait pour transférer les soldats à d'autres corps.

Mais j'avais les ordres du gouvernement pour la censure que j'ai passée sur cet acte. Si la Régence l'avait autorisé d'aucune manière, et qu'elle même en a après fait passer une censure, elle a agi d'une manière très in-conséquente, pour ne rien dire de plus.

Mais la cause pour laquelle je m'adresse à votre Excellence une seconde fois sur ce sujet se trouve dans le dernier paragraphe de votre lettre du 23 Mars ; par lequel on croirait qu'en obéissant à l'ordre que j'avais reçu du gouvernement, je me suis servi de termes de censure également méconnus, et peu demandés par les circonstances. Je peux vous assurer que si je me suis servi de tels termes, c'était bien contre mon intention. Les circonstances sûrement ne les demandaient pas ; et même si j'eusse pu croire qu'elles les demandaient, mon respect pour le rang, les services, et les qualités qui distinguent votre Excellence m'auraient empêché de m'en servir ; et je crois que ceux qui verront ma lettre à votre Excellence du 17 Mars, conviendront, qu'étant obligé par les ordres du gouvernement de censurer un acte de votre Excellence, la censure ne pouvait être moins dure, ni les termes desquels je me suis servi, ni les sujets être plus généraux que ceux dont je me suis servi dans cette lettre.

Je conviens qu'il n'est pas agréable pour ceux qui servent la patrie avec zèle, et qui n'ont pas été accoutumés aux censures, de s'y trouver pour la première fois en but ; et j'espère que je dois attribuer à ces sentimens la sensibilité de votre Excellence à celle que j'ai du vous envoyer. Je serais bien fâché si quelque chose que j'ai pu écrire à votre Excellence a pu diminuer votre zèle, réglé comme il doit l'être par attention aux ordres et même aux vœux de l'autorité supérieure dans les cas où on ne trouve pas d'ordres positifs ; mais je ne peux ni ne dois retracter la censure que j'ai donnée ; et il faut s'attendre que si je dois former et passer une opinion sur les actes de quelqu'un, je dois en énoncer ma désapprobation si j'en désapprouve, quoique dans des termes, desquels je me flatte que je ne me suis départi jamais.

To Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 23d March.

It is impossible to lay before the government an account of the expenses in the provinces of Seville and Cordova before we have them in detail.

When I proposed to the government, and the government promised to me, that nine tenths of the revenues of the liberated provinces should be assigned for the maintenance of the armies, I thought it was understood that these nine tenths should be paid into the military chest without any deduction whatever, excepting the expenses of collection.

The Commanders in Chief of the several armies were then, under the 11th article of the decree of the Cortes, to be responsible for the expenditure of the sums of money which should come into the several military chests.

If, however, it is to be understood that pensions, and the salaries of employments of all descriptions, and other expenses are to be paid from the amount of the nine tenths of the revenues supposed to be allotted to the armies, it is quite certain that this arrangement is nugatory ; and Spain may have an army of pensioners and of persons in civil and other employments, but she will not have one of soldiers.

It is impossible, however, that I can bring this subject distinctly under the view of the government, until I shall be possessed of the detailed information which your Excellency proposes to send to me ; and then I may hope to prevail upon the government to adopt the measures which are necessary in order to insure the subsistence of the armies.

I propose to endeavor to have provision made in Estremadura, to supply the troops under your command on their advance towards the probable scene of action, if we should be enabled to make them advance ; but in the mean time the collection of magazines in Cordova and Ecija is expedient, particularly if that measure can be adopted without preventing the collection of a sum of money in the military chest.

I mention this, because I think it very possible to be able to collect a large magazine in the provinces of Seville and Cordova in payment of the contribution *de Guerra*, which it would be impossible to collect in money. But if the contribution can be collected in money it is desirable ; and if that should be the case, I should not deem it desirable at present

to form in those provinces a larger magazine than for one month for the number of men stated.

The scene of operations will necessarily be at a distance from those magazines; and the transport of the magazines which the money would equally purchase elsewhere, would be very expensive and difficult.

I will attend to what you state in regard to the state of discipline of the troops, when the time shall come for ordering them to move.

I am very much inclined to apprehend, however, that instead of having too few troops in a state of discipline to take the field, we shall find that we have more troops clothed, armed, and disciplined, than the means of the country can support, unless the government should adopt, in earnest, the measures proposed to them, and arranged with me, and should give the armies the real nine tenths of the revenues fairly collected and honestly administered. It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of the war on the Duero or the Ebro, crowds of starving soldiers. We shall only lose them by desertion, and with them our own characters, and increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage from the trouble taken in forming them.

In whatever force the army of reserve may march, I will take care that it is attended by a body of cavalry in proportion to the strength of the cavalry of the army.

It is very desirable that the 2d company of artillery should be formed as proposed; and if your Excellency will be so kind as to let me know what equipments and military stores you require for both companies, I will inquire whether the stores of the British army at Cadiz can afford to supply them.

I have written to the government respecting the battalion of Campo Maior. The future disposition of the Walloon guards must depend upon the prospects which there will be of keeping together in operations, in one body, a large corps of Spanish troops.

It is very desirable that the battalion of *zapadores* should be completed, which I understand was the object in view in bringing it into Andalusia. I addressed the government upon this subject; but it is very desirable that this battalion should be trained as sappers, rather than as infantry.

Having conversed with Don Josef Canterac in regard to the details of the plan proposed for forming the brigades of mules for the army of reserve, I am induced to doubt whether the government itself, without the authority of a decree of the Cortes, has the power to order the execution of such a plan, for the reason stated by your Excellency. The call for these mules would be tantamount to the call for a fresh contribution; unless it should be in commutation for a part of the extraordinary contribution *de Guerra*. In this view it would be objectionable. It would be better to levy the contribution, and then to purchase the mules, supposing it to be expedient to form such brigades of mules in the service of government. From my experience, however, of the service in the Peninsula, I am inclined to doubt the expediency of forming such brigades.

In the allied British army we have never been able to maintain even one brigade of mules the property of the public, although we have many

brigades of hired mules; and I would recommend to your Excellency to consider of the means of drawing from the provinces of Seville and Cordova the service of a certain number of brigades of mules to attend the army for a limited time as *bagages*, under the contract and customs of the country, to be relieved by others from the same towns at the end of the limited period allotted for their service. By these means, which I believe may be adopted by the Intendants of the provinces without further authority from the Cortes, your Excellency will have in the service of the army of reserve a certain proportion of mules.

Au Duque del Infantado.

Freneda, ce 28 Mars, 1813.

J'ai reçu hier votre lettre du 17 Mars, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé. L'affaire entre 'las Cortes' et l'ancien gouvernement a été un peu leste. Je m'attendais à quelque chose de la sorte en conséquence de ce que j'avais vu et entendu à Cadiz; mais je n'ai pas cru que l'assaut serait si soudain, si vif, ou sitôt décidé.

Vous aurez su comment a fini l'affaire des Russes.

J'ai déjà parlé ce matin au Général Wimpffen sur la manière de vous employer à l'armée, et je crois pouvoir proposer un arrangement au gouvernement qui vous sera agréable et qui vous offrira les moyens de vous distinguer. Je vous écrirai plus en détail là dessus en quelques jours.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 19th. From what I see in the newspapers, I should doubt the success of Carlota. However, we shall see.

Whittingham's and Roche's corps must of course be taken care of from the resources to be procured at Cadiz. In regard to the remainder, they must be considered in the first instance disposable for the supply of the military chest of the British army; and I will state at what periods, and in what proportions, they may be applied to other Spanish services. I think it desirable that at present, besides the current supplies for Whittingham's and Roche's corps, Mr. Duff should be prepared to issue 400,000 dollars for Spanish services.

I wish, and propose, to open the campaign on the 1st of May, and to aid the several Spanish corps with that sum, at about that period. But from all that I hear, I am much afraid that none of them will then be ready. We shall be so, I hope, completely; and if there was money, I should entertain no doubts of the result of the next campaign in respect to the Peninsula. But the Spanish government have so contrived their matters, that the arrangements concerted and agreed upon with me have not yet produced a shilling, and as far as I can judge, are not likely to produce much. However, I cannot yet write decisively and officially upon this subject, as I have not the official reports; but I have certainly the most obstinate and worst tempered people to deal with (particularly Gen. —) that I have yet met in my life.

I acknowledge that I have never expected much from the certificates; and I have never yet been able to issue even one. I believe there is very little money in Spain to be borrowed; and that the few people in Spain who have money to lend, have no confidence in any thing like a govern-

ment security. They would infinitely prefer that of Mr. Duff. I am very little satisfied, however, with the objections of Mr. — and Mr. — to the certificates. There is nothing in the form of the certificate that does not add to the security of the lender; a truth, of which any person who should have money to lend would be convinced, if the agents of the borrower would take the trouble to explain it to him. Mr. —'s certificate is drawn with a view to English, not to Spanish, objection. I never heard of any but metal money in Spain, or that any attempt had been made by the British government to introduce the paper currency of Great Britain into this country. Our certificate states, that the debt shall be paid in certain places in the Peninsula, and means, of course, in the money of the Peninsula; and if I was a lender in the Peninsula instead of a borrower, I should suspect the validity of the certificate drawn as Mr. — proposes; but I should not have much difficulty in granting this certificate, if any money could be procured for it. What does Mr. — say upon this point?

Depend upon it, that the result of the next campaign depends upon our financial resources. I shall be able in a month to take the field with a larger and more efficient British and Portuguese army than I have yet had; and there are more Spanish troops clothed, armed, and disciplined, than have ever been known, and we are making a daily progress towards getting out of the chaos in which I found matters. But if we cannot realise the subsidy without falling on the resources of the British army, and can get nothing from the country, we shall end the next campaign as we did the last. That is, after we shall have consumed what we can seize of the harvest, *we* must retire; and when *we* shall retire, nobody else can remain forward. You will see, therefore, how necessary it is to sift to the bottom the whole question regarding the money to be raised on loan, and if there should really be any, which I doubt, to ascertain what are the real objections to the certificate proposed.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 28th March, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst. regarding the bounty due to certain serjeants and private men of the Watteville regiment.

I know nothing of the order which Major Gen. Ross had upon this subject; but there is no doubt that he was in a situation to give these people reason to believe that he was authorised to issue the proclamation under the engagements of which they deserted, and afterwards enlisted; and, under these circumstances, I request that they may be paid the sums stated to be due to them, that is to say, 18 dollars to each of the 2 serjeants, and 8 dollars to each of the 44 R. and F.

To Major Gen. Baron Bock.

Freneda, 29th March, 1813.

I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of private — —, of the — regt., which I return, and request the Court to revise both the proceedings and sentence.

It is very desirable to me, whose business it is to form a judgment on

the proceedings of the Court, that the circumstances should be clearly stated in the recorded proceedings which produced on the minds of the members of the Court the conviction that the prisoner did not intend to steal the horse, contrary to the uncontradicted evidence of Lieut. —, and to the finding of the Court itself, that the horse was offered for sale in Rio Maior.

Whatever the circumstances may be, it is desirable that the Court should omit from their sentence that part which states their reason for passing a 'lenient sentence' on the prisoner. Such an addition to the sentence does not appear necessary; and I am afraid that those to whose knowledge it will come will not be able to distinguish the difference between taking a horse from its owner, riding it a certain distance, and offering it for sale, and abusing and ill treating the owner when he came to claim it, and stealing it.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 29th March, 1813.

I received the night before last your letters of the 10th and 11th, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your first movement on the enemy.

It is impossible for me to move in Castille till the green forage shall have appeared, which I expect will be in the first week in May. The season is however very unfavorable. We have had no fall of rain since December; and up to this moment we have dry harsh north easterly winds, that destroy the vegetation which might support our horses and other animals. You will judge, therefore, of the expediency of your doing more at present than you have done.

I entertain no doubt that you will have nothing upon you excepting the troops immediately under Suchet, as all the rest are upon the Tagus and Duero, and preparing to resist the movements which they expect us to make. If I should find that they hesitate about going towards the Duero, or that they detach towards you, I shall move forward a part of this army immediately as far as the Tormes, which will bring them back.

As soon as I see the equinoctial rain fall I shall be able to fix the day on which I shall move, and I will then write to you to begin your operations, reckoning upon the dispatches taking 15 days to reach you.

I have not yet determined whether you shall carry on an operation by land, keeping your right flanks on the Mediterranean, of the same description with that which I carried on in Portugal in 1808, or whether you shall embark the British part and such other of your force as you have transports to convey, and attack Tarragona, leaving the corps under Gen. Elio, and the other troops for which you will not have conveyance, to proceed to take possession of Valencia, and to follow the movements of the enemy. Much depends upon the state of the equipments and resources of the 2d and 3d Spanish armies, of which I have not yet the returns.

If we could retake Tarragona, which, with the means at your command, does not appear a difficult operation, we should obtain a most important point in a view to the position of the troops in Catalonia and to the future operations of the war; and, on the other hand, if we should fail, it must

be in consequence of the movement of such a body of the enemy's troops from Valencia as would secure the possession of that city, and probably of the whole of the province. However, much depends upon the capacity of movement of the 2d and 3d Spanish armies.

I am sorry to have a bad account of your troops. The *esprit* of ours has always been good, but their discipline occasionally very bad indeed. We are getting better, however, and I trust we shall make a good figure in this campaign. I don't know of any light troop officer that I could send you, as we change our hands almost every month. You shall have the 67th regt.; but you must remember that, in case of an accident anywhere, that or some other regiment must return to Carthagena.

P.S. I enclose a letter which I beg you will send to the General officer commanding in Catalonia, in order that he may be ready to co-operate with you in case you should proceed to the attack of Tarragona.

To the Spanish General officer commanding in Catalonia. Freneda, 29th March, 1813.

I think it proper to take an early opportunity of informing your Excellency that it is possible that the allied troops on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula may begin their operations early in May by an attack on Tarragona; and it is desirable that your Excellency should be prepared to co-operate with them on the first intimation you will receive from the General officer commanding the troops of his being about to carry that plan into execution.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 29th March, 1813, 10½ P.M.

The messenger goes off in the morning, and I write again to let you know that the English mail to the 10th has arrived. There does not appear any news of importance. There is some prospect of decreased hostilities towards Great Britain on the part of Denmark; and it is stated that a Regency has been appointed in Prussia. But these are only reports. The public attention in England appears to be entirely engrossed by the Princess of Wales.

I congratulate you upon the result of La Carlota's affairs.

I wish you could send me, by the first messenger who comes, a box of cigars, not for myself, but for Tweeddale.

I request you to send 6000 suits of clothing to the army of Catalonia, and 4000 to the army under Elio at Alicante, and to state positively to the agents that it is for those armies.

Your courier of the 25th arrived this evening.

Let me know how much more clothing you have in store at Cadiz.

The A.G. to General officers commanding divisions.

29th March, 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to transmit to you the enclosed copies (one of which is intended for your own use and one for the use of each officer commanding a brigade in the division under your command) of instructions regarding the field movements of the troops which have been drawn up by his Excellency, and which he desires may be duly attended to on all occasions wherein the division as a body, or any brigade or battalion belonging to it, shall be assembled for the purpose of exercise.

To Col. Mark Wilkes.

Freneda, 30th March, 1813.

I received by yesterday's post your letter of the 2d inst., in which you have enclosed a copy of the memorial to the Court of Directors of the East India Company of yourself and other gentlemen, executors named in the will of the late Gen. Agnew, in favor of the General's family.

Having served in the East Indies during a great part of the period referred to in the memorial, and having had a perfect knowledge of the public transactions in that country of that period, of the share Major Gen. Agnew had in them, of the trust and confidence reposed in him, and of the ability and integrity with which he fulfilled the various duties with which he was intrusted, and having always felt the greatest regard for him as an officer and a member of society, I should feel the utmost satisfaction in giving my aid to relieve the inconveniences brought on his family, in a great measure by his virtues and by his zealous discharge of his duty to his employers, if I knew of any channel through which I could venture to address the Court of Directors, without the risk of being supposed guilty of intrusion upon them.

I entertain no doubt, however, that the Court of Directors will feel every disposition to attend to your forcible appeal to their generosity and justice; and you may depend upon it that, if you can point out to me any channel by which, without intrusion, I can venture to recommend your memorial to their attention, I will with pleasure avail myself of your suggestion.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 30th March, 1813.

You have gone so far beyond our expectations in supplying us with money, that I should not now address you upon this subject, only that I have heard a report, from something like authority, that the price of silver in England had come to its standard, and that that of gold was falling rapidly.

I beg your Lordship's attention to the contents of a letter which I sent you last week from Sir H. Wellesley in regard to our prospects of money from Cadiz for the British army, after providing for the Spanish subsidy. From all the accounts which I have yet received of the produce of the revenues of the Spanish provinces freed from the enemy, I have every reason to fear that we shall realise but little, if any thing; and yet I feel no hesitation in predicting now, that the result of the campaign about to be opened will depend in a great measure upon our being able to keep together, in a state for service, a large force of Spaniards, which can be done only by the aid of money.

I must also inform your Lordship that our debts to the muleteers attached to this army are becoming a very serious evil. There was very lately a desertion to a very large amount from Gen. Hill's corps, produced, I believe, in a great measure, by the *sharks*, called British merchants, residing in Lisbon, under the protection of the British government, who are ready to do any thing to gain a little by the public distresses. In proportion as the success of the army may clear the country of the enemy's troops, and the inland traffic will revive, we must expect the desertion of this useful class of people, unless we can pay

them a part of what we owe them, and their future hire more regularly than we have that which they have earned heretofore. Any desertion of them is very inconvenient, and a very large desertion would be fatal to us.

I likewise beg to draw your Lordship's attention to a new head of expense which has begun to occur only lately, that is, bounty on the re-enlistment of British soldiers. The demands on the military chest on this head alone at this moment are estimated at 800,000 dollars, which you are aware cannot be postponed without serious inconvenience to the service at large. Yet I am sure I don't know how I am to take the field in the first week in May, and to defray this demand and all the others for Spanish and Portuguese service which exist on our military chest.

I have brought this statement under your view only because I hope, from what I have heard, that there exist now in England means of relieving our difficulties to a very great extent.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, 1st division.

30th March, 1813.

I take leave to return to you the letter of Major Gen. Stopford and the accompanying proceedings of medical boards enclosed in your letter of the 29th inst., and I have the honor of informing you that the regular mode of proceeding in similar cases is for the General officer commanding the division, or the senior medical officer present with the army, to order a board of medical officers to assemble in order to examine and report upon the cases of such soldiers as may be brought before them. The proceedings of such medical boards, being first approved by the senior medical officer present with the army, are then transmitted to the senior officer of the Adj. Gen.'s department at head quarters, for the purpose of being submitted to the Commander of the Forces for decision as to the disposal of the soldiers whose cases are therein reported upon.

To the Rt. Hon. W. W. Pole.

Freneda, 31st March, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and I am much obliged to you for the trouble you take with my concerns.

Having the estate in Somersetshire, I should prefer a purchase in that same county and neighbourhood; but I feel no objection to any other; and if ——— can be bought for £70,000, I think it would be a good purchase, but I doubt that more ought to be given for it.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 31st March, 1813.

In answer to those parts of your letters of the 25th inst. to which I did not reply in my letter of the other night by the courier, I have to recommend to you to make the purchases of flour to be sold again, if you should think you can sell it with advantage, that no difficulties will be thrown in your way on the part of the government, and that the measure is not likely to become generally known. If it should be so, it would render us very unpopular, however useful it would be to the population of Cadiz. It is very obvious, however, that it will put in the chest the whole sum that you will receive for the flour, as that will be paid for by bills on England.

You did right to notice the paragraph in the *Conciso*, if only to convince the British government that you had nothing to say to it. You have nothing to say, any more than I have, to ———'s politics; and

as long as you do your duty by the government, it does not appear to me to be necessary to advert in any way to his opposition measures. I hope that nothing will induce you to think of resigning your situation.

I was pretty certain from what I saw in the papers that, notwithstanding her majority, La Carlota would not succeed in her object. The *liberales* must, however, take care what they are about: they may stir up the populace of the seat of government once too often; and they should recollect the fate of *all* the popular leaders of the French revolution by such conduct. I am quite sick of the whole business, which every day's experience convinces me cannot end well, be our military success what it may. We have done the Spaniards a great deal of mischief by encouraging them to establish what is called a free, but what is really a licentious, press; and so we shall find to our cost!

The Minister at War is going on just as usual; and I must either resign, or throw him and the government on their responsibility; and desire some Member of the Cortes to call for the letters. He sends orders to the troops, and so do I; and the consequence is, that neither are obeyed. I wish you would talk on the subject to the Cardinal.

Pray let me know how much of the clothing of the last year you have got; and send me a note of how you disposed of it. I will send you officially the account of the disposal of mine.

P.S. It appears by a paper of the 13th that the Russians were advancing on Hamburgh. God send that they may not go too far!

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 31st March, 1813.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 11th inst. (No. 105), and I will convey the orders which it contains to the officers commanding at the several stations in the Peninsula within the limits of my command.

I beg leave to observe to your Lordship that I am not aware that any officers who had deserted from the enemy have been sent to England, from Lisbon, in the manner described in your dispatch; but I think it right to inform you that there are many French officers (deserters) now there, of whom I don't know how to dispose, and who are constantly making applications to be provided for, in some way or other.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 31st March, 1813.

The King arrived at Valladolid on the 23d, and was still in that city on the 25th. It was expected that the head quarters of the Army of Portugal were to be moved to Palencia.

One division of the Army of the South have arrived at Avila; and the 1st division of the Army of Portugal, hitherto cantoned in that province, have moved towards the Duero. The other divisions of the Army of the South, as reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch, with very few troops, remain in La Mancha.

There has been no other movement of importance on this side of the Peninsula.

I have the honor to enclose a report which I have received from Lieut.

Gen. Sir J. Murray,* of an attack made by him upon the enemy's post at Alcoy, on the 7th inst. He has established his posts at that place, and proposes to move them still forwarder.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 2d April, 1813.

Since I wrote to you the other day, I have turned over in my mind the measure said to be in the contemplation of the Spanish government to pass a law to prevent the entry of foreign troops into Spanish garrisons, which I find, from what Wimpffen says, had been thought of before he quitted Cadiz; and I consider it likely to make so bad an impression abroad, as well as in England, that I think it very desirable that you should have some conversation with La Vega, Argüelles, and some of the principal people in the Cortes, in order to apprise them in what manner this question really stands.

1st; Spain is in a very different situation in respect to every question that can come under consideration, but more particularly in reference to military affairs, from any other country in Europe. The enemy are still in possession of a large proportion of the country, having only, within a few months, been deprived of the remainder of it. The Spanish army, which had been entirely destroyed, is now only in its infancy, and its organization and formation are checked by difficulties of every description, and the principal dependence of the country for relief from the enemy must be upon the aid of foreign troops.

2dly; It is not necessary to advert to the services of the foreign troops, nor to their good conduct, particularly in Spanish garrisons, into each of which they have come by invitation from the government of Spain; but I would beg those who are to consider this question, to see whether there is any ground whatever to be found in the conduct of our officers and troops for jealousy on this subject. If that is the case, it is surely unwise to insult an ally, and to afford ground for the abuse of our character by such an enactment.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart., to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Alicante, 10th March, 1813.

I had the honor, in my letter of the 26th ult., to acquaint your Lordship that I had taken the command of the division of the Mediterranean army serving on the eastern coast of Spain.

Since my letter of the 26th Feb., nothing of importance has occurred.

On the 3d inst., when reconnoitring the position of Alcoy, it became necessary to drive in the advanced posts. The enemy lost in the action, as I have been informed, one officer killed, and about 20 men killed and wounded.

The possession of Alcoy appeared to me of importance; and having had a very accurate view of the position, I thought it possible, in carrying the place, to cut off the corps stationed there. With this intention, on the 6th inst. I directed the march of a part of the army on Alcoy, and attacked that post on the morning of the 7th; but by the unfortunate delay of the column which was destined to cut off his retreat, the enemy effected his escape; had this column arrived a quarter of an hour before, not a man could have got off. The advanced guard of the column destined to attack the enemy in front drove him about 6 or 7 miles, when I found the soldiers so much fatigued, that even had I wished, I could have pressed them no farther. The country over which the enemy retired was extremely favorable for him, and certainly might have been much better defended. He was on this account enabled to dispose of his killed and wounded, and I cannot state his loss. That on the part of the allied army is inconsiderable. I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that trifling as these affairs have proved, they are sufficient to give me great confidence in the troops which were engaged; and it is with peculiar pleasure I have noticed the state of Major Gen. Whittingham's division of the Spanish army.

3dly; The measure may be attended by the most serious inconvenience. I have British officers and soldiers at this moment employed in Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo in repairs and improvements, which could not be carried into execution without their assistance. Works of the same description are carrying on in the same manner at Carthagená, Alicante, Tarifa, and even on the Isla itself, under the eyes of the Cortes. All these must be discontinued; as it must be supposed that after such an insult to our character, I can never allow an officer or soldier to go near a Spanish fortress. This may be attended by the most serious inconveniences and losses. We must not believe that we are yet arrived at that point of our affairs in Spain, that we may not meet with defeat, or that we may not again be obliged to withdraw near to our magazines, or that when the necessity for such a measure occurs, there will not be a very serious desertion and dispersion of Spanish troops. It is notorious that, on these occasions, the last place to which a Spanish soldier will go is a fortified garrison, which, in such a case, incurs the risk of being left without defence. This was so much the case when we fell back upon the Agueda last winter, and the desertion from the garrison which was in Ciudad Rodrigo was so great, that I had determined, if the enemy had continued to advance, to throw into that place a garrison of British troops; and actually left a division in the suburbs for that purpose when the rest of the army went into cantonments. It might happen to me to be obliged to retire again; it may happen to Sir J. Murray to be obliged to retire: what will be said if Ciudad Rodrigo is to be lost on one side, or Alicante on the other, in consequence of these movements?

4thly; The government and Cortes of Spain should observe that they have no magazines of either stores or provisions in any of their fortresses, not supplied by Great Britain. The magazines in Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo are those belonging to this army. They cannot expect that, after such an insult to our integrity, I shall leave them in those places.

The measure will really be one of wanton insult, which will do more harm to the cause for which we are contending than any thing that has yet been done. If the Cortes are seriously desirous that our troops should not be in their garrisons, let them say so quietly, and I will withdraw them; but while we are embarked in the same cause, and engaged in this arduous contest, don't let us insult each other by legislative measures.

It is obvious that the Spanish Regency neither have, nor can have, any power; and I don't know of any party in the Cortes with which you could connect yourself more closely, so as to have more influence over the measures in contemplation. It appears that the newspapers guide every thing, and I have often considered that it might be worth your while to have such a control over one or two of them, as to be certain that they would insert that of which you would wish the public at Cadiz to be informed. This is a matter, however, to be managed with great secrecy and discretion, and whatever you should think proper to publish, should be confined to a simple statement of facts and dates, in plain language, with the obvious reasoning resulting from them.

If you should find the government and Cortes determined to pass the proposed law, I think you should desire Major Gen. Cooke to remove all

the British troops and establishments from Cadiz to the Isla, without loss of time; and it is much better to make no remonstrances.

The mail is arrived to the 19th March. The news remarkably good. The King of Prussia has joined the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor of Austria has consented to an armistice with Russia, indefinite as to period of time. He has proposed himself as a mediator of a general peace. Count Weissenberg is expected in England every day on that subject. Dantzic has not fallen.

I enclose a letter for La Vega, which I beg you to read and deliver to him. I can't go on with these people unless I can set them to rights. I likewise enclose a letter, which Alava desired me to request you would have delivered.

To Señor Don A. A. de la Vega, Infanzon.

Freneda, 3d April, 1813.

Before I accepted the command of the Spanish armies and went to Cadiz, I wrote a letter to the late Regency, on the 4th Dec., in which I apprised them of my opinion of the state of the armies, of the difficulty which I should find in exercising the command, and of the powers with which it was necessary that the government should intrust me; and after I went to Cadiz I wrote them a second letter on the subject, on the 25th Dec., in which I explained, and again urged them to agree to what I had proposed in my first letter of the 4th Dec.; and after repeated discussions they did fully agree to these proposals of mine, in a letter from the Minister at War, of the 1st Jan. My object in proposing these measures, was to place the armies of Spain on the same footing of subordination and discipline with the other armies of Europe; and to preclude all chance of the continuance of those intrigues, by applications to the government which had brought the army to the state in which I found it. I could have no object, or wish of ambition, personal to myself. There are not 10 officers in the army whom I know even by sight. I can have no feeling for any but the public interest, connected as it is with the discipline of the army.

Another proof that I can have no object of that description, is to be found in my letter to the government, of the 27th Dec., in which I proposed that the Captains General of the different armies, and not myself, should be the Captains General of the provinces allotted for their support; and that in their hands should be vested all the power which the military were to have in the country.

I am sorry to have to inform you, that whatever my views may have been, they have been entirely frustrated by the departure of the government from every article of their engagements with me, as sanctioned by their letter of the 1st Jan.

1st; They have removed officers from their stations, and have placed them in others, without any recommendation from me, or any other superior officer; and without even acquainting me, or the superiors of those officers, that they had made such arrangements.

2dly; They have appointed officers to stations without my recommendation, or that of any other superior officer; and have given them assurances that they should remain in those stations, contrary to their en-

gagements with me; and to the Royal *Ordenanzas*, by which the powers and responsibility of the Captains General of the provinces are regulated.

3dly; They have, without my recommendation, or sending through me their orders, and even without acquainting me with their intentions, moved corps of cavalry and infantry from the army to which they belonged, to other stations; and this without any reason, that I am acquainted with, of a public nature. By this last measure the greatest inconvenience and confusion has been produced.

I had proposed, and the government had consented to, a reform of the cavalry; and they had ordered that it should be carried into execution. I sent orders in consequence, and I might have hoped that the armies would have had a tolerably well organised cavalry by the commencement of the campaign. Instead of that, I find that the government have likewise sent orders to the same corps different from those which I had sent; and I am informed, but not by the Minister at War, that the cavalry which I had destined to form part of the army of Galicia, at the opening of the campaign in May, had been ordered, some of it on the 6th Feb., and others on the 6th March, without my knowledge, to the Isla de Leon, there to join a cavalry depôt, which has been formed at that station, likewise without my knowledge. Another corps of cavalry, ordered by me to Alicante, to receive its clothing and horse appointments there, has been ordered by the Minister at War to the province of Seville.

I have frequently remonstrated upon these breaches of agreement with me, and on the evils likely to result from them; but I have hitherto been unable to obtain from the government any satisfactory reply, whether they intended to conform to their agreement with me or not.

To this statement add, that owing to the delays of the government in issuing the orders to the financial departments in the provinces, to carry into execution the measures decreed by the Cortes, and arranged with me to provide for the support of the armies, that branch of the service is in the same confusion as it was in the end of last year. All the armies are in the greatest distress, for want of pay and provisions; nothing can be realised even from those provinces which have been longest freed from the enemy; and the expectations of the country, and of the allies, that we should have a good Spanish army in this campaign, will certainly be disappointed.

I am fully alive to the importance which has been attached throughout Spain, as well as in England and in other parts of Europe, to the circumstance of my having been intrusted with the command of the Spanish armies; and the officers of the Spanish Staff, who are here with me, will, I am convinced, do justice to the interest, the devotion, and diligence with which I have labored to place the military affairs of the country in the state in which they ought to be. But I have a character to lose; and in proportion as expectation has been raised by my appointment, will be the extent of the disappointment and regret at finding that things are no better than they were before.

I confess that I don't feel inclined to become the object of these disagreeable sensations, either in Spain, in England, or throughout Europe; and unless some measures can be adopted to prevail upon the government

to force the Minister at War to perform the engagements of the government with me, I must, however unwillingly, resign a situation and trust which I should not have accepted if these engagements had not been entered into, and I had not believed that they would have been adhered to.

I have written you this long story, because I believe you were principally instrumental in producing the unanimous votes of the Cortes, that the command of the army should be conferred upon me; and I wish you to communicate this letter to Señor Argüelles and the Conde de Toreno; and to Señor Ciscar, who, I believe, was the person who first moved the subject in the Cortes. I wish them to call for all my letters to the Minister at War and his answers, from the 1st Dec. last to the present day; and they will learn from them the exact state of the case; and will be able to judge whether any, and what measures ought to be adopted. But I must tell you that, whatever may be their opinion regarding the measures to be adopted by the Cortes on this subject, I must reserve to myself the power of acting according to my own judgment; and if the agreement made with me, or something substantially the same, is not adhered to by the Regency, I must resign my situation.

I have now to tell you, that I propose to take the field at the head of the Allied British and Portuguese army, as soon as the rain shall have fallen, and the appearance of the green forage will enable me to support the cavalry of the army; but I am sorry to tell you, that, owing to the measures which are the subject of this letter, I don't believe that a single Spanish soldier will be able to take the field till after the harvest.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 3d April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th March, enclosing another anonymous letter from Cadiz. As the police must know the person to whom this letter is addressed, it might be possible to discover, through his means, by whom the letter is written.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Hay, 5th division.

3d April, 1813.

Having submitted to the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 1st inst., I have been directed to communicate to you the following remarks of his Lordship on the subject of the robbery of the mail on the 29th ult., in the neighbourhood of Lamego, by 3 British soldiers: That his Lordship is concerned to hear of this circumstance; that it shows that but little attention is paid by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiments composing the 5th division to the conduct of their men, otherwise such an event could not occur, and most particularly, the men could not destroy or dispose of the contents of the mail without the knowledge of the officers and non-commissioned officers, if either did their duty; that his Lordship augurs but ill of the corps of the 5th division in consequence of this circumstance, but he hopes that he shall find them better than he now believes them to be; that the men who committed this crime should not have been able to be so long from their quarters without its being known to their officers, if these did their duty; and most particularly that they ought not to have been able to dispose of the contents of the mail bag. I have to add that the Commander of the Forces desires that you will be pleased to communicate the contents of this letter to the several Commanding officers of corps in the 5th division.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith, K.B.

Freneda, 4th April, 1813.

I received your letter by the last post. I have recommended for pro-

motion, upon every occasion in which I have been permitted to recommend, those officers recommended to me by the General officers serving under my command, excepting in cases in which they have injured those whom they wished to serve, by recommending too many.

In such cases I have been obliged to select from their lists the names of those who, it appeared to me, were most deserving; and in some cases, as in the siege of Badajoz, I have referred the whole to the Commander in Chief, who has promoted those he thought proper. After the battle of Salamanca, I don't recollect that you recommended any body to me; and certainly if you had recommended Capt. Dowson to me, I should have recommended him. After that battle there were 6 officers promoted, belonging to the 5th division, all recommended by Gen. Pringle; and there was one recommended by him, Major Faunce, of the 4th regt., who was not promoted. I am afraid it is now too late to hope that Capt. Dowson will be promoted. But to show you that I don't forget your wishes, I inform you that I have recommended that Mr. Hay,* your aide de camp, might be promoted to the only company that has been at my disposal for a very considerable length of time.

I hope that your health has been improved by your voyage to England.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 4th April, 1813.

I think it proper to mention to you, that since the accounts have been received of the defection of the King of Prussia from the cause of France, and his junction with the Emperor of Russia, the Prince of Orange has expressed a desire to go to Germany to join the King. I recommended him to consult the wishes of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and he proposes to write to the Duke of York on the subject by the first mail.

To Major Gen. Baron V. Alten.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst.

I have received orders from H. R. H. the Commander in Chief and the Sec. of State to allow soldiers from all the regiments of cavalry in this country to volunteer their services in the Staff corps of cavalry to be formed; and I cannot see any reason why I should except the soldiers of the — from the benefits of this arrangement.

I have likewise received the orders of the Commander in Chief to draft the horses from the —, if more horses should be wanted for the other regiments of cavalry in this country; and, whatever may be the opinion and feelings of the regiment on the subject, I shall certainly obey the orders if it should be necessary.

I did not require the assistance of the opinion of — to be aware of the services and merits of the —, which I probably should have taken a proper opportunity of expressing, if it had not appeared from your letter that the probability that the horses of the regiment would be drafted (which, by the by, has never been communicated to the regiment in any manner, or to any individual in it excepting yourself) had occasioned a dissatisfaction, which appears to me rather inconsistent with the principles of military discipline and subordination, which had induced

* Sir A. Leith Hay.

you 'to *advise* the regiment to bear their fate quietly, and as good disciplined and brave soldiers ought to do, and to behave on their march every where as such;' and to tell me that 'you trust they will do so.'

I had believed the ——— would *certainly* behave in such a manner on all occasions and under all circumstances; and that, if there should be any doubt on the subject, something more forcible than *advice* would have been given to insure their good behaviour.

I now have to inform you that, if I should find it necessary to order that the horses should be drafted from the ——— in consequence of the Commander in Chief's directions, I shall order ——— to march with the regiment as their Colonel, and to remain with them till they shall be embarked, in order that I may be certain that they will behave themselves, under the circumstances, 'as good disciplined and brave soldiers ought;' and that, contrary to my usual practice, I shall refrain from paying, in G. O., the compliment which I may deem their services to deserve till they shall have quitted the country.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I have received a letter from the Minister at War, by which I have been informed that the Regency have appointed Lieut. Gen. Valdez to be Captain General of Cadiz and a district in the neighbourhood, with certain military powers over the troops within it, which measure renders it necessary that I should give you corresponding instructions.

You will observe that, under the 3d article contained in my letter to Mr. Frere of the 5th Feb. 1810, enclosed in my letter to Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart of that date, as his instructions, it was stipulated with the Spanish government, when first the British troops were detached from this army to Cadiz, 'that they, as well as their officers, were to be relieved as often as might be deemed necessary;' and there can be no doubt or difficulty upon that point. But, Gen. Valdez being the Governor of Cadiz and the Captain General of that city and its district, and having the sole and exclusive command on the Isla, &c., it is necessary that, whenever you should be ordered by me, or should find it necessary, to detach any troops from Cadiz, or should be ordered, or should find it necessary, to relieve those there by others, or to make any alteration of the force there, or of the individuals composing it, you should wait upon Gen. Valdez, and make him acquainted with the directions which you have received, and obtain his consent to their being carried into execution. I beg you to communicate these instructions to His Majesty's ambassador at Cadiz, and that you will inform Gen. Valdez that you have received them.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I beg you to send orders to the 2d batt. 67th regt. to embark at Carthage in vessels which Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray will send there for their removal, and to proceed to join the troops under his command at Alicante. The Commanding officer at Carthage will of course make the necessary communications to the Governor of Carthage for his information. The

artillery, &c., are to remain at Carthagena in charge of the British stores, &c., at that place.

I request you likewise to send to Alicante, to join Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, two officers of the corps of Royal Engineers, if they can be spared from Tarifa or Cadiz.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I had the honor of receiving last night your letters, Nos. 3, 4, and 5, of the 23d, 25th, and 27th March, in which you have informed me of your further operations since the 10th March, of your plan to detach Gen. Roche's division on an expedition on the coast to the enemy's rear, and of your receiving the directions of Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck of the 13th March to send back to Sicily certain of the troops under your command mentioned in his letter, on account of certain political events in that island.

I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of State, dated the 16th Feb., conveying the directions of his Lordship both to Lord W. Bentinck and myself, in regard to the command of the allied British and Sicilian troops employed in the Peninsula.

Although I have had these instructions in my possession for about a fortnight, I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with any directions founded upon them, because I conceive that the instructions heretofore sent by the Sec. of State and by me to your predecessor applied to all the cases supposed and provided for in these instructions.

Lest, however, you should have received these instructions from the Sec. of State subsequent to the period at which you will have received Lord W. Bentinck's directions of the 13th March, and before you will have carried them into execution, I think it proper to take the earliest opportunity to acquaint you that I have received these instructions, and to inform you of my opinion of them as applicable to the existing call for troops from Sicily.

The Sec. of State did not advert to the possible call of the troops from Sicily on the ground of a counter-revolution in the government, or of consequent internal disturbances; but the object of his orders is, that I should send the troops back, if there should exist any real necessity for that measure. My judgment must be guided, in deciding on this question, by the report of Lord W. Bentinck of the circumstances of the case, and his opinion on them; and I have no hesitation in desiring that the troops called for by Lord W. Bentinck may be sent forthwith, according to his directions, if, in consequence of the receipt of the instructions of the Sec. of State of the 16th Feb., you should have delayed to send them waiting orders from me.

I should have preferred sending whole battalions of the same numbers to sending detachments of flank companies; but Lord W. Bentinck knows his own army and his own concerns best, and I don't wish to interfere in any of his arrangements. I don't understand, however, exactly, from the letter, whether you are to send both flank companies from each of the English regiments named, or only from the Germans; and I request to hear from you on this point as soon as possible.

I have directed that the 2d batt. 62d regt. may join you from Carthage-
 gena. This detachment certainly makes a serious diminution from that
 part of your force upon whose exertions implicit reliance might be placed ;
 but I still hope you will have it in your power to carry on the operations,
 which I propose should be carried on on the Eastern coast, with the assistance
 of other Spanish corps, which it is in my power to give you.

I beg you to send a copy of this letter to Lord W. Bentinck.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 25th and 27th March, and I send here-
 with an official answer in regard to Lord W. Bentinck's call for the troops.

In regard to ———, I have sent for the Commanding officer of
 the artillery and will give you an answer in the postscript to this letter.
 I rather believe, however, that he is the Captain of one of the companies
 of artillery sent from this army to join the allied British and Sicilian corps,
 and that he can't be called from his company without cause publicly assigned.
 We found him here a very capable officer, and he was promoted to be ———
 ——— by brevet for his conduct at two sieges.

I can't give you more troops than the battalion at Carthage-
 gena. We have only one English regiment (the 29th) at Cadiz, which has been sent there
 because it is unfit to serve in the field. You must recollect what I told
 you in a former letter about sending the battalion back to Carthage-
 gena in case of accidents.

In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably set
 my face against it, and have never consented to it or done it, even for a
 day, in any instance. My reasons are: 1st; That it entails upon Great
 Britain an expense which the country is unable to bear. 2dly; That it
 entails upon the departments of the army which undertake it a detail of
 business and a burthen in respect to transport and other means, to which
 the departments, if formed upon any moderate scale, must be quite un-
 equal. 3dly; I know from experience that, if we don't interfere, the
 Spanish troops, particularly if paid as yours are, and in limited numbers,
 will not want food in any part of Spain; whereas the best and most expe-
 rienced of our departments would not be able to draw from the country
 resources for them.

I have already consented to the formation of a magazine for the use of
 Gen. Whittingham's and Gen. Roche's corps for a certain number of days,
 if it should be found necessary to give them assistance of this description.
 I can go no farther; and I earnestly recommend to you, if you give assist-
 ance at all, to give over a magazine to last a given time, but not to take
 upon yourself to supply the Spanish troops engaged in operations. If,
 however, you should, notwithstanding this recommendation, take upon
 yourself to give such supplies, I must object, as the Commander in Chief
 of the Spanish army, to your giving more than bread to the troops who
 receive pay, as that is positively contrary to the regulations and customs
 of the Spanish army. I recommend to you also to attend with caution to
 the demands of both Gen. ——— and Gen. ———, and to observe that, in
 proportion as you will comply with their demands, demands will be made
 upon you by Gen. Elio and others, and you will involve yourself in a scale

of expense and difficulty which will cramp all your operations, and which is quite inconsistent with the views of government on the eastern coast of the Peninsula.

Since writing the above I have seen the Commanding officer of artillery, and I have settled with him that ————'s company of artillery on the eastern coast shall be relieved by a company now at Lisbon, which will be sent round; and, as soon as relieved, I request you to send ———— and his company of artillery round in the same transports to Lisbon. I don't believe that the engineer officers can be spared from Carthagena; but I write to Gen. Cooke to request that he will send you two from Tarifa.

P.S. You will of course endeavor to keep secret, as long as you can, the departure of the troops for Sicily, and the object of their being detached.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I have omitted to request you to send vessels to Carthagena to bring away the 2d batt. 67th regt. to Alicante.

Au Duque del Infantado.

Freneda, ce 6 Avril, 1813.

Je n'ai pas encore écrit au gouvernement pour leur proposer de vous employer à l'armée, et les moyens de le faire, parcequ'en causant sur ce sujet avec le Général Wimpffen, il lui a paru aussi qu'ayant en vue la manière dont la dernière Régence a été dissoute, il valait mieux retarder cette proposition pendant quelques jours, pour donner le temps aux esprits de se calmer, et pour qu'on ne crut pas que vous aviez proposé de servir à l'armée pour vous soustraire aux poursuites qu'on pourrait se croire en droit de faire de votre conduite pendant la Régence, tenant en vue votre responsabilité.

Mais, comme je crois que les choses se sont calmées depuis qu'on a nommé permanente la nouvelle Régence, je compte écrire à ce sujet au gouvernement par la première occasion; et je vous prie de vous tenir prêt à partir.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I have been informed, by your Excellency's letter of the 28th ult., of the decision taken by their Highnesses the Regency of Spain, that a new Captain Generalship should be formed for the province of Cadiz, which, together with the troops actually in that district, should be independent of any other Chief; and naming for this new command, Gen. Don Cayetano Valdez, who shall receive his orders from only the Regency of the Kingdom.

In obedience to this superior command, I shall give orders to the respective Captains General concerned to obey it; and henceforth not to include, in their state of the troops under their command, those now comprised within this new district; nor to avail themselves of the resources of those parts of the country assigned for their support, trusting that the Regency will replace these by others, with the view that with such there may be sufficient to maintain them.

With respect to this new arrangement, I beg leave to make some

observations to your Excellency, which I think necessary to be placed under the consideration of the Regency. There will be, in consequence of their order, a corps of the army entirely independent of my authority; as also several establishments of instruction in the two principal arms withdrawn entirely from my cognizance or control.

I don't make this observation to your Excellency as complaining of any diminution of my authority; on the contrary, I consider the Regency's decision as a wise measure, suitable to the circumstances of the moment, and preventing a thousand causes of dissension which would undoubtedly arise without it; but I think certain restrictions necessary, without which it will be impossible to complete the organisation of the armies in conformity to what I have proposed.

When, in my letter of the 25th Dec. last, I stated distinctly as my first proposition, 'that officers should be promoted and appointed to commands solely at my recommendation,' in this request I did not refer to the regular regimental promotions under the 25th title of the *Ordenanzas* (which *Ordenanzas* I require should be obeyed in every article), but to the extraordinary promotions which the government are in the habit of conferring upon officers for extraordinary services. I required that 'no promotion of this description, nor appointment of any description, should be made to any command, whether in chief or of a division, or of any other description, excepting at my recommendation;' not that it was my intention to make myself the sole and absolute dispenser of favor, but in order to eradicate intrigue, which had been preferred to real merit.

If in this part of the army, independent of my authority, the Regency does not refrain from giving promotion except in the cases prescribed under the 25th title of the *Ordenanzas*, and by the channel and recommendation of the respective Inspectors, not only will the armies in the field be abandoned by all those who have direct or indirect means of appeal (which are never wanting), but discontent will spread among those who have not that power, and discontent once introduced into the army, all the world knows the result. That the decision of their Highnesses may therefore have the good effect which they anticipate and which may result, I recommend:

1. That the part of the army in question shall not be favored by other promotion but those under the *Ordenanzas*, and that for it, as well as the other parts of the army, my first proposition shall remain in full force, as approved by their Highnesses in their letter of the 1st Jan. last.

2. That from the corps actually serving in this new district, it shall not be permitted to take others which are incorporated in the other corps of the army, without personally acquainting me, and taking into consideration my opinion. The same rule should extend to every officer employed in them, whatever may be his rank.

3. That whenever the government shall consider it necessary to forward to the army of operation any one of the corps forming the army of reserve, it will have the goodness to acquaint me with its intention, that I may make my observations, and acquaint them with the motives I may have for one course or the other.

4. As the 3d regt. of artillery is in this new district, from which the 3d

army and the reserve are provided, I hope that it will not be inconvenient for the relief or increase which they may require.

5. That none of these corps shall in any manner be removed from the dependence of the Inspectors General, through which channel every thing relative to organisation should pass according to what is stated in the 1st Article.

6. It being the desire of their Highnesses to diffuse instruction in the establishment of these new depôts, it will be very useful to order to it all the officers who may be supernumerary in the different armies.

These propositions, in no manner opposed to the views of the Regency, are those which I think necessary in order to produce the result which may be expected, and which I request you will submit to the consideration of their Highnesses, that they will be pleased to decide accordingly.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

In order still further to reinforce the allied British and Sicilian corps under Sir J. Murray, on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, I have ordered that the 2d batt. 67th regt. may join it from Carthagená, of which I beg you will apprise the Spanish government.

The British artillery now at Carthagená will, however, still remain there, in order to take charge of the stores, &c. in that garrison, belonging to the British government.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 6th April, 1813.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 31st, and I now enclose my answers to Sir J. Murray. It is impossible to prevent the troops from going; but I don't think their departure is likely to be decisive of the campaign on the Eastern coast. Murray must keep it concealed as long as he can.

I have received a letter from the Regency in answer to mine of the 17th March, of which I sent you the draft: they promise fairly; and they have proposed to form a distinct division of troops, under Valdez, for the service of Cadiz and the neighbourhood, which, if carried into execution in the mode which I have proposed, and which will go to them by to-morrow's post, will probably answer to prevent the jarring and bickering which we have had hitherto, if the Minister at War can be prevailed upon not to interfere in my concerns, till they shall be regularly brought under the view of the government. Under these circumstances, I am inclined to wish that La Vega, &c. should do no more than call for and read the correspondence with the Minister at War, till they shall hear further from me.

I am sincerely desirous of carrying on the service, not only to the public advantage, but in the manner that will be most agreeable to the government; and the last thing that I should think of would be to bring my discussions with the government under the view of the Cortes, if it should be possible to avoid it.

By a letter from the Duque del Parque, I see that he has got only 20,000 dollars of the 100,000 which it was settled, when I left Cadiz, should be sent to the 3d army. Have you given any more to the govern-

ment for the use of that army? Could you send any flour to Catalonia instead of money? Communicate with the government on this subject, and let me know the result.

I am afraid that my letter of the 28th, in which I requested you to keep 400,000 dollars for the use of the Spanish armies, will have arrived too late; but from what I hear of the state of the money market in England, I hope that if you should have sent that money, much time will not elapse before you will be able to replace it.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

6th April, 1813.

I have not failed to lay before the Commander of the Forces your Lordship's letter of the 3d inst. and its enclosures, and I have been directed to signify to you in answer that his Excellency will take an opportunity of seeing the 7th division, when he will particularly examine into the state of the 82d regt.; and that, at all events, it will be time enough to decide in what manner that regiment is to be disposed of when the army shall be put in motion. Mr. —'s letter to your Lordship has been forwarded to the Commissary Gen. with directions to supply the deficiency of mules attached to the Commissariat department with the 7th division, and an extract from your Lordship's letter regarding the clothing of the 82d regt. will be transmitted to the Horse Guards.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

I think it probable that you will arrive at Lisbon nearly about the time that this letter will reach that place; and as I propose to take the field as soon as the appearance of the green forage will secure the food of our horses, I lose no time in acquainting you with the situation of our cavalry, and in requesting to know your wishes upon some points relating to it.

You will have heard in England that, in consequence of orders from home, I have drafted the horses from the 4th dragoon guards, 9th and 11th light dragoons, and that I have orders, and have it in contemplation, to draft the horses from the 2d hussars.

By sending to the Adj. Gen. at Lisbon, you will get a copy of the orders of the 13th March last, in which you will see the distribution made of the horses drafted. Excepting the 1st and 2d Heavy Germans, all the regiments will have as many horses as they can mount. I preferred drafting the horses from the 11th to drafting them from the 13th, as the men of the 11th were very sickly; and I found that by keeping the 13th I should have more mounted dragoons than by keeping the 11th.

I propose that the whole cavalry of the army should be in one division, under your command; and that the cavalry duty of any detachments that should be made from the main body shall be done by detachments of brigades, or other subdivisions from that division. This will simplify the concern very materially.

I have received discretionary orders to send to England — — —, — — —, and — — —; and Gen. G. Anson has asked to be appointed to the Staff in England. Gen. Fane is coming out. I have not sent home any of these officers, because I am not quite certain what your wishes and opinions are, and because I doubt whether you would mend matters very materially by their removal. The hussar brigade is vacant, and is at present commanded by Col. Grant of the 15th. One of the Generals above mentioned must go at all events, as I conclude that you will wish to put

the 13th light dragoons in the brigade with the 12th and 16th, or with the 1st hussars and 14th light dragoons, if the 2d hussars should be drafted, and I beg to know which of the three you wish should go.

You will recollect that Gen. Vandeleur has long had a claim to a command in the cavalry; and if he is to have one, you must fix upon the second who is to go. If he is not to have a command, the senior — is —; and I acknowledge that I don't see that the service would derive much advantage from sending to England any one of the three General officers above mentioned, in order that — may command a brigade. The next to — is —, and he can have a brigade only by sending home the three General officers above mentioned, and not taking Vandeleur from the infantry.

I wish to have your opinion upon all these points as soon as possible; and likewise that you will let me know what regiments you wish should be in each brigade, and what General officer at the head of each brigade.

I must observe to you, however, that the English hussar brigade having come out as a brigade, I don't think we can with propriety break it up.

There is no General at present with the Household brigade, but I understand that O'Loughlin is coming out; and, in the mean time, *according to the privileges of the Guards*, they must be commanded by an officer of their own corps.

I hope that your wound is entirely healed, and that you are in good health.

P.S. Let me know, 1st; To what brigade the 13th dragoons should be posted?

2dly; What brigade Gen. Fane shall command?

3dly; Which of — —, — —, or — — shall be sent home to make room for Gen. Fane?

4thly; Shall any more of the three above mentioned Generals be sent home, and which?

5thly; Shall Gen. Vandeleur be removed to the cavalry?

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

I think it probable that you will arrive at Lisbon nearly about the time that this letter will reach that place; and that you will receive it, and that which I wrote to you some time ago, at the same moment, from Sir C. Stuart.

King Joseph has moved his head quarters to Valladolid, by orders from Paris, as I understand; and the armies are concentrated very much towards the Duero. The enemy have now very few troops in La Mancha, and they are all in a state of preparation for an immediate movement.

Soult is gone to France with from 3000 to 5000 men, of drafts for the Imperial Guard, Marines, *Cadres*, *Estropiés*, &c. &c. The Guards which remained in Spain have likewise been sent to France.

A few conscripts, from 5000 to 7000, have arrived; but I don't hear that more are expected soon.

Our army will be at least as strong as I expected. We have now more than 37,000 R. and F. of cavalry and infantry, present and fit for duty;

and there are more than 3000 men on their march to join, not included in the states. The Portuguese army have 27,000 men present and fit for duty.

The Spanish concerns have not gone on well yet, but I have still hopes that they will succeed.

We have no sickness excepting in the 1st regt. of Guards, and have had none of importance, excepting in that regiment and among the new troops arrived from England, Gibraltar, and Cadiz. I have sent the 1st regt. of Guards to Oporto, and I am much afraid they will not be able to take the field with the other troops.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

When I lately appointed Messrs. Greenwood and Cox to be agents to the Blues, I told them that I thought that, in justice to my family, I ought to require security for them to guarantee me and my family against loss in pecuniary transactions, in which we could not be gainers; and I enclose their answer, in which you will see that they consent to give the security. I really don't know what sum I ought to require as security, nor the form in which it ought to be given; but I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire, and have this matter settled for me.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Sir R. Hill, of the Royal Horse Guards; and in requesting you to lay it before the Commander in Chief, I beg to state, for His Royal Highness' information, that this officer has conducted himself entirely to my satisfaction since his arrival in this country, and has used his utmost exertions to render the regiment under his command efficient. Since the return of Major Gen. Rebow to England, Sir R. Hill has commanded the brigade of Household cavalry.

In the event of the promotions recommended in the enclosed letter being approved of by the Commander in Chief, I beg leave to submit the name of Lord W. Pitt Lennox for the Cornetcy in succession.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

I enclose two dispatches from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, the one of the 25th March, in which he informs me of his intention to detach Gen. Roche's division on an expedition on the coast of Valencia, to the rear of the enemy; and another of the 27th March, in which he informs me that Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck had directed that certain of the British and German troops should return to Sicily, in consequence of the resumption of his authority by the King.

I enclose a copy of my answer to these dispatches. I likewise enclose the extract of a private letter from Sir J. Murray,* and the extract of my

* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart., to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Castalla, 23d March, 1813.

In my dispatch of the 10th inst., I had the honor to inform your Lordship that I had found it expedient to drive the enemy from Alcoy, and to occupy that place with a strong division of the allied army. In consequence of this movement, Marshal Suchet quitted

answer, in regard to his feeding, by the British Commissariat, the Spanish troops employed with him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

The enemy continue nearly in the same positions in this part of the country as when I addressed you last, and King Joseph was still by the last accounts at Valladolid. The head quarters of the army of the South have been moved from Toledo to Madrid, and the army in general appear to be in a state of preparation for a sudden movement.

Since the movement made by Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, of which I enclosed the report in my last dispatch, it appears that Marshal Suchet has collected his troops on the right of the Jucar, and has established his head quarters at San Felipe de Xativa. Major Gen. Whittingham's division of Spanish troops had driven the enemy's advanced guard beyond the Puente de Albayda; and I enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray's report of the 23d ult., of the affair which the Major General had with the enemy on this occasion, and of one which Major Gen. Donkin had in a reconnaissance on the same day.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 7th April, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Lucotte, King Joseph's aide de camp, to King Joseph, which contains some curious matters. It shows how much Napoleon is distressed for money, and that probably in the beginning of March they suspected the Emperor of Austria. This letter was in cipher, and it is desirable that its contents should not be published.

We have not yet had the rain which usually falls at the period of the equinox; and there is as yet no appearance of grass. But I still propose to move early in May, that is to say, if we can get up the equipments of the army; but I am sorry to say that we have had some privateers on the coast, which have taken and destroyed some ships off Oporto, and others are missing, which it is supposed have met with a similar fate. I cannot express how much we shall be distressed if the navigation of the coast should not be secure from Coruña, at least, to Cadiz. We have money,

Valencia, and has assumed the command, in person, of the troops on the right bank of the Jucar. He appears to have drawn to this division of his army nearly all the disposable force which he has in the neighbourhood of Valencia.

Finding that the enemy was concentrating his force, I assembled the allied army at Castalla on the 20th. In consequence of this concentration of the allied army, Marshal Suchet has reinforced his right, and has now a strong force at Onteniente, Mogente, and Fuente del Higuera. Since I had last the honor of addressing your Lordship, there have been several trifling affairs with the enemy. Gen. Whittingham has forced him to retire beyond the Puente de Albayda, with a very considerable loss. In this affair, which Gen. Whittingham conducted with great judgment, and in which the Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry and order, the General was slightly wounded, as were an officer and 7 men.

In a reconnoitring party on the same day, conducted by Major Gen. Donkin, Capt. Jacks, and the foreign troop of light cavalry, Capt. Waldron, and the grenadiers of the 2d batt. 27th, and Lieut. M'Dougall, of the Adj. Gen.'s department, had an opportunity of making a spirited attack on an enemy's post, which was carried in the presence of a battalion drawn up as spectators. We suffered no loss on this occasion, but killed some of the enemy, and took a few prisoners.

Before I conclude this letter I beg to add, that, since I have been in co-operation with Gen. Elio, I have found his Excellency most anxious to forward every object I have in view: it is impossible too highly to extol his zeal, or the readiness with which he meets my wishes.

provisions, clothing, military stores and equipments on all parts of the coast almost every day in the year, and the loss of one vessel only may create a delay and inconvenience which may be of the utmost consequence.

P.S. I enclose the daily state. The hussar brigade are not on the strength, and there are about 1300 infantry also not on the strength, on the march to join their corps. We shall have more than 40,000 British infantry and cavalry in the field, which is nearly 10,000 more than we have ever had, and I hope they will be better equipped than any British army that has yet appeared.

The A.G. to Officers commanding the — regiments of cavalry. 9th April, 1813.

I have the honor of returning to you enclosed the return which I have received from you of non-commissioned officers and privates of the regiment under your command who have volunteered and have been recommended for the mounted Staff corps. The proportion of non-commissioned officers and privates which the Commander of the Forces has fixed upon to be furnished by the regiment is stated in the margin, and I have to request that you will transmit to me without delay a nominal list of such non-commissioned officers and privates as you may think proper to select from amongst those named in the enclosed return, to complete the number required to be furnished by the regiment, as stated in the margin.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

I have to inform you that Gen. Sir C. Stewart is about to be employed on a mission to Berlin, and there is reason to believe that his office of Adj. Gen. to the forces in Spain and Portugal will be vacant. I wish to know whether you are desirous of succeeding to it. It was clearly understood by the Horse Guards that you had a claim to succeed to Gen. Stewart; and

G. O.

Freneda, 8th April, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires that in future, when any detachment will arrive from England for any regiment in this army, a list of the men's names composing it, with a size and description roll of each man, and a state of his necessaries, and debts and credits, shall forthwith be sent to the Adj. Gen. of the army, by the officer in charge of the detachment, in case there should be such an officer capable of performing this duty; or by the officer in command at Belem, or at any other station, where such detachment should land, if there should be no officer in charge of it.

2. Major Gen. Peacocke is requested to give directions that this order may be strictly obeyed at Lisbon.

3. The Adj. Gen. will regularly transmit these lists to the officer commanding the regiment, who is forthwith to take on the strength of the regiment, and post to companies, the men of whose names the list will be transmitted to him by the Adj. Gen.

4. These men are to be returned 'on command,' till they will join their regiment, unless they should have been reported to have been sent into any hospital, when they are to be returned accordingly.

5. The Commander of the Forces again draws the attention of the officers commanding regiments to the orders repeatedly issued respecting the ticket to be given to soldiers on being sent to hospitals. He receives frequent complaints of the loss of arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, in the hospitals; but one moment's reflection would convince those who make these complaints, that the Purveyors cannot be held responsible for these articles belonging to a soldier sent to hospital, unless a regular ticket should be sent with him.

6. The omission to make out and transmit these tickets has besides occasioned other inconveniences and irregularities, and it has become almost impossible to account for the soldiers supposed at their regiments to be in general hospital, owing to the frequency of the omission on the part of their officers to send tickets with them, and the men being unable from sickness to tell their own names, or the state of their necessaries, and frequently concealing both purposely.

7. The Commander of the Forces is always concerned to be obliged to occasion trouble to any officer, but the officers of the army may depend upon it, that no duty, which they are called upon to perform, can be omitted without serious inconvenience to the service, which will be felt sooner or later.

although I have heard you express that you did not like the office, I could not think of recommending any body for it without first offering it to you.

To Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

The conduct of a detachment of the — regt., coming up from Lisbon in charge of military stores, has recently been under the consideration of a General Court Martial at Coimbra, whose sentences on some of the men comprising it have been published to the army in G. O.

I thought it proper to bring to trial serjeant —, of the — regt., who commanded the detachment; who, in the course of his defence, stated that the soldiers of the — regt. refused to obey him, and were guilty of mutinous conduct in various instances.

I had serjeant — examined by the Acting Judge Advocate in regard to the particulars of the mutinous conduct complained of; and I enclose the report of his examination, and the report of the examination of various soldiers of the — regt. to the same point; from which it appears clearly that the soldiers of the — regt., convicted of the other offences for which they have been tried by the General Court Martial, were likewise guilty of mutinous conduct.

It is impossible for any detachment of troops to have behaved worse than those under serjeant —; and those of the — regt., in particular, committed every crime of which it is possible for soldiers to be guilty.

I beg you will do me the favor to call before you the Commanding and other officers of the — regt., and that you will communicate to them the enclosed papers and this letter. When the — regt. before formed a part of this army, I was obliged to send it to Lisbon, on account of the state to which it had been brought by its want of discipline and order; and I shall certainly send this regiment again into garrison, and shall report to the Commander in Chief my sense of its bad conduct, and unfitness for service in the field, if I should receive any more complaints such as those which have recently reached me; and should find the soldiers in such a state of insubordination, and such an absence of discipline in the regiment, that the soldiers cannot be trusted on a detachment without mutinying against the authority of the officer or non-commissioned officer commanding such detachment.

It is in the power of the Commanding and other officers, in any battalion, to establish such a system of discipline and subordination in it, that the soldiers shall respect the authority of the non-commissioned officers, and shall not dare to commit the outrage which the soldiers of the — have committed in serjeant —'s presence, much less mutiny against his authority; and if the — cannot be brought to such a state, they shall not serve in the field with this army.

To Major Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Stewart, K.B.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

I received yesterday your letter of March 23d, and, at the same time, one from Lord Bathurst, of the 24th, in which he informed me that you were about to be sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin; and I understood

from Wood,* that as long as 6 weeks ago you had received from the Prince Regent expectations, that in case any person should be sent to the King of Prussia, you should be selected. I therefore conclude the matter is settled. I kept your office open for you only for your advantage, and I should be very sorry if you should for a moment hesitate to accept a situation which you may think more advantageous to you, out of deference to me, or from consideration of my convenience.

I sincerely congratulate you upon this mark of the Prince Regent's favor, and wish you every success in your new appointment.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

We have received letters and papers to the 24th March. Sir C. Stewart is going on a mission to Berlin. I enclose a letter from Bunbury, which contains the only public news that I have.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 10th April, 1813.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 24th March (No. 108), containing the copy of one from the Sec. of the Treasury, proposing that I should in future grant warrants for the issue of båt and forage allowances to officers of the marines and navy, whom I should think entitled to those allowances for their services.

I beg to recall to your Lordship's recollection, that the question whether these battalions ought to have båt and forage allowance was referred to my consideration by desire of the Treasury. These officers, and those of the navy serving on the north coast of Spain, under the command of Sir H. Popham, were in no manner under my command; and, therefore, I conceive that I ought not to have issued warrants for any allowance to them, nor ought not in future, in any similar instance of officers co-operating with the troops under my command, but not under my command, excepting under the special command of your Lordship.

The A.G. to Commandants of hospital stations.

10th April, 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you a form of a return which is to be forwarded to this office, along with the general weekly states, of the general hospital station of which you are Commandant; and I have to observe, that as the enclosed form of return is calculated to furnish the Adj. Gen. with all the information in the way of returns (besides what is contained in the general weekly states) which it is desirable to obtain in regard to the general hospital stations, it will no longer be necessary that you should transmit to this office the return of alterations amongst the hospital servants or any of the other returns which have hitherto been required to accompany the general weekly state.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 11th April, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 5th and 7th April, which involve different points for consideration. When the calculations were made, on which the grant was made of the additional subsidies to Portugal, £100,000 sterling were estimated as the amount of the expense of the pay to the British officers to be employed in the Portuguese service. As well as I recollect, it was settled by Mr. Villiers that this sum should be paid to Mr. Bell, and that he was to pay these officers under warrants from your-

* Lieut. Col. C. Wood.

self; but I never understood exactly how this arrangement stood, or what was precisely the nature of Mr. Bell's appointment, or of his duties. I likewise perfectly recollect that I told you, at the period at which we were conversing upon the expediency of rendering the situation of British officers in the Portuguese service better, that I could facilitate and arrange the means of giving those officers their British pay from their regiments, if the expense of the increase of the Portuguese pay should come to be too heavy for the fund of £100,000 *per annum*, allotted from the subsidy for the expense of the British officers serving in the Portuguese army.

I don't recollect any objection on the part of the Portuguese government to this allotment of the £100,000, though certainly such an objection might have been made without my now being able to recollect it. I can only say, that I don't think I have ever admitted the justice of the objection. From the mode in which the subsidy was, and has continued to be granted, it is, and always has been, in the power of the British government, through its officers here, to insist upon the application of the whole subsidy, or any part of it, to such parts of the service as might be deemed expedient; and indeed I have had, and still have, it in contemplation to apply the money, part of the subsidy now paid, to defray the expense of the pay of the officers and soldiers of the army employed in the field; and have delayed the measure only till you come up, and I can talk to you about it. I mention this now to show you what my sentiments are, and always have been, about the subsidy; and how clear I consider our right to dispose of the £100,000 a year through the hands of Mr. Bell. You had a clear right, therefore, in my opinion, to act on that sum by your warrants.

I don't know any thing of the arrangement by which this sum of £100,000 *per annum* was transferred from Mr. Bell to the military chest. I rather believe this arrangement commenced its operation in the beginning of last year, when a great desire existed to uphold the military chest, and the new system of the Commissariat, by throwing into the military chest as large a sum as could be scraped together, from the chest of 'the Aids.' It is certainly better, however, if only on account of the difference of opinion which has arisen respecting your power of granting warrants for the pay of British officers, that the sum of £100,000 *per annum* should be retained by the chest of 'the Aids' for the future; as in point of fact, the military chest can have no knowledge of what those officers are entitled to. It will still be easy to pay the British officers as heretofore by the Provincial, or Army Treasurer; the accounts of the payments to them being settled between Mr. Bell and the keeper of the military chest; by the transfer of the former to the latter of the sums, which it will appear that the latter has paid.

I now come to the consideration of your right to issue warrants to the keeper of the military chest; and I enclose you the draft of my letter of the 23d Aug., and of my memorandum to Dom M. Forjaz, upon the formation of the military chest, which contain, I believe, the constitution of this establishment, and the opinions which I had formed upon it. In order to understand the second of the two memorandums, you must get

from Dom M. Forjaz the memorandum enclosed to me in his letter of 18th Aug.

From these papers you will see that I had not in contemplation that you were to issue warrants for payments by the military chest to be formed. In fact, this establishment was not intended by me to be one for detailed payments, but for the receipt, keeping, and distribution of the sums destined for carrying on the war, the detailed disbursements of which were to be made by the departments and treasuries in the country. On the principle on which this establishment was formed, I should conceive it as irregular for the Commander in Chief to have the power of granting warrants for payments by it, as for the Commander in Chief in England to grant warrants on the Exchequer. I don't conceive that the whole of the aids having been put into the military chest, makes any difference in this respect.

Your want of the power to issue your warrants on the keeper of the military chest, affords a good reason for keeping the £100,000 of the aids distinct, in the hands of Mr. Bell in future; but the payment of that sum into the military chest up to this day, or of any other sum, cannot give you a power which you have not in terms, and which the constitution of the military chest had it not in contemplation to give you.

I don't know whether I have made myself understood to you; but a perusal of the enclosed papers will serve to explain my meaning. Pray return them, as I have no copies.

On the whole subject of the pay of the army, we must come to some definitive arrangement, upon which it is as well to delay to say any thing till we meet. But I rather believe that as the increase of the pay of the Portuguese officers depends upon the continuation of the war, it is convenient to the government to keep the different heads of pay and increase distinct; at the same time that there can exist no reason, excepting a Portuguese reason, for paying officers, to the first his pay to one period, his 12 *per cent.* to a second, and his British increase to a third! I believe now that I have gone into all the points contained in your letter.

I hope that the new opening of your wound will complete your cure.

To Col. Stirling.

Freneda, 11th April, 1813.

I beg leave to call your attention to a practice which appears, from your confidential report, to prevail in the — regt., of postponing the execution of the sentence of a Regimental Court Martial.

If the execution of the sentence be postponed, and the man remain in confinement, an injustice is done him by the unnecessarily lengthened duration of his confinement; and the ends and purpose of justice are weakened, if not lost, by lengthening the period between the commission and the punishment for a crime. If the execution of the sentence be postponed, and the man be allowed to return to his duty, a military irregularity is committed. No soldier should be put on duty having hanging over him the sentence of a Court Martial.

I recommend that all the men whose punishment has been postponed may be pardoned; and that the practice of postponing punishments may be discontinued in future.

P.S. The — regt. having left the 6th division, you will be pleased to communicate this letter to the Commanding officer of that corps.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 11th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 2d April, in answer to mine of the 24th March last, in which I had informed your Excellency of the difficulties found in realising the resources of the country by the Intendants of all the armies, and of the consequent existing evils; and I proposed to address your Excellency again upon the subject, as soon as I should have received the details.

I have not yet received detailed information on this subject from any of the armies; and I now trouble your Excellency, in consequence of your Excellency informing me in your letter of the 2d April, that the Regency has none.

In justice to the General officers commanding the different armies, I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency, that I have every reason to believe that they have done every thing in their power to remedy the existing evils; and that, if it had not been for their exertions, and those of the Intendants General under their directions, the inconveniences felt by the troops, and the evil to the public interests, would have been greater.

Although I have not all the official reports on the subject which I should wish to have, I would request your Excellency to draw the attention of the Regency to the report which I have transmitted to your Excellency, from his Excellency the Duque del Parque, pointing out the difficulties which he had experienced in realising the resources of the country for the troops under his command, in consequence of the want of the assistance of the Intendant General of the army, and of the usual number of officers of the *Hacienda*; and of the unwillingness of the *Ayuntamientos* to afford any assistance.

I likewise request your Excellency to draw the attention of the Regency to the letters received from the Intendant General of the army of reserve of Andalusia, to the Minister of Finance, and from the Conde de la Bisbal, from which it appears clearly that the charges already existing, and to be paid out of the revenues of the provinces of Cordova and Seville, were sufficient to absorb all the resources of those provinces allotted for the maintenance of the army of reserve of Andalusia.

From the following expression in your Excellency's letter to me of the 2d April, 'Aclaradas las facultades de los Generales en Xefe, y de los Intendentes Generales de los exercitos, y la parte de los productos de las provincias que deben aplicarse *exclusivamente* al entretenimiento de los mismos exercitos,' I am induced to believe that it is understood by the Regency, as it was understood by me, that nine tenths of the revenues of the several provinces were to be allotted exclusively, and without charge, to the maintenance of the armies. If that is the case, it is most desirable that the understanding and intentions of the Regency upon this point should be clearly expressed; as I know that the charges already paid in the provinces out of the revenues, constitute the leading difficulty.

The justice of the Regency will, I am convinced, induce them to advert to those points already officially before them, before they pass a

censure, much less remove or suspend from their command meritorious General officers, who have done every thing in their power to apply a remedy to the evil. But although I am not able to lay before the government official reports, other facts have come to my knowledge, and without doubt must be known to the Minister of Finance, and consequently to the government, which would likewise induce their justice to suspend, at least, if not to relinquish entirely, the censure which it appears, by your Excellency's letter, that they have it in contemplation to pass on the General officers commanding the different armies.

1st; I believe it is well known that the officers of the *Hacienda*, in the different provinces, are, in general, very little experienced in the performance of their duty; and, however numerous, very inadequate to it.

2dly; The difficulties in realising the revenues are much increased by the new system of contributions established by the laws.

3dly; It appears by the report of the Duque del Parque, transmitted to your Excellency, that the *Ayuntamientos* are very unwilling to perform their part in the fiscal system established by the laws of the Cortes. Yet I don't know of any law, and it does not appear that there exists any law, to force them to perform the duty imposed upon them, in respect to the allotment and collection of the contributions.

4thly; The government are greatly in debt throughout the provinces for articles received, and for services performed at different periods of the war. The creditors of the State conceive, contrary to every principle of public credit and of finance, that each individual has a right to carry to account the amount of his demand against the State, against the amount of the demand of the State upon him, on account of the current contributions. These unreasonable pretensions and unfounded principles, coming before unwilling *Ayuntamientos* and inexperienced officers of the *Hacienda*, augment the difficulties which must attend every financial transaction; and I am certain, that when the government consider all the points, they will at least acquit the General officers commanding the armies of blame; more particularly when,

5thly; They consider that the power given by the decree of the Cortes, of the ———, and by the *Ordenanza*, to the Intendants General of the armies over the Intendants of the provinces, is not so efficient as it ought to be, to insure such a control over their conduct, and to make the Generals Commanding in Chief responsible for their failures.

I propose, however, to transmit to the General officers Commanding in Chief copies of the letter of your Excellency of the 2d April; and will, if possible, still further stimulate their exertions in this important branch of their administration.

The A.G. to Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

11th April, 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you the returns of 'sick absent' of the regiments named overleaf, in order to their being referred to the Purveyor's department, to ascertain, as far as it may be found possible to do so, what has become of the men returned by the regiments as 'sick absent,' whose names are not to be found in the returns of men sick in hospital, transmitted by you to this office. A line with red ink has been drawn through such names in the enclosed returns as are to be found in the returns sent from the general hospitals, and

those names through which a line with red ink has *not* been drawn are not to be found in the returns sent from the general hospitals; some of these names unaccounted for will probably be found in the Purveyor's register of deaths; and I take the liberty of suggesting, that in order as far as possible to obtain the desired information regarding these names unaccounted for, the Purveyor's register should be examined from the very commencement of the service in the Peninsula.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

Freneda, 12th April, 1813.

I request permission to call the attention of your Royal Highness to the state of your troops, and of all your establishments, in consequence of the great arrear of pay which is due to them.

According to the last statements which I have received, pay is due to the army of operations from the end of last September; to the troops of the line in garrison, from the month of June; and to the militia, from February. The transports of the army have never, I believe, received any regular payment, and none whatever since June, 1812. The honor of your Royal Highness' arms may perhaps suffer greatly by these evils; and I have repeatedly called, but in vain, the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to this subject.

I am now upon the point of opening a new campaign with your Royal Highness' army, to which pay is due for a greater space of time than when the last campaign was concluded; although the subsidy from Great Britain has been hitherto regularly paid, granted especially for the payment and maintenance of a certain body of troops; and even although it has been proved within the last 3 months, that the revenue of the state has produced a sum nearer a third than a fourth larger than in any other 3 months during the whole time I have been *au fait* of this matter.

The serious consequences which may probably result from the backwardness of these payments, affecting as much the honor of your Royal Highness' arms as the cause of the allies, and the uniform refusal of the Governors of the Kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for temporary or permanent relief, have at last obliged me to go into your Royal Highness' presence, for the purpose of stating the result of the measures which I have recommended to the Governors of the Kingdom for the reform of the Custom house, which measures have not been yet carried into full effect, in consequence of the opposition they encounter from the Chief of the Treasury; although the Governors ought to have been convinced there was room for the suggestion of improvements in the several branches of the public administration of the Kingdom of Portugal. But I cannot prevail against the influence of the Chief of the Treasury; this is what induces me to lay this *exposé* before your Royal Highness.

In order to improve the resources and means of the Kingdom, I have recommended the adoption of some method by which the taxes might be actually and really collected, and the merchants and capitalists really pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war; the effects of this system being first tried in the great cities of Lisbon and Oporto.

I can declare that no one knows better than I do, the sacrifices which have been made, and the sufferings which have been experienced by your

Royal Highness' faithful subjects during the war, for there is no one who has seen more of the country, or who, for the last 4 years, has lived so much amongst the people.

It is a fact, Sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places of the Kingdom, have gained by the war; the mercantile class, generally, has enriched itself by the great disbursements which the army makes in money; and there are individuals at Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. The credit of your Royal Highness' government is not in a state to be able to derive resources from these capitals, owing to remote as also to present circumstances; and it can obtain advantage only through the means of taxes. The fact is not denied, that the tributes regularly established at Lisbon and Oporto, as also the contribution of 10 *per cent.* upon the profits of the mercantile class, are not really paid to the state; nor is it denied that the measures which I have proposed would, if efficaciously carried into execution in the above mentioned cities, furnish the government with great pecuniary resources. It remains for the government, therefore, to explain to your Royal Highness the reasons why it has not put them in practice, or some other expedient which might render the revenue of the state equal to its expenses.

All I have stated to your Royal Highness respecting the arrear of payment to the troops, is equally undeniable. The only motive to which I can attribute the government not having adopted the measures aforesaid, is the fear that they might not be popular; but the knowledge I have of the good sense and loyalty of your Royal Highness' subjects, the reliance I place therein, and my zeal for the cause in which your Royal Highness is engaged with your allies, induce me to offer myself not only as responsible for the happy issue of the measures which I have recommended, but to take upon myself all the odium which they might create. I have, nevertheless, not been able to overcome the influence of the Treasury.

Another measure which I recommended, was the entire abolition of the *Junta de Viveres*, to put an end to a monthly expense of nearly 50 *contos* of *reis*, caused by the Junta, under the plea of paying their old debts.

Never was any sovereign in the world so ill served as your Royal Highness has been by the *Junta de Viveres*, and I don't think I have rendered a greater service to your Royal Highness than that which I did in soliciting that it might be abolished.

However, after its abolition, under the specious pretext of paying its debts, it has received monthly from the Treasury, a little more or less, 50 *contos* of *reis*. It cannot be doubted that the *Junta de Viveres* is very much in debt, and it is of great importance to your Royal Highness' government that some method of arranging and paying these debts should be adopted.

But I request that your Royal Highness will order the Governors of the Kingdom to let your Royal Highness see in detail the manner in which the above mentioned 50 *contos* of *reis*, granted monthly, have been applied.

Have all the accounts of the *Junta de Viveres* been called in and liquidated? Who has performed this operation? To what sum does their debt amount? Has it been classified? Finally, have measures

been adopted to know with certainty how much is really due to those to whom something has already been paid upon account of their debt? Is any part of the 50 *contos* of *reis* which have been issued for many months by the Treasury, applied to the payment of the salaries of the members of the *Junta de Viveres*, abolished, I believe, by your Royal Highness' orders?

I request that your Royal Highness will command that an answer be given to each of the questions aforesaid, which will enable your Royal Highness to see the state of these transactions.

But admitting that it be convenient to pay at this time the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, it would be almost superfluous to propose the question, whether it be more important to pay those debts, or to pay the army which has to defend your Royal Highness' Kingdom and government, and to protect the honor and property of your Royal Highness' subjects, and every thing most dear to them in life; without which, nothing could escape destruction. This army will neither be able nor willing to fight if it be not paid.

Another measure which I have lately recommended as a remedy capable of putting the government in a condition to pay the army of operations for some time, in the same manner and to the same period to which their comrades in the British army are paid, is, that there be taken out of the hands of all the collectors of the revenue of the State the balances which they may owe to the Royal Treasury.

My attention was called to this subject by a communication made to me by a military officer in the province of *Tras os Montes*, relating to a large sum of money in the hands of the collector of the revenue at *Braganza*, at the time when the enemy made movements towards the *Esla*; and having inquired into this matter, I found that, according to the manner in which the Treasury manages its transactions, every one of the collectors of the revenue of the State has always in his possession the amount of the revenue he has received in the space of a month.

I recommended that the collectors should be obliged to deliver in, every 15 days, whatever they had received; but I have not been able to accomplish it.

Your Royal Highness has frequently deigned to make known to the Governors of the Kingdom your Royal desire that they should attend to my advice, and they have as frequently assured your Royal Highness that they give it every attention.

I can assure your Royal Highness, that when I devote myself to the labor of taking into consideration the affairs of the State, and giving my opinion upon them to the Governors of the Kingdom, I have no object in doing so excepting the interest I feel in the good of the nation, and the honor and prosperity of your Royal Highness; and I am not in any degree induced to do so from objects of personal interest, for none can I have relatively to Portugal; nor can I have any with regard to individuals, from not having any relations, and being almost unacquainted with those who direct or would wish to direct the affairs of your Royal Highness.

Although the measures which I have hitherto recommended, and which have at last been adopted, such as the payment of the interest upon the national debt in paper currency, the reform of the Custom houses, the

establishment of a military chest, and others which it is unnecessary to mention, have answered the ends of their adoption; and perhaps I might say, that other measures which I could propose would have similar results; yet I am ready to allow that I may perhaps deceive myself. Nevertheless, I request with great earnestness that your Royal Highness will deign to be persuaded that the motives which induce me to recommend these measures, and to appeal against the Chief of the Treasury, are founded upon my wishes to promote and forward the benevolent intentions of your Royal Highness, as well as the best results to the cause in which your Royal Highness is engaged.

I venture to express again, in the most decided manner, my very ardent wish that your Royal Highness will be pleased to return to your Kingdom, to take charge of its government, which not only myself, but all your Royal Highness' faithful subjects desire with the greatest anxiety.

May God preserve your Royal Highness many years.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 13th April, 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the Commissary Gen., Sir R. Kennedy, in regard to his accounts; to which subject I think it proper to draw your Lordship's attention.

It cannot be denied, that to leave accounts unsettled, for such immense sums of money as those chargeable to Sir R. Kennedy, for so many years as are likely to elapse before the accounts in question will be even looked at, is a great public evil, as well as a gross injustice to the individual who is loaded with such responsibility; and after a long consideration of the subject, and some experience in the command of armies, and of the mode in which the business of all the departments is conducted and settled, I feel no hesitation in stating my opinion, that by the adoption of a different mode of transacting the business, both evils would be much diminished, if not entirely got the better of.

According to the existing system, the Commissary Gen., whatever may be the extent of the concerns intrusted to his management, is the only person accountable to the public; and he is responsible for the acts and conduct of his deputies, for their honesty and their abilities, and their fitness for their situations and duties, although they are appointed by other authorities over which the Commissary Gen. has no control. I believe there is no instance of such a responsibility for the expenditure of money being imposed on any other description of officer; and it appears to me to have originated in the diminutive nature of our concerns of this description, which rendered it possible for one man personally to superintend them, and to have been continued after their growth to their existing magnitude, notwithstanding that it must be obvious to every body that it is quite impossible for the Commissary Gen. to exercise an efficient control over the expenditure and accounts of the numerous persons who must, under existing circumstances, be intrusted with the expenditure of the public money, and at the same time attend to the other duties of his office, more important in relation to the operations of the army to which he may be attached.

It is my opinion that the Commissary Gen. of an army should be re-

lieved from all responsibility for the accounts of that army. He should be, as he is at present, the head of the finance of that army; and he should give his orders for purchases, or for incurring other expenses, and should issue money from time to time to those officers whom he should employ in making purchases or in incurring expenses. But his responsibility to the public should end with the production of the receipt of the officer who should have received the money, and his justification of the order which he had issued for the purchase or expenditure; and with his return to the Account office of the name of the officer to whom he had authorised the issue of money for a particular service.

The officer who should have received the money should be responsible for the account of its due expenditure, and for rendering the account within a limited period of time. The responsibility for accounting being thus imposed upon those who actually make the expenditure, and being divided among many, it is certain that accounts would be rendered in a very limited and much shorter space of time than can be expected under the existing system; and the control of the office of Accounts over the accountants would be immediate and direct.

Those who receive stores from the Commissary Gen. ought in like manner to be responsible directly for the care and subsequent disposal of them according to regulation and order, and for accounting for them, as well as for money; and the Commissary Gen.'s responsibility ought to cease for stores as well as for money, on the production of the receipt of the officer to whom they were delivered, and his justification for the issue to such officer.

But this system would not be attended by all the beneficial consequences which might be expected from it, unless the Account and Audit offices should be established on a different footing from that on which they stand at present. It is obvious that the Account office must possess means of exerting a more efficient control over the expenditure and accounting for money than they possess at present; and it is desirable that that office of accounts which may be attached to an army should have the power of finally passing accounts.

With these views it is desirable that an Auditor General of Accounts should be attached to the army, with the power of calling upon all persons to whom public money may be intrusted, or to whose charge stores may be delivered either for issue or otherwise, to account for the same, and to pass finally such accounts. The Auditor Gen. should have the means and power of inquiring into the prices of articles, and the conduct of persons intrusted with the expenditure of the public money, or the charge or issue of stores.

I recommend the appointment of one person to perform these duties instead of a Board, because I am convinced that Boards only create delay; and that the public would gain more in the way of saving expenditure by the early examination and settlement of accounts than the most sanguine could expect from the superior vigilance to be exerted by a Board.

I am perfectly aware of the difficulties and inconvenience which attend all great changes in the mode of conducting business in a large and actively employed department; but it appears to me that if your Lord-

ship and His Majesty's government should approve of what I have suggested, and should adopt that part which appears on every ground to be immediately necessary, viz., to appoint a special Auditor to reside at Lisbon for the final examination of the accounts of this army, it would not be difficult by degrees to carry into execution, under the control of the Commander of the Forces, that part of the measures above recommended which have for their object to relieve the Commissary Gen. from the weight of responsibility for his accounts of the expenditure of money, and of the issue of stores.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 13th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 23d ult., regarding the intended Bill to enable officers commanding detachments to assemble Courts Martial, which I think will be of some use. I enclose Mr. Larpent's observations upon it, and mine upon his. I believe we shall not mistake the meaning of the word *arson*, though it would be better if any other term could be used.

MR. LARPENT'S (DEPUTY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL) OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW MILITARY LAW BILL.

Other act of *violence* done—or *injury*, I think, should be added; as many serious *injuries* may scarcely be acts of *violence*.

I conclude *theft* is omitted intentionally, and that *plunder* is meant to include it: but this will hardly meet every case of stealing.

Should not the Act also be extended to cases of *insubordination*, *mutiny*, and breach of discipline and orders, requiring (for example sake) immediate punishment?

Should not the same powers be given to any military commandant of a station at or near where any offence may be committed, if called upon by any officer commanding a party, &c., in which there are not a sufficient number of officers so as to enable him to assemble a Court Martial himself, or if called upon by any *non-commissioned* officer commanding a party?

From the title of the Act, I must suppose *under the immediate command*, &c. is to confine the remedy to a *division*, *brigade*, or *detachment*, when on the march, and *separate* from the main army. If so, I think this should be more clearly specified; and also, that *regiment* or *battalion* should be added, as the case will be more likely to occur of a battalion marching up singly to join, than either a division or brigade.

THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOREGOING.

The object of the Bill being to provide for injuries to the inhabitants of the country, for which the existing law does not afford means of punishment, because it is impossible to procure the evidence of the facts on which it is necessary to convict, I think it should not extend to the cases of mutiny, &c. It may certainly be very desirable to make an early example in such cases; but *early example* is not the object of this Bill, but to have some mode of bringing criminals to justice.

I think that the power of assembling a Court Martial under this Act should be given to the officer commanding a station, on the complaint of an officer or non-commissioned officer commanding a party or detachment on their march, or on the complaint of the inhabitants.

The crimes for which it is desirable to find means of punishment are not generally committed by troops marching in divisions, brigades, or regiments, or battalions, but in small detachments. When a regiment or large body is marching, the soldiers are under the eye and control of their officers, and are generally prevented from committing those crimes, and at all events the Commanding officer of the regiment or larger body

has the power and means of assembling a regimental or other Court Martial for the trial of the offenders; and he can punish, although probably not to the full extent which might be desirable, immediately. Officers marching with smaller detachments have not such powers or means; and it is the object of this Act, as I understand, to afford them.

The A.G. to Officers commanding — regiments of cavalry.

13th April, 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to cause the men of the regiment under your command who shall have been selected by you for the service of the mounted Staff corps, under the directions contained in my letter of the 9th inst., to proceed forthwith to Freneda. These men are to bring with them their arms, accoutrements, and horse appointments, and each man is to be mounted on the horse which belonged to him when the returns of men recommended for the mounted Staff corps were first called for.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency a letter* for H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal, which I request their Excellencies the Governors of the Kingdom will be pleased to read, and afterwards convey to His Royal Highness' presence.

Having frequently made representations to their Excellencies the Governors of the Kingdom, as well directly through means of your Excellency as through the intervention of his Excellency Sir C. Stuart, upon the deficiency of the sums applied to the military service of the state, and upon the means of increasing the revenue of the Kingdom, the Governors aforesaid have always thought proper to refuse to accede to the measures which I have recommended to them.

The exigencies of the army, and of all its establishments, are at this moment in a worse state than they were at the conclusion of the last campaign; the arrear of payment to the officers, to the troops, and to all that belong to them, is greater now than ever, although the British subsidy is regularly paid up to the day.

I therefore consider it my duty to make known to His Royal Highness my opinion upon the state of his affairs, and the manner in which they are conducted, particularly the branch of finance; and I transmit to their Excellencies the exposition I make to His Royal Highness upon this subject, to enable them to add the observations thereon which they may think proper, and to forward the whole together to His Royal Highness.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 6th inst., enclosing one from his Excellency the Duque del Parque, complaining of the removal of Brigadier Rich from the 3d army to be Inspector General of the cavalry with the army in Andalusia.

This arrangement was made by the late Regency before I was appointed to command the army; and Brigadier Rich is now employed in superintending the organisation of the cavalry in Andalusia.

The Duque del Parque has made no report to me respecting the unfit-

* See p. 417.

ness of Brigadier — to command the cavalry of the 3d army ; nor has he informed me that he does not consider himself responsible for the cavalry under his command unless Brigadier Rich shall be sent back to the 3d army. When he does make such reports to me, I shall state my reasons for thinking that he is and must be responsible for the conduct of all the troops under his command, unless he shall state and prove substantial ground of complaint against the officers employed under him by the authority of the Regency.

Au Duque del Infantado.

Freneda, ce 14 Avril, 1813.

J'ai le plaisir de vous faire savoir que j'ai aujourd'hui écrit une lettre au gouvernement, par la poste de cette nuit, pour proposer au gouvernement que vous soyez employé à la 4^{me} armée ; et j'ai arrangé avec le Gén. Castaños que vous devez commander cette partie de la 4^{me} armée qui sert avec l'armée alliée Anglo-Portugaise sous mes ordres. J'ai aussi demandé d'ajouter à la 4^{me} armée deux bataillons de la garde Espagnole ; dont l'un doit venir de Cadiz, quand il sera relevé par un qui vient de Grenade ; et l'autre doit venir de la 3^{me} armée.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

I have this morning received yours of the 12th, from which I understand that you are disposed to take the office of the Adj. Gen., if your health should permit it. Understanding from what you had before said of an official department in the army, that you were disinclined to fill one, I was anxious to have your answer, so as to be able to recommend Lord Aylmer, by this day's mail, and I desired Lord FitzRoy to write to Abercromby yesterday morning, to request that you would allow him to write one line, to say whether you would take the office or not ; but as it appears from your letter of the 12th that there are hopes that you will take the office, I have no objection to wait for your decision as long as you may wish it, and I shall this day write to England to say that I intend hereafter to recommend you for the situation.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

In consequence of the information from Sir C. Stewart, and from Lord Bathurst that Sir Charles had accepted a diplomatic situation (received by the last mail), I propose to recommend that Major Gen. Pakenham should be appointed Adj. Gen., if his health should enable him to perform the duties of the situation : if not, I propose to recommend that Lord Aylmer should be appointed the Adj. Gen., and Lieut. Col. Elley the D. A. G. I should still, however, propose to leave Col. Elley attached to the cavalry, unless, by the sickness or absence of the Adj. Gen., he should be called to take charge of the department.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 24th March in regard to Gen. Sir C. Stewart ; and I find, from a communication which he had made to an officer who is attached to the Adj. Gen.'s department here, that the Prince Regent had some time ago informed him that he should send him on this

mission to Berlin, if there should be any occasion to send any body. This officer, Capt. Wood, is to go with him, and knew of the arrangement 6 weeks ago. I have written to Col. Torrens to inform him that I propose to recommend Gen. Pakenham for the situation, if his health should allow him to accept of it, and Lord Aylmer, if it should not.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

The enemy have continued to move troops from the Tagus towards the Duero, and one division of the army of the South have relieved at Salamanca the division of the army of Portugal which have been there for some time, and have now marched towards the Duero; another division of the army of the South being at Avila.

The head quarters of the King continue at Valladolid, those of the army of Portugal at Palencia, those of the army of the Centre at Cuellar, and those of the army of the South at Madrid, according to the last accounts.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 14th April, 1813.

We have had a little rain, and I propose to put the troops in motion on the 1st May. I am much afraid, however, that our horses will suffer much in the course of the campaign from the extraordinary dryness of the winter and spring, particularly as we have so much new cavalry, all of a description of which the officers are not remarkable for giving much attention to the care of the soldiers' horses. I therefore draw your Lordship's attention thus early to this subject, and to the supply of horses for the artillery.

I acknowledge that I am one of those who are incredulous respecting the difficulties of procuring horses in England for the service of the cavalry and artillery of this army. 1000 horses for the cavalry in this winter and spring would have given the army the service of 3, if not 4, regiments of cavalry, from which I have been obliged, by orders from the Horse Guards, to draft their horses, very much against their inclination. We are now so deficient in horses for the artillery, that I shall, as usual, take the field with an equipment of artillery far inferior to that of the enemy, and to what I intended to take with me; and we shall have no spare horses whatever.

Surely horses of 5 and 6 years old cannot be wanting in England; and, if it is possible to collect in 3 months in France between 30,000 and 40,000 horses for the remount of the French cavalry and artillery, it cannot be impossible to collect in Great Britain and Ireland one twentieth of the number for the supply of this army. It is very possible that the persons usually employed to supply horses, and the ordinary means, and perhaps even the ordinary price, are not sufficient to procure a large supply at a moment; but England must be much altered if there is any deficiency of horses.

I think the question of price is deserving of some attention. The sum of 25 guineas is paid for a dragoon horse, but he is rising 3 years old, and is not fit for work, and much less for service, for a year and a half or two years. In estimating his cost to the public at 5 years old, the age at

which we prefer them here, it is not unreasonable to add to the sum about half as much more; if that be true, would there be any thing unreasonably extravagant in giving £40 or 40 guineas for 5 and 6 year old horses or mares for the regiments on service, and £45 or 45 guineas for horses for the artillery abroad? If it is not thought expedient to do this, there remains then only to draft the 5 and 6 year old horses from the regiments on the home establishment, and to make a great effort to replace them in the regiments by purchases of 2 and 3 year old at the usual price. But if this is done, care must be taken that the regiments on the home service don't send us out their old and worn out horses, as they did upon a former occasion, of which there is one instance of the whole remount of one regiment dying in consequence of one day's work.

In suggesting these measures to your Lordship, I am perhaps travelling out of my line; but the success of our operations here depends so much upon the state of our cavalry and artillery, that I cannot avoid to draw your Lordship's attention to these suggestions.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS TO BE CARRIED ON, ON THE EASTERN COAST OF
THE PENINSULA.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

14th April, 1813.

1. It is obvious that these operations cannot be commenced with advantage till the allied British and Portuguese army shall take the field in Castille, which is intended in the first days of the month of May.

2. The troops applicable to these operations are the allied British and Sicilian corps, and the Spanish divisions under Major Gen. Whittingham and Major Gen. Roche, under the command of Sir J. Murray; that part of the 2d army under Gen. Elio, composed of regular troops; and the regular troops of the 3d army under the command of the Duque del Parque.

3. The objects for the operations of the troops on the Eastern coast of Spain are: 1st; To obtain possession of the open part of the kingdom of Valencia: 2dly; To obtain an establishment on the sea coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the army of Catalonia; and eventually: 3dly; to oblige the enemy to retire from the Lower Ebro.

4. Although these objects are noticed in this order, circumstances may render expedient a departure from it, and that the one mentioned in the third instance should precede that mentioned in the second.

5. If Sir J. Murray possesses the means of embarking 10,000 infantry and artillery, or more, the first and second objects may be combined with great advantage: that is to say, that the attempt to secure the second object by a brisk attack upon Tarragona with all the British and Sicilian corps, and such part of the division of Gen. Whittingham or Gen. Roche as can be transported to Tarragona, will necessarily induce Suchet to weaken his force so considerably in Valencia, as to enable Gen. Elio and the Duque del Parque to take possession of a great part, if not of all the open country in that kingdom.

6. The first object will then be attained.

7. The second will be a question of time and means. If Suchet, notwithstanding the junction of the troops of the 1st army with those under

Sir J. Murray, should be so strong in Catalonia as to oblige that General to raise the siege, and to embark without accomplishing his object, the first object will at least have been gained without difficulty; and the return of Sir J. Murray's corps into the kingdom of Valencia will secure it.

8. If Sir J. Murray should succeed in taking Tarragona, the first and second objects will have been attained, and a foundation will have been laid for the attainment of the third object.

9. Orders have been sent for the Duque del Parque to commence his movement from his position at Jaen, and to proceed to put himself in communication with the 2d army, either by posting himself at Almanza, or at Yecla.

10. As soon as the corps under the Duque del Parque arrives in communication with Gen. Elio, the allied British and Sicilian corps and Gen. Whittingham's division should embark, to the number of at least 10,000 men, or more if possible, and proceed immediately to the attack of Tarragona, in which they should be aided by the 1st army.

11. The troops remaining in the kingdom of Valencia, that is to say, those under the Duque del Parque and Gen. Elio, and those of Gen. Whittingham's and Gen. Roche's divisions, and of the allied British and Sicilian corps which should not embark, should continue on the defensive, and retire, even upon the lines at Alicante, if it should be necessary.

12. But as soon as it shall be found that Suchet begins to weaken his force in the kingdom of Valencia, they are to follow him up, and take possession of as large a part of that kingdom as it may be in their power to do.

13. It must be understood, however, by the General officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavors in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive any thing, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed.

14. Sir J. Murray will take with him to the siege of Tarragona such of the allied British and Sicilian cavalry as he may have horse transports to convey; the remainder, with the cavalry belonging to Gen. Whittingham's division, will remain with the troops under Gen. Elio and the Duque del Parque.

15. If Gen. Sir J. Murray should be obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona, and embark, or, at all events, when he returns to the kingdom of Valencia, he is to land as far to the north as may be in his power, in order to join immediately on the right of the troops under Gen. Elio and the Duque del Parque; and the mules and other equipments belonging to the allied British and Sicilian corps, which must necessarily be left behind at Alicante, are to join that corps at the place of disembarkation.

16. If Tarragona should be taken, it must be garrisoned by a part of the 1st army under Gen. Copons.

17. In case Sir J. Murray should not have the means of embarking

10,000 infantry, at least, the corps of troops to undertake a serious operation on the sea coast in the rear of the enemy's left will not be sufficient, and the plan must be altered; and the following measures must be adopted to obtain a sufficient force in rear of his right.

18. 1st; The regiments, as stated in the margin,* must be detached from the 2d and 3d armies, and must be embarked. These, with about the same number recently ordered from Galicia, will augment the army of Catalonia sufficiently to enable them, according to the opinion of Gen. Copons, to take the field against the enemy's troops now in Catalonia, and to force them to remain in their garrisons.

19. As soon as he shall be joined by these reinforcements, Gen. Copons should make himself master of the open country, particularly between Tarragona and Tortosa, and that place and Lerida.

20. 2dly; The 3d army of the Duque del Parque should be employed to turn the right of the enemy's positions in Valencia, while the allied troops under Sir J. Murray and Gen. Elio will attack them in front. I imagine that it will be necessary for the Duque del Parque to proceed, in this case, as far as Utiel and Requena, before he will be able to make any impression on the position of the Jucar.

21. In proportion as the allied troops shall gain ground, this operation will be repeated; the 3d army continuing to move upon the enemy's right till it shall come in communication with the 1st army on the left of the Ebro. With this object in view, Gen. Copons and the Duque del Parque should keep in constant communication.

Note. It would be very desirable that, if practicable, Gen. Copons should get possession of Mequinenza.

22. When the enemy shall have been forced across the Ebro, either by the maritime operations in rear of his left, or by those just described on his right, it will rest with Gen. Sir J. Murray to determine, in the first instance, on the line to be pursued, in a view to the local situation of affairs, in respect to the ulterior objects of the operations; whether to establish the Spanish authority in the kingdom of Valencia, by obtaining possession of Murviedro, Peñíscola, and any other fortified posts there may be within that kingdom, or to attack Tortosa or Tarragona, supposing that that place should not have fallen by the maritime operations first proposed.

23. In my opinion, the decision on this point, as far as it depends upon the state of affairs on the eastern coast, will depend much upon the practicability and facility of communicating with the shipping on the coast, without having possession of the maritime posts in Valencia.

24. If that should be practicable, it would be most desirable to attain the 2d and 3d objects of the operations, without waiting to obtain possession of the posts within the kingdom of Valencia; respecting which, it is hoped, there would be no doubt, when the operations of the 1st army should be connected with those of the 2d and 3d and of the troops under Sir J. Murray.

25. The divisions composed of irregular troops attached to the 2d army,

* Voluntarios de Jaen, of the 1st division of the 2d army; the regiment of Alicante, of Gen. Roche's division; 2d de Burgos, of Gen. Whittingham's division.

and commanded by Gens. Duran and Villa Campa, should direct their attention to prevent all communication between the enemy's main army under the King in person, and that under Suchet.

26. The operations of these divisions should be carried on on the left of, and in communication with, the Duque del Parque; and, in proportion as the 3d army should move towards the Ebro, the operations of these divisions should be pushed forwards likewise.

27. The division of Don Juan Martin must be kept in reserve, nearly in its present situation, and directions shall be sent to Don Juan Martin.

28. Gen. Sir J. Murray, having under his command the largest and most efficient body of troops, upon whose movements those of the others will depend essentially, will direct the operations of all the corps of troops referred to in this memorandum, when their operations shall be connected immediately with those of the corps of troops under his command.

29. If Gen. Sir J. Murray's allied British and Sicilian corps and the whole or part of Gen. Whittingham's division should embark, Gen. the Duque del Parque will direct the operations ordered in this memorandum to be carried on in the kingdom of Valencia; but, in either case, the General officers commanding the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies, and Gen. Whittingham, must command each their separate corps.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 16th April, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 1st April, and I now transmit a memorandum on the operations which I wish should be carried on on the Eastern coast of the Peninsula, translated copies of which are gone to the Duque del Parque, Gen. Elio, and Gen. Copons.

In forming a plan of operations for troops in the Peninsula, it is necessary always to bear in mind their inefficiency, notwithstanding their good inclinations, their total want of every thing which could keep them together as armies, and of the necessary equipments of cannon, &c. &c., and their repeated failures in the accomplishment even of the most trifling objects, notwithstanding the personal bravery of the individuals composing the armies. If I had had to form a plan for the operations of half the numbers of real soldiers, well equipped and prepared for the field, it would have been one of a very different description; but such a plan would not suit, and could not be executed by the instruments with which you have to work.

I beg therefore that you will set to work as soon as you may think proper, as proposed in the enclosed memorandum. I have nothing to say to the equipments or establishments of your troops, or to any thing relating to them, excepting their operations, and the occasion and period of quitting the Peninsula if there should be occasion. But if you will send me a regular report of the mules and horses you have purchased, stating the prices, and for what purpose, I will send you the regular authority for the purchase.

I still object, however, to your feeding Gen. Roche's or Gen. Whittingham's, or any other Spanish troops in Spain, as occasioning an useless expense to such an amount as that Great Britain cannot bear it, and as

eventually likely to break down your own departments. I am likewise certain that, if those officers take pains, your assistance, however loudly they may call for it, is not required. As long as I have served in Spain, I have never done such a thing, and never will.

P.S. Of all your wants that of artillery-men appears most extraordinary. Besides the artillery-men who came with the corps from Sicily, which, as the corps came to carry on a siege, I conclude cannot be inconsiderable in number, you have 2 companies of British and 2 of Portuguese artillery belonging to this army; I believe the very same men, in the same numbers, that took Badajoz for us last spring. It would, however, be very desirable, now that the communication is quite secure, if you could send me a regular return of your force. I cannot let you have the artillery-men at Carthagena, as I have nothing else to take care of our stores, &c., there; but, if 4 companies, besides those belonging to Sicily, are not enough, I will try to send more from this army.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 16th April, 1813.

I have received yours of the 7th and 11th.

I concur entirely with you respecting the sending Spanish troops to America. I have made no attempt to prevent it, and I think it best that you should make none. The Minister at War promises fairly, but he still violates daily the engagements made with me.

What I meant by the encouragement given by us to the licentiousness of the Spanish press, referred to that by individuals, and particularly by —.

I should wish you to send 100,000 dollars to each of the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies, and the army of reserve of Andalusia, between this time and the 1st May, if you can. I shall inform the government that I have made this request. How much have you given to each army of the sum settled to be given when I was at Cadiz?

I enclose a copy of the memorandum of the operations to be undertaken on the Eastern coast. I shall send to England your letter, &c., on loans.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 16th April, 1813.

I have given directions to the Commanding officer of artillery at Lisbon to prepare for embarkation a company of artillery, which I am desirous should be sent to Alicante; and I will thank you to provide tonnage to convey them there under convoy of a ship of war.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 17th April, 1813.

In consequence of a desire which I transmitted, as Commander in Chief of the British army, through His Majesty's minister at Cadiz, to be made acquainted with the wishes of the Regency regarding the payment for certain supplies received by the troops under my command in Castille during the last campaign, the Regency desired that payment should be made into the national treasury. I now enclose a letter which I have received from Gen. Castaños, pointing out the inconveniences which the service will feel here if the money should not be paid into the provincial

treasury ; and I beg leave to recommend the representation of Gen. Castaños to the consideration of the Regency, and that I should receive directions accordingly.

The A.G. to Staff Surgeon —.

17th April, 1813.

The Commander of the Forces having thought proper, in consequence of a representation from Lieut. Col. Elley respecting a transaction which occurred between him and you in December last, on the subject of quarters, to cause inquiry to be made regarding the class in which the quarter occupied by you at that period was classed, and the circumstances under which the billet was obtained by you, and it appearing that the quarter was classed as a Field officer's quarter, to which you are not entitled by your rank in the service, his Lordship has directed me to signify to you that if any further complaint of you should reach him upon the subject of quarters, he will order you to move out of any quarter which you may happen to occupy at the time, and to occupy your tent.

The A.G. to Officers commanding divisions.

17th April, 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you the returns of sick in general hospital of the division under your command, which have been forwarded to this office by Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector Gen. of hospitals, in compliance with the G. O. of the 14th Feb., for the purpose of enabling the Commanding officers of regiments to account for men whose names do not appear in the nominal lists of 'sick absent' and men 'on command,' which have been forwarded to this office by the several regiments of this army. In reference to the accompanying returns I have to observe that the names through which a red line has been drawn have been discovered in the regimental nominal lists of 'sick absent' and of men 'on command,' but that the names through which a red line has not been drawn are not to be found in either of those lists. After the accompanying returns shall have been carefully examined by the several regiments, I request that they may be sent back to me, with a remark opposite to each name (of those through which a red line has not been drawn), stating whether the man belongs to the regiment, and if so, in what manner he has hitherto been returned. With a view of ascertaining as far as possible whether any, and to what extent, men have been entertained in general hospital under feigned names, and as belonging to regiments to which in reality they do not belong, the Commander of the Forces desires that you will be pleased to cause an officer per regiment to proceed to the general hospitals named in the margin, for the purpose of searching the general hospital, and of examining the Purveyor's registers to discover men belonging to their respective regiments. It will be necessary that the officers selected for this duty should be those who, from their long service in the regiment and their knowledge of the men, are the best calculated to obtain the desired information.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 18th April, 1813.

The government have been very stingy of the supplies, not only of horses for our artillery, but of drivers to take care of the few they have sent us, and we want 350 drivers. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you can assist me with a few drivers, or can let us have the use of some of the dismounted cavalry to take care of some of our artillery stores.

I will let you know by to-morrow's post at what places we shall require them.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 18th April, 1813.

Sir R. Fletcher has suggested to me that it would be very desirable to have with the army the whole, if possible, if not, a large detachment at least, of the corps of Portuguese sappers under some of the officers of the

Portuguese engineers, not of higher rank than that of Major. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what number of this corps are fit for service, and if you will order such of them as are, or the whole if possible, to march upon Coimbra, letting me know when they will arrive.

I have just received your letters of the 13th and 14th.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 18th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter (marked *muy reservado*) of the 8th inst., and I have read its enclosures with the greatest attention.

The writer of them is certainly unacquainted with the numbers, the position, or the circumstances, as affecting the efficiency of the armies of the several allied nations; and he appears to me to be equally unacquainted with the position of the enemy's armies; and not to be aware of the facilities which they possess of effecting a junction of their different corps, long before the armies of the allied nations, supposing them to be sufficiently numerous, could perform the proposed operations.

Having had a long experience in the operations of war, particularly against the French, I am induced to doubt very much the practicability of the execution of all schemes such as that proposed for the surprise of the post of Toledo; of the head quarters of one of the *corps d'armée*, &c. &c.

In order to see the fallacy of such schemes, it is only necessary to reflect upon the difficulty, nay impossibility, of moving through the enemy's posts, unperceived, such a body of troops, 1000 men, as are required to execute such a scheme. In truth, it is very frequently difficult for a single man to pass through them to carry a letter; and it is not reasonable to expect that 1000 men could pass through many leagues of country occupied by the enemy, in order to surprise the head quarters, or park of artillery, in such a town as Toledo.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Arentschildt, 1st hussars, K.G.L.

19th April, 1813.

It has been represented to me by Lieut. Col. Scovell that the horses of two of the soldiers of the 1st hussars who arrived here yesterday for the mounted Staff corps have been changed for others, notwithstanding the directions contained in my circular letter of the 13th inst.; it has been determined, however, that one of the horses so changed shall be returned, but the other is sent back, and I am to desire that the horse which was in possession of Fred. Neils at the period when the returns of men of the mounted Staff corps were first called for, may be sent here in place of it.

The A.G. to Commandants of hospital stations.

19th April, 1813.

The Commander of the Forces having been pleased to direct that an officer per regiment of certain divisions shall proceed to the general hospital stations in the neighbourhood of their respective cantonments for the purpose of searching the general hospitals, and of examining the Purveyor's register with a view of discovering men who may have been entertained in the general hospitals under feigned names, and as belonging to regiments to which in reality they do not belong, I am to desire that the officers who will arrive at the general hospital station under your command for the above purpose may receive every assistance towards obtaining the desired information which it may be in your power to afford, and I request that you will communicate the contents of this letter to the Purveyor, in order that he may be also prepared to assist the officer in fulfilling the object in view.

To Lieut. Col. Holmes, 3d dragoon guards.

Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

The Sec. at War has transmitted to me your letter to his Lordship, of the 30th Jan. last, on the subject of the profits made by Paymasters of regiments in this country.

I don't understand what sums are in the hands of the Paymasters of regiments in this army for *non-effectives*; nor do I understand exactly what is meant by that term. As the Sec. at War has referred this subject for my consideration, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give me such further explanation as may be in your power.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

Having written to Lord Bathurst on the subject, the government have consented to our removing such of the military agents as we might think proper; and I think that Gens. Roche, Whittingham, and Doyle, being employed as Spanish Generals, should no longer be paid as military agents; and if you concur in this opinion, I shall be obliged to you if you will notify to them that, after the end of this month, they are not to receive their allowances; or let me know if you wish that I should, and I will. If Doyle does not receive, he should hereafter be paid, his Spanish allowance.

The clothing, &c. can be hereafter issued to the Spanish corps through the Spanish authorities, whom I shall hold responsible for their due distribution.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

I have received your Lordship's dispatch (No. 112) of the 31st March, in regard to the dangers to the British shipping at Coruña, in consequence

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Col. the Hon. C. M. Cathcart, A. Q. M. G. Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

Gen. Bock will have communicated to you the intended movement of the 3 brigades of cavalry on the coast to the country about Braga, Guimaraens, and Santo Tirzo. The sooner they get there the better, as they may then have some days' halt previously to their further movements; and, indeed, the chief object of the present arrangement is to break the length of their intended march.

The regiments should start as complete as possible in every kind of field equipment, as, after passing Oporto, they will be at a distance from all supplies of those articles.

The further movement of the 3 brigades from the province of Minho will be directed probably upon Braganza and Vimioso, or into the country between Vimioso and Miranda de Douro.

The brigade moving from Braga will probably be ordered to march by the road of Chaves to Braganza; that from Guimaraens may find a direct route, I hope, upon Villa Franca, and thence by Val Paços to Braganza, or towards Vimioso, leaving Braganza to the left.

Another column may move by Amarante, Villa Real, and Mirandella.

I should wish officers to be sent as soon as possible to reconnoitre the above routes. They should be directed to report upon the nature of the road, the distances, the accommodations for cantoning, the best bivouacking places (should it be necessary to bivouac), and the supply of forage.

I should think it unnecessary for these officers to rejoin until their regiments have moved forward. They should, therefore, send written reports back to you, to enable you to regulate the routes of the regiments to the best advantage; and I beg they may also be instructed to send copies of their reports to me. This they can do with most certainty through the officer of the Commissariat department at Braganza.

You will see the necessity of the officers on the above reconnaissance avoiding as much as possible to give any intimation of the intended movement of the cavalry towards the frontier of the *Tras os Montes*, and the object of reconnoitring the new cantonments may be made the pretext of their being detached at present from their regiments.

of the insecure state of the prisoners, and I have desired Gen. Castaños, who commands in Galicia, to give directions that measures may be taken to secure the prisoners of war in that province.

It would be very desirable, however, and would tend much to increase the resources of the province of Galicia for the maintenance of troops, if the prisoners of war could be removed from thence to England.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 7th. I went the other day to see Gen. C. Alten, who is by far the best of the Hanoverian officers, and his opinion most consulted and respected, purposely to ascertain how he felt respecting the state of affairs in Germany, and the expediency of sending back to Hanover the German Legion; and I am happy to inform you that I found his opinion to be very sensible and correct upon those subjects. He is clearly of opinion that the best thing for England, for Germany, and the world, is to make the greatest possible effort here; and in respect to the German Legion, in particular, he thinks that its services, which would be very useful here during the approaching campaign, would be entirely thrown away in this campaign, if they were to be sent round to Hanover. When a large levy of men shall have been made in Hanover, it may be a question whether it would not be expedient to send there a large part, at least, if not the whole, of the German Legion, if the war should continue in Germany. But now I am quite certain that government, as well as Gen. Alten, are right.

We must have the orders of the Sec. of State for any alteration in the mode of wearing the medal by the General officers. It may do very well for an Admiral to wear his medal round his neck on his quarter deck, but we on horseback ought to wear it always at our button hole. Indeed this is the common practice in all distributions of this description, and was the rule at first on the grant of the medal for the battle of Maida; and I don't know why it was altered.

The A.G. to General Officers commanding divisions.

20th April, 1813.

Enclosed I have the honor of transmitting to you returns which I have received

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 20th April, 1813.

It seems at present probable that the first movements to be made by the right of the army will be, that your corps should move up to Tamames, or a little in front of it, and that the most advanced divisions of this part of our force should move forward at the same time into the country about San Muñoz and Matilla.

I shall be much obliged to you, therefore, if you will direct Lieut. Col. Abercromby (who left this to-day for Coria) to make out a *proposed* arrangement for the assembly and march of all the troops under your orders in the direction above mentioned. In this arrangement the previous junction of the Spanish corps of Gen. Morillo should be adverted to.

The arrangement, however, of your march must depend, of course, very much upon the situation and force of the nearest corps of the enemy's army at the moment when the movement is to take place; but I am inclined to think there will be no danger in your making use of the Perales road for a part of your corps.

It would lighten the march a good deal if the Conde de Amarante's division, or Gen. Morillo's (or both), were to proceed by the Puerto de Perales, whilst the British part only of your force marched by the route of Baños; and the divisions from this quarter might be brought a day sooner to their destination, if thought necessary, so as to cover the arrival of your corps.

I shall be glad to have a copy of your proposed arrangement as soon as it is prepared.

from the Inspector General of hospitals of arms, accoutrements, and necessities remaining in store at the several hospital stations belonging to men who are dead or no longer in hospital at the station. These returns, I hope, will prove in some degree useful to officers in command of regiments, not only as enabling them to recover accoutrements, clothing, and necessities belonging to their respective regiments, but as affording a clue for the discovery of men whom they have hitherto been unable to account for in a satisfactory manner; for you will be pleased to observe that the numbers or letters on the arms remaining in store are inserted in the enclosed returns, and the officers commanding companies, by referring to the rolls of their companies, in which it is presumed the number or letter on each man's arms is inserted opposite to his name, will in many instances be enabled to discover the names of soldiers who are returned as 'unknown' in the enclosed returns.

To J. C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

In consequence of the very favorable report which I have received from Sir R. Kennedy of the conduct of Dep. Commissary Gen. Pipon, I beg to acquaint you, that I have directed him in G. O. to act as Commissary Gen. till the pleasure of the Lords of the Treasury is known, and I trust you will be pleased to recommend the appointment to their Lordships' favorable consideration.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

I have the honor of enclosing to your Royal Highness a return of the number of men from each regiment of cavalry in this country transferred to the Staff corps. I considered it most consistent with your Royal Highness' intentions that the men should be allowed to volunteer their services for this corps, and I arranged accordingly; taking from no regiment any man that had not volunteered, and confining the numbers taken from those regiments which were to remain on the service in this country

G. O.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers, and Commanding officers of regiments, particularly those of the cavalry, and of brigades and troops of artillery, not to use the green corn as forage, if it can be avoided. There is nothing that will, at the present season of the year, be of such advantage to the horses and other animals of the army, as to turn them to grass during the entire day, or at least such part of it as the animals may not be employed on duty.

2. If it should be necessary to use the green corn as forage, it should be cut, and the animals should not be turned out in the corn fields. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the officers to his orders regarding the mode of cutting the green corn as forage, in order to render it certain that the owners may have compensation for their property.

3. The Commander of the Forces has already received complaints from the inhabitants of inattention to his orders on this subject; for which complaints he had hoped no cause would have been given. He trusts, however, that no cause will be given in future.

4. The whole of the cavalry, including Brig. Gen. d'Urban's and Col. Campbell's brigades of Portuguese cavalry, are to be in one division, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton.

5. The duty of the cavalry with any detached body of troops will in future be done by detachments from the division of cavalry.

6. Lieut. Col. Sturgeon is appointed to act as an Assistant in the department of the Q. M. G., until the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent is known, from the 25th inst.; and from the same period he is to take charge of the Corps of Guides, and of the Post office, and other communications of the army, *vice* Lieut. Col. Scovell.

7. The Corps of mounted Guides will in future consist of 2 troops, each of the following strength:

Capt.	Lieuts.	Cornets.	Troop serj. maj.	Serj.	Corp.	Trump.	Far.	Privates.	Reg. serj. maj.
1	3	3	1	8	8	1	3	75	1

2 F 2

to 10 privates. The King's Heavy German dragoons and the English hussars did not furnish any.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Major Gen. Cooke, in which he requests to have leave to go to England for a short time, in the month of June, for the benefit of his health. Col. Capel will be the senior officer at Cadiz during the absence of Major Gen. Cooke; from which I don't think that any inconvenience will result.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

When I was at Cadiz in the course of the winter, I had some conversation with Sir H. Wellesley and some of the monied people in that place respecting the practicability of raising money by loan on the certificates which I had before been authorised by His Majesty's government to grant; and I enclose a copy of his last letter upon this subject.

The reason for insisting on all the formalities in the transfer of securities when granted, was to preclude the chances of forgery, of which the late Chancellor of the Exchequer was very apprehensive; and I imagine that your Lordship will not be disposed to relax any arrangement which he thought necessary to recommend, having that object in view.

If this were not the case, there would probably be no objection to the proposed clause in the certificate drawn by Mr. Costello, which stipulates that the sum borrowed should be repaid in coin; or to giving, by way of premium, such additional sum beyond 5 *per cent.* for the use of the money, as the custom of Spain and the state of the money market might render expedient.

I have not yet granted one of the certificates which I was heretofore authorised to grant for money borrowed; nor do I see much prospect that I shall have occasion to issue any.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

The enemy withdrew all their troops from the left of the Tagus, and evacuated Toledo on the 10th inst.; but they have still a body of troops under Gen. Leval in Madrid; and Gen. Pierre Soult's cavalry are in Getafe, Leganez, &c., to the south of Madrid.

The army of the South have, however, in general, occupied the positions heretofore occupied by the army of Portugal on the rivers Duero and Tormes; and it appears that the army of Portugal have been collected about Palencia, the army of the Centre continuing in the province of Segovia.

I propose to put the allied British and Portuguese army in motion in

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

Lord Wellington wishes that the most distant corps under your orders should now be brought more *à porté* to the movements they may have hereafter to make.

With this view it is desirable that you should draw the Conde de Amarante's corps to this side of the Tagus, as also the cavalry under your orders.

Lord Wellington desires you will be so good as write to Gen. Morillo likewise, to place his Spanish corps in the most convenient cantonments for being at hand to pass to this side of the Tagus at Alcantara when ordered.

the first days of next month. I have already sent orders to Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray to commence his operations, and to the General officers commanding the 1st, 2d, and 3d Spanish armies to co-operate with him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th, in regard to the artillery horses, &c.

I now enclose the state of them as they stood on the 19th inst., from which you will observe that, by our purchases of mules, we are in possession of a few more animals than are absolutely necessary to move our equipments, supposing the whole to be in a condition for work. The difference between your account and ours is owing, I believe, to our having carried to account, on the 1st Oct., the 203 horses which, in your Lordship's account, appear to have sailed on the 15th Sept., and not having carried to account the 110 horses at Portsmouth, which have not yet arrived.

We are greatly in want of drivers. I have written to Sir W. Beresford to endeavor to borrow some from the Portuguese. If we cannot get them, I must take soldiers from the infantry, which it would be very desirable, if possible, to avoid.

In reference to my last letter on this subject, I would request your Lordship to observe that we pay 200 dollars in cash for each of our mules, which, at the rate of exchange of the day, is not less than £60. A mule is not so good as an English horse: indeed, in fire he cannot be used. Allowing that the Ordnance were to give 45 guineas for 5 and 6 year old horses, and for the expense of sending each horse out about £10, you will see that it would be cheaper to supply us with horses, even at that price; to which add, that the mules lately purchased have not taken much less from the military chest than 100,000 dollars in specie; whereas the horses would be bought in England, and for bank notes.

We shall be stronger in cavalry than we have ever been, as well as in every thing else; but the enemy will still be superior to us in cavalry, even including the Portuguese and some Spaniards.

I am very much annoyed by the conduct of the Cortes, who appear to follow the example of the Assemblies of France. The *liberales*, or rather the writers of the newspapers, who are, in fact, the government, have lately brought into play the mob of Cadiz; and, on the question of conferring the Regency on the Princess of Brazil, the mob decided; as, although there was undoubtedly a majority of the Assembly in favor of the Princess, nobody dared even mention her name.

The elections for the new Cortes, which, by some extraordinary manœuvre, the existing Cortes have brought under their own cognizance, have been generally in favor of priests; and where the choice has fallen on laymen, they are known to be hostile in opinion to the *liberales*. They have contrived to set aside many of the elections on account of some informality or other; and they are endeavoring to give a construction to an article of the constitution, in order to set aside all the elections of the priests. They will succeed in this, or any thing else that they choose.

I think that by these manœuvres the existing Cortes will create an apparent necessity for their continuing to sit after the month of October, the period fixed for their dissolution and the assembly of the new Cortes. It is impossible to calculate upon the plans of such an assembly. They have no check whatever; and they are guided and governed by the most ignorant and licentious of all licentious presses, that of Cadiz. I believe they mean to attack the Royal and feudal tenths, and the tithes of the church, under the pretext of encouraging agriculture; and I am sadly afraid that, finding the contributions not so productive as they imagined they would be, they will seize the rents of the estates of my friends the *Grandees*.

If I am tolerably successful early in the campaign, I intend to try and prevail upon them to quit Cadiz, which I know the *liberales* consider as their stronghold; and the other parties and my brother are of opinion that the only chance of salvation is to remove the government from thence. This may be the case, if matters should be well managed on their removal; but wherever the Cortes and government should fix themselves, the press would follow them, and would exercise the same control over the proceedings of both; and in a very short space of time the mob of Seville, of Granada, or even of Madrid, would be as bad as that of Cadiz. The only permanent advantage likely to result from the removal would be, the probability of less prejudice in the consideration of all questions of commerce.

Adverting to the state of affairs in Spain, as well as elsewhere at present, does it not occur to you that it would be wise for Great Britain to recur again to the principles laid down in Lord Liverpool's dispatch to the government of Curaçoa, in regard to the Spanish Colonies? The practice of our smuggling merchants and ship captains has never been in conformity with that letter; and although I think it very improbable that any thing will give Great Britain the influence we ought to have over the deliberations and measures of the Cortes, as now constituted, a load of suspicion and prejudice would be removed, if the conduct of our merchants was more consistent with the fairness of the principles laid down in that dispatch.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 21st April, 1813.

Notwithstanding that I have written you so many letters this day, I am induced to trouble you again, in consequence of Sir R. Kennedy communicating to me a letter from Mr. Herries of the 2d April, enclosing one of the 1st from the Treasury, to which documents I beg to refer you.

I enclose your Lordship the printed copy of a letter which I wrote to Sir C. Stuart in April last year,* in which I have described particularly the origin and description of certain securities floating in this country, commonly, but improperly, called commissariat bills, and have stated my opinion of the injury which the *sharks*, called British merchants, at Lisbon did to the army and their country by the purchase of these securities at a depreciated rate.

In consequence of the clamor at Lisbon, which even reached to

* See vol. v. p. 604.

England, in consequence of my determination that these securities should not be discharged by the grant of bills upon the Treasury, Mr. Bissett was induced, with my consent, to pay some of them in that manner, and the holders of these bills immediately went into the market with them; and for a considerable length of time during the last campaign no money came into the military chest for any of the Commissary's bills on the Treasury negotiated at Lisbon. The measure was then adopted, in October and November last, of paying these securities by bills upon the Treasury, on the condition that the holders of them should lodge in the military chest, likewise for a bill on the Treasury, a sum equal in amount to that for which they were to receive a bill for the Commissariat security, by which measure we have got, on an average, into the military chest, about 850,000 dollars a month, which has latterly increased to 1,000,000 of dollars. This supply the Lords of the Treasury have entirely cut off by their letters of the 1st April, on the ground of the supposed injustice of forcing a person to take a bill upon the Treasury for money equal in amount to that for which he should have another bill in payment for a debt.

If the Lords of the Treasury, or the Commissary in Chief, had done me the honor of consulting my opinion on any part of this transaction, or had placed in me the common confidence which I might have expected, they would have learned, 1st; That nothing can be more inconvenient to the public service than that the British merchants should thus purchase our debts: 2dly; That they have purchased them with the knowledge of my opinion of this inconvenience, at least since the 22d April, and of my determination to pay these debts at the moment, in the order, and in the manner which might be most convenient to the public service: 3dly; That they have purchased them to the amount of nearly a million of dollars, or more, since the month of October last, with a knowledge of this mode of payment, which the Lords of the Treasury now pronounce to be so unjust, and which they have positively forbidden. Probably if their Lordships had known all this, and had seen the enclosed letter, they would have been of opinion, that if there is any thing unjust in these measures, those who feel the injustice have brought it on themselves by their own act.

In a very recent instance, I found the British merchants at Lisbon intriguing with the muleteers of the army, and on the point of doing us, and their country, and the cause, irreparable mischief, in order that they might get more of these securities into their hands; in the payment of which they are treated with so much injustice, according to the opinion of the Lords of the Treasury.

I don't feel much encouragement to interfere in a matter of this kind, which is no concern of mine, after the peremptory orders given upon it by the Lords of the Treasury; but at this promising moment I cannot see the affairs of the country fail for want of money, which, by my interference, might be procured; and I have therefore desired the Commissary Gen. to continue the existing practice till he shall receive further orders from the Treasury, which I earnestly entreat your Lordship may be sent to him without loss of time.

In the letter from the Treasury there are several facts stated in regard to rates of exchange, the comparative rates of merchants' bills and those of the Commissary Gen., which are entirely unfounded, as will be seen by reference to the Commissary Gen.'s reports. But these facts proceed from the authority of the merchants at Lisbon, who wish that which the Treasury have ordered, viz., that they shall be paid by bills upon the Treasury for the Commissariat securities which they hold and have purchased at a depreciated rate; and they would then sell these bills in the market of Lisbon for coin; and it would soon be found that the military chest would get nothing, as was the case in the last summer.

On all these points I conceive that it is no business of mine to find money for the army; it is that of the Treasury. I interfere only from zeal for the public service, and I do so in the hope of being treated with fair confidence, which, in this instance, I certainly have not received.

The A.G. to Mr. Egerton, Whitehall.

21st April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 28th March, and am sorry to find that you have not received the first part of the G. O. for 1812, which had been prepared for the press and transmitted to you, as made known to you in a letter from this office. I beg you will make inquiries for this MS. at the Horse Guards, and should it be forthcoming, that you will complete the volume with as much dispatch as possible. In the mean time I have ordered a fresh copy of the missing orders to be prepared, which will be transmitted to you by the next mail.

To Major Gen. Baron Bock.

Freneda, 22d April, 1813.

I have received the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of Lieut. —, of the —, and your letter of the 19th, in which you have, by desire of the General Court Martial, recommended that officer for mercy, which recommendation I am desirous that the Court should reconsider.

1st; I would beg the Court to observe, that it is never thought necessary to trouble a General Court Martial with any but cases carrying on the face of them the appearance of an extraordinary degree of guilt; and it does appear a waste of the time of the public, and in itself very extraordinary, that a General Court Martial, having had proved before it the guilt of a prisoner, having convicted him by their sentence, and decreed a punishment, should then do worse than defeat all the objects of the trial, by holding up an example of impunity, procured through the means of the very tribunal appointed by the Legislature to be the principal instruments in maintaining the discipline and good order of the army. This observation applies to recommendations by General Courts Martial in general, to which I make it a rule to pay attention; but I am quite convinced that, if I were to exercise my own judgment on these recommendations, or if General Courts Martial were to consider them as they are, the effects of a mistaken lenity, and were to be more sparing of them, the army would be in a better state of discipline, and much of the time of the public, now spent in these trials, would be saved.

But, 2dly; I would beg the Court to reflect on the charge of which they have found Lieut. — guilty, viz., 'behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is unbecoming an officer and a gentleman;' on

the punishment annexed by the Articles of War to the guilt of this charge ; and on the facts on which the charge is founded, as detailed in the charge itself, and which have been clearly proved before the General Court Martial. In the whole catalogue of military crimes, it is scarcely possible to find one more enormous, or more likely in its consequences to be injurious to the service in every way in which injury can be done to it.

Then, 3dly ; I would beg the Court to reflect upon the infamy attaching to the character of Lieut. —, after the conviction of guilt of such a charge founded on such facts. Supposing that H. R. H. the Prince Regent should attend to their recommendation, do the General Court Martial believe that the officers of the — — would willingly associate with such a man ? Is there any regiment in the army of which the officers would not deem it a disgrace to associate with him ? Is there an officer upon the General Court Martial who would not consider himself disgraced if he were seen in company with him ?

If this be true, I beg the General Court Martial to consider in what a situation they will place H. R. H. the Prince Regent by their recommendation. His Royal Highness will be called upon to pardon an officer for a crime so infamous, that neither the officers of the corps to which he belongs, nor those of any other regiment in the army, will associate with him.

I entreat the Court, therefore, to feel that confidence in the justice and propriety of their sentence which it deserves ; and to allow it to go before His Royal Highness without the recommendation : but if they should still desire that the recommendation should be forwarded, I shall send it to England, but without any remark on my part, as I never will be instrumental in retaining in His Majesty's service, as an officer, a person found guilty of behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner, such as is unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and in forcing him into the society of officers by whom, to associate with him, will be deemed a disgrace.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 22d April, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Prince Regent of Portugal, by which I am informed that His Royal Highness has been graciously pleased to confer on me the title of Duque da Victoria.*

I beg that your Lordship will be so kind as to lay this letter before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and that you will submit to His Royal Highness my request that I may be permitted to accept the title which has been granted to me by H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 22d April, 1813.

I have the honor to transmit the copy of a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with the copy of one from the Conde de Aguiar, stating that H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal had created the Marshal Marquez do Campo Maior.

I beg that you will lay these papers before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and that you will obtain His Royal Highness' permission that Marshal Sir

* See Appendix, No. VIII.

W. Beresford may accept the honor which has been conferred upon him by the Prince Regent of Portugal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 23d April, 1813.

I have just heard of your arrival at Lisbon on the 20th inst. You will have received my letters there.

There has been no material change since I wrote last. I propose to move as soon as I can after the beginning of the month; and rather think, between ourselves, I shall direct my march across the Lower Douro within the Kingdom of Portugal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Freneda, 23d April, 1813.

Since I wrote to you last, Gen. Slade has been recalled in consequence of Gen. Clinton having been made a Lieutenant General in the Peninsula. It now rests with you whether you will make another vacancy, and, if you should, whether you will appoint to it Gen. Vandeleur or ———.

I have put all the cavalry in one division; and I propose to put the 13th light dragoons into the brigade with the Royals and 3d dragoon guards, under the command of Major Gen. Long, the whole being only a temporary arrangement till you arrive.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Freneda, 23d April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 23d March, in which you have acquainted me with the orders which you had received from Lord Keith, and had desired to be made acquainted with my opinion regarding your operations.

Adverting to the probable operations of the campaign, it is very desirable that the enemy's communication by sea along the coast of Cantabria should be prevented as far as possible, from Bayonne to Santoña. They have already made two or three attacks upon Castro Urdiales, all of which have failed; but I think it not unlikely that they will try again; and it would be very desirable that you should communicate with the Spanish officer in command of the troops in that garrison. The Spaniards have some craft there, which might be of use, under your protection, in preventing the communication of the enemy along the coast.

The transport loaded with bread might as well be left at Coruña.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Freneda, 23d April, 1813.

I enclose a letter for Sir G. Collier, who is in command of a squadron either at Coruña or cruising off Cape Ortegal. I shall be obliged to you if you will take a copy of it, and send it to him by a safe hand; and afterwards take an opportunity of communicating to him the copy, in case the original should miss him.

I have directed that the sum in your hands for the use of the Spaniards may be increased to 100,000 dollars; and I request you to pay it to the order of Gen. Giron or of Gen. Castaños. The former is going to-morrow to take the command of the Spanish army of Galicia.

Au Major Gén. Baron Löw, K.G.L.

Fréneda, ce 23 Avril, 1813.

Il y a quelque temps que son Altesse Royale le Commandant en Chef m'a fait savoir qu'il avait ordonné à un autre Officier Général de la Légion de passer à cette armée pour vous remplacer ; et je crois qu'avant peu de temps il pourra arriver.

Sous ces circonstances, et étant à la veille de l'ouverture de la campagne dans ce pays ci, et voyant que les affaires dans votre propre pays s'avancent d'une telle manière que vos services, si votre santé vous permet encore de les donner ou au moins vos conseils seraient fort à désirer, j'ai cru de mon devoir de vous annoncer cette disposition, afin que vous preniez là dessus les mesures qui vous conviendront.

En attendant je vous prie de croire que je suis très sensible, et que je me souviendrai toujours avec plaisir des services que vous avez rendus avec cette armée ; et que partout où vous irez, vous aurez mes souhaits pour votre succès et votre bonheur.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 23d April, 1813.

I had the honor of receiving last night your letter of the 12th inst., in which you have made me acquainted with two communications which you had received from the Minister of *Hacienda*, in regard to the subsistence of the troops.

As your Excellency is aware, this subject has already received much of my attention ; and I have already done every thing in my power to obtain a knowledge of the resources of the country, and to have them applied with regularity and economy ; and I have assisted them, as much as has been in my power, by advances of money from the military chest of the British army, on account of the subsidy from His Majesty and the government of Spain.

It is desirable, however, that I should receive positive instructions from the government on certain points, in order to be enabled to do all the good that I wish to do on this subject.

I entirely agree with the government in the opinion, that when the Spanish soldier receives his pay regularly and his bread, he ought not to receive what is called *étape* of any description ; and that it is essentially necessary, not only with a view to the economy of the resources of the State, but for the honor and advantage of the soldier himself, that he should be brought back to the system of frugal economy enjoined by the ancient *Ordenanzas*.

But I beg leave to call the attention of your Excellency to the fact, that owing to the confusion and irregularity which have prevailed in the management, particularly of the military concerns of the nation, in the course of the contest, it is not exactly known, either what is the pay of the soldier, or what he is to provide out of it ; or whether, supposing that he receives bread and his pay, and no *étape*, he is to receive any money called *sobrantes*, and if he is to receive such an allowance, to what amount ; also whether, if the soldier receives *étape*, what amount of his fixed daily pay shall be stopped from him.

It is most desirable that the government should declare itself clearly on all these points without loss of time ; and in order to assist them in doing

so, I proceed to give them my opinion on the several points to which I have above referred.

1st, then; I recommend that the pay of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of all ranks should be fixed at the rate of the ancient *Ordenanzas*; that is to say:

2dly; The only stoppage from this pay should be from each man for the hospital, for the purchase and maintenance of the small articles of his necessaries; for which the officer should be accountable at the periods fixed by the ancient *Ordenanzas*.

3dly; That the remainder of the pay of each rank of non-commissioned officer and soldier present with his regiment, should be paid to him every day.

4thly; That when the soldier shall receive this pay, he shall not be entitled to any description of *étape*, or other allowance in lieu of it, of any description, according to the ancient *Ordenanzas*, whether in the field, in garrison, or in cantonments, within the Spanish dominions, excepting on such extraordinary occasions as that it is absolutely impossible for the troops to provide for themselves, such as being actually engaged with the enemy; or in operations so near to the enemy, as that the *vivandiers* and other attendants on the troops cannot with safety remain near them.

5thly; That in such extraordinary cases, the *étape* shall be fixed by the General commanding the troops, and shall consist of such articles as he can procure.

6thly; That on occasions when the pay cannot be delivered to the troops regularly every 5 days, they are to receive *étape*, to consist of the following articles:

7thly; That the full *étape*, when supplied to the army, shall be valued to each non-commissioned officer and soldier as one real a day, and the half *étape* half a real; and the soldiers will be entitled only to the overplus of their pay, the stoppage for the *masita* in both cases remaining the same.

I beg your Excellency to observe, that in proposing what is above detailed for the consideration of the government, I am perfectly aware that it will be very difficult, and in some situations and at some seasons quite impossible, for the soldier to exist on this pay. I am equally certain, however, that the resources of the State are not equal, even with all the assistance which Great Britain can give them, to support a larger expense, even supposing that we can overcome the difficulties which oppose at every step the realization of those resources to such an amount as to enable us to defray the diminished expense proposed. Hereafter, however, it may be necessary for the government to give an allowance to the soldiers of the army in the field, at least, in order the better to enable them to provide themselves with food; the amount of which may be fixed upon a review and consideration of the detailed statements which may be made by the Commanding officers of regiments.

But whatever may be the amount of the sum to be fixed as that to be paid to the soldier, to enable him to provide himself with provisions, I recommend that system to the government for their armies while stationed within the Spanish territory, rather than that of giving *étape*, the expense

of which would exceed fourfold the amount of any allowance which it might be thought expedient to make to the soldier.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 24th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 21st. I am very much obliged to you for the drivers and the dismounted cavalry. The former might supply the 50 men wanted at Lisbon, and the latter the 300 required here. If I should find that we want the 300 before we can hear further from you, I shall desire Harvey to call for them from the garrison of Almeida. I am likewise much obliged to you for the artificers and pontoniers. I should wish the 2 companies of the former to be marched up to Almeida as soon as may be convenient. The company of the latter might remain attached to the bridges, as you had proposed.

I am glad to find that you are coming up. I propose to put the troops in motion in the first days of May. My intention is to make them cross the Douro in general within the Portuguese frontier, covering the movement of the left by the right of the army towards the Tormes, which right shall cross the Douro, over the pontoons, in such situation as may be convenient. I then propose to seize Zamora and Toro, which will make all our future operations easy to us.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 24th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 21st, and I have certainly no desire that my letter of the 12th, to the Prince Regent, should go before the government, if you should be of opinion that it is likely to produce inconvenience; nor that it should go to the Prince, if the object which it was intended to produce is likely to be accomplished in any other manner.

The truth is, that the greatest inconvenience was felt in the last campaign by the want of pay for the Portuguese troops; and this inconvenience was on the point of becoming a danger and evil of the first magnitude and importance. In several instances the Portuguese troops behaved excessively ill before the enemy, and this conduct was attributed by the officers to the miserable state in which they were kept for want of pay. I am therefore naturally anxious to guard against this evil in future. I believe there is no doubt about the facts stated in my letter to the Prince, and that there is no very material difference of opinion between you and me.

I am aware, and I believe I stated, that a great deal has been done at the Custom house, but much still remains to be done; and the revenue is in that state, that a very slight effort, and a cordial co-operation with us on the part of the government, would render it equal to the expenditure, and I should then be able to do much more for both Portuguese and Spaniards than I can now.

I had no intention of blaming the Marquez de Borba exclusively. The government itself is more to blame than he is, on some of the points of complaint; but I repeat, if there is any chance of a remedy, without sending the letter to the government or to the Prince, I have no objection; but then the remedy must be effectual.

In my account of the state of the subsidy, I go upon estimate, not having yet seen the accounts. At all events, whether it has been paid in full or not, I know that no more can be paid in specie.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 24th April, 1813.

I send you by this occasion the report received by the Chief of the Staff from the Intendant General of the 2d army, in which that officer has enclosed estimates of the expenses of the army, and detailed accounts of the resources applicable to defray those expenses, to which you will of course draw the attention of the Regency. But I beg particularly to draw your attention to the observations of the Intendant General in regard to the debts due in the provinces on account of former supplies to the troops, and the effect produced on the existing and current resources by the mode of paying those debts adopted under the decree of the Cortes of the 3d Feb. 1811.

There can be no doubt that debts to a very considerable amount are due to the inhabitants of all the provinces of Spain, and that it is reasonable and just that measures should be taken to pay those debts as soon as their amount shall be ascertained. But I am afraid that the interests of the nation are exposed to considerable risk by leaving to the individual creditors of the State the power of deciding upon their own claims, and of subtracting from the current contributions the amount of their payment. The nation and the individual contributors also must suffer from this system, even though it should be successful in paying off old debts; as I repeat that it is impossible to maintain an army without money; and it is impossible to find resources for our Spanish army, excepting in the contributions of the people; and it cannot be expected that the enemy will be removed from the Spanish territory, or, if removed, should be long kept out of it, unless a respectable Spanish army can be formed. The interest then of the individual creditors of the State is combined with that of the State at large to put an end to this system.

In my opinion, the first step to be taken in regard to these debts is to ascertain the amount due to each individual, and the amount of all the debts in each district and province of the Kingdom. This might be effected by a commission to be appointed to sit in each province, with powers to receive, consider, and decide finally upon the claims of each individual; as the government may depend upon it that there are many claims very ill supported, and many for which there is no foundation whatever.

As soon as the state of the debts shall have been ascertained, it will rest with the Cortes to determine in what manner they shall be paid; whether by the allotment of the unappropriated and uncultivated lands, or by a certain per centage on the contributions of each individual, or by a combination of both methods, or any other that their wisdom and justice may suggest. But it appears to me to be essentially necessary that the decree of the Cortes of the 3d Feb. 1811, should be revised; and I earnestly recommend to the Regency to call the attention of the Cortes to this subject.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, Lisbon.

24th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of laying before the Marquis of Wellington your letter of the 21st inst. reporting your arrival at Lisbon, and I have received his Lordship's commands to request that you will be pleased to proceed to the 5th division of infantry for the purpose of taking charge of that division until the arrival of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith.

To Major Gen. the Hon. Sir C. Stewart, K.B.

Freneda, 25th April, 1813.

Sir T. Graham has sent me your letter of the 28th March, for which I am much obliged to you, and for your expressions of regret at quitting this army. I certainly should have felt no inconvenience or disinclination to keep your office at your disposal during the time you have been absent from it, even if you had at first looked to a diplomatic situation; and I cannot think that you had not a free choice whether to accept such a situation or not when it was offered to you. I sincerely hope it will answer your expectation, and that you may be as successful as I wish you may be.

I have sent to buy two of your horses for £400; and I believe that Wood is to send me the hounds, as he thought head quarters rather deficient in that respect, as we had not harriers this winter (since Marsden carried off your old pack), as well as fox hounds. I am besides indebted to you for a mare, which you left with me last year, and which I have been keeping up for you, and she is now in excellent condition. Wood says you intended to give her to me; but I say that all officers of dragoons are horse dealers, and that I can't take her from you.

You may tell your friends in Germany, if you should receive this letter there, that I propose to take the field in a few days, and that I only hope that I may be as successful as they have been. At all events, I hope to prevent the enemy from detaching any thing from hence against them.

P.S. I have appointed *le petit fils* du Roi George* to be a D. A. A. G.

* The late Earl of Munster.

G. O.

Freneda, 25th April, 1813.

12. As the English and German infantry of the army will be provided with tents during the ensuing campaign, the Commander of the Forces is desirous that the great coats of the soldiers should be left behind, in order to relieve them from a part of the weight which they would otherwise be obliged to carry, and that they should carry only their blankets.

13. The following arrangements are to be made immediately for the care and preservation of the soldiers' great coats:

14. The great coat of each soldier must be well cleaned, and his name and number, and the letter of his company, marked upon it.

15. Those of each company are to be packed in bales, each bale containing 20 great coats; and the name of the officer commanding the company, and the letter of the company, and the number of the regiment, must be marked on the bale.

16. Orders will hereafter be issued for the disposal of the great coats of the regiments in store.

17. The officers commanding regiments will make a requisition upon the Commissaries attached to their brigades for linen cloth to pack the great coats, which the Commissaries are hereby ordered to supply.

18. The Commander of the Forces expects that the great coats, excepting those of the 59th regt., respecting which further orders will be given, will be packed as above ordered by the 29th inst.

19. It would be very desirable that the officers commanding regiments should take measures and have the corners and outside selvage of the soldiers' blankets strengthened, in order that the soldiers may pitch them, without injury to the blankets, in case it should upon any occasion be necessary in order to shelter them from the sun.

To the Marquis of Buckingham.

Freneda, 25th April, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 10th March, and I assure you that I am highly flattered by your recollection of me at such a moment as that at which you wrote to me, and at the expression of your wish that the friendly and affectionate intercourse with which I had so long been honored by your much respected father should be continued with yourself. I assure you that, from regard for yourself and respect for your whole family, as well as from affection for the memory of your father, I am most desirous that the loss which I have sustained in him should not be aggravated by the discontinuance of my intimate intercourse with yourself and family; and I accept, with the utmost satisfaction, the offer of your continued friendship.

I am much obliged to you for your congratulations upon the recent honor which H. R. H. the Prince Regent has conferred upon me, which is enhanced much to me by its having been worn by my old patron and friend. Pray present my best respects to Lady Buckingham.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 25th April, 1813.

I received your Lordship's dispatch, No. 26,045, of the 31st March, by the last post, in regard to the difficulties still existing in the settlement of accounts of soldiers sent home from this country, and again requiring my opinion respecting the appointment of a paymaster of detachments at Lisbon.

I wish that your Lordship had sent me the names of the soldiers whose accounts had not been settled, specifying the regiments and companies to which they belong. The fact is, my Lord, that the origin of the evil exists in the regiments. Notwithstanding the pains which are taken to enforce the orders and regulations of the service in regard to the settlement of the soldiers' accounts, and to the measures to be adopted in relation to those accounts, when a soldier is sent to a general hospital, when he is made a prisoner of war, or is invalided, or becomes in any manner a casualty on the returns of his company and regiment, I am convinced, indeed I know, that in nine out of ten instances those orders and regulations are not complied with; and no paymaster of detachments, or any other officer stationed at Lisbon, could settle the soldiers' accounts in any reasonable space of time. The consequence of the appointment of such a person would be the detention of many soldiers in this country till they should die, while the paymaster of detachments should be engaged in a correspondence with the regiment regarding the accounts, each communication of which correspondence would take from 5 to 7 days.

When your Lordship adverts to the difficulty which you experience in obtaining from the Commanding officers and paymasters of regiments their states and accounts, which are almost mere forms to be filled up, and to the number of calls which you are obliged to make upon those officers of superior rank and intelligence, one of whom has nothing else to attend to, you cannot be surprised that the Captains and Subalterns of the army should be ignorant of, as they are in many instances, and should neglect, the important duties assigned to them regarding the accounts of the soldiers above referred to. All that I can do is to urge them to attend to

these duties, and to notice in a particular manner any instance of a neglect of them which may come to my knowledge.

It is impossible to attempt to punish any individual for such a neglect of duty, as he would be to be tried for it by others, each of whom would probably have been guilty of a similar or even greater neglect.

To the Rt. Hon. the Secretary at War.

Freneda, 25th April, 1813.

I had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 29th March, No. 45,496, by the last post, enclosing one which your Lordship had received from Lieut. Col. Holmes, of the 3d dragoon guards, relative to the advantages made by the Paymasters of the army, by the accumulation of money in their hands. As I am perfectly aware that the Paymasters of the army trade in every way in which they can acquire any profit, I entertain no doubt that they derive profit from the sources referred to by Lieut. Col. Holmes. But the remedy for the evil rests with your Lordship, and not with me.

It appears to me that your Lordship might order the Paymasters of regiments to pay into the military chest of the army, at stated periods, the amount stopped from the subsistence of the officers of regiments on account of the income tax, taking the receipt of the Dep. Paymaster Gen. for the amount; and that the Dep. Paymaster Gen. might be authorised to draw upon the Paymaster Gen. in favor of the Sec. at War, or the Lords of the Treasury on the agents of the regiment, for the amount thus paid into the military chest, specifying in the draft that it was for a sum of money received as the income tax of the officers of a particular regiment, for a particular period of time.

I thought it proper to call upon Lieut. Col. Holmes to specify what he meant by the term he used in his letter to your Lordship, stating that a considerable sum was in the hands of the Committee of Paymastership, on account of the pay of the officers and non-effectives of the 3d dragoon guards, before I should address your Lordship; and the result has been as follows:

Your Lordship is aware that the British troops serving in this part of the Peninsula have long been paid in arrear, and that the term of the arrear is now for 4 months; the subsistence to the 24th Dec. 1812, being only now in the course of issue. During every month passed by an army employed on service against the enemy, it must be expected that the casualties will be very numerous; and the Paymasters, under the existing regulations, have been in the habit of receiving from the Paymaster Gen. the subsistence of officers and soldiers who may die during the period of the arrear.

Thus, a Paymaster would be entitled to receive the pay of an officer or soldier who should die on this day, from the 25th Dec. to the 24th April, at the periods at which it should become payable by the Dep. Paymaster Gen., in consequence of the issue of the warrants and the orders of the Commander of the Forces; and this is what Lieut. Col. Holmes means by the pay of officers and non-effectives.

I don't think it is possible to prevent the Paymasters of regiments from receiving these sums from the Pay office. There may be regimental

demands against the deceased officer; such demands certainly will exist against the deceased soldier, and it would create great confusion and difficulty, if the Paymasters of regiments were prevented from receiving those sums of money into their hands.

But under the regulations for their guidance, the Paymasters of regiments are called upon to send to England the sums due to deceased officers and soldiers, to invalids, to prisoners of war, &c. &c., upon the settlement of the account of each individual; under which order, it appears to me, that the Paymasters have made the profit adverted to. It will be proper, therefore, for your Lordship to order that the Paymasters of regiments should pay into the military chest all such sums of money as they have been heretofore ordered to send to England, under any of the heads above adverted to, giving the Dep. Paymaster Gen. a statement of the account on which the sum has been paid in, and reporting that it has been paid in, in detail, for your Lordship's information; and the Dep. Paymaster Gen. should be authorised to grant a bill upon the Paymaster Gen. for such sum of money, specifying, in a letter of advice, for what purpose drawn, either in favor of the Sec. at War, or of the agents of the regiment.

It appears to me that the Paymasters of regiments will be prevented from making profit in future under these heads, by the adoption of the measures above proposed; and the military chest of the army will be aided to a very considerable amount.

The A.G. to Major Macdonald, Lisbon.

25th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of laying before the Marquis of Wellington your letter of the 21st inst. reporting your arrival at Lisbon, and his Lordship has directed me to signify to you in answer that in consideration of the large number of officers at present on the Staff in the Adj. Gen.'s department, he regrets that he cannot re-appoint you to the department. I beg leave to apprise you that you have been discontinued as A. A. G. with this army from the 25th Dec. 1812.

To Major Gen. J. O. Vandeleur.

Freneda, 26th April, 1813, 4 P.M.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset has just given me your letter of this day, and I assure you I should be very happy to appoint you to command a brigade of cavalry if I could; but, notwithstanding Gen. — is ordered home, there is no brigade vacant. Four regiments of cavalry have been drafted by orders from home, and 2 brigades of cavalry have been sent out, and 2 General officers to command brigades of cavalry. Unless I remove Gen. — from his command, or some other General officer of the cavalry, I don't see how I can give you the command of a brigade of cavalry. Indeed, after all, unless some General officer should be removed, the brigades of light cavalry must be of the strength of only 6 squadrons. I have written 2 letters to Sir S. Cotton on the subject, which he will find on his arrival; and I sincerely wish that he may be able to suggest an arrangement which may give you a situation in the cavalry, which I acknowledge I cannot, without sending home some officer or other.

You will recollect that I advised you to settle this matter in England. I have nothing to do with the choice of the General officers out here, or

with their numbers, or the army with which they are to serve; and when they do come, I must employ them as I am ordered.

A Dom M. Forjaz.

Freneda, ce 26 Avril, 1813.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 21 Avril, et j'en avais déjà reçu une sur le même sujet du Chevalier Stuart. Je lui ai répondu que je n'avais nul désir que ma lettre au Prince soit mise sous les yeux du gouvernement si elle était de nature à les fâcher; ni même qu'elle passât au Prince s'il était probable que les objets que j'avais en vue fussent accomplis.

J'ai assez à faire, et je n'ai nul désir de m'embrouiller dans de mauvaises querelles avec qui que ce soit; mais je ne peux pas voir les affaires du Prince Régent, son armée, et la cause des alliés se détériorer sans m'en plaindre au Prince; surtout sachant que le Prince a ordonné qu'on fit attention à mes conseils, et que j'ai eu le bonheur de n'avoir jamais encore conseillé quelque chose qui n'ait pas réussi.

Je vous avoue que je ne suis pas du tout satisfait de l'état des paiemens énoncé dans votre lettre. Il est clair que l'armée n'est payée que jusqu'à la fin de Septembre: on parle d'argent ici et là; mais je ne vois rien de certain dans tout cela; et si, quand je marcherai dans quelques jours, je trouve que les troupes sont toujours en arrière de celles de Sa Majesté Britannique, il faut bien que j'insiste pour que ma lettre soit envoyée au Prince.

Mais la paie de l'armée n'est pas la seule chose dont je me plains, quoique la plus pressante et peut-être la plus importante en cette lettre. Je persiste à dire que si le gouvernement Portugais avait voulu suivre mes conseils, s'il voulait les suivre à présent, Sa Majesté serait en état de faire beaucoup plus pour les Puissances de la Péninsule qu'elle ne peut faire à présent; et chaque jour de délai en est un de risque et de malheur pour ces deux nations. Le bien qui résulterait de ce que j'ai conseillé n'est pas nié. Mais on ne le fait pas parceque on ne le veut pas. Cette conduite est elle juste? est elle patriotique? est elle honnête envers le Souverain?

Je me résume. Si l'armée n'est pas payée avant que nous marchions, il faut que la lettre passe sous les yeux du Prince par la première occasion. Si on ne prend pas tout de suite des mesures sur les plans que j'ai recommandés, elle y passera sous une autre forme à la première occasion, même si la paie de l'armée était en règle.

Je n'aime pas écrire sur la conduite de qui que ce soit sans lui en faire part, et j'ai toujours agi de cette manière avec le gouvernement, et je désire beaucoup n'en pas départir. Mais si vous et le Chevalier Stuart sont d'opinion que mettre ma lettre sous les yeux du gouvernement ferait du tort aux affaires, je vous prie de l'envoyer directe au Prince. Je vous prie dans ce cas, tous les deux, de vous souvenir que vous avez ma lettre dans vos mains pour la leur montrer, au cas qu'il fut jamais possible qu'on attaquât ma probité en envoyant une accusation au Prince, contre qui que ce soit sans lui en faire part.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Hay, 5th division.

26th April, 1813.

On referring to the account which has been furnished by the Paymaster Gen.

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of the sums deducted from the estimates for the month of November last, of the several corps composing the 5th and 6th divisions at that period, on account of damage done to the property of certain individuals in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, it appears that no part of the sums charged against the 30th and 44th regts., in the accounts which I had the honor of transmitting to you with my letter of the 23d ult., have been deducted from the estimates of those corps for the period in question. I beg leave, therefore, to refer you to the directions contained in my letter of the 23d ult., and to request that you will be pleased to cause so much of the sums charged against the 30th and 44th regts., in the statement above alluded to, as it may be found practicable to recover, to be deducted from their estimates for the month of November last, and the amount left in the hands of the Paymaster Gen. in order to be applied to the purpose for which the deduction has been ordered by the Commander of the Forces.

To H. R. H. the Duke of Clarence.

Freneda, 27th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' commands of the 2d inst.; and in obedience to them and to those of H. R. H. the Duke of York, I have appointed Capt. FitzClarence* to the Staff of the Adj. Gen., and have called him to head quarters. Your Royal Highness may depend upon my paying him every attention in my power, as well as to his brother.†

I am very much flattered by your Royal Highness' approbation; and I earnestly hope that our exertions in the campaign now about to commence may be as successful as is expected.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Freneda, 27th April, 1813.

I have received your Royal Highness' commands of the 7th inst. After I had written to your Royal Highness on the 11th March, I found that I had given the 4th dragoons 30 horses of the 11th more than they could mount; and these horses were transferred to the 1st German dragoons, which regiment became thereby more nearly complete in horses. I had also an inspection made of the 1st and 2d hussars, and found that there were in the former 43, and in the latter 96 horses fit for the heavy cavalry, a number fully equal to complete both the regiments of heavy German dragoons.

The 1st hussars wanted only 36 horses to complete the number they could mount, 43 horses to replace those to be drafted from that regiment for the heavy cavalry, and 36 men and horses to complete the 3 squadrons in this country to their establishment. The 2d hussars could furnish all these demands; and as all the regiments have now as many, and some more, horses than they can mount, and as the horses they would have received from the 2d heavy German dragoons would only have encumbered them, I considered it best to confine the execution of your Royal

* The late Earl of Munster.

† Who died in India.

G. O.

Freneda, 27th April, 1813.

1. The non-commissioned officers and soldiers sent to form the Staff Corps of cavalry, under the orders of the 13th March, 1813, No. 22, are to be continued on the strength of the several regiments of cavalry to which they have hitherto belonged, and are to be returned as 'on command.'

2. Their pay is to be drawn for them in their several regiments to the 24th April, and from that time in the Staff Corps. The horse appointments sent with these men from their several regiments will be returned to their regiments, as soon as those intended to be sent for them from England shall arrive in this country.

Highness' orders of the 7th April to the 2d hussars. I have, besides, to observe, that some of the regiments being on march, it would have been very difficult to reach them with the horses from the 2d German dragoons till the whole army should be collected.

The officers and men of the 2d hussars, with the exception of those drafted to the 1st hussars, will be sent to England by the first opportunity.

To Major Gen. J. O. Vandeleur.

Freneda, 28th April, 1813.

I am convinced that you are not in earnest in wishing me to adopt the plan you have proposed to open the door for your removal to the cavalry. If Gen. — were not already in the cavalry, I might have it in my power, with justice, to make the selection between you and him; but as it is, I have it not.

It is very true, as Gen. Calvert says, that I should have had it in my power to put you into the cavalry, if Great Britain could have furnished only 700 horses to remount our cavalry this winter; but as these could not be found, I have been ordered to draft 4 regiments, and 5 new regiments have been sent out. But with these five, two new General officers!

I have written to Sir S. Cotton on the cavalry arrangements, and I assure you that I shall be very happy to do what you wish.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 28th April, 1813.

I hope that in a few days we shall commence our operations, and I think it is not impossible that we may hereafter have to communicate with the shipping in one of the ports in the north of Spain. Under these circumstances, the communication along the coast becomes of the utmost importance, and I acknowledge that I feel a little anxious upon the subject, adverting to the weakness of the squadron under your command, and that you have to attend to the southern coast and Cadiz, as well as to Lisbon and the western coast.

I wrote to Lord Bathurst on this subject on the 7th inst. a letter which he must have received by this time: but if you should concur in opinion with me, that you are not strong enough, it is very desirable that you should intimate it to the Admiralty.

Sir G. Collier is now at Coruña with the *Surveillante*, and, I believe, two other frigates, and he is destined to cruise off the northern coast during the summer. I have now recommended to him to take his station between Santoña and Bayonne, and to prevent the enemy from communicating along the coast by sea; but if you cannot get any reinforcement from England, I shall apply to him to station one of his frigates off Cape Finisterre.

Au Duque del Infantado.

Freneda, ce 28 Avril, 1813.

Je vous envoie une copie de la lettre que je viens de recevoir de la Régence en réponse à celle que je leur ai écrit pour proposer que vous soyez employé à l'armée. Je n'ai aucune connaissance de la cause de leur décision; mais je suppose qu'elle a quelque rapport avec la conduite de la Régence dont vous faisiez partie. Je suis bien fâché que je n'aurai pas votre assistance au moins au commencement de la campagne.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 28th April, 1813.

I enclose a letter for the Duque del Infantado, which I beg you to have delivered to him. I applied to the government to send him to the army, but they have refused; and Wimpffen tells me that the Cortes are about to attack the late government. This will be a wise measure!!! Don Juan O'Donoju is to be Minister at War, and is going to Cadiz.

The news from the north continues to be very good. It appears by the paper of the 14th that Gen. Morand and his whole division were killed or taken prisoners at Lunenberg.

We have at last got some rain in earnest, and the whole army will be in motion directly.

P.S. Is the clothing for the cavalry arrived yet?

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Freneda, 28th April, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst. in regard to the leave of absence to Col. Palmer, of the 10th hussars.

Nearly about the time I received your letter of the 18th ult., informing me of the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent that Lieut. Col. Palmer should have leave to go to England when Lieut. Col. Quentin should come out, I received an application from Lieut. Col. Palmer for leave to go immediately, written in the belief that Col. Quentin was then on his passage.

As I was aware of the nature of Lieut. Col. Palmer's business in England, and conceived that it might be desirable to him to be in England when Parliament should assemble after the holidays, I gave him leave to go to England, conceiving that I was acting according to the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and that the service would suffer no inconvenience from the absence of both Lieut. Col. Palmer and Lieut. Col. Quentin from the regiment for the short period during which it was likely to take place.

Under these circumstances, and as I am certain that Lieut. Col. Palmer would not have desired to go if he had not believed Lieut. Col. Quentin was on his passage, and that he would have preferred to stay, at all risks to the object which has taken him to England, to relinquishing the service, I hope and entreat that he may not be obliged to relinquish the service in consequence of my error in acting upon the orders which I received.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 28th April, 1813.

The enemy have made no movement of importance since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st inst., and their troops are cantoned nearly in the same situations.

Those of the allied British and Portuguese army have moved, however, and the cantonments are closing up with a view to the movements which I propose to commence in the first days of May.

The A.G. to S. Hunter, Esq., Dep. Paymaster General.

28th April, 1813.

In reference to your letter of the 25th inst., respecting the sums which have been received from the 5th and 6th divisions of infantry towards indemnifying the

owners of certain gardens in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo for the damage done to their property by the soldiers of those divisions, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to request that you will direct Mr. Assist. Paymaster Gordon to pay to my order for the benefit of those whose property was injured the amount which has been received, and which is stated in the margin.

28th April, 1813.

The A.G. to Mr. Egerton, Whitehall.

I have sent you by this mail the G. O. (which you have reported as having miscarried) from the 1st Jan. to the 11th April. Those from the 12th April, to complete the half year's Orders, will be transmitted by the next packet; and I beg you will have the volume completed with as little loss of time as possible, his Excellency the Marquis of Wellington being desirous that they should be circulated without delay. I regret being under the necessity of returning herewith your account, which, as you will perceive by a remark annexed to it, from the mode prescribed for the settlement of contingent accounts, must be in duplicate, with a receipt annexed.

Freneda, 29th April, 1813.

To Brig. Gen. Pack.

I return your letter. Col. Bunbury and I are highly flattered by your preference of the service in this country to that which has been proposed to you by the Sec. of State. I think you were right; but, at all events, I am very sensible of the kindness of your motives in refusing to accept the offer.

29th April, 1813.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 28th inst., and its enclosure from Capt. —, D. A. A. G., his Excellency has desired me to remark to you that he considers the officers of the Adj. Gen.'s department to be strictly responsible for the due circulation of the G. O. of the army. His Excellency therefore desires that you will yourself enter into the most particular inquiry, the result of which he desires may be forwarded to me for his information, with a view of ascertaining whether the G. O. of the 3d Feb. last were duly transmitted to Col. Ashworth's brigade, and every precaution taken by Capt. — that could have been taken by him to insure their receipt. His Excellency has desired me to add, that if any neglect in the transmission of these Orders shall be found to have existed on the part of Capt. —, he will displace that officer from his situation in the Adj. Gen.'s department.

29th April, 1813.

The A.G. to Dr. McGrigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to cause Dr. —, physician to the forces, to be placed under an arrest and to be relieved from the duty in which he may be at present engaged, it being his Excellency's intention to cause that medical officer to be brought before a General Court Martial for having, without a billet, and without leave from the Commandant, seized upon and occupied the house of the Visconde da Lapa at Viseu, a quarter which had been kept vacant for officers of rank passing through the station.

29th April, 1813.

The A.G. to S. Hunter, Esq., Dep. Paymaster General.

I have the honor of transmitting to you a letter and enclosure which I have received from the Commandant of Castello Branco, stating the circumstances of a robbery which has been recently committed on a box containing public treasure on its passage through that station; and I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will cause the most diligent inquiry to be made, the result of which you will be pleased to report to me for the information of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, with a view of ascertaining whether the officer of the Paymaster Gen.'s department who accompanied the treasure, of which the box in question contained a part, complied with the G. O. of the 4th May, 1810.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 30th April, 1813.

I take the chance of this letter catching the mail to enclose you a copy of the news which I have received this day from Alicante, from which it appears that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray had a very successful affair with Marshal Suchet on the 13th inst. I hope to send you the details by the next mail.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th, and I have sent the enclosure from the Conde de Amarante to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford; and I have informed the Marshal, as I now inform you, that the troops under the Conde de Amarante and Col. Campbell must be supplied by Portuguese means, or they must not take the field, or they must starve, as I neither can nor will allow the British departments to undertake to feed them.

I beg that you will send a copy of this letter to the Conde de Amarante, and keep it by you as the rule for your proceeding throughout the campaign in respect to those troops, as well as in respect to the Spanish troops which may be employed with you. Let the Conde de Amarante know that I never will give another answer to any demands of this kind; that I never will authorise a charge on our Commissariat for feeding the Portuguese troops under his command, and that it is quite useless to renew these applications.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 28th, regarding Gen. Oswald. He is now on his way to join the 5th division, but I will appoint him to command a brigade in the 2d division if he should lose that command.

To Brig. Gen. Pack.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I write to state to you how we stand in respect to British brigades, in order to show you that I have not forgotten your wishes.

There are two brigades vacant: one in the 2d division, which I keep vacant till I know whether Sir J. Leith will come out, when Major Gen. Oswald will be appointed to it; and one in the 7th division. Fermor is senior to you, and must be appointed to that. I think it probable that

G. O.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers, and Commanding officers of regiments, to the 9th paragraph of the G. O. of the 1st March, in regard to tents.

2. He is aware that 3 tents for each company will not be sufficient to give cover to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of some of the strong regiments; but it is to be understood that all the tents are to be disposable by the A. Q. M. G. attached to the division in which any regiment may be, who will see that all the men are covered; and he will apply the tents to cover such part of the divisions as he may think proper.

3. He must take care, however, that the camps are so disposed as that the tents belonging to any regiment attached for the moment to the use of another, may not be removed to an inconvenient distance from the regiment to which they may belong, and the animals which are destined to carry them, and the bāt men who are to take care of them.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires that it may be observed as a general rule, that the tents are to be concealed from view in the day time as far as may be practicable; but there will be no inconvenience in removing them at night to heights, or any other situation, on which it may be convenient to post the troops during the night, from which, for the purpose of concealment, it may be expedient to keep them in the day time.

either Leith or Gen. Walker will not come out; and in either case, if no General officer should be sent out, you shall be removed to the British army, as you desire.

To Col. Ross, 20th regt.*

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 29th April. I shall be very happy to appoint you to the command of a brigade in the army when it shall be in my power. Col. Hinde and Col. Stirling command brigades, as being the senior Field officers of the brigades in which their regiments are. If you will refer to the Army List, you will see that there are in this army Brig. Gen. Brooke, Brig. Gen. Inglis, and Col. Fermor, senior to you, without brigades, besides Gen. Pack, who is to be removed to the British army, and other officers belonging to the cavalry.

It has been the practice of this army not to move officers from the command of their regiments to command brigades until it was quite certain that, by the arrival of other officers with the army, they would not be obliged to return to the command of their regiments; and it is very desirable not to depart from this practice.

To Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I have this day directed the Chief of the Staff to inform you that the materials for the repair of the bridge of Almaraz had moved from Elvas, and that it was expedient that the troops under your command should commence their march from Seville.

I have received your Excellency's letter of the 22d April, in regard to the measures proposed to be adopted in the provinces of Seville and Cordova, to procure means of transport for the troops under your command; and I have only to refer you to my letter of the 28th March ult. for my opinion upon that subject.

It is very evident to me that the troops under your command, any more than other troops, cannot undertake operations in the field without having some means of this description; and I am well aware of the difficulties which you will have to encounter during the campaign in consequence of deficiencies of means of transport, and of wants of all kinds occasioned by the poverty of the resources of the Spanish government, which the circumstances of the times don't allow us to ameliorate.

Under these circumstances I acknowledge that I have felt a considerable degree of hesitation in sending orders to your Excellency to put your troops in motion; and I beg that you will understand that, if you consider these difficulties to be of a magnitude likely to injure your corps, I don't wish you to march, at least till the harvest shall be on the ground, and that you will find more easily the means of subsisting it; and that, whether you march now or at a future period, I consider it to be more important to have a small body of troops well paid and appointed, than a larger one which there should not exist means of either paying or feeding. The former may render some service to the cause, and be some credit to the officer commanding it; the latter cannot. I have invariably assisted the Spanish armies as far as has been in my power;

* Afterwards killed at Baltimore.

and, in point of fact, the money recently issued to them has been taken from the military chest of this army; and I shall continue to endeavor to assist them with money.

But it would be quite impossible for me, as the Commander in Chief of the British army, and with British funds, and by the agency of the British Commissariat, to endeavor to form magazines for the Spanish armies. These must be formed by the agency of the officers of the Spanish government, and with the resources of the Spanish nation; and if those agents are incapable, or the resources are not equal to the object, we must endeavor to carry on the war with the Spanish troops without the aid of the magazines.

With this object in view, I recommend to you, at whatever period you may undertake your march, to move by cantonments, in separate small divisions, each upon a separate road.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 1st May, 1813.

I have received a letter from the Spanish government to request that I should state whether I have any objection to the ———, ———, being appointed to command in chief the army of reserve in Galicia. If I were to answer this letter as Commander in Chief of the Spanish army, I should say that ——— is incapable of performing the duties of the situation; and that, moreover, I have learned that his reputation in Galicia in particular is at a very low ebb, he having served in that province under the Marques de la Romana. He was ———, and he is suspected of having taken bribes. There is this besides to be said, that Gen. Lacy is the Commander in Chief of that army, and I have not yet seen any reason why he should be displaced. But ——— is in some manner connected with ———, and, as you rely a good deal upon him, I don't like to give this answer: I wish, therefore, that, if you can do it, you would speak to ———, and tell him that, as ——— is unwell, and cannot go to his station, it would be very desirable if this application were withdrawn. The arrangement certainly will not answer.

It is very extraordinary that the 3000 sets of horse appointments have not yet arrived at Cadiz: As far back as the 9th March they were reported in readiness to sail from Lisbon, and, I conclude, sailed with the first convoy. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire about them.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

1st May, 1813.

Referring to your letter of the 27th ult., conveying the medical opinion of Dr. Woolrich, and your Lordship's conviction of the correctness of that opinion, regarding the evil consequences to be apprehended to the health of the troops composing the 7th division, in consequence of their being deprived of the use of their greatcoats, I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to inform you in answer, that his Excellency has done what he conceives to be his duty thereupon, by causing your Lordship's letter to be referred to Dr. M'Grigor, Inspector Gen. of hospitals, and desiring to be furnished with his opinion upon the subject of it; and the Commander of the Forces has had the satisfaction to learn that Dr. M'Grigor coincides with him in opinion, that there is no reason to expect that the apprehensions entertained by your Lordship and Dr. Woolrich will be realised. His Excellency has directed me to point out to your Lordship's notice that the soldiers, whilst in exercise during the day, seldom wear their greatcoats, which are

worn by them only at night, together with the blanket; but as the Commander of the Forces has caused the army to be provided with tents, as far as it has been found practicable to do so, the necessity of the greatcoat, for night use, is superseded. For a considerable time past it has been recommended by Commanding officers of regiments, and the Medical officers of the army, to ease the soldier of a part of the weight which he has to carry; and all the officers with whom his Excellency has conversed upon the subject, have expressed an opinion (which opinion is confirmed by his Excellency's own experience of 5 years' service in the Peninsula) that the least objectionable mode of accomplishing this object is, to take from the soldier his greatcoat whilst actively employed in the field, and this has been done during the late campaign in the Peninsula, although the army have been hitherto without tents to cover them.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Hardinge, D.Q.M.G., Portuguese army.

1st May, 1813.

In compliance with the desire of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, I have had the honor of laying before the Marquis of Wellington your letter of the 27th ult., and the enclosed papers regarding the issue of rations to certain corps of Portuguese troops serving with the British army; and I have been directed by his Excellency to signify to you in answer, for the information of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, that the proportion of spirits directed to be issued to the Portuguese troops, under the G. O. of the 19th March, 1811, appearing to exceed what is allowed by the Portuguese government, his Excellency supposes that the proportion of one-third of a pint of spirits, instead of one-sixth of a pint, must have been inserted in the G. O. by mistake, which can easily be rectified by directing the officers of the Portuguese Commissariat to regulate their demands upon the British Commissariat accordingly. The enclosures in your letter of the 27th ult. are herewith returned.

Freneda, 2d May, 1813.

To Capt. Foley, R.N.

Having directed the General officer commanding in Catalonia to prepare for embarkation from 2000 to 2500 recruits, I shall be much obliged to you if, after having disembarked the regiments of *Pontevedra* and *El Principe*, you will be so kind as to take on board the transports which shall have conveyed those corps the recruits which the General may have ready to send, to the number above mentioned, and if you will convoy the vessels to Cadiz, where I request the troops may be landed and delivered to the depôt at the Isla. After having executed this service, I beg you will return to Lisbon for the purpose of receiving the orders of Vice Adm. Martin.

Freneda, 2d May, 1813.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Referring to my letter of the 26th Jan., in which I reported to you an outrage committed by a detachment of the 28th regt. at Zibreira, I have now the honor to transmit to you a letter and its enclosure from the A. A. G. of the 2d division, stating that the child who was supposed to have been killed in the affray is in perfect health, and requesting, by desire of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, that the offenders may be pardoned in consideration of their long confinement.

I beg you to submit this proposition to the consideration of the Portuguese government; and I hope I may be favored with their decision upon it at an early period.

2d May, 1813.

The A.G. to S. Hunter, Esq., Dep. Paymaster General.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will cause the sum of 697 dollars, 2½ *vintems*, to be paid to the bearer of this letter, being the amount of sums deducted from the estimates of the several corps com-

posing the 5th and 6th divisions of infantry, on account of damage done to the property of certain individuals in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo in the month of November last.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 3d May, 1813.

I have received your letter, No. 2, of the 28th April, in which you have enclosed some papers transmitted by Lord Castlereagh, including a letter from the Board of Trade, in regard to the purchases of corn made by your authority in concert with me in Brazil, America, and Egypt.

When I see a letter from the Board of Trade, I am convinced that the complaint originates with the jobbing British merchants at Lisbon; and although I am delighted to see the government turn their attention to these subjects, as it will eventually save me a great deal of trouble, I am quite convinced, that if we had not adopted, nearly three years ago, the system of measures now disapproved of, not only would Lisbon and the army, and this part of the Peninsula have been starved, but if we had, according to the suggestion of the Commissary in Chief and the Treasury, and the Board of Trade, carried on transactions of a similar nature through the *sharks* at Lisbon (above referred to), calling themselves British merchants, the expense of the army, crippled as its operations would have been, and depending upon those who, I verily believe, are the worst subjects His Majesty has, and enormous as that expense is, would have been very much increased.

I wish that you would just call the attention of the government to the transactions of this kind which the British merchants have carried on for us; to Mr. —'s transactions in 1809; to the recent conduct of the merchants at Lisbon in regard to the biscuit contract, respecting which I suppose I shall soon hear of a complaint, that I have made the Commissariat value their own biscuit; respecting the purchase of meat for the army, &c. &c.

It is my opinion that it is my duty to see that the service is well carried on; and next, to see that it is carried on at as cheap a rate to the public as is possible; and having a large establishment of commissioned officers capable of superintending and of carrying into execution transactions of this description, I conceive that I perform my duty by the public in employing them in this manner, rather than in contracting for services with merchants, whose object is their own advantage, at what cost of money or inconvenience to the public is a matter of indifference to them.

In regard to the particular subject under consideration, it is obvious to me that the authorities in England have taken a very confined view of the question. When Lord Liverpool wrote to me in the winter of 1811, to inform me that I could expect no supplies of grain or flour from the British Islands, on account of the failure of the harvest in England, I ordered the Commissary Gen. to take care to keep in his stores a supply to answer the demands upon him for 6 months; and the danger that the communication with America might be stopped, which I believe it now is, has induced me to take care that the stores should have more than less of this necessary article.

It appears to me to be extraordinary, that when Lord Castlereagh read

the statement that the Commissary Gen. had in his stores a supply of corn and flour to last 100,000 men for 9 months, he should not have adverted to the fact that the greatest part of the Portuguese subsidy, indeed, all in the last year, but £600,000, was paid in kind, and principally in corn; and that he should not have seen that a supply for 100,000 men for 9 months was not exorbitant under the circumstances.

Then the government appears to me to have forgotten all that has passed on the particular subject of your purchases, the advantages derived from them in saving a starving people during the scarcity in 1810-11; in bringing large sums of money into the military chest which otherwise would not have found their way there; and *in positive profit in money*, I believe, in every one of these transactions.

The first of them took place in the end of the year 1810, when, in consequence of the probability of the continued blockade of Lisbon, and the neglect of the government to have the produce of the country brought down in time, you and I agreed that it would be expedient to endeavor to make purchases of corn in America for *bills upon England*. The measure was carried into execution with great success: the produce of the sale of the corn, when the Commissary Gen. did not take it himself, was thrown into the military chest; and, as well as I can recollect, there was a profit on the transaction to the amount of 15,000 or 16,000 dollars. However, you must have these papers, and I recommend you to remind government of the facts.

In respect to the purchases in Brazil and in Egypt, they were founded: 1st; Upon the necessity of taking some measures to keep the stores supplied with corn in the event then expected (in March, 1812) of the stoppage of the intercourse with America: and 2dly; Upon a knowledge of the prices in Egypt and Brazil, and a decided conviction that the transaction would be profitable to government, upon a comparison with the actual and probable prices at Lisbon, and would bring money into the military chest which would not otherwise find its way there; as the corn in Brazil was to be bought with the produce of bills to be negotiated in Brazil. Of this last advantage to be derived from the purchase of the corn in Egypt, I was never quite so certain, notwithstanding that the agent assured us that the money employed in this purchase could not in any manner find its way into the military chest.

If all this be true, which, I believe, you have it in your power to prove, I cannot understand why government find fault with these transactions, unless it is that they are teased into a disapprobation of them by the merchants who are interested in their being discontinued. I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculating in corn, &c. But when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions and adopt measures of this description, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the government in adopting them.

It is only the other day that I recommended to my brother something of the same kind to assist in paying the Spanish subsidy; and I have adopted measures respecting corn and other articles in Galicia, with a

view to get a little money for the army in that quarter. If these measures were not adopted, not only would it be impossible to perform the King's engagements, but even to support our own army.

The only ground of complaint that I see in these papers is, that different British agents are bidding against each other in the same market; and that ground of complaint is more apparent than real. If in the transactions carried on under your directions you have inquired beforehand, and have taken care that government should be a gainer, it is scarcely matter of blame that the transaction has not been so profitable as it would have been if one agent had been employed instead of another. It is, besides, a fact, that we had not the power of employing Mr. Burgman in the purchase in Egypt, to which this complaint particularly applies; and that person was employed who most honestly and successfully had carried on similar transactions for you before.

These transactions, however, must be discontinued in future, according to the orders of government; and I only hope that they will take care to keep the stores supplied with corn, and the military chest with money, as well as both objects have been accomplished hitherto, at an equally cheap rate to the public.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 3d May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 28th April, in which you have enclosed a correspondence which you have had with Dom M. Forjaz in regard to the purchase of British colonial rum by the Commissariat for the use of the army.

There is nothing more clear to me than that it is most for the advantage of all the allies, whether it be the consumption of Portuguese wine, Portuguese brandy, or British colonial rum, to procure that which takes least money out of the military chest of the army, and requires least of land transport to convey it to the troops; and I invariably decide every question of this description as I shall this, by a reference to these principles.

When we purchase wine or Portuguese brandy in this country, we are obliged to pay for it an enormous price, all in specie. When we purchase colonial rum or foreign brandy, we pay for it by bills drawn upon England; and I believe that we are enabled to deliver the ration to the soldier at one third of the price at which we could procure wine or Portuguese brandy, besides the convenience of paying for it by a bill upon England; and we give him a wholesome, instead of an unwholesome spirit. But this is not all: a British or Portuguese soldier's ration of wine is one pint; that of a British soldier in rum is one third of a pint; that of a Portuguese soldier is one sixth of a pint. Supposing, then, that we are obliged to draw the wine from a distance, which we are, generally speaking, from the Douro, it may fairly be stated that the issue of spirits to the troops is made at the expense of one fourth of the land carriage required for the issue of wine.

I don't mean to say that in many instances it is not advantageous to use wine, because the expense of transport of rum, to be defrayed in money, must be taken into consideration. But the fact is, that whenever wine

can be procured without any extraordinary difficulty of transport, at a tolerably cheap rate, it is preferred. But for the general use of the army, for the reasons above stated, rum is preferred.

I believe that Dom M. Forjaz will not differ in opinion with me on the soundness of the principle which guides my opinion; and if he does not, I fancy there can no longer be a question on the subject.

I am perfectly ready to admit that we are essentially interested in the prosperity and in the increase of the revenues of Portugal; but that interest ought and must give way to the pressing motive for keeping the military chest supplied with money.

The A.G. to Major Macdonald, Lisbon.

3d May, 1813.

I have not failed to lay before the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 29th ult., when his Excellency was pleased to observe, in reference to its contents, that he has found it necessary to establish a rule by which Staff officers who may be absent from the Peninsula, beyond a certain period, are discontinued on the Staff of this army (those excepted who return to England on account of wounds), and others are appointed in their room; and that it would be extremely hard upon officers, so appointed, to be displaced on the return of those whose duty they had fulfilled during their absence. Those officers, therefore, who, having been absent beyond a certain period, have been struck off the establishment of the Adj. Gen.'s department, must join their regiments on their return to the army, and must take their chance of being re-appointed as vacancies happen to occur. At the present moment the number of officers employed in the Adj. Gen.'s department is very considerable. An Assist. Adj. Gen. is attached to, and is present with each division of the army, and there are besides three assistants unattached. Under these circumstances the Commander of the Forces has directed me to repeat to you the expression of his regret at not having it in his power to reappoint you to a situation in the Adj. Gen.'s department.

To Col. Fisher, R.A.

Freneda, 4th May, 1813.

264 horses in the draft are required to draw 44 carriages in the pontoon train, which it is necessary should be drawn by horses after its arrival at Sabugal.

In order to procure these horses, it is necessary that those now employed in the draft of Capt. Cairns' brigade of 9 pounders now at Penamacor, and those employed in the draft of carriages in the reserve of the artillery now at Covilhão, should be at Sabugal on the day the pontoon train will arrive there. You will give directions accordingly to Capt. Cairns and Lieut. Col. Dickson.

The bullocks now employed in drawing the pontoon train will, till further orders, be employed in drawing the spare carriages and reserve ammunition carriages in the reserve of the artillery; and you will give orders to Lieut. Col. Dickson to have as many carriages prepared for bullock draft, still, however, carrying with them such shafts as may be necessary, in consequence of taking 264 horses from the artillery department for the service of the pontoon train. You will be so kind as to give directions that the Commissariat attached to these horses, &c., while with Capt. Cairns' brigade and reserve artillery, may attend them when transferred to the pontoon train.

The carriages belonging to the reserve of the artillery, to which the horses have hitherto been attached, must be brought to Sabugal by the horses, and there parked with the guns and carriages of Capt. Cairns'

brigade. When the horses now on their road from Lisbon shall arrive, Capt. Cairns' brigade must be horsed, then the 18 pounder brigade, then the ball cartridge carts; and lastly, the reserves of gun ammunition; and those of the last, which cannot be horsed, must be drawn by the bullocks of the pontoon train.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 4th May, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 25th and 28th, and that from La Vega, to which you refer. His letter upon the state of parties at Cadiz is a very able and correct representation. He has altered the paragraph to which you refer respecting the *Liberales*. He charges them, and I think justly, with democratical French principles; but he does not say that they look to the establishment in Spain of a Republic.

—— is a weak, foolish creature, who did not know what he was about, or the mischief he was doing. I am astonished that —— should be so anxious about him; but I conclude that this anxiety has some relation to the sick lady; and one can only lament that he should be another instance of the influence possessed by women over the most sensible men.

I have not seen in the papers any trace of the intention of the Cortes to fix upon Seville as the place of assembly for the new Cortes, excepting an argument in the *Abeja* against such an arrangement, although I have the papers to the 27th. But you must be accurately informed upon this subject, and you mention it in your letter of the 25th.

I consider that this decision renders it certain that the existing Cortes will separate at the period fixed for their separation; at least, that it will be in the power of the new Cortes to force them to separate by assembling themselves at Seville. It is also as good a mode as could be devised of getting the government and Cortes out of Cadiz.

If the decree has passed, I recommend to you to hold a language, and to adopt a conduct, as if you considered the arrangement quite settled. You should take a house at Seville, and make all the arrangements for your removal thither at the proper time. I will take an opportunity of recommending to the government to remove from Cadiz.

I think it not unlikely that there may be a *Town* Cortes and *Country* Cortes, particularly now that Seville has been appointed as the place of meeting for the new Cortes. The line which I shall take, in case of such an event, is not at all difficult. My business is to oppose the French; and there can be very little occasion for my taking a line to decide which of the two is the rightful assembly, during the short period that such a state of things could possibly exist. Your line of conduct may be more difficult, because both parties will press for your acknowledging their authority, as the best support that it could acquire. But a diplomatic person has always the advantage of being able to ask for time to receive instructions from his employers; and while waiting for these, or pretending to wait for them, circumstances may occur to enable you to decide positively to which authority it would be expedient to give your countenance.

I acknowledge that I entertain a very bad opinion of the existing Cortes; and I believe that the assembly lately elected will be a more true

representative of the feelings and sentiments of the people of Spain; and I should now be inclined to decide for the Cortes of Seville. But circumstances may occur to render such a decision unadvisable when it will have to be made.

In case the event under consideration should occur, I believe your functions should be suspended until you should decide, unless in the very common cases. But even this may be matter of doubt, as to suspend the exercise of your functions towards the government and Cortes of Cadiz, to which you are accredited, would be, in some degree, a decision in favor of the right of that of Seville.

We are a little delayed by the movements of our bridge, but I expect to march in 2 or 3 days.

P.S. I have no account of affairs in Valencia, excepting similar accounts to those you sent me, viz., Alicante papers of the 15th. It was reported at Madrid that Valencia was evacuated on the 21st.

Since writing the above, I have received, and sent to the minister, a report from the Chief of the Staff of the 2d army, of the transactions in the neighbourhood of Alicante, from which it appears that the success in the action of the 13th was not so important as from Sir J. Murray's letter, published in the *Alicante Gazette*, I had been induced to believe it. Sir J. Murray was, however, still in pursuit of the enemy on the 16th. You will see the letter.

O'Donoju tells me that the new Cortes are to be formed of the *Extraordinarios*, (excepting 80 members, who are to go out,) and of the newly elected. How is this? If it be true, the appointment of Seville as the place of meeting is a manœuvre to keep the new members and the country quiet, and to retain the power in the hands of the *Extraordinarios*. If the new Cortes are firm, determined fellows, however, there may still be two Cortes; and the line to be taken would be still the same.

In sending the flour to Catalonia, desire the person who goes in charge of it to be sure of his communication with the army before he lands it; and not to land it till Gen. Copons shall have means of carrying it off: otherwise the French will get it all.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rowan, A.A.G., Light division.

4th May, 1813.

A question was put to me some days ago by Major Stewart, who desired to be informed, before whom should be attested the soldiers of the Light division, whose term of service has expired, and who are about to enter into a fresh engagement. I have referred this question to Mr. Larpent, the Dep. Judge Advocate Gen., and I am informed by him that he is not clear whether these men should be attested at all; but if it should appear, upon reference to the act of parliament (of which no person at head quarters is in possession of a copy), that they are to be attested, this should be done either before him, or some person appointed to act as Dep. Judge Advocate Gen. in his absence.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 4th, regarding the Provisional battalion in the 2d division of infantry. I wrote to the Commander in Chief regarding it, as I told you I would: but His Royal Highness did not approve of the reform which I proposed; and, therefore, I have taken no further steps on the subject.

To J. C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

I beg to refer to your consideration the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry, held at Cadiz, to investigate the circumstances attending the loss of a sum of money, which was stolen by a Commissariat clerk, acting under Assist. Commissary Gen. Wilgress; and I have the honor to transmit the opinion of Major Gen. Cooke and Sir R. Kennedy of that officer's conduct in this transaction. I have to request that you will favor me with your directions whether the sum lost is to be repaid to the public by Mr. Wilgress.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

I enclose, for the information of the government, reports of the transactions which have recently occurred in the neighbourhood of Alicante, which have been received from the Chief of the Staff of the 2d army by the Chief of the Staff at head quarters, which, however, I beg may not be published, as I am in momentary expectation of the official reports.

I beg you will inform the government, however, that I shall consider it my duty to order that a very strict inquiry shall be made into the conduct of the regiment of Velez Malaga at Villena; and that those may be brought to punishment who may be proved to have behaved in so scandalous a manner as is reported.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

In transmitting, to be laid before the Commander in Chief, the enclosed letter from Capt. —, of the — regt. (Commandant of the dépôt at Belem), I beg to state for His Royal Highness' information, that I perfectly recollect having had a conversation with Capt. — in January last, in which I informed him that I had a very favorable opinion of his services, and should have great pleasure in recommending him for promotion when an opportunity offered; but he is mistaken in the supposition that I then promised to recommend him for brevet promotion, as I have ever (except in two or three cases of particular hardship) gone on the principle of not recommending officers to the Commander in Chief for advancement by brevet, unless it were after an action in which the officers recommended have distinguished themselves; from a knowledge that His Royal Highness conferred that promotion on those occasions only. Capt. — is a most deserving officer, and has performed the duties of the situation which he holds at Lisbon much to my satisfaction; but he has, unfortunately for him, been out of the way of deriving the advantage which officers who have continued with their corps in the field have enjoyed, during the service in the Peninsula.

I think it right to bring these circumstances under the view of the Commander in Chief, in order that His Royal Highness may be induced to permit Capt. — to purchase one of the vacant majorities in the — regt., if that officer should be desirous of doing so, when he is informed that he has not been recommended for brevet promotion.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 28th April, I have received

reports to which, though not official, I give credit, that Marshal Suchet attacked the left of the position occupied by the allied British and Sicilian troops under Gen. Sir J. Murray, and by the 2d Spanish army under Gen. Elio, on the 11th April, and at first gained some success at Yecla and Villena against the division of Brigadier Migares, belonging to the 2d Spanish army. It appears, however, that Sir J. Murray collected his corps at Castalla in the course of the 12th, covering that operation by an advanced guard, placed at Biar, which fell back upon the main body; and that Gen. Elio covered with the 2d army the left of the allied British and Sicilian corps in the new position; Gen. Whittingham's and Gen. Roche's Spanish divisions being on the right.

It appears that on the 13th, Marshal Suchet advanced upon Castalla, and made an attack upon the left of the position occupied by the allied British and Sicilian corps, which was repulsed with considerable loss. The enemy then retired, and I understand that, as late as the 16th, Sir J. Murray was in pursuit of them, which is, I conclude, the reason that I have hitherto received no official account of these transactions.

The enemy have made no movement of importance on this side. They sent a small detachment into Toledo on the 28th April; but there is no appearance of any movement in that direction. The heavy rain which has fallen has necessarily delayed the arrival of some of the equipments of the army, and has obliged me to defer its movement; but the troops will march immediately.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

I enclose an account which the Chief of the Staff of the Spanish army has received from the Chief of the Staff of the 2d army, of the transactions in the neighbourhood of Alicante of the 11th, 12th, and 13th April, of which I have not yet received any other details,* and I beg that these

* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart., to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Castalla, 14th April, 1813.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship, that the allied army under my command defeated the enemy on the 13th inst., commanded by Marshal Suchet in person.

It appears that the French General had, for the purpose of attacking this army, for some time been employed in collecting his whole disposable force. His arrangements were completed on the 10th, and in the morning of the 11th he attacked and dislodged with some loss a Spanish corps, posted by Gen. Elio at Yecla, which threatened his right, whilst it supported our left flank. In the evening he advanced in considerable force to Villena, and I am sorry to say that he captured, on the morning of the 12th, a Spanish garrison, which had been thrown into the castle by the Spanish General, for its defence.

On the 12th, about noon, Marshal Suchet began his attack on the advance of this army posted at Biar, under the command of Col. Adam. Col. Adam's orders were to fall back upon Castalla, but to dispute the passage with the enemy; which he did with the utmost gallantry and skill for 5 hours, though attacked by a force infinitely superior to that which he commanded. The enemy's advance occupied the pass that evening, and Col. Adam took up the ground in our position which had been allotted to him.

On the 13th, at noon, the enemy's columns of attack were formed, composed of 3 divisions of infantry, a corps of cavalry of about 1600 men, and a formidable train of artillery. The position of the allied army was extensive. The left was posted on a strong range of hills, occupied by Major Gen. Whittingham's division of Spanish troops, and the advance of the allied army under Col. Adam. This range of hills terminates at Castalla, which, and the ground to the right, was occupied by Major Gen. Mackenzie's division, and the 58th regt. from that of Lieut. Gen. Clinton.

The remainder of the position was covered by a strong ravine, behind which Lieut. Gen. Clinton was stationed, supported by 3 battalions of Gen. Roche's division, as a column of

may not be made public. I don't think the success appears so decided as it did upon the perusal of the *Alicante Gazette* of the 15th, which I sent you on the 30th. And as it appears that Suchet took his position in the Puerto de Biar on the evening of the 13th, not more than 2 miles from the scene of action, I cannot conceive what could have induced Sir J. Murray to follow his march afterwards, not having felt himself sufficiently strong to attack him before.

reserve. A few batteries had been constructed in this part of the line, and in front of the castle of Castalla. The enemy necessarily advanced on the left of the position. The first movement he made was to pass a strong body of cavalry along the line, threatening our right, which was refused. Of this movement no notice was taken. The ground to which he was pointing is unfavorable to cavalry, and as this movement was foreseen, the necessary precautions had been taken. When this body of cavalry had passed nearly the half of our line of infantry, Marshal Suchet advanced his columns to the foot of the hills, and certainly his troops, with a degree of gallantry that entitles them to the highest praise, stormed the whole line, which is not less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in extent. But gallantly as the attack was made, the defence of the heights was no less brilliant: at every point the enemy was repulsed, at many with the bayonet. He suffered a very severe loss; our gallant troops pursued him for some distance, and drove him, after a severe struggle, with precipitation on his battalions of reserve upon the plain. The cavalry, which had slowly advanced along our right, gradually fell back to the infantry. At present his superiority in that arm enabled him to venture this movement, which otherwise he should have severely repented.

Having united his shattered battalions with those which he kept in reserve, Marshal Suchet took up a position in the valley; but which it would not have been creditable to allow him to retain. I therefore decided on quitting mine, still, however, retaining the heights, and formed the allied army in his front, covering my right flank with the cavalry, whilst the left rested on the hills. The army advanced in two lines to attack him a considerable distance, but unfortunately Marshal Suchet did not choose to risk a second action, with the defile in his rear.

The line of the allies was scarcely formed when he began his retreat, and we could effect nothing more than driving the French into the pass with defeat, which they had exultingly passed in the morning. The action terminated at dusk, with a distant but heavy cannonade.

I am sorry to say that I have no trophies to boast of. The enemy took no guns to the heights, and he retired too expeditiously to enable me to reach him. Those which he used in the latter part of the day were posted in the gorge of the defile, and it would have cost us the lives of many brave men to take them. In the dusk the allied army returned to its position at Castalla, after the enemy had retired to Biar. From thence he continued his retreat at midnight to Villena, which he quitted again this morning in great haste, directing his march upon Fuente de la Higuera and Onteniente. But although I have taken no cannon from the enemy, in point of numbers his army is very considerably crippled; and the defeat of a French army, which boasted it had never known a check, cannot fail, I should hope, in producing a most favorable effect in this part of the Peninsula.

As I before mentioned to your Lordship, Marshal Suchet commanded in person. The Generals Harispe, Habert, and Robert commanded their respective divisions. I hear from all quarters that Gen. Harispe is killed; and I believe, from every account that I can collect, that the loss of the enemy amounts fully to 3000 men; and he admits to 2500. Upwards of 800 have already been buried in front of only one part of our line; and we know that he has carried off with him an immense number of wounded. We had no opportunity of making prisoners, except such as were wounded; the numbers of which have not yet reached me. I am sure your Lordship will hear with much satisfaction, that this action has not cost us the lives of many of our comrades. Deeply must be felt the loss, however trifling, of such brave and gallant soldiers; but we know it is inevitable, and I can with truth affirm, that there was not an officer or soldier engaged who did not court the glorious termination of an honorable life in the discharge of his duty to his King and to his country. The gallant and judicious conduct of those that were engaged deprived much more than one half the army of sharing in the perils and glory of the day; but the steady countenance with which the divisions of Gens. Clinton and Mackenzie remained for some hours under a cannonade, and the eagerness and alacrity with which the lines of attack were formed, sufficiently proved to me what I had to depend on from them had Marshal Suchet awaited the attack.

I trust your Lordship will now permit me to perform the most pleasing part of my duty, that of humbly submitting, for H. R. H. the Prince Regent's approbation, the names of those

The rain, which has fallen plentifully, and some other trifling circumstances, have retarded our march for two or three days. But we shall have our bridge, which is what we wait for, by the 8th, when all the troops shall move.

I never saw the British army so healthy or so strong. The hussars and 59th are not on the strength of the enclosed state, nor some of the detachments, which either have joined, or are very near their regiments.

officers and corps which have had the fortunate opportunity of distinguishing themselves, in as far at least as has yet come to my knowledge. Col. Adam, who commands the advance, claims the first place in this honorable list. I cannot sufficiently praise the judicious arrangements he made, and the ability with which he executed his orders on the 12th inst. The advance consists only of the 2d batt. 27th regt., commanded by Lieut. Col. Reeves; the 1st Italian regt., commanded by Lieut. Col. Burke; the Calabrian Free corps, commanded by Major Carey; one rifle company of the 3d and 8th batts. K. G. L., commanded by Capt. Luedor and Brauns of those corps; and a troop of foreign hussars, under the orders of Capt. Jacks, of the 20th dragoons, with 4 mountain guns, in charge of Capt. Arabin, Royal artillery.

The enemy attacked this corps with from 5000 to 6000 men, for 5 hours, and (then only in consequence of orders) succeeded in possessing himself of the pass. This fact alone says more in favor of Col. Adam, and in praise of those he commands, than any words of mine can express. I shall therefore confine myself to assuring your Lordship, that the conduct of all engaged in this brilliant affair merits, and has met with my highest approbation. Col. Adam was wounded very early in the attack, but continued, and still continues, in charge of his division.

On the 13th the attack of the enemy on Col. Adam's division was very severe, but the enemy was defeated at every point, and a most gallant charge of the 2d batt. 27th, led by Col. Adam and Lieut. Col. Reeves, decided the fate of the day at that part of the field of battle. The skill, judgment, and gallantry displayed by Major Gen. Whittingham and his division of the Spanish army rivals, though it cannot surpass, the conduct of Col. Adam and the advance.

At every point the enemy was repulsed; at many at the point of the bayonet. At one point in particular I must mention, where a French grenadier battalion had gained the summit of the hill, but was charged and driven from the heights by a corps under the command of Col. Casans.

Major Gen. Whittingham highly applauds, and I know it is not without reason, the conduct of Col. Casans, Col. Romero, Col. Campbell, Col. Casteras, and Lieut. Col. Ochoa, who commanded at various points of the hills. To the chief of his Staff, Col. Serrano, he likewise expresses himself to be equally obliged on this, as well as many other occasions; and he acknowledges with gratitude the services of Col. Catinelli, of the Staff of the Italian Levy, who was attached to him during the day.

These, my Lord, are the officers and corps that I am most anxious to recommend to His Royal Highness' notice and protection; and I earnestly entreat your Lordship will most respectfully, on my part, report their merits to the Prince Regent and to the Spanish government.

It now only remains for me to acknowledge the cordial co-operation and support I have met with from the several General officers and Brigadiers, as well as from the various officers in charge of departments attached to this army. To Major Gen. Doukin, Q. M. G., I am particularly indebted, for the zeal and ability with which he conducts the duties of his extensive department, and the gallantry he displays on every occasion. Major Kenah, who is at the head of the Adj. Gen.'s department, affords me every satisfaction. Lieut. Col. Holcombe, and under his orders, Major Williamson, conduct the artillery branch of the service in a manner highly creditable. The different brigades of guns, under Capt. Lacy, Thomson, and Gilmour (and Garcia of the Sicilian army), and Lieut. Patton, of the flying artillery, were extremely useful, and most gallantly served; and the Portuguese artillery supported the reputation their countrymen have acquired.

The army is now in march. I proceed to Alcoy in the hope, but not the sanguine hope, that I may be enabled to force the Albayda Pass, and reach the intrenched position of the enemy at San Felipe before he can arrive there. I consider this movement as promising greater advantages than a direct pursuit, as the road which he has chosen being very favorable for cavalry, in which arm he is so much superior, I should probably be delayed too long to strike any blow of importance.

I beg leave to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the allied army.

P.S. I have omitted to mention, that in retiring from Biar, two of the mountain guns fell into the hands of the enemy; they were disabled, and Col. Adam very judiciously

We have gained in strength 25,000 men since we went into cantonments in the beginning of December, and infinitely more in efficiency.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 5th May, 1813.

From a letter which Sir C. Stuart has sent me from Lord Castlereagh, and its enclosures from the Board of Trade, the Treasury, and the Commissary in Chief, I am afraid that the government has been teased by the importunities of the British merchants at Lisbon to give the orders which those letters contain, that the purchases of corn made in America, Brazil, and Egypt, on account of government, under the directions and superintendence of Sir C. Stuart, generally at my request, but always in concert with me, may be discontinued.

I have written fully to Sir C. Stuart upon this subject, and he will probably address Lord Castlereagh upon it, and therefore I shall not trouble your Lordship at any length. Sir C. Stuart can show, not only that we have saved the people of this country during a year of invasion and another of scarcity by this system, but that we have actually brought into the military chest considerable sums of money, which would otherwise not have found their way there; that we have gained money for the public by each, I believe, of these transactions; and that we paid more than two thirds of the Portuguese subsidy in kind in the last year, principally in corn thus imported. I also request that it may be recollected, that about a year and a half ago I was informed that we must expect no supplies of grain from the British islands, the harvest having failed. As it takes about 3 months, upon an average, to get any thing from England that is required, I reckon that we ought to have 3 months' supply of those articles which we are to get from England; and when we are to look for them where we can find them, we ought to have a supply for 6 months.

Then came the prospect of the American war, and the probability that the intercourse between America and Portugal would be stopped, which has since occurred, which induced me to look for other markets; and

directed Capt. Arabin, who then commanded the brigade, to fight them to the last, and then to leave them to their fate. Capt. Arabin obeyed his orders, and fought them till it was quite impossible to get them off, had such been Col. Adam's desire.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, near Castalla, on the evenings of the 12th and 13th April, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	2	1	66	7	69
Wounded	12	15	259	3	286
Missing	0	0	42	1	42

The above does not include the Spanish and Portuguese loss.

upon a statement of prices in Brazil and Egypt, I determined that purchases should be made on account of government in those countries.

Your Lordship is acquainted with my opinion of the British merchants at Lisbon. If they were real merchants trading fairly with a capital, and looking for fair profits, and acting fairly and with probity in every transaction, as we read that British merchants did formerly, I should have no objection to employ them; but knowing what I do of them, I never will make use of the agency of any of them in transactions of this description, unless I should receive the positive orders of government to do so.

The orders of government will of course be obeyed, and I shall not allow of any more of those transactions; and it will rest with government to take care to keep the stores of this army supplied with corn, and its military chest with money to defray the charges of the army, and to perform the King's engagements to the powers of the Peninsula. I believe it will be found that they can do neither the one nor the other at so cheap a rate, or with so little inconvenience as that at which both objects have been accomplished hitherto, and that it is better to turn a deaf ear to the merchants than to alter the system. There is not now a shilling that can be got any where by any mode that is not brought into the military chest, nor an instant in which corn, or any other article, can be substituted for money in the performance of the King's engagements, that the measure is not adopted. Without these detailed engagements we should not have got on, and I only hope that the improvement of our situation, in consequence of the opening of the ports in the north of Europe, will enable government to supply us plentifully in future.

To ———, ———.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 5th inst. When I expressed a wish to Lord Mulgrave that you should be allowed to remain in command of the artillery attached to this army, I thought I had reason to believe that you were thoroughly acquainted with all the details of the service, and that they would be conducted by you in a manner advantageous to the public interests. Not having the pleasure of being much acquainted with you, I should not have thought of interrupting an arrangement which had been made by the Master General for the command of the artillery with this army, if I had not felt persuaded that you were fully capable of conducting the great machine placed under your direction.

As you state that you don't feel yourself equal to the magnitude of your situation, and that the arduous and responsible charge devolved upon you, 'added to a debilitated state of health, which has a considerable effect on your recollective faculties, made you view it with some degree of apprehension and uneasiness,' I can feel no scruple in acknowledging that I was mistaken, or in pleading guilty to the charge of not placing confidence in you. The fact is, that in proportion as the period fixed for the army taking the field has approached, and as the arrangements in progress, since the beginning of December last, have drawn to their completion, I have found that you were not so capable as I had believed you to be for the arduous task which you had undertaken, from the very defects which you yourself notice.

Under these circumstances, and being aware of the vital importance of the good management of your department to the honor, or, more properly speaking, the safety of the army; and knowing that the existence of these defects would have been no excuse for me, in case the mismanagement of your department should have caused such a misfortune, as might be expected, it is not astonishing that I should have manifested an uneasiness and want of confidence which, under other circumstances, I should not have felt.

I am very much concerned that the matter has turned out in this manner, but I applaud your conduct highly for the step you have taken. I should be glad to render this step as little hurtful to your feelings, and injurious to your future prospects in the service, as may be in my power; and if you will call upon me in the morning, I shall be happy to talk to you on the subject.

In the mean time, however, it is desirable that you should send off an express to Lieut. Col. Dickson, to beg him to come over here as soon as possible.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 2d, and I enclose the copy of one which I have written to Lord Bathurst, on the subject of the naval concerns on the coasts of Spain and Portugal, which I hope will be in time for the packet.

I shall write to Sir G. Collier in regard to your wishes; but I am convinced that he can do no more than observe Cape Finisterre with one frigate.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

Major Gen. *Baron* Low and Major Gen. Slade having been ordered to return to England by H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, I shall be much obliged to you if you will, on an opportunity offering, provide them with a passage in a man of war.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

Since I wrote to you on the 22d ult., I have had a correspondence with Adm. Martin, respecting the security of the navigation of the coast of Portugal and the north coast of Spain, which is a most important object for our future operations. The Admiral is very little able, I believe, to give the protection to the communication, which is so necessary to us; and I enclose the copy of his last letter to me upon the subject, in answer to one which I wrote to him, in which I asked him whether I should request you to station one of your frigates off Cape Finisterre, in order to aid in securing the navigation of the coast.

It appears to me that it will be impossible for you to do more than that, without interfering with the objects held out in my letter of the 22d ult., which appear to me to have been those for which the squadron under your command was sent to the coast. It may be impossible for you even to do so much, consistently with those objects; but I shall be very much obliged to you if you will do what you can to secure for us

the communication between the Tagus and Coruña; and if you will let me know what you will do.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

The navigation of the coast of Portugal and Spain is of the utmost importance to us, and I have had some correspondence with Adm. Martin respecting it. I enclose the copy of his last letter, in answer to one in which I asked him whether it would give him any assistance if I were to request Sir G. Collier, who commands a squadron of 3 frigates on the north coast of Spain, to station one of his frigates off Cape Finisterre. I had before recommended to Sir G. Collier to endeavor to prevent the enemy's maritime communication between Bayonne and Santoña; and to put himself in communication with the Spanish garrison in Castro Urdiales.

It appears to me that it would be very desirable to put under the command of Adm. Martin the whole coast of Portugal and Spain, from Bayonne as far to the south and east as his command now extends. It would certainly simplify arrangements for convoys and for naval operations, in concert with the army in the ensuing campaign, and would materially forward the service.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 6th May, 1813.

Having referred to the Commissary Gen. the papers transmitted (herewith returned) by you on the 18th ult., regarding an arrangement for the better support of the animals employed in the transport of the army, I have the honor to enclose a copy of Sir R. Kennedy's letter on the subject, by which it appears to be his opinion, that it is impossible to act upon the system proposed in a general way, although, as a partial measure, it might, on some occasion, be feasible.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

6th May, 1813.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that in consequence of a report which has reached the Commander of the Forces, from the Commandant of Celorico, stating an instance of neglect of duty and disobedience of orders on the part of Lieut. — of the — regt., whilst on the march through that station, in command of a detachment, his Excellency has been pleased to direct that Lieut. — shall be brought to trial before the General Court Martial of which your Lordship is President, upon charges which will be transmitted to the Acting Dep. Judge Advocate, by Mr. Larpent, the Acting Dep. Judge Advocate Gen.; and his Excellency is desirous that the trial may take place with the least possible delay.

P.S. Your Lordship will be pleased to cause Lieut. — to be forthwith placed under arrest.

To Sir E. Littlehales, Bart.

Freneda, 7th May, 1813.

I enclose a memorial from a soldier who, it appears, has been pensioned in Ireland, on account of his wounds, received in this country; and who, I believe, has not received what he ought. I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire into the circumstances, and see that he is redressed, if the case is as I suppose it to be; and, at all events, send for this poor fellow, and get him employed as he desires, if he is so sober and well behaved as to deserve employment or notice.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 7th May, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 21st April, in answer to a part of a private letter which I addressed to your Lordship on the 3d March.

His Majesty's government had agreed to supply the Spanish government with clothing, according to the enclosed list and allotment, for 300,000 men for the year 1812; and it had been proposed to reduce this quantity to clothing for 50,000 men for the year 1813. I had, in consequence, applied to your Lordship to have the quantity increased to a supply for 100,000 men in the year 1813, and enclosed a list of articles to be sent to this country accordingly. In answer to this letter, the Under Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs has addressed the Under Sec. of State for the War Department on the 14th April, and has sent you the return of clothing and equipments, of which I enclose the copy.

It is impossible for me to know whether this return is that referred to in the beginning of the second paragraph of the letter from the Under Sec. of State, of the 14th April; or whether it is the list of the articles intended to be sent from England to complete what is required to make up the quantities required for the Spanish army for the year 1813. I rather believe it is the supposed return of what was in store in the magazines in Portugal and Spain on the 24th Dec. 1812. But it is obvious that this return contains an account of articles intended for British and Portuguese troops as well as for Spaniards.

The articles marked in the list enclosed in the letter from Mr. Lambton, are not in the list of those originally sent to me, of what was intended for the Spaniards, and I suppose are intended for British or Portuguese troops. I don't know what stores some of them are; and I am ignorant to what purpose they are to be applied: 100,000 cramps, 5,000 sergeants' chevrons, 150 white wings with bugles, 150 green wings with bugles, 250 yards red cloth, 1,500 yards white fringe. But I would beg your Lordship to advert to the following observations upon this subject:

1st; From what I have understood from Sir H. Wellesley, the quantity of clothing sent for the Spaniards, as the supply for 1812, has not amounted to the quantity stated in the enclosed return marked A.

2dly; Supposing it had, it does not appear that the British government can fairly take credit for the remains in store on the 24th Dec. 1812, supposing that they had before them an accurate return of the remains for the use of the Spanish army only; and carry those remains to account against the supplies promised to be furnished in the year 1813.

On the 3d March, having before me as accurate an account as I could get of the state of the stores applicable to the Spanish army (because the whole business of the Storekeeper's department in this country is in very great confusion), and having likewise before me the state of the clothing of the Spanish army, and knowing their probable wants, I applied to your Lordship that a list of clothing for 100,000 men for the year 1813 might be sent out in the course of that year; a supply for 50,000 only having been offered. It would not have been thought expedient to carry to account for the supply of the 50,000 suits of clothing for the year 1813,

the contents of the magazines on the 24th Dec. 1812, even if the return of those contents had referred only to clothing for the Spanish armies; and I hope that, upon consideration, it will not be so thought in respect to the grant of my recommendation for clothing for 100,000 men; but that the whole of the demand made will be supplied within the year.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Freneda, 9th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 2d. The British troops at Carthage-
gena are to continue, as heretofore, to be solely and exclusively under
the orders of the General officer commanding at Cadiz; and you will
convey your directions accordingly to the officer commanding the British
troops at that place. The senior officer there is to continue to receive an
allowance of 20*s. per diem*.

The 6 companies of Dillon's regiment have been sent to Carthagena
under orders from the Sec. of State.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 9th May, 1813.

Gen. Cooke has sent me your letter of the 16th April to Col. Prevost,
and he has asked for orders in regard to certain points on which you had
given directions at Carthagena.

Carthagena has in it some of His Majesty's troops, in consequence of
the desire expressed by the Spanish government that this measure should
be adopted; and the troops at Carthagena having been detached from that
division of this army which is stationed at Cadiz, they have always been
under the directions of the General officer commanding at Cadiz, who is
in constant communication, as well with me as with the King's minister
at Cadiz. It would not answer to alter this system; and I conceive that
the troops at Carthagena cannot well be made liable to receive your orders
and those of Gen. Cooke.

When, therefore, you shall have taken from Carthagena the 2d batt.
67th regt., I beg you to leave that garrison as it will stand, unless the case
should occur of your having to send back the 2d batt. 67th regt.

By Gen. Cooke's letter, I find that 6 companies of Dillon's regiment
had been sent to Carthagena in consequence of the orders of the Sec. of
State. This measure would render it still more necessary to send back
the 2d batt. 67th regt., or some other regiment, in case that place should
be liable to be attacked.

I have already written to you about the artillery at Alicante. I cannot
understand your wanting artillery men, considering that your corps came
from Sicily for a siege, and that you have 2 companies of British artillery,
and 2 of Portuguese artillery, with the train of this army; but I hope
soon to have your return.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 9th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th April in regard to Gen. —.

Although I don't very much approve of Gen. —, I shall have no
objection to employ him as a General officer, provided he will join, take

the command of, and stay with, the body of troops which he will be appointed to command, and confine his attention solely to them.

Gen. —'s letter from —, of the 22d April, is a counterpart of all those I have ever seen from him. I possess many that I could substitute for it which would convey equally good information of the same description; and the letters are not confined to you, who may have sent him to — to acquire information, but they fly about the army and England, addressed to persons of all descriptions. I possess *accurate* information on every point on which Gen. — has written, and can supply it to you if you wish for it.

If Gen. — will discontinue his attentions to *universals*, and confine them to his particular duty to the troops which he may command, I shall employ him as a General officer, otherwise not; but I will not allow him to remain as an idler or amateur with any army, in order to give him an opportunity of circulating the description of intelligence which he picks up and circulates.

P.S. I enclose an answer to Gen. Whittingham's memorandum. It is not difficult to find fault with our own situation, and to see the benefit of the situation of others. That which ought to be done is to examine a subject of this kind *à fond*, and it would soon be found that it is impracticable to execute what is proposed.

Observations on Gen. Whittingham's Memorandum of the 24th April, 1812, in regard to the draft of supplies from the country.

There exists no doubt that the French troops do draw supplies from the seat of their operations in all parts of Europe; that this advantage is not enjoyed by their enemies in some instances at all, in others in a very inconsiderable degree, and in none to so great a degree as it is by the French. It is likewise true that to this system, whose date is that of the Revolutionary war (as what the King of Prussia did in this way was trifling), is to be attributed both the system of tactics and of politics of the present day.

I must observe, however, that much has been done of late years to show the French government that they could not rely upon this system. Those who study accurately the nature of their operations against the allied armies in the Peninsula, and of their recent operations in Russia, will find ample reason for the belief that the system of making the operations of war produce the resources for carrying on war, or, in other words, the system of making war a resource, and profitable and advantageous to a state, instead of being expensive and burthensome, must be got the better of.

These observations, however, are only general; and Gen. Whittingham complains, with great reason, that the French, by means of their system, live in countries, in Spain, in which the Spaniards starve; and it is likewise true that the *starvation* of the Spanish armies is more burthensome to the country than the plentiful mode of living of the French. I will go farther than Gen. Whittingham, and state that, notwithstanding that the British army pay for all the supplies they receive from the country, the British troops, if deprived of their magazines, would starve in a district in Spain in which the French army would live in plenty.

To what are these facts to be attributed? Certainly not to the inclination of the inhabitants of the country to the enemy; certainly not to the superior abilities of the officers of the civil departments of the French armies, at least not in comparison with the civil officers of the British army; but to the system of terror on which the French, and all under their authority, invariably act, and to which no power in Europe ever has, or ever can have, recourse.

It is not difficult to make allotments of districts, and supplies to be drawn from them, and perhaps to go one step further, to make the magistrates of villages allot to individuals their share of the burthen to be borne by the village. But if there is no compulsion, who will obey?

Let any person attend to the detail of a French operation of this description, he will see the use of the bayonet in every part of it; he will see the compulsory quartering of soldiers on individuals called refractory, and the necessity of incurring large expenses laid upon these individuals, besides serious inconveniences; he will see women, children, &c. taken as hostages, &c. &c.; and, in short, every thing done to compel the individual and village to obey the requisition, and to instil terror into others who might be inclined to resist.

In what country, excepting in France in the first days of the Revolution, could such a system be carried into execution by its own government and army? In what country could we, as allies, venture to follow such an example? Till these questions can be answered, it is useless to discuss the advantages which the French derive from this system, and the disadvantages which their enemies feel in not adopting it.

Having gone thus far, I need not consider this subject farther; but I have long and maturely considered all the modes of subsisting armies, and I think I could show that neither the Spanish nor the British soldiers are of the description, nor in the state of discipline, owing likewise to the want of the same vigorous system, to carry into execution these systems of requisition so easily managed by their enemy.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B., 4th division. 9th May, 1813.

I have not failed to submit to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 6th inst. and enclosures, on the subject of Lieut. —'s arrest. His Excellency has directed me to signify to you in answer, that a statement of the transaction at Villa Franca, which was the occasion of Lieut. — being placed under arrest, has been long since referred to the Portuguese government, and no answer has yet been received. The Commander of the Forces is sorry that Lieut. — should have remained in a state of restraint for so long a period; but his Excellency was pleased to observe that this circumstance must be considered as one of the evils to which those who commit a breach of the laws of the country render themselves liable.

To Major Gen. the Hon. E. Stopford.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, and enclose the form according to which they ought to be recorded; and I beg you to direct the Assistant Dep. Judge Advocate to alter them accordingly.

As I am obliged to return the proceedings on this ground, I would

beg the General Court Martial to reconsider their sentence of honorable acquittal.

It appears to me that the conduct of Dr. —, in requiring a billet for a Lieut. Colonel, without mentioning his name, was not quite correct, more particularly as by that trick, if it may be so termed, he was billeted on a house which the Commandant had expressed his wish that he should not occupy.

If this impression be correct, I am convinced that the General Court Martial will not think the Doctor entitled to an *honorable* acquittal, in which is included the sense of the Court Martial of the merit of the prisoner under trial, as well as of his innocence of the charge.

At all events, whether the Doctor procured the billet by a trick or not, there can be no merit in the transaction; and it would appear that on this ground the Doctor's case is not one on which such a sentence should be passed.

I request you to give directions that Dr. — may be released from his arrest.

To Major Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 6th. I entertain the highest opinion of Col. Ross, and will appoint him to command a brigade as soon as it shall be in my power; but every day's experience convinces me that it does not answer to remove an officer from his regiment to command a brigade, of which his regiment does not form a part, until he is of such relative rank as to render it probable that he will not be obliged to return to the command of his regiment.

To Col. — —.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 8th inst., and I acknowledge that I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer which are to be mortified by his performance of his duty in the situation in which His Majesty and the rules of the service have placed him; and I can only say that, in the course of my military life, I have gone from the command of a brigade to that of my regiment, and from the command of an army to that of a brigade or division, as I was ordered, without feeling any mortification.

As, however, you feel mortified upon your reassuming the command of your regiment, from the command of a brigade, of which your regiment forms a part, I trust that you will now see the propriety of my determination not to remove officers from the command of their regiments to the temporary command of brigades of which their regiments do not form a part; as it is probable that your feelings would have been mortified in a greater degree if you had now been obliged to return to the command of your regiment from a brigade of the line.

I beg that you will make the regular application for leave to go to Oporto, which will be granted.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on the murder of

Lieut. —, of the Brunswick regiment, on the evening of the 1st May, in the neighbourhood of Rio Forte, and I request you to apply to the Portuguese government to give directions to the magistrates of the country to inquire into the circumstances of this transaction.

To Sir I. Heard, Garter King at Arms.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th March, in which you have apprised me of the honor conferred upon me by my having been elected into the Most Noble Order of the Garter, at a Chapter of that Order, held at Carlton House on the 4th March.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., delivered to me your letter and the insignia of the Order at Freneda, in Portugal, on Thursday, the 6th May, in obedience to the commands and warrant of H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

To Sir I. Heard, Garter King at Arms.

Freneda, 10th May, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th March, and I am very much obliged to you for the spy glass which you sent me.

I am very glad that you did not come to this inhospitable country and climate to invest me with the Order of the Garter; and I will take the liberty of troubling you if I should require any riband for the Order.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether the riband of the Order is worn over the right or the left shoulder.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

10th May, 1813.

I have had the honor of submitting to the consideration of the Marquis of Wellington your Lordship's letter of the 8th inst. and enclosures, regarding the circumstances which have been the occasion of Lieut. —, — light infantry, being ordered to appear before a General Court Martial. His Excellency has, nevertheless, been pleased to direct that that officer shall be brought to trial (agreeably to the orders conveyed in my letter to your Lordship of the 6th inst.), when that officer will have an opportunity of bringing forward whatever he may have to urge in justification of his conduct.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 11th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 20th April, and I am very much obliged to you for the care you take of our money concerns. It is certainly true that large sums have been exported from this country to America in payment for corn imported; but this corn is besides that imported in consequence of our orders, and paid for by our bills negotiated in America. One of my reasons for agreeing to the purchase of corn in Brazil and Egypt was to put a stop to the purchases of the imported American corn, if the American government should have allowed of the intercourse after the declaration of war.

I enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given to Sir J. Murray,* and Generals Copons, Elio, and the Duque del Parque. Sir J. Murray has informed me that he proposes to carry into execution the plan recommended in the first instance, viz., the attack upon Tarragona; and, by a letter from him of the 30th, I understand that he is well satisfied with what is proposed for him and the troops on that side. I likewise

* See p. 426.

enclose an extract of a letter from him of the 24th, which shows the nature of Suchet's position, and how impracticable it would be to make any thing of it in any other manner. These papers will make you acquainted with the plan of operations for the troops on the other side of the Peninsula, which are necessarily disconnected with those of the troops on this side, at least for a time.

I propose on this side to commence our operations by turning the enemy's position on the Duero, by passing the left of our army over that river within the Portuguese frontier. I should cross the right in the same manner, only that I have been obliged to throw the right very forward during the winter, in order to cover and connect our cantonments; and I could not well draw them back for this movement without exposing a good deal of country and incurring the risk of a counter movement on the part of the enemy. I therefore propose to strengthen our right and to move with it myself across the Tormes, and establish a bridge on the Duero below Zamora. The two wings of the army will thus be connected, and the enemy's position on the Duero will be turned. The Spanish army of Galicia will be on the Escla on the left of our army at the same time that our army will be on that river.

Having turned the enemy's position on the Duero, and established our communication across it, our next operation must depend upon circumstances. I don't know whether I am now stronger than the enemy, even including the army of Galicia; but of this I am very certain, that I shall not be stronger throughout the campaign, or more efficient, than I now am; and the enemy will not be weaker. I cannot have a better opportunity for trying the fate of a battle, which, if the enemy should be unsuccessful, must oblige him to withdraw entirely.

We have been sadly delayed by the bridge, without which it is obvious we can do nothing. The equipment is quite new, and has marched only from Abrantes; but there has already been much breakage, and I understand that the carriages are shamefully bad. The truth is, that English tradesmen, particularly contractors, are become so dishonest, that no reliance can be placed on any work, particularly in iron, done by contract. I have the same complaint of some carts made for the Commissariat; 18 out of 25 of which broke on a good road without loads in 80 miles. I shall have sad work with this bridge throughout the campaign, and yet we can do nothing without it.

I shall send the Prince of Orange home, as you desire, unless you should comply with his wish to join the Prussian army, and allow him to go home for that purpose.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th. Of course the detailed measures to be adopted for the relief of your posts subsequently to the junction of the Duque del Parque must be arranged and made by the authorities on the spot. The Duque del Parque has marched, and must by this time be near you.

I have nothing new to tell you from this side. The bridge will arrive to-morrow, and we shall march immediately.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

I have the honor to report to you that 3000 suits of clothing and sets of cavalry appointments having arrived at Cadiz for the use of the Spanish cavalry, I have requested His Majesty's Ambassador to give directions that they may be made over to the directions of your Excellency.

It appears that, in consequence of directions from the former Inspector of Cavalry, 1000 of these suits of clothing and appointments are for dragoons, 1000 for hussars, and 1000 for chasseurs; and there is therefore not a sufficient quantity of clothing and appointments of any description to answer for 2 regiments, on the establishment recently fixed for them.

Considering the Spanish army, the cavalry in particular, in the infancy of its reorganization, I acknowledge that I am very indifferent respecting the fashion of its clothing and appointments, provided they are good of their kind, and each regiment is in itself uniformly clothed. If, therefore, I had had any thing to say to the Spanish army at the period this clothing was ordered, I should have requested that the whole of it might be the same; and I beg you to take the opinion of the government regarding the clothing and appointments for cavalry which I have recently requested the British government to send to Spain; and, if they should agree in opinion that the whole ought to be alike, that you will be so kind as to fix upon the pattern of the clothing and appointments now received, according to which the whole are to be made.

In regard to the distribution of the clothing now arrived, I beg leave to submit to you the expediency, first, of issuing to the King's regiment of cavalry a complete suit of clothing and appointments for the full number of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of which it consists, of that pattern sent out for dragoons. I have not yet heard that the reform proposed for this regiment has been carried into execution; but, as I suppose it will be so before long, I consider that it will be desirable that early measures should be adopted to transmit to this regiment its clothing and appointments by the sea and river navigation, as far as possible; and that land transport should be procured to forward it from the landing place on the Guadalquivir.

I shall hereafter have the honor of submitting to you my opinion regarding the disposal of the remainder of the 3000 suits of clothing and appointments; but it appears now generally desirable that, supposing the clothing and appointments to be sufficient for 5 regiments, 3 of them should be uniformly clothed and appointed, whether as dragoons, as chasseurs, or as hussars; and that of each of the other 2 regiments, 3 squadrons should be clothed as dragoons or as chasseurs, and one squadron of each as hussars.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter received from the Conde de la Bisbal, and various papers on the subject of the revenues and expenses of the provinces of Cordova and Seville, to which I request you to draw the attention of the Regency.

The government will see in these papers ample reason for their active interference to preserve the public property.

1st; I would beg to draw their attention to the immense expenses attending the collection of these small revenues in these kingdoms, amounting in Seville to more than one fourth, and in Cordova to about one sixth, of the whole revenue collected; the collection of some of the branches of revenue costs nearly one half of the gross produce; and yet it appears that, notwithstanding this large expense incurred, the amount due to the Crown is not collected.

2dly; I would beg to draw the attention of the government to the charges upon these revenues for expenses at Cadiz, Malaga, the Isla, Puerto de S^{ta} Maria, Algeiras, &c., the revenues of which places are allotted to other objects.

3dly; I request the attention of the government to the payment of 232,000 *reales* monthly to the quicksilver mines of Almaden from the revenues of the province of Cordova; the profits of the mines being applicable to other purposes.

4thly; I likewise request the attention of the government to the general charges for pensioners, &c., payable out of the revenues of these provinces.

The fact is, that these charges and those of collection only would absorb the whole amount of the produce of the revenue, and leave nothing for the army; and it becomes absolutely necessary for the government to turn their attention in the most serious manner to the subject, otherwise it is impossible to hope to maintain the army.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

I beg that the 3000 suits of clothing and cavalry appointments for the use of the Spanish army recently arrived at Cadiz may be placed at the disposal of the Minister at War.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

Having received from Sir T. Graham the insignia of the Order of the Garter, I enclose a letter for Lady Wellington containing directions for returning to the genealogist of the Bath the collar and badge of that Order. Some of my brother officers, however, have expressed an anxious desire that I should continue a Knight of the Bath, into which I have admitted most of them; and all of them owe this honor to actions performed under my command. Under these circumstances, and adverting to the reasons which induced you to wish that I should resign the Order, I would wish you to consider whether it would not be better that I should keep it.

1st; There is a precedent of a British subject holding two British Orders, neither of them military, in the case of the Duke of Roxburgh.

2dly; If you will refer to the statute of the Order of May, 1812, you will see that upon my resignation you have not the power of appointing a Knight of the Bath. My stall will be filled by the senior Extra Knight, and under the statute you may appoint as many Extra Knights as you please.

I feel great reluctance in suggesting that I should keep this Order, and

I should not have done so if it had not been suggested to me by some of the Knights. God knows I have plenty of Orders, and I consider myself to have been most handsomely treated by the Prince Regent and his government, and shall not consider myself the less so if you should not think proper that I should retain the Order of the Bath. I beg you will return me the enclosed letter, or not, as you may decide upon this point.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 12th May, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the report which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray of the operations of the troops under his command, and of the 2d Spanish army, from the 11th to the 13th April, and on the battle fought at Castalla;* and I request your Lordship will draw the attention of His Royal Highness to the conduct of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, and of the officers and troops under his command, particularly to those named by him.

Nothing of importance has occurred in this part of the country since I addressed your Lordship on the 5th inst. The delay in the arrival of the bridge obliged me to halt the troops, whose march had already commenced; but I expect that it will arrive to-morrow, and the whole army will be in motion in the course of a few days.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

12th May, 1813.

Having had the honor of submitting to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 9th inst., conveying your suggestions with regard to the disposal of damaged stores, reported by a board of officers to be saleable, although unfit to be issued for the use of the army, his Excellency was pleased to direct that the stores in question should be reshipped for England accordingly; and he desires that you will be pleased to cause the necessary steps to be taken for this purpose. I have the honor to return to you enclosed the proceedings of the Board, and a return of damaged but saleable stores in the Commissariat magazine at Figueira.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Freneda, 13th May, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a private letter of the 23d Nov. from Earl

* See p. 467.

G. O.

Freneda, 13th May, 1813.

2. The Commander of the Forces receives frequent complaints of the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the army towards the magistrates of the country, notwithstanding the repeated orders which have been given on this subject: and it appears the more extraordinary that ground for these complaints should be given by the officers and soldiers of the British army, as it is well known that in their own country no individual can venture to insult or ill treat the civil magistrates.

3. Circumstances, however, have increased the inconveniences resulting from such conduct; and the Commander of the Forces begs that the officers of the army will recollect that the operations of the army are carried on within the territories of friendly powers, whose laws for the protection of the persons invested with authority are as strict as those of Great Britain, and that any injury done or insult given to the civil authorities of the government, will be attended by the same consequences as similar conduct would in Great Britain.

4. The Commander of the Forces begs that pains may be taken to communicate these orders to the Portuguese officers and troops, as well as the British; and he trusts that the Portuguese will pay the same deference and respect to the civil authorities in Spain as all classes of persons are obliged by the laws of Portugal to pay to the civil authorities in Portugal.

5. The quartering of the head quarters of the army is to be in future under the superintendence of the Commandant of the mounted Staff Corps, and Lieut. Col. Scovell will appoint an officer of the corps to manage the details of that duty.

Bathurst, containing a complaint against ——— for misapplication of the supplies of clothing and equipments with which he has been provided for the use of the Spanish troops under his command.

Instructions by the Q. M. G. for the assembly of the allied army.

Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry will move from Braga on the 13th May, by Ruivaes and Chaves, and will arrive at Braganza on the 22d.

Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry will move from Guimaraens on the 17th May, by Villa Pouça, and arrive at Braganza on the 22d.

Major Gen. Bock's brigade of cavalry will march from Santo Tirzo on the 14th May by Villa Real and Mirandella, and arrive at Outeiro on the 22d.

The horse artillery and all other wheel carriages, with the 3 brigades of cavalry above mentioned, will join and move with Gen. Bock's brigade.

They will be assisted, if necessary, at the ravine of the Tenella river, and also at that near Mirandella, by the infantry of the 5th division, the General in command of which has received instructions to that effect.

Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry will march on the 13th May from Penafiel by Amarante, and by Villa Pouça to Braganza, where it is to arrive on the 21st.

The 1st division of infantry will march from Viseu and from Mangualde on the 13th May, and having passed the Douro at Pezo da Regoa, it will proceed by Villa Real and Carazedo to Braganza, where it is to arrive on the 23d.

Brig. Gen. d'Urban will be pleased to move forward the brigade of Portuguese cavalry under his orders to Outeiro, so as to arrive there on the 21st May.

The 5th division will march on the 14th May from Lamego, and after having passed the Douro at Pezo da Regoa, it will proceed by Villa Real and Mirandella to Outeiro, where it is to arrive on the 23d.

Brig. Gen. Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry will march on the 17th May from Villa Real, by Mirandella, to Outeiro, so as to arrive there on the 21st.

The 3d division will march on the 16th May from Moimenta da Beira, will pass the Douro at S. João da Pesqueira on the 18th, and proceed by Villafior and Limão to Vimioso, where it is to arrive on the 24th.

But the artillery and all other wheel carriages belonging to the division will move by the road leading through Torre de Moncorvo, and rejoin the division at Vimioso.

The 7th division will march from Moimenta da Serra on the 14th May, and proceeding by Trancoso and Villa Nova de Foz Coa will pass the Douro at Poçinho, and thence proceed by Torre de Moncorvo to Miranda de Douro, where it will arrive on the 23d.

The 6th division will move from Coa on the 14th May, by Trancoso and Villa Nova de Foz Coa, and proceed, after crossing the Douro at Poçinho, by Torre de Moncorvo to Miranda de Douro, where it is to arrive on the 24th.

The 4th division will pass the Douro at the Barca de Poçinho on the 20th May, and reach Malhados near Miranda de Douro on the 25th.

The Hussar brigade will pass the Douro at Poçinho on the 21st and 22d May, and be in the neighbourhood of Miranda de Douro on the 26th and 27th.

The brigade of 18 pounders, the reserve brigade of artillery, and the spare ammunition which has been allotted to the left of the army; the pontoon train, with a detachment of sappers and miners, and the Royal Staff corps, will all pass the Douro at the Barca de Poçinho, and proceed according to the routes which have been issued to them, respectively, to the neighbourhood of Miranda de Douro.

Freneda, 13th May, 1813.

Instructions for the march of the troops under the immediate orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

The 2d division, the 3 regiments of British cavalry under Major Gen. Long, with Capt. Bean's troop of horse artillery, and Major Gen. Morillo's Spanish corps, are to be put in motion so as to arrive at Fuente Roble on the 23d May.

The Portuguese division of infantry under the Conde de Amarante, including 2 brigades of Portuguese artillery, and the 6th regt. of Portuguese cavalry, are to march as follows:

May 18th. Payo, Peñaparda, &c.

19th. Saugo.

20th. Zamarra.

21st. Moras-verdes.

22d. El Villar and Moraleja, on the Huebra river in front of Tamames.

The artillery of the Portuguese division may proceed to Fuente Guinaldo on the 19th; to the convent of La Caridad, near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 20th; and to Moras-verdes, to rejoin the division, on the 21st. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will be so good as to give the necessary orders for the march of these troops, and cause a copy to be transmitted to the Q. M. G.

The 4th regt. of Portuguese cavalry not being yet prepared to move, will receive separate orders.

I also transmit his account of the stores he has received, and of the mode of their distribution; and a letter from Mr. —, containing a return of the issues made to — — under the directions of Sir H. Wellesley; and a statement of the strength of his division in Nov. 1811, and June, 1812.

I beg you will communicate such parts of the enclosure in the Sec. of State's letter as you may think proper to — —, and that you will endeavor to ascertain whether the stores have been applied in the manner stated by him, and if he has received supplies from any quarter besides that of His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz.

As it is highly necessary for the good of the service, and in justice to — —, that the circumstances complained of should be thoroughly examined, I beg you will adopt such measures as you may consider expedient for the investigation of the subject.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

13th May, 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will be pleased to issue instructions to the officers of the Commissariat at Lamego, Celorico, and Almeida, to receive into store, and to take charge of the greatcoats of the soldiers of the several divisions of infantry, directed to be sent into store at those places by the G. O. of the 11th inst.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Sir R. Hill, brigade of Household cavalry.

13th May, 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Marquis of Wellington your letter of the 12th inst. and enclosures, conveying an application for leave of absence to Lieut. — of the 2d regt. of Life Guards, to proceed to England on urgent private affairs, his Lordship has directed me to signify to you in answer, that he is surprised that an officer should think proper to make application for leave of absence at the present moment, when the army is on the point of taking the field; and his Lordship has further directed me to desire that Lieut. — may be called upon to state the nature of the circumstances of urgency which have induced him to solicit leave of absence from his corps.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

13th May, 1813.

Your letter of the 9th inst. and enclosed proceedings of a Court of Inquiry (herewith returned) held at Coria, to investigate the circumstances attending the murder of private — —, and the wounding of private — — of the 39th regt., by a Spaniard attached to the Commissariat department, have been referred by me to Gen. Alava, with the view of ascertaining the mode by which justice may be obtained against the offender, and the following has been recommended by him as the regular way of proceeding:

The testimony of such persons as can give evidence against the person accused, as well as those he may think proper to call upon in his defence, should be drawn up in writing before the Alcalde of the place where the murder was committed, and the Commissary of the division to which the accused person is attached; the accused person himself being present, and permitted to put such questions to the parties under examination as he may think necessary to his justification. These informations, after having been regularly sworn to, and signed by the parties deposing, are to be transmitted to me for the purpose of being submitted to Gen. Castaños (Captain General of the province where the murder was committed), who will be requested to cause a Court Martial, composed of Spanish officers, to assemble. The written examinations will be laid before the Court Martial so assembled, and judgment will be pronounced upon the case.

To Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Camp of the Pontoon Train, 14th May, 1813.

Learning from Gen. Murray that it was possible that the pontoon train

might be in readiness to move to-morrow, I came over here this afternoon in order that I might see it, and might not delay it. It is clear, however, that the train will not be ready to move till the day after to-morrow, on which day I wish it to move by the road fixed upon by Gen. Murray, and which you were to reconnoitre this day. There is one pontoon quite rotten, which it would be desirable to leave behind here.

20 pairs of wheels, if Col. Dickson can spare as many, would set the train up in that respect completely. As this equipment is so important, it appears to me to be desirable that Col. Dickson should give all the wheels it requires, taking from it the bad wheels to be used in his reserve artillery and spare carriages till they can be replaced by others.

Lieut. Piper appears to be of opinion that the bullocks answer equally well with the horses. In my opinion, the best thing to do would be to leave with the train both the horses and oxen; more particularly, as it appeared from Col. Dickson's report of yesterday, that he had, within a very small number, a sufficiency of horses to draw all his artillery carriages. If this should be practicable, the pontoons should, in general, be drawn by the oxen, and the horses should be used only when absolutely necessary; and the horses accompanying the pontoons might be as a reserve for the service in general, but marching with the pontoons to aid them in case of difficulty.

In case the train can march to-morrow, it had better move a short distance by the proposed road.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir G. L. Cole, K.B., 4th division. 14th May, 1813.

Having had the honor of submitting to the consideration of the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 12th inst. and its enclosures, from Col. —, of the — regt., I have received directions from his Excellency to signify to you in answer, that it is by no means necessary that Col. —, and the other persons called upon

G. O.

Freneda, 14th May, 1813.

2. All the inconveniences felt by the regiments in receiving men from general hospitals without clothing, necessaries, or accoutrements, and the inconveniences and delays experienced in the settlement of the accounts of soldiers to be sent home as invalids, or in any other manner, originate in the neglect of the officers commanding companies, to the duties ordered by these orders.

3. Measures have lately been adopted to facilitate the execution of the duties ordered by the G. O. of this army, of the 17th Dec. 1809; and the Commander of the Forces declares his intention to have a note taken of the name of any officer who may neglect the performance of this necessary duty in future, and to bring the conduct of such officer under the consideration of the Commander in Chief, upon every occasion on which his claims for promotion may be brought forward.

4. The Commander of the Forces desires, that on the receipt of this order, the officers commanding at the hospital stations of Coimbra, Viseu, Celorico, Castello Branco, Abrantes, Santarem, and at Lisbon, will have Boards of officers appointed to survey and report upon, and frame registers of the Purveyor's stores, as ordered by the G. O. of the 17th Dec. 1809.

5. In future, the Commanding officers of the several hospital stations are to visit the depôts of arms, accoutrements, and necessaries, in charge of the Purveyors at the several hospital stations, at least once in each week, and to see that they are regularly kept; and the Commanding officers at the hospital stations must take care that when soldiers are sent from the hospital to join their regiments, they take with them their own arms, accoutrements, and necessaries.

6. The officers of the Purveyor's department are reminded that, as public officers, they are personally responsible for the articles of soldiers' necessaries, accoutrements, and arms, placed in their charge; and the Commander of the Forces declares his intention of making them pay for the losses and damage which these articles will sustain while in their charge.

by Lieut. —, should proceed to Lisbon for the purpose of appearing as witnesses in that officer's defence at his ensuing trial. It will be sufficient that those persons should appear before a Portuguese magistrate to be interrogated by the party accused: their interrogations and their answers committed to writing, and duly signed and sworn to by the deposing parties respectively, will be considered by a Portuguese tribunal sufficient evidence to authorise it to pronounce judgment on the case. This being the mode of proceeding pointed out by the laws of Portugal, where the personal attendance of witnesses cannot be conveniently obtained, the inconvenience to the service contemplated in your letter may be readily obviated; and in reference to what personally concerns Col. — in the transaction which took place at Villa Franca, the Commander of the Forces has directed me to observe that, as no charge has been regularly preferred against Col. — by the Juiz de Fora, his personal attendance at the trial of Lieut. — on that account will not be necessary.

His Excellency desires that Lieut. — may be directed to proceed to Lisbon forthwith, agreeably to the instructions conveyed in my letter of the 10th inst., addressed to Col. —.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 15th May, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Regency, a letter which I have received from Capt. Gen. Castaños, in which he has enclosed letters from Gen. Don P. A. Giron, and a correspondence between that officer and the Intendant of Galicia, in regard to the application of the resources of that province.

I have requested Gen. Castaños, in answer to that letter, to remind the Intendant of the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan., and of the orders of government of the 15th Feb., and to communicate a copy of the letter from the Minister at War to me of the 2d April, under which the Captains General of the Provinces are made, in a very particular manner, responsible for the realization of the revenues of the provinces. And I have urged Gen. Castaños to inform the Intendant of Galicia that he will be held responsible for obedience to his orders in all matters placed under the superintendence of the Captains General of the Provinces, by the decrees of the Cortes and the orders of the government.

The private letter from the Adj. Gen. Don Pascual Enrile of the 7th, refers to an arrangement which I desired might be made for the supply of the prisoners of war at Coruña, under which I engaged to supply the articles required for their food by importations to Coruña, provided that the money which had hitherto been expended in their support should be handed over to the Galician army. The government will see that the Intendant would not come into this arrangement; and they will also see in this letter ample cause for interference to prevent the corruption of the morals of the people, and other evil consequences likely to flow from

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 15th May, 1813.

I think it not impossible that the movement of your corps may be deferred a little. At least, as it stands now, it will be 2 or 3 days more forward than that of the left of the army, on account of our pontoon train getting on so badly.

It appears to me that your corps coming up the Pass of Baños will at once put the enemy upon the alert, which it would be desirable should not take place until every other part of the army is as forward as possible.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have been with Lord Wellington, who desires that you will limit the movements (which I observe by the arrangement sent me are to commence to-morrow) to the closing up of your cantonments, and that you will then suspend them until you hear further from hence.

the unrestrained communication with the prisoners spread through the provinces.

Upon transmitting these papers, to be laid before the government, I request you again to call their attention to my address of the 11th April, in answer to the letter of the government of the 2d of that month.

It is more than ever obvious that it is necessary that the government should explain themselves in regard to the charges to be defrayed out of the revenues of the provinces allotted for the armies; and should arm the Captains General of the Provinces with full powers, to be executed under strict responsibility, to control the conduct of the Intendants of the provinces in every respect.

I have lately transmitted, to be laid before the government, reports of the state of the resources of all the provinces freed from the enemy, in which they will see ample ground for an alteration of system; and if the further interference of the Cortes should be necessary, I earnestly recommend to the government to communicate with the legislature on the subject.

Great progress has been made in the clothing, the equipment, and the discipline of the troops; and much has been done in the last 3 months to prepare a Spanish army for the field. But all our efforts have failed to produce resources adequate at all to maintain them in the field; and I earnestly recommend to the government to revert to the letters which I addressed to them on the 27th Dec. 1812, and 24th April. Every day's experience convinces me that it is impossible to expect to maintain a Spanish army in the field, excepting by the resources of Spain itself.

Great Britain, owing to the misfortunes of the world, and particularly to the unfortunate situation of the Spanish colonies, cannot procure specie to give the assistance which is required of her, and to defray her own expenses in the war; and it is with difficulty, and by cramping every branch of the service, that I am enabled to perform the King's engagements to his allies. I must observe, likewise, with that frankness with which I am accustomed to address the government, that it is not reasonable to expect pecuniary sacrifices from Great Britain, when it is obvious that the country possesses resources which, if duly administered, and really applied to the object of maintaining troops in the field, would be more than sufficient for the purpose.

The campaign is about to open. The troops are all in march, and I now foretell to the government what will be the consequence. For a short time, and while the harvest shall be on the ground, the troops will be maintained by means which it is unnecessary to detail; but which will deteriorate the discipline of the troops, and will be equally distressing to the General officers who must sanction them, and to the inhabitants of the country who will have to bear the burthen. This resource will last, however, but a short time; and at the end of that time the Spanish troops must be dispersed, or must be sent to the rear for want of support.

What will then happen it is impossible at this moment to foresee; but as I am not myself deceived by appearances, I am anxious that the government should know the real situation of affairs, and that they should adopt early measures to insure those resources for the armies which I know the

country can afford, and which it is obvious require only a due administration of them in order to be realised.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

Gen. O'Donell, who is by this time on his way from Seville, will cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and proceed from thence across the Tietar by Plasencia on Baños, &c. He will not arrive for some days; but I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me have all the information you have been able to acquire regarding the fords, bridges, and *barcas* on the Tietar, and the roads leading to them, in order that I may send it to Gen. O'Donell.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Gen. Alava in regard to the conduct of the Portuguese magistrate of Lamego towards certain Spanish muleteers attached to the 5th division.

It is very obvious that not only would the allied army be unable to enter upon its operations, but to defend even the Kingdom of Portugal, if it were not for the assistance of the Spanish muleteers; and yet there is no class of persons so ill used as they are by the corrupt Portuguese magistracy.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will put the matter referred to in the enclosed letter in a train of inquiry, with a view to have the magistrate at Lamego punished for his misconduct.

To Brig. Gen. Inglis.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

I enclose the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of Lieut. — of the — regt., whom the Court have recommended for mercy, having found him guilty of 'behaving in a manner unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.'

I would beg the Court to observe, that supposing H. R. H. the Prince Regent to be inclined to attend to their recommendation, it cannot be expected that the officers of the —, or of any other regiment, will like much to associate with Lieut. —; and this act of the Court may be injurious to the authority of the Prince Regent, or to the feelings of any regiment in which Lieut. — may be placed.

I acknowledge that upon perusal of the proceedings of the Court Martial, it appears to me that the case against Lieut. — is not proved. I am inclined to believe that Lieut. — has been engaged in a description of traffic very improper for an officer of the army, in connexion with the quarter master of the regiment; and that transactions were carried on between them, and accounts existed, which have not come to light. It is proved that Lieut. — had the permission of the quarter master to apply to his private purposes the money sent to Lisbon for the payment of the regimental debt due to Mr. —; and it is likewise obvious that Lieut. — declared his readiness to pay Mr. —'s demand. Under these circumstances, although Lieut. —'s conduct was improper, it has not been proved as charged in the first charge; and the sentence ought probably to be modified accordingly.

In the evidence on the third charge there is an appearance of the existence of the transactions to which I have above referred; and it is proved that Lieut. —, having these transactions with the quarter master, did send to the paymaster of the regiment a statement of debts from the officers of the regiment, to be recovered by the quarter master to the amount charged against him in the estimate; and upon the whole I conceive that it would be best for the Court to modify their sentence.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Freneda, ce 16 Mai, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 9, et le Gén. Castaños m'a envoyé celle que vous lui avez écrite, sur vos discussions avec l'Intendant de la Galice. J'ai déjà écrit au gouvernement là-dessus; et j'en espère des bons résultats. Nos vivres seront à la Corogne; mais nous n'en donnerons pas pour les prisonniers Français, à moins que ce ne soit pour vous donner de l'argent.

J'ai déjà ordonné au Commissaire Gén. d'être préparé à vous donner encore 100,000 *duros* vers les derniers jours de Juin. Je vous prie de faire dire à vos marchands de la Corogne de se mettre en communication avec M. White, notre Commissaire là, pour ce qui regarde l'argent qu'ils ont à donner pour des billets sur l'Angleterre.

Quoique je sois toujours ici, nos troupes sont toutes en marche du côté du nord du Douro; et le Quartier Général, qui doit rester ici jusqu'au dernier moment, se mettra en mouvement dans 3 ou 4 jours. Notre pont nous a causé du retard, mais il est arrivé à Sabugal, et est encore en marche.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

In addition to the letter which I addressed to you yesterday in regard to the state of the finances in Galicia, I beg leave to call the attention of the Regency to the recommendation of the Capt. Gen. Castaños, that the Intendant of Galicia may be removed from his office, and Don Juan de San Martin may be appointed to fill it. There certainly appears something very extraordinary and inconsistent in his statements.

I have besides to observe upon this point, that it is positively stated by the Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, that the officers and soldiers, with their regiments of the army of Galicia, have received no pay since the month of January last.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 16th May, 1813.

Lord W. Bentinck has sent me, in a letter of the 13th April, of which I enclose a copy, copies of his dispatches to Lord Castlereagh (marked secret and separate) of the 24th Feb. 1813. I acknowledge that I don't see any thing in the former of these dispatches to induce me to alter the opinion which I had formed on the state of affairs in Italy; and from the latter it would appear that Murat, at least, thought himself sufficiently strong to attack the allies.

I have no knowledge of what number of men Lord W. Bentinck could bring into the field in the south of Italy, supposing the allied British and Sicilian corps now on the eastern coast of Spain were returned to him. But from what I see in the papers above referred to, and knowing that

Gen. Garnier has been withdrawn from Italy, it is my opinion that he ought not to land in Italy with less than from 30,000 to 40,000 men, well equipped in every respect with cannon, cavalry, &c.

There is very little in the paper enclosed in Lord William's dispatch to Lord Castlereagh of the 24th Feb.; but that little shows that in the first effort at least we should have to depend solely upon our own means; and those means must be sufficiently strong to overcome all opposition to be reasonably expected, otherwise I think it may be inferred from the same paper, not only that we should have no assistance from the country, but that as far as their resources would go, the people of the country would assist the enemy.

You will see throughout the paper that the people of the country look for the protection of some power against the French, and it is stated that they prefer the protection of Great Britain to that of Austria. This I perfectly understand. The Austrians would require from them assistance in money and provisions, and would insist upon their allegiance, and upon governing them, in return for their protection. It is supposed that we, as we have elsewhere, would at least defray the expense of the army by means of which we should protect them; and probably, besides, aid them with a subsidy.

The south of Italy is, for many reasons, probably the best scene of operations for a British army, excepting the Spanish Peninsula; and it is certainly a question of means whether the British government will undertake any operations in that quarter, on the scale to which I have above referred. It may be depended upon, that if they are commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last, and to increase the means of opposing the French in Italy to the utmost, by raising, clothing, and feeding armies of the natives of Italy, or by enabling others to raise, clothe, and feed them, the plan will fail, and our troops would be forced to embark with loss and disgrace.

P.S. Upon referring to the letters from Lord W. Bentinck, I find that they are addressed to your Lordship, and not to Lord Castlereagh.

The A.G. to Col. Arentschildt, 1st hussars, K.G.L.

16th May, 1813.

The Commander of the Forces purposes to review the Light division to-morrow,

G. O.

Freneda, 17th May, 1813.

4. The frequent neglect of the officers of the junior ranks of the army to perform those duties required, has been attended by the most serious and distressing consequences; and the Commander of the Forces had hoped that the orders of the army, and the precepts and examples of their superiors, and their own reflections, would have taught them to pay more attention, and that he should not have had occasion in future to complain of these neglects.

5. The duty of reporting a detachment on its march to the Commandant of every military station through which it passes, is prescribed and practised in every army, wherever stationed; and it is particularly enjoined in this army, for reasons to which it is not now necessary to advert, but which are sufficiently detailed in the G. O. upon the subject.

6. Inadvertency is no excuse for the neglect of this or any other duty, however frequently it may be alleged; and as the Commander of the Forces has full reason to acknowledge the zeal and good intention of all the officers of the army, he has to lament and complain of their inadvertency only for the various neglects from which the service suffers so seriously: it is their business to make themselves masters of the orders for the guidance of their conduct on every duty on which they may be employed, and if they will only turn their mind towards and reflect, each upon his own business, they will soon find that the performance of essential duties, and the obedience to orders, will not escape their memories.

the 17th inst., at 10 o'clock A.M., on the Espeja plain; and his Excellency is desirous of seeing the 1st hussars under arms, at the same time and place, in as great strength as can be mustered. I am to desire, therefore, that you will march with the 1st hussars, so as to be on the ground at the appointed time. The place where the Light division are to assemble may be ascertained on application to Major Gen. C. Alten.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

16th May, 1813.

With a view to insure regularity in the mode of accounting for men belonging to this army, who may from time to time be sent to England invalided, I have to request that a register of invalided men may be kept at the depôt at Belem, a form of which register is herewith transmitted. A certain number of pages in the register is to be set apart for each regiment and corps, and the men's names are to be inserted by regiments and corps according to the date of embarkation or removal from the depôt. In transmitting to you this form of register I beg you will understand that, if it should appear to you that it is susceptible of being altered for the better, I shall be glad to attend to your suggestions on the subject, my sole object being to establish at the depôt at Belem a document so framed as to be handy for reference, and at the same time affording all necessary information as to the date of embarkation and other particulars regarding invalided men. It will be desirable that the register should commence as far back as the documents in the Commandant's office at Belem will enable you to make the entries of names, date of embarkation, &c., with the necessary degree of accuracy.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a report which I have received from Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, on the carriages and boats of the pontoon train now with this army.

As the operations of the army will depend principally on the efficiency of this train, and it has already occasioned a delay of several days, and it has been necessary to dismantle some of the carriages of the artillery, in order to equip those of the pontoon train with wheels, it is very desirable that measures should be taken to send to Coruña good carriages, constructed as proposed by Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, for 18 pontoons of the large size, and 20 new pontoons with their carriages.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

I enclose the memorandum from Lieut. — — —, of the — regt., whom I have ordered to Lisbon to report himself to you as being in readiness to take his trial according to the Portuguese law, for his conduct at Villa Franca in December last.

You will see in his memorandum the statement of the grievances upon him, in consequence of the apparently unnecessary, and, under the circumstances, cruel delay, in bringing him to trial; and I beg that you will lay my request before the Portuguese government, that, as owing to these delays all the persons whom Lieut. — — might call upon in his defence will be absent, and probably at a great distance from Lisbon, in the ser-

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Freneda, 17th May, 1813.

Lord Wellington desires that you will be so good as continue the movement of the troops under your immediate orders, so that those destined for Fuente Roble may reach that place on the 24th inst.; and those destined for El Villar and Moraleja may arrive at those points on the 23d inst.

I beg you will be so good as acknowledge the receipt of this letter. A copy of it is transmitted direct to the officer commanding at Moraleja for the information and guidance of the Conde de Amarante, to whom you will of course also communicate your orders.

vice of the government of Portugal and its allies, the Governors of the Kingdom will give orders that ample time and every facility may be

Instructions for movement. Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

The 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions of infantry, and Gen. Pack's and Gen. Bradford's brigades, and Major Gen. Anson's, Major Gen. Ponsonby's, Major Gen. Bock's, and the hussar brigades of British cavalry, and Brig. Gen. d'Urban's brigade of Portuguese, have been ordered across the Douro, together with a brigade of 18 pounders and the pontoon train; and the reserve artillery and ammunition, as will be made known hereafter to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.

These troops will be stationed as follows:

At Braganza	{ Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade, 21st. Major Gen. Anson's brigade, 22d. Brig. Gen. Ponsonby's brigade, 22d. 1st division of infantry, 24th.
At Outeiro	{ Gen. Bock's brigade, 22d. Gen. d'Urban's Portuguese brigade, from 21st to 23d. 5th division of infantry, 24th. Gen. Bradford's brigade, 21st.
At Vimioso	3d division, 20th.
At Malhadas and Miranda de Douro	{ 6th division, 24th. 7th division, 23d. Hussar brigade, 27th. 4th division, 26th. 18th Portuguese brigade, 21st.

Pontoon train not ordered farther than Villa Velha, on the road to Malhadas. It will be at Villa Velha between the 22d and 24th.

These troops have then received orders to move as follows: viz.; the left from Braganza, in 4 marches on Tabara, where the cavalry will arrive on the 28th, and the infantry on the 29th.

The centre at Outeiro and Vimioso. Those at Outeiro in 4 marches to Losilla, where the cavalry will arrive on the 28th, and the infantry on the 29th. Those at Vimioso in 3 marches to Losilla. The right at Malhadas are to receive their detailed instructions from Lieut. Col. de Lancey, now at Miranda, so as to arrive at Carvajales on the 28th, 29th, and 30th.

It is intended to lay the bridge of pontoons at the Barca de Villal Campo, about a mile below the junction of the Esla with the Duero, where it is expected it will arrive on the 30th.

The orders for the movements subsequent to the 24th, and those given by the Q. M. G. to Col. de Lancey, accompany this memorandum.

A magazine has been formed at Mirandella, and another at Miranda de Douro. The former has been ordered forward to Braganza.

The troops which will march by the left of the Douro, being the 2d, Light, and the Conde de Amarante's divisions of infantry, and Gen. Slade's, Gen. Alten's, Gen. Long's, and the Household brigades of cavalry, and Col. Campbell's Portuguese brigade, will arrive at Salamanca the 27th, from whence they will direct their march towards the Barca de Villal Campo, where they will arrive on the 30th.

The object of these movements is first to turn the enemy's positions on the Duero, and next to secure the junction of the right of the army with the left, as far up the river as may be practicable.

Capt. Mitchell is now employed in the examination of the fords and other passages of the Esla.

Head quarters will move with that part of the army which goes by the left of the Duero; and there is now a communication established from hence to Miranda, and thence to Braganza. As head quarters will move forward, a communication will be established by Freixo de Espadacinta, which will fall in with the communication from Freneda to Miranda at Fornos, where a person will be stationed.

When head quarters shall arrive at Salamanca, the communication will be carried from thence by Bemposta to Sindim, on the road to Miranda, where another person will be posted.

As the communication will thus be very short and easy, and as the further operations of the left of the army will depend upon circumstances, further instructions will be sent to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham if it should be necessary.

Gen. Giron, with the Galician army, will be ordered to be at Benavente on the 29th and 30th.

allowed to Lieut. — to produce such evidence as he may think proper after obtaining a knowledge of the exact charge against him.

To Lieut. —.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

I have received your memorial of the 16th inst.

Every independent government has a right to order the trial of any individual residing in the country under its government by the tribunals and according to the laws of the country; and it is impossible for me to interfere in any manner to prevent the Portuguese government from bringing you to trial before a Portuguese Court for your conduct at Villa Franca.

I am much concerned that there should have been any delay in bringing you to trial, which I believe is owing to the natural progress of a proceeding in a Portuguese Court of Law, and not to any desire to oppress you or to deprive you of any evidence which you may think necessary for your defence. This is one of the evil consequences of your conduct at Villa Franca.

I have written, however, to Sir C. Stuart, His Majesty's minister at Lisbon, and have pointed out to him the disadvantages under which you will labor from the delay of your trial; and have requested that he will apply to the Portuguese government that you may have time given to you to obtain answers to such interrogatories as you may think proper to put to such persons as you may think proper to have examined in your defence.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 28th, in regard to the Prince of Orange. I recollect that he spoke to me respecting his wish to join the

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Col. De Lancey, D. Q. M. G.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

You will find by the accompanying routes and memorandums, that I have given you a good deal to do. I know, however, by experience, that you will get well through it all.

I send you copies of letters I have written to Sir L. Cole and to Major Gen. Hay, desiring they will each be so good as to furnish you with an assistant. You had perhaps better send the copies to meet these Generals upon their march, as memorandums. The only alterations I am apprised of having occurred since you left this are the following: The 1st division will be 2 days later in reaching Braganza than originally ordered, owing to unavoidable delay in passing the Douro at Pezo da Regoa; and the 5th division may, possibly, be one day later in arriving at Outeiro, from the same cause.

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Col. the Hon. C. M. Cathcart, A. Q. M. G.

Freneda, 18th May, 1813.

You will be so good as proceed to Braganza as soon as you can after receiving this letter, and continue with the column of troops which are to assemble at, and to march from that place. The enclosed route will point out to you the line of march to be taken by these troops; you will place yourself under the orders of the senior General officers present with these troops, and you will continue with the column until further orders.

It is very desirable that you should see Brig. Gen. d'Urban in your way to Braganza, as he will be able to furnish you, probably, with some valuable information respecting the route which the column from that place is to move by; and he will make you aware also of the best channels for obtaining further information. Be so good, likewise, as to put yourself in communication from Braganza with Lieut. Col. De Lancey, who is stationed at Miranda de Douro. A post has been established from head quarters to Braganza, through Miranda de Douro, by which you will be so good as to send reports to me of the arrival of the troops directed upon Braganza; and transmit to me, also, such other information as it may be of importance that I should be made acquainted with.

A copy of this letter will be sent to Major Gen. Bock for his information.

Prussian army, when the probability that the King of Prussia would take a line with the Russians was talked of here ; and, after some consideration, finding that he was anxious to go, I gave my consent, provided the Prince Regent should approve of his doing so. He afterwards received the account of the Prussian defection from the French, and the Prince wrote to the Duke of York and to your Lordship on the 4th ult. It appears that you had not received these letters when you wrote to me on the 28th, and, therefore, I conclude that the letters from the Prince's gentleman to M. Fagel must have referred to my conversations with the Prince before we were certain of the line taken by the King of Prussia, and must have been written before the Prince wrote to the Duke of York, or I to your Lordship, on that subject.

I don't recollect to have mentioned to the Prince, or to any body, that I had had any communication with you respecting his return to England ; and as I find that his father has not written to him by the mail which brought mine of the 28th, I don't propose to speak to him respecting his departure till the next mail shall arrive.

The Prince of Orange appears to me to have a very good understanding ; he has had a very good education, his manners are very engaging, and he is liked by every person who approaches him : such a man may become any thing ; but, on the other hand, he is very young, and can have no experience in business, particularly in the business of revolutions ; he is very shy and diffident ; and I don't know that it will not be a disadvantage to him to place him in a situation in which he is to be at the head of great concerns of this description ; and that too much is not to be expected from him. The worst that can happen to him, in my opinion, is, that he should remain long in England ; and if it had been arranged that he should go to the Prussian army, and his father had not been in London, I should have advised him on his departure to stay in London as short a time as was possible, and to keep himself quite clear of cabals and disputes ; and I am sure he would have done as I should desire him. His father being there, things are different ; and as he is looked to as the head of the insurrection in Holland, he will have to wait in London, of course, till there shall be some appearance of such an insurrection.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Freneda, 19th May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 13th May, and I have perused the proposed regulation for the collection of the direct taxes in Portugal. In my opinion it does not go to the objects I have in view. These were to draw from the merchants in particular, and other proprietors in the great towns, the real tenth of the income of each. This regulation goes only to levy from the *commercio* and other bodies the taxes laid on those bodies. Why should the nobleman or land proprietor pay a tenth of his income,

Instructions for the movement of the troops cantoned between the Coa and the Agueda, and of head quarters.

Freneda, 19th May, 1813.

Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade of Light cavalry, the Light division, a body of sappers and miners, the brigade of Household cavalry, and a troop of reserve artillery, will march to-morrow by the routes transmitted to them, and arrive on the 23d inst. at San Muñoz.

and the merchant not the hundredth of his? Why should the *commercio* be taxed as a corporation? This is the great evil, for which the proposed regulation is no remedy.

To Earl Bathurst.

Freneda, 19th May, 1813.

The bridge of pontoons arrived at Sabugal on the 13th, and the repairs which it required occasioned the necessity for a halt on the 14th and 15th. It has since continued its march, however, and all the troops are in motion; and I trust that the whole army will be collected on the Duero, having a bridge on that river, in the neighbourhood of Zamora, with the Spanish army of Galicia in communication with the left of the allied British and Portuguese army, by the end of this month.

The 3d Spanish army, under the command of the Duque del Parque, has commenced its movements, and was on the 8th inst. with its right at Alcaraz, and its left at La Carolina. The cavalry are covering the movement at Manzanares.

The enemy occasionally send a small body of troops into Toledo; but there has been no material alteration in their position for some time past.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Freneda, 20th May, 1813.

I received last night an account, that one division of the army of the Centre had arrived at Valladolid on the 11th, and that the head quarters of the army of the South had been moved from Arevalo to Rueda. The first of these facts has been confirmed by accounts received this morning; the last has not been mentioned.

But adverting to the facility which the enemy have of collecting their force upon Toro and Zamora, and of operating either upon the left or the right of the Duero, and the length of time which would elapse to bring our bridge back to the passage of Espadacinta, supposing it should be necessary, after all, to pass the right of the army there, I have deemed it expedient to order 14 of the pontoons and a proportion of the establishment to halt at Espadacinta, which will be sufficient for the passage of the river there: 19 boats will proceed on, which will be more than sufficient either for the passage of the Duero at the Barca de Villal Campo, or for that of the Esla.

I enclose a memorandum,* showing the carriages of the reserve artillery which will cross the Douro at Foz Coa, and the days on which they will arrive at Malhadas.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Freneda, 20th May, 1813.

I send you the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial

* See p. 493.

Memorandum.

Freneda, 20th May, 1813.

The head quarters of the army, with the military departments attached to it, will move on the 22d inst. to Ciudad Rodrigo.†

The civil department attached to head quarters will move on the same day by Torre de Moncorvo to Miranda de Douro, where they will arrive on the 31st May.

† One of the reasons why the Commander in Chief and the Military departments of head quarters moved by Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca, was to give the impression that the principal part of the allied army was advancing by that line.

of Mr. Drake. It appears clearly, that the officer sent by the government to Coimbra to expedite the transmission of the clothing of the army acted in a manner totally contrary to regulation; that he was not authorised to press boats, yet he pressed at the British landing place boats which had been in our service for two years, and actually loaded with our stores. I don't think he has proved clearly that there was any violence used by Mr. Drake in defence of his boats; but, at all events, not against what could be called a sentry.

I don't know whether any thing can be done with the government on this subject; but, as usual, I suppose not.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Freneda, 20th May, 1813.

I just write to let you know that we shall move head quarters the day after to-morrow. All the troops are in motion. Our confounded bridge has delayed us many days, but I hope that before the end of the month we shall be established beyond the Duero.

The last accounts from England are to the 28th April. The Russians, under Witgenstein, had had some success against Beauharnais on the 5th, and it was supposed that there had been another successful affair on the 13th.

The Prince of Orange had arrived in England.

Au Gén. Don L. Wimpffen.

Freneda, ce 21 Mai, 1813, à 2 heures de l'après midi.

Je vous envoie le rapport sur le passage du Tietar, que je vous prie d'envoyer au Comte de la Bisbal, et de lui dire, en même tems, que, comme la gauche de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise a déjà passé le Douro, et se porte sur l'Esla, et que la droite suit ce mouvement de ce côté ci de la rivière, et qu'elle passera le Douro aussi tout de suite, il serait trop éloigné s'il ne passait pas par Plasencia et le Puerto de Baños, ou pour agir de concert ou pour sa propre sureté, en cas que l'ennemi se déterminât à se tenir à cheval sur le Douro. Je crois que le courrier fera bien de passer par le pont d'Alcantara, et de là tout droit à Merida, où il aura des nouvelles du Comte de la Bisbal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Ciudad Rodrigo, 22d May, 1813, 3 P.M.

I arrived here this day; and the Light division and cavalry and the Conde de Amarante's division are encamped on the river of Santi-espiritus in front. I go to-morrow to Tamames.

G. O.

Freneda, 21st May, 1813.

4. There is to be an officer of the General Staff at all times present in the camp or cantonment of each division of the army, who is to receive all orders sent to the division, and who is to be responsible that the orders are immediately communicated to the senior officer present, to be forthwith acted upon by him if necessary, in the event of the General officer commanding the division being absent.

5. In camp, the tent, or hut, of the above mentioned Staff officer is to be placed always in the same situation in the division, and it is to be known to the quarter guard of each regiment, so that any person arriving in the camp of the division with orders may be immediately conducted to it.

There is nothing new ; and I am inclined to believe that the head quarters of the army of the South are still at Arevalo.

The French detachment was certainly in Toledo on the 16th.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Tamames, 23d May, 1813, 8 P.M.

I write to apprise you of our arrival here.

The Light division and cavalry are at San Muñoz. I have not yet received the reports from thence. The Conde de Amarante is at Moraleja ; and Sir R. Hill has moved from Bejar.

I have no news of the enemy, excepting that they were still in Madrid and Toledo on the 18th. I hear from my brother that the Americans had made some fresh propositions for peace, connected with an offer to submit to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Tamames, 23d May, 1813.

I received this morning your letter of the 17th.

My objection to — is not his being employed by you, but his attending to any thing and every thing excepting his own business, to which he must attend with steadiness if I should recommend that he may be employed with the troops.

I think that in the beginning of July the army of reserve of Andalusia, and 1st, 2d, and 3d armies, ought to have each 100,000 dollars, in addition to what they have had. I have desired our Commissaries to prepare to give 100,000 at that period to the operating army of Galicia ; and we continue to pay Don Carlos and Morillo.

I hope that the British government will not submit to the arbitration of Russia. The point at issue between them and the Americans is very simple, and we have no answer to give excepting that we neither can nor will concede it either to them or any other power : there can be no mediation on any other point. The object of this offer must be to create a division between us and the Russians.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Tamames, 24th May, 1813.

Having communicated with the Commissary Gen., Sir R. Kennedy, regarding the plan on which you and I had conversed for the convoy of the money of both nations from Lisbon to the army, I have settled with him, that instructions shall be sent to Dep. Commissary Gen. Papon, and Dep. Paymaster Gen. Boyes at Lisbon, to have the money for the British army in readiness to march from Lisbon on the 1st and 15th of every month ; and they will have directions to communicate with any officer you will appoint in regard to the escort, and to the meeting with the money intended for the Portuguese army.

I enclose the stages according to which the mules can march, with the several halts which they usually make ; the whole arranged as far as Salamanca. Beyond that place I conceive that the money ought to march by special order, to be arranged from time to time.

The cavalry escort might relieve those of the infantry at Sabugal, or Aldea da Ponte.

I enclose a copy of the orders of this army in regard to the charge of money on a march, of which it will be expedient to give a translation to the officer commanding the escort of money.

1st day, Sacavem,	9th day, Niza,	17th day, Gallegos,
2d .. Villa Franca,	10th .. Sarnadas,	18th .. Ciudad Rodrigo,
3d .. Azambuja,	11th .. Castello Branco,	19th .. halt.
4th .. Santarem,	12th .. S. Miguel,	20th .. Martin del Rio,
5th .. Golegão,	13th .. Memoa,	21st .. Calzada de Don
6th .. Abrantes,	14th .. Sabugal,	Diego,
7th .. halt.	15th .. halt.	22d .. Salamanca.
8th .. Gavião,	16th .. Aldea da Ponte,	

To Viscount Melville.

Tamames, 24th May, 1813.

In reference to my letter of the 27th Jan., in which I communicated to your Lordship the opinion entertained by Major Gen. Cooke and the inhabitants of Cadiz in general, of the services of Capts. Pell and Carroll of the Royal Navy, who were in charge of the gun boats there during the late siege, I have the honor to transmit for your consideration the copy of a letter I have received from Capt. Thomas, who appears to have been employed on the same duty as the officers before mentioned.

To Earl Bathurst.

Tamames, 24th May, 1813.

I am very much obliged to your Lordship for the key of the cipher as far as it had been discovered, which you transmitted to me on the 5th April last; and I now enclose for your information such parts of it as have been made out by Lieut. Col. Scovell without reference to the key received through your Lordship.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813, 8½ P.M.

I arrived here this day. Our right will be to-morrow, the Spaniards at Alba, and Hill and De Amarante close to Aldea Tejada. The Light division and the Household brigade on the Valmusa, and V. Alten's brigade on the heights between that stream and Salamanca. I shall throw them into Salamanca if I can.

The enemy have evacuated Ledesma, and drawn the troops from thence into Salamanca, which looks as if they did not intend to move upon Zamora. I have not heard of the movement of those at Avila. They were still on the Tagus, at Mombeltran, and Toledo, on the 20th. There is nothing new on the side of Valladolid, excepting a report that Reille's head quarters have been moved to Burgos.

P.S. I have ordered that the bridge may be laid under Espadacinta, but that is only by way of precaution.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

In consequence of what passed between you and me this day, I have given directions that Capt. O'Ryan, of the Spanish army, attached to the department of the Q. M. G., may be attached to the division under the Conde de Amarante. This officer will have authority and directions to make such requisitions for supplies on the Spanish authorities in the country as he may be directed to make by the Conde de Amarante, the

Conde de Amarante taking the necessary measures that due receipts or money may be given for the same.

I request, however, that Gen. the Conde de Amarante may be apprised of the degree to which the country is already exhausted; and that, besides the division of troops under his command, there is a very large army to be supplied, in some degree, from its resources. It will be necessary, therefore, that he should make his Commissaries exert themselves to get up supplies from the rear; and that, at all events, an effort should be made to pay with ready money for what will be demanded.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

I have nothing particular to tell you that is not in the dispatch, of which a copy goes with this. I think we shall be in Salamanca tomorrow, and shall have no difficulty in establishing our communication across the Duero.

I find that the enemy were still on the Tagus on the 20th.

To Earl Bathurst.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

The troops forming the left of the army having made considerable progress in their march on the right of the Duero, I put in motion the 2d and Light, and the Conde de Amarante's divisions of infantry of the allied British and Portuguese army, and Gen. Morillo's Spanish division; and Gen. Fane's, Gen. Long's, Gen. V. Alten's, and the Household brigades of the British cavalry; and the 6th regt. of Portuguese cavalry, and Don J. Sanchez's of Spanish cavalry; and moved the head quarters from Freneda on the 22d inst.

The enemy evacuated Ledesma yesterday afternoon, and the force there

Instructions for the movement on the 26th May, 1813.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will be so good as direct Major Gen. Morillo's division to move to Alba de Tormes, and to occupy that place, if it has been evacuated by the enemy.

The 13th regt. of light dragoons is to march with the Spanish division.

The remainder of the troops under Sir R. Hill are to move forward towards Salamanca by the road through Morilla and Miranda de Azan, which is to the right of that leading upon Aldea Tejada, and are to halt upon the right bank of the Zurguen rivulet, a little above Aldea Tejada.

The Portuguese troops under the Conde de Amarante will move forward by the road to Aldea Tejada, and will halt near that place.

The Household brigade, and the reserve artillery, will move through Carnero to Fraquas, upon the Valmusa rivulet.

The detachment of the Household brigade in front of Matilla will march by the direct road towards Salamanca, and halt upon the Valmusa rivulet until further orders.

The Light division will march by Calzada de Don Diego to the Valmusa rivulet.

If the enemy has not evacuated Salamanca, Major Gen. V. Alten will move to the Valmusa river only, and there wait for the Light division.

But if Salamanca has been evacuated, Gen. V. Alten will move beyond that place to the village of Villares.

In the event of Salamanca being evacuated by the enemy, Sir R. Hill will order the cavalry under Major Gen. Fane to cross the Tormes by the ford of S^{ta} Marta to the village of Cabrerizos; and Gen. Fane will, in that case, establish his outposts so as to occupy Aldea Lengua on the right, and to communicate, by the heights behind Morisco, with the outposts of Major Gen. V. Alten.

Major Gen. Fane will ascertain as early as he can to-morrow morning, whether the Tormes is at present fordable at S^{ta} Marta, and Major Gen. V. Alten will, in like manner, ascertain whether it is fordable at El Canto, below Salamanca.

marched towards Salamanca; and I expect that the allied troops will be on the Tormes to-morrow.

I hope that I shall experience no difficulty in establishing the communication across the Duero, near its junction with the Esla; but lest I should, I have taken measures to establish a bridge lower down, which secures the junction of the right of the army with the left, as soon as this part of the country shall be cleared of the enemy's troops.

The enemy were still at Madrid on the 18th inst.; and I have not heard of their having, up to that period, made any alteration in their positions, excepting that a part of the army of the Centre had arrived at Valladolid.

My last reports from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray are dated the 11th inst.; and he expected that, about the 22d inst., the 3d Spanish army would be in communication with the 2d.

The army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of the Conde de la Bisbal, broke up from the neighbourhood of Seville on the 11th and 12th, and was likely to cross the Tagus on the 24th at Almaraz, where I have established a bridge.

P.S. I have just received intelligence, to which I give credit, that Longa attacked on the 3d inst., between Miranda de Ebro and Armiñon, a convoy under Gen. Rouyer, whom he obliged to retire upon Miranda with considerable loss, particularly in officers.

To Earl Bathurst.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a return of field equipment required for the use of the army under my command; and I will thank your Lordship to give directions that the different articles may be sent by the earliest opportunity to Coruña.

To Earl Bathurst.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

I enclose the morning state. We have struck off the 4th provisional battalion, consisting of the detachments of the 30th and 44th regts., about 600 R. and F.; on the other hand, however, we have to take on the strength about 300 men returned on command, who have been at work constructing buildings for hospitals between the Agueda and the Coa. Some few men have fallen sick since the troops marched; but in general, the troops are more healthy than I have ever known them to be.

Unfortunately, some vessels were taken on the coast of Portugal, which had on board the equipments for the troops, and they are not so complete as I could wish in some articles. It was impossible to wait for the arrival of the articles ordered from Lisbon to replace those lost; and we must, therefore, do as well as we can without them.

I hope, however, that some measures will be taken to secure for us the navigation of the coasts of Portugal and Spain. Your Lordship will observe that we have got every thing into the field that we can scrape together; and after all, I believe we are inferior to the enemy.

I don't mean to complain of the Duke of York's decision to take from us 4 regiments of cavalry, but a remount of 700 horses at the end of the last campaign, and the permission to take 100 horses from each of the

regiments of the English hussars which they would have been better without, would have given us now 1200 additional cavalry, and would have enabled me to keep that number in reserve, to be brought forward towards the close of the campaign, when we may expect that a great effort will be made by the enemy, as was done last year, and all the dissatisfaction would have been avoided, which has been the consequence of drafting the horses from these regiments.

Your Lordship will be the best judge whether it is expedient to provide for the augmentation of the cavalry at the close of the campaign; and if you should judge it to be so, I recommend that the augmentation should be sent out without loss of time.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Matilla, 25th May, 1813.

As it is possible that the enemy may be obliged to evacuate a considerable portion, if not the whole, of Castille, I beg your Excellency will suggest to the Regency the expediency of appointing the officers of the *Hacienda* to perform the duties in the several provinces of that kingdom, and that they should be sent without delay to their stations.

It is particularly desirable that an intelligent and active person should be sent into the province of Soria.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Salamanca, 26th May, 1813, 8½ A.M.

We arrived here this morning, and Villatte waited for us rather longer than he ought, and we did him a good deal of mischief on his retreat with the cavalry of Gen. Fane's and Gen. Alten's brigades.

He is gone towards Cantala-piedra and Medina del Campo. The garrison of Alba joined at Babila-fuente or Villoria. It is rather extraordinary that he should have marched by Cabrerizos and the ravine, which we used to think so bad for even a horse, and thence by Aldea Lengua. I believe the division at Avila goes by Arevalo. Thus I hope we shall have no difficulty in the junction as at first projected. I hope to cross the Douro at Miranda on the 28th or 29th.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Salamanca, 26th May, 1813.

I received your letter of the 20th, relative to Gen. Juan, yesterday, before I had received that of the 18th.

I arrived here this morning, and found the enemy still in the town, with one division of infantry and 3 squadrons of cavalry, and some cannon of the army of the South, under the command of Gen. Villatte.

The enemy evacuated the town on our approach, but they waited longer than they ought on the high ground in the neighbourhood, and afforded an opportunity for the cavalry, under Gen. Fane and Gen. V. Alten, the former of whom crossed the Tormes at the ford of Sta Marta, and the latter at the bridge, to do them a good deal of injury in their retreat. Many were killed and wounded, and we have taken above 150 prisoners, 7 tumbrils of ammunition, some baggage, provisions, &c. The enemy retired by the road of Babila-fuente, and near Huerta were joined by a body of infantry and cavalry on their march from Alba. I then ordered our troops to discontinue the pursuit, the infantry not being up.

The A.G. to Capt. Brown, Belem.

27th May, 1813.

With reference to your letter of the 21st inst. regarding the accounts of invalided men ordered to be transferred to the 13th Royal Veteran battalion on the 24th inst., I have the honor to inform you that those men are to be settled with by their respective regiments to the 24th inst. inclusive; they will commence pay with the 13th Royal Veteran battalion from the 25th inst. inclusive.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 28th May, 1813.

I intend to go to Miranda de Douro to-morrow, in order to join the left of the army.

This part of the army consists at present as follows:

The 2d, Light, and Conde de Amarante's divisions of infantry; Gen. Morillo's division of Spanish infantry; the Household brigade, Major Gen. Fane's, Major Gen. V. Alten's, and Major Gen. Long's brigades of cavalry; the 6th Portuguese regiment; and Don Julian Sanchez's Spanish regiment.

These troops are disposed as follows:

The 2d division and Gen. Fane's cavalry encamped near La Orbada.

The Light division and Gen. Alten's cavalry at Aldea Nueva de Figueroa.

The Conde de Amarante's division, one brigade at Villares and one at Cabrerizos; and the 6th regt. at Morisco and Castellanos de Moriscos.

Gen. Morillo's division and the 13th light dragoons encamped at Machacon, having a post of observation in Alba de Tormes, and one at Aldea Lengua.

Don Julian Sanchez's regiment at Santis and Peñausende, on the road from Ledesma to Zamora.

The Household brigade of cavalry in Salamanca, and Capt. Cairns' brigade of artillery is with them.

Gen. V. Alten has orders to patrol the roads towards Zamora this day and to-morrow. He has his outposts this day at El Cubo, and is in communication with Don Julian Sanchez.

Orders have been given to place the bridge over the Duero at the Barca de Villal Campo, near the junction of the Esla with the Duero; and it is believed that the bridge will be down on the 30th. The left of the army will be, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th, on the Esla, between Carvajales and Tabara; and the Spanish army of Galicia about Benavente.

I shall be at Carvajales on the 30th; and on that day the most direct communication with me will be by the Barca de Villal Campo, where I will take care that there shall be means of passing a letter.

The enemy's force appears disposed as follows:

They have one division of infantry (I believe Darricau's) and a brigade of cavalry at Zamora and Toro.

The division which was in Salamanca and Alba (Villatte's) has marched towards Medina del Campo. The troops in Peñaranda, and I believe those in Villa de Toro, which I imagine belong to the division at Avila, have marched to Madrigal, likewise on the road to Medina del Campo; and I should imagine those at Avila have gone in the same direction, probably by the road of Arevalo.

The head quarters of the army of the South, which were at Arevalo, it

is said have been moved to Medina del Campo; and we may therefore conclude that about the 29th and 30th there will be at and about Medina del Campo 4 divisions of the army of the South, viz., that from Salamanca, that from Avila, that which was at Arevalo, and that which was at Medina, &c.; one division at Zamora and Toro, and one still about Madrid.

The cavalry is much dispersed, a part, under Gen. Pierre Soult, being with the division at Madrid, and part at Zamora and Toro; some were with the troops at Medina del Campo.

The objects of the position given at present to the troops composing the right of the army are, 1st; to secure their junction with those on the right of the Duero: 2dly; to keep possession of Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, till the communication shall be established across the Duero.

It does not appear to me probable that any attempt will be made by the enemy to return to the Tormes, more particularly as on the 31st we shall make an attempt to cross the Esla, and probably some of our troops will be across that river. If such an attempt should, however, be made, you will attack those who shall advance, if you should consider yourself sufficiently strong.

If you should not think yourself sufficiently strong, you will give up the communication by Salamanca for the moment, and will collect your troops about Mayaldi and El Cubo, on the high road from Salamanca to Zamora; from whence, if necessary, you will fall back by Peñausende towards the Barca de Villal Campo on the Duero, which must be the point of our communication. The road for the 2d division, &c., in this case, would be by Aldea Nueva de Figueroa; and for the troops at and near Salamanca, by the great road of Zamora.

If you should think it proper to give up the communication by Salamanca, it will be necessary to send persons along the roads from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, to turn every thing on the road off towards Ledesma.

It would be desirable that on the 31st and 1st you should order Gen. V. Alten to threaten the ford of Fresno, between Zamora and Toro, if all should remain quiet.

The persons who furnish me with intelligence will be directed to correspond with you.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Salamanca, 28th May, 1813.

In addition to the letter which I have written to you this day, I have to inform you that Gen. Castaños is in Salamanca, together with the Civil Deputy of the province; and the Spanish regiment *La Princesa* is in garrison in the town.

I beg that you will keep Gen. Castaños acquainted with all that occurs, and with your intentions; and in case you should make any movement which will leave Salamanca exposed to a movement from Medina, you will of course give him timely notice of it, and direct the regiment *La Princesa* to fall back upon Don Carlos de España at Tamames.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Hill.

Salamanca, 28th May, 1813.

I enclose a paper which I have just received, stating that some of the

troops under your command are cutting and destroying the green forage in this neighbourhood. There can be no occasion for this destruction at present; and, at all events, if it is necessary to give green forage to the horses, the G. O. of the army prescribe a mode of doing it in which it will not be prejudicial to the owners, and they will get the value of it. I beg that you will enforce these orders invariably in the Household brigade, and thus prevent these complaints.

Instructions for passing the Esla.*

Carvajales, 30th May, 1813.

The troops at Losilla will march this evening at a sufficiently late hour to prevent their movement being perceptible to the enemy, and they are to be so placed as to be enabled to begin passing the river to-morrow, at the ford of Monte Marta, at dawn of day, in the following order:

Major Gen. Bock's brigade of cavalry.
One brigade of infantry of the 3d division.
Brig. Gen. d'Urban's brigade of cavalry.
The remainder of the 3d division.
Brig. Gen. Bradford's brigade of infantry.
The 5th division.

If the artillery can march by the same route, the guns of the 3d division will follow the first battalion that crosses; and those of the 5th division will precede their division; but the spare carriages of the 2 brigades of artillery will cross in rear of the 5th division.

The troops at Tabara will move this evening to Remillos, on the road towards Losilla; and to-morrow morning at daybreak they will again march, following the route of the 3d division, and will also cross the Esla at the ford of Monte Marta.

These troops will march on the morning of the 31st, in the following order:

Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and Capt. Ramsay's troop of horse artillery.
Brig. Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry.
Brig. Gen. Pack's brigade of infantry.
The 1st division.

The baggage of all the troops which cross at the ford of Monte Marta will remain at Losilla, until ordered to move forward.

If there is no opposition to the passage of the troops at the ford of Monte Marta, Major Gen. Bock's brigade of cavalry will afterwards move to the right, towards Almendra, as soon as it can do so with advantage, in order to favor the passage of the right column of the army, and establish the communication between the right and the left.

The troops near Carvajales will pass the Esla to-morrow morning by the ford of Almendra in the following order:

The hussar brigade and Capt. W. Smith's troop of horse artillery.
The 7th division.
The 6th division.
The 4th division.

The hussar brigade will move in sufficient time to be prepared to pass the ford at daybreak.

The 7th division will follow the hussars.

The 6th division will move one hour before daybreak.

The 4th division will follow the 6th division.

The part of the army which crosses at the ford of Monte Marta will be, for the present movement, under the immediate direction of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, who will be so good as give the necessary orders to the troops now at Losilla and at Tabara.

The troops at Carvajales will be in like manner, for the present movement, under the immediate command of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham. The baggage of the latter troops will remain in their respective camps until ordered to be loaded and to be moved forward.

* The lower part of the river Esla did not become fordable till about the 25th May: on the 30th May it was passable without danger at several fords, both for cavalry and for infantry. But during the night between the 30th and 31st so considerable a rise took place in the river that the ford of Monte Marta became wholly impassable for infantry, and that at Almendra was rendered also very dangerous except for cavalry. A pontoon bridge was promptly laid, however, a little way above the ford of Almendra, by which the troops of both columns passed, after the possession of the opposite bank had been secured by an advanced detachment.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Salamanca, 28th May, 1813.

I enclose you the copies of intercepted letters, which give some reason to apprehend that the Russians have met with a serious check.

The enemy are collecting about Medina del Campo; our troops hereabouts are disposed so as to join those on the right of the Duero.

I go to Miranda to-morrow, and shall be at Carvajales on the 30th.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Carvajales, 30th May, 1813, 9 P.M.

I arrived here this day, and the troops will cross the Esla to-morrow morning.

The enemy are still in Zamora, but in small numbers; and I understand that they have destroyed the bridge there.

We have not the bridge over the Duero at the Barca de Villal Campo, as I think it will be required for the Esla; but this will make no difference in your instructions for the present. We can always remove the bridge in time if you should require it.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Carvajales, ce 30 Mai, 1813, à 9 heures du soir.

Je vous ai fait écrire par le Général Wimpffen pour vous apprendre que notre armée serait sur l'Esla, entre Tavera et Carvajales, entre le 28 et le 30.

Je suis arrivé ici aujourd'hui, après avoir fait à la division qui était à Salamanque assez de mal, et avoir établi le Général Hill, &c., entre le Duero et le Tormes. Je compte passer l'Esla demain au matin aux gués de Manzanal, et à un gué auprès de Monte Marta. Nous n'avons pas encore de vos nouvelles ici; et je vous prie de m'en faire avoir, et de vous approcher de notre gauche. On me dit que l'ennemi est à Benavente, en quelle force je ne sais pas. Mais je crois que c'est seulement une reconnaissance pour avoir des nouvelles de nous ou de vous.

P.S. J'ai laissé le Général Castaños hier à Salamanque en bonne santé.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

The greatest part of the army crossed the Esla this day, the cavalry in particular. The enemy have evacuated Zamora, and I shall be there to-morrow. We shall have a post at Fresno, by which I shall send to you.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

The mail from England to the 12th arrived last night, and I have a letter of that date from Lord Bathurst, in which he does not mention the battle supposed to have been fought at Lutzen on the 2d. I have as yet no

G. O.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

2. The Commander of the Forces requests the several officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding officers of regiments, to take means to prevent the destruction of the corn in the neighbourhood of their encampment, and the unnecessary passage of the troops across it.

3. The damage that is done by the turning of the cattle and animals of the followers of the army into the green corn, which would be better fed in the grass, and by the cutting of corn as forage by unauthorised persons contrary to orders, is incalculable, not only to the individuals to whom the corn belongs, and who deserve the protection of the army, but to the army itself.

paper of a later date than the 10th. It recites various affairs in the end of April on the Saale, and states that Paris papers had been received to the 7th. You will recollect that it was stated in the letter to Villatte that the Empress received the accounts at Paris on the 6th.

There are letters from Hamburg of the 4th published in the *Courier* of the 10th; and it appears that the French had then retired from the Saale and lower Elbe.

Our troops crossed the Esla this morning. We took some prisoners; and the officer stated that the news of the victory was not credited in the army. Our posts will be in Zamora to-morrow.

To Visc. Sidmouth.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 30th April, enclosing one from Mr. —, late an officer in His Majesty's and the Portuguese service. Mr. — has not given an accurate account of the circumstances which occasioned his removal from the Portuguese, and his resignation of his commission in His Majesty's service. I believe him to be an excellent officer; but the fact is, he was guilty of something more than disobedience of orders.

I have not yet observed any inclination in the Spanish government to accept the services of British officers in their army; and, indeed, their services would be useless, unless their admission were very general, and other measures were adopted to secure the maintenance of the army. The services of a few individuals would not be of much benefit, and I am afraid would only tend to diminish the character which the British army have acquired in the Portuguese service. I have, therefore, rather discouraged applications of the description of Mr. —.

I confess, however, that if I had not done so, I should wish to decline recommending Mr. — to the Spanish government, although I entertain a good opinion of him as an officer.

To Earl Bathurst.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

I have received your Lordship's letter of the 30th April, with one from Lord Strangford to Lord Castlereagh, proposing that horses should be bought in Brazil for the use of His Majesty's troops in this country.

I don't know what kind of horses those of Brazil are, nor does Lord Strangford state the price at which they could be purchased; it is therefore difficult to form an opinion. But I should imagine the hire of the transports for each horse would amount to £60 sterling, besides the expense of his food on the passage, and for the length of time which would elapse after landing in Portugal before he could be fit for service after so long a voyage.

I was not aware of the great loss of horses on the passage from the British Islands to the Peninsula, adverted to by Lord Strangford, and I imagine that his Lordship must have been misinformed.

To Earl Bathurst.

Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

The troops arrived at Salamanca on the 26th inst., and we found the enemy still in the town with one division of infantry, and 3 squadrons of

cavalry, and some cannon of the army of the South, under the command of Gen. Villatte. The enemy evacuated the town on our approach, but they waited longer than they ought on the high ground in the neighbourhood, and afforded an opportunity for the cavalry, under Gen. Fane and Gen. V. Alten, the former of which crossed the Tormes at the ford of Sta Marta, and the latter at the bridge, to do them a good deal of injury in their retreat. Many were killed and wounded, and we took about 200 prisoners, 7 tumbrils of ammunition, some baggage, provisions, &c. The enemy retired by the road of Babila-fuente, and near Huerta were joined by a body of infantry and cavalry on their march from Alba. I then ordered our troops to discontinue their pursuit, our infantry not being up.

Major Gen. Long, and Don P. Morillo, in command of the Spanish division, attacked Alba, from which place the enemy retired. In the course of the 27th and 28th, I established the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Upper Estremadura, between the Tormes and Duero, under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, with the view to their early communication and junction with the main body of the army, on the right of the Duero, and in the mean time, to their retaining possession of the Tormes, and of the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and I set off myself on the 29th to join the troops here, and arrived that day at Miranda de Douro; and here on the 30th I found the troops on the Esla, under the orders of Sir T. Graham, as I had intended, with their left at Tabara, and in communication with the Galician army, and their right at this place, and all the arrangements made for passing the Esla. The greater part passed that river this morning, the cavalry by fords, and the infantry by a bridge, which it was necessary to throw over the river, as it was so deep that some men, even of the cavalry, were lost in the passage. The English hussars, who crossed first, took an officer and 30 prisoners near Val de Perdices.

The enemy have evacuated Zamora, and our patrols have been in that town. The troops which were there have fallen back upon Toro, where I understand they have one division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry.

It appears that the enemy have joined at La Nava del Rey the troops which retired from Salamanca, Avila, &c. with those which were at Arevalo and Medina del Campo; and I imagine that as this part of the army will advance, they will retire across the Duero. The enemy's troops were still at Madrid and on the Tagus on the 22d inst. I conclude that they will have evacuated that part of the country on hearing of our movement.

I have received a report to which I give credit, though it is not official, that the Spanish garrison have evacuated Castro Urdiales, and have embarked in His Majesty's ships.

I have received no accounts from Alicante since I addressed your Lordship last.

Zamora, 1st June, 1813.

P.S. This dispatch having been detained, I have to inform your Lordship that I moved the head quarters here this day.

The enemy have evacuated Toro, into which place our troops have entered. The head quarters will be there to-morrow.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Zamora, 1st June, 1813.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received a paper of the 14th, which I enclose, from which it appears that there has been an action in Germany, supposed to be favorable to the French. I suspect only one of outposts, as it is scarcely possible that the Russians and Prussians could have collected their army for a general action at Lutzen, from the other side of the Saale, between the 30th April and 2d May. We are getting on fast. I shall be at Toro to-morrow.

P.S. I understand that there is at Lisbon a newspaper of the 13th, containing the French bulletin of their action; but I have not heard the particulars.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Toro, 2d June, 1813, 2½ P.M.

I have received yours by the peasant of 10 A.M.; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence it contains. I was aware that the enemy had crossed the Duero; but not of the exact spot in which the army was likely to be concentrated. I have likewise heard that the troops from Segovia have crossed the Duero. I don't think we are so close up, or so well concentrated as we ought to be, to meet the enemy in the state in which he will appear on the Horniza, probably to-morrow; and, therefore, I propose to halt the heads of the different columns to-morrow, and to close up the rear of each, and to move Hill in this direction preparatory to our farther movements.

The 10th have had a very handsome affair this morning with the enemy's cavalry, between this and Morales. Their loss is small; but they must have destroyed the enemy's 16th dragoons, of whom they took above 210 prisoners. The enemy showed in great strength in cavalry about Pedrosa del Rey.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Toro, 3d June, 1813.

I have received your several letters to 9½ last night. It appears that the enemy are concentrating in the valley of Torre-lobaton. We shall be tolerably strong in that quarter to-morrow; and I expect that Sir R. Hill will be across the Duero, and at Morales, and Pedrosa del Rey.

I enclose you letters from Gen. Giron, and another just received. I likewise enclose one for Gen. Giron, which I beg you to forward by an officer. I believe he is this day at Villal-pando; and I have begged him not to approach nearer to Rio Seco till I shall write to him to-morrow. It is best to keep him in *échelon* to your left.

I have never been able to discover exactly where Reille went after he had moved his quarters from Palencia. I had not heard of his arrival at Burgos, and I thought it not unlikely that he had gone to the frontiers of Galicia, where the cavalry belonging to the army of Portugal, under Rouyer and Curto, were. I was not quite certain, also, of the march of all the infantry of the army of Portugal to the North of Spain.

Don Julian surprised a post of 30 cavalry yesterday evening, at Castro-nuño, and took them all prisoners.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Toro, ce 3 Juin, 1813, 1½ P.M.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 1^{er} par un officier de votre part;

et comptant que vous seriez peut-être aujourd'hui à Villal-pando, j'allais vous écrire pour vous prier de ne pas vous approcher plus près de Medina de Rio Seco jusqu'à ce que je vous écrive. Je compte que vous pourrez y arriver en une marche de Villal-pando. La gauche de notre armée sera demain à Villar de Frades et Villa Nueva de los Caballeros, où je vous prie de communiquer avec le Général Graham.

La seule chose que je ne peux pas faire c'est de vous donner des cartouches de fusil en campagne. Tout ce qu'on peut faire est de ne pas vous mettre dans une situation d'en faire une grande consommation, jusqu'à ce que vous en soyez pourvu.

L'ennemi paraît assez concentré dans la vallée de Torre-lobaton, et nous le serons pareillement demain. Je crois que je vous ferai marcher après demain sur Medina.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Toro, 3d June, 1813, 8½ P.M.

I have received yours of 4 P.M. I don't think it necessary to make any alteration in our disposition for to-morrow, in consequence of the enemy's retiring. We are all moving to our point, and shall be well connected, which is our object.

Gen. Giron knows of old that I can give no ammunition in the field. I must make use of him according to his means in this way; and if I should want to use him, I must try to give him ammunition. But this is the way in which I have always found the Spanish troops equipped. It is very true that Gen. Giron has not been long in Galicia; but why has not somebody been there long enough to get those equipments essentially necessary for an army?

The allied army moved forward from Toro as follows:

	LEFT COLUMN. <i>Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.</i>	CENTRE COLUMN, <i>and Head Quarters.</i>	RIGHT COLUMN. <i>Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.</i>
June 4th,	Villar de Frades	La Mota	Morales
.. 5th,	Rioseco	Castro-monte	Torre-lobaton.
	SPANISH CORPS. <i>Major Gen.</i> <i>Don P. Giron.</i>	<i>Lieut. Gen.</i> <i>Sir T. Graham.</i>	<i>Head Quarters.</i> <i>Lieut. Gen.</i> <i>Sir R. Hill.</i>
June 6th,	Gaton and Villaramiel	Vellarias and Torre de Marmajon	Ampudia
.. 7th,	Becerril	Grixota	Palencia
.. 8th,	Valloldo	San Cebrian and Pena de Campos	Amusco
.. 9th,	Villasarracino	Santillana and Osorno	Amusco
.. 10th,	Herrera	Zarzosa	Melgar de Fernamental
.. 11th,		Sotresgudo	Castroixeriz
.. 12th,		Ditto	Ditto
.. 13th,		La Piedra	Villadiego
.. 14th,	Polientes, on the Ebro	San Martin de Helines, on the Ebro	Masa
.. 15th,	Soncillo	Villarcayo	Quintana, near Puente de Arenas, on the Ebro
.. 16th,	Quintanilla de Pienza	La Cerca	Medina de Pomar
.. 17th,	Villasana de Mena	San Martin de Loza and Lastras de Teza	Quincoces
.. 18th,	Valmaseda	Near Berberana	Berberana
			Membligo

To all these complaints I have one answer, 'Either stay and do your best, or go back and I must do my best without you.' It will certainly be an eternal disgrace to the Spanish nation if I am to have another campaign in the heart of Spain, without the assistance of a single Spanish soldier, excepting guerrillas.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

La Mota, 4th June, 1813, 1 P.M.

I have received yours of this day, and all appears quiet in front. I sent a letter for Gen. Giron.

I don't know what I can do more in regard to foraging the troops, whether Portuguese or others. It rests with the General officers commanding brigades to see that the orders are carried into execution, which provide for all cases in which forage can be got. I send however, to D'Urban, Bradford, and Pack upon the subject.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

La Mota, ce 4 Juin, 1813.

Je reçois votre lettre d'hier de 11 heures du matin, et je vous prie de faire marcher votre infanterie demain sur Villa Frechos, et votre cavalerie sur Aguilar de Campos. Notre gauche sera à Medina de Rio Seco, où je vous prie de communiquer avec elle. Le quartier général sera à Castro-monte.

C'est bien vrai que je vous ai donné des cartouches de fusil l'année passée, quand nous en avons reçu plus qu'il ne nous en fallait; mais à présent je n'en ai que trop peu; et vous pouvez vous assurer que jamais je ne les ai données en campagne, pas même aux Portugais qui se battent dans nos rangs. Si je prétendais en donner, je me mettrais tout de suite dans le même embarras où vous vous trouvez. Donc il faut vous tenir en réserve; et si nous sommes dans la nécessité de vous mettre en bataille, il faut nécessairement vous donner des cartouches, que les conséquences soient telles qu'elles voudront. Mais il faut que cette nécessité soit causée par moi-même.

Je ne dis pas que ce manque de cartouches vous doit être attribué, ni à la troupe. Mais c'est un malheur, et la seule chose qu'on puisse faire pour y remédier est ce que je propose faire, et aussi que vous-même vous fassiez ôter à la troupe la moitié ou 30 des cartouches qu'elle a à présent; que vous les fassiez rélier en paquets de 10 chacun; et que vous les mettiez en ballots bien reliés de 500 en chaque ballot. Un mulet en porterait 4; et je crois que vous ne trouverez pas de difficulté à avoir 200 mulets de charge dans ce pays ci.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

La Mota, 4th June, 1813.

I once more beg your Excellency to draw the attention of the government to the conduct of the Intendants and civil authorities in the country, of which I have so frequently had serious cause to complain.

The army of reserve of Andalusia are detained in Estremadura, on the Guadiana, because the Intendants of that province have not collected the provisions which the Captain General had ordered by my desire might be collected for its subsistence, not less than 10 weeks ago. The army of Galicia, which is joined to the allied British and Portuguese army under

my command, is unprovided with mules to carry ammunition, or any thing else, on account of the neglect of the civil authorities in Galicia, of which I have before complained.

The consequence is that this army, which is clothed, armed, and disciplined, cannot be brought into action with the enemy; and I am obliged to keep it in the rear. Thus this campaign will be fought without the aid of a single Spanish corps, notwithstanding that it is supposed there are 160,000 Spanish troops in arms. It cannot be expected that troops will march without provisions, or will fight without ammunition; and it cannot be stated with truth, either that provisions for the army of reserve could not have been collected in Estremadura upon 10 weeks' notice, or that 200 or 300 mules could not have been procured in Galicia for the ammunition for the army of that province. Yet for want of these exertions the cause may be lost.

I earnestly entreat the government to concert with the Cortes the means of establishing in the provinces some authority to which the people will pay obedience, and which will insure their resources for the purposes of the war; otherwise, notwithstanding all our exertions, the cause of the country will be lost.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

La Mota, 4th June, 1813.

I write just to let you know that we are getting on as well as I could wish. We have established the whole army on the right of the Duero, having possession of the two bridges of Zamora and Toro.

The enemy have retired from Madrid, Toledo, &c., and have all crossed the Upper Duero. They appear to be retiring towards Burgos.

The 10th hussars destroyed the 16th French dragoons on the day before yesterday, between Toro and Zamora. They took about 210 prisoners; and Don Julian took 30 dragoons prisoners on the same evening at Castro-nuño.

Gen. Giron, with the Galician army, is joined to our left.

To Earl Bathurst.

La Mota, 4th June, 1813.

I have received your Lordship's letter (No. 122) of the 13th May, enclosing one from the Transport Office of the 12th May, in regard to the number of transports in the Peninsula; and your Lordship may depend upon my doing every thing in my power to diminish the number and to limit it hereafter.

I would request your Lordship to observe, however, that of 191 ships, containing 54,992 tons, in other ports of the Peninsula besides Lisbon, there are 119, containing 37,009 tons, in the service of the army on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, besides all His Majesty's troop ships attached to this army. This is to be attributed to the peculiar situation of that army, to the services to which it is destined in the Peninsula, and to the call to which it is at every moment liable from Sicily. There are 4, containing 445 tons, on the same service at Carthagená, and on passage from Gibraltar, and 4, containing 1345 tons, on the coast of Catalonia. Of the remainder, there are 12 ships at Cadiz, containing 3308 tons, and there are 15, containing 3379 tons, at Coruña, or on the passage from

England, laden with ordnance stores, &c., making nearly 150 ships out of 191 with which this army can have nothing to do, and over which I can have no control. Of the remaining 41 there are 8 employed in conveying Spanish troops to the coast of Catalonia, others in the removal of stores for the Spanish or Portuguese army from one part of the coast to the other. Of the 64 ships stated to be at Lisbon and on the passage, there are 3 loading flour for Gibraltar, and 1 for Alicante, under order from England, 15 are refitting, 5 ordered to England, and 11 on their passage from England, leaving 29 ships which can fairly be stated to be in the service of this army exclusively.

I would beg your Lordship likewise to observe the nature and extent of our operations, carried on, as they are, with a limited supply of money. We are frequently obliged to move from Lisbon to the nearest post to the army, not only all the ordnance stores, ammunition, &c., required for the army and the allies, but the provisions and forage corn likewise, from the want of specie to purchase those articles in the country which may be the seat of our operations.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Castro-monte, 5th June, 1813.

I have just received your letter of $\frac{1}{2}$ past 11, enclosing one from Gen. Giron, acknowledging the receipt of his orders to march this day. I have not received the report of the Spanish officer to which you refer.

From all the accounts which I have from the front, the enemy have probably no troops on this side of the Carrion; at all events, none on this side of the heights between Dueñas and Palencia. But if they had, our line is so concentrated that with 4000 men they could not venture to touch any part of it. It is very desirable, however, that the cavalry and infantry should be kept together, in order to support each other.

To Brig. Gen. Sir N. Trant.

Castro-monte, 5th June, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 25th May, and have spoken to Marshal Sir W. Beresford regarding your leave of absence, upon which he will write to you himself.

I perfectly concur in the justice of your claims; and I enclose a letter upon them to the Sec. of State, which you will either take to England, if the Marshal should give you leave, or forward to the Sec. of State, as may suit your convenience.

To Earl Bathurst.

Castro-monte, 5th June, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Brig. Gen. Trant, explaining the inconveniences under which he labors, in consequence of a decision of the War office that he shall not receive his pay as Captain and Assistant in the Q. M. G.'s department, bearing a King's commission as such, while employed in this country under orders from the Sec. of State.

Having frequently had occasion to draw the attention of His Majesty's government to the services and conduct of this officer, and having obtained the interference of the late Sec. of State, the Earl of Liverpool, to prevent his removal from his office of Assistant in the Q. M. G.'s department, while employed in this country, it is scarcely necessary that I

should endeavor to justify my present application for your Lordship's interference in favor of Brig. Gen. Trant's claims by another reference to his services and merits. I can only repeat my sense of them, and my assurance that he has continued them much to my satisfaction, and that of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, since I had last occasion to address the Sec. of State upon his case. He has been employed in this country in a most important situation, for the expenses of which his allowances are by no means adequate; and it is really a matter of justice that he should receive the pay of the situation which he holds in England.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Castro-monte, 5th June, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d ult., containing an extract of that you wrote to me on the 20th Oct. last; and I beg to assure you, for the Commander in Chief's information, that for some time past I have given officers who have made application 3 months' leave of absence, which I consider quite sufficient for the arrangement of the affairs of any officer.

Memorandum to Sir R. Kennedy, of an arrangement for the distribution of bread, corn, and wine received from the country to the troops of the different nations of which the army under Lord Wellington is composed.

5th June, 1813.

1. Whenever a magazine of provisions shall be taken from the enemy by the troops under the immediate command of Lord Wellington, it is to be divided among the troops of the three nations as follows: that is to say, for the English troops one half; for the Spanish troops one quarter; for the Portuguese troops one quarter. The Commissary in Chief will settle the contents of the magazine; and in case the Commissary of any nation shall have received more of it than its proportion, the value of the overplus shall be paid to the Commissary of that nation which shall have received less than its proportion.

2. The rents due to the Crown of Spain received in hand shall be applicable to the subsistence of the armies.

The Intendant General of the 4th Spanish army will ascertain as soon as possible the amount of these dues to the Crown of Spain in the several provinces under the Capt. Gen. Castaños. The produce of these rents shall, in the first instance, be applicable to the support of the Spanish troops in the army under the command of Lord Wellington. Those not wanted for these troops are to be handed over to the Commissary Gen. of the British troops, who, upon receipt thereof, is to pay into the Treasury of the Spanish government the value of those supplies, at the price current of the day.

3. The Chief of the Staff of the Spanish army, and the Q. M. G. of the British army, upon making the daily disposition for the movement of the army, are to settle from what parts of the country the separate Spanish corps, under the Conde de la Bisbal and Gen. Giron, are to draw their bread and forage; or if by accident these corps should march by the same lines with the allied British and Portuguese army, in what proportions they are to share the resources of the country through which the troops may pass.

4. In case any Spanish or Portuguese troops should serve in the same

corps with British troops, as at present in the corps under the command of Sir R. Hill, the troops under the Conde de Amarante, and Cols. Campbell and Diggens, and the Spanish troops under Gen. Morillo; and in the corps under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, the Portuguese troops under Gens. Pack and Bradford; and in the centre of the army, the Portuguese troops under Gen. D'Urban, and the Spanish troops under Don Carlos de España, the Commissary Gen. of the British army is to take care that his deputies, attached to those corps, shall make such distribution of the bread, wine, and forage corn received from the villages through which the corps will pass, or from which it may receive its supplies, as may be just, adverting to the numbers to be fed by the different nations; and the Dep. Commissary shall, for this purpose, communicate with the Commissaries of the several nations, and come to an understanding with them for their wants accordingly.

5. It is, however, to be clearly understood, both by the Spanish and Portuguese Commissaries, and by the people of the country, that the credit of the British government is pledged for the payment of that only for which the British Commissary will give a receipt.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Ampudia, ce 6 Juin, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 5 aujourd'hui même. J'ai reçu de l'Amiral à Lisbonne une lettre par laquelle il me dit qu'on a demandé un vaisseau pour transporter l'argent en Galice, et qu'il compte en donner un tout de suite. Aussitôt que l'argent sera arrivé en Galice je le ferai donner à votre ordre, quoique je comptais qu'avec ce que vous aviez déjà, vous auriez assez pour la fin du mois.

Quand je vous donne certaines sommes d'argent, c'est tout ce que je peux vous donner; et ce que nous pouvons recevoir pour des billets négociés à la Corogne doit être considéré pour le service général. J'ai déjà donné l'ordre qu'on prit tout ce qui s'offre à la Corogne pour billets; et il nous conviendrait beaucoup de pouvoir trouver là l'argent qu'il vous faudrait au lieu de le faire venir des fonds à Lisbonne. Je vous prie donc de faire dire à vos amis à la Corogne de donner à M. White tout l'argent qu'ils ont à donner pour des billets sur l'Angleterre.

Le quartier général sera demain à Palencia, et je vous ferai dire chaque jour où il sera, et de quelle manière vous devez communiquer avec lui.

Je crois que le Gén. Castaños est allé à Valladolid.

Au Lieut. Gén. Comte Gazan.

Au Quartier Général, ce 6 Juin, 1813.

Sachant que vous aviez permis au Capt. Lloyd de retourner à l'armée sur parole de ne pas servir jusqu'à ce qu'il fût échangé, j'ai renvoyé hier à l'armée Française, en échange pour lui, le Capt. Vernier, pris à Castromuño le même 2 de Juin. Si j'eusse su que votre Excellence aurait préféré en échange le Capitaine d'Artillerie Chevillé, je l'aurais fait renvoyer en France.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Ampudia, 6th June, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Peacocke, and its enclosures, which I beg you will lay before the Portuguese government, and request that they

will decide whether the person accused of the alleged murder shall be tried according to the Portuguese law. In this instance it would be very convenient that he should be so tried.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ampudia, 6th June, 1813.

The troops have continued to advance since I wrote to your Lordship on the 31st of last month, and were on the 1st at Zamora, and on the 2d they arrived at Toro.

The English hussars, being in the advanced guard, fell in, between Toro and Morales, with a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, which were immediately attacked by the 10th, supported by the 18th and 15th. The enemy were overthrown, and pursued for many miles; and 210 prisoners, with many horses, and 2 officers, fell into our hands.

I enclose Col. Grant's report* of this gallant affair, which reflects great credit upon Major Robarts and the 10th hussars, and upon Col. Grant, under whose directions they acted. On the same evening, Don Julian Sanchez surprised the enemy's post at Castro-nuño, and took 2 officers and 30 cavalry prisoners; and he drove their posts from the ford of Pollos.

The enemy had destroyed the bridges of Zamora and Toro; and the difficulties in the passage of the Escla had retarded the movement of our rear, while the enemy had concentrated their force to a considerable

* Col. Grant to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington, K.G. Morales, 2d June, 1813.

I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship, that on approaching Morales this morning with the hussar brigade, the French cavalry appeared in considerable force near that place.

The 10th Royal hussars were immediately brought forward, under the orders of Major Robarts, who attacked the advanced squadrons of the enemy in the most gallant manner: their front line made a determined resistance, but was instantly overpowered by the irresistible impetuosity of the 10th hussars, which being now supported by the 18th (the 15th being in reserve) reached their second line and drove it with loss to the heights, two miles in front of Morales; a position which the enemy occupied with a large force of cavalry and infantry, and where the remains of their shattered squadrons took shelter under cover of their guns. It is with much satisfaction I acquaint your Lordship that nothing could exceed the steadiness and bravery of the troops in this affair. I have, however, to regret the loss of a very promising young officer, Lieut. Cottin, of the 10th hussars, who was killed in the midst of the enemy's ranks. I am sorry to add that Capt. Lloyd, of the same regiment, is missing.

I have the honor to enclose the return of the killed and wounded, and also a return of the loss sustained by the enemy, as far as it can be ascertained.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have learnt that Capt. Lloyd was wounded and taken prisoner, but has been left at Pedrosa del Rey, having given his parole to the enemy. His wound is severe, but not dangerous.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, near Morales, on the 2d June, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	—	1	4	2
Wounded	1	1	13	12	15
Missing	1	1	2	11	4

amount between Torre-lobaton and Tordesillas. I therefore halted on the 3d at Toro, in order to bring the Light division and the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill across the Duero by the bridge of that town, and to close up our rear, and to bring the Galician army to join our left; and we moved again on the 4th.

The enemy had commenced collecting their troops towards the Duero when they found that we passed Ciudad Rodrigo; and they crossed the Duero at Tordesillas on the 1st and 2d. The troops at Madrid, and the detachments on the Tagus, broke up on the 27th, and crossed the Duero at the Puente de Duero on the 3d; and Valladolid was entirely evacuated on the 4th. The enemy left considerable magazines of grain at Arevalo, and some ammunition at Valladolid and Zamora. The enemy have passed the Carrion, and are apparently on their retreat towards Burgos.

I have received a report, to which I give credit, that the enemy, having brought 5 guns to Castro Urdiales from Santoña by sea, effected a breach in the town wall on the 11th May, which they stormed and carried, the garrison having retired to the castle. They attempted to storm the castle, but were repulsed with considerable loss; and the garrison were carried off on the morning of the 12th by H. M.'s sloops *Lyra*, *Royalist*, and *Sparrow*, and were landed at Beromeo.

I have received no accounts from Alicante since I addressed your Lordship last.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ampudia, 6th June, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Sir R. Kennedy, regarding the plan of sending Mr. Dawkins to this country for the examination and passing of Sir R. Kennedy's accounts; and I have only to add, that the sooner he is sent the better.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B., 3d division.

7th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of communicating to the Commander of the Forces your letter of this day's date, and in compliance with his Excellency's commands I have represented to the Commissary Gen. the circumstance of two regiments of the 3d division being without bread for this day, and that there is little probability of a supply for to-morrow; and I understand from him that the officer of the Commissariat department, with the division, is in momentary expectation of receiving a supply from Valladolid. The Commander of the Forces requests that when any corps shall have been without the regular rations of bread, you will be pleased to direct that it shall receive an additional proportion of meat, agreeably to G. O.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Amusco, 8th June, 1813, 7½ P.M.

I received your note on my return home, and just now your letter, enclosing one from Gen. Böck. We have seldom, if ever, been able to get any assistance from the cavalry for the police; and there is no doubt that the condition of the horses would be much deteriorated by a constant patrol of the numbers stated, which, however, is stronger than I hope is necessary. I will speak to Lord Aylmer to send a second detachment of the Staff corps to your head quarters to-morrow to aid in the police.

I must refer you to the G. O. for the duties and authority of the Provost and his Assistants. I doubt the legality of the Provost's authority; and, in my opinion, necessity and custom are the only foundation for it; but

the authority ought not to be extended farther than has been customary, unless absolutely necessary. The Assistant Provosts, therefore, have not the power of executing capitally, even though they catch a soldier in the act of committing an outrage; nor can they, or even the Provost himself, punish, unless they do catch a soldier in the act.

I never heard of the exemption from duty stated to be desired by Pack and Bradford. Generally, I have found it inconvenient in this army, and in all allied armies, to name General officers of the day, unless the number of Generals should be very confined. By taking a general roster, we should place German and Portuguese, and in some instances even Spanish General officers, in command of our officers and troops, which seldom answers. I never recollect to have had General officers of the day, excepting at the siege of Badajoz, where the duty was performed by 3 British Major Generals, Colville, Kempt, and Bowes, to the exclusion of Brigadier Generals, in order to avoid the inconvenience of placing our officers and troops under 2 or 3 Portuguese Brigadiers.

I have seen Sir R. Kennedy regarding the want of bread by the 5th division. The fact is, that we have not marched our magazines; and although the country is abundant and willing to supply us, I believe, for our money, there will be some difficulty in such an army as this; and the General officers must give an increased allowance of meat when the bread by accident fails. They should also endeavor to let the Commissary Gen. know of the want before it occurs rather than afterwards.

It is perfectly true that I have made an arrangement for the division of the country, and the distribution of the supplies which it contains; but it takes some time to translate and copy it, and it would only create confusion if it were given to one party before it were ready to be delivered

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Amusco, 8th June, 1813.

With a view to keep the enemy in ignorance as much as possible with respect to the intended movements of the army, and to give the appearance of our following him by the direct road to Burgos, Lord Wellington has desired that the following arrangements may take place to-morrow on the right of the army:

The light infantry of the right column to move to Quintana del Puente.

The cavalry of the column to precede the infantry, and to move forward to the neighbourhood of Villadiego, from whence Major Gen. Fane will push on such patrols as he may judge expedient along the road to Burgos.

Major Gen. Fane will either keep the cavalry to-morrow night at Villadiego, or retire it in the evening nearer to the support of the light infantry at Quintana del Puente, as he may judge expedient.

Major Gen. V. Alten will move forward his brigade of cavalry at the same time from Villalaco, in such manner as to be a support to Major Gen. Fane, and to protect the left flank of Major Gen. Fane's movements, as may be requisite.

Major Gen. V. Alten will be directed to communicate with you in regard to the above movements. That part of the infantry of the right column which is not employed on the above service, you will be so good as place upon the right bank of the Pisuerga, in the most convenient situation between the bridge of Cordavilla and Villalaco.

I should apprise you that the movement of the right column of the army on the 10th inst. will probably point by the bridge of Astudillo towards Castrojeriz, in order that the arrangements for to-morrow may be so managed as not to interfere with those for the following day.

Head quarters will remain to-morrow at Amusco; and you will be so good therefore as continue the letter parties of cavalry placed to-day for keeping up your communications.

I beg you will communicate such instructions to Don Julian Sanchez as may be necessary to enable him to conform to, and co-operate with the movements of Major Gen. Fane's cavalry to-morrow.

to all. This arrangement, like every thing else, will depend upon the execution, and upon that I own I am not sanguine.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Amusco, 8th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st May, enclosing one of the 8th May, from Lieut. Gen. Campbell, the Governor of Gibraltar, in which he has proposed that Major Gen. Whittingham's corps should be paid from the military chest at Alicante.

I don't see exactly the reason for adopting this arrangement, or in what way it would be convenient; though I see many why it would be otherwise. Major Gen. Whittingham's is a Spanish corps paid under your Excellency's directions out of the subsidy from His Majesty and the Spanish government. The military chest at Alicante is destined to defray the expenses of the allied British and Sicilian corps under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray; and although Major Gen. Whittingham's corps is doing duty under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, the payments to Major Gen. Whittingham cannot be made without occasioning a complication of accounts which would be very inconvenient.

I would also observe, that as Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray would certainly not consent to advance money from the military chest to pay Gen. Whittingham's Spanish corps, unless a sum at least equal to its demands were thrown into the military chest, I don't see the advantage which could be gained by this measure in the way of saving money which might be demanded from Gibraltar.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B., 3d division.

8th June, 1813.

Having had the honor of laying before the Commander of the Forces your letter of this day's date, I have been directed by his Excellency to signify to you in answer, that it is far from his intention that the troops should suffer the inconvenience therein complained of; and that if that inconvenience should continue to exist, his Excellency thinks that the 3d division had better halt until the necessary means of conveyance for the sick shall have been supplied.

To Major Gen. Cooke.

Amusco, 9th June, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 20th May, and I have perused with attention the papers which you have enclosed regarding the conduct of Mr. — — and of other officers of the Commissariat; and I acknowledge that the acquaintance which I have with the former would have induced me to expect a different conduct from him; and that I am astonished that any persons of the character of gentlemen, and bearing His Majesty's commission, should have conducted themselves as the gentlemen of the Commissariat have acknowledged that they have done. It appears, however, that they are not aware of the impropriety of their conduct, as each of them, not excepting Mr. — —, makes that a matter of boast, which any other person would be desirous of concealing, if by accident or in a moment of warmth he had been guilty of such impropriety. I beg that you will explain to them all the concern which I feel upon this occasion; and that you will express my expectation that they will avoid such conduct in future.

Mr. — —, and the gentlemen belonging to the department under his charge, may conceive that he has, and he certainly has, reason to com-

plain of those persons at Cadiz who have, by anonymous letters and other infamous means, traduced his character and conduct, and that of the gentlemen of his department, to his superiors. But he is mistaken if he supposes that he is the only person liable to such an evil. All those who serve the public honestly and faithfully have for their enemies and traducers those who are desirous of profiting by the public wants, inconveniences, and disasters, and by the misfortunes of the times; and Mr. — and the gentlemen of the department ought to have been satisfied by the result of the investigation of their conduct, and to have relied upon the justice of their superiors for their acquittal from any future anonymous charges, and ought not to have made what I must call a disgraceful appeal to the doubtful result of a personal contest with persons entirely unworthy of their notice.

I feel exceedingly displeased with Mr. — and all the gentlemen of his department; but I will not consent to their removal from Cadiz. I should do them a gross injustice if, after the investigation to which they have submitted, I were to doubt the propriety of their conduct towards the public, or were to allow any anonymous accuser to induce me to act towards them as if I at least considered there was the slightest ground for such accusations. They must therefore remain at Cadiz; but I hope that they will hereafter view these accusations, and those whom they may suspect of making them, with the contempt which they deserve; and that, above all, they will refrain from the conduct which is the subject of this letter.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Amusco, 9th June, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 26th May, and having conversed with Marshal Sir W. Beresford regarding the employment of the military force to check the depredations which are so prevalent on all the roads in Portugal, he has stated to me that the military force in the Alentejo have already taken up and put in the power of the government a great number of robbers; but not one has yet been brought to justice or punished. If this is the case, it is an useless employment of the military force, and is rather an encouragement to robbery to send them in pursuit of robbers who when caught are not to be brought to punishment, but are eventually to be let loose again to prey upon the public.

While writing upon this subject, I beg leave to call your attention to the enclosed complaint from the Commissary Gen. of the omission of the Portuguese authorities to punish 8 persons convicted of stealing public cattle. If these practices can be continued with impunity, the Portuguese government will be so kind as to take measures to furnish the Portuguese army with cattle, as it is impossible for me to furnish them, if at the same time our cattle parks are to be plundered with impunity. The greatest fault that any government can be guilty of is to allow crimes to remain unpunished; and I am sorry to observe that this is but too common in Portugal.

To the Principal Magistrate at Madrid.

Amusco, 9th June, 1813.

I avail myself of the opportunity of the passage of a messenger through

Madrid, to inform you that the enemy are in retreat towards Burgos; and that the army of the allied nations will pass the Pisuerga to-morrow morning.

The government have been regularly informed of the state of affairs in this part of the country, and I urge them to send to the capital without loss of time the principal civil and military authorities. In the mean time I trust that the loyal people of Madrid will, as heretofore during this eventful contest, conduct themselves with submission to the laws and to the existing authorities, and above all will respect property, and aid in the protection of the safety of persons.

To Sir I. Heard, Garter King at Arms.

Amusco, 9th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th April, in answer to which I beg to refer you to the Sec. of State's office for copies of all documents by which different titles and orders of knighthood have been conferred upon me by the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and have been accepted by me with the gracious permission of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, as signified from time to time by the Sec. of State.

I have not these documents by me, for which reason I give you the trouble of a reference to the Sec. of State's office.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Melgar on the Pisuerga, 10th June, 1813.

There are at Coruña certain ships loaded with biscuit and flour, and certain others loaded with a heavy train of artillery and ammunition, and some musket ammunition; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will request any officer of the navy who may be at Coruña when you receive this letter to take under his convoy all the vessels loaded as above mentioned, and to proceed with them to Santander. If he should find Santander occupied by the enemy, I beg him to remain off the port till the operations of this army have obliged the enemy to abandon it. If the enemy should not be in Santander, I beg him to enter the port; but to be in readiness to quit it again, if the enemy should approach the place, until I shall communicate with him.

If Mr. White should have any money in his hands which he can spare, I beg he will send it by the same opportunity.

I have directed that 100,000 dollars should be sent round from Lisbon for the use of the Spanish army; and I learn from Adm. Martin that a ship was ready at the end of May to take this money to Coruña. I beg that, when this sum shall arrive, it may be delivered to the order of Gen. Giron at Coruña.

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Melgar de Fernamental, 10th June, 1813.

As the difficulties in regard to supplies, which already begin to be felt, would be considerably increased were the army to continue to push forward, Lord Wellington has determined to continue for a day or two near the fertile country upon the Pisuerga, to give the Commissary Gen. an opportunity of making such arrangements as will enable us to move to the Ebro. In the mean time, it is intended to keep alive the attention of the enemy on the side of Burgos.

I enclose a copy of the partial movements of the army ordered for to-morrow. The right column is directed to be moved up to Castrojeriz.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. Melgar on the Pisuerga, 10th June, 1813.

I have nothing particular to communicate to you. The army are across this river, and within two or three marches of the Ebro. The enemy are still about Burgos, as I am informed and believe, although it is said they have retired towards Miranda.

I hear that a Russian bulletin has been received at Oporto, with an account of the battle of Lutzen, in which it is stated that the Allies took 6000 prisoners and 20 pieces of cannon. They have, however, retired beyond the Elbe; and Buonaparte's head quarters were, by the last accounts, at Dresden.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Castrojeriz, 11th June, 1813.

Having found that a large number of Spaniards, who, during the course of the contest of Spain for her independence, have taken the side of the French, are now staying with the enemy's army, I take the liberty of addressing you upon that subject.

Many of these individuals are highly meritorious, and have rendered the most essential services to the cause, even during the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. It is also a known fact, that fear, the misery and distress which they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons to take the part which they have taken; and I would beg leave to suggest for consideration, whether it is expedient to involve the country in all the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law, in order to punish such persons.

I am the last person who will be found to diminish the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained among the enemy without entering their service, have served their coun-

G. O.

Castrojeriz, 11th June, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces has frequently observed, that after an action with the enemy large numbers of soldiers lose their arms, accoutrements, and necessities, notwithstanding that this army has invariably remained in possession of the ground on which it has fought; whereby the public and the Colonel of the regiment are put to a large expense, and much inconvenience is felt by the service in a case in which the loss ought to be trifling.

2. In many cases men who are wounded are perfectly capable of taking care of their own arms, accoutrements, and necessities, and they should be ordered to do so by the Surgeon who will give them their first dressing.

3. The Commanding officer of every regiment engaged with the enemy should, as soon after the engagement as possible, send an officer and 20 men over the ground over which the regiment may have marched, and on which it may have been engaged, in order to collect the arms, accoutrements, and necessities belonging to the regiment, which when collected must be taken care of.

4. In future when any regiment shall make a claim upon the public for the loss of arms, accoutrements, and necessities in action, it will be necessary to prove that the soldier, for whom a claim is made for loss of necessities, was so badly wounded that he could not take care of his necessities, and that the provisions of this order have been obeyed.

5. The Commander of the Forces begs that it may be observed that there is nothing in this order which authorises the detaching of more soldiers to take care of wounded in action than has been the practice hitherto. The Commanding officers of regiments, and the officers and non-commissioned officers of companies, must take care that no men fall out of the ranks, under pretence of taking care of wounded, who are not ordered to fall out by the officer commanding the company, and this officer must take care that no more men are employed on this duty than are absolutely necessary to perform it.

try at the risk of their lives. But, at the same time that I can appreciate the merit of those individuals, and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the Powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed, and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization which followed; and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, as I have above stated, now deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended King, have, by that very act, acquired the means of serving, and have rendered important services to their country.

It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty, with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of the effort now making, failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort should fail, the enemy will, by an amnesty, be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed. He will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain; and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the effort should succeed, as I sincerely hope it may, the object of the government should be to pacify the country, and to heal the divisions which the contest unavoidably must have occasioned. It is impossible that this object can be accomplished, as long as there exists a large body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest properties in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest; conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons, their friends and relations, will, if persecuted, naturally endeavor to perpetuate the divisions in the country, in the hope, at some time, to take advantage of them; and, adverting to their number and to that power which they must derive from their property and connexions, it must be feared that they will be too successful. But there are other important views of this question:

1st; Should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed at some time or other, some approaches to peace must be made between the two nations; and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement.

2dly; Should ever Spain be at peace with France, and should the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless Power to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of the renewal of war, which will be their constant wish and object, they will be the most active, the

most mischievous, and most inveterate enemies of their country; of that country which, by mistaken severity, aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects.

On every ground, then, it is desirable that this measure should be adopted, and that the present moment should be seized for adopting it. I am far, however, from thinking that an amnesty ought to be granted without exceptions and conditions; and I proceed to state, 1st, the exceptions which, in my opinion, ought to be made; and 2dly, the conditions on which any amnesty ought to be granted.

The amnesty ought not to extend to the ministers of King Joseph, nor to those who have been most active in his support, and by their influence and persuasions can be proved to have induced others to have espoused his interests, nor to those who have been instrumental in shedding blood, and in committing acts of cruelty against any Spaniard. Those likewise who have deserted any public trust or station to join the Intruder, with the exception of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the army, ought to be liable to the legal consequences of their conduct.

All others ought to be pardoned on the following conditions: 1st; That unless positive evidence should be given to the government of their having served the public during the time they were in the service of the pretended King, they shall reside in the place appointed for their residence, and be under the inspection of the police, and shall not be employed by the public for 2 years from the date of the amnesty. After that time they should be eligible for employment, unless previously accused of some act, the proof of which would legally render them incapable of filling an office.

In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government, I am, perhaps, intruding my opinion on a subject in which, as a stranger, I have no concern; but having had an advantage enjoyed by few, of being acquainted with the concerns of this country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible, both in the last and in the present campaign, of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper, as an individual well wisher to the cause, to bring it under the consideration of the government; assuring them, at the same time, that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my own country; nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions, to which I may attribute more weight than they merit; but they are formed upon experience and long reflection, and are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of this country.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Castrojeriz, 11th June, 1813.

I observe, upon looking over the accounts of the revenue of last month, a much larger sum employed upon naval expenses than it was agreed should be incurred; and likewise that the sum for the *Junta de Viveres* is paid in metal. I shall be obliged to you if you will notice these circumstances.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

11th June, 1813.

I have the honor of transmitting to you herewith a letter and enclosure, which I have received from Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., regarding the detention by Mr. —, of the Commissariat, of a soldier belonging to the Royal Waggon Train; and I request that you will be pleased to direct Mr. — not only to restore the soldier alluded to to his regiment, but to state in writing the circumstances which induced him to act in disobedience to the G. O. of this army by employing the man as his servant.

The A.G. to Gén. Wimpffen, Chef d'Etat Major de l'Armée Espagnolle, Ce 12 Juin, 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que les prisonniers de guerre dont je vous ai parlé hier après midi doivent partir de Salamanque le 23 du courant sur la route de Lisbonne, et qu'ils arriveront le 26 à Ciudad Rodrigo, où ils feront halte le 27; et Milord Wellington m'a chargé de vous prier d'écrire au gouverneur de cette place de faire marcher les prisonniers sur Sabugal par la route ci-jointe sous l'escorte d'un détachement de sa garnison. L'officier commandant l'escorte venant de Salamanque aura l'ordre d'y retourner après avoir remis à la charge du gouverneur de Ciudad Rodrigo les dits prisonniers. Le nombre de ces derniers montera à-peu-près de 500 à 550 de tous grades. A Sabugal l'escorte Espagnolle sera relevée par un détachement de milices Portugaises.

The A.G. to Capt. Hunt, 57th regt., Salamanca.

12th June, 1813.

I have the honor to apprise you that a party of prisoners of war and deserters, consisting of about 60 men, marched from hence this morning on the route to Salamanca, where they will arrive on the 21st inst.; and I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that you will cause the whole of the prisoners of war and deserters to proceed under charge of Capt. Campbell of the Portuguese service, on the 23d inst., to Ciudad Rodrigo, according to the annexed route. At Ciudad Rodrigo, Capt. Campbell will deliver over the prisoners of war and deserters in charge to the Governor of that place, and will proceed by the way of Salamanca to join the army with his detachment.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Capt. Sir G. Collier, containing the report of the capture of Castro Urdiales by the enemy.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

The army passed the Carrion on the 7th, the enemy having retired across the Pisuerga; and on the 8th, 9th, and 10th we brought forward our left and passed that river.

The celerity of our march up to this period, and the probable difficulties in, and the necessity of providing for the subsistence of the army in our farther progress, induced me to make short movements on the 11th, and to halt the left on the 12th; but on the latter day I moved forward the right under Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, consisting of the 2d British, Gen. Morillo's Spanish, and the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese divisions of infantry; and the Light division under Major Gen. Baron C. Alten;

G. O.

Castrojeriz, 12th June, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces omitted to return his thanks to the 2d regt. of hussars, K.G.L., for their services in this country, when he was lately under the necessity of ordering that their horses should be drafted from them.

2. There is no corps in the army of whose services and merits the Commander of the Forces entertains a higher opinion than of the 2d hussars; and he assures them that the measure which has deprived the Commander of the Forces of their assistance in this country was adopted with regret, as far as they were concerned, and was occasioned solely by views for the general benefit of the army.

and Major Gen. Fane's, Major Gen. Long's, Major Gen. V. Alten's, Brig. Gen. Ponsonby's, and Col. Grant's (Hussar) brigades of cavalry, towards Burgos, with a view to reconnoitre the enemy's position and numbers near that town, and to force them to a decision whether to abandon the castle to its fate, or to protect it with all their force.

I found the enemy posted with a considerable force, commanded, as I understand, by Gen. Reille, on the heights on the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village of Hormaza, and their left in front of Estepar. We turned their right with the hussars and Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry and the Light division from Isar, while Gen. V. Alten's brigade of cavalry and Col. the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan's brigade of the 2d division moved up the heights from Hormaza, and the remainder of the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill threatened the heights of Estepar.

These movements dislodged the enemy from their position immediately. The cavalry of our left and centre were entirely in the rear of the enemy, who were obliged to retire across the Arlanzon by the high road towards Burgos. Although pressed by our cavalry, and suffering considerable loss by the fire of Major Gardiner's troop of horse artillery, and obliged to make their movements at an accelerated pace, that they might not give time to our infantry to come up, they made it in admirable order; but they lost one gun and some prisoners, taken by a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, commanded by Capt. Milles, and a detachment of the 3d dragoons which charged their rear.

The enemy took post on the left of the Arlanzon and Urbel rivers, which were much swollen with rain, and in the course of the night retired their whole army through Burgos, having abandoned and destroyed as far as they were able, in the short space of time during which they were there, the works of the castle which they had constructed and improved at so large an expense; and they are now on their retreat towards the Ebro by the high road of Briviesca and Miranda. In the mean time the whole of the army of the allies has made a movement to the left this day; and the Spanish corps of Galicia under Gen. Giron, and the left of the British and Portuguese army under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, will, I hope, pass the Ebro to-morrow at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin.

In the course of the 9th, 10th, and 11th, Don Julian Sanchez was very active on the left of the enemy, and took several prisoners.

The Conde de la Bisbal with the army of reserve of Andalusia will arrive at Medina del Campo on the 14th.

I have received a letter from Gen. Elio of the 1st inst., in which he informs me that the 3d Spanish army had joined the 2d, that these armies had taken the positions before occupied by the 2d army and the Anglo-Sicilian troops under Sir J. Murray, and that Gen. Sir J. Murray had embarked in obedience to the orders which he had received with the troops under his command; had sailed from Alicante with a fair wind, and was out of sight on the 1st inst.

I have had the castle of Burgos examined this day, and I am happy to inform your Lordship that I have reason to believe that it is possible to

put it in a state of repair at a reasonable expense. It is a post of the greatest importance to the country, particularly during the winter; and if I should find it practicable, I will have it put in a state of defence.

To Earl Bathurst.

Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

I enclose the last weekly and daily state. We keep up our strength, and the army are very healthy, and in better order than I have ever known them. God knows how long this will last. It depends entirely upon the officers.

I have nothing to tell you excepting what is contained in the dispatch of this day.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

I have no news from hence to give you besides what is in my dispatch. I think we are getting on well; and I consider the evacuation of the castle of Burgos a very important event.

I have no news from England. The French have a bulletin of the 24th May, when Napoleon was at Dresden. They talk of successes; but as he was still at Dresden on the 24th, having arrived there on the 8th, they cannot be very important.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Masa, 14th June, 1813, 11 P.M.

I received last night your letters of yesterday, and I would have written to you, only that I had the Cadiz and English mails to dispatch.

You will have heard from Murray that the enemy blew up the castle of Burgos in the morning, but the destruction is not so complete as they hoped to make it. I understand that the explosion destroyed many men. The whole army was at and near Burgos on the day before yesterday, and marched yesterday morning towards Briviesca, leaving the same rear guard as before, in the neighbourhood of Gamonal. The rear guard had not moved at dusk yesterday evening, but I suppose they went off last night.

In regard to ———, I will appoint him to the Adj. Gen.'s department, if this arrangement should be thought likely to be of use to prevent his doing a very foolish thing; but I don't see how I can with propriety give the hint which you suggest. I could do so only on public grounds; and I am afraid there are too many Staff officers in this army similarly attended to allow of my making this condition in his case. If the appointment of ——— is not likely to have the wished for effect, I acknowledge that I feel unwilling to make it. There are some officers in the army who have lost their appointments to the Staff by going home on

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Masa, 14th June, 1813.

The enclosed is the arrangement for to-morrow. I am informed there are two roads from San Martin to Villarcayo, the one by La Lastra, Lomas de Villamediana, Bezana, Soncillo, Villarcayo; the other by Riva, Manzanedo, Ancenillas, Villarcayo. The former of these is stated to be good for artillery, and to make the distance $7\frac{1}{2}$ leagues. The latter (which is reported to be passable for artillery from Villarcayo only as far as Riva) is stated to me to be good for infantry all the way, and to be only $4\frac{1}{2}$ leagues. I therefore calculate upon your moving the infantry by the latter road, and the artillery by the former, and upon the whole being able to reach Villarcayo to-morrow. I beg you will send a report to head quarters at Quintana, near Puente de Arenas.

account of their health, and have staid away more than 2 months, who have claims to be appointed; and there are others, such as —, of the Guards, whom I have long been desirous of appointing when there should be an opportunity; all of which claims will be postponed by this arrangement. But if it will produce the wished for effect, I shall not feel any objection to postpone these claims, and will appoint him. I return his letter.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Masa, ce 14 Juin, 1813, à 11 heures du matin.

J'ai reçu avant hier votre lettre du 11, et hier celle du 13. J'ai cru que j'avais fait un arrangement pour les subsistances, sur lequel il ne pourrait pas avoir ou méprise ou dispute; mais je vois que je me suis trompé. Mais il paraît que c'est dans l'exécution qu'il a manqué; et j'ai donné ordre hier que dorénavant on vous dise les noms des endroits d'où vous devez tirer vos subsistances, auxquels notre Commissaire Général ne doit envoyer personne.

Il y a des difficultés en tout, mais surtout en subsistances de guerre, quand quelques-uns vont au marché avec de l'argent, et les autres sans le sou. Mais il ne faut pas se relâcher. Pour ce qui regarde Palencia, Fromista, et Carrion, il me paraît qu'ils ne sont ni sur votre gauche ni sur vos derrières. Mais je vous prie de me faire savoir les noms de ces commissaires qui se sont *apoderados* des fours à Palencia et Fromista. Ils seront indubitablement punis, parceque je ne permets pas l'usage de la force par les Messieurs de cette espèce.

Pour ce qui regarde l'argent, j'ai fait tout ce que j'ai pu avec le gouvernement, mais, je suis fâché d'ajouter, sans effet. Il paraît que le gouvernement pense que l'armée peut opérer sans argent, et que les Généraux se plaignent sans raison. Je tâcherai de vous donner encore 100,000 *duros* à la fin du mois d'Août.

Je n'entends pas exactement l'affaire des officiers du régiment d'Almanza et des hussards d'Estremadure comme vous l'avez représenté; et je vois qu'il y a quelque méprise de la part de ces officiers. En tout cas, ils ne peuvent pas quitter les corps où ils sont sans ordre ou permission. — — aime assez les eaux troublées; mais il faut qu'il apprenne que c'est le devoir d'un Général dans sa position de calmer, au lieu d'exciter, les inquiétudes. Je ferai mieux de causer là dessus avec vous à la première occasion, avant de faire quelques démarches sur ce sujet.

L'ennemi a fait sauter le château de Burgos, et est en pleine retraite sur l'Ebre.

To Gen. Don X. Elio.

Masa, 14th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 30th May and the 1st inst., and I have requested the Chief of the Staff to send you an answer to that which you wrote me respecting the operations of the 2d and 3d armies.

In answer to your other letter of the 1st June, enclosing one from the Inspector of Infantry of the 29th May, I write to you myself to request you to continue your efforts in the service of your country, in hopes that some remedy may be found for the various evils of which you complain.

I am perfectly sensible of those evils, and I am sorry to say, that experience has proved to me that time only can find a remedy for some of them; and it is incumbent on us in high situations to set the example of patience and perseverance in the performance of our duty, of which we have witnessed such signal instances in the lower classes of society, and in the inferior ranks of the army.

Your Excellency may depend upon my attending to your wishes in every respect, as far as may be in my power, and upon my neglecting no means in my power to induce the government to attend to the necessities of their army.

Au Gén. Don L. Wimpffen.

Masa, ce 14 Juin, 1813.

Je vous prie d'envoyer un officier de l'Etat Major Général dans la province de Sorïa, pour les objets dont nous avons parlé ce matin. Il se mettra en communication avec le Général Duran, et il recevra de lui et des autres officiers commandants des corps en cette province, et en Aragon, des états de leur corps; et il s'informera où ils sont stationés, et comment ils sont habillés, armés, et équipés; et quels sont leurs moyens pour entreprendre une opération quelconque contre l'ennemi. Il s'informera aussi quels sont les postes occupés par l'ennemi au nord de l'Ebre dans ces parties là, et par quelle force.

Il serait très important aux opérations des armées de ce côté ci et du côté du bas Ebre, si on pouvait prendre possession de Saragosse; et si on pouvait couper la communication entre Suchet et le Roi. Après Saragosse il me paraît que le point le plus important à occuper par les troupes de ce côté là serait Tudela de l'Ebre, afin de nous donner les ressources de ces provinces à nos opérations ultérieures. L'officier dira ceci au Général Duran ou à celui qui y commandera.

Au Gén. Don L. Wimpffen.

Masa, ce 14 Juin, 1813, à 2½ heures du soir.

En écrivant au Comte de la Bisbal sur sa marche, je vous prie de lui dire de tirer des subsistances de Tordesillas et de Valladolid; et, après avoir passé Valladolid, de Lerma, Roa, &c., et le pays entre le Pisuerga, le Duero, et l'Arlanzon.

P.S. Je ferai arrêter le courrier jusqu'à l'arrivée des ordres sur ce sujet, en cas que vous ayez écrit le premier avant de recevoir celle-ci.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Masa, 14th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th May, enclosing the decree of the Cortes Regency of the 18th May, in regard to the Intendants of the armies and the Intendants of the Provinces, which I consider as the determination of the government, upon the different representations which I have made to your Excellency in regard to the abuses, whose existence thus perpetuated, absolutely prohibits the existence of a Spanish army.

Since the month of December last, I have apprised the government of the fatal consequences to the military operations of the army resulting from the abuses in the financial system; and I have recommended mea-

tures, which have not only not been adopted, but nothing has been adopted in their stead.

I have forwarded to the government, from the Generals of all the armies, representations of the prevailing abuses in the finance, and of the misery suffered by the troops under their command respectively. It is at the same time obvious, that the existing system is as cruelly oppressive upon the people as it is ruinous to the army and to the State, and is more likely to alienate the affections of the people from the government, than a system of finance rigidly carried into execution, which should provide for the wants of the armies.

It is a fact, Sir, that the troops of Spain, in diminished numbers, are starving in rich provinces, which, only last year, maintained ten times the number of French troops in plenty. It is also a fact that this is owing to inexperience, and mal-administration, and to the misapplication of the public funds.

There are about 24,000 Spanish troops belonging to the 4th army, and the army of reserve of Andalusia, serving with the grand army of the allies under my command. Nine-tenths of the revenues of Seville and Andalusia, of Estremadura, of Galicia, and of Old Castille, that is to say, of more than three-fourths of Spain, now freed from the enemy, are said to be allotted to the support of these troops; and yet I assure your Excellency, that, if it were not for the sums which are given to these troops from the military chest of the British army, which so far diminish the efficiency of that army, these troops would not have a shilling to pay. Their provisions are forced from the country by a description of plunder.

The government have been made acquainted with the consequences to be expected from these evils; and they are so obvious, and the Generals commanding armies feel themselves so incapable, under existing circumstances, of applying a remedy, or of avoiding the fate which awaits us all, that two of them have already desired leave to resign, and to serve in inferior stations.

I have had many reasons to regret that your Excellency should have been separated from head quarters; but I regret particularly that you were called to the responsible situation which you now fill, before you were a witness of the dreadful consequences to the discipline and efficiency of an army, of being without pay or resources of any description, at the moment at which the efforts and exertions of all are required to be directed against the common enemy. Your experience would then have given double weight to the counsel which I feel convinced you have given to the government on these subjects, with a view to draw their attention to the finances of the state, in order to insure the support of that army, upon whose efficiency the state depends for its existence.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, 5th division.

14th June, 1813.

The Marquis of Wellington has directed me to transmit to you the enclosed return of carts belonging to the 5th division which were observed this day on the line of march, and to inform you that besides these carts his Lordship himself took notice of two others, one loaded with private baggage belonging to the 59th regt., and one loaded with tents belonging to the 4th regt. His Lordship has directed me to point out to you how very inconvenient these carts are to the

operations of the army, and how very desirable it would be to get rid of them entirely, particularly in a mountainous country; that to carry private baggage upon carts is positively contrary to orders, and that to carry tents upon carts is quite ridiculous, as they cannot by any possible chance arrive upon the ground to be occupied by the troops before they will march from it. That a very liberal allowance has been made to the Captains to enable them to provide sufficient mules to carry 3 tents for each company, and that his Lordship is very sorry to observe that the only regiments which have not got such mules to carry their tents are those in the 5th division, notwithstanding that he particularly requested the General officers would attend to this essential branch of the equipment of the regiments under their command. That his Lordship has before had to notice similar want of attention in the 5th division, the consequence of which is, that although composed of the finest regiments in the army, it has many more sick in comparison with the other divisions.

That his Lordship has sent orders to Major Lawson about his having bullock carts to attend his brigade of artillery, contrary to his Lordship's repeated orders; and that his Lordship now begs that you will give orders that the Provost attached to the 5th division may attend the baggage occasionally, and that all private baggage of every description carried upon carts may be burned, and the carts handed over to the Commissariat. His Lordship also desires to know the names of the Captains of companies, who have omitted to have proper mules to carry the tents of their companies, in order that his Lordship may take measures to have the allowance which has been given for that purpose stopped from their pay.

G. O.

Quincoces, 17th June, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of the General officers to his order of the 16th March, 1811, directing that the column of march of the infantry shall be formed by sections of 3 men in front.

2. In the defiles through which the army is likely to march, it is very desirable that great attention should be paid to the march of the baggage, the hour at which it is to set off, and the order in which it is formed.

3. When more than one division of infantry, or brigade of cavalry, march upon the same road from the same camp, it is desirable that the baggage of each should follow it; and this must be the practice, unless otherwise ordered. When the country is open, 2 or more divisions of infantry, or brigades of cavalry, moving from the same camp, are to march half an hour after each other; when the country is close, they are to march one hour after each other.

4. The baggage is to be formed as follows, unless otherwise ordered:

1st; Oxen for the day's provision.

2d; Wheel carriages drawn by horses or mules.

3d; Wheel carriages with iron axletrees drawn by bullocks.

4th; Mules with ammunition.

5th; The baggage of the staff of the division, or brigade of cavalry.

6th; Camp kettles or tent mules, and the baggage of the officers of regiments, in the order by regiments in which the regiment stands in the column.

7th; The commissariat stores upon mules.

5. All bullock carts upon wooden axletrees, and droves of oxen, excepting those required for the day's supply for each division, or brigade of cavalry, are to follow the whole column which will move from the same camp.

6. Officers are to take care that all the baggage is ready to start at the hour appointed for the march of the division.

7. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests the attention of the officers to the march of their several regiments, troops, and companies, in marching through a continuation of narrow roads and defiles, such as must be passed in this country. It is scarcely ever necessary for the rear to move at an accelerated pace in order to close up to the front of a column; whatever may be the distance to which the passage of a difficulty may throw any body of troops to the rear, it is almost certain that the head of the column will meet with others which will enable the rear to gain its distance without hurrying the troops; and if such difficulty should not occur, it is in the power of the Commander of the column to halt it, and it is better that the head should halt than that the rear should be hurried. Officers commanding troops and companies will attend to this.

8. The Commander of the Forces likewise requests that when the names of several villages are marked in the route to be passed through, the Staff officer leading the column will inquire from his guide for each of them successively.

The Marquis of Wellington likewise begs that Brig. Gen. Robinson may be informed that his Lordship is concerned to find that both these regiments (the 4th and 59th) are in his brigade.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Quincoces de Yuso, 17th June, 1813.

The whole army have crossed the Ebro, and we are in march towards Vitoria and the high road to France, of which I hope that we shall be in possession in a day or two. It is reported that the King is in march by Haro and Logroño towards Pamplona. We have not yet heard of any very large force on this side of the Ebro. The last large corps I heard of was encamped at Briviesca, on the night of the 14th. We saw the lights of a small corps last night at Frias.

We have, by Coruña, English papers to the 3d, which I have sent to Sir R. Hill, or I would enclose them. There were severe actions at and in the neighbourhood of Bautzen, on the 20th, 21st, and 22d, in which Buonaparte acknowledges that he lost 12,000 men. The Duc de Friuli was killed. The allies retired, and on the 23d Buonaparte's head quarters were at Gorlitz. The victory is claimed by the French, royal salutes fired, &c., &c.; but I hear from the frontiers that Buonaparte lost 50,000 men in these actions. It appears to have been defensive on the side of the allies, and I suspect that there was hard fighting on the first two days, and none on the last, when Buonaparte turned them, and they retired. If that is the case, they have lost ground, but are unhurt. He has offered (before the battle) to consent to a congress at Prague, to consist of ministers from himself, the King of Denmark, *King of Spain (Joseph), and the United States of America*; and from England, Russia, Prussia, *les insurgés d'Espagne, et la masse belligérante*. An armistice, to commence when the ministers shall arrive at Prague. Then follows the usual *Philippic* against England, about her rights on the ocean, and her egotism; and it is obvious, from the whole paper, that he means, if he can, to make peace with Russia and Prussia, and, at all events, to get an armistice, but to pursue his objects in Spain.

There are so many lies on all sides, that it is impossible to know the

Q. M. G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Quincoces, 17th June, 1813.

Lord Wellington directs that the 6th division remain at Medina for the present. Sir R. Hill has been directed to leave at Medina 2 squadrons of cavalry to be also under your orders. The object of this arrangement is to cover the communications of the army, and to watch, more especially, the force which the enemy still has in the country about Frias. I have to request that you will communicate whatever information you obtain respecting the numbers and movements of that force.

A letter party of cavalry will be stationed at this place to receive and forward your reports.

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Quincoces, 17th June, 1813.

Gen. Giron will be at Valmaseda to-morrow, and I beg you will establish a post at Amurrio, on the road from Orduña to Bilbao, with which post Gen. Giron has been instructed to put himself in communication.

Q. M. G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Quincoces, 17th June, 1813, 10½ P.M.

As it appears that the enemy has some considerable force in the neighbourhood of Espejo, Lord Wellington desires you will be so good as send Gen. Pack's and Gen. Bradford's brigades of infantry only, and one of your brigades of cavalry, to-morrow morning to Orduña, according to the arrangements already issued, and that you will halt the remainder of your column in the neighbourhood of Berberana until further orders.

real state of the actions on the 20th, 21st, and 22d, and I don't think that the Russians and Prussians can agree to the armistice without submitting entirely. It was supposed, before the last battle, that the Emperor of Austria would join the allies.

The King of Saxony has joined Buonaparte, and his troops were in the last battle.

P.S. The Catholic Bill is thrown out of the House of Commons; I don't know what was the majority. The minority was 248.

The A.G. to Brig. Gen. the Hon. W. Ponsonby, cavalry.

17th June, 1813.

The soldiers named in the margin were apprehended this day by Lieut. Col. Hardinge of the Portuguese service, with some goats in their possession, which the people of a village (near which the soldiers were found) said had been stolen from them, together with some clothes; and the inhabitants stated that the soldiers had committed great violence in the village by beating and illtreating them. The soldiers are now sent under escort to the bivouac of your brigade, to be brought to trial by a brigade or regimental Court Martial, as you may think proper to direct. Two inhabitants of the village to serve as evidence will be sent at the same time; and I beg to inform you that Lieut. Col. Hardinge, who is to be found at Marshal Beresford's, will be at leisure to attend to give evidence at 7 o'clock this evening. I have to request you will have the goodness to send to Lieut. Col. Hardinge at the village of Rastra de la Torre, to let him know whether his attendance will be required at that hour.

Lieut. Col. Hardinge also states that he came up with serj. —, commanding

Berberana, 18th June, 1813.

Instructions for the movement of the army on the 19th June, 1813:

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham will put in motion Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, the 1st division and the 5th division, as soon as possible after daybreak, and will march them without delay, by Berberana into the road which leads towards Orduña. The object of this movement is to open the route for the other columns of the army, and Sir T. Graham will be so good, therefore, as take the most effectual measures for carrying the rear of the above divisions and their baggage promptly beyond Berberana. This being effected, these troops will receive fresh instructions respecting their further destination. Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole will put the 4th division in motion at 4½ o'clock, and will march it back through the pass it now occupies, and place it (left in front) on the road leading from the village of Carcamo by Barron to Escota.

The Light division and Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade are to be put in motion at 5 A.M., and to pass to the left of the great road which leads through Espejo; and these troops will be prepared (on receiving further orders) to move by Salinas de Paul to Pobes. The object of their crossing to the left of the great road is, that they may be clear of the column which is to move by that road to Espejo.

The 2 brigades of the 2d division which are in support to the Light division will close up to Villanañe, and there wait for further orders; 1 battalion from these brigades will, however, remain at San Millan. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will put the troops under his orders in motion as soon as the 1st and 5th divisions have cleared the great road; and Sir Rowland will then move his column by Espejo towards the Puente Larra, occupying the Puente Larra and the most advantageous position near it on the left of the Ebro.

Brig. Gen. d'Urban's brigade of cavalry will move as soon as possible after daybreak to the village of Carcamo, and will form the head of the column of the 4th division, when that division comes up to Carcamo, and is ordered to proceed to its further destination. The hussar brigade and Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade will receive orders to-morrow respecting their destinations; as will also the brigade of Household cavalry, Major Gen. Bock's brigade of cavalry, and Brig. Gen. Bradford's and Brig. Gen. Pack's brigades of infantry. Major Gen. Bock will leave a letter party at Orduña.

The 3d division and reserve artillery will move from Oteo to Berberana.

The 7th division will move from Castrobarto to Villalba de Loza.

The baggage of head quarters will move at 8 A.M., and will proceed through Carcamo, Barron, and Escota, following the 4th division.

Major Gen. Giron will be so good as march his troops to-morrow from Valmaseda towards Orduña to Amurrio. He will be so good as put himself in communication with a post of British cavalry, which will be left at Orduña for that purpose.

a party of the 5th dragoon guards, to the conduct of which party the serjeant appeared wholly indifferent; and when Lieut. Col. Hardinge called upon him to assist in repressing some irregularities of which his party were guilty, he appeared very unwilling to attend to the Lieut. Colonel's directions, and, instead of checking, defended the conduct of the men.

I have to observe that the soldiers who were guilty of stealing the goats, and serj. —, were moving in a direction quite wide of the line of march.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Baron V. Alten, cavalry.

17th June, 1813.

Lieut. Col. Dickson, commanding the Royal artillery, has handed to me the enclosed return of ammunition, which I have now the honor of forwarding to you, and request that you will be pleased to call upon Col. Arentschildt to state in what manner the 1st hussars became deficient of ammunition to so large an amount as appears by the enclosed return; for it is hardly to be supposed from the nature of the affairs which took place with the enemy on the 26th ult., and the 7th and 12th inst., that the whole quantity deficient was expended on those occasions. It is the more remarkable that that regiment should be so deficient of ammunition, as it must have received a supply on the day on which the brigade under your command crossed the Tormes.

Au Lieut. Gén. Comte Gazan.

Au Quartier Général, ce 19 Juin, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 14, dans laquelle vous me proposez l'échange du Capitaine Hay, pour le Capitaine d'artillerie Chevillé, prisonnier de guerre en Angleterre, et vous me dites que vous renverrez le Capitaine Hay ici. J'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence que j'écris aujourd'hui en Angleterre qu'on renvoie en France le Capitaine Chevillé, et je vous prie de faire renvoyer le Capitaine Hay.

To Earl Bathurst.

Subijana, on the Bayas, 19th June, 1813.

The left of the army crossed the Ebro on the 14th, by the bridges of San Martin and Rocamunde, and the remainder on the 15th, by those bridges and that of Puente de Arenas. We continued our march on the following days towards Vitoria.

The enemy assembled on the 16th and 17th a considerable corps at Espejo, not far from the Puente Larra, composed of some of the troops which had been for some time in the Biscayan provinces in pursuit of Longa and Mina, and others detached from the main body of the army, which were still at Pancorbo. They had likewise a division of infantry and some cavalry at Frias since the 16th, for the purpose of observing our movements on the left of the Ebro. Both these detachments marched

Q. M. G. to Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham.

Berberana, 19th June, 1813.

As yet no report has been received from you respecting the force or movements of the enemy on the side of Frias, or if any of his troops still remain in that quarter. Under this uncertainty, positive orders cannot be given respecting the movement of the troops under your command. If you have ascertained, however, that the enemy has evacuated the country beyond the Ebro in the neighbourhood of Frias, as also that none of his troops remain between the Ebro and Medina, you will, in that case, be so good as put the 6th division and the cavalry with it in motion, and march by La Cerca to Quincoces, and thence to Berberana, regulating the length of these two marches according to circumstances, and reporting to head quarters through letter parties stationed at Quincoces and at Berberana. If you find it expedient that the troops under your orders should still remain in the vicinity of Medina, for the objects pointed out in my former letter, you will be so good as apprise me as early as possible of your intention to remain at Medina; and you will in that case relieve the letter party at Quincoces, directing that now there to proceed to Berberana and there wait further orders.

yesterday morning : that from Frias, upon San Millan, where it was found by the Light division of the Allied army, under Major Gen. C. Alten; and that from Espejo, on Osma, where it met the 6th and 5th divisions, under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham. Major Gen. C. Alten drove the enemy from San Millan, and afterwards cut off the rear brigade of the division, of which he took 300 prisoners; killed and wounded many, and the brigade was dispersed in the mountains.

The corps from Espejo was considerably stronger than the Allied corps under Sir T. Graham, which had arrived nearly at the same time at Osma. The enemy moved on to the attack, but were soon obliged to retire; and they were followed to Espejo, from whence they retired through the hills to this place. It was late in the day before the other troops came up to

Berberana, 19th June, 1813.

Instructions for the ulterior movement of the army on the 19th June :

The Light division and Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade of cavalry will march by Salinas de Paul to Pobes. The 4th division and Brig. Gen. d'Urban's brigade of cavalry will march from Carcamo, by Guinca, Barron, and Escota, to Morillas and Subijana on the river Bayas. The movements of these two columns are to be so combined that they may, as far as circumstances permit, be in constant communication with each other, and favor each other's advance in case of opposition on the part of the enemy. Major Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and the 1st and 5th divisions, will move by Luna, Archua, Sta Eulalia, and Jocano, to Zuazo.

This column will communicate (when it can be done) with the column of the 4th division; and Sir T. Graham will cause it to occupy Apricano, between Zuazo and Subijana. Gen. Bock's brigade of cavalry, with Major Gen. Pack's and Major Gen. Bradford's brigades of Portuguese infantry, will move from Orduña by Unza and Abecia to Anda; and will communicate from thence with the troops at Zuazo. The hussar brigade and Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry will move at 10 A.M. to Carcamo, and thence by Barron and Escota, following the route of the 4th division. The brigade of Household cavalry will move at 10 A.M. by Berberana to Carcamo, and there remain.

The 3d division and reserve artillery (already ordered to Berberana) will continue their march to Carcamo. The 7th division (already ordered to Villalba) will continue its march to Berberana. The hussar brigade will station a letter party at Berberana, to remain there till further orders. This letter party will communicate by Carcamo, Barron, and Escota, with head quarters, and also with a letter party of Major Gen. Fane's cavalry stationed at Quincoces.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Subijana de Morillos, 19th June, 1813.

From the ground occupied by the 4th division we can see Vitoria and the country intervening between it and a pass in the hills near La Puebla, through which the road from Miranda goes to Vitoria. The whole of the enemy's army appears to be in the plain between that pass and Vitoria. It has been arriving there from the side of La Puebla during the whole of the day.

The movements which have been ordered for to-morrow are made with a view to bring the army in general into a more concentrated situation, extending our left a little, however, so as to occupy the roads leading from Vitoria by Murguia towards Orduña and Berberana.

As there is hardly any possibility of employing cavalry until we *déboucher* from the defiles in which the army now is, I should recommend your movement to be made to-morrow somewhat in the following manner :

The infantry, without any incumbrances, to move by Villambroza and Paul, passing between Arreo and Salinas. This road being hilly and narrow, however, artillery could hardly move by it, and it will be better, therefore, to send the artillery by Espejo and Salinas, and the brigades of artillery can meet their respective divisions again as each arrives near Salinas by the infantry road.

I should recommend that one brigade of cavalry also should march by Espejo and halt near Salinas, and that the other brigade should follow the infantry and halt in the neighbourhood of Arreo; and in the mean time it may be ascertained how this latter brigade can be most conveniently moved down from the hilly country into that towards La Puebla.

I should think the whole of the baggage had better be kept clear of the troops till they have made their movement, so that if any thing should occur beyond a mere march, all obstructions may be prevented, which in a country such as this is might prove very embarrassing.

the advanced position which those under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham had taken; and I halted the 4th division, which relieved the 5th, near Espejo.

The army moved forward this day to this river. I found the enemy's rear guard in a strong position, on the left of the river, having his right covered by Subijana, and his left by the heights in front of Pobes. We turned the enemy's left with the Light division, while the 4th division, under Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole, attacked them in front; and the rear guard was driven back upon the main body of the army, which was in march from Pancorbo to Vitoria, having broken up from thence last night. I am informed that the enemy have dismantled Pancorbo. Col. Longa's division joined the army on the 16th, on its arrival at Medina de Pomar.

The Conde de la Bisbal will arrive at Burgos on the 24th or 25th.

I have not received any intelligence from the eastern coast since I addressed your Lordship last.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 12th to the 19th June, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Horses.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	4	23	18	27
Wounded	9	7	137	26	153
Missing	—	—	—	7	—

Subijana de Morillos, 20th June, 1813.

Instructions for the movements of the army on the 21st June.

RIGHT COLUMN.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will put the troops under his command in march at daybreak to-morrow morning, and will move them, by the communications already directed to be ascertained for that purpose, into the great road to Vitoria, in the vicinity of La Puebla de Arganzon. The divisions of this column are to march right in front, and Sir R. Hill will be so good as place them in the following order, viz.:

A brigade of Major Gen. Morillo's Spanish division.

Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade of light cavalry.

The 2d division.

The remainder of the cavalry of the right column.

The Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division.

As the column advances, and the country opens, the cavalry will move out of the column to act on either flank of it, as circumstances may require, and the nature of the ground will permit.

The destination of the Spanish brigade, under Gen. Morillo, being to move along the heights which lie to the right of the great road to Vitoria, that brigade will slant up the ascent from La Puebla de Arganzon in such a direction as may be necessary to enable it to turn the left flank of the enemy in that quarter.

Gen. Morillo will take care, however, never to lose his communication with the right column, from which he will receive such further support in his advance as may appear to Sir R. Hill to be necessary.

No part of the baggage of the right column is to move forward beyond La Puebla until Sir R. Hill sends an order for it to follow the column.

Although Gen. V. Alten's brigade of cavalry is to move in the first instance with the right column, as above pointed out, it may possibly receive another destination in the course of the day.

RIGHT CENTRE COLUMN.

The Light division will move at daybreak, and proceed by the road along the left bank

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Subijana, ce 20 Juin, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 16, et je ferai tout en mon pouvoir de vous donner des armes à feu pour votre cavalerie. Je crois que j'en pourrais ôter la moitié à la grosse cavalerie Anglaise si je n'en peux pas trouver autrement. Votre cavalerie ne pourra pas servir sans armes à feu.

L'ennemi est aujourd'hui campé entre nous et Vitoria. Je les attaquerai

of the river Bayas, through the pass which leads to Subijana de Morillos, and thence by Moutevité, and the camp of the 4th division, towards the village of Nanclares.

One squadron of the 15th hussars will be ordered to act with the advanced guard of this division. The remainder of the 15th hussars and Major Gardiner's troop of horse artillery will move in rear of the Light division.

The 4th division will follow in rear of the 15th hussars, and the 18th and the 10th hussars will follow the 4th division.

The reserve artillery will follow the 10th hussars, leaving, however, all the spare carriages of the brigades of artillery to follow in rear of the whole of the troops of the column.

Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry will follow the reserve artillery, and the brigade of Household cavalry will follow Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade.

The divisions of infantry and the brigades of cavalry of this column will march left in front.

When the head of the column reaches the village of Nanclares, further instructions will be given for its guidance.

The mules laden with spare ammunition are to move with the reserve artillery as far as the village of Nanclares, where these mules are to remain until otherwise ordered.

Brig. Gen. d'Urban will place his brigade of Portuguese cavalry in column at some distance to the right of the road by which the Light division is to march, and will move forward towards the river Zadorra at the same time that the Light division is advancing to Nanclares.

The several regiments belonging to the right centre column are to be particularly careful to keep clear of the line of march of those which are to precede them in the column; and they will employ small detachments to keep the roads clear in the vicinity of their respective camps.

All the baggage is to be in rear of the whole of the troops composing the column; and the officers in charge of the baggage of divisions and brigades must take care to keep that of each regiment perfectly clear of the road until it comes to its turn to enter upon the line of march. But none of the baggage of the column is to advance beyond the village of Nanclares until that belonging to head quarters, which will be immediately behind the troops, is ordered to move forward.

The regiments of cavalry, which are bivouacked on the right bank of the river Bayas, will pass by the ford. Lieut. Col. Hartmann will ascertain whether it will be most convenient for the artillery to pass also by the ford or to cross by the bridge, and will move it accordingly.

The Commanding officer of the mounted Staff corps will have the streets of the two villages of Morillos and of Subijana kept perfectly clear of all obstructions until the troops have passed through.

LEFT CENTRE COLUMN.

The 3d and the 7th divisions (marching from the left of divisions) will move at day-break, and will proceed by the village of Anda, and thence (turning to the right) by the villages of Gueta, which are on the road from Anda to Vitoria. On approaching Gueta the column will throw out detachments on its right, to communicate with those which will be ordered out from the left of the column moving by Nanclares.

Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie will have the immediate command of this column.

The baggage of the 3d and 7th divisions will remain sufficiently in the rear not to become a cause of embarrassment to the troops under any circumstances.

LEFT COLUMN.

This column will be composed of the 1st and 5th divisions, and of Major Gen. Pack's and Major Gen. Bradford's brigades of Portuguese infantry, Major Gen. Bock's and Major Gen. Anson's brigades of cavalry, and of Col. Longa's Spanish guerrillas.

The column will move (divisions left in front) from Murguia by the road leading from that place to Vitoria. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham will put himself in communication as soon as possible with the left centre column, from which detachments will also be sent out on its reaching Gueta, to facilitate that communication.

The column under the Earl of Dalhousie and that under Sir T. Graham are to regulate their movements by those of the two columns of the army on the right, the advance of which they are to endeavor to facilitate; but they are not to forego the advantage of being

demain matin s'ils ne font pas la retraite dans la nuit. Je crois qu'il faut vous tenir au moins près de nous pour le moment, parceque l'ennemi est très fort ; et l'armistice ayant été fait en Allemagne, il faut s'attendre qu'il sera renforcé. Mais il y a assez à faire pour tous.

J'ai écrit à mon frère il y a quelque temps de vous faire avoir 100,000 *duros* à la fin de ce mois de Juin.

able to turn the right of the enemy's position, and the town of Vitoria, by moving to their left flank, in the event of being required to do so. This latter part of the instruction is applicable more particularly to the column under the orders of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.

The Spanish corps, under Major Gen. Giron, has already received orders to move from Orduña to Murguia very early to-morrow morning. That corps will either act as a reserve to the left column of the army, or it will regulate its march in such manner as to be always in retired échelon to the left column, as may be deemed most expedient by Sir T. Graham, with whose instructions, in these respects, Gen. Giron has been directed to comply.

All communications for the Commander in Chief are to be sent to the right centre column.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Subijana de Morillos, 20th June, 1813.

The enemy has moved farther back towards Vitoria than he was yesterday afternoon.

It is desirable that you should be in force at Murguia as soon as possible, both on account of the inquietude which the enemy might give us by moving troops towards that point, and because it appears that it is from that quarter that our left should move in any further offensive operations we undertake.

The 3d and 7th divisions will be to-day at Zuazo and Apricano. If every thing is quiet in your neighbourhood, it does not seem necessary, however, that you should wait the arrival of these divisions ; it will in that case be sufficient to leave a small force only in observation till either the 3d or 7th division comes up.

I beg you will establish a secure and expeditious means of communication between Murguia and the centre divisions of the army. I should wish Col. De Lancey to send me a tracing of our line of communication, and of the course of the river Bayas between Apricano and Murguia. The distances of the intervening places should be marked in the tracing, as also the points where roads come in from the side of Vitoria. When the line of communication runs upon the left bank of the Bayas, or is otherwise exposed, posts should be established for its protection ; and it should be ascertained whether there is any other more secure line, which can be made use of in case of necessity.

I should wish to have reports as soon as possible from the patrols which Gen. Bock sends towards Vitoria ; as also from Col. Longa, who should push his people forward towards the great road beyond Vitoria, and obtain information of what is doing in that quarter, and whether any part of the enemy's army is continuing its retreat.

I beg you will let me know when you learn that Gen. Giron's corps has reached Orduña.

Additional instructions for Sir T. Graham, sent from Nanclares early in the morning of the 21st June :

Notwithstanding any thing contained in the general instructions of yesterday's date, if Sir T. Graham shall perceive that the right of the army does not gain ground towards Vitoria, he will direct his movement so as to come into immediate co-operation with the centre columns. But if, on the contrary, he observes that the troops forming the right of the army continue to advance, he will, in that case, turn his whole attention to cutting off the retreat of the enemy by the great road which goes from Vitoria by Tolosa and Irun to France.

Additional instructions transmitted to Sir T. Graham during the action of the 21st June, dated at 2 o'clock, P.M. :

Sir T. Graham will be so good as move forward and press the enemy. He will judge from the force of the enemy, and the obstinacy, or otherwise, of his resistance, whether it will be most expedient to move wide of Vitoria, leaving it to his right, or to move direct upon that place. If the enemy appears to be strong and persevering, it would not appear expedient to undertake any manœuvre which would separate the left column too much from the centre. If, on the contrary, the enemy appears decidedly in retreat, Sir T. Graham's movements should be directed in whatever manner will enable the army to reap the most effectual advantages from its success.

Pray send frequent reports, and keep up a sure communication with the other columns on your right.

To Earl Bathurst.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

The enemy, commanded by King Joseph, having Marshal Jourdan as the Major General of the army, took up a position, on the night of the 19th inst., in front of Vitoria; the left of which rested upon the heights which end at La Puebla de Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of Ariñez. They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley to the Zadorra. The right of their army was stationed near Vitoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro, had necessarily extended our columns; and we halted on the 20th, in order to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where it was most likely it would be required. I reconnoitred the enemy's position on that day, with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it. We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am happy to inform your Lordship, that the Allied army under my command gained a complete victory, having driven them from all their positions; having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, provisions, cattle, treasure, &c., and a considerable number of prisoners.

The operations of the day commenced by Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested, which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division under Gen. Morillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body on the high road from Miranda to Vitoria, and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of these heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill was obliged to detach, 1st, the 71st regt. and the light infantry battalion of Gen. Walker's brigade, under the command of Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point; and the Allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to retake them.

The contest here was, however, very severe, and the loss sustained considerable. Gen. Morillo was wounded, but remained in the field; and I am concerned to have to report, that Lieut. Col. the Hon. H. Cadogan has died of a wound which he received. In him His Majesty has lost an officer of great merit and tried gallantry, who had already acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected that, if he had lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country. Under cover of the possession of these heights, Sir R. Hill successively passed the Zadorra, at La Puebla, and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadorra, and attacked and gained possession of the village of Subijana de Alava, in front of the enemy's line, which the enemy made repeated attempts to regain.

The difficult nature of the country prevented the communication between our different columns moving to the attack from their stations on the river

Bayas at as early an hour as I had expected; and it was late before I knew that the column, composed of the 3d and 7th divisions, under the command of the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them. The 4th and Light divisions, however, passed the Zadorra immediately after Sir R. Hill had possession of Subijana de Alava; the former at the bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Tres-puentes; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the column under the Earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendoza; and the 3d division, under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the Earl of Dalhousie. These four divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to attack the height on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to strengthen his detachment on the hills, abandoned his position in the valley as soon as he saw our disposition to attack it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vitoria.

Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. In the mean time, Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, who commanded the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th divisions, and Gens. Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and Gens. Bock's and Anson's of cavalry, and who had been moved on the 20th to Murguia, moved forward from thence on Vitoria, by the high road from that town to Bilbao. He had, besides, with him the Spanish division under Col. Longa;* and Gen. Giron, who had been detached to the left, under a different view of the state of affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on the 20th at Orduña, marched that morning from thence, so as to be in the field in readiness to support Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, if his support had been required.

The enemy had a division of infantry with some cavalry advanced on the great road from Vitoria to Bilbao, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes de pont* to the bridges over the Zadorra at these places. Brig. Gen. Pack with his Portuguese brigade, and Col. Longa with his Spanish division, were directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by Major Gen. Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry under the command of Major Gen. Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these troops.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham reports, that in the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish troops behaved admirably. The 4th battalion of caçadores, and the 8th caçadores, particularly distinguished themselves. Col. Longa being on the left, took possession of Gamarra Menor.

As soon as the heights were in our possession, the village of Gamarra Mayor was most gallantly stormed and carried by Major Gen. Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced in columns of battalions, under

* The advance of the column under the command of Sir T. Graham was so effectually covered by Col. Longa that the enemy was not aware of any British troops advancing in that direction.

a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted by 2 guns of Major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The enemy suffered severely, and lost 3 pieces of cannon.

The Lieut. General then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division, by forming a strong battery against it, consisting of Capt. Dubourdieu's brigade, and Capt. Ramsay's troop of horse artillery; and under cover of this fire, Col. Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack of the village, which was carried; the light battalions having charged and taken 3 guns and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by Gen. Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry. During the operation at Abechuco the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Mayor, which were gallantly repulsed by the 5th division, under the command of Major Gen. Oswald. The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the Zadorra, 2 divisions of infantry in reserve; and it was impossible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them through Vitoria. The whole then co operated in the pursuit, which was continued by all till after it was dark.

The movement of the troops under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, and their possession of Gamarra and Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road towards Pamplona; but they were unable to hold any position for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter which had not already been taken by the troops in their attack of the successive positions taken up by the enemy in their retreat from their first position at Ariñez and on the Zadorra, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had, were taken close to Vitoria. I have reason to believe that the enemy carried off with them one gun and one howitzer only.

The army under King Joseph consisted of the whole of the armies of the South and of the Centre, and of 4 divisions and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the North. Gen. Foy's division of the army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bilbao; and Gen. Clausel, who commanded the army of the North, was near Logroño with one division of the army of Portugal commanded by Gen. Taupin, and Gen. Van-der-Maesen's division of the army of the North. The 6th division of the allied army under Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham was likewise absent, having been detained at Medina de Pomar for 3 days, to cover the march of our magazines and stores.

I cannot extol too highly the good conduct of all the General officers, officers, and soldiers of the army in this action. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill speaks highly of the conduct of Gen. Morillo and the Spanish troops under his command, and of that of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, and the Conde de Amarante, who commanded divisions of infantry under his directions. He likewise mentions the conduct of Col. the Hon. R. W. O'Callaghan, who maintained the village of Subijana de Alava against all the efforts of the enemy to regain possession of it, and that of Lieut. Col. Rooke of the Adj. Gen.'s department, and Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Abercromby of the Q. M. G.'s department. It was impossible for the move-

ments of any troops to be conducted with more spirit and regularity than those of their respective divisions, by Lieut. Gens. the Earl of Dalhousie, Sir T. Picton, Sir L. Cole, and Major Gen. Baron C. Alten. The troops advanced in *échelons* of regiments in 2, and occasionally 3 lines; and the Portuguese troops in the 3d and 4th divisions, under the command of Brig. Gen. Power and Col. Stubbs, led the march with steadiness and gallantry never surpassed on any occasion.

Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville's brigade of the 3d division was seriously attacked in its advance by a very superior force well formed, which it drove in, supported by Gen. Inglis's brigade of the 7th division, commanded by Col. Grant of the 82d. These officers and the troops under their command distinguished themselves.

Major Gen. Vandeleur's brigade of the Light division was, during the advance upon Vitoria, detached to the support of the 7th division; and Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie has reported most favorably of its conduct. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham particularly reports his sense of the assistance he received from Col. De Lancey, the D. Q. M. G., and from Lieut. Col. Bouverie, of the Adj. Gen.'s department, and from the officers of his personal staff; and from Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Upton, A. Q. M. G., and Major Hope, A. A. G., with the 1st division; and Major Gen. Oswald reports the same of Lieut. Col. Berkeley of the Adj. Gen.'s department, and Lieut. Col. Gomm of the Q. M. G.'s department.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, and to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, for the manner in which they have respectively conducted the service entrusted to them since the commencement of the operations which have ended in the battle of the 21st; and for their conduct in that battle; as likewise to Marshal Sir W. Beresford for the friendly advice and assistance which I have received from him upon all occasions during the late operations.

I must not omit to mention likewise the conduct of Gen. Giron, who commands the Galician army, who made a forced march from Orduña, and was actually on the ground in readiness to support Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.

I have frequently been indebted, and have had occasion to call the attention of your Lordship to the conduct of the Quarter Master Gen., Sir G. Murray, who in the late operations, and in the battle of the 21st June, has again given the greatest assistance. I am likewise much indebted to Lord Aylmer, the D. A. G., and to the officers of the departments of the Adj. and Q. M. G. respectively; and also to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and Lieut. Col. Campbell and those of my personal staff; and to Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, and the officers of the Royal Engineers.

Col. H. S. H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange was in the field as my aide de camp, and conducted himself with his usual gallantry and intelligence.

Mariscal de Campo Don L. Wimpffen, and the Inspector Gen. Don T. O'Donoju, and the officers of the Staff of the Spanish army, have invariably rendered me every assistance in their power in the course of these operations; and I avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction with their conduct; as likewise with that of Mariscal de Campo

Don M. Alava; and of the Brig. Gen. Don José O'Lawlor, who have been so long and usefully employed with me.

The artillery was most judiciously placed by Lieut. Col. Dickson, and was well served; and the army is particularly indebted to that corps. The nature of the ground did not allow of the cavalry being generally engaged; but the General officers commanding the several brigades kept the troops under their command respectively close to the infantry to support them, and they were most active in the pursuit of the enemy after they had been driven through Vitoria.

I send this dispatch by my aide de camp Capt. Fremantle, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection. He will have the honor of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness the colors of the 4th batt. 100th regt., and Marshal Jourdan's bâton of a Marshal of France, taken by the 87th regt.

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the late operations, and a return of the ordnance, carriages, and ammunition taken from the enemy in the action of the 21st inst.*

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the allied army at Vitoria, on the 21st June, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of Officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. and F.	British.	Spanish.	Portuguese.	Horses.
Killed .	33	19	688	740	501	89	150	92
Wounded	230	158	3782	4174	2807	464	899	68
Missing .	—	1	265	266	—	—	—	26

1 serjeant, 2 drummers, and 263 R. and F. have been returned missing by the several corps of the army, British and Portuguese. It is supposed that the greater number of them lost their regiments in the course of the night, and that very few of them have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

Return of Ordnance, Carriages, and Ammunition, captured from the enemy in the action at Vitoria, on the 21st June, 1813.

151 Brass Ordnance, on travelling carriages.
 415 Caissons.
 14,249 Rounds of ammunition.
 1,973,400 Musket Ball cartridges.
 40,668 lbs. of Gunpowder.
 56 Forage waggons.
 44 Forge waggons.

A. DICKSON, Lieut. Col. commanding the Artillery.

* See Appendix, Vol. vii., No. III., p. 678.

G. O.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the General officers, officers, and soldiers of the army, for their conduct in the action of yesterday. They may depend upon it that he will not fail to do them justice in the reports which he will make of their conduct to their several Sovereigns.

A. G. O.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

1. All horses and mules captured from the enemy are to be immediately sent to the officer commanding the Royal artillery; and an allowance made to the captors for each animal. If this order is not complied with, the captured animals will be seized, and no allowance whatever will be made for them.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that I yesterday attacked the enemy's army commanded by King Joseph, in the neighbourhood of Vitoria, and gained a complete victory, having taken from the enemy more than 150 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, baggage, cattle, provisions, treasure, &c. The enemy, prevented from retiring by the direct road to France, are on their retreat to Pamplona. I followed them this day with the advanced guard, to within 6 leagues of that place, to which the whole army are in march.

Our loss has not been severe. I send this letter by post; but I propose to-morrow to dispatch my aide de camp with all the details of this battle, which I hope that your Excellency will receive before this letter.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

I have the pleasure to inform you that we beat the French army commanded by the King, in a general action near Vitoria yesterday, having taken from them more than 150 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, baggage, provisions, money, &c. Our loss has not been severe. They are on their retreat to Pamplona, and we are following them.

I am much concerned to add to this account, that of the severe wound and reported death of Cadogan. He had distinguished himself early in the action, as you will see by the detailed report, a copy of which I will send you to-morrow. But he received a wound in the spine as I am informed, and he died last night. This is Churchill's account, for which I

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Salvatierra, 22d June, 1813.

I enclose an instruction respecting your moving into the great road from Vitoria to Bayonne, by the short line of march which I gave you this morning. I have some doubt of your being able to take artillery by that route. You will, of course, ascertain that when you get more near the difficult parts of the road, and send back your artillery if it cannot pass.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham will be pleased to put the under-mentioned troops in motion as soon as possible after daybreak to-morrow morning, and proceed with them to Villa Franca, upon the great road from Vitoria towards Bayonne:

The 1st division.

Pack's brigade } Portuguese infantry.
Bradford's brigade }

Anson's brigade of cavalry.

The destination of this corps is to act against any part of the enemy's troops, or any of his convoys, which may be moving by the great road above mentioned.

Sir T. Graham will judge from the information he obtains, and from other circumstances, how far it may be expedient to follow up this operation.

He will also make it an object of his attention to act against the force of the enemy which is understood to be retiring from Bilbao. Major Gen. Giron's corps is already moving by the route of Mondragon against that force, and Sir T. Graham will put himself in communication with Gen. Giron as soon as possible, and will take the necessary measures for the effectual co-operation of the two corps, giving Gen. Giron such further instructions as may seem most expedient.

The original instruction to Major Gen. Giron is enclosed.

Sir T. Graham will take care to keep up his communication with Salvatierra, and will be so good as transmit reports of his operations, as likewise all information obtained respecting the enemy through that channel.

Sir T. Graham will be so good as advert to the possibility of the operations of the troops under his orders being hereafter directed to the right of the great road, with a view to acting against the enemy upon his other lines of retreat.

can't vouch; but it is certain that he was wounded, and as I have not heard from himself, I am afraid that the consequence is too true.

His private character and his worth as an individual were not greater than his merits as an officer, and I shall ever regret him. It is a curious instance of his attachment to his profession, and of the interest he felt in what was going on, that after he was wounded and was probably aware that he was dying, he desired to be carried and left in a situation from which he might be able to see all that passed.

The concern which I feel upon his loss has diminished exceedingly the satisfaction I should derive from our success, as it will yours.

P.S. I have received your letters about Roche's affair, and La Carlota, which I shall answer immediately. I expect that this army, as also Suchet's, will evacuate at least this part of Spain.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Salvatierra, 24th June, 1813.

The recent operations of the army under my command, of which I have the honor to report to you the details by this occasion, afford me an opportunity of which I am anxious to avail myself, to draw the attention

Q.M.G. to the Marquis of Wellington.

Vitoria, 22d June, 1813.

It appears to me, from the map, that by moving a part of the left column of the army upon Villa Franca, we might be able to cut in upon the Bayonne road, and intercept, perhaps, some part of the enemy's force or of his artillery, or other convoys. I have sent to procure information here respecting the roads by which such a movement could be made, and I shall go myself by the route marked out for the left column to gain further information, and also to prepare Sir T. Graham for acting upon any order your Lordship may think proper to send to him upon this subject.

I should suppose that it might be sufficient to send the 5th division (or the 1st), and a regiment of cavalry, if the thing should appear expedient, and without artillery, if the roads are bad. The 6th division could replace, if requisite, the division sent from the left column.

It occurs to me that perhaps Gen. Giron may be retarded on the great road by some fortified post (besides that his chief attention and his movement will be upon Mondragon), and that any convoy going off by the great road of Bayonne may escape possibly without much effectual molestation.

P.S. I have just learnt that there is a road leading upon Villa Franca which shortens the distance 4 leagues; it being by the great road 12 leagues from this to Villa Franca, and only 8 by the direct road. The left column of the army is now about a league nearer that direction, I should think. I have got the names of the places through which the road passes, and I am told that the country carts go by it; but that a part of it, called the Puerto de S. Adrian, is very steep and difficult.

3 P.M.

I approve of this, if it is not now too late. Probably the two Portuguese brigades and the 1st division had better go, and that part of the cavalry which has not marched. I have sent to the 6th division to halt at Vitoria, or wherever the order might find them, as I learn that Clausel was on the march in that direction; and it would not answer to allow him to touch our hospital or our captures.

W.

After having dispatched the above letter by an officer to Lord Wellington, who had left Vitoria at an early hour in pursuit of the enemy, the Q.M.G. had an opportunity of communicating with Sir T. Graham before quitting Vitoria for Salvatierra. But the original letter, with Lord Wellington's approval and improvement on the suggestion it contained, in place of being carried direct to Sir T. Graham, was brought back to the Q.M.G., and, owing to that accidental circumstance, the left column did not take the proper turn into the road leading to the Puerto de S. Adrian, on the march of the 22d, as had been intended, but moved into that route (part of it having to countermarch) only on the morning of the 23d. This alone enabled the corps of Gen. Foy, which was retreating from the province of Biscay, by Villa Real and Villa Franca, to pass, on the 24th, a short time before the arrival of Graham's column, upon the great road.

of the Regency to the conduct of some officers, and to recommend them for promotion.

I beg leave to recommend that the Mariscal de Campo Don F. Copons y Navia, Don L. Wimpffen, Don P. A. Giron, Don M. Freyre, the Principe de Anglona, and Don J. O'Donoju may be promoted to be Lieut. Generals; that Brigadier Don P. Morillo may be promoted to be Mariscal de Campo; and that Col. Don M. Llauder may be promoted to be a Brigadier. All these officers have rendered important services during the war; and although the occasion applies only to a certain number of them, I don't think I can with propriety or justice recommend some to the Regency without attending to the claims of others.

I likewise hope that the Regency will have promoted Col. Don F. Longa, according to my former recommendation.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Irurzun, 24th June, 1813.

I refer you to the enclosed dispatches for the details of our operations since I wrote to you on the 17th. I wrote to you also on the 22d, but I hope that you will first receive this letter.

I know how much you will feel for the loss of poor Cadogan, which has distressed me exceedingly. He was so anxious respecting what was going on, that after he was wounded and knew that he was dying, he had himself carried to a place whence he could see all the operations! Pray let George and Louisa know of their misfortune.

King Joseph and his army must quit Spain; indeed, they have already this night retired from Pamplona. I am trying to cut off some of the others, and I shall try to turn them all out of Spain before they can be reinforced.

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Irurzun, 24th June, 1813.

Capt. Leith Hay of the 11th foot, who was taken prisoner a short time ago, having been permitted to return to the British army, I will thank you to send to France in exchange for him Capt. Chevillé of the French artillery, now a prisoner on parole at Abergavenny.

I enclose a letter for that officer, which I request you will be so good as to have forwarded to him.

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurzun, 24th June, 1813.

The departure of Capt. Fremantle having been delayed till this day by the necessity of making up the returns, I have to report to your Lordship that we have continued to pursue the enemy, whose rear reached Pamplona this day. We have done them as much injury as has been in our power, considering the state of the weather and of the roads; and this day the advanced guard, consisting of Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade, and the 1st and 3d batts. of the 95th regt., and Capt. Ross' troop of horse artillery, took from them the remaining gun they had. They have entered Pamplona, therefore, with one howitzer only.

Gen. Clausel, who had under his command that part of the army of the North, and one division of the army of Portugal which was not in the

action of the 21st, approached Vitoria on the 22d, where he heard of the action of the preceding day; and finding there the 6th division, which had just arrived under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, he retired upon La Guardia, and has since marched upon Tudela de Ebro.

It is probable that the enemy will continue their retreat into France. I have detached Gen. Giron with the Galician army in pursuit of the convoy which moved from Vitoria on the morning of the 20th, which I hope he will overtake before it will reach Bayonne.

I have the honor to enclose a report * which I have received from Gen. Copons, of a very gallant affair in Catalonia on the 7th May, by a brigade of Spanish troops under the command of Col. Don M. Llauder; and I have received a report, not official, stating that on the 17th May Gen. Copons had defeated the enemy in the position of Correal, near La Bisbal.

Gen. Mina informs me that he has accounts of the landing of the force under Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray in Catalonia, and of the capture of the Coll de Balaguer and of Tarragona by them after a siege of 8 days. I have hitherto received no accounts of these events.

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurzun, 24th June, 1813.

I shall take an opportunity of answering your letter regarding Mr. Sampayo's concerns when I shall have more leisure. I shall now only say that the reasoning of the Commissary in Chief, in his letter to the Treasury, would be very good, if his facts were true, but they are all false. However, it is no concern of mine. It is the business of the Treasury, and of the Commissary in Chief, to find money to perform His

* Gen. Don F. Copons y Navia to Gen. the Marquis of Wellington.

Villa Franca, 18th May, 1813.

The God of armies favors the operations of that which I have the honor to command.

The 2d brigade of the 2d division, under the command of Col. Don M. Llauder, completely destroyed, on the 7th inst., an enemy's column, composed of 1500 men, commanded by the Marshal who left Puycerda, for the purpose of attacking Col. Llauder's flank, while he was engaged in the blockade of Olot: 4 officers and 290 men made prisoners, 12 caissons, and more than 500 muskets, and the reduction of the enemy's number to some 300 men, are the results of this fortunate affair.

Gen. M. Mathieu, with a corps of 6000 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 5 pieces of cannon, under Gens. Expert and Debans, marched to Tarragona, for the purpose of protecting a convoy.

I followed with the 2d brigade of the 1st division, the 1st of the 2d, the battalion of the General, and 30 cavalry, making a total of 3200 men. On the return of Gen. Mathieu for Barcelona, I endeavored to draw him to an advantageous position, which I occupied at the village of La Bisbal, where I offered him battle on the 17th. At half-past 7 in the morning the fire began, and soon became general along the whole line: the attack and movement of the enemy to turn my flank were unavailing. At half-past 12 he attacked with the greatest spirit, and being repulsed and vigorously pursued, commenced his retreat, in sight of our valiant soldiers.

The field remained covered with bodies and arms: the enemy's loss exceeded 600 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. One Commanding, and 5 inferior officers, were among the first, and 7 were wounded.

The enemy confessed this loss in the village, in which he left part of his wounded, under charge of a French surgeon.

My loss is not accurately ascertained, but I know that it bears no proportion to that of the enemy. When the different reports are received, I shall forward them to your Excellency; but, in the mean time, I have the honor to give your Excellency this information for your satisfaction.

Majesty's engagements to the powers in the Peninsula; and I hope they will perform that duty. I have nothing more to do with it.

I likewise beg leave to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adopting some measure for the protection of the navigation of the coast of Portugal, and of the north coast of Spain. Sir C. Stuart informs me that many vessels have lately been taken off the coast of Portugal. Ammunition required for the army has lately been delayed at Lisbon for want of convoy; and it is not yet arrived at Santander, and I am obliged to use the French ammunition, of a smaller calibre than our muskets, to make good our expenditure in the late action. The army cannot remain in this part of the country without magazines, notwithstanding its successes, and these magazines must be brought by sea, or they must be purchased with ready money. For the first time I believe it has happened to any British army, that its communication by sea is insecure; and certainly we have not money to purchase in the country all we want.

The increase of the naval force on the Lisbon station is likewise necessary, because our money must be transported from Lisbon by sea once a fortnight. We are too far from Lisbon to transport it by land; and the expense would be enormous. I trust that your Lordship will adopt some measures to afford us the wished for security in the navigation of the coast.

To Major Gen. Roche.

Near Pamplona, 25th June, 1813.

Sir H. Wellesley has transmitted to me your letter to him, and that to me of the 1st inst., and the copy of his answer of the 12th, with which I concur so entirely, that I need only refer to it for a statement of my opinion.

I don't know the person who made the statement to government which induced them to order me to call upon you for your accounts of the issues of the stores entrusted to you, and to investigate those accounts; but if I had received such a statement I should have acted as they have.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Près de Pamplona, ce 25 Juin, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 18; et comme vous avez appris des autres tout ce qui est arrivé ici, je ne vous écris pas là dessus. J'espère que nous pourrons attraper Clausel. Le Roi et ses débris sont partis pour la France. Nous bloquerons cette place demain matin.

Je vous donnerai des billets sur l'Angleterre pour toutes les sommes d'argent que vous pouvez mettre dans la caisse militaire, qui seraient employées à payer les troupes de la 4^{me} armée.

J'avais l'intention de réparer le château de Burgos; mais si vous l'avez détruit, n'importe.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Orcoyen, near Pamplona, 25th June, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 12th regarding the pretensions of the Princess of Brazil to the Regency of Spain.

When I was at Cadiz, I had a conversation with the Portuguese minister upon this subject, upon the occasion of his pressing me to declare myself in her favor. My answer was, that I never interfered in concerns of that description, and that I had come to Cadiz upon military business, and

would not interfere in any other ; that I was the servant of three masters, and had not received the instructions of any one of them to talk to any body, or to interfere in any manner in that concern ; and that, as far as I had any knowledge, I believed that to urge the pretensions of the Princess at that moment was repugnant to the wishes of the Prince of Brazil, equally with the English government and the Spanish Cortes and Regency.

I then said, that, as a matter of private opinion, I thought that the Princess had behaved very indiscreetly on many occasions which I could enumerate, but particularly in her declarations against the English alliance. That in other times, and under other circumstances, the policy of that alliance might be doubted with fairness ; but that the person who declared against it under the existing circumstances must be either a fool or knave, as it was quite clear that it afforded the only hope of saving Spain and the Peninsula from the hands of the French. That in consequence of all these reflections, he must excuse me from giving my opinion in any manner on the subject.

I cannot convey what I think regarding the appointment of the Princess to the Regency in stronger terms ; and you may make what use you please of this letter.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

25th June, 1813.

I have been directed by the Commander of the Forces to desire that your Lordship will be pleased to cause an officer belonging to the 7th division, of the rank of Captain, to proceed to the rear to the village of Echarri-Aranaz, for the purpose of acting as Commandant of a passing hospital station for sick and wounded, which it is proposed to establish there. One of the men of the mounted Staff corps attached to the 7th division is likewise to proceed to Echarri to act as Provost, or to be sent forward to head quarters in the event of the Commandant having any communication to make of an urgent nature.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

25th June, 1813.

The severity of the weather having occasioned considerable sickness, it has become expedient to establish a receiving station at Echarri-Aranaz, where men of the above description may be assembled till a selection shall take place of those equal to rejoin, and for such as it may be proper to send to the established dépôt at Vitoria. I am directed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to request that you will forthwith detach a Commissariat officer to Echarri-Aranaz, for the purpose of supplying that dépôt, and that you will be pleased to cause the returning transport to pass through that town for the purpose of assisting, as well in assembling the weakly and wounded there, as further to aid in their removal to Vitoria in the instances it may be deemed necessary.

The A.G. to the A.A.Gs., 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions. 25th June, 1813.

The inclemency of the weather having occasioned a great degree of sickness in the army, a passing hospital station has been established at Echarri-Aranaz, and men taken ill upon the road between that place and the head of the column are directed to be sent to the above hospital, which you will be pleased to report to the General commanding the division. The contents of this order are to be communicated to any brigade of cavalry that may be near the division.

The A.G. to A.A.Gs. of divisions and cavalry.

25th June, 1813.

When more than one division march by the same route, and that the severity of marching or of the weather shall oblige the weakly soldiers to fall in the rear out of their ranks, the divisions in rear are expected by his Excellency successively to provide accommodation for soldiers or detachments of this description remaining

in the vicinity of their head quarters, and provision them in all respects as if actually belonging to them. The Adj. Gens. are particularly requested to examine into the authority of absence of soldiers found in rear, to prevent imposition, and to enable the General officer's decision in reference to them.

His Excellency by no means wishes this instruction should remove any preceding order calculated to check soldiers falling in rear of their respective corps, but rather as an additional provision against a casualty, which, if not brought under the immediate notice of the General officers commanding divisions, might produce, at a period of necessary exertion, disadvantage and delay to any proposed movement.

To Lieut. Col. Bourke.

Orcoyen, near Pamplona, 26th June, 1813.

I send herewith the duplicate of my dispatches to the Sec. of State of the 22d and 24th inst., and of this day, containing accounts of the battle of the 21st, near Vitoria, and of subsequent events in this quarter.

You will see by the last that I propose to lay siege to Pamplona; and I mean to make use, in that operation, of 28 French 12 pounders, taken from the enemy in the battle of Vitoria.

I enclose letters to the Commanding officers at Ferrol and in the province of Galicia, to order them to concert with you the means of sending round to Deba 12 pounder shot, to the amount of 28,000; and I request you to press forward as much as may be in your power the delivery of the shot from the arsenals, and to arrange with the Commissary Gen. and the officers of the British Navy at Coruña, or any other British authority who may be there, the hire of vessels to carry the shot to Deba; and to impress upon them the necessity that, for the good of His Majesty's service and the cause, all persons should exert themselves to carry this service into execution.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Orcoyen, near Pamplona, 26th June, 1813.

I had this day the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst. Before you will receive this, you will probably have heard of our victory of the 21st. The enemy are on their retreat into France; and I propose forthwith to make the siege of Pamplona.

I dispatched yesterday an officer to Santander, with directions to bring to the port of Deba the battering train and its equipment, which is now, I hope, at Santander. I am afraid it will be necessary to tranship the ordnance, &c. into smaller vessels; but the communication by land from hence with Deba is so much more convenient than by Bilbao, that I have given directions that the ordnance, &c. may be transhipped into small vessels, to be hired at Santander, if, upon inquiry there, it should be found that the ships in which they are now embarked cannot enter Deba on account of the lowness of their draught of water. I request you to aid these measures by your influence and assistance at Santander.

I propose to use in the siege of Pamplona some of the French 12 pound ordnance captured in the battle at Vitoria; and I have sent to Coruña for 28,000 12 pounder shot for that service, which must likewise be brought to Deba. It would be very desirable if this shot could come in a ship of war of a small size; and, at all events, I request you to adopt immediate measures to give it convoy. After having taken Pamplona, it will not be difficult to make ourselves masters of Santoña, Castro Urdiales, and even

San Sebastian ; and it is not impossible that the measures to take those places might hereafter, with your assistance, go hand in hand with those for the capture of Pamplona ; but at present we must direct all our efforts to the latter.

I send this letter to you off Bilbao, and a duplicate to Santander.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Près de Pamplona, ce 26 Juin, 1813.

J'ai reçu ce matin votre lettre du 24, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé. Je vous ai écrit hier. J'ai envoyé ordre au Comte de la Bisbal de tâcher de prendre Pancorbo, et je lui ai envoyé un ingénieur Anglais, qui a fait la reconnaissance de la place, pour l'aider. Je fais l'investissement de cette place ; et, en même temps que nous rejettons la grande armée en France, je vais tâcher d'attraper Clausel, qui est encore sur l'Ebre avec 15,000 hommes. Au moins nous le renverrons sans canon ou voitures.

To Earl Bathurst.

Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. containing the copy of one from the Commissary in Chief to the Lords of the Treasury in regard to the importation of grain from America.

Your Lordship is mistaken in supposing that Mr. Sampayo has made a contract for the supply of that article at the Lisbon prices. The fact is, that under a commission from Sir C. Stuart, he purchased grain on account of the government, with bills on the Treasury, furnished him by His Majesty's minister, and government enjoyed all the profit arising from the difference of price at Lisbon and at the place at which the corn was purchased.

To Earl Bathurst.

Orcoyen, near Pamplona, 26th June, 1813.

The enemy continued their retreat yesterday morning from the neighbourhood of Pamplona, by the road of Roncesvalles into France, and have been followed by our Light troops.

The fort of Pamplona has been invested this day ; and I have made arrangements for landing and bringing up the train of artillery to attack that place.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Longa of the 22d, stating that he has taken 6 pieces of artillery from a detachment of troops under the command of Gen. Foy, on their retreat into France by the high road at Mondragon.

I ought to have informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 24th, that on the 23d inst. I had detached Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to the left towards Tolosa, with a view to the operations to be carried on in that quarter. By a letter from him of the 25th, it appears that he arrived yesterday at Tolosa, having been opposed in his occupation of that town by the troops which retired under the command of Gen. Foy. He mentions the assistance which he had received from Col. Longa, and from 2 battalions of the army of Galicia, which Gen. Giron had left with him, in his attack upon Tolosa.

I have not received any official intelligence of the state of affairs on the Eastern coast ; but Gen. Mina told me yesterday that the allied troops

were certainly in possession of the lower town of Tarragona, which they had stormed, and that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray had commenced his attack upon the upper town; and that an officer belonging to one of the regiments under his command, on the frontiers of Catalonia, had reported to him on the 23d that the fire at Tarragona had ceased entirely.

Sir J. Murray had certainly landed in Catalonia on the 3d inst., and had taken possession of the Coll de Balaguer on the 7th, in which fort were found 17 pieces of cannon. Some prisoners were taken.

It is likewise reported in the country that the Spanish troops are in possession of Valencia.

To Earl Bathurst.

Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

When I wrote to your Lordship on the 10th Feb. regarding the battering trains to be prepared in England, I had in contemplation, in the first instance, the siege of Burgos, and afterwards that of Pamplona and other places in the enemy's possession between the Ebro and the French frontier. I now therefore beg your Lordship to order to Santander the other trains requested to be in readiness for this service. In the mean time I am about to use in the siege the 12 pounder ordnance taken from the enemy.

To Col. Malcolm.

Orcoyen, 26th June, 1813.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 22d May, which I received by the last post, and the sword which you have given me.

* * * * *

You will hear of events here. I have taken more guns from these fellows in the last action than I took at Assye, without much more loss, upon

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Tafalla, 27th June, 1813.

Gen. Clausel has continued his march upon Calahorra, and I fear we must relinquish the hope of intercepting him at Tudela. In consequence of this movement of the enemy, Lord Wellington desires that you will be so good as bring forward the remainder of the right column of the army out of the valley of Araquil.

When these troops have come up, you will order Major Gen. Byng, with one British and one Portuguese brigade of the 2d division, and Major Gen. Morillo's Spanish division, to proceed by the route along which the enemy's army retired from Pamplona towards France (believed to be by the pass of Roncesvalles).

The objects of this movement are: 1st; To ascertain with certainty the direction of the enemy's march, and whether he has continued it beyond the frontier, evacuating entirely the Spanish territory. 2d; To watch and oppose his movements if he should attempt to return, or to send any parties in the direction of Pamplona.

There is no objection to Major Gen. Byng's pushing his advanced detachment beyond the frontier, provided he can do so without meeting with much opposition, or having to force any strong post; but his attention must be chiefly directed to acting upon the defensive.

You will be so good as endeavor to obtain as perfect a knowledge as possible of the country towards the frontier, by sending out officers to reconnoitre and report upon it.

In addition to the officers of the Q.M.G.'s department, and of the Engineers, who may be employed in this manner, Lord Wellington authorises your employing likewise such regimental officers as may be found qualified for that service; and these officers will receive a contingent allowance of 3 dollars a day whilst detached from their regiments and employed in this manner. You will be so good as send such detachments of cavalry (from the cavalry of the right column of the army) with Major Gen. Byng as the information you obtain respecting the nature of the country gives you reason to think necessary or useful to him; and you will be so good as make arrangements for keeping up a certain and expeditious communication with the troops detached under Gen. Byng's orders.

about 70,000 men engaged. The two armies were nearly equal in numbers, but they cannot stand us now at all.

The A.G. to Col. Grant, hussar brigade.

26th June, 1813.

I request you will be pleased to call on the officers commanding regiments under your charge, for a specific report in how far the G. O. have been complied with, of the 22d inst., whereby all captured animals were required to be given over for the disposal of the officer commanding the Royal artillery.

You will also be so good to communicate to me, for his Excellency's information, the steps you have taken, or propose to take, for the object of collecting the treasure seized on by the individuals of the — hussars, on the day of action, at a period when their attention should solely have been directed to the furtherance of the advantages which were gained.

On the receipt of your report the Commander of the Forces proposes to give such instructions for the distribution of the sum collected, as may best tend to recompense the soldiery who did attend to the immediate service then in course of execution, as also to discourage the discreditable act of forsaking the ranks for plunder.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Orcoyen, 27th June, 1813, 6 A.M.

I have just now received your note of yesterday from Tolosa. Knowing that Murray communicated to you all that was passing on this side, I have not written to you; and I refer you to the letter which he wrote to you yesterday, and of which he will send a duplicate this morning, for the detail of what I intend to do.

I am just setting out after Clausel with the 4th division and Light division. Sir R. Hill will invest this place. I shall get him likewise to post a strong force towards Roncesvalles.

You must be too late to do Foy any mischief, but you might push him on; and afterwards take your defensive on the great road, according to the instruction of yesterday.

I propose to bring the artillery, &c. for the siege of Pamplona from Deba by Tolosa.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart.

Orcoyen, 27th June, 1813.

I have just received yours of yesterday. I have already stated to you the arrangements for the command of brigades in the 2d division, and it is not in my power to give Gen. Ross the command which you ask. I have besides reason to believe that he is desirous of staying where he is.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Caseda, on the Aragon, 28th June, 1813, 2 P.M.

I received in the night your report to the 26th,* and this morning from Lord March your letter of the 27th; and Gen. Murray has shown me two letters which he had received from you last night and this morning.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Tolosa, 26th June, 1813.

It was so late on the 23d when I received the order to march by the Puerto San Adrian on Villa Franca, and the weather and the road were so extremely bad, that but a small part of the column could get over the mountain that day: and it was not till late on the 24th that I could move from Segura on Villa Franca, with Major Gen. Anson's brigade of light dragoons, the light battalions of the King's German Legion, and the 2 Portuguese brigades; the rest of the troops not being yet come up.

The rear of the enemy's column was then just passing on the great road from Villa

I know of nothing that has retreated from Vitoria by the great road, nor that is on the great road at present, excepting the troops which came with Foy from Bilbao, and the garrisons which he has picked up on his way.

The troops stated to have passed from Irurzun by the Tolosa road towards San Estevan, certainly returned to Irurzun, and marched with the remainder of the army to Pamplona, from whence the whole have retired by Zubiri. At Zubiri, the armies of the South and Centre, and part of that of Portugal, went to St. Jean Pied de Port, where they arrived on the 26th. Part of that of Portugal went by Berrueta towards Bayonne.

The account, however, which you have given of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, in your letter to Gen. Murray, has induced me to alter my plans a little. The 5th and 6th divisions were brought between Vitoria and Logroño, with a view to Clausel's probable movement upon Salvatierra, according to all the authentic reports of the moment, and to a

Real to Villa Franca, and he occupied, in considerable force, some very strong ground on the right of the great road, and of the river Oria, in front of the village of Olaverria, and about a mile and a half from Villa Franca.

Major Gen. Bradford's brigade marched by Olaverria, and was employed to dislodge the enemy on the right, while the remainder of the troops advanced by the *chaussée*, defended by the enemy's tirailleurs on the heights, and a strong body at the village of Beasayn.

As the enemy reinforced the troops on his left, it became necessary to push on by the *chaussée*, which was done by the light battalion, under Col. Halkett, assisted and flanked by some companies of Major Gen. Pack's Portuguese brigade; and this service was performed, in the most gallant style, by these brave troops, who drove the enemy from the village of Beasayn. The enemy having troops ready posted on the succession of strong heights on each side of the deep valley, at the bottom of which the road runs, a considerable time became necessary to reach his flanks, during which he evacuated Villa Franca, without further dispute.

The Portuguese brigades on the right and left of the valley pushed on their advance to Isasondo, and the troops assembled at Villa Franca. Here, likewise, the head of Gen. Giron's corps and all Col. Longa's arrived in the course of the evening.

The next morning (the 25th) the enemy evacuated Celequia; and, as he had taken up a very strong position between that and Tolosa, covering the Pamplona road, the Spanish corps of Col. Longa was marched by Alzo towards Lizarza, to turn his left, while Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal was requested to dispatch some battalions from Azpeitia to turn his right, appuyed on a high mountain, with an inaccessible ravine in front.

The enemy was driven from the summit of an important hill, lying between the Pamplona and Vitoria roads, by a very skilful attack of Lieut. Col. Williams, with two companies of the grenadiers of the 1st regt., and three of the 4th *caçadores*, belonging to Gen. Pack's brigade. The conduct of Lieut. Queiros, and of Ensign Vasconcellos, of the 4th *caçadores*, was distinguished on this occasion. The latter officer lost an eye by a musket shot. This hill was immediately occupied by Major Gen. Bradford's brigade, supported by the 3 line battalions of the King's German Legion. The rest of the day was chiefly spent in skirmishing with the enemy's tirailleurs, to give time for the Spanish corps arriving at their destination.

A general attack began between 6 and 7 in the evening. Two guns of Capt. Ramsay's troop, and two 9 pounders of Capt. Dubourdieu's, under an escort of Capt. Childer's troop of the 11th light dragoons, and of the advance of Col. Halkett's light battalions, were brought rapidly forward on the *chaussée*, and fired with effect against several formed bodies of the enemy in the plain near the town; while the column, consisting of the German light battalions, the brigade of Guards, and a Spanish division of Gen. Giron's, continued to advance by the *chaussée*. Two Spanish battalions and one Portuguese, forming a separate column on the left of the *chaussée*, passed quickly on the left of the town; Gen. Bradford and the line battalions of the Germans driving in the enemy on their front, by the Pamplona road, and Col. Longa from the side of the mountains, still more on the right, turning and forcing, from very strong positions, all the posted bodies of the enemy on the right of the town. Still the enemy held possession of the town, which was much more capable of defence than had been represented. The Vitoria gate was barricaded, and also the Pamplona gate on the bridge; and both were flanked by convents and other large buildings

letter in cipher which he wrote to the King. His movement having, however, been directed along the Ebro, I have ordered back the 5th division of infantry; and you will learn from the Q. M. G. at what time they will be at your disposal.

2dly; If we cannot depend upon the operations of the Spanish and Portuguese troops in pursuing a flying enemy, we certainly cannot depend upon them in those operations which must be carried on to cover the siege of Pamplona. I therefore propose to blockade that place rather than lay siege to it. We shall get the place at a later period; but other advantages will attend this mode of proceeding.

Clausel arrived at Tudela last night. I have moved in this direction in order to try to stop him on his march towards Jaca; but I think he will continue his march along the Ebro to join Suchet.

P.S. I wish your report had arrived in time to go by the mail of the 26th; but as it has not gone, and you have reason to be dissatisfied with

occupied by the enemy, and the town was nowhere open. A 9 pounder was therefore brought up, under cover of the fire of the light battalion, close to the gate, which was thus burst open.

It was now dark, and it was not possible to distinguish the troops of the different nations engaged, which gave the enemy, now flying from every point, an opportunity of escaping with much less loss than he must have suffered, had we had daylight.

The conduct of all the troops concerned in this attack was highly creditable; that of the line battalions on the Pamplona road, and of the light battalions at the Vitoria gate, was such as was to be expected from these distinguished corps, and the column of the left did equal honor to the Spanish and Portuguese arms.

Col. Longa's corps, after a repetition of long and severe marches, undertook and executed, with the greatest spirit, the fatiguing duty of this day, and behaved in the most gallant manner. The battalions sent from Azpeitia by Lieut. Gen. Mendizabal repulsed, with great steadiness, an attack of the enemy, and afterwards pursued him down from the mountains, taking a good many prisoners. I have not yet got the return, but I believe above 200 prisoners were taken by the two Spanish corps, and many wounded men were left here. The enemy's loss in killed, too, must have been considerable.

This place has, besides the defences at the gates, new towers to flank the exterior wall, and a strong wood blockhouse in the square, which shows the importance the enemy attached to its occupation.

It would be unjust to the troops employed in this assault, not to mention their exemplary conduct when in possession; there was no excess committed. The German Legion and Col. Longa's corps passed on, and formed immediately beyond the town.

I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the British and Portuguese in these 2 days, which, considering the nature of the service, could not have been expected to be less than considerable.

The Spaniards lost several officers killed and wounded yesterday, but I have not had any return of them.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, on the 24th and 25th June, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	2	3	54	61
Wounded	26	12	278	316
Missing	1	—	44	45

The Portuguese loss included: all the missing were Portuguese.

the conduct of some of the Portuguese and Spaniards, do you not think it would be desirable to qualify the report in some degree in regard to them?

I have not yet got the return of killed and wounded. I am sorry to observe from your letter to Gen. Murray that you have been hit; but I hope that you have not been materially hurt, and that in the mean time you will keep yourself quiet till you are well.

To Gen. Don F. Copons y Navia.

Casada, on the river Aragon, 28th June, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that I gained a complete victory over the enemy's army, commanded by the King, near Vitoria, on the 21st inst. We took from them 151 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, baggage, treasure, &c. The enemy, cut off from the high road to France, retired upon Pamplona, and thence into France, by Roncesvalles, on St. Jean Pied de Port, where they arrived on the 26th inst. Gen. Clausel, with about 12,000 or 14,000 men, composed of part of the army of the North, and of one division of the army of Portugal, was on the Ebro during the action, and was not engaged in it. I have now turned towards him, and shall endeavor to cut him off, if he attempts to retire by Jaca. He was last night at Tudela.

I have heard that Gen. Sir J. Murray had landed in Catalonia on the 3d; that he obtained possession of the Coll de Balaguer on the 7th, and proceeded immediately to the siege of Tarragona, of which it is reported that he had possession of the lower town in 8 days; and I learn that since the 23d no firing has been heard at Tarragona. It is likewise reported that Sir J. Murray has proceeded to the siege of Tortosa; but this must be conjecture.

I shall be very glad to know the state of affairs in Catalonia, and on the Eastern coast. It would be most desirable if you could establish a regular communication along the right of the Ebro, as far as Tudela, with which town I could communicate.

I beg you to send this letter to Sir J. Murray.

I enclose a copy of the return of Suchet's army of the 13th May.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. Casada, on the river Aragon, 28th June, 1813.

I received in the night your letter of the 17th, in which you have informed me of Gen. Castaños' removal from the command of the 4th army and its provinces, which has annoyed me a good deal, both on account of the circumstance itself, and of the manner in which it has taken place. I don't propose, however, to take any notice of what has passed till I shall hear from the Minister at War.

Castaños has gone on always perfectly well with us, particularly latterly; and I am certain that great inconvenience will result from his being removed. I shall speak to him respecting the Princess of Brazil, and his conduct in general at Cadiz, before he goes; and I shall communicate to him the letter which I wrote to you the other day on the former subject.

As for your leaving Cadiz, I don't think it will have any effect. The people of the country, at least those 20 miles from Cadiz, never think of

what passes there; nor is there sufficient communication between Cadiz and the country for them even to know of your absence. The people think of nothing but getting rid of the French, and avoiding to contribute any thing towards the support of any army; and if they can accomplish these objects, they don't care much about others.

If the government or the Cortes cared about the opinion of their ally, or about carrying on the war, I should acquiesce in the measure; but it is heartbreaking to see that they care about neither the one nor the other, and there is no tie over them. All they appear to care about, is the war against the clergy; and it appears as if the measures for carrying on the war against the enemy were incompatible with those for the prosecution of the more favorite hostilities against the priests.

I have come here in pursuit of Clausel, who, after all, will, I am afraid, get out of our reach.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Casada, ce 28 Juin, 1813, 2 heures P.M.

Alava vous aura fait savoir que j'ai reçu dans la nuit une lettre de mon frère, dans laquelle il me dit que vous êtes rappelé au Conseil d'Etat de Cadiz; et que Giron doit être remplacé dans le commandement de l'armée. Sa lettre est du 17, et je n'ai rien du Ministre. La réponse qu'on a faite aux remontrances de mon frère sur ces mesures a été que vous étiez nécessaire au Conseil d'Etat, et qu'on était sûr que je serais satisfait des raisons qui les avaient motivées. Je suis bien sûr que je n'en serai pas satisfait. Mais je vous prie de m'approcher un peu avant que vous ne partiez à fin que je puisse causer avec vous.

J'ai beaucoup à vous dire qu'on ne peut pas écrire; mais je ne perds pas cette occasion de vous remercier pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour moi, depuis que j'ai eu le bonheur de vous connaître; pour les aides que vous m'avez données en toute occasion, et pour la cordialité avec laquelle nous avons conduit tant de mauvaises affaires à un résultat heureux. Je suis sûr que le service du public ne peut pas gagner, et peut perdre par aucun changement qu'on fera; et de long temps je n'ai été si fâché ni mortifié comme je le suis, depuis que j'ai reçu cette lettre de mon frère.

P.S. Clausel étant arrivé avant nous à Tudela, je suis venu ici pour l'arrêter en sa marche en Aragon vers Jaca. Il était à Tudela hier au soir.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Casada, 28th June, 1813, 8 P.M.

I am anxious that some measures should be adopted for the more close and strict blockade of Pamplona, and I suggest the following for your consideration:

1st; That the water which supplies the town by the aqueduct should be cut off. It will not be difficult to effect this object without mischief to the country, by cutting the aqueduct at any place under which there may be a channel through which the water might run.

2dly; In order to complete the annoyance of this measure, it will be necessary to establish posts upon the river, to fire day and night at any persons who may approach it for water. These posts should be covered

by a trench. A redoubt should likewise be constructed at the distance of musket shot from each of the bridges; each to hold a sufficient number of men to support the posts on the river, in case the enemy should make a sortie upon them. There should be a gun or two in each of these redoubts, which we can bring from Vitoria.

3dly; There is a wood to the southward of the place, on the same side of the river; and that should be examined, and, if possible, an abattis should be formed in it, to protect the blockade on that side, which should be brought as close as possible.

4thly; The remainder might be occupied by piquets at the usual distance, communicating well with each other, having support at hand, in redoubts armed with artillery. One of these might be where the old hornwork is.

5thly; Measures should be taken, without loss of time, to cut and carry away, or, if that cannot be done, to burn the corn between our posts and the place. These measures must be well considered, and must not be allowed to fail.

I beg that all this may be done without loss of time; and the sooner it is done, the sooner I shall be able to relieve your troops entirely from this blockade, and give it in charge to the Spaniards.

I don't think we shall be able to do much against Clausel. He has passed Tudela on his march to Zaragoza. I propose to try him on the road to Jaca.

To Earl Bathurst.

Casada, on the river Aragon, 29th June, 1813.

It is desirable that any reinforcements of infantry which you may send to this army may come to Santander, notwithstanding that I am very apprehensive of the consequence of marching our vagabond soldiers through the province of Biscay in that state of discipline in which they and their officers generally come out to us. It may be depended upon, that the people of this province will shoot them as they would the French, if they should misbehave.

We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better; but that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars, which were got for the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on and increased their fatigue, and I am quite convinced that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle; and that we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have; and have never in any one day made more than an ordinary march.

This is the consequence of the state of discipline of the British army. We may gain the greatest victories; but we shall do no good until we shall so far alter our system, as to force all ranks to perform their duty.

The new regiments are, as usual, the worst of all. The — — are a disgrace to the name of a soldier, in action as well as elsewhere; and I propose to draft their horses from them, and to send the men to England, if I can't get the better of them in any other manner.

To Earl Bathurst.

Caseta, 29th June, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a letter, which I received some time ago from a very sensible gentleman, a member of the Cortes, in answer to one which I had written to him; which conveys, in my opinion, a very accurate representation of the state and spirit of parties in the Cortes and at Cadiz, with the exception only of that part of the letter which relates to the French party supposed to exist in the Cortes. I believe that that party ought more properly to be called anti-Anglican than French. The Cortes are, however, getting on at a fine rate. They have now removed Gen. Castaños from his situation, and his nephew from the command of the Galician army, for reasons they have not disclosed to my brother. I have not yet received from themselves any intimation of these arrangements, which are in direct breach of their agreements with me.

I believe that they propose to carry on the war against the bishops in Galicia; and that they have removed Gen. Castaños, and appointed Gen. Lacy to be Captain General in that province, because they think the latter more fit for their purpose than the former. The consequence of this war will be that we shall have a disturbance on our communications. We and the French shall change sides. They will have the clergy and lower orders in their favor in future.

It is difficult to advise a line of conduct under such circumstances. We and the powers of Europe are interested in the success of the war in the Peninsula; but the creatures who govern at Cadiz appear to feel no such interest. All that they care about really is to hear the praise of their foolish Constitution. There is not one of them who does not feel that it cannot be put in practice; but their vanity is interested to force it down people's throats. Their feelings respecting the Inquisition are of the same description. I apprised them, when at Cadiz, of the danger of hurrying on that measure; and it was repeatedly represented to them by others. But they were determined to persevere, although they knew that the abolition of the Inquisition was disagreeable to the clergy, and to the great body of the people. Then their vanity is interested in forcing this absurd measure, and the still more absurd, because insulting, mode of carrying it into execution, upon the clergy and people. The bishops and clergy in Galicia have openly resisted this law, and I understand that the people in that province are by no means favorably disposed to the Constitution and new order of things. In Biscay the people positively refused last year to accept of the Constitution, as being a breach of the privileges of their province.

I mention this subject at present, in order to draw the attention of government towards it. Hereafter I shall bring it under your Lordship's view in a more formal manner; and it will rest with government to determine what shall be done. It appears to me that as long as Spain shall be governed by the Cortes acting upon Republican principles, we cannot hope

for any permanent amelioration. To threaten that you would withdraw your assistance, without withdrawing if there were no amelioration, would only make matters worse. You must be the best judges whether you can or ought to withdraw; but I acknowledge that I don't believe that Spain will be an useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the Republican system is not put down.

The A.G. to Major Gen. C. Alten, Light division.

29th June, 1813.

I am directed by his Excellency to observe to you that many soldiers of the Light division have been in Caseda this morning unprovided with passes, and unaccompanied with officers, and that from the general loose appearance of these visitors much advantage could not be expected from the liberty they had probably taken of leaving their camp, previous to putting every thing belonging to them in order. There is not any indulgence which his Excellency would deny to the soldiers under reasonable restriction, but in the course of the late marches we have had renewed proof that some restraint is necessary to preserve the health of British soldiers. All purposes of marketing could certainly be executed under the charge of officers, and indulgence to any extent might be allowed the good soldiers when their equipment was in order, which their personal appearance commonly would enable their officers to ascertain. I must add that the foragers of the — regt. straggled this morning so much from their officer, that many were for a considerable period quite from under his control, and were turned out of town by the divisional and head quarter Provosts. The foraging, in consequence, in the vicinity of the town has been very irregular, many fields having been trespassed on without a possibility of paying the proprietor. Should this irregularity have produced more injury than I am now aware of, I shall make it the subject of further communication.

The A.G. to Major Gen. C. Alten, Light division.

29th June, 1813.

I am directed to request you will be pleased, on receipt of this letter, to order from the 1st brigade of the Light division a Captain and 4 subalterns to repair to head quarters for the purpose of composing a Court Martial to investigate the conduct of 2 soldiers of the — regt., charged with having robbed and much illtreated an inhabitant of Caseda. This renewed report of the disorder committed by soldiers of your division has much dissatisfied the Commander of the Forces, his Excellency being of opinion that such continued irregularity shows evident relaxation in discipline, both regimental and divisional. You will be pleased to refer the officers commanding brigades and regiments to the 5th No. of the G. O., 9th Aug. 1809, and acquaint them of the concern his Lordship has felt in noticing the want of common decency in the state and appearance of the soldiers this day.

To Capt. Gen. Don F. X. Castaños.

Monreal, 30th June, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th inst., in which you have enclosed the *Redactor General* of the 17th, containing a report from the Minister at War to the Cortes, that you had been called to attend the sittings of the Council of State, as you were not at the head of the 4th army, the command of which had been confided to you.

I had already received intimation of this arrangement, as I have informed you, though not from the government, nor from the Minister, nor was the cause made known to me. I lament this arrangement, whatever may be the cause, as it deprives me of your valuable assistance, and the public of your services against the common enemy, at the moment when they might be most important.

I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the mode in which this

arrangement has been made, and the cause assigned for it, are not less injurious to your Excellency's reputation than the arrangement itself is to the public service; although I am convinced that the Regency is too just intentionally to inflict such a disgrace upon a meritorious public servant, without at least hearing him in his defence, and too patriotic to deprive the public of your services at such a moment, if they were aware of the circumstances.

I think it but just, however, on my part, to take this opportunity, and to adopt this mode of stating to your Excellency, what I shall state to the Minister at War, for the information of the Regency, that, in point of fact, but a small proportion of the 4th army was in the field collected in one body, and that it was necessary to keep the different divisions of which it is composed separate, for a variety of reasons, some referring to their local situation, and others to finance, into which it is not now necessary to enter, but which are perfectly well known to the government; and your Excellency would have been out of your place in the organisation of the army, if you had been at the head, as it is called, of any one of these bodies of the 4th army.

But it is forgotten that your Excellency, besides being Commander in Chief of the 4th army, is Captain General of the provinces of Estremadura, Old Castille, and Galicia. It was your duty, and it was absolutely necessary for the cause, that your Excellency should take measures to establish the Spanish authorities in the different towns and districts of which the kingdom of Castille is composed, in proportion as by the operations of the armies they should be successively evacuated by the enemy. This was the plan for your conduct, settled with me before we broke up from the Agueda in May; and you have continued to act on this plan since we separated at Salamanca.

I am convinced that, considering the importance to the government and to the army of the services which you have rendered, and adverting to the manner in which the army of Galicia has been commanded by Don P. A. Giron, you could not have been so advantageously employed elsewhere; and I am persuaded that if the government had adverted to the necessity of the performance of the duties of Captain General in settling the government in Castille during the rapid advance of the army, they would not have allowed a stigma to be thrown upon your reputation, whatever might be the cause for removing you from your command, to call you to attend the sittings of the Council of State.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Monreal, ce 30 Juin, 1813.

J'ai reçu vos lettres du 27, et vous aurez déjà vu ce que j'ai senti sur ce qui vous est arrivé; et je vous envoie une lettre officielle aujourd'hui dont vous ferez l'usage qui vous conviendra. Pour moi, je crois qu'on préfère faire la guerre aux Evêques en Galice à la faire aux Français; et on vous ôte parcequ'on vous croit assez fou pour être d'opinion que c'est essentiel avant tout de chasser les Français.

Pour ce qui regarde la fin de votre lettre, je peux faire ce que vous désirez d'une manière ou d'une autre. Mais il est essentiel pour vous que

personne n'en sache rien excepté vous, mon frère, et moi. Nous causerons sur le mode quand je vous verrai. La chose n'est pas difficile.

Je retourne vers Pampelune. L'alcalde de Tudela a ruiné notre affaire contre Clausel;* et il a passé vers Saragosse; et comme il avait trop le devant sur nous, je n'ai pas voulu tâcher de le couper de Jaca, en quoi je n'aurais pas réussi; et je l'aurais forcé de se joindre avec Suchet.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

30th June, 1813.

In the event of your receiving an order from the Q. M. G. for the march of the detachments under your command, you will be pleased to form the men of each division into a separate battalion. Should it be specified in your route that 2 divisions of convalescents are to move at the same time, I would recommend your forming a brigade of every 2 divisions so ordered.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatches, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, of the 19th and 20th June; the first having a postscript dated Alicante, the 23d June.

The enemy's army, commanded by King Joseph, was totally defeated by that of the allies under my command, in a general action fought near Vitoria on the 21st June. The enemy lost 151 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, baggage, treasure, &c. They have since fled into France, followed by our troops. Gen. Clausel, with about 12,000 men of the army of the North, was on the Ebro during the action. He has since made various attempts to get into France by the passes northward of Vitoria, and by Pamplona.

I marched against him with a detachment on the 27th, from the neighbourhood of Pamplona, to endeavor to cut him off, but he arrived at Tudela de Ebro before I could reach him, and continued his march upon Zaragoza; and I then considered it more for the advantage of the allies to leave the road into France open for this corps by Jaca, than, by pushing the pursuit farther, to force Clausel to join himself with Suchet. I have therefore returned, and am now on my way to the frontier, to superintend the operations of the troops there. Pamplona is blockaded.

From this outline of the state of affairs here, your Lordship will judge of the consequences which may be the result of the unfortunate commencement of the campaign on the east coast of the Peninsula. Sir J. Murray, in a letter of the 23d, refers me to one of the 14th, which has not reached me; and from that of the 23d, I can form no idea of the progress of events, or of the circumstances which compelled Sir J. Murray to raise the siege, to leave his cannon and stores behind him, and to embark; nor am I enabled to judge, excepting from the report of the courier, where the Duque del Parque and Gen. Elio are; nor to form the most distant notion of the force left by Suchet in Valencia. In his dispatch of the 23d, Sir J. Murray talks of Suchet's having left about 10,000 men in Valencia. If that be true, it appears by the enclosed return of his force, found amongst King Joseph's papers, that he could not have brought into Catalonia much more than 5000 men. This, with Gen. Mathieu's column

* This appears, by subsequent letters, not to have been true.

from Barcelona of 8000 men, and the troops which the enemy may have drawn from Tortosa, is the whole amount of the disposable force which it appears occasioned the unfortunate measures to which I have above referred. There can be no doubt of the truth of the enclosed return. Suchet has, besides, 3000 men in the province of Aragon under Gen. Paris, which he cannot withdraw without losing that province entirely.

In order still further to make your Lordship acquainted with the state of affairs on the eastern coast, I enclose the copy of the last letter which King Joseph addressed to Suchet,* which I have had only since yesterday. From that it appears that the King has suggested to Suchet the expediency of retiring upon Zaragoza; but as it appears from letters from Suchet to the King, that he was very desirous, and considered it of the utmost importance to the interests of the Emperor, that he should keep Valencia, it is not impossible that he may not attend to the King's letter of the 16th, of which the order is not positive.

It now remains for me to instruct your Lordship as to your future proceedings. I have not by me the state of the heavy ordnance and stores which were sent round to the eastern coast for the proposed service, nor have I an accurate notion of what has been lost by the raising the siege of Tarragona. From the demands of Capt. Williamson, of the artillery, I should suppose the equipment to be, in its present state, unfit for the accomplishment of any of the objects in view when it was formed. But advertng to the state of Suchet's force, which I enclose, it appears to me that that under the command of your Lordship is fully equal to obtain possession of the open country of Valencia, and to prosecute the objects held out in my instructions of the 14th April, so far as to establish itself on the Ebro. This operation would at least have the effect of diverting the attention of Suchet from this army; and if it should not succeed in that object, the allies would gain ground on the eastern coast, in proportion as our difficulties would be increased on this side by the increase of the force opposed to us. I beg your Lordship, therefore, to proceed to carry into execution the other objects in my instructions of the 14th April.

Advertng to the nature of the force of which the army under the command of your Lordship is composed, to the state of equipment of the whole, and particularly of the allied British and Sicilian corps, I have always been of opinion that a maritime expedition was best suited to its means; and your Lordship will be the best judge, when you shall be in possession of your equipment of ordnance, &c., whether it is most expedient to embark and again attack Tarragona, or to cross the Ebro and attack Tortosa, or to endeavor to obtain possession of the enemy's fortified posts on the coast of Valencia. For this last object, indeed, it is possible that the ordnance equipment may be sufficient in its existing state. Wherever you may determine to embark, I believe you will be able to accomplish your object with equal facility as at Alicante, supposing you should determine to attack Tarragona.

I recommend to you, in your advance through Valencia, to place the allied British and Sicilian corps on the right, and to keep open your com-

* See Appendix, Vol. vii., No. III., p. 678.

munication constantly with the sea on your flank, and to move your fleet on a line with your army. These measures will compensate for the want of means of transport, and you will always be well supplied.

P.S. I see a large demand made for spherical case shot by Capt. Williamson, and I beg to know whether that article has been left behind as well as every thing else.

Since writing the above, the Chief of the Staff of the Spanish army has received a letter of the 24th June from the Duque del Parque, from San Felipe, from which it appears that Suchet had arrived on the 23d at Valencia, and the Duque del Parque intended to retire from the Jucar.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K. B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch, No. 124, which I have received from the Sec. of State, enclosing one for your Lordship, directing that certain transports should be sent to England.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from the Sec. of State of the 4th June, by which his Lordship has modified the orders which he had conveyed on the 2d.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

In answer to your Lordship's dispatch of the 20th, No. 3, I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

Since I closed my dispatches to your Lordship of this day, Capt. Carroll of the Royal Navy has arrived, and has delivered to me Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray's letters of the 14th ult.

I now enclose for your Lordship's perusal a private and public letter which I have written to the Lieut. General, and I will thank you to have them delivered or sent to him as soon as it may be possible after you have made yourself acquainted with their contents.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

I received yesterday your dispatches and your private letter of the 23d.

Sir J. Murray's misfortune will create a devil of a breeze; and, according to the information I have at present, I can form no opinion of the merits of the question, and therefore don't write any to him. I shall send his letters home without comment on my part, excepting to draw the attention of the government to my instructions, of which they have a copy.

I don't consider Sicily to be in any danger whatever at present, and I believe that the fleet at Toulon is not manned, and in some degree dismantled. At all events, a landing on an island is a ticklish operation; and if the British troops on the island will do their duty, it would probably fail. I don't exactly know how many men you have there now, but I suppose from 10,000 to 15,000.

In regard to Italy, I entertain no doubt that its preservation is more important to the power and resources of Buonaparte than Spain; but I have always doubted the existence of such a state of affairs in Italy, that

the employment of a British force there would shake the influence of Buonaparte; or that our efforts would end in any thing but disgrace. It is an useless waste of your time and mine to enter at present into a discussion of these opinions, as your late discussions with Murat's agents have entirely altered the appearance of affairs in Italy; and I entertain no doubt that the English and Murat, or the English and any other power that could put 30,000 or 40,000 men in the field, would create a revolution in Italy.

It is very difficult to form an opinion of Murat's sincerity; but I am quite certain he will do nothing unless the Emperor of Austria should take a line with the Allies. In that case he will probably conclude with you. If he should conclude with you, I authorise you to embark from Spain all your Anglo-Sicilian corps, and to take them where you please, in order to carry into execution your treaty with Murat.

You will in that case throw the Spaniards on the defensive, unless you should think them strong enough to pursue the objects of their instructions alone.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

I had last night the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d June, by a courier from Alicante, and this afternoon that of the 14th,* by Capt. Carroll, of the Navy. In the hurry in which you state you wrote your dispatch of the 14th June, you have omitted to give me a narrative of

* Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Camp before Tarragona, 9th June, 1813.

In my letter of the 28th May, I had the honor to inform your Lordship, that, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, the British army was then embarking. On the 31st we sailed, and anchored to the eastward of Salon Point on the evening of the 2d inst.; on the 3d the army disembarked, and I invested Tarragona.

Previous to coming to an anchor, I detached Lieut. Col. Prevost's brigade, under convoy of the *Brune*, to attack the fort of San Felipe; and, in the night, Gen. Copons, at my request, detached a brigade of infantry to co-operate. The brigade of Col. Prevost consists of the 2d batt. 67th, and the battalion of Roll Dillon, and to these was subsequently joined the brigade of Spanish troops commanded by Col. Llauder. The fort has been taken, and I have the honor to enclose Col. Prevost's report to me, with the returns which he has sent.

This capture, in the present situation of our affairs, is of great importance, as it blocks up the nearest and most accessible road from Tortosa to Tarragona.

Adm. Hallowell, with the alacrity and zeal for which he is so much distinguished, sent Capt. Adam, in the *Invincible*, to conduct the naval part of the expedition, and added the *Thames*, Capt. Peyton; *Volcano*, Capt. Carroll; *Stromboli*, Capt. Stoddart; *Brune*, Capt. Badcock. Lieut. Col. Prevost speaks highly of the exertions of these officers and their men, and I know how valuable and important their services were found to be. The troops of both nations bore their fatigue and performed their duty with the greatest alacrity of spirit, and deserve every commendation. The Lieut. Col. has, in a former dispatch, particularly noticed the gallantry and good conduct of Ensign Nelson, of the 67th, and Ensign J. Dermot, of Roll Dillon's battalion.

P.S. I have omitted to say, that Capt. Carroll's services were particularly meritorious; and Lieut. Corbyn, of the *Invincible*, who commanded a battery manned by seamen, kept up a well directed and heavy fire. The importance of this acquisition, and the rapidity with which the fort has been taken, make it quite unnecessary for me to say how much I approve the conduct of Lieut. Col. Prevost and of Capt. Adam.

Lieut. Col. Prevost to Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Fort San Felipe, Coll de Balaguer, 7th June, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you, that, in obedience to your orders, I proceeded on the 2d inst. with the brigade under my command, consisting of the 2d batt. 67th regt., and Roll

your proceedings from the time of your making the coast of Catalonia to the time of your quitting it, and you have not adverted to this omission in your dispatch of the 23d.

Dillon's regt., to which was added a detachment of the Royal artillery, with two field pieces, under the command of Capt. Arabin, and Roll's rifle company, to attack the castle of San Felipe, in the Coll de Balaguer.

Capt. Adam, of H. M. S. *Invincible*, joined off Salon, for the purpose of co-operating with the troops under my command.

We landed on the 3d inst., at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, about one mile to the eastward of the entrance to the Pass from Tarragona. I was then joined by the Spanish regiments of Barcelona and Palma, under the command of Don J. Carles. I immediately directed Roll's rifles, the light company of the 67th, and Roll's light company, under the command of Capt. Muller of Roll's, to invest the fort as closely as possible, which he did so completely by 2 o'clock, that the enemy could not show himself before his parapet.

One 6 pounder was brought up the Sierra del Tasal, a very steep mountain, within 700 yards of the fort, to annoy the enemy with Shrapnel shells. The Engineer officers not having arrived with the intrenching tools till very late, nothing further could be undertaken that evening.

The Fort of San Felipe is situated upon the eastern extremity of an insulated village, in the centre of the Coll de Balaguer, commanding completely the great road through the pass. It is a square fort, with some bastions, but commanded on two sides by almost inaccessible mountains.

On the 4th, two 12 pounders and 1 howitzer, under the command of Lieut. Corbyn, of H. M. S. *Invincible*, and manned by the crew of that ship, were likewise brought up to the Tasal. This battery continued to play upon the fort the whole day, in order to attract the attention of the enemy, whilst Capt. Chyne, of the Royal Engineers, was tracing out the ground for the breaching batteries, within 300 yards of the place, and the troops busied in filling the sand bags. At night, the whole of the seamen and troops were employed, the former in bringing up five 24 pounders, shot, powder, &c., for the battery, whilst the troops constructed the work. The ground being very unfavorable, the whole could not be completed before break of day. The embrasures were therefore filled up, and the work deferred till the following evening, when Capt. Adam and myself sent a summons to the Commanding officer, offering the most favorable terms; but they were rejected. On the 5th the batteries continued a heavy fire upon the fort. In the evening the working parties and seamen went down early to the battery.

The enemy having perceived the firing down, kept up a heavy and galling fire of shells, round and grape shot, during the whole of the night, which occasioned some loss.

Unfortunately about 10 o'clock a most violent storm of thunder and lightning commenced, which impeded the works greatly; and as the seamen and troops were quite exhausted, we found it expedient again to delay bringing the guns upon the platforms, and to keep the embrasures masked. In the evening a battery of two 8 inch mortars (commanded by an officer of the Marine artillery, belonging to the *Stromboli* bomb) was placed upon the road, within a few hundred yards of the castle, under the breaching battery, as was likewise one of two 4 pounders upon the heights to the right, where the riflemen were stationed. At daybreak these three batteries opened to protect the working party at the breaching battery, and kept up a tremendous fire until 6 o'clock, when that of the castle having completely ceased, their expense magazines upon the batteries being blown up by the shells from the mortars, the white flag was hoisted upon the castle: Capt. Zehnfenning, and Capt. Stoddart, of the Royal Navy, were sent in, and returned in about 5 minutes, with an offer of surrender, upon conditions of marching out and grounding their arms upon the glacis, and of being permitted to carry their personal baggage with them.

As Marshal Suchet's approach was hourly expected, Capt. Adam and myself judged it right to grant them the terms required, as we should by that means get the fort in a good state of defence. The advance of the division immediately took possession of the castle.

I have the honor to enclose you a return of the ordnance, ammunition, provisions, and stores, found in the place, as likewise a return of the prisoners taken.

I now come to the pleasing task of calling your notice to the admirable conduct of the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers I have had the honor to command. Their labor and exertion have been severe, but I should be wanting in my duty did I not particularise Capt. Chyne and Lieut. Gipps, of the Royal engineers, Capt. Arabin, of the Royal artillery, and Capt. Muller, of the advance.

The success of this expedition may in a great measure be attributed to the zealous and indefatigable exertions of Capt. Adam, and the officers and seamen of the Royal Navy. I beg likewise to particularise Capt. Carroll, of H. M. S. *Volcano*, and Lieut. Corbyn, of the *Invincible*.

I impute our loss being so trifling to the tremendous and well directed fire kept up by

I am therefore entirely ignorant of all the circumstances which occurred, which led to the result which you have reported, and it is impossible for me to form the judgment, which in your public and private letters you

the latter from his battery. I have the honor to enclose you a return of the killed and wounded since our disembarkation.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the allied troops at the taking of Fort San Felipe, from the 3d to the 7th June, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non - commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	—	4	5
Wounded	—	1	38	39
Missing	—	—	—	—

The Spanish loss included.

Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

H. M. S. *Malta*, 14th June, 1813.

Adm. Hallowell has just decided on sending a ship to Alicante, and I have merely time to state to your Lordship, and I do so with great regret, that I have been under the necessity of raising the siege of Tarragona, and embarking the army under my command. In my private letter of the 7th inst., I mentioned to your Lordship the reports of the assemblage of the French forces at Barcelona, and that Marshal Suchet was likewise in march from Valencia; and stated it as my own opinion, that, should these reports be confirmed, the object your Lordship had in view could not be accomplished. Unfortunately, these rumours proved true, and reluctantly I resolved on raising the siege and embarking the army, as the only means of avoiding a general action, which must have been fought under every disadvantage. I cannot at this moment refer to dates, but it is sufficient for the present to state, that the French force at Barcelona was never rated to me at less than 8000, and that previous to their march it would amount to 10,000, with 14 pieces of artillery. I have, however, no account that it ever exceeded 8000, and that is the number on which my calculation was formed. This force upon the evening of the 9th, or morning of the 10th, marched out from Barcelona, and entered Villa Franca at 4 o'clock in the evening of the 11th, from whence it was reported to me to march at 12 o'clock at night for Vendrell, distant only 18 or 20 miles from Tarragona, by the great road, and a few miles farther by another road, by which cannon can easily pass. On the 9th or 10th the arrival of Marshal Suchet at Valencia was made known to me; his exact force was never perfectly ascertained; but, from the intelligence received from Valencia, he marched from thence with 9000 men, and certainly in the rear of that place had the power of drawing great reinforcements to his army.

To these corps must be added, a body of 1000 men, which had previously arrived at Tortosa, and another corps, independent of the garrison of 2500 men, who had arrived at Lerida. These corps, which I am sure I do not exaggerate, amount to 20,500 men, with which, in 4 or 5 days, Marshal Suchet could attack the allied army, if he thought proper, or avoid an action, if he wished still more to reinforce his army. Your Lordship, on the other hand, will observe that I could scarcely bring into the field 12,000 men, and that the army of Catalonia was stated to me at 8500, making 20,500, of which 2 British and 2 Spanish divisions were at the Coll de Balaguer, and could not be withdrawn, and I could not leave less than 2500 to cover the artillery and stores, and to observe the garrison of Tarragona. The 2 corps, at the least, would amount to upwards of 4500 men, leaving me 16,000 men to meet the best French troops in Spain, amounting to upwards of 20,000.

I am sure there is nobody more willing to give full credit to the gallantry of the Spanish troops than I am, but your Lordship well knows that they are unable to move, and I could not therefore depend upon the execution of any order which necessarily obliged them to make a movement; and of troops of this description I had about 13,000 men: unless, therefore, I could place them in position (and the French had always the option of

desire I should form on your proceedings. You have likewise, in your dispatch of the 23d, expressed a wish that His Majesty's government should decide on the subject; and as you acted under instructions from me, and as the circumstances which have occurred are of a nature to attract the attention of the public, it is best that His Majesty's government, and not I, should form a judgment of them.

In order, however, that a judgment may be formed by any body, it is necessary that you should furnish information on the following points:

1st; It appears by your dispatch of the 23d, that you disembarked on the 3d June; what were your first operations? when did you break ground before the place? at what distance? and what was the progress of the siege from your investing the place to your raising the siege?

2d; It appears that you had possession of the Coll de Balaguer; at what time, and by what troops, and in what manner, was that post taken possession of? where did these troops land?

3d; On what days did you disembark the artillery, ammunition, and stores?

4th; On what days did you put them in battery?

5th; Did you ever open your fire against Tarragona?

6th; On what day did you raise the siege and embark your troops?

7th; What reinforcements, as mentioned in your letter of the 14th, did you expect, which induced you to continue the siege so long?

8th; Where was the corps of Spanish troops under Gen. Copons be-

fighting when and where they pleased), it was impossible I could place any reliance upon them. My British and German troops amount only to 4500. Perhaps your Lordship may be of opinion, that, under these circumstances, I ought to have risked an action, had no other unfavorable objections existed; but when your Lordship is informed that I had no possibility of retreat if unsuccessful, that there would have been no hopes of embarkation if followed, and that the army must have been unavoidably lost if beaten, I venture to hope that your Lordship will think, however much it is to be regretted, that I have adopted the only means of maintaining entire, or indeed of saving, an army on which so much depends. I feel the greater confidence in this hope, on reverting to the 13th paragraph of your Lordship's general instructions for the conduct of the campaign.

I am fully aware that there are many circumstances which may require further information, and upon all parts I shall be happy to give every explanation in my power. Your Lordship perhaps may be of opinion, that the place should have been taken; but as it was far too strong to storm, I believe it not only to have been impossible, but that we should not have taken it in 8 or 10 days: my only regret is, that I continued the siege so long, induced by the hopes of the reinforcements I expected. I continued it to the last moment, and fortunately, the weather proving favorable, the troops were embarked without molestation. On this favorable circumstance I could not depend for another day, and therefore, having taken my plan, I immediately put it in execution, and I regret to say that I was, in consequence, obliged to leave the guns in the most advanced batteries. Had I remained another day, they might have been brought off; but this risk I would not run, when the existence of the army was at stake, not only from unfavorable weather, but from the appearance of an enemy, in whose presence I could not have embarked perhaps at all, certainly not without suffering a great loss, and without the possibility of deriving any advantage.

I have only further at this time to add, should blame be attached to the failure of the expedition, no share of it can fall on Adm. Hallowell, who conducted the naval branch of it. From that distinguished officer I have met with every assistance and co-operation in his power; and I think it only justice to him to state, that it was his opinion that the cannon in the batteries might have been saved by remaining till night, and that they then could have been brought off. This, however, was a risk I did not wish to run for so trifling an object, and preferred losing them to the chance of the embarkation being opposed, and of an eventual much more serious loss.

tween the 3d and 13th June, and what was the nature of the communication you had with them?

9th; Where were the enemy's separate corps on their march from Barcelona and Tortosa when you determined to raise the siege?

10th; It appears by the dispatch from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck of the 19th ult., that he joined the army at the Coll de Balaguer on the morning of the 17th, and then decided upon the embarkation of the army. What were the operations of the army between the period of the raising of the siege and the junction of Lord W. Bentinck, which brought them to the Coll de Balaguer? and where was the Spanish corps under Gen. Copons during that time?

11th; Where were the enemy's corps during that time?

I think it proper, and take this opportunity of enclosing you a return of Suchet's army, which I have found among King Joseph's papers.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart.

Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 14th and 23d June, and I am much concerned that your matters have turned out so unfortunately. In my official letter I have stated the points on which we want information, and I recommend to you to write a detailed narrative of all your proceedings.

I confess that that which weighs most upon my mind in all this is the loss of your artillery and stores, of which you think the least. 1st; They are very important trophies to the enemy, of which he will make good use, under existing circumstances, and entirely alter the nature of the operation of raising the siege.

2dly; The loss of them entirely cripples our operations on the Eastern coast during the campaign, and prevents the army of the Eastern coast from taking all the advantage which they may take of our success in this quarter, which it is probable will be followed by Suchet's throwing his army on our right flank. However, the consequences are not so important to you as the facts themselves; and I am anxious that you should place these in a light to justify you in the eyes of His Majesty's government.

The A.G. to General Officers commanding divisions.

1st July, 1813.

I am directed by my Lord Wellington to call to your recollection the numerous G. O. that have been issued for the marching of the army, which are equally calculated for the movement of a division or detachment, and which were formed to meet the difficulties to be expected in campaign.

Had these orders been complied with by the several ranks to which they refer, the disgraceful number of stragglers, now absent from the several divisions, could not have fallen from their ranks. Of the list of absentees few have been found so ill as to require medical aid, whilst every species of disorder has been committed on the line of march by wretches who had not the spirit to undergo perhaps less fatigue in the execution of their duty.

The serious consequences that would attend a repetition of such breach of discipline have induced his Excellency to call for an explanation of the chief causes of the irregularities complained of, which no circumstances of deprivation or fatigue can justify, although his Excellency feels disposed to make every reasonable allowance for casualties arising from hardships.

You are requested to impress on the General officers and officers commanding regiments that their presence is very immaterial with their respective commands,

if they only lead, careless of all that passes in the interior, or towards the rear of the column.

Generals of brigades are particularly bound constantly to visit all parts of their line of march, and notice at the moment any deviation from orders.

Commanding officers of regiments and companies, when mounted on the line of march, are better placed in the rear than front of their commands. Obedience to the orders issued would quite preserve the degree of discipline established in the service, and for which the Commander of the Forces will not admit any relaxation.

I have, therefore, distinctly to acquaint you, that on every future instance of neglect, you are expected to report the officer guilty of omission, or any regiment showing general inattention to orders, when his Excellency will take steps to stop the promotion of the individuals or corps that shall have proved themselves unworthy of the service to which they belong.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

1st July, 1813.

I regret having to communicate to you the extreme displeasure of the Commander of the Forces at the receipt of a representation of the outrages that have been committed at and near Vitoria by the soldiery under your command, as well as by the stragglers that have fallen in rear of the army.

You will cause the whole of the detachments not on duty to be put under arms for 8 hours each day whilst they remain at Vitoria; you will let the soldiery understand this severity is intended as a punishment for their general ill conduct: and you will further be pleased to send me the names of the officers in command of detachments, whose promotion his Excellency proposes to have stopped; at all events till they shall requite the service for the injury their neglect or want of energy has in this instance occasioned.

I send a Provost Marshal with full authority to execute any soldier found plundering, or committing any act of disobedience amounting to mutiny. The tenor of this letter will sufficiently explain to you the advantage that possibly might result from your pointing out a proper subject to bring to trial, on charges to be deduced from any of these disorders.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Waters, A.A.G.

1st July, 1813.

His Excellency the Commander of the Forces directs you to proceed to Vitoria, for the purpose of inquiring into complaints made from that quarter, of the conduct of the troops left there on detachment under the orders of Major Burton, 7th Royal fusiliers.

You will endeavor to ascertain in what these disorders have originated, and should the complaints (a copy of which is annexed) prove well founded, take every means to learn whether the officers of the detachments generally have exerted themselves or neglected their duty, and most particularly whether Major Burton, the Commandant, has taken every means to support good order and discipline within his command, or omitted to take the necessary steps to secure regularity, in which consisted his principal responsibility.

A Provost Marshal and a detachment of the Staff corps of cavalry are attached to you; and you will cause all stragglers to be arrested and sent as prisoners to the nearest station. The Provost is vested with special authority to execute on the spot any soldier committing any act of plunder or flagrant outrage on the inhabitants of the country, or their property.

In the event of your finding it advantageous to remain in the rear for a few days, you will report the result of your proceedings so soon as convenient, as also the state as well as the regularity of the supplies of the station.

The A.G. to Assist. Provost Marshal M'Kay.

1st July, 1813.

You will proceed from hence to Vitoria by Echarri-Aranaz; you will take into custody every straggler you meet; and should you detect any soldier in the act of plundering or destroying the property of the inhabitants, or committing any flagrant act of outrage, you are hereby invested with the orders of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces to cause such offender to be executed on the spot, by hanging

the offender by the neck till dead. Should any stragglers resist your authority in the execution of your duty, you are empowered to cause them to be shot. You will report your arrival at Vitoria, and instructions, to Major Burton, commanding there.

To Major Gen. G. Anson.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I have the honor to inform you that, in consequence of the wish expressed by you in the month of February last, to be removed to the Home Staff, I have been authorised to state that you will be appointed to the Home Staff on your return to Great Britain.

I have directed Major Gen. Vandeleur to proceed to take the command of your brigade, of which you will deliver to him the command when he shall join it.

To Major Gen. Vandeleur.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

Sir S. Cotton arrived this morning, and I have settled with him that you shall be appointed to command the brigade of light dragoons, hitherto commanded by Major Gen. G. Anson.

To Col. Grant, 15th hussars.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

Sir S. Cotton is arrived, and a new division of cavalry into brigades has been made; and I am sorry to tell you that it is not in my power at present to give you the command of a brigade. I assure you, however, that I regret these circumstances very particularly, and I hope I shall soon be able to make an arrangement which will place you permanently in a situation which you have already filled with advantage to the public and credit to yourself.

To Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I am anxious to establish a strict and close blockade of Pamplona, preparatory to any other measures for the capture of the place which it may be expedient to adopt, of which I request your Lordship to take charge, and to arrange the details with Col. Sir R. Fletcher, who has received my directions upon the subject.

It is my opinion that the principle on which the blockade ought to be established is, that redoubts should be constructed on certain favorable spots which Col. Sir R. Fletcher will point out, at the distance of 1000 and 1200 yards from the place, to serve as points of support to the piquets by which the blockade should be maintained by day and night. These should be posted by day, in posts to be fixed for them and numbered. At night they should be closed to within 600 yards of the place, and ought to communicate. Measures should be taken to strengthen the village on the north side of the fort, so as to render it a secure post.

It is my wish to render the duty of the blockade as light as possible to the several divisions which shall come up; and I request your Lordship to order them to occupy such positions in the neighbourhood of the place as may best enable them to form the blockade, and to execute the works which it will be necessary to make. Hereafter I propose that the blockade should be held by the Spanish troops, when I shall relieve your Lordship from the trouble with which I am now charging you.

It is desirable to cut the corn as close to the fort as possible, and at all events to prevent the enemy from cutting it. It might be possible, perhaps, after a few dry days, to burn that close to the fort, which will not be under the fire of our day piquets, or of the guns in the situations of our redoubts. The guns attached to the divisions might be in these situations till those intended for them shall arrive from Vitoria.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from the Minister at War in regard to the removal of Gen. Castaños, and the consequent arrangements, and the copy of the draft of my answer of this day. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will call together Argüelles, Ciscar, La Vega, Toreno, and any other persons who may have been concerned in nominating me to the command of the Spanish army, and show them these letters, and tell them that, if I have not some satisfaction for the insult offered to me by these arrangements, in breach of all the engagements entered into with me, it will be impossible for me to continue to hold the command. I beg you will tell these gentlemen, at the same time, that I am sincerely desirous of continuing to hold the command, from knowing the importance attached to my continuance, in Spain, as well as in the rest of Europe; but I cannot do it under existing circumstances. I consider the gentlemen above mentioned to have been principally concerned in nominating me to the command of the army, and that they are likewise the principal supporters of the existing government; and I wish that they should be aware of all the circumstances, and should have it in their power to interfere, if they still wish that I should retain the command. If they don't wish it, and will not interfere, it is better that I should resign; to which measure, if I am compelled, I will adopt it in a manner to do as little injury to the government as may be in my power.

I judge, from the measures adopted, that it is intended to carry on the war against the Bishops in Galicia, for which I conclude that Castaños and Giron are not considered fit instruments. I wish that you would take the same opportunity of pointing out to these gentlemen the danger and imprudence of such measures. It will now rest with the Archbishop of Santiago whether or not we shall have a civil war in our rear. If we have, we must take leave of all our communications and our supplies of all descriptions, and we shall soon feel the consequences. To be sure, it will be droll enough if, having commenced the war in Spain, and continued it to this moment, with the clergy and people in our favor and against the French, they and we were to change sides, and after our victories we should be compelled to withdraw by having the clergy and people against us.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 15th June, conveying to me the pleasure of the Regency that the Captain General Castaños should be recalled from the command of the 4th army, in order to attend the sittings of the Council of State, as he

was not at the head of that army of which the command had been confided to him by the Regency ; and that Gen. Freyre should be Captain General of Estremadura and Castille, and should command the 4th army ; and that Gen. Lacy should be Captain General in Galicia, and should command the troops in that province independently of the General commanding the 4th army ; and that Gen. Don P. A. Giron should be removed to the 1st army.

As the constitution of the Spanish monarchy has declared the ministers responsible for the acts of the government, I may consider these acts as those of your Excellency, and I hope that I may venture to convey a few observations upon them, which I beg may be laid before the Regency.

Justice towards the character of Captain General Castaños, an officer who has served his country in close concert with me for the last 3 years, and who in the whole course of that time has never differed in opinion from me on any subject of importance, induces me to remind your Excellency that the local situation of the 4th army before the commencement of the campaign prevented its formation into a corps of which the Captain General could with propriety place himself at the head ; that, if this formation had been locally practicable, the deplorable state of the finances applicable to the support of the 4th army would have prevented its remaining united in such a corps.

Your Excellency must be aware that, when there is no money for the support of the troops, a particular district of country may not find it impossible to supply without payment the food for a small body, while it would be quite impossible to supply it for a large one ; and for this reason, and others referable to the state of discipline and the peculiar organization of some of the troops, I did not think it proper that more of the troops of the 4th army should be assembled together than the 2 divisions composing the army from Galicia under the command of Don P. A. Giron.

It would have been indecorous and improper, adverting to Gen. Castaños' rank and situation, besides being inconvenient, if he had joined these divisions, or any other portion of the 4th army ; and he therefore, in the commencement of the operations of the campaign, had his head quarters at or near mine and the Portuguese head quarters by my desire.

Not only your Excellency has not adverted to these circumstances in the decision which you have recommended to the government regarding Gen. Castaños, but you have omitted to advert to others. Besides being Commander in Chief of the 4th army, Gen. Castaños was Captain General of Estremadura and Castille and Galicia. In that capacity he had duties to perform most important for the political interests, and particularly for the welfare of the army.

It was his duty to establish the authority of the Spanish government in the different towns and districts, as they should be successively evacuated by the enemy ; and, from the nature of the operations of the army, and from the peculiar line of march it followed, he could not have performed this duty if he had been what is called at the head of the 4th army, or at my head quarters, which have moved nearly every day since the 22d May,

have never been in any large or capital town, excepting Salamanca, where I left Gen. Castaños, nor ever upon the high road.

It was I, and not Gen. Castaños, who suggested that he should employ himself in this manner; and I must say that, considering the manner in which Don P. A. Giron has commanded the divisions of the army of Galicia in the field, we should have neglected our duty to the State, if we had not chalked out for Gen. Castaños the performance of those duties for which he is now punished and disgraced.

In regard to the arrangements made by your Excellency for filling the appointments held by Gen. Castanos, and the removal of Gen. Don P. A. Giron, without trial or even cause assigned, from a situation in which he had been placed by Gen. Castaños by my desire, and in which he had conducted himself entirely to my satisfaction, as I had already reported to the government, I believe that, in addition to the inconvenience and injury to the public of all changes of this description in the midst of a military operation, it will not be denied that they are directly in breach of the engagements made to me by the late Regency, and confirmed by the existing Regency, which engagements, your Excellency knows well, alone induced me to accept the command of the Spanish army.

Your Excellency knows also that this is not the first time that the engagements solemnly entered into with me, after full and repeated discussions, have been broken; and nobody knows better than your Excellency the inconvenience to the service which resulted. You are likewise aware of my disposition and desire still to serve the Spanish nation as far as is in my power. There are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury; and I confess that I feel that I have been most unworthily treated in these transactions by the Spanish government, even as a gentleman.

It is not my habit, nor do I feel inclined, to make a parade of my services to the Spanish nation; but I must say that I have never abused the powers with which the government and the Cortes have intrusted me, in any, the most trifling, instance, nor have ever used them for any purpose excepting to forward the public service. For the truth of this assertion I appeal likewise even to your Excellency; and I believe it will be admitted that the circumstances which rendered necessary the formation of those engagements render it necessary to perform them, if it is desired that I should retain the command of the army.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d June, and I enclose copies of your letters of the same date, from which you will see how I have filled up the blanks. Major Gens. Spry, Bradford, and Power will remain with the Portuguese army.

I don't think any of the others in the same list would be of any advantage to the Alicante army.

I have told Major Gen. G. Anson that he will be appointed to the Home Staff when he shall go home, and I have appointed Major Gen. Vandeleur to command his brigade, for which he has long been anxious. It would likewise be very advisable to appoint Major Gen. — to the

Home Staff, as he is not very useful here, and I believe would be very much so at home; and this would give Grant, of the 15th, a brigade, of which he is deserving. But I don't wish to remove — unless he can be provided for at home.

To Earl Bathurst.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

You cannot conceive the inconvenience to which we are put for want of the sea communication with Lisbon. The ships which were ready in the Tagus on the 12th May had not sailed on the 19th June; and our magazines of provisions and military stores, which I expected to find at Santander, have not yet arrived. Of some kinds of ammunition we have none left; and I have been obliged to carry French ammunition of a smaller calibre than ours in our reserve. Surely the British navy cannot be so hard run as not to be able to keep up the communication with Lisbon for this army! The same want of security on the coast affects us in other ways. Our money cannot arrive by land in much less than 2 months, and we cannot get it by sea. The captured ordnance and stores cannot be sent away; and, if any accident were to happen to us, the whole would be lost.

To Earl Bathurst.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the Governor of Vitoria, which shows how our men are going on in that neighbourhood. These men are detachments from the different regiments of the army who were sent to Vitoria the day after the battle, each under officers, in order to collect the wounded and their arms and accoutrements. It is quite impossible for me or any other man to command a British army under the existing system. We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers; and of late years we have been doing every thing in our power, both by law and by publications, to relax the discipline by which alone such men can be kept in order. The officers of the lower ranks will not perform the duty required from them for the purpose of keeping their soldiers in order; and it is next to impossible to punish any officer for neglects of this description. As to the non-commissioned officers, as I have repeatedly stated, they are as bad as the men, and too near them, in point of pay and situation, by the regulations of late years, for us to expect them to do any thing to keep the men in order. It is really a disgrace to have any thing to say to such men as some of our soldiers are.

I now beg to draw your attention to the mode in which these irregularities affect our numbers. On the 17th June the total British and Portuguese force was 67,036 R. and F.; on the 29th June it is 58,694 R. and F.: diminution 8342 R. and F. The British on the 17th June were 41,547 R. and F.; on the 29th June 35,650 R. and F.: diminution 5897. The loss of British R. and F. in the battle was 3164, including 200 missing; so that the diminution from irregularities, straggling, &c., since, for plunder, is 2733. The loss of Portuguese R. and F. in the battle was 1022, including 73 missing; and their diminution from the same causes is 1423..

While we were pursuing the enemy by the valley of Araquil towards

Pamplona, finding so many men straggling from their ranks, I ordered that an hospital might be established to receive them; and, although there are so many men absent from their regiments, there are only 160 in that hospital. The others are plundering the country in different directions.

To Earl Bathurst.

Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a letter and its enclosure which I have received from Lord W. Bentinck, referring to a dispatch to Lord Castlereagh, of which he sent the duplicate open for my perusal, regarding a negotiation with King Murat. I likewise enclose my answer to Lord W. Bentinck, from which you will observe that I have given my consent to his taking the Anglo-Sicilian corps away from Spain to be employed as he pleases, in case he should conclude a treaty with Murat. My letter to his Lordship explains sufficiently the ground on which I have given this consent.

The A.G. to Capt. Marlay, D.A.A.G., Light division.

2d July, 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 30th ult., reporting the delay of arrival of the G. O. of the 22d, and the arrangement for the disposal of captured animals which Major Gen. Alten was, in consequence, induced to make, to disembarass the Light division, you will communicate to the Major General, that from the evident propriety of his intention, his Excellency has been pleased to sanction the sale of those animals; but I am commanded at the same time to observe the proceeding was altogether irregular, as there exists a regulation in this army* that all captured animals are to be reported to head quarters previous to disposal. The money arising from the sale of the animals in question is to be divided amongst the division: his Excellency conceives, however, that the men who have forsaken their duty and their ranks for plunder, have forfeited their claim to this gratuity.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

I have received just now your letter of the 2d. My notion that the troops had not behaved as you wished was founded on your letter to Murray, and I am sure I am very happy to find that I was mistaken.

I congratulate you upon your success. I send orders for the pontoons and 18 pounders to join you, and wait for Major Smith's report to determine upon the attack of San Sebastian, which appears to be an operation of a very different description from the attack of Pamplona.

Gen. O'Donnell has taken Pancorbo, with 650 prisoners, by capitulation.

Matters are not going on well on the eastern coast. Sir J. Murray has raised the siege of Tarragona, and has lost his heavy artillery; and I am afraid that the Duque del Parque has lost the ground which he had gained in Valencia by Suchet's movement after Sir J. Murray. Lord W. Bentinck has however joined the army, which has returned to Alicante; and I hope that things will go on better. I have not a very clear notion of what occasioned the raising the siege and embarkation of the army, notwithstanding that I have two dispatches and two private letters from Sir J. Murray, and three dispatches from Lord William. They are too voluminous to send to you, and they are copying to go to England. But I send you the copy of a short note from the Admiral, which shows his opinion

* G. O., Nos. 7 and 8, 19th May, 1809.

of the matter, and states some facts which show that matters were not conducted in a very decisive manner.

The best of it is that Sir J. Murray does not mention any thing of this second disembarkation; and indeed his whole account is so confused and little satisfactory, that I have been obliged to put questions to him in my answer.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

Major Gen. G. Anson having been removed from the Staff of this army to that of Great Britain, I request you will be pleased to provide him with a passage in the first man of war which may sail from Santander after his arrival at that place.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Ostiz, ce 3 Juillet, 1813, à midi.

Permettez que je vous remercie, et que je vous donne mes félicitations bien sincères sur vos succès à Pancorbo. Par hasard nous n'avons pas encore reçu votre récit du premier avantage, mais nous avons celui du résultat, qui est parfait; et je vous en fais mon compliment. Je vous suis bien obligé aussi d'une lettre que vous m'avez écrite l'autre jour sur nos succès du 21.

Les Français ont passé la Bidasoa, et ont rompu le pont. Nos troupes sont à Irun et à St. Jean Pied de Port, sur la droite. Nous tenons Pampelune bloqué par les troupes, qui se reposent de leur marche après Clausel. L'ennemi a détruit Guetaria, et Longa a pris leur garnison à Pasages. Ils n'ont plus de postes sur la côte qu'à San Sebastien et à Santona. Les choses cependant ne vont pas si bien sur la côte du Levant. Le Général Murray a levé le siège de Tarragone, et malheureusement a perdu son canon; et je crains que le Duc del Parque n'ait perdu le terrain qu'il avait gagné, par la marche de Suchet en Catalogne, pour suivre les mouvemens de Murray; mais j'espère que tout cela se réparera.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the wife of Gen. O'Farrill was left at Valladolid sick when King Joseph and his ministers, &c., evacuated that city on the approach of the army under my command. She has since recovered, and has lately expressed a desire to go to France to join her husband; and I have requested that she might be informed that I would lay this desire before the government.

I beg to receive the orders of their Highnesses upon this subject.

To Visc. Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

I have already taken the liberty of recommending to your Lordship's patronage Capt. Carroll of the Navy, in consequence of the recommendation of him to me by the authorities in Cadiz, for his services during the siege of that place. He has now brought me, and takes home, the dispatches regarding the recent transactions on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, and I understand is recommended by the Admiral for his conduct at the Coll de Balaguer; and I beg leave again to recommend him to your Lordship.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

As I have reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the — — in the action of the 21st ult., and as the irregularities of which they have since been guilty are numerous, and evince a want of discipline highly discreditable to the officers, I think it proper to forbear to recommend the senior — of that corps for the troops which have become vacant by the death of Cpts. — and —.

I therefore request you will submit to the Commander in Chief my recommendation of — — from the — —, and of — — from the — —, to be promoted to these vacancies.

— — has been employed during the last 3 years in the Portuguese service, in which he has distinguished himself, and has lately had an officer from the — — — appointed over his head to a troop in the —; and — — has served in this country as aide de camp to — —, and was most severely wounded at the battle of Salamanca, where his conduct was highly spoken of.

Should, however, — — have already been promoted in the — —, which I understand is probable, I beg you to lay before the Commander in Chief my request that — —, from the — —, may succeed to one of the troops vacant in the —.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

When the Spanish frigates were taken at the commencement of the late war with Spain, various individuals lost their properties which were on board those frigates. As war had not been declared, the money, &c., in the frigates became the *droit* of the Crown; and restitution has been made to various individuals. Some persons have applied to me, in the distress which the contest that has since occurred in Spain has increased, to endeavor to obtain for them a similar favor; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know if it is still time, and if government are disposed to receive, favorably, applications of this description.

If they are not so disposed, it is better that I should decline to forward them than that it should be supposed that government refuse to grant what these suffering individuals must think a just claim.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

Gen. Clausel having retired towards Logroño, after finding our troops at Vitoria on the 22d June, and having ascertained the result of the action of the 21st, still remained in the neighbourhood of Logroño on the 24th, and till late on the 25th, and had not marched for Tudela, as I had been informed when I wrote my dispatch of the 24th June: I conceived, therefore, that there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat; and after sending the light troops towards Roncesvalles in pursuit of the army under King Joseph, I moved the Light, 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions, and Col. Grant's and Col. Ponsonby's brigades of cavalry, towards Tudela; and the 5th and 6th divisions, and the Household and the Conde de la Bisbal's cavalry, from Vitoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño, in hopes that I should be able to intercept Gen. Clausel. He made some extraordinary forced marches, followed by Gen. Mina with his own cavalry, and the

regiment of Spanish cavalry under the command of Don Julian Sanchez, and arrived at Tudela on the evening of the 27th. He there crossed the Ebro; but the Alcalde* having informed him that we were upon the road, he immediately recrossed, and marched towards Zaragoza, where I understand from Gen. Alava that he has since arrived.

I then turned off to Caseda on the Aragon, where I arrived on the 28th; but, finding that the enemy had already advanced so far upon their march as to render it impossible for me to cut them off from Jaca, and thinking it probable that my farther advance in that direction would force Gen. Clausel to avoid the road of Jaca, and to seek a junction with Marshal Suchet, which he would otherwise seek to avoid, and which I had no means of preventing, I discontinued the pursuit with the allied British and Portuguese troops; and they are on their return towards Pamplona. Those under Gen. Mina are still following the enemy; and he has taken from them 2 pieces of cannon and some stores in Tudela, and 300 prisoners. Lieut. Gen. H. Clinton has also taken possession of 5 pieces which the enemy left at Logroño.

In the mean time the troops under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill have kept the blockade of Pamplona, and have moved through the mountains to the head of the Bidasoa, the enemy having entirely retired into France on that side.

I enclose the report which I have received from Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham of his actions with the enemy on the 24th and 25th June,† which appear to have been more serious than I had imagined when I addressed your Lordship on the 26th ult.

Gen. Foy had with him the garrison of Bilbao, and those of Mondragon and Tolosa, besides his division of the army of Portugal, and his force was considerable. It gives me great satisfaction to see that the Spanish and Portuguese troops, mentioned by Sir T. Graham, have conducted themselves so well. The General has continued to push on the enemy by the high road, and has dislodged them from all strong positions which they have taken; and yesterday a brigade of the army of Galicia, under the command of Gen. Castaños, attacked and drove the enemy across the Bidasoa, by the bridge of Irun. The enemy still maintained a post in a strong stone blockhouse, which served as a head to the bridge, and some troops in some loop-holed houses on the right of the Bidasoa; but Gen. Don P. A. Giron having sent for some Spanish artillery, and Capt. Dubourdieu's brigade of 9 pounders having been sent to their support, the fire of these guns obliged the enemy to evacuate; and they blew up the blockhouse and burnt the bridge. Sir T. Graham reports that in all these affairs the Spanish troops have conducted themselves remarkably well.

The garrison at Pasages, consisting of 150 men, surrendered on the 30th to the troops under Col. Longa.

The enemy, on seeing some of our ships off Deba, evacuated the fort and town of Guetaria on the 1st inst.; and the garrison went by sea to San Sebastian. This place is blockaded by land by a detachment of Spanish troops. They have likewise evacuated Castro Urdiales, and the garrison have gone by sea to Santoña.

* See note at p. 562.

† See p. 553.

In my former reports I have made your Lordship acquainted with the progress of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under Gen. the Conde de la Bisbal, to join the army; and he arrived at Burgos on the 25th and 26th ult.

When the enemy retired across the Ebro, previous to the battle at Vitoria, they left a garrison of about 700 men in the castle of Pancorbo, by which they commanded, and rendered it impossible for us to use, the great communication from Vitoria to Burgos. I therefore requested the Conde de la Bisbal, on his march to Miranda, to make himself master of the town and lower works, and to blockade the place as closely as he could. I have not received the report of his first operations, but I understand that he carried the town and lower fort by assault on the 28th; and I have now the pleasure to enclose his report of the final success of this operation, and the copy of the capitulation by which the garrison have surrendered.* The decision and dispatch with which this place has been

* Gen. Conde de la Bisbal to Don L. Wimpffen.

S^{ta} Marta de Cubo, 1st July, 1813.

On the 29th June last, I had the honor to acquaint you, for the information of His Excellency the General in Chief of the National armies, that the caçadores and grenadiers of the 1st brigade of the 1st division of this army had assaulted and taken the fort of S^{ta} Marta de Pancorbo. I have now the satisfaction of acquainting you that, at 8 o'clock this morning, the castle of S^{ta} Engracia, or principal fort of Pancorbo, surrendered by capitulation. The garrison consisted of 650 men; they had provisions for several days, no very great quantity of water, and that not of a good quality. There were found in the castle 25 pieces of cannon, of a calibre from 16 to 4 pounds, many gun carriages, and a sufficient quantity of ammunition for a regular defence. The garrison surrendered under the enclosed articles of capitulation, and will march to-morrow morning for Burgos.

From the 28th, the day on which the fort of S^{ta} Marta was taken, I had posted the sharpshooters in the vicinity of the walls of the fort, and, by blockading it most vigorously, I cut off all communication with the spring from which they provided themselves with water. The different detachments employed upon this service performed their duty with a steadiness and valor deserving every praise; and the enemy could no longer procure their water without imminent risk. Taking advantage of this circumstance, I ordered several numerous detachments to establish themselves as near the wall as possible, and out of the range of the enemy's guns. A quantity of ladders and other necessary implements were procured for attacking the castle; but, being anxious to adopt every necessary step for economising the lives of my men, I hinted a second time to the Governor to surrender, which he consented to accede to, under condition of being carried back to France with his garrison; but he yielded at last, upon my refusing to admit this condition, and threatening to take the place by storm. The successful result of this business is not a little owing to the intelligence and judgment which my aide de camp, Lieut. Col. J. M. Reyna, displayed during the course of his conferences with the Governor. The result of the Lieut. Colonel's negotiation has proved of no little advantage to us.

During the space of 24 hours, a battery for 6 pieces had been constructed on the summit of the hill, by the indefatigable exertions of the sappers of the army (and several peasants), under the direction of the Commandant General of the Engineers, Mariscal de Campo Don M. Zappino; and 6 pieces of cannon, which had been collected by the Colonel, Major General of the artillery, Don M. Ferraz, were got upon the hill with the greatest activity, under the direction of the Colonel, who was ably assisted by the Lieut. Colonel of artillery, Don J. Jarabia, and the serjeant major, Don B. Gutierrez, and other subaltern officers. Eight hours after the battery was commenced, the guns began to open upon the enemy, and, besides causing him considerable loss, impressed him with sufficient respect for us.

I cannot but call the attention of the General in Chief of the National armies to the valor and activity displayed upon this occasion by Brig. Don J. Latorre, commanding the 1st brigade of infantry; by the Chief of the Staff of the army, Col. Don M. Desmaysieres, who scarcely took one moment's rest during the siege, which lasted 3 days; and to the good conduct of the officers of the Staff who were placed under his orders, and that of the Commander and officers of the infantry and cavalry which composed the besieging corps.

I must also notice the meritorious conduct of my aides de camp, Lieut. Cols. Don J. de Ruiz, Don J. M. Reyna, Don V. Vinader, and Lieut. Don B. Diaz, and of my Military Secretary, Don J. Serfate, and Salazar, who carried my orders, on repeated occasions, to

subdued are highly creditable to the Conde de la Bisbal and the officers and troops under his command.

I am concerned to inform your Lordship that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray raised the siege of Tarragona, I cannot say on what day, and embarked his troops: a great portion of the artillery and stores were left in the batteries. It appears that Marshal Suchet, with a considerable body of troops, had moved from Valencia by Tortosa, and Gen. Maurice Mathieu with another corps from the neighbourhood of Barcelona, for the purpose of impeding Sir J. Murray's operations, which he did not think himself sufficiently strong to continue. I have not yet received from Sir J. Murray the detailed account of these transactions.

Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, however, who had joined and taken the command of the army at the Coll de Balaguer on the 17th, had brought it back to Alicante, where he arrived himself on the 23d, and was proceeding to carry into execution my instructions.

the very walls of the enemy's fort, heedless of the latter's fire. The enemy kept up a brisk fire from his guns, &c., but the loss which he occasioned us has been very inconsiderable. The enemy's surrendering the place created great regret among the troops, who had consented to take it by assault, and they only console themselves with the hope of there being more places to conquer. I have put a small garrison into the fort of Pancorbo, and shall supply it immediately with provisions and water; but I shall not make any addition to the works without knowing first the intentions of the General in Chief relative to the demolition or preservation of this place.

Capitulation of the Fort of Sta Engracia de Pancorbo.

We, Don Josef Maria de Reyna, Lieut. Colonel of the Corps of National Artillery, Major of a Brigade of the same in the army of Andalusia, and aide de camp to the Conde de la Bisbal, Captain General of the kingdoms of Seville and Cordova, and General in Chief of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia, being furnished with full powers by His Excellency; and Don Alexandre de Ceva, Lieutenant in the 31st regt. of light infantry in the service of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and serving in the garrison of Sta Engracia de Pancorbo, being furnished with full powers by the Governor of the said fort, Don Carlos Auguste Durand, Member of the Legion of Honor, and Lieut. Colonel of the 55th regt. of the Line, have agreed upon the following articles:

Art. I. The Spanish troops will occupy the fort of Sta Engracia on the day and at the hour hereafter expressed.

Art. II. The garrison will be made prisoners of war, and be allowed the honors of war.

Art. III. The Commanding officers and officers will retain their swords, horses, and baggage; and the serjeants and soldiers will preserve their effects, and will be furnished with means of transport.

Art. IV. The garrison will be exchanged by the first cartel that takes place, and they will for that purpose be removed to as small a distance as possible.

Art. V. The officer commanding the artillery in the fort will formally deliver to the officer of artillery appointed by the General in Chief, the artillery, ammunition, and war-like stores that may be in the fort.

Art. VI. The Conde de la Bisbal and the Governor of the fort will ratify this capitulation to-morrow, the 1st July, at 7 o'clock in the morning, and one hour afterwards the principal gate of the fort will be occupied by a Spanish detachment; at 10 the garrison will march out, and, after having laid down their arms, will proceed to quarters in the fort or town of Pancorbo, as the Governor may think proper, until the 2d July, when they will proceed to their destination.

Spanish generosity guarantees the execution of this treaty.

Done in Sta Maria de Rivaredonda, 30th June, 1813.

JOSEF MARIA DE REYNA,
Lieut. Colonel, Actg. and Aide de Camp.

ALEXANDRE DE CEVA,
Lieut. 31st Light Infantry.

Ratified by me the 1st July, 1813, at 7 o'clock, A.M.,

P. EL CONDE DE LA BISBAL.

Ratified by me, Governor of the Fort,

C. A. DURAND.

When Marshal Suchet marched into Catalonia, the Duque del Parque had advanced, and had established his head quarters at San Felipe de Xativa, and his troops on the Jucar, where he still was on the 24th; but I believe that he will have retired upon Suchet's return to Valencia.

I am not informed of the extent of the loss of the heavy artillery at Tarragona, nor whether it will cripple the operations of the troops on the eastern coast. Considering, however, the nature of the enemy's position in Valencia and Catalonia, and his possession of the numerous fortified posts in these provinces, which render it scarcely possible for the allied troops to carry on any operation until they shall become masters of some of them, I am apprehensive that the enemy will be induced to withdraw his active army from thence, in order to throw them upon our right flank, in the confidence that, in the existing state of our equipment, we can effect nothing against any of the fortresses; and that, without some at least of the fortresses, the operations of our troops in the field must be very confined.

Before I had received intelligence of the last state of affairs on the eastern coast, I had doubted the expediency of laying siege to Pamplona, which I had at first intended, upon finding that the place was of such a description, and in such a state of defence, as to require a much larger equipment of heavy ordnance than I had immediately at command; and that it would require an operation of from 5 to 6 weeks' duration, which could not even be commenced for a fortnight or 3 weeks, and the employment of from 15,000 to 20,000 men of our best troops; whereas the blockade could be held by troops of inferior numbers, and of not so good a description; and it is probable that, in point of time, the place would be obliged to surrender within 12 weeks. The disasters at Tarragona, and my view of their probable consequences, have induced me to determine only to blockade Pamplona, for which the necessary works are now constructing; and I shall now have the whole army at liberty for any operation that I may think it proper to carry on.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

I have reported, in my dispatch of this day, that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray had raised the siege of Tarragona, and had embarked, leaving behind him a portion of his artillery. Although I have received two dispatches and two private letters from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, and two from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, on this transaction, I don't feel myself sufficiently informed to be able to write more upon it.

I enclose all the letters which I have received relating to Tarragona, including one from Adm. Hallowell; and I likewise enclose the copies of the dispatch which I have written to Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, to require further information, and of a private letter to him, and likewise the copy of a dispatch to Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck. I shall make no further comment upon these papers, or the facts to which they relate, than to draw your Lordship's attention to the construction put by Sir J. Murray on my instructions to him and the Spanish Generals, of the 14th April, of which your Lordship has a copy.*

In regard to the expectations which I entertained of success in both the

* See p. 426.

objects embraced by those instructions, there is nothing in any letter from me which expresses a doubt respecting the success: the instructions speak for themselves, and it is useless to trouble your Lordship further upon the subject.

I beg your Lordship's particular attention, however, to the 13th paragraph of the instructions, and to the application of the orders it contains by Sir J. Murray to himself, and his own situation. I don't mean to justify myself from the imputation of directing any General officer not to be defeated; but it must be obvious to any one who will read the 11th, 12th, and 13th paragraphs of the instructions, that the 13th was intended to apply to the Duque del Parque and Gen. Elio alone, and not to Sir J. Murray. This will be still more obvious, if the word *the* be inserted before 'General Officers' in the copy of the paragraph contained in the dispatch from Sir J. Murray, at the place marked by me; which word was really used in the 13th paragraph of the instructions. Likewise, if the words, *and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position*, be inserted as they stand in the instructions. These words show that the paragraph could not be intended for Sir J. Murray, whose operations under the instructions were not likely to lead to the attack of a strong position.

I gave those orders to the Duque del Parque and Gen. Elio, from the knowledge I have of the character of the nation and of these Generals.

I thought it not improbable that Gen. Sir J. Murray might be under the necessity of leaving at Alicante the British, German, and Sicilian cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry belonging to Gen. Whittingham. I know that it is a common opinion among the Spanish General officers, that the disasters and defeats which they have sustained during the war, are to be attributed entirely to the want of good cavalry; and I thought it not improbable that, if they had the use of this cavalry, they would immediately attack the enemy in his strong positions on the Jucar, and lose not only their own armies, but our cavalry.

It would not have been proper to order that they should not have the use of the cavalry, if it were left in Valencia; and the only mode of preventing the evil which I had reason to apprehend, was to give the instructions contained in the 15th paragraph.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

It occurs to me that Sir J. Murray's friends in England may differ in opinion with me regarding his dispatches of the 14th and 23d, and may consider them sufficiently explicit, and fully to justify his conduct. If you should find any to be of that opinion, I beg you to have them published, without my dispatch of this date which conveys them to your Lordship, or that from me of the 1st inst. to Sir J. Murray.

I beg your Lordship to observe in what manner the blockade of the coast is kept up. I wish to make the siege of San Sebastian, which is one of quite a different description from that of Pamplona; but I cannot undertake it till I shall know whether we are secure at sea. I really believe that this is the first time of late years that any British Commander on shore has had reason to entertain a doubt on this point.

To Earl Bathurst.

Ostiz, 3d July, 1813.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch from Lord W. Bentinck regarding the supposed danger in Sicily, and of my answer.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lanz, 4th July, 1813.

I intend, if possible, to attack San Sebastian, and have written to the officer in charge of the train on board the transports now at Bilbao to proceed to the port of Pasages, and to put himself under the direction of Sir T. Graham, who commands the allied troops stationed near him.

I understand that there is a constant communication by sea between Bayonne and San Sebastian, which it would be very desirable that you should endeavor to interrupt; and with this object, and in order to give you aid in the operations against San Sebastian, it would probably be desirable that you should station the squadron under your command off or in Pasages, with the exception of one vessel, to watch Santoña.

To Col. Dickson, R.A.

Lanz, 4th July, 1813, 7 P.M.

From what I have heard of San Sebastian, I am inclined to form the siege of that place; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send an officer to Bilbao, to order the train from thence to Pasages.

Send the enclosed letter with this officer to be delivered to Sir G. Collier; and desire Major Fraser to communicate with Sir George in regard to convoy for the train from Bilbao to Pasages, and to its maritime security while there; as it will actually be within sight of the French posts.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Lanz, 4th July, 1813, 7 P.M.

From the accounts which I have received from Major Smith of the state of San Sebastian, I conceive that our means are sufficient to enable us to obtain possession of that place, which, therefore, I am desirous of attacking.

I have ordered the ordnance from Bilbao to Pasages. I have ordered that Major Smith should have fascines, gabions, &c. prepared; and I request you, without loss of time, to let Sir T. Graham know the price which I had fixed upon for these articles for Pamplona.

The sappers, &c., will be ordered to be sent to San Sebastian, and I shall hereafter request you to go there.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lanz, 4th July, 1813.

From the account which I have received from Major Smith of the state of San Sebastian, and in a view to the general situation of our affairs, I feel very anxious to attack that place. Although our train, which was framed with a view to the siege of Burgos, is not quite sufficient for that of Pamplona, it appears to me, from all accounts, that it is fully so for that of San Sebastian. It is now at Bilbao, and I have desired that it may be ordered forthwith to Pasages. I have likewise written to Sir G. Collier, who commands the squadron on the coast, to request him to station himself off or in Pasages, in order the better to keep the maritime blockade of San Sebastian at all events, and to assist eventually at the

siege. I have likewise written to England for an increase of the maritime force on the coast.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire Major Smith to have the necessary preparations made of fascines, gabions, &c., for this operation. I write to Sir R. Fletcher, to desire he would let you know the prices which I had agreed to pay for these for the siege of Pamplona.

Sir R. Fletcher is now employed in the arrangement and construction of the works for the blockade of Pamplona; but as soon as these shall be arranged, I will send him to San Sebastian. In the mean time, Major Smith might act for him. I shall likewise send Lieut. Col. Dickson, and all the means in artillery, sappers, &c.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know your opinion whether the Spanish troops could carry on this concern, with a few English to assist occasionally to lead an assault, &c. It will be very desirable if this should be practicable, as it will save our English and Portuguese troops, of whom we have lost more since the 21st, I am very certain, than the enemy have lost. However, as the loss is to be attributed in a great measure to their own irregularity, I am in hopes it is not quite irretrievable.

I understand that San Sebastian is now blockaded by the Spanish troops; but if any more than the mere blockade should be thought necessary by Major Smith, before I can receive your answer, and can settle what troops shall carry on the siege, I shall be obliged to you if you will settle that it may be done by any troops you may think proper.

Hill is in Berrueta; Byng close to St. Jean Pied de Port; and the 7th division will be to-morrow through the Puerto de Arraiz. Clausel was at Zaragoza on the 1st.

P.S. I believe I informed you yesterday that the Conde de la Bisbal had taken Pancorbo, with 700 prisoners.

Au Lieut. Gén. Baron Maucune.

Au Quartier Général, ce 6 Juillet, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez adressée le 4. M. Houzé, étant parti pour s'embarquer pour l'Angleterre, il y a près d'un mois, devrait être déjà arrivé dans ce pays là; et j'écris pour qu'on le renvoie en France, sans échange, aussitôt son arrivée. Cela me fait grand plaisir d'avoir cette occasion de faire ce qui peut vous être agréable.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

6th July, 1813.

I am commanded by his Excellency the Marquis of Wellington to desire you will call upon the Governor of Vitoria for an explanation why, or by the application of whom, he caused some muleteers of suspicious appearance and employment to be liberated the end of the last, or the beginning of the present month, from the custody of the civil authorities of the village of Barroa, near to Vitoria. On explanation it did appear that the muleteers above stated were conducting French money to the rear, although by the first inspection of the equipment it looked like common baggage. You are further to understand there was no kind of escort with this money, neither any acknowledged conductor with the treasure. The Commander of the Forces feels fully assured that the Governor of Vitoria was unacquainted with these facts at the period of his interference, which now can only be amended by his active inquiry into the case at large, and the route the persons have taken whom he so injudiciously liberated without previous investigation.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

6th July, 1813.

The arrangements for the regularity of the rear of the 2d division have in general been so good, that I regret having to call your attention to evident instances of departure from system within the last two days.

On the arrival of the head quarters, on the 4th, at Lanz, 10 stragglers were picked up by the Provost Marshal there, all of whom appeared equal to march, and have accompanied head quarters to this place. Neither officer nor non-commissioned officer was sent to the rear to inquire after these men, nor was there any intimation left in rear that such men had fallen out of their ranks.

This day, on arrival, I have found in this village 15 British soldiers wounded, without either officers or non-commissioned officers in charge of them, neither any kind of memorandum stating to what period they have been provisioned, or even whether their wounds had been dressed, and there was no medical officer left in attendance. Some of these cases, it is possible, should not be removed for some days, but there are others quite equal to bear carriage to the rear; when, to conclude this statement, I have myself met above 40 unloaded mules returning for supplies that might have been employed in the transport of the wounded to the rear. I beg 2 officers may immediately be sent in here, one to attend the wounded to the rear, the other to bring up the stragglers, and that you will speak to your Dep. Assistant.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Irurita, 8th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

My time has been so much occupied by reconnaissances and by Sir R. Hill's operations, for the last 3 or 4 days, that I have not been able to write to you. The enemy appeared particularly anxious to keep hold of this fine valley of Baztan; and Gazan has disputed every position in it; and it was necessary to reconnoitre each of them very closely before it was attacked, which in these mountainous countries is not very easy. However, we have at last got him out. He had 3 divisions yesterday in the Puerto de Maya, the last position in Spain, too; and a very strong one it is. We had not quite troops enough up, and we manœuvred with two British and one Portuguese brigade and a half. If the 7th division, which was ordered, had arrived in time, or the sea fog had held off for an hour or two longer, we should have made a good thing of it. Our loss is about 60 wounded. In the other days there was a good deal of firing, but we sustained no loss.

I should think that the enemy had left Echalar and Vera, but I don't know that they have yet. However, we can now make them do as we please, both there and on their whole line to the sea. I propose to go over and take a view of that side, probably to-morrow; and I shall see you before I return. I hope that your hip is better.

I believe Longa has now disposed his posts as you wished.

I enclose the note of the heavy ordnance ordered round to Pasages in the transports. I wish the 24 pounders to be used, rather than our 18 pounders, as I wish to keep up the ammunition of the latter complete for the field.

Upon consideration, I think you had better give Gen. Oswald charge of the siege of San Sebastian, with the 5th division, and either Pack's or Bradford's brigades; and I will arrange that as many Spanish battalions as you may think fit shall assist. I don't think the Spaniards are yet to be trusted alone; and I should not like to see our ordnance exposed to the risk of their keeping. Besides, they will not work, and their own officers cannot make them work.

I have not yet received my dispatch by the *Fancy*, but I believe that it will be desirable that, at all events, Sir G. Collier should detain her, and I shall be obliged to you if you will tell him so.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received the dispatch by the *Fancy*. It is from Lord Keith, and contains nothing important. But it is desirable that the *Fancy* should wait. You will see that I concur entirely with you respecting the Spanish troops.

Au Lieut. Gén. Comte Gazan.

Au Quartier Général, ce 8 Juillet, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 6, par laquelle vous m'annoncez le renvoi de votre part de M. M'Culloch, chirurgien de l'armée Britannique; et vous désirez que je fasse renvoyer en France M. Vienné, Commissaire des guerres, prisonnier de guerre en Angleterre, pris à Badajoz. J'écris pour le faire renvoyer en France tout de suite.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Irurita, 8th July, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch (No. 4) of the 30th June.

Adverting to the 15th paragraph of my instructions of the 14th April * to Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, it appears most extraordinary that when he embarked for Tarragona, he should have discharged the mules and carts collected to attend the army under his command. As it appears that after raising the siege of Tarragona and leaving his cannon, and embarking the army, he disembarked again at Coll de Balaguer, and remained 4 days, till your Lordship arrived to take the command of the army, I should imagine that Sir J. Murray must have totally overlooked that part of his instructions which required him to return to Valencia instantly, if he should be obliged to raise the siege, in order that he might support the Duque del Parque, and enable him to maintain the ground which he should have gained, in consequence of Suchet's absence in Catalonia.

It appears that Suchet acted upon principles entirely different from those of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray. I judge from his proclamation to his army, and the date of his arrival at Valencia, on his return, that he did not lose a moment in Catalonia after he had effected his purpose of raising the siege of Tarragona; as it does not appear that he even knew that Sir J. Murray had left his cannon.

In suggesting the measures proposed in my memorandum of the 14th April, for the operations of the armies on the eastern coast, now under the command of your Lordship, I had in mind the state of discipline and efficiency and equipment of each of them. As far as I have any knowledge of it, the Spanish army under the command of the Duque del Parque is, excepting that in Catalonia, the best (not including the divisions of Whittingham and Roche), and if well commanded and managed with prudence and sense, might, I think, be trusted in operations alone. While under Ballesteros it always acted singly; and although in reality little or nothing was done, it was never dispersed; and I know that Soult exerted himself to involve it in difficulties. This was the corps, therefore,

* See p. 426.

which I recommended should be detached to the enemy's flank, and that the corps, certainly inferior in every respect, of Elio, should co-operate in the same line with the allied British and Sicilian army, of which I understand that the divisions of Roche and Whittingham form a part.

This recommendation has, however, been departed from; and Gen. Elio has been detached, and the Duque del Parque has remained in Valencia, in the same line with the Anglo-Sicilian corps; and I have no wish that this arrangement should be altered if your Lordship approves of it. I am certain, from Suchet's correspondence, that he was much alarmed lest a corps should be placed at Utiel and Requena. It is probable, however, that this feeling would be weakened when he would find that the King had retired from Madrid and the Duero.

Your Lordship having determined, in consequence of hearing of the state of affairs here, to operate directly upon Suchet, it is scarcely necessary that I should advert to the plan which you had proposed of quitting the coast and turning the enemy's right with the whole army, by the road from Zaragoza.

The great difficulty which I have always found in the Peninsula has been the subsistence of the army; and in order to supply this want, and the various others of the army, I have never ventured to risk even the communication with the sea. The troops under your Lordship's command are not so numerous as those I have; but still, including Sicilians, they are so numerous as to render it not an easy task to provide for them in the Peninsula, even when the harvest is on the ground; and it will be very difficult afterwards. Your Lordship must observe that you will get nothing without money; and your first want, when you shall lose your communication with the sea, will be money.

On these grounds, and because I know that the corps under your command cannot be supplied as it ought to be with means of transport, and as I have always understood it to be the wish of your Lordship, as well as of government, that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be in a situation to return to Sicily at a short notice; I have considered it to be essential in every plan of operations for that army, that it should not be separated from the sea coast.

If they can be spared from the service of the troops under your Lordship's command, it is very desirable that 3 or 4 of the troop ships of war should be sent to the Tagus; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will make application accordingly to the Admiral.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Irurita, 8th July, 1813.

There are two or three points adverted to in your Lordship's dispatch, No. 4, to which I think it best to send you a reply in a private form.

I am perfectly aware of the inefficient state of the equipments of all the Spanish armies, but I have done every thing in my power to produce an amelioration, hitherto without effect. Neither government nor Cortes appear to me to care much about the foreign war. The former are a mere instrument and creature of the latter. All that these care about, is the praise of their stupid Constitution; and how to carry on the war against the bishops and priests.

You will have seen that by the Constitution, all military regulation is in the hands of the Cortes, and they have a Board of officers now sitting to consider of a military constitution for the army, which it is intended to republicanize. Any proposal for an alteration, therefore, is laid aside till the new military constitution shall be fixed. One of the defects in the constitution of the Spanish army, as now existing, is in the office and power of the Inspectors of cavalry and infantry, in whose hands is the nomination of all officers to commissions and for promotion. This cannot be altered. Whittingham, contrary to all rule, is both Commander and Inspector of his own division. I have not the power to make the same arrangement in favor of any body else. I have no objection to your allowing the Duque del Parque cavalry, to act under the command of Whittingham for the moment; but I beg you not to make any alteration in the existing organization of any of the Spanish armies. If you do, you will bring me into difficulties.

I have a newspaper from England of the 29th June. It is stated that the French Ambassador had quitted Vienna. Notwithstanding the armistice, the war of the partisans was continuing with great success in the rear of the French army. Czernichef had gained a very important success at Halberstadt; and Woronzow and another had entered Leipsic, and taken and destroyed above 3000 men.

Matters are going on well here. There is not a Frenchman in Spain on this side, excepting within garrison. I wait to see what turn affairs take in Germany before I determine on my line. In the mean time I have blockaded all the fortresses, and am about to attack San Sebastian, and am giving some rest to the troops, who have been a good deal fagged by their late exertions.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

I enclose a return of men and horses in readiness in England to be sent out to the several regiments of cavalry in this country. I fancy there are more horses than some of them can conveniently mount. I have requested Lord Bathurst to give orders that all of them may be sent out to Santander to receive orders; and I propose to order them to Bilbao, there to be landed: if there should be more for any particular regiment than the regiment can mount, we will transfer the overplus to the others. How will they be supplied with horse appointments?

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatch (No. 126) of the 16th June; and I request your Lordship will give directions that the detachments of cavalry and infantry referred to in that communication may be sent to Santander as soon as may be convenient, there to receive further directions, which will probably be to proceed to disembark at Bilbao.

I imagine that there are more horses than some of the regiments can at present conveniently mount; but if I should find this to be the case, I shall distribute them among the other regiments, and I imagine that they will not be a burthen to the army.

In the present situation of the army, much time and expense would be

saved if a depôt were formed for this army at Falmouth, preferably, or at Plymouth, if it should not be possible to form one at Falmouth, of those articles of camp equipment and military ordnance and medical stores, of which the army are daily in want; and that orders should be given to the storekeepers of this depôt to send out such articles as I might from time to time require, in the same manner as they would if the depôts were formed at Lisbon.

I enclose lists of the articles which should be lodged in these depôts at Falmouth or Plymouth, and constantly to be kept complete for the service of the British army only.

I likewise beg leave to recommend that any money which your Lordship may have to send to the army may be transmitted to Santander, there to receive further directions.

The ships which will bring out the troops, or the stores required from time to time by the army, might take back such wounded or sick soldiers as it might be expedient to send to England for their recovery. By these measures the troops could be better supplied with every article which they require, much expense would be saved, and the army would be relieved from a heavy burthen.

Hereafter, when the clothing for the regiments in this country would be prepared, it might be sent to the same depôt at Falmouth or Plymouth.

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

In reference to the dispatch (No. 62) which I have written to you this day, regarding the formation of a depôt at Falmouth for the supply of this army, I have to mention that it would be very convenient if 5 or 6

G. O.

Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves among those of the frontiers of France.

2. Every military precaution must henceforward be used to obtain intelligence and to prevent surprise. General and superior officers at the head of detached corps will take care to keep up a constant and regular communication with the corps upon their right and left, and with their rear; and the soldiers and their followers must be prevented from wandering to a distance from their camps and cantonments on any account whatever.

3. Notwithstanding that these precautions are absolutely necessary, as the country in the front of the army is the enemy's, the Commander of the Forces is particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated, and private property must be respected, as it has been hitherto.

4. The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties authorised and encouraged by their chiefs towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

5. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the Commander of the Forces now addresses himself, and at all events would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

6. The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier, and the Commissaries attached to each of the armies of the several nations will receive the orders from the Commander in Chief of the army of their nations respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies.

well found transports or store ships, not drawing more than 12 feet water, were attached to this depôt. Vessels of these dimensions can enter the river of Bilbao, which will always be a convenience. Those of a greater draught of water cannot go higher than Portugalete; where, however, unless the weather should be very bad, the cargoes can be removed into the river craft. Merchantmen, and even ships of war of any size, to those of 74 guns, can go into Santander and Pasages.

To Earl Bathurst.

Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Lord Keith, in regard to the naval means on this station, which don't agree exactly with the accounts received from Sir G. Collier, of what he has under his command.

I send your Lordship, by this occasion, a dispatch on the subject of our future communication with England, and the measures to be adopted for our future supplies. The execution of these measures, however, will depend entirely upon our having means of communication with England with celerity and certainty, which we now want.

I wrote to Sir G. Collier the other day to make a particular disposition of our ships, with the battering train, he being on the flank of the army at Pasages, to blockade San Sebastian by sea; and he was obliged to quit his station himself for the purpose, having no vessel to send. This is not the way in which the service can be carried on.

I don't know what measures to take about our vagabond soldiers. By the state of yesterday, we had 12,500 men less under arms than we had on the day before the battle. They are not in the hospitals, nor are they killed, nor have they fallen into the hands of the enemy as prisoners; I have sent officers with parties of the Cavalry Staff corps in all directions after them, but I have not yet heard of any of them. I believe they are concealed in the villages in the mountains.

To Earl Bathurst.

Zubieta, 10th July, 1813.

In order to give the government the most accurate information regarding the recent transactions in Catalonia, and the state of affairs in general on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, I have the honor to enclose the copy of a private letter of the 7th, and of a dispatch and its enclosures of the 9th June,* from Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, the latter giving an account of the attack of Fort San Felipe, in the Coll de Balaguer; likewise the copy of a dispatch from Lord W. Bentinck of the 30th June, and of a dispatch and private letter which I have written to his Lordship in answer thereto.

To Earl Bathurst.

Zubieta, 10th July, 1813.

Since I addressed your Lordship on the 3d inst., I have received reports from Gen. Mina, stating that Gen. Clausel had marched from Zaragoza towards Jaca. I have not yet heard of his arrival at that place.

On their right the enemy have remained nearly in the same situation

* See notes at pp. 565-567.

since they crossed the Bidasoa, and destroyed the bridge of Irun. Preparations are making, and are already in great forwardness, to attack the fort of San Sebastian, of which I am in hopes that we shall obtain possession in a short time after we shall have broken ground.

Notwithstanding that the enemy had withdrawn their right and left quite into France, they still maintained their centre in strength in the valley of Baztan; of which, on account of its riches, and the strong positions it affords, they appeared determined to keep possession, and had assembled there 3 divisions of the army of the South, under the command of Gen. Gazan. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, having been relieved from the blockade of Pamplona, dislodged them successively from all their positions on the 4th, 5th, and 7th inst., with two brigades of British, and one of Portuguese infantry of the 2d division, under the command of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, and with one brigade of Portuguese infantry of the Conde de Amarante's division, under the command of the Conde.

The last post which the enemy occupied in the Puerto de Maya, between that village and Urdax, was remarkably strong; and the fog was so thick in the afternoon, that it was impossible for the troops to advance beyond the point at which they found themselves when it came on. The enemy, however, had been pushed so vigorously up to that point, that they were obliged to abandon their post in the night, and to retire into France. In all these affairs the troops conducted themselves remarkably well; and Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill was much satisfied with the conduct of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart, and of the Conde de Amarante.

The whole of our right being thus established on the frontier, I am proceeding to the left, in order to superintend the operations there.

In proportion as the troops have returned from the movement which they made last week to intercept the retreat of Gen. Clausel, I have employed them in the blockade of Pamplona, a measure which, at the same time that it has enabled me to increase our force in the mountains, gives those troops some repose, which they require after the marches which they have made in the last 2 months. The 3d, 4th, and 6th divisions are now employed in the blockade, and in the construction of the works, to enable me to maintain it with a reduced body of troops.

I have not yet heard of the progress of the Conde de la Bisbal since the fall of Pancorbo; but as soon as he shall arrive I propose to give his troops a few days' rest in the same manner, and by that time I hope that I shall not only have brought to a termination the operations of the siege of San Sebastian, but shall have heard of the result of the armistice in Germany.

Since I addressed your Lordship last, I have received from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck a letter of the 30th ult. It appears from other accounts, that the Duque del Parque had retired from the Jucar on the 25th, without loss, and had taken up again the position of Castalla. Lord W. Bentinck had received accounts of the battle of the 21st June, and proposed to move forward as soon as it should be in his power.

It is unfortunate that when Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray raised the siege of Tarragona and embarked his army, leaving his cannon, he did not proceed immediately to Valencia, according to the orders which I had given

him, instead of disembarking again, and remaining at the Coll de Balaguer.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 4th to the 8th July, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	—	1	7	8
Wounded	5	4	110	119
Missing	—	—	2	2

Portuguese loss included.

To Earl Bathurst.

Zubieta, 10th July, 1813.

I am afraid you will think me very troublesome about our want of ships of war on these coasts. I beg leave, however, just to draw your attention to the enclosed from Lieut. Col. Bourke, mentioning the difficulties under which he labors, and the shifts to which he is put to forward our stores from Coruña to Santander. Observe, also, that these stores are provisions and military stores ordered to Coruña long before I marched from Freneda, which were reported to be embarked in the Tagus, and ready to sail on the 12th May, and have been detained till lately for want of convoy. Then, when ordered from Coruña to Santander, the military officer there, for want of a vessel of war of any kind, is obliged to do the best he can to give an appearance of security to 7 out of 13 vessels; which appearance is, in fact, no security at all.

I am certain that it will not be denied, that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most important to us to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt, the communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with our shoes, we must halt for six weeks! Your Lordship will have seen that the blockade of the coast is merely nominal. The enemy have reinforced *by sea* the only two posts they have on the north coast of Spain.

I hope it will not be deemed unreasonable to request to have the navigation of the coast of Spain and Portugal secured for me, without which your Lordship must not expect success.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Zubieta, 11th July, 1813, 6 A.M.

I have intelligence that you have in your front the whole army of the South between Ainhoué and Urdax, and that they have with them 8 pieces of cannon. I don't think they will attempt any thing; but you should order up Major Tulloh's 9 pounders: you might also order to Lanz the 9 pounder brigade attached to the 2d division.

I think that artillery might, with very little improvement to the road, be taken up to and along the height on which the 7th division is placed. Let the roads up the hill from the high road be examined, and a road be

opened for the artillery along the height to the post occupied by Gen. W. Stewart on the 7th. Let the road likewise be examined and improved from Elizondo to Les Alduides, and from thence to Byng's post.

The Light division have their artillery with them at San Estevan, and the road is excellent from thence to Elizondo.

To Earl Bathurst.

Hernani, 12th July, 1813.

You will see by my recent dispatches that we are in a good position here. I hope we shall soon have San Sebastian; and if we get well settled in the Pyrenees, it will take a good reinforcement to the French army to drive us from thence.

My future operations will depend a good deal upon what passes in the north of Europe; and if operations should recommence there, upon the strength and description of the reinforcement which the enemy will get in our front. However, the government and allies may depend upon it that I will do all that I can.

In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his government please: but I would beg them to recollect that the great advantages which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that every body feels that I am doing what is right, which advantage I should not enjoy, for a time at least, in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it.

You see that we have already settled the question of the Ebro for you; and by a letter from my brother of the 3d, I see that the Spanish government have settled for themselves the question of peace with Buonaparte. I recommend you not to give up an inch of Spanish territory. I think I can hold the Pyrenees as easily as I can Portugal. I am quite certain I can hold the position which I have got more easily than the Ebro, or any other position in Spain. I will go further; I would prefer to have Joseph as King of Spain, without any cession to France, (seeing how ready all the Buonaparte family are to separate from France, and notwithstanding that he is, I think, the least likely of any so to separate,) than to have Ferdinand with the Ebro as the frontier. In the latter case Spain must inevitably belong to the French.

I understand that the province of Galicia is submitting quietly to the decrees of the Cortes about the Inquisition, and that the Archbishop of Santiago has removed into Portugal. I am inclined to advise the government not to interfere in the internal concerns of Spain, at least directly. Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the

G. O.

Zubieta, 11th July, 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces calls the attention of the General officers and Commanding officers of regiments in a very particular manner to the orders which have been given for the regulation of the march of the baggage of the army, which he begs may be attended to. He directs that the bätmen and men attending cattle may be made to carry their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, on the march of their several regiments at all times.

characteristic of all Spaniards ; and any declaration of the British government against the *Liberales* would give them more weight and power than they possess already, or are likely to possess. I think it not unlikely that their violence and democratical principles will induce some of the provinces to declare against them ; and then would be the time for the British government to come forward, particularly if its support or its opinion should be asked for. But if such a crisis should not occur, I rather believe that it is best for the British government to wait with patience for the termination of all this folly, till a regular government shall be established in Spain.

I have just now received a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 7th, from San Felipe, and another of the same date from Gen. Elio, from Valencia. Suchet has retired towards the Ebro, leaving a garrison of 2000 men in Murviedro.

Memorandum.

Hernani, 13th July, 1813.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham is requested to order such troops as he may think proper, of the 1st and 5th divisions, and Gen. Pack's and Gen. Bradford's brigades, to invest and carry on the operations of the siege of San Sebastian, from the blockade of which fort the troops under the command of Gen. Mendizabal are to be entirely relieved.

Gen. Mendizabal is forthwith to detach from the 7th division of the 9th army a sufficient body of troops, with those now there, to form and insure the blockade of Santoña, so as to prevent the enemy from coming out at all from that place, or from receiving any supplies into it by land.

Gen. Mendizabal will have such works constructed as will enable a small body of troops to hold this blockade.

The remainder of the troops composing the 7th division of the 4th army, which are under the immediate command of Gen. Mendizabal, not employed in the blockade of Santoña, are to be posted on the heights of Monte Jaitzquibel, in the rear of Fuenterrabia ; having posts between Monte Jaitzquibel and the sea ; which Monte they are to hold. They will thus secure the left of the covering army of the siege.

The 3d, 4th, and 5th divisions of the 4th army, together with such of the allied British and Portuguese troops above mentioned as will not be employed in the siege, are to cover the siege, in the position already fixed upon, until Vera shall be possessed by the troops on the right.

The troops of the 6th division of the 4th army, under Gen. Longa, are to move so as to arrive to-morrow evening, the 14th, at Aranaz, Yanci, and Lesaca ; from whence they will communicate with the Light division of the allied British and Portuguese army at Sumbilla.

Those at Yanci and Aranaz will move along the left of the Bidasoa on the following morning of the 15th, towards Vera, when they will find that the Light division will have passed along the right of the river, beyond the bridge of Cinco Villas.

Those at Lesaca to consist of 1000 men, to move at the same time upon Vera by Salain.

One brigade of the division of the 4th army, now at Oyarzun, are to move very early on the morning of the 15th by San Antonio towards Salain, so as to co-operate in the attack upon Vera.

The troops of the 7th division of the 4th army will show themselves on Monte Jaitzquibel on the morning of the 15th.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

San Estevan, 14th July, 1813.

I arrived here this afternoon. I have opened your letter to Murray.

It would appear that the enemy have reinforced their left, towards St. Jean Pied de Port; and I should besides conclude that Clausel, who was in the valley of Aisa on the 9th, has by this time passed on to Oleron, and is in communication with St. Jean Pied de Port.

I ordered Gen. Clinton, two days ago, to march to Lanz with the 6th division, where I believe he has arrived this day; and I have ordered Sir L. Cole, with the 4th division, to move from the blockade upon the road towards Roncesvalles. He may march to-morrow; but probably not till next day. Sir T. Picton likewise with the 3d division will march to Olague, on the road to Lanz and to Egui, as soon as he shall be relieved in the blockade by the corps under Gen. O'Donell, which is at Puente la Reyna, 3 leagues from Pamplona, and is ordered to take the blockade. The truth is, that having two objects in hand, viz., the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pamplona, we are not so strong on any point as we ought to be. These movements, when effected, will render us full strong enough for any thing.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Hernani, 14th July, 1813.

An instruction has been sent to the Conde de la Bisbal to move the Spanish corps under his command to the vicinity of Pamplona, and to take upon himself the blockade of that fortress.

Your Lordship will be so good, therefore, as communicate without loss of time with the Conde de la Bisbal upon the subject of the arrangements to be made for the relief of the British troops now before Pamplona under your orders; and as soon as the Spanish corps has taken the duties of the blockade, you will be so good as direct the 4th division to march to Linzoain, where it will be in reserve to support the troops under Major Gen. Byng in the passes of Roncesvalles; and the 3d division to march to Olague. I beg you will apprise me of the day when each of these divisions will move, as soon as the arrangements for their relief have been fixed.

In the event of both divisions not moving on the same day from before Pamplona, it will be desirable that the 4th division should be the first to march.

When your Lordship has made over the duties of the blockade of Pamplona to the Conde de la Bisbal, Lord Wellington directs that you will be so good as resume the command of the 7th division, which is at present in the neighbourhood of Elizondo.

I shall have the honor of writing to you further respecting the distribution of the cavalry at present before Pamplona.

You will be so good as direct Major Goldfinch, of the Royal engineers, to continue in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, under the orders of the Conde de la Bisbal, until otherwise ordered.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Hernani, 14th July, 1813.

Upon the Conde de la Bisbal moving forward to the neighbourhood of Pamplona, you will be so good as direct Major Gen. Long to march the 13th light dragoons into cantonments upon the road towards Roncesvalles, extending these cantonments no farther forward than the village of Zubiri, and reporting to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill the date when the regiment will arrive there.

Your Lordship will be so good also as to order Major Gen. Fane's brigade of cavalry, and the 4th Portuguese regt. of cavalry, to canton in the direction of Monreal and Sangüesa at the same period.

I shall not complete the movement upon Vera to-morrow, unless I should be able to see well; however necessary it may be to protect the siege of San Sebastian, that we should have command there. Considering how ticklish our affairs are to the right, I think you had better not yourself quit Elizondo, but endeavor to have an early communication with Campbell and Byng; and let me hear from you by Echalar. I shall be with the Light division in the morning; but think that my quarters will be at Sumbilla, or perhaps here.

I write to Gen. Clinton, at Lanz, to desire him to endeavor to find a road to Egui from Lanz, or to Roncesvalles. I know that he can go to the former from Olague.

If you should find that Byng is attacked, order Gen. Clinton to move upon Roncesvalles by Egui and Espinal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Clinton, K.B.

San Estevan, 14th July, 1813, 7 P.M.

I believe that you will be at Lanz either this day or to-morrow; and I shall be very much obliged to you if, on your arrival there, you will have the road reconnoitred from thence to Egui, on the road from Pamplona towards Les Alduides; and the road from Egui to Espinal, on the road from Pamplona to Roncesvalles.

I request you likewise to have the road reconnoitred from Lanz to San Estevan.

I see, in a gazette of the 3d, that you are appointed a Knight of the Bath, on which I congratulate you.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

San Estevan, ce 14 Juillet, 1813, 7 P.M.

Le Chef d'Etat Major vous aura écrit ce matin pour vous prier de vous charger du blocus de Pampelune, et le Lieut. Gén. Lord Dalhousie vous aura donné tous les ordres et renseignemens qu'il a là dessus. Je crois que les ouvrages sont, à peu près, si non tout à fait, finis; et j'attends que les 24 canons que j'ai mandés de Vitoria pour les armer, et qui sont partis le 11, soyent arrivés.

Je vous prie d'en faire armer les redoutes et batteries selon les renseignemens que vous donnera l'ingénieur qui les a construites, de les faire servir par l'artillerie attachée à votre corps; et de me faire dire s'il vous faut quelque chose. Ils sont traînés par des bœufs du pays, et je vous prie de donner l'ordre qu'on laisse repartir ces bœufs pour Vitoria, où ils vont encore traîner des canons à la mer, pour le compte du gouvernement Espagnol.

Vous aurez appris que les Français ont quitté Saragosse, où le Gén. Mina est depuis le 10. Clausel, après avoir déposé un convoi, je crois, en Jaca, est passé par Verdun, d'où il a marché par la vallée d'Aisa. J'ai entendu son arrivée là le 9. Mais il doit avoir passé en France, et être déjà en communication avec la gauche de l'ennemi à St. Jean Pied de Port.

Nous ferons le siège de San Sebastien avec notre gauche, et nous couvrons cette opération et le blocus de Pampelune dans ces gorges. Il me paraît que rien ne peut vous interrompre sur vos derrières. Mais j'ai

des officiers à Sangüesa, qui observent ce qui se passe en Aragon et dans les vallées qui y aboutissent ; et je leur ordonne, par la lettre incluse, de communiquer avec vous. Toute notre cavalerie aussi est entre Pampelune et l'Ebre, et je vous prie de communiquer avec le Lieut. Gén. Sir S. Cotton, qui la commande, et qui est à Tafalla ; et avec le Gén. Mina par Tudela à Saragosse. J'ai assez de forces en réserve dans ces montagnes ; et je pourrai toujours venir à votre secours en cas de mouvement par les vallées qui aboutissent en Aragon. Je vous mets au blocus de Pampelune seulement pour donner quelque repos à mes troupes ; et je compte vous relever bientôt. Je vous prie de me faire savoir combien d'armes à feu il vous faut pour votre cavalerie, pour que je les ôte à mon régiment et aux Gardes du corps.

To Don Roman Losada.

Lesaca, 14th July, 1813.

I take this opportunity of requesting you to accept my best thanks for the very handsome sword belonging to the pretended King, which you did me the favor to present to me, and which I have received with satisfaction, as a testimony of regard from an officer for whom I have every reason to entertain the greatest respect.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

Gen. Pakenham has given me your letter of the 10th, with its enclosures, which has given me a good deal of uneasiness, as I have always been anxious that all parts of a great action, like that of the 21st June, should correspond with the general result.

Your letter to Gen. Brisbane of the 8th is so positive, that it leaves nothing to desire in the way of official information ; and if you should think that you cannot be mistaken in what you therein state, it is my opinion that there is no alternative, and that the Commanding officer of the regiment must be put in arrest and brought to trial.

The disposition for the action was for the 3d, 4th, and Light divisions to attack the hill in front of Ariñez, which hill the enemy abandoned. The riflemen of the Light division were the first to ascend the hill ; and I went up immediately after them, in order to see the disposition made by the enemy on their retreat beyond it. The — came up next, in extreme disorder ; and I halted them and made them form under the brow of the hill, the 95th being stopped by the fire of one or two battalions of the enemy, formed on its declivity between the top and Ariñez. As soon as formed, the — advanced in good order, and attacked and drove this body into, and, as I thought, through Ariñez. But I cannot recollect to have seen more of them till some time afterwards, when they were formed behind the church and walls of the village, on our side of it.

The — came up the hill next to the —, and I made them form before they went down ; and I think that the — were formed at the village when the — went to them.

My attention was taken up by other objects, particularly by the desire that the troops should form before they moved forward ; and I cannot say

that I saw the conduct of the — after they had passed the brow of the hill for some time, and then I saw them formed behind the village. I think the question would rest entirely upon the numbers that went through the village. If the light infantry went through the village, and were driven back, it would be nothing; if the whole regiment, it becomes a serious matter.

Under these circumstances, and adverting to the desire in which we must all participate, that there should be no discussion on the conduct of any part of the army which gained such a victory, I would request you to consider whether your censure would not apply exclusively to the light infantry or other skirmishers in front of the — regt. If it would not, we must bring the Major to a Court Martial.

To Don A. A. de la Vega, Infanzon.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

I have received your letters of the 2d, and I am very much flattered by, and obliged to you for, your congratulations on our recent success here, which I hope will be attended by the most important consequences to your country and the world. I will not detain you longer than to assure you of my esteem and regard.

An Lieut. Gén. Comte Reille.

Au Quartier Général, ce 16 Juillet, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 10 Juillet. Je crois que votre aide de camp, M. le Chef d'Escadron Bruce, est déjà parti pour s'embarquer pour l'Angleterre; mais j'écris pour le faire revenir, si on peut le trouver sur la route; et je serai bien aise de lui être utile jusqu'à ce qu'on puisse faire son échange. Si, par hasard, il était déjà embarqué, je n'aurai aucune difficulté à le faire renvoyer en France, quand il conviendra à votre Excellence de renvoyer un officier en échange pour lui.

To — —.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 12th from Roncesvalles, and Sir R. Hill has transmitted to me that which you wrote him on the 14th from Ochagavia.

In the former you tell me that you had received intelligence from Ochagavia of that date that Clausel had arrived at Oleron, which intelligence was confirmed by other accounts, stating that the troops under Taupin had been at Anso, Verdun, and S^{ta} Engracia. In the latter, however, that of the 14th, you say that Clausel had united his forces on the 11th and 12th at Jaca. Which of these stories am I to believe?

It is not unaccountable that you should receive intelligence at the same time, or at nearly the same time, to different purports; but it is very desirable that, when you do receive such intelligence, you should endeavor to ascertain which is true, and observe yourself, in your report, the difference of that intelligence from that which you had transmitted before, and your reason and the facts for believing one rather than the other.

I have already mentioned this before, and repeat it now.

To H. R. H. the Prince Regent.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

I trust your Royal Highness will receive graciously my humble acknowledgments for the honor which your Royal Highness has conferred upon me by your approbation, for the terms in which it is conveyed, and for the last distinguished mark* of your Royal Highness' favor. Even if I had not been supported and encouraged as I have been by your Royal Highness' protection and favor, the interest which I feel for the cause which your Royal Highness so powerfully supports would have induced me to make every exertion for its success. I can evince my gratitude for your Royal Highness' repeated favors only by devoting my life to your service.

To H. R. H. the Duke of York.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness' letter of the 3d inst., and I am much flattered by your Royal Highness' notice of our success here, and much obliged by your concurrence in the mark of distinction which H. R. H. the Prince Regent has been pleased to confer upon me. I have received too many marks of your Royal Highness' favor not to be certain that the objections which you say you had entertained to my obtaining this mark of distinction were founded upon your sense of justice to my brother officers, my seniors, and upon what was fitting for the public service.

I hope that I shall be found incapable of founding any pretension upon this extraordinary mark of the Royal favor, and that I shall never give your Royal Highness reason to regret that you had concurred in its being conferred upon me.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 16th July, 1813, 8½ P.M.

I have received your letter of this morning just now. We have heard no firing during the day, and we are in hopes that the convent has surrendered. We made the siege of Badajoz with the 3d, 4th, and Light divisions of the army, not amounting to 11,000 men, and the detachments of the working parties and the guards for the trenches were very large. In this siege no guards are required, at least on one side, and the work is comparatively trifling; but I never saw a siege in which ——— and ——— would not employ the whole army if they could. There can

In 1812.

* H. R. H. the Prince Regent to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Carlton House, 3d July, 1813.

Your glorious conduct is beyond all human praise, and far above my reward: I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but most devoutly to offer up my prayer of gratitude to Providence, that it has, in its omnipotent bounty, blessed my country and myself with such a General. You have sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French Marshal, and I send you in return that of England.

The British army will hail it with rapturous enthusiasm, while the whole universe will acknowledge those valorous exploits which have so imperiously called for it.

That uninterrupted health and still increasing laurels may continue to crown you through a glorious and long career of life, are the never ceasing and most ardent wishes of, my dear Lord, your very sincere and faithful friend,

G. P. R.

be no reason, however, why the 1st division should not be employed, at least in the right attack; and all the troops employed in the siege, excepting the guards which may be absolutely necessary for the trenches, and the artillery to work the guns, must be considered disposable to cover the siege and to maintain the position which covers the harbour of Pasages, in case the enemy should attempt to interrupt the operation.

I did not understand from Major Smith that he wished to have more guns on the hill than 2; and he appeared to think the distance too great for even those 2. If he had thought more necessary, he might have had them; for, according to his arrangement, there were left 4 24 pounders in the store ships, which 4 I have since settled should be in battery, with 4 more borrowed from the *Surveillante*.

The officers of the engineers and artillery are the best judges of these matters, however, and may alter their opinions as well as others; and if they wish to have 4 instead of 2 guns upon the hill, they must only reduce the fire below, or borrow 2 more guns from Sir G. Collier, in addition to the 6 they have already.

I hope that you will have the convent at least to-day, before the fire opens from the sand hills, otherwise the breach will be made before you are prepared to storm, and to support the storm by your establishment on the isthmus. There is nothing extraordinary here. Lieut. Reid has discovered a gun road, as he reports, from hence to Oyarzun.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 17th July, 1813, noon.

Reflecting upon your want of troops for the siege of San Sebastian, and at the same time upon the necessity of having a sufficient corps, particularly of red coats, to co-operate in covering it, I conceive that it is desirable that the following disposition should be made. 1st; That such a number of British and Portuguese troops as are necessary to carry on the works on the side of the convent, and to maintain the ground and keep the blockade on that side, should be encamped on that side; and that all the rest of the troops should be encamped nearly where the 1st division are now.

Every morning at daylight a detachment should march from the latter, of sufficient strength to perform the duties of the trenches on the attack from the side of the sand hills, reckoning upon 4 reliefs in 24 hours for the working parties, and 2 reliefs in 24 hours for the covering parties,

G. O.

Lesaca, 17th July, 1813.

1. The time of the Commander of the Forces is occupied very much by complaints from different parts of the country of the use of the green corn by the cavalry, without giving regular receipts. These complaints are made particularly of Major Gen. V. Alten's brigade.

2. The Commander of the Forces again requests the General officers, and officers commanding regiments, to attend to this point.

3. It is most desirable, as well for the inhabitants as for the army itself, that the green and unthrashed corn should not be used as forage: and considering that there is still so much grass in the country, it appears to the Commander of the Forces that the use of green and unthrashed corn might be entirely avoided; at all events, if it is necessary to use forage of this description, it must be regularly taken, and regular receipts given for what is taken.

that is, if any covering parties are thought necessary on that side. The parties coming off duty, with the exception of those immediately employed in the trenches, might march on their return likewise at daylight. These troops might be cantoned, during their tour of duty, in the houses on the high road from Pasages to San Sebastian, from whence they might relieve the parties in the trenches every 6 or 12 hours.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 17th July, 1813, 5½ P.M.

I have just received your note of noon this day, and congratulate you upon taking the redoubt and convent.

In writing to you last night I stated that you ought to have possession of the convent 24 hours before the fire should begin from the batteries on the sand hills. Considering the work to be performed on the convent heights, however, and to connect the burnt village with the convent, and on the esplanade on the left of the burnt village, I should think you ought to have that ground longer than I had before mentioned. As it is probable that the fire of the batteries on the sand hills will make a breach in a very short time, it would be better probably that they should not be opened, unless they can be turned to destroy the defences of the horn work, till all the works at the convent, and on the esplanade, and at the burnt village, shall be finished.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 17th July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 4th July, and I beg you will tell the government that I am quite certain that no expedient will answer to get from the merchants the real truth, excepting the adoption of the measure proposed by me about 15 months ago. Every thing else is a cover for fraud, and fraud will be the consequence.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

As I expect every day the arrival of the ships at Bilbao with the troops and horses, it is desirable that you should, without loss of time, send a steady officer to superintend their disembarkation and preparations for their march to join their regiments; and an officer or two, and a farrier from each regiment, to march the detachments up. I will order those from the 1st hussars and 13th and 14th light dragoons, which are in this neighbourhood.

P.S. I shall write a letter to the magistrate at Bilbao, which I will send you by to-morrow's post, to be given to this officer.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813, 7 A.M.

Since I wrote to you yesterday evening I have seen Gen. Murray, who has explained to me that the great difficulty which you experience is the want of means of transport from the country, and that the men are obliged to carry up the ammunition from the shipping.

I recommend to you to use the ammunition mules attached to both the divisions, and to Pack's and Bradford's brigades, in the carriage of the

ammunition to the place nearest to the trenches to which they can go in safety. These would go far to provide for the service of the batteries on the sand hills and heights, the landing place being so near.

The carriages attached to the 18 pounders, and the other carriages of the field artillery which is about Hernani, would, I should think, keep the 18 pounders supplied on the other side. At all events, these carriages and the few carts of the country which there are would do it.

To Lieut. Gen. Campbell, Gibraltar.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

I have received intimation from the Sec. of State that you have received orders from his Lordship to send to the army the 37th regt., when the 2d batt. 84th regt. shall arrive at Gibraltar; and I request you to direct that they may proceed to Santander for orders.

I request that the regiment may be supplied with a blanket, canteen, and havresack, for each man; with bill hooks, one for every 10 men; with tin camp kettles in bags, one for every 6 men; and with the following proportion of intrenching tools:

5 spades, 5 shovels, 5 felling axes, 5 pickaxes.

I likewise request that the regiment may be provided with the following tents:

3 for non-commissioned officers and privates of each company, 1 for officers of each company, 1 for each Field officer, 1 for Paymaster, 1 for Surgeon and assistants, 1 for adjutant and quarter master.

To the Officer of the Q. M. G.'s department at Santander. Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

In case any ships should arrive at Santander, having troops on board, I beg that you will direct all those having infantry on board to proceed to Pasages, and all those having cavalry on board to proceed to Bilbao.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

I enclose a dispatch which I have received from the Sec. of State, in which he desires that I will acquaint you where I wish the troops now expected from England and Ireland should disembark, in order that you may station a cruiser off Cape Machichaco to give them their instructions. Accordingly, I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that all the ships having infantry on board may proceed to Pasages, and all having cavalry and horses on board may proceed to Bilbao.

To the Commissioners of Transport.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

The General in Chief of the French army of the South having permitted Hospital mate M'Culloch, who was left in charge of some sick at Salamanca in November last, to return to the British army, I will thank you to send to France, in exchange for him, M. Vienné, *Commissaire des guerres*, who was taken last year at Badajoz, and is supposed to be now a prisoner in England.

I shall also be much obliged to you if, on the arrival in England of M.

Houze, who was taken on the 18th June, you will permit him to return to France without exchange; Gen. Maucune, to whom he was secretary, having allowed Lieut. Royal, of the 61st regt., who fell into his hands at Salamanca, to come back to the British army in the month of January last without any stipulation whatever.

Au Gén. Dumouriez.

Lesaca, ce 18 Juillet, 1813.

Il y a bien long temps que je ne vous ai écrit, mais je n'avais rien à vous dire qui pouvait vous intéresser, et à présent même, tout ce qui peut vous intéresser est dans les journaux.

Nous faisons le siège de San Sebastian avec notre gauche, et nous tenons Pampelune étroitement bloqué; et, en attendant, je refais mon armée, qui avait beaucoup souffert par ses marches rapides et par un temps terrible depuis le 15 du mois passé. Je veux voir aussi ce que les Puissances d'Allemagne vont faire, et de quel côté le Maréchal Suchet se jettera, avant de me trop aventurer en France.

Jusqu'à présent je n'ai eu de communication avec aucun parti mécontent en France, quoique je croye qu'on nous attend, et qu'on a diablement peur de notre approche. L'autre nuit on sonnait les cloches à Bordeaux, à cause du feu, et toute la ville était en alarme, croyant que nous y étions entrés. On craint la vengeance des Espagnols et des Portugais; mais je vous envoie la copie d'un ordre * que j'ai donné, et que je fais circuler dans le pays, qui me paraît valoir mieux que mille promesses en proclamation, parceque voilà ce qui est ordonné. D'ailleurs, les proclamations ont été tellement abusées dans les guerres de France et d'Espagne, que jamais je n'ai pu me résoudre à en faire seulement une.

S'il arrive quelque chose d'intéressant qui ne soit pas publié, je vous l'écrirai, et, en même temps, avec mes réflexions comme ci-devant; et je vous serai bien obligé des opinions que vous voudriez bien me donner.

Le malheur du Gén. Murray m'aurait été bien funeste si nous avions moins de succès de ce côté-ci; mais j'espère que les affaires iront mieux à présent de ce côté-là.

Je ne sais pas si Suchet a encore passé l'Ebre.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 5th, and I am sorry that I can't recommend ——— for promotion, because I have had him in arrest since the battle for disobeying an order given to him by me verbally. The fact is, that, if discipline means habits of obedience to orders, as well as military instruction, we have but little of it in the army. Nobody ever thinks of obeying an order; and all the regulations of the Horse Guards, as well as of the War office, and all the orders of the army applicable to this peculiar service, are so much waste paper.

It is, however, an unrivalled army for fighting, if the soldiers can only be kept in their ranks during the battle; but it wants some of those qualities which are indispensable to enable a General to bring them into

* See G. O., 9th July, 1813, p. 590.

the field in the order in which an army ought to be to meet an enemy, or to take all the advantage to be derived from a victory; and the cause of these defects is the want of habits of obedience and attention to orders by the inferior officers, and indeed, I might add, by all. They never attend to an order with an intention to obey it, or sufficiently to understand it, be it ever so clear, and therefore never obey it when obedience becomes troublesome, or difficult, or important.

When we were in pursuit of the French in the valley of Araquil, — — — was ordered to the front with his — — —. Returning from the front I met him, and, having thought it would be better to send Sir T. Graham with the left of the army by the high road to Irun, in addition to the Spanish troops, I determined that — — —'s — — —, which had been with Sir Thomas before, should accompany him again if he was detached. But it was necessary to make some inquiries about roads before I should determine to detach him. I desired — — — to halt and canton in the village at which I met him, and not to move from it till he should receive further orders from myself, knowing that he would be sent to from the advanced posts. Notwithstanding these orders, he left the village in the morning, before the orders reached him to join Sir Thomas; and he got forward into the defile, and it was not possible to bring him back till the whole column had passed. I consequently put him in arrest, and had determined to make an example of him; but though I have since released him, I can't recommend him for promotion.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 18th July, 1813.

I have written to Sir G. Collier, in consequence of the receipt of your Lordship's instructions of the 5th inst., to desire that the ships conveying the infantry detachments to the army may be brought to Pasages; those with the cavalry to Bilbao.

I trust that your Lordship will have given directions that every man may be supplied with a canteen, havresack, and blanket; that they may have bill hooks in the proportion of one for every 10 men; tin camp kettles in bags in the proportion of one to every 6 men, and that the regiments of infantry may have tents, and the following proportion of intrenching tools, viz.: 5 spades, 5 shovels, 5 felling axes, 5 pickaxes.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, K.B.

18th July, 1813.

I have submitted to the Commander of the Forces Major Gen. Fane's letter desiring to know the extent of his responsibility. In reply I am to request you will explain to Major Gen. Fane that the right column of the army, on its march to the position which it now occupies, consisted of the troops which, till then, had served under the command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, the cavalry which had composed the 2d division forming a part of that force. The officers of the Staff attached to the 2d division of cavalry were allowed to remain with the senior General officer of that service which should march with that column, in order to assist him in the performance of his orders. The situation of the army at present is different, the cavalry being so much separated from the infantry. Under any circumstances, however, his Excellency should not have thought it necessary to define Major Gen. Fane's command, as the senior officer of more than one brigade of cavalry, acting in combination, should naturally assume the command of the

whole, without any order or reference. If, under the existing state of the case, Major Gen. Fane does not want the assistance of the Staff above alluded to, they are to be sent to the head quarters of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

18th July, 1813.

In reply to your inquiry relative to the propriety of employing the light battalions of the K. G. L. on working parties, I have no hesitation in saying they have no kind of privilege by which they should be exempt from the most irksome duties of a siege. At Badajoz the 95th regt. took its regular turn of working fatigue, and I hardly think the light battalions of the K. G. L. have an equal claim to exemption with the 95th regt., but one third of these corps being armed with rifles. The others are light infantry, who cannot receive more justice than being estimated and dealt with as the Light division always has been. To prove that our light troops took fatigue as well as covering duty, I have but to call to the recollection of those anxious to be informed that the duty of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was performed divisionally, and that every kind of work was delivered over to the relieving corps.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

18th July, 1813.

I have had the honor to receive and submit to the Commander of the Forces your letter of the 14th inst., covering a general report of Purveyor —, on non-observance of the established rules of admission into hospital, in the instance of soldiers disabled from wounds at the battle of Vitoria, and who now chiefly compose the patients remaining in that dépôt. You will be pleased to call on Mr. — to be more specific in his report, to enable those officers to be brought to an account who, it would appear, have been guilty of such omission in a duty they were left in rear with large detachments purposely to execute, namely, to collect and regularly to enter the wounded of their respective regiments in the newly formed hospital.

The course of active service is a succession of difficulties, to the overcoming of which the G. O. of this army are proposed as a guide. His Excellency cannot, therefore, admit that the omission or deviation on the part of Regimental officers should in any degree justify a similar disobedience or departure from established rule in the Purveyor's department. Although the arms and accoutrements delivered in at the hospital may have been few, that does not justify the irregularity of repeated exchange reported by Mr. —, and much less does it warrant the transfer of responsibility from the Purveyor's to the Ordnance department adopted by Mr. — to disembarass himself of a difficulty now hardly to be remedied. As the most distinct manner of explaining to the department that such unauthorised proceedings will not be suffered to pass uncorrected, you will be pleased to cause Mr. — to be placed in arrest, and call on that officer for any specific statement on his part which may lead to an arrangement of the irregularities subject of correspondence, or which can further justify his conduct in the eyes of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

I have received your letters up to that of 2 P.M. of yesterday. I think it very desirable that you should keep as many troops as possible assembled in your camp in front of Oyarzun. If the march from thence to the *chaussée* is difficult for a large body of men, it might be made at different periods of the day by the troops, as they should be required for the reliefs in the trenches. The enemy have a notion that we have only one British division at Oyarzun, &c.

On reading the report of the campaigns of the western Pyrenees at the commencement of the revolutionary war, I see that there is a good road from Fuenterrabia to Pasages, at the back of Monte Jaitzquibel. This road should be looked at, and how far it is covered by the position of

Mendizabal's troops. But if Giron's position between the Bidasoa and Irun is a good one, as I believe it is, now that its right is covered by the *débouchés*, that road will be safe, and the object will be to support Giron in his position. The troops in the old position at Oyarzun will be near enough for that.

I hear that Clausel has marched from Jaca to Oleron, and is approaching St. Jean Pied de Port. Gen. Paris has evacuated Aragon; and it appears likewise had arrived at, and was about to quit Jaca.

I have not yet heard of Suchet's arrival on the Ebro. He had evacuated Valencia on the 5th. Gen. Elio entered that city on the 7th, and Lord William was to be there on the 10th.

P.S. You must be better judges on the spot than I can be; but I think the town wall will breach easily and in a very short time, and that you should not begin to batter in breach till you shall be established on the esplanade.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, ce 19 Juillet, 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 17, avec votre demande officielle de passer aux bains. Vous me permettrez, j'espère, de vous dire mon sentiment sur cette démarche. Vous avez raison en voulant vous soustraire à une punition, car c'en est une de vous mettre à servir dans l'armée de Catalogne en grade subalterne, ayant commandé la partie disponible de la 4^{me} armée; punition qui est donnée non seulement sans cause quelconque, mais au moment où vous avez mérité la considération du gouvernement; et je vous donnerai autant qu'il dépend de moi la permission d'aller aux bains que vous demandez.

Mais il me paraît que vous ferez mal de quitter votre poste jusqu'à ce que vous soyez relevé par l'officier nommé par le gouvernement, ou du tout, si le gouvernement change cette nomination, même si on ne vous avance pas selon ma proposition. Il y a bien de la différence entre le ressentiment pour une punition non méritée, et le ressentiment pour n'avoir pas reçu les récompenses dues à ses services. Tout le monde conviendrait de la justice de l'un, personne de l'autre; et il ne faut pas vous mettre dans ce cas là.

Je voudrais avoir le croquis et la description de la position que vous occupez à présent. Comme nous couvrons à présent entièrement votre flanc droit, je crois que vous protégeriez plus efficacement le siège en occupant cette position que celle de Oyarzun. Cela dépendra beaucoup de l'étendue du terrain à occuper. Mais il faudrait resserrer votre monde un peu vers Irun pour pouvoir donner la main à ceux sur la Bidasoa en cas d'attaque. J'ai écrit hier au Gén. Graham, de re-occuper avec les troupes les positions qu'il avait quittées, et de là donner le monde nécessaire pour le siège.

To Gen. Espoz y Mina.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 12th, and I sincerely congratulate you upon your success.

We are carrying on the siege of San Sebastian here, which operation I am covering with the army; and the Conde de la Bisbal is blockading Pamplona with the troops under his command. I have constructed works there so as to hold the blockade with a small body of troops.

It has been reported to me that Gen. Clausel and Gen. Paris have both retired from Jaca into France, leaving 1500 men in that place; but I cannot be certain of the truth of that report, neither do I know precisely where Suchet is, or what he is doing.

I have plenty of guns, howitzers, and ammunition, without the means of moving them to Zaragoza, but I am endeavoring to procure them. In the mean time, Gen. Duran will do well to continue the blockade of the redoubt there; and I would suggest to you to do the same with Jaca, unless Suchet should move into Aragon. In that case, I recommend to you to collect all your battalions and cavalry about Tudela, to which place you will fall back yourself gradually; and order Gen. Duran to proceed with his troops to Pamplona, where he will be employed in maintaining the blockade. I shall join you, in that case, with some of the allied British and Portuguese divisions, and the cavalry, and the Conde de la Bisbal's corps; and we will give battle to Suchet.

To Gen. Espoz y Mina.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

It has been reported to me that the Commandant of Jaca is not indisposed to give up that place. You will do well to summon him; and, at all events, open a communication with him to endeavor to get him out.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

Having examined our situation on the great road from Vitoria to Irun, and our prospects for the siege of San Sebastian, it appeared to me to be desirable to obtain possession of the *débouchés* of the mountains towards Vera; and I accordingly returned to San Estevan on the 14th, and on the 15th moved forward the 7th and Light divisions, which are now posted on the heights overlooking Sarre and Vera, and the latter occupy Vera. The enemy made but a trifling resistance, and withdrew their posts to the top of the Puerto de Vera.

We established a battery of four 18 pounders against a convent, which the enemy had fortified and occupied in force, about 600 yards from the works of San Sebastian, the possession of which was necessary, previous to the commencement of any further operations against the place. This battery opened on the morning of the 14th, and the convent was so far destroyed that Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham ordered that the building, and a redoubt which protected its left flank, might be stormed on the 17th. I have not yet received his report of the details of this operation, which, however, was successful; and our troops were established at the convent, and at the village immediately below it, which the enemy had burnt. Our works have been since continued with great activity; and I understand from Sir T. Graham that the batteries will open to destroy and enfilade the defences of the point of attack to-morrow. The same batteries will answer to effect a breach in the town wall.

I have every reason to believe that Gen. Clausel has marched from Jaca into France. I have received a report from Gen. Mina of the 12th, in which he informs me that Gen. Duran had joined him in the neighbourhood of Zaragoza, and that he had attacked, on the 8th, Gen. Paris, who had for some time commanded a division in Aragon. Gen. Paris had retired on the night of the 9th, leaving a garrison in a redoubt in the neighbourhood of Zaragoza, which Gen. Mina had left Gen. Duran to attack while he followed the enemy with his own division and the cavalry under Brigadier Don Julian Sanchez. He had taken a considerable number of prisoners and a good deal of baggage from Gen. Paris; and a convoy on the 11th. It is impossible to applaud too highly the activity, intelligence, and gallantry with which these operations have been carried on. I have since heard that Gen. Paris had arrived at Jaca on the 14th, and that he had brought with him the garrisons of Ayerbe, Huesca, &c., and was about to retire into France.

Marshal Suchet evacuated Valencia on the 5th inst., and Gen. Elio entered that city at the head of the 2d army on the 7th. I have a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 7th, from San Felipe, in which he informs me that he expected to arrive at Valencia on the 10th.

I have not heard of Marshal Suchet's retreat beyond Castellon. But the garrison of Segorbe has been withdrawn; and I understand that on the instant Gen. Severoli blew up the fort of Alcañiz and marched upon Mequinenza by Caspe.

The Conde de la Bisbal's corps relieved the British and Portuguese troops in the blockade of Pamplona on the 17th inst. The enemy made two sorties on the 11th and 15th inst., in both of which they were repulsed, and suffered considerably. I enclose a list of killed and wounded on those occasions.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received a dispatch from Sir T. Graham, of which the enclosed * is a copy, containing his report on the attack of the convent near San Sebastian.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.
Hernani, 18th July, 1813.

The convent of San Bartolomeo, and the adjoining work on the extremity of the steep hill towards the river, were taken yesterday by assault.

The natural and artificial strength of these fortified posts, occupied by a large body of troops, and the impossibility of access to either but by the fronts, made it very desirable to have destroyed the defences as much as possible, and a new battery on the left was begun the preceding evening, but not being ready in the morning, the attack was determined on.

A column, consisting of the piquets of the 4th caçadores, commanded by Lieut. Antonio de Queiros, of 150 men of the 13th Portuguese regt., under Capt. Almeyda, supported by 3 companies of the 9th regt., under the command of Lieut. Col. Craufurd, with a reserve of 3 companies of the Royal Scots, under Capt. Arguimbau, was formed on the right to attack the redoubt, under the direction of Major Gen. Hay. Major Gen. Bradford commanded the left column, composed of 200 men of the 13th Portuguese regt., under the command of Major Snodgrass, of that regiment; an equal number under Lieut. Col. Macneagh, of the 5th caçadores, and supported by the 9th regt., under Lieut. Col. Cameron. The whole of the troops employed in this service being under the command of Major Gen. Oswald.

About 10 A.M. the left column began the attack on the convent, while the right passed the ravine near the river. Both attacks were made with such vigor and determination, that all obstacles were overcome, without the loss that might have been expected.

The enemy were driven in confusion down the hill, carrying a strong reinforcement,

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

I enclose another letter from Sir J. Murray. From the report in my dispatch of this day, you will see how unfortunate his failure has been; and particularly, what I must call, his unnecessary and ill-judged loss of his cannon.

If Lord W. Bentinck should return to Sicily, and the army should remain in Spain, it is my duty to inform your Lordship that it is desirable that Sir J. Murray should not return to command it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th July, 1813.

The examination of King Joseph's papers has shown the use which the enemy make of the intelligence they get from the English and Peninsular newspapers, and from my dispatches, notwithstanding the care taken to publish nothing that can be of importance. I don't think they are yet certain whether we mean to attack San Sebastian or Pamplona; and I have therefore marked as not to be published every thing relating to both places; as you may be sure they will get the dispatch in the opposite camp as soon as possible after it is published in London.

I enclose the daily state of the 16th July, which is the last I have received. Our diminution since the battle is now 9626; it was at one time 12,477, but many men have since joined their regiments. The diminution now stands as follows:

	British.	Portuguese.	Total.
Increase of sick, present	167	234	401
Do. of sick, absent	3528	1963	5491
Do. of on command	573	706	1279
Do. of prisoners of war and missing . .	57	242	299
			7470
Decrease of Total	1299	857	2156
			9626

There are many stragglers still out, who are returned sick, absent, and the number of men on command will probably diminish to its old standard. The decrease of the total are either dead, deserted, or transferred.

just sent from San Sebastian, along with them in their flight through the burnt village of San Martin.

The impetuosity of the troops in pursuit could not be restrained by the exertions of the superior officers, who had received Major Gen. Oswald's directions not to pass San Martin, and some unavoidable loss was sustained by those who followed the enemy to the foot of the glacis, on their return to San Martin.

I need hardly assure your Lordship, that on this, as on other occasions, Major Gen. Oswald conducted the service in the best manner; and I am equally obliged to Major Gens. Hay and Bradford, for their conduct of the attacks entrusted to them. But I beg, in justice to the officers, whose gallantry was most conspicuous in leading on their men to overcome the variety of obstacles that were opposed to them, to mention Major Snodgrass, Capt. Almeyda, and Lieut. de Queiros (severely wounded), of the Portuguese service, and Lieut. Colin Campbell of the 9th foot.*

I cannot conclude this report without expressing my perfect satisfaction with all the officers and men of the Royal artillery, both in the four gun battery, employed for three days against the convent, and on the opposite bank of the river, whence several field pieces were served with great effect.

P.S. I omitted to mention that Major Gen. Hay expresses his great obligations to Capt. Taylor, of the 48th regt., his Brigade Major.

* Now Col. Campbell, C.B., 98th regt. (see p. 651).

I must again draw your Lordship's attention to the naval concerns off the coast. Nothing has yet arrived but two or three small vessels to carry dispatches, and we have nothing for the blockade excepting the *Surveillante*, from which we have got 6 guns, and a few Spanish boats fitted out by Gen. Giron.

Any thing in the shape of a naval force would drive off Sir G. Collier.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813, 2 P.M.

I have just received your letter of 5 A.M. by Capt. Calvert. The officers of engineers and artillery don't appear to be very *light* in their demands of working parties; but they must have them of course. It appears, then, that it will be necessary to keep the 5th division encamped entire near the left attack, and Bradford's brigade near the right, to which I have no objection. In case of any movement by the enemy upon Irun, it will be necessary that all the men not required to guard the trenches should march for the camp at Oyarzun.

In regard to the storm, unless more men should be necessary than the 5th division can afford, I don't see any reason why the 1st division should be employed in it, if they have not been materially employed in the works of the siege. If they have, some of them should be in the storm.

I did not summon Badajoz or Burgos, and the reason for not doing so has been confirmed in the King's papers, viz., that French officers are ordered not to surrender a place before it has been stormed; but as I hope the men will, on this occasion, employ themselves, when they get in, in destroying the enemy, rather than, as usual, in plunder, I think the place should be summoned. As it is desirable that the summons should be given at a period when it will not convey notice to the enemy of our intentions, you had better send it in to-morrow morning.

I believe the storm ought to take place by daylight, particularly if the defences are effectually destroyed; and as the enemy have their retreat open to the castle, and the means of sortie from thence when they please, the officers and men ought to be particularly warned of the danger of wandering about the town in search of plunder.

P.S. I have a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 13th, from Valencia. He was about to move towards the Ebro. He has still an ample train left for any thing he can require.

Memorandum of Instructions for Lord Aylmer.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

Lord Aylmer is to proceed to Pasages, in order to take the command of the 76th, 85th, and 37th regts., which are expected there, and are to form a brigade under his command, which will eventually be attached to the 1st division of infantry.

As the 37th regt. is to come from Gibraltar, it will not arrive for some time.

Orders have been given to the Commissary Gen. to provide an establishment for a commissariat for this brigade, upon the same footing as the others of the army, upon which subject Lord Aylmer will be so kind as to communicate with the Commissary Gen. He has likewise been

desired to provide a mule for each company of each regiment to carry their tents, for which the Captains are to pay ; as well as one for the Surgeon's chest, and one for the Paymaster's books, to be paid for by those officers respectively, and one for the intrenching tools on the usual establishment of the other regiments of the army.

The Commissary Gen. has likewise been desired to be prepared to supply these regiments with their camp kettles in bags, in case they should not be provided with them.

In regard to other parts of the equipment of the soldiers for the field, viz., blankets, havresacks, canteens, bill-hooks, intrenching tools, and tents, it is hoped that the authorities in England will not have forgotten that the army don't travel with stores of them, and that the troops now coming out may be duly provided. If not so, they must do without them till supplies expected from England shall arrive.

If the troops should come provided with tents, Lord Aylmer will take care that they land only with the proportion allowed by the G. O. of the 1st March, 1813.

Besides the 3 regiments above mentioned, detachments for different regiments of infantry are expected, according to the annexed return.

Lord Aylmer will be so kind as to take charge of these detachments, as well as of the regiments composing his brigade, and will see that they are marched off without loss of time to their several divisions, according to the routes from the Q. M. G., and supplied with provisions according to the same.

On his arrival at Pasages he will fix on the places in which he will canton these troops on their arrival either at Pasages or its neighbourhood, so that there may be no difficulties on this subject.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Lesaca, le 20 Juillet, 1813, à 8 heures du soir.

Le Général Wimpffen, étant indisposé, m'a envoyé votre lettre du 17, à laquelle je prends cette manière de répondre en partie, prenant l'occasion d'un courrier que j'envoie par Tudela et Saragosse en Valence.

Je crois que, quand vous avez écrit cette lettre, vous n'aviez pas reçu la lettre que je vous ai écrite de San Estevan le 14, dont je vous envoie à présent le duplicata. Vous y verrez qu'il y a nulle occasion de croire que l'ennemi puisse approcher par vos derrières ; ou que vous soyez dans le cas d'abandonner le blocus sans avoir communication avec moi. Mais si ce malheur, qui doit être inattendu, vous arrivait, je sais bien que vous n'avez pas les moyens d'ôter les canons qui sont dans les redoutes. Vous les ferez enclouer dans ce cas là et vous ferez brûler ou autrement détruire les affuts.

Mais je crois que vous verrez par la lettre incluse, et par ce que je vous apprend de l'état des affaires, que l'ennemi ne peut pas vous approcher du dehors, au moins sans que je le sache.

Le Général Clausel et le Général Paris se sont retirés en France par Jaca. L'ennemi a abandonné tous ses postes en Aragon, à l'exception de la redoute près de Saragosse, bloquée et attaquée par Duran, de Mequinenza, de Monzon, et de deux autres près de la frontière de la Catalogne.

Suchet est en Catalogne, à ce qu'il paraît; et les troupes alliées en Valence devaient s'avancer le 15 de Valence vers l'Ebre. Non-obstant leur perte de canons à Tarragone, elles étaient amplement pourvues pour l'attaque de Tortosa ou de Tarragone.

Je crois que vous n'avez rien à craindre de ce côté ci, au moins sans que je le sache.

Notre feu a commencé aujourd'hui contre le corps de la place de San Sebastian.

To Gen. Duran.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I beg that, on the receipt of this letter, you will place yourself and the troops under your command under the orders of Gen. Espoz y Mina, and you will obey all orders that you shall receive from him.

To Gen. Espoz y Mina.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 16th, which renders necessary some alteration in the instructions which I had given to you.

I conceived that you had been more advanced than it appears you are towards Jaca; and I now leave it to you to blockade Jaca or not, as you may think expedient; telling you, however, that I consider the blockade of that place, if it is likely to be successful, to be the most important of any. I will send you heavy artillery as soon as it shall be in my power: it is not so at present.

I enclose a letter to Gen. Duran, in which I desire him to place himself under your command. I beg you will accelerate his measures for the attack of the fort at Zaragoza.

The messenger who will deliver this letter has dispatches for Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, who commands the Allied British and Sicilian and Spanish forces on the eastern coast of the Peninsula. He was at Valencia on the 13th, and proposed to move forward towards the Ebro on the 15th: by what route he does not state.

I have directed the messenger to proceed from Zaragoza to Alcañiz, and to inquire there where the General is; and I request you to communicate to Lord W. Bentinck, by the same opportunity, any intelligence of the state of affairs which you may think interesting.

The fire against the body of the place of San Sebastian commenced this day.

To Gen. Copons y Navia.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I think it proper to enclose to you the copy and translation of a letter which I have found among King Joseph's papers, from the Prince de Neufchâtel, which I think it desirable that you should make public to the people of Catalonia.*

They will therein see the hatred which the unconquerable spirit of themselves and of their ancestors has excited in the breast of the tyrant, and his consequent desire to subdue them, in particular, to his iron yoke.

* See Appendix, No. IX., 25th Aug. 1811.

I need not point out to them that this letter affords fresh motives for their determined resistance to his usurpation ; in which I beg that you will inform them, that they shall have every assistance from me which the circumstances of the war will enable me to afford them.

The Catalans will see, however, that it is necessary, not only that they should exert themselves in their own cause, but that they should endeavor to supply the wants of those armies which must be employed to assist them in driving the enemy from their country ; and they must do every thing in their power to distress and destroy that enemy, during the short time which it is to be hoped that he will be able to remain.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I had this day the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatches of the 28th June and 13th July, Nos. 4 and 5.

I will inquire whether it is possible to send any officers from the 3d to the 2d batt. 27th regt. ; but I am afraid it is not. A very large proportion of the officers of that regiment are, and have long been, in England and Ireland.

I am very much obliged to your Lordship for the details of your means of undertaking a siege, transmitted in your dispatch No. 5, which appear to me to be sufficient for the attack of Tarragona or Tortosa.

The intentions of Suchet, or rather, the nature of the orders under which he is acting, are not quite clear. Gen. Clausel has certainly retired from Jaca into France, and he is now probably on the left of the troops in front of this army ; and Gen. Paris, who belongs to the army of Aragon, under the command of Suchet, and who has always commanded a division of about 3000 men in Aragon, has gone off in the same direction. Mina did him a great deal of mischief on his march.

The enemy have withdrawn all their garrisons in Aragon, excepting in a redoubt near Zaragoza, in Mequinenza, in Fraga, in Monzon, and in Venasque ; all, you will observe, on the frontier of Catalonia. The troops, likewise, which evacuated and destroyed Alcañiz, marched from Mequinenza on Mora. All this tends to prove the intention of Suchet to hold his ground in Catalonia ; and I should be inclined to attribute the march of Paris on Jaca to his being pressed by Mina, and to his want of communication with Suchet, and his ignorance of his movements in Valencia.

Gens. Mina and Duran are now near Zaragoza. The latter proposes to attack the redoubt near that place. I have desired Mina to blockade Jaca if he can, and to retire gradually towards Tudela, if, as appeared probable before I received his letter this day, Suchet should enter Aragon. I now write to Mina, and likewise to Capt. Blanckley, who is with him, and Duran, to request that they will communicate with your Lordship ; and I beg you to take measures to communicate with Gen. Mina.

It is impossible for me at present to give your Lordship any further instructions. In the course of a few days I hope to have possession of San Sebastian, and I propose then either to move forward into France, or to make myself master of all the garrisons of Aragon, so as to connect myself more closely with you, still keeping the blockade of Pamplona.

Much will depend upon the state of affairs in the north of Europe. If the war should be renewed, I shall do most good by moving forward into France, and I shall probably be able to establish myself there. If not renewed, I should only go into France to be driven out again; and I shall do best to confine myself to secure what I have gained. In either case my movements will assist you; in the latter, more directly.

I am not acquainted with either Gen. Elio or the Duque del Parque; but I believe your Lordship's opinion is quite correct regarding both.

When I was at Cadiz in the winter I endeavored to remedy the inconvenience which you have found in the separation of the 2d and 3d armies, of which I wished to form only one, but I could not succeed. The Spanish armies, modelled as they are on the plan of French corps, are equally independent of each other, and are as troublesome to manage.

I am perfectly aware also of the rapine and confusion which attend all the business of supplying a Spanish army, and the excessive and unnecessary misery and distress which their demands, and their mode of enforcing them, occasion to the country. But there is no remedy for these evils at present. The great want of this nation is of men capable of conducting public business of any description; and the Revolution, as it is called, instead of having caused an improvement in this respect, has rather augmented the evil by bringing forward into public employment of importance, more inexperienced people, and by giving to men in general false notions, entirely incompatible with the nature of their business; then all real improvements in the mode of governing and of transacting business are despised by the government and Cortes, and never thought of.

You will find that when you shall have given the month's supply of flour to the Duque del Parque and Gen. Elio, they will not know how to carry it, how to get it baked into bread, or how to issue it. They will never repay the supply; and I request you to let me know the value of it, that I may have it carried to account against the subsidy.

You may depend upon it that your best magazines of all kinds will be your ships, which you should always keep close to you.

I beg your Lordship to urge the Admiral to send to the Tagus, if possible, all the troop ships of war which were sent round from the western side of the Peninsula last year; they are most necessary to us.

It would likewise be very desirable if you could carry into execution the measures in regard to the transports ordered by the Sec. of State in his dispatch, No. 124. Indeed, as the nature of your operations is now decided, it appears to me that you might send to England all the transports excepting those which should be absolutely necessary to transport the British and Sicilian troops, in case that their presence should be necessary in Sicily, or that you should think proper to remove them from Spain for the reasons referred to in my private letter to your Lordship of the 1st inst.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I have nothing to add to my dispatch of this day, excepting to tell you

that I have sent to government the information contained in your private letter of the 13th, regarding Murat.

My dispatches relating to the battle of the 21st arrived in England on the 3d, and were immediately sent to the Continent. The account of our crossing the Ebro had been received a day or two before. It was known at Paris on the 29th, that there had been a battle unsuccessful to the French, but the particulars were not known. Soult arrived here on the 13th, to take the command of the army; and he came from the army in Germany. It is rumoured in the French army opposite to me, that we are in communication with Murat, and it has been in the English newspapers. If the former is not founded upon the latter, the French rumours tend to prove Murat's sincerity. However, if Austria should declare against Buonaparte, I don't doubt Murat. You must, however, take the lead of him, if you can.

Our last accounts from England are of the 8th; there is no news from the Continent, but if I can find the newspapers, they shall go to you.

The *Shannon*, Capt. Broke, has taken the *Chesapeake*, which I consider a most fortunate event. It took place, it appears, in consequence of a challenge off one of the American ports, in presence of hundreds of spectators in pleasure boats.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I enclose a letter which I have received from the Commissary Gen., containing a complaint of the conduct of the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal, in arresting with a military guard a soldier of the 11th Veteran battalion, acting as a conductor of stores, and in confining him in the gaol of Guarda at the distance of 6 leagues, without notice to his military superior, without cause assigned, known, or even suspected.

I request you to lay these papers before the Portuguese government. I have already frequently, particularly recently, had occasion to draw the attention of the Portuguese government to the conduct of the Portuguese magistrates; and of this person more than once, who, to say the least of him, has not conducted himself in a very conciliatory manner. I don't know whether it is consistent with the laws of Portugal, but it is certainly not so with the courtesy due from one nation to another, or from the civil authorities of one nation to the military authorities of the other, that a person should be seized in this manner and imprisoned, without cause assigned, or even notice given; and I hope that the government will feel disposed to give me some satisfaction on this subject, otherwise I beg you to lay these papers before his Majesty's government.

I likewise beg to draw your attention to the miserable condition of all persons who are prisoners in the gaols in Portugal; they literally starve for want of food, and the buildings in which they are kept are incapable of sheltering them from the weather, and in such a state of filth as to occasion disease. I leave it to you to decide upon the measures to be taken to protect His Majesty's subjects employed in his service for the protection of Portugal from the common enemy, from such oppression and its consequent evils, as that to which they are liable from the conduct of such a man as this magistrate.

I must say, that the British army which I have the honor to command have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that every thing that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I enclose a letter from Sir R. Kennedy, stating the inconvenience which will be experienced in this country by the removal of Mr. — from the duties which he is performing at Lisbon, under the directions and upon the responsibility of the Commissary Gen., Sir R. Kennedy.

I have had some experience of Mr. —'s abilities. He is very capable of performing any duty under the direction, and at the risk and responsibility of another, but quite incapable of undertaking such a charge as that which will devolve upon him at Gibraltar upon his own responsibility.

I had already made arrangements to send Mr. Wright to Alicante from this army; and I must inform your Lordship that the removal of Mr. Bissett from Gibraltar is an arrangement as inconvenient to the service of this country, as the removal of Mr. — from Lisbon, or any other that could be devised.

It is not at all understood by the departments in England that much time elapses before any gentleman coming out to perform a duty, here, is at all fit for it; and till he does acquire the necessary knowledge and experience, the service here suffers. This observation applies particularly to those officers charged with the business of procuring money and supplies, and their management and dispatch to the army, which were the duties performed by Mr. Bissett and Mr. —.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 20th July, 1813.

I think it probable that, as the weather is so bad, the messenger dispatched yesterday will not have sailed, and therefore I send you the copy of a letter of the 13th, which I have received from Lord W. Bentinck, reporting the state of affairs in Sicily, and of his negotiations with Murat.

His Lordship was at Valencia on the 13th, and intended to march on the 15th towards the Ebro. He has of battering train twenty three 24 pounders, nine 18 pounders, twenty 12 pounders, 11 large mortars and howitzers, making 63 pieces, besides howitzers with his field train; and ten 24 pounders which had been sent for to Mahon and Sicily. But he has more guns than I ever had at any siege; and as for mortars and howitzers, I never use them against a Spanish town if I can avoid it.

Suchet appears to have withdrawn his garrisons from Aragon, and to have collected his force in Catalonia, according to accounts from Mina of the 16th. Lord William did not know exactly which way he had gone. The French had garrisons in Murviedro and Peñíscola in Valencia, which Lord William intended to blockade.

In writing to you yesterday about our naval means, I omitted to mention to you that the Spanish boats which have been armed are manned by the Spanish battalion of Marines, and are so much in diminution

of the army; and besides the labors of the siege, the Portuguese troops are employed in unloading the ships in the harbour of Pasages. I am convinced that no combined British army has ever before been employed on such duties. We have, besides, no convoy for any thing: 100,000 dollars from the subsidy for the Galician army have been waiting at Coruña for above a month, for a ship of war to carry them.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

20th July, 1813.

I have submitted your letter and the annexed statement of the Assist. Provost Marshal now stationed at Vitoria of the circumstances of a peasant in the vicinity of that place having been mortally wounded by a foraging party of the brigade of artillery under Capt. ——. It is the pleasure of the Commander of the Forces that you send for Capt. —, and observe to him that such a lamentable outrage could not have taken place had the G. O. relative to foraging been fully attended to by the soldiers composing his command.

It is his Excellency's further pleasure that you direct Capt. — not to cut green corn in the ear, of any description, while grass is to be obtained within a league and a half of his brigade; and that an officer must attend every foraging party sent out from his command; and that should there not be any other officer to attend to that duty, he is bound to superintend its regularity in person. You will make it a point constantly to inquire how the soldiers belonging to Capt. —'s brigade conduct themselves towards the inhabitants generally, and to observe whether the injunctions contained in this letter are fully attended to by Capt. — and his officers so long as that brigade may continue in the adjacents of your command. The letter to which this is intended as a reply has been transmitted by his Excellency to the Spanish government, accompanied by observations referring to the extraordinary and injudicious conduct of the Governor of Vitoria on this and former occasions.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813, 9 A.M.

I have received intelligence from a person who has hitherto given me that upon which I can rely, stating that the enemy are making a flying bridge at Urrugne, which is behind their position opposite Irun, and that they talk of transporting boats from St. Jean de Luz to the Bas de Behobie. I don't know where that is; but I should think near the mouth of the Bidasoa. That river is not fordable now at this side.

The enemy's posts in this front have certainly been weakened; and Clausel must have joined upon their left near St. Jean Pied de Port.

I have desired Giron to maintain and support the heights between Irun and the Bidasoa; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will send forward to support him all the field artillery which is about Hernani and Oyarzun, the men of which can be spared from the heavy guns. I have likewise desired him to take care of Fuenterrabia.

In regard to capitulations, I have no objection to allow the honors of war and private property; but officers and men must be prisoners of war. I am certain, however, that they will make no capitulation. I should like to except from it the Governor of Guetaria, but that is, I believe, impossible.

P.S. I have just received your letter of 4 P.M. I was not wrong, I see, in my conjecture respecting the capitulation.

— and — appear to be worse than usual in their demands for working parties; and unless they are forced to use the animals and carts at their disposal, whenever they can be used, they will work your

men to death. I have known ——— demand hundreds of men whom he could not use; and I am quite certain that much of the carriage of ordnance stores from Pasages might be done by mules or carts.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton, Bart., K.B.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813, 2 P.M.

I have received your letter of the 20th. I have thought it best not to order round Capt. Walton till we shall have possession of San Sebastian.

I have ordered an officer and farrier from the 13th, 14th, and 1st hussars. The ——— shall remain where they are. They are the worst regiment I have yet seen.

You had better give your orders for the detailed distribution of the horses before they shall leave Bilbao, as they will have to march by different roads almost from their leaving that place.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Clinton, K.B.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813.

I was very sorry to learn from Dr. M'Grigor that you were so ill as to be under the necessity of returning to England; and I had given directions, which I repeat, that leave of absence might be officially announced to you.

The object of my letter of the 14th was only to apprise you of the object in ordering the 6th division to Lanz, and to request you to send a brigade to San Estevan; and to inform you that I had seen in a Gazette that you were made a Knight of the Bath, on which I sincerely congratulate you. The letter was opened by Gen. Madden, and the order executed.

I sincerely congratulate you upon this well deserved mark of the Royal favor, which I should have been happy to have been employed to deliver to you, as I have to others, if your health had permitted you to remain with us. I assure you, however, that that is not the only reason for which I regret the necessity for your return to England, and that I am fully sensible, as well of the good which you have done us, as of the assistance which I should have received from you, if it had been in your power to remain.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813.

I have written to Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck to request that he would urge the Admiral commanding the fleet in the Mediterranean to send to the Tagus the troop ships of war, which, having been attached to this army, were sent last year to the Eastern coast of Spain, in order to attend the operations of the army in that quarter, where they are now no longer required.

When the ships shall arrive, or earlier if there should be any disposable transports in the Tagus, I request you to apply to Adm. Martin to send round to Santander, where they will receive further directions respecting their destination, any British soldiers who may be at Lisbon, and who may be sufficiently recovered to join their regiments. Any officers who may be at Lisbon might come to the army by the same opportunity.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford has informed me that there are at Mafra 1200 recruits for the Portuguese army, who are in readiness to join. It

is very desirable that these recruits should likewise be sent round by sea; and I beg you to arrange with Adm. Martin to have them sent round, and that you will settle all points regarding their embarkation with Gen. Blunt, of course under the superintendence of the General commanding in the province of Estremadura.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813, 11 A.M.

I have received your letter of the 21st at noon. I shall be very happy if any arrangement is made which will be satisfactory to you; but it will be quite impossible for me to interfere in any manner in the naval arrangements of this coast. The Admiralty are responsible for them; and I hope they will adopt some measures to give us a secure and easy communication along the coast, and the means of using its harbours with convenience. If they don't, they will be responsible for any failure that may occur.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813, 11 A.M.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st June, and am much concerned that the *Surveillante* has been driven off the coast.

I have settled with the Commissary Gen. that, for the present, all the vessels having on board provisions or camp equipage stores for his department shall be sent from Santander to Bilbao, where they are to remain till required at Pasages to be unloaded, when they will be sent for. He sends directions accordingly to Santander; but in the mean time it will be desirable that you should send a vessel to order into Bilbao any that may be on their passage, excepting those with troops or military ordnance stores. As fast as the provision and camp equipage ships now at Pasages are unloaded, I beg that you will order those from Lisbon to return thither; those from England to return to England.

There is a large number of vessels waiting at Coruña for convoy, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send a vessel to give them convoy to Santander, and from thence eventually to Bilbao.

I enclose a letter to the Captain of the port of Pasages to the purport you desire.

To the Captain of the Port of Pasages.

Lesaca, 22d July, 1813.

You are aware of the important operations which are now carrying on in this part of the country, for the benefit of the Spanish nation; and of the necessity of combining these operations with those of the British squadron on the coast, and with the other naval means of Great Britain.

The harbour of Pasages becomes a most interesting point for all our communications; and I most earnestly request you will attend to the suggestions and requisitions of Sir G. Collier, who commands the British squadron, and will regulate matters in the port of Pasages in such a manner as to insure the easy use of it.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, 7th division.

22d July, 1813.

A peasant now residing at Lara has on the frontier a drove of pigs, a flock of

sheep, and some cows, and has been induced to keep them in that hazardous neighbourhood for objects materially advantageous to our service. This peasant complains that on or about the 17th inst. the Portuguese brigade attached to the 7th division plundered him of 12 pigs, and that he apprehends leaving his house for an hour lest further depredations should be committed on his property. My Lord Wellington has felt much dissatisfaction at the renewal of such irregularities, which every means has been taken to guard against, and which in this particular instance have nearly marred views of much consequence. His Excellency requests your Lordship will be pleased to institute the most serious inquiry into the grounds of this complaint, and put the Portuguese brigade under arms for several hours, to prove to the troops that such irregularities will not pass unnoticed even on the frontiers.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir L. Cole.

Lesaca, 23d July, 1813.

I should be glad to know from Bell the result of his reconnaissance about Pamplona, and along the line of road from Pamplona to Roncesvalles.

I am anxious to have it ascertained also, as soon as possible, whether we could take up the following line of defensive position, viz. :

Our right to be in the passes of Roncesvalles, and as far beyond that as may be necessary to prevent these passes from being turned by Orbaizeta.

The line of defence to run from the passes of Roncesvalles by those between the foundry of Egui and the village of Alduides; and to extend from these latter to the pass of the Puerto de Velate, between Lanz and Almandoz.

The above appears to be the direction of one of the principal ridges of the mountains, and it would probably form, therefore, a more secure and a stronger line of defence than any which descended into the valleys, to rise again over the several branches which run out from the main ridge, and separate these valleys from each other.

The doubt is, whether communications exist, or could be found without much difficulty, along the main ridge or immediately behind it, so that the several posts of the line of defence might have a secure connexion with each other, and might afford each other mutual support. I wish you would allow Bell to reconnoitre in the direction I have mentioned, and to make me a report, accompanied, not by a finished sketch, but a mere outline, showing the situations of the principal mountains and their line of connexion with each other; as also the course of what may appear to be the most practicable line of communication along the chain or immediately behind it.

A good deal of information respecting the right of the line I have mentioned, may be obtained from Gen. Byng; and I will give directions to Mr. Mitchell, who is sketching the country about Les Alduides and about Egui, to furnish to Bell all the information he can.

I should mention, that I do not look for a line of communication for any thing but infantry in the direction I have mentioned.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir L. Cole, K.B.

Lesaca, 23d July, 1813.

It is intended that you should support Major Gen. Byng in the defence of the passes in front of Roncesvalles as effectually as you can, without committing the troops under Gen. Byng, and the 4th division, against a force so superior as that the advantage of the ground would not compensate it, making allowance also for the feeling of inferiority which may influence the enemy at present in meeting our troops.

You will be so good as make arrangements farther back, for stopping the enemy's progress towards Pamplona, in the event of your being compelled to give up the passes which Major Gen. Byng now occupies, and to retire in that direction. It is very essential that certain and speedy means of communication should exist between the troops towards Roncesvalles and those under Brig. Gen. Campbell at Les Alduides and the foundry of Egui, in order that either may be informed, as quickly as possible, of any retrograde movement which the others might be obliged to make.

A sure communication should exist also between both these quarters and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton; and Sir Thomas should in like manner be apprised of any movement of the troops, either of those upon the Roncesvalles road, or of those upon that of Egui and Les Alduides, in order that he may make such arrangements as circumstances may dictate for giving support to either as they fall back, should such an event occur.

You will be so good as request Major Gen. Long to give whatever assistance, by dragoons, that may be necessary in rendering the communications more prompt and effectual between the several corps above mentioned.

It is desirable that you should transmit a daily report for the present to head quarters.

A duplicate of this letter is transmitted (open) under cover, to Sir T. Picton, with directions to act accordingly.

The A.G. to Major Stovin, A.A.G., 3d division.

23d July, 1813.

Col. Keane, commanding the 5th batt. of the 60th regt., having favorably reported on the causes of Ensign —'s absence, as also that a disposition had evidently appeared on the part of that officer to join his corps, you will release him from arrest and order him to duty. I beg you will take this occasion of observing to Ensign — that an officer should always communicate to his immediate commander the difficulties that impede, or the progress made towards meeting his duty, and that on any future necessity of following the course of an army I recommend that officer's moving by orders rather than by the suggestion or caprice of a travelling companion.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, ce 24 Juillet, 1813, à 11 heures du matin.

J'ai reçu hier au soir des nouvelles, à n'en pouvoir douter, que la grande force de l'ennemi a marché vers St. Jean Pied de Port. Les bateaux, qui sont deux trains de pont, restent toujours à Urrugne. Ainsi on croirait que l'ennemi a vraiment l'intention de tirer notre attention de ce côté-là, et alors de faire quelque tentative sur la rivière. Mais, comme je n'entends plus de feu du côté de San Sebastian, j'espère que cette affaire est finie.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th July, 1813, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 12 A.M.

I have just received your letter of 5 this morning, and I am sorry that circumstances did not allow of your attacking the place this morning.

I wish you would consider whether, if the fire continues this evening, it would not be worth while to take possession of the breaches, and intrench parties upon them, well supplied with musket ammunition, keeping a communication with them at high water by means of some of the pontoons. If we cannot communicate with the town by the breaches, one would imagine that the enemy could not injure those men, at least not those on the great breach. Those on the smaller one might be injured by the fire from the barrack and the one gun battery. Would it not be worth while to turn all our guns this evening and to-morrow morning against that part of the wall which you commenced, but afterwards discontinued, to breach yesterday morning? If it answers, you will have a third breach, I believe it will be at the end of the rampart of which it is so desirable for us to get possession.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir L. Cole, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th July, 1813.

Since writing to you yesterday, Lord Wellington has desired that I should express still more strongly how essential he considers it that the passes in front of Roncesvalles should be maintained to the utmost; and I am to direct, therefore, that you will be so good as make every necessary arrangement for repelling effectually every direct attack that the enemy may make in that quarter.

You will be so good as see established in a solid manner the connexion between the left of the posts occupied by Major Gen. Byng, and the right of those held by Brig. Gen. Campbell, and take also the necessary precaution to secure the right of Major Gen. Byng's post from being turned on the side of Orbaizeta.

Lord Wellington attaches very little importance to any wider movement which the enemy might attempt, for the purpose of turning the right of our position.

The difficulties and delays in which such an operation would engage him are of themselves very considerable obstacles; and would retard the enemy sufficiently to give time for other arrangements to stop his progress, without giving up the hold we now have of the passes upon the frontier.

You will be so good as understand that in so far as relates to any military operations that may occur on the extreme right of the army, the troops commanded by Major Gen. Byng are under your direction, as the senior General officer in that quarter.

I have undoubted intelligence that Soult has moved the greatest part of his force towards St. Jean Pied de Port, leaving at Urrugne the boats, which are two complete bridges. It would appear, therefore, that he entertains serious designs to draw our attention from the side of Irun, and then to attempt to pass the river.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th July, 1813.

In answer to your private and confidential letter, I recommend to you to have nothing to do with the formation of any Regency, excepting on the scheme proposed in my letter to La Vega, as you may depend upon it none will answer.

In respect to the American mediation, I conclude that you have orders from government: if you have not, I recommend to you to say that you are ready to receive and forward to government any proposition they have to make, either that Great Britain should mediate between them and their colonies, or for a commercial arrangement with Great Britain.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th July, 1813.

I have this morning received your letters of the 15th and 16th. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will explain from me to the government, the Minister at War, and Señor Argüelles, that, although I think the conduct of government towards Gen. Castaños and Gen. Giron is harsh and unjust, I don't complain of it as a breach of engagement with me; nor does that conduct occasion my desire to be satisfied respecting the breach of engagement. Señor Argüelles will see, therefore, that I have not put the Cortes and government in the dilemma of choosing to keep Gen. Castaños in his employment or of losing my services.

Neither do I complain of the refusal of government to promote the officers whom I had recommended after the battle as a breach of engagement. It was ungracious; but there is no engagement to me that either all I recommend shall be promoted or that none shall be removed. It would have been unreasonable to ask such an engagement, and improper to make it. What I complain of is, that, government having made an engagement with me, without which I neither can nor will hold the command of the army, they have broken it, not in one, but in a hundred instances; and that they appear to do it wantonly, because they know my disinclination to relinquish the command, on account of the bad effect which such relinquishment will have on the cause, as well in Spain as throughout Europe. Their conduct is therefore injurious as an indignity, as well as because it deprives me of the only power which I can have over the army; and I must have some satisfaction on the subject.

Nobody knows better than I do the miserable state to which authority is reduced in Spain; and the government will do me the justice to acknowledge that, whenever they have called upon me to support their authority, I have done it, and efficaciously. But they know well the inefficacy of the *Ordenanza* to punish any officer: in fact, it is in this respect a dead letter. Authority can be maintained only by influence; and, I thank God! I possess a sufficient degree of influence over the officers of the army to induce them to do their duty; and I believe that,

if I were to lose the command to-morrow, they would act with me as cordially for the public service as they did before I was appointed to the command. But I should lose all influence and authority over them if I were to submit to these indignities without complaint; and therefore it is that I complain, and that I must insist upon the government satisfying me upon this point.

I do think the cause of Spain is materially involved in my retaining the command both externally and internally. One advantage resulting from it is that the army is directed to repel the common enemy, and is kept clear of all interference in the disputes of the parties of the day. This would not be the case if the command were in the hands of any person who could feel an interest in these parties.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. May, A.A.G., Royal artillery.

24th July, 1813.

You will observe by the enclosures that the Commissary Gen. has applied through this office for an explanation in how far his Excellency approves of spirits being issued in extra allowance to soldiers of the Royal artillery actually employed in the batteries during the operations of a siege, on the simple requisition of the officer commanding the artillery brigades. I am to inform you his Excellency has instructed Sir R. Kennedy that the order of the Commander of the troops so employed is alone to be considered a sufficient voucher for such issues, and I have in consequence to recommend you to obtain the sanction of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham for the order annexed of the 16th July, which you appear to have authorised in an informal manner, and which you will afterwards return to me for transmission to the Commissary Gen.'s office.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813, 10 P.M.

When on my road home I heard that there had been firing in the Puerto de Maya, and since my arrival I have heard that the enemy had

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

It looks very much as if Soult were going to make an effort against Byng and Cole upon the Roncesvalles road. If he does so, he will probably make some demonstration at least in other points, and be prepared to follow these up if he has any success in his principal attack.

In the latter case I should think Campbell would be obliged to fall back from Les Alduides; and that happening, you would have to evacuate your more advanced positions in the valley of Baztan. The enemy would, of course, follow up these retrograde movements, and the result, I should think, would be, our having to draw back also the 7th and Light divisions, and to take up for the moment a more retired line.

If the accounts from the right continue to threaten active operations on the part of the enemy, head quarters will probably move more that way. Lord Wellington is gone towards San Sebastian. An assault was made upon the breach there this morning, but it failed. I do not understand that our loss has been very considerable.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

It will be a proper precaution that your division should be prepared to make a movement this evening, should it be necessary.

Pray give me the earliest intelligence you can of whatever occurs towards Sir R. Hill's posts.

If the enemy has any decided success in the upper part of the valley of Baztan, your division may have to move towards San Estevan.

I can say nothing more at present. Lord Wellington is towards San Sebastian.

Q.M.G. to Major Gen. Baron C. Alten.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

It would appear, from a report I have from Lord Dalhousie, that the enemy is attempting something against the Puerto de Maya. Let your division know they may have occasion to move on a short notice. You will of course let Major Ross know also, that his horses and mules may be kept at hand, in case his troop of artillery should be required to move.

moved in force in the morning upon Roncesvalles, and were engaged in the middle of the day with Gen. Byng and the 4th division: I have not yet heard the result.

As the siege is now in that state that we can do no more till the ammunition, &c., arrives from England, it will render your force much more disposable, and it will be desirable that you should have embarked all the carriages, wheels, &c., and every thing else not absolutely necessary. The guns ought likewise to be returned to the *Surveillante*, and the others moved out of the batteries to the landing place, excepting two on the right to keep up a fire on the breaches, and the four 18 pounders to be on the left. Two howitzers might be left on the hill.

It is impossible to judge of Soult's plan yet, particularly till I know the result of his operations of this day. I understand that the enemy were driven off from the Puerto de Maya. One can hardly believe that, with 30,000 men, he proposes to force himself through the passes of the

Instructions communicated by the Q.M.G.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

Sir S. Cotton will be so good as assemble Major Gen. Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and the 3 regiments of British hussars, with as little delay as possible, in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, near the roads which lead to that place from Puente la Reyna and from Tafalla.

He will also direct Brig. Gen. d'Urban's brigade, and the Household brigade of cavalry, to move from their respective cantonments towards the same point, by routes which he will be so good as point out to them.

Major Gen. Fane's brigade will continue towards Monreal, having a post of observation at Sangüesa, and observing also the roads which come down any of the valleys of the Salazar or the Iraci rivers, or by the valley of Erro.

Sir S. Cotton will put himself in communication with the Conde de la Bisbal before Pamplona, as also with Don Carlos de España, who is expected to arrive before Pamplona from Vitoria, by the road of Salvatierra.

As there is an hospital station at Arazure, near Pamplona, Sir S. Cotton will be so good as make preparations for its removal in the direction of Vitoria, in case circumstances should occur to render such a measure expedient.

An officer's party of the cavalry should be placed as soon as possible at Villaba, leaving a letter party at Ostiz; and another officer's party must be placed at Lizaso, to communicate by Doña Maria with San Estevan.

Arrangements to take place in the event of its becoming necessary to assemble a force to oppose the advance of the enemy towards Pamplona by the Roncesvalles road:

Major Gen. Byng and Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole, if compelled to fall back from the passes of Roncesvalles, will take up a position behind Linzoain.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton will move the 3d division from Olague to Egui, and Silbeti, to sustain the left of the troops under Sir L. Cole, and to support Brig. Gen. Campbell also, upon the road to Les Alduides.

When Brig. Gen. Campbell finds himself obliged to abandon the valley of Les Alduides, he will maintain himself in the passes in front of the foundry of Egui, and will dispute the ground there as long as possible. If still obliged to retire, he will retreat towards Egui, where he will be supported by Sir T. Picton.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill will be so good as make arrangements so as to hold as long as possible the road for artillery which passes through Sumbilla, Narvarte, and Irurita to Berrueta, and by which the artillery of the Light division has been ordered to continue its march this morning.

Major Gen. Pack will place 2 brigades of the 6th division beyond Legasa, in the situation most favorable for supporting the left of the troops under Sir R. Hill. The other brigade of the 6th division will continue posted near San Estevan, to cover and maintain that point.

Lord Dalhousie will move upon Sumbilla.

The baggage of the 7th division will precede it, and will move a little beyond San Estevan, in the direction of Doña Maria.

Lord Dalhousie will maintain Sumbilla, and will connect himself on the right with the 6th division.

The Light division will place itself on the left bank of the Bidasoa, in such situation as

mountains. The remainder of his force, one would think, must come into operation on some other point, either to-morrow or the day after; and it is desirable that you should be prepared.

I shall apprise you immediately of any intelligence I may receive, and of any movements I may make.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Lesaca, ce 25 Juillet, 1813.

L'ennemi a hier fait des mouvemens vers St. Jean Pied de Port; et il a aujourd'hui paru en grande force en avant de notre poste à Roncesvalles, et dans le Puerto de Maya et Les Alduides. On me dit qu'il a été repoussé au Puerto de Maya; mais je n'ai pas de nouvelles récentes de Roncesvalles, c'est à dire, pas depuis une heure de l'après midi.

Le Gén. Don Carlos de España doit être arrivé à présent dans le voisinage de Pampelune avec sa division, à laquelle j'ai ordonné d'y marcher; et je vous prie de le prendre sous vos ordres. Qu'il y soit arrivé ou non, je vous prie de faire marcher la moitié de l'infanterie que vous aurez au blocus de Pampelune sur Zubiri, d'où vous aurez la bonté de les mettre en communication avec le Gén. Sir T. Picton, qui commande la 3^{me} division de l'armée Britannique et sera à Egui; et avec le Gén. Sir L. Cole,

to be enabled to move by its right to San Estevan, or by its left towards Yanci and Lesaca.

It will communicate, on its right, with the troops at San Estevan and Sumbilla; and, on its left, with the troops of Brig. Longa. The baggage of the Light division will move off as soon as possible to Yanci, and Major Gen. Alten will regulate the withdrawing of his troops in such manner as may best cover the march of the 7th division upon Sumbilla, as also that of his own baggage.

The baggage of head quarters will move off as soon as possible by Yanci to Elgoriaga, near San Estevan, where it will receive further orders.

Brig. Longa will occupy, with his right, Yanci and Lesaca, having posts at the bridges and along the banks of the Bidasoa, and communicating also with the Light division.* With his left he will occupy the heights which overlook the Bidasoa below the bridge of Lesaca and the bridge of Vera; and he will have posts also at Salain and at the ferry of Endalaza. There should be a battalion of Gen. Longa's division in reserve upon the hill to the left, where the roads from Salain and from Endalaza meet, near the house called Gardel.

There should be posts also at San Antonio and at the mill of Andarra, to communicate with Oyarzun and with Irun.

* 'Instruction pour le Brig. Longa.

' Lesaca, 26 Juillet, 1813.

' Le général Longa voudra bien disposer ses troupes aujourd'hui de manière qu'elles occupent sur leur droite les villages de Yanci et de Lesaca; ayant des postes considérables sur le pont de Yanci, et sur celui de Lesaca; et observant, aussi, par des postes plus petits, tout le cours de cette partie de la rivière. La gauche de la division du général Longa doit occuper les hauteurs qui dominant le cours de la Bidasoa depuis le pont de Lesaca jusqu'à la barca de Endalaza; occupant, fortement, le pont de Vera, et ayant des forces respectables aussi à Salain et à la barca de Endalaza. Le général Longa prendra aussi des précautions convenables pour empêcher que l'ennemi puisse pénétrer en avant, quand même il aurait réussi à faire passer la rivière par une partie de ses troupes; et à cet effet le général Longa tiendra toujours une bonne partie de ses troupes en réserve, et campée sur les hauteurs les plus dominantes qu'il y aura immédiatement en arrière de ses postes avancés. Le général Longa aura soin d'être toujours en communication avec les troupes Anglaises (la division Légère) qui seront sur sa droite; comme aussi avec les troupes Espagnoles du général Giron, qui seront sur sa gauche. Il communiquera avec les dernières et par la route qui va de la vallée d'Andarra à Irun, et par celle qui va par la même vallée à Oyarzun. Le général Longa voudra bien mettre, aussi, des postes de sa cavalerie à Articuza et à Goizueta, pour être en communication avec le centre comme aussi avec la gauche de l'armée.'

qui commande la 4^me division et sera ou à Linzoain ou en avant de cette ville, à Roncesvalles. Le blocus sera tenu par le reste de l'infanterie.

Avec cette lettre il en va une pour Sir S. Cotton à Tafalla, qui lui ordonne de rassembler sa cavalerie près de Pampelune, et je vous prie de la lui faire remettre par une voie prompte et sûre.

Je vous prie aussi d'écrire à Mina, à Saragosse, et de lui dire ce qui se passe de ce côté-ci. Il me paraît que, pour le présent, il devrait se contenter du blocus du fort de Saragosse; et qu'au moins, avec son infanterie et celle de Duran, il devrait se rapprocher de nous.

To the Earl of Liverpool.*

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 7th, marked *private and confidential*. Buonaparte sent off Soult from Dresden on the 4th, upon hearing of our having passed the Ebro. He did not hear of the battle till the 6th.

Your Lordship is aware that we must continue our efforts against the enemy in order to establish ourselves well on this frontier; and I shall soon be able to decide whether the effort ought to be directed to France itself, or to Catalonia, during the remainder of the campaign. Much will depend upon what will be going forward in the north of Europe.

I don't think we could successfully apply to this frontier of Spain the system on which we fortified the country between the Tagus and the sea. That line is a very short one, and the communication easiest and shortest on our side. The Pyrenees are a very long line; there are not fewer than 70 passes through the mountains, and the communication, as far as I have been able to learn hitherto, is on the side of the enemy. We may facilitate the defence by fortifying some of the passes; but we can never make the Pyrenees what we made between the Tagus and the sea.

The Spanish troops are now useful, and will be still more so than they are, in defending those passes; and there is no doubt but that the Spanish armies may be very considerably augmented by recruits from the provinces mentioned by your Lordship, although they have already furnished considerable numbers of men to Longa's, Mina's, and Porlier's divisions, and to the troops serving under the command of Mendizabal. But when I tell your Lordship that the Spanish army does not consist of much less than 160,000 men at present, you will probably be of opinion that we don't want men to defend such positions as the Pyrenees, but means to pay, feed, and clothe those men, and to keep them in that state of efficiency and discipline in the field in which soldiers ought to be to render any effectual service to the country which employs them. Your Lordship will see this, when I tell you that of those 160,000 men we have not much more than between a quarter and a third of the numbers employed against the enemy; and those are not in the state of discipline and efficiency in which they ought to be or might be. Our efforts, therefore, should be directed to improve the financial resources of Spain rather than increase the number of men at present in the Spanish armies. I have only this day had a proposition from Longa to go to the rear, as he can get neither pay nor food in front. The wants of all are of the same description;

* Enclosed in a letter to Lord Liverpool, 4th Aug. 1813, p. 649.

and, as far as I have any knowledge, there are no troops paid in Spain at present, excepting those to whom I have been enabled to spare money out of our military chest in payment of the Spanish subsidy.

Your Lordship must have seen enough of the Spanish character, during the contest and our connexion with them, to be aware that it will not answer to press any measure upon them which they don't like. I have not seen among them the slightest inclination to employ English officers to discipline their troops to such an extent as would answer any useful purpose; and I believe that one of the reasons for which they like me so well is that, contrary to their expectations, I have not pressed them to take English officers. Besides, as I have above stated to your Lordship, the Spanish troops don't want discipline, if by discipline is meant instruction, so much as they do a system of order, which can be founded only on regular pay and food, and good care and clothing. These British officers could not give them; and, notwithstanding that the Portuguese are now the *fighting cocks* of the army, I believe we owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their pockets and bellies than to the instruction we have given them. In the end of last campaign they behaved in many instances exceedingly ill, because they were in extreme misery, the Portuguese government having neglected to pay them. I have forced the Portuguese government to make arrangements to pay them regularly this year, and every body knows how they behave. Our own troops always fight, but the influence of regular pay is seriously felt on their conduct, their health, and their efficiency; and as for the French troops, it is notorious that they will do nothing unless regularly paid and fed.

If your Lordship will do me the favor to look at the letter which I wrote to you in 1809, in regard to the defence of Portugal, and to look over the morning states which I send every week to the Sec. of State, you will see that we have seldom had in the ranks of Portuguese and British troops the full numbers therein pointed out. Till the other day, I have never had 60,000 men in the field; and I have them not now, if Lord W. Bentinck's corps is not reckoned, as it ought not to be. It is my opinion that you ought not to have less than 60,000 British and Portuguese troops in the field as long as you maintain the war in the Peninsula, let the Spanish armies have what they may.

One of the results of the operations of this summer upon which you may rely, is a great reduction of the expense, at least of the British army. As soon as I shall get possession of San Sebastian I shall commence, and as soon as I shall have Pamplona I shall complete, the reduction of all our expenses in Portugal; not to incur others upon the northern coast of Spain; but I hope that I shall be able to have all our principal magazines in England, our hospitals in England, and that the expense of the transport of the army at least will be very much reduced. I hope likewise that we shall now get more money; and your Lordship may depend upon it that every sum that we can spend in purchases in the country will save the government enormously.

I believe that I have now given answers to all the topics in your Lordship's letter.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 25th July, 1813, 4 A.M.

Gen. W. Stewart was obliged to withdraw from the Puerto de Maya yesterday, but regained it with the assistance of a brigade of the 7th division. I had a verbal message from him at 10 P.M., when Sir R. Hill had ordered him to retire.

I have no report from Sir R. Hill of a later date than 6 P.M., at which hour he mentions Gen. Stewart having been obliged to leave the Puerto, and he says he will hold Elizondo. His orders to Gen. Stewart were to retire upon Berrueta, which is 2 leagues farther back; but it is possible that he proposes to place him in the rear. He does not tell me what had passed on the right, though he mentions having come from Les Alduides.

The loss of the Puerto de Maya renders it necessary to withdraw the 7th division to Sumbilla. The Light division will, however, still occupy this place and Yanci, and this part of the Bidasoa; and Longa the rocky heights, by which the roads pass from hence and the Bidasoa on Oyarzun. We must endeavor to regain these positions, however, or we can scarcely make the siege of San Sebastian; and I think it desirable that you should carry into execution the arrangement proposed in my note last night so much farther as to embark the guns and stores which you will take out of the batteries, leaving only those sufficient to keep up the fire.

I am going towards San Estevan and Elizondo. I shall write to you again this day, as well this way as by Goizueta.

The A.G. to Capt. Mackrill, Palencia.

25th July, 1813.

I enclose to you the copy of a representation submitted by the authorities of Palencia to the Commander of the Forces of the suffering of the inhabitants of that place from the irregularity of foraging of the troops and followers of the army in passing that road. You understand that one of the most essential attentions of an officer commanding a passing station is to prevent such disorders and causes of complaint, which is only to be done with certainty by making previous arrangements with the magistrates for the issue of every supply not in the possession of the Commissariat on the responsibility of that department; you will therefore be pleased in conjunction with the resident Commissary to have an explanation with the chief authorities, who appear disposed to come to an understanding, and you will report to me the result of your conference. Followers of the army committing trespass of the above nature should be made to pay for the damage, or be given over to the civil power otherwise to answer for it.

The A.G. to Major Tryon, A.A.G., 6th division.

26th July, 1813.

On receipt of this letter you will direct Capt. Swain of the 36th regt. to proceed without delay to Bilbao, there to execute the duties of a Commandant of a hospital station it is proposed to establish at that place. Capt. Swain will communicate with the Q. M. G. and principal Medical officer now at Bilbao as to the most eligible buildings to be occupied, and you will direct him to be regulated by the annexed printed instructions on the points of duty to which they refer, and to attend to the forms and periods of the returns required. Capt. Swain is expected to report his arrival to the head quarters of the army, and from time to time make

To Major Gen. Pack and Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie. Almandoz, 26th July, 1813.

Major Gen. Pack will put the 6th division in motion at daybreak to-morrow morning and march to Olague.

Lord Dalhousie will extend to the right, so as to occupy, with at least one battalion, the vicinity of the village of Oyeregui, and command the road which leads from thence towards Almandoz. This is necessary to secure the rear and the left of Sir R. Hill's position.

such communications to this office as the service may require. The most strict attention must be paid to the conduct and cleanliness of the soldiers.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

On the heights in front of Villaba and Huarte, 28th July, 1813, 10½ A.M.

I have been in movement so constantly since I quitted Lesaca, that I have not been able to write to you. Sir L. Cole and Sir T. Picton did not think themselves sufficiently strong to hold any position between this and Roncesvalles; and they came here, where I joined them, luckily about two minutes before the road to Ostiz was occupied by the enemy. I have

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B.

Almandoz, 26th July, 1813.

I have received and shown to Lord Wellington a letter from Sir L. Cole, dated at Linzoain, this day. It appears by that letter that Sir L. Cole looks forward to the likelihood of having to continue to retire upon Pamplona.

As you will become the senior General officer present with the troops now between the enemy and Pamplona, when the divisions are united, Lord Wellington has directed me to represent to you how necessary it is that the advance of the enemy in that direction should be checked.

Reinforcements for your support are moving upon Olague from this quarter, and the Conde de la Bisbal is ordered to move with a very considerable body of Spanish troops from Pamplona upon Zubiri. Lord Wellington is of opinion, therefore, considering the nature of the country, and the very respectable force of good troops which will be at your disposal, that even should the enemy have already penetrated beyond Linzoain when you receive this, he will undoubtedly be stopped between that place and Zubiri.

Head quarters will be to-morrow at Olague, and Lord Wellington purposes to go on himself to join the 3d and 4th divisions, unless he should receive reports in the mean time to render that unnecessary.

I am to request that you will not omit to send frequent reports to head quarters so long as the situation of affairs in the quarter where you are continues to have so much interest as at present.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lanz, 27th July, 1813.

I enclose an instruction for yourself and also for the troops on your left. You will be so good as send on the artillery of the Conde de Amarante's division and that of the Light division to Lanz, without delay; ordering such detachments of infantry for its assistance as may be necessary. Lord Wellington will send further instructions respecting any movements to be made by you from the passes mentioned in the enclosed instructions.

Lanz, 27th July, 1813, 9 A.M.

The head quarters of the army will be to-day at Lizaso.

All the baggage and the followers of head quarters arriving at Olague are to proceed to Lizaso, and the officer commanding at Olague will take particular care to prevent any of them going on towards Ostiz.

Lord Wellington desires that Sir R. Hill will put the troops under his orders in motion at 2 o'clock, P.M. this day, and fall back to the passes between Almandoz and Lanz. Sir R. Hill will be so good as send instructions to Lord Dalhousie to move at the same hour by Doña Maria towards Lizaso; and to place his infantry in the most convenient situation for enabling it to maintain the passes behind Doña Maria.

Sir R. Hill will also send instructions through Lord Dalhousie to the 1st hussars at Doña Maria, to fall back, as soon as this order reaches them, towards Lizaso, that they may not embarrass the infantry in the passes. Instructions are also to be sent through Lord Dalhousie, by Sir R. Hill, to Major Gen. C. Alten to move the Light division to Zubieta. Major Gen. Alten will inform himself there of the roads which lead from thence into the great road from Tolosa, by Lecumberri, to Pamplona; and in the event of his retiring from Zubieta, his march will be directed into that great road.

Sir R. Hill, Lord Dalhousie, and Major Gen. C. Alten will endeavor to maintain their communication with each other, for the mutual conveyance of orders, or of intelligence which might affect the situation of any of these corps. They will also put themselves in communication with Lizaso, where head quarters will be this day.

Brig. Gen. Longa's Spanish division will remain in the positions which it at present occupies; and Major Gen. C. Alten will communicate this order to Brig. Gen. Longa, apprising him at the same time of his own movement to Zubieta. Major Gen. Alten will also communicate all his movements to Sir T. Graham.

in my front Soult, with from 30,000 to 35,000 men; but he does not appear inclined to attack us. The 6th division have just joined.

Sir R. Hill must be by this time at Lizaso, he having been obliged to retire from the valley of Baztan, in consequence of the movements of the right. He has in his front from 12,000 to 13,000 men; and, as far as I can learn, there are in front of Irun only the Reserve, consisting of 7000 or 8000, under Gen. Villatte, being the German, Italian, and Spanish troops of the three armies and the 118^{me} regt. The Light division will be at Lecumberri, on the road from Irurzun to Tolosa, by which for the present our communication must be kept.

In the existing state of affairs, I don't think the enemy can interrupt it or annoy your position on the great road in any measure. I should

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lanz, 27th July, 1813.

If things should not go on well towards Pamplona, we may, in that case, have to wheel the army back upon its left, placing the troops now about Pamplona near Irurzun; the centre of the army between that and Tolosa; the left, under Sir T. Graham, remaining nearly where it now is.

There is an artillery road from Olague to Irurzun (4 leagues), and one branches from it to Lecumberri. These roads will give the means, therefore, of moving the 6th division (now at Olague), the 14th light dragoons, the troops with you and in this neighbourhood, the sick and wounded, as also the 7th division and the 1st hussars, towards the line I have mentioned, should any communications arrive to render it necessary or expedient to do so.

The Light division can move from Zubieta into the same line, which being that of the great road from Tolosa towards Pamplona, our communications and lateral movements would be easy.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie and Col. Arentschildt.

Lizaso, 27th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The 1st hussars and the King's German Legion will move, on receiving this order, to Lizaso, and encamp near it.

The 7th division will march also to the vicinity of Lizaso. But Lord Dalhousie will leave a post of observation in the passes, and Col. Arentschildt will leave a few hussars with that post, to bring reports from it.

The 1st hussars will send a small party, under an officer, to the village of Lecumberri, on the great road between Tolosa and Pamplona.

This party is stationed there to keep up the communication between the right and left of the army. The officer commanding it will put himself in communication, as soon as possible, with Major Gen. C. Alten, at Zubieta, and report his having done so.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Heights of Villaba, 28th July, 1813, 4 P.M.

The enemy has been repulsed in all his attacks here. It will be necessary to take effectual precautions, however, against any attempt he may make to move towards Irurzun. This he might do with the troops which followed your march by the Lanz road, and those which may have followed Lord Dalhousie through the pass of Doña Maria. Lord Wellington will be found either upon the heights of this position or at Villaba. The baggage of head quarters is at Berrioplano.

The sick and wounded are sent to Irurzun.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Heights near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 8½ A.M.

Your report of the enemy moving on Lizaso has been received. The 7th division (now near this) has been ordered back to your support. Your object must be to prevent the enemy moving towards Pamplona, by the direct road on Berrioplano from Lizaso, as also to prevent his moving or sending detachments upon Irurzun.

With the support of the 7th division you will probably be equal not only to secure the above objects, but even to act offensively, in case that should appear to be the most effectual means of preventing the enemy from moving upon Irurzun; but should you perceive that the enemy returns his force into the road of Olague and Ostiz, you will, of course, send back the 7th division to its destination on the left of this position.

Be so good as report if you have any information from the Light division, and communicate with it by the party of the 1st hussars which is stationed at Lecumberri.

Major Gen. Fane's brigade of cavalry is on its way to Berrioplano.

be very sorry to be obliged to give up the siege of San Sebastian, which I am afraid we should be by weakening the blockade, so as to be unable to hold the trenches.

3½ P.M. Although I told you in the commencement of this letter that I did not think Soult would attack us, he did attack our left in three minutes afterwards, and the writing of this letter was interrupted. The enemy were repulsed at all points with considerable loss. We have also lost a considerable number of men, particularly of the Fusiliers and 4th Portuguese; the latter gave way, and the enemy broke through our line, which principally occasioned the loss of the Fusiliers; but upon the whole I never saw the troops behave so well.

It is extraordinary that Gen. Giron should make any difficulties about acting with you; but I will make the Chief of the Staff write to him.

I should be very happy, but I am afraid that I shall not have it in my

Q.M.G. to Major Gen. Fane.

Position near Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 10 A.M.

When your brigade gets near Berrioplano you will be so good as send one squadron to Irurzun. Let the officer commanding it be instructed to patrol towards and up to Lizaso, and endeavor to communicate in that way with Sir R. Hill (near Lizaso). Let him communicate also with the party of the 1st hussars at Lecumberri. Be so good as be yourself in communication also with Sir R. Hill.

Let me know when any reserve ammunition arrives at Irurzun from Vitoria or from Hernani.

Memorandum for Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie and for Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Heights above Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 6½ P.M.

The force of the enemy which was approaching this from the side of Lanz is reported to have halted, and to have encamped in the vicinity of Ostiz.

From the lateness of the hour it does not seem likely, therefore, that any serious attack can take place this evening.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as close his division towards its right, that it may be in a situation whence it can with facility move to the ground on the wooded ridge where Major Gen. Pack's left now is; and he will also ascertain whether one of his brigades could be moved up to a high ridge which lies between the wooded ridge above mentioned, and the great hill in its front.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as have it ascertained also whether (with the assistance of men) guns could be got up upon the ridge where the left of the 6th division now is.

Sir R. Hill's last report states his having sent the Conde de Amarante's division to Marcalain. This division should be left in a situation whence it may move to its right towards the 7th division, should such movement be required.

The remainder of the force under Sir R. Hill had better continue where it is.

Sir R. Hill will be so good, however, as to have the roads leading upon Ostiz ascertained, and posts of infantry pushed forward in the direction of that place. The cavalry should also have posts as far forward as possible towards Olague and Lanz. These measures will tend to keep the enemy jealous for his right and rear; and the line pointed out may become the direction, also, of an offensive movement against him, should any circumstance occur to give a favorable opening for such a measure. Reports from Lieut. Col. Sturgeon (on the great hill in Lord Dalhousie's front) state the enemy's force near Ostiz, at 3½ P.M., to appear to him to be about 8000 or 9000 men. Posts of observation should be kept on the most commanding hills all day, and should be again on the look out as soon as there is light in the morning.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Villaba, 29th July, 1813, 10 P.M.

As it is understood that there is a road from Ostiz to Marcalain, Lord Wellington thinks it advisable that some British troops should be early in the morning with the Conde de Amarante's division, and requests you will make an arrangement for that purpose.

It will be desirable to have a report from you at as early an hour in the morning as possible.

Marshal Soult having been foiled in his attempt to raise the blockade of Pamplona, the allied army assumed the offensive, after dislodging the enemy from the heights in its front, and moved forward according to the following instructions.

power, to propose that Gen. Robertson should be employed with this army; but I will write to you upon this subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

On the heights in front of Villaba, 30th July, 1813.

The enemy, in the course of yesterday, collected all their force, excepting Villatte's reserve, in this neighbourhood; and they appear now

Position near Villaba, 30th July, 1813.

Instructions communicated by the Q. M. G. for the advance of the army:

The 3d division, with 2 squadrons of light cavalry, will follow the enemy by the Roncesvalles road. Sir T. Picton will be hereafter informed what other troops will follow the 3d division.

The 4th division will, for the present, act along the hills that are between the Roncesvalles road and the Ostiz road. This division will connect the columns which advance by these two roads. Its own progress must, of course, be slow, from the nature of the country; and Sir L. Cole is besides instructed not to press the enemy by any direct attack when he is strongly posted, but to wait a little in these cases for the co-operation of the columns moving by the roads, whose advance will, of course, alarm the enemy for his flanks.

The column moving by the Ostiz road will be composed as follows:

Major Gen. Byng's brigade, and one squadron of the 13th light dragoons.

The 6th division.

The remainder of the 13th light dragoons.

The troops under the Conde de la Bisbal.*

The 7th division will move by the hills on the left of the valley of the Ostiz, and Lord Dalhousie will regulate his advance in a manner similar to that ordered for the 4th division. He will communicate on his right with the column on the Ostiz road, and on the left with the troops under Sir R. Hill.

Sir R. Hill will be so good as point his movements towards Lanz and towards Olague, regulating them according to those of the enemy, and communicating frequently to head quarters whatever he can ascertain respecting the enemy's march.

Head quarters will be with the column on the Ostiz road.

The 3d division, 6th division, and 2d division will move with one brigade of artillery each.

The remainder of the artillery is not to move for the present. Major Gen. Long's brigade of cavalry will move with Sir R. Hill.

Major Gen. Fane's brigade of cavalry will continue near Berrioplano.

The remainder of the cavalry under Sir S. Cotton will continue in the neighbourhood of Pamplona.

All the troops will send for their baggage.

Ostiz, 30th July, 1813, 9 P.M.

Instructions for the further advance of the army.

The troops will continue to follow the enemy to-morrow morning at daybreak, according to the following arrangement:

The right column will continue to move by the Roncesvalles road, Sir T. Picton regulating its advance according to circumstances.

The column on the Ostiz road will move forward in the same order as this day, subject, however, to the following arrangement on the march, viz.: At Olague the 6th division will move off to the right to Egui, and the 13th regt. of light dragoons (except the squadron with the advanced guard) will move with the 6th division. The further destination of these troops is to march by Zilbeti to Linzoain, and thence to join the 3d division. They will not leave Egui, however, till they are replaced there by other troops.

Sir L. Cole will move the 4th division, when he can most conveniently do so, into the Ostiz and Lanz road, and will replace the 6th division in the column moving upon that road.

Sir R. Hill will direct the movements of the troops under his orders towards Lanz, making his disposition so as to turn always the right flank of any post taken up by the enemy, and

* The troops under the Conde de la Bisbal were afterwards ordered to join the left of the army to support Sir R. Hill.

The Conde de la Bisbal to the Q.M.G.

30 Juillet, 1813.

Selon ce que le général Hill a désiré, je me trouve placé sur le chemin que doit suivre le corps que ce général commande, et en contact avec la division de Morillo, et celle ci avec le corps du général Hill. Je suivrai son mouvement si je ne reçois ordre contraire, et je ferai de mon mieux pour contribuer à la complète destruction de l'ennemi.

to be in march to their rear by their right, that is towards the valley of Baztan. Some are, however, certainly moving by the Roncesvalles road; the greater number by the others. I have made all the dispositions for following them, and shall push forward our left, so as to support your position, which must be between Irun and the Bidasoa.

I have a letter from Gen. Giron, expressing apprehensions of the consequence to that position of losing Vera. The fact is, that Vera is no

pressing him as much as circumstances will admit of. That part of the Conde de la Bisbal's force which moved this afternoon to Marcalain is to support the troops under Sir R. Hill; Sir Rowland will therefore communicate the arrangement to the Conde de la Bisbal, or the officer commanding these troops.

The ultimate destination of the 7th division is to move by the pass of Doña Maria. Lord Dalhousie will therefore give that direction to the division when he perceives it can be done without affecting the more immediate operations against the enemy; and Lord Dalhousie will concert with Sir R. Hill about the passing of the division to the left of Sir Rowland's troops, which latter are destined to return into the valley of Baztan.

Sir R. Hill will direct the 1st hussars to send one squadron with the 7th division by the route of Doña Maria.

Sir R. Hill will also make arrangements for the march of Brig. Gen. Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry by Olague, or from Lanz to Egui. Its destination from thence is to move by the foundry of Egui to the passes leading into the valley of Les Alduides.

The General officers commanding the several columns will be so good as make the best arrangements they can for keeping up communications with each other, and they will communicate, either by that means, or by a more direct channel, as may be most convenient, with head quarters. The artillery of the 3d division will move as far forward on the Roncesvalles road as Sir T. Picton may deem expedient.

The 6th division will not move any artillery towards Egui.

The artillery on the Lanz road will not proceed beyond Lanz without a special order.

If Sir R. Hill thinks that Major Gen. Fane's brigade of cavalry may be of use to-morrow by moving by Irurzun upon Lizaso, he will be so good as send orders for that movement to Major Gen. Fane, either through a letter party which is at Berrioplano, or through the detachment of the brigade which is stationed at Irurzun.

Head quarters will move by the road of Lanz.

Q.M.G. to Major Gen. C. Alten.

Ostiz, 30th July, 1813.

The army is following the enemy in the direction of the passes of the mountains. You will be so good, therefore, as put the Light division in movement without delay towards Zubieta.

Be so good as keep up the communication with Lecumberri, and establish a nearer one when it can be done.

One column will move from this side by Doña Maria.*

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to the Q.M.G.

Oyarzun, 1st Aug. 1813, 7 P.M.

I received your welcome letter (dated Lizaso, 31st July, 11 A.M.) in the middle of last night. All that could be attempted to interrupt the enemy's retreat was to reinforce Longa, and to desire him to endeavor to hold the bridge at Yanci with a greater force. However, the enemy got there when he had only 2 companies, which were driven from it; they (the French) passed it, and occupied a strong height on this side of it, from which Longa, reinforced by a light battalion of Barcena's brigade (one of Giron's, sent in support), drove the enemy. It held the bridge for some hours against the attacks of a much superior force: De Lancey, who had gone that way, left them about 3 this afternoon, when the enemy's fire had slackened, and he was in hopes that they would hold it. But Lieut. Col. Bouverie, who staid later, and is but just returned, tells me that the enemy, having got a good many men up the hill unperceived, gained the summit, and so turned this battalion, which was obliged to give way.

The enemy had a quantity of baggage, and were in great confusion, and numbers of men were scrambling over the mountain on the other side, trying to escape without fighting. I don't suppose the Spaniards would attempt to retake the bridge: the road will therefore be open for the enemy to pass on, unless this delay should have given the Light division time to come up from Zubieta, where, I understand, it would arrive about 10 o'clock this morning. Had it been possible for it to get to Zubieta yesterday, as I hoped from your letter, this column of the enemy must have suffered great loss. Both De Lancey and Bouverie speak highly of the behaviour of this light battalion of Gen. Barcena's brigade.

object to any body. The heights are important for the communication with Lesaca, by the valley of the Bidasoa; and the heights on the other side open the *débouché* into France: but the loss of both would not affect the position of Irun, if the passages through the rocky heights on the right of Irun and Oyarzun are well guarded, for which Longa is allotted; and this is what it is most important to take care of. If Vera, Salin, and Lesaca can be kept, it is so much the better, as then those heights cannot be approached; but the possession of those places is not so important as Gen. Giron appears to think, till we shall be forward again in the valley of Baztan.

The Light division will probably be this day at Lecumberri; and they shall move forward to-morrow towards Zubieta and Sumbilla, to communicate with your right.

P.S. I have just received a report, stating that the reserve consists of 12,000 or 14,000 men, instead of 8000, as had been stated. The troops under Thouvenot and St. Pol are part of the reserve.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal. Sur les hauteurs en avant de Villaba, ce 30 Juillet, 1813.

Soult se fait pousser un peu de la montagne, mais j'en viendrai bientôt à bout. Nous tenons les montagnes à la droite et à la gauche, et la 4^{me} division s'avance sur celle qui était occupée par l'ennemi. Je fais avancer la 6^{me} division sur la route d'Ostiz, et la 3^{me} par celle de Roncesvalles.

Pour le blocus, je vous prie d'avoir la bonté d'en donner charge à Don Carlos de España, et de lui laisser assez de monde de l'armée de réserve et de l'Andalousie pour en faire 6000 hommes; laissez lui aussi l'artillerie et la cavalerie, à l'exception d'un escadron qui vous sera toujours utile dans les montagnes. Avec le reste, je vous prie de suivre les mouvemens de la 6^{me} division par le chemin d'Ostiz.

P.S. Dans peu de jours j'espère que votre monde vous rejoindra, puisque ferai bloquer la place par des troupes de Duran et de Mina.

To Major Gen. Baron C. Alten.

Near Almandoz, 31st July, 1813, noon.

I sent to you yesterday, to desire that you would return to Zubieta; but it is just possible that you may not have received the order, or that you may have been disturbed from the station at which I thought you, in consequence of hearing from Col. Rooke that Gen. Hill was pressed by the enemy in the afternoon.

If you should have arrived at Zubieta, I give you notice that a large body of the enemy are marching upon Doña Maria; and it is very desirable that you should endeavor to head them at San Estevan. If you should find that you cannot head them there, you might at Sumbilla; or you might cut in upon their column of march. They are in the greatest disorder. The head of our troops is here; and others are following the enemy by Doña Maria. Communicate this letter to Sir T. Graham, by Goizueta.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

San Estevan, 1st Aug. 1813, 8 P.M.

I imagine there are none of the enemy in Spain this night. Gen.

Hill's troops are in the Puerto de Maya; the Light division at Yanci; the 4th between that and Sumbilla; the 7th division between Sumbilla and Echalar. We have taken many prisoners. We should have taken many more, and struck some terrible blows this day, if it had not been for some mistakes and the great fatigues of the troops. I hope to be tomorrow beyond the frontier. Head quarters will be in Echalar; but I shall be somewhere about the Puerto de Maya.

It is very desirable that you should get up your pontoons, artillery, and cavalry; and that all your arrangements should be made to cross the Bidasoa, still keeping the blockade of San Sebastian so as to resume the siege.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

San Estevan, ce 1 Août, 1813, à 9 heures du soir.

Je viens de recevoir votre lettre.

D'abord je vous prie de vous faire rejoindre par le Général Clarke, et de tenir vos 7000 hommes rassemblés. Puis je vous enverrai mes dispositions par le Chef de l'Etat Major Espagnol *ordinariamente*; quelquefois, s'il ne était pas auprès de moi, je vous écrirai moi-même, ou je vous ferai écrire par le Général Murray, avec qui j'arrange toujours le détail des mouvemens.

Le fait est, qu'après que je vous avais écrit, et que le 30 on reçut la nouvelle de l'attaque sur le Général Hill, et que vous avez consenti à aller à son secours, je n'ai pas su le véritable état de choses avant que j'eusse commencé le mouvement d'hier; et connaissant les défilés de ces montagnes et les difficultés de subsistance que vous auriez peut-être eues, j'avais arrangé que vous et la 4^{me} division feraient halte à Lanz; et que le Général Hill passerait le premier pour occuper son ancienne position de la vallée de Baztan.

Je ne savais pas qu'il était toujours cerné par l'ennemi trop fort pour lui, et que l'ennemi se tenait en telle force sur Doña Maria; et que le cas était un de ceux où des Officiers Généraux qui ont la confiance de leur chef sont dans l'obligation de se départir de ses ordres. Mais la conséquence en est toujours la confusion et l'inconvénient pour quelques corps de l'armée.

Le Général Murray vous fera savoir les dispositions pour demain. Mais, comme la chose ne presse pas du tout, je vous prie de ne pas marcher jusqu'à l'heure qui vous conviendra; et même de raccourcir votre marche si vous le trouvez nécessaire, me faisant savoir où vous trouver.

Voici la première fois que je me trouve au Quartier Général depuis le 26, et cela m'arrive souvent. Mais on sait toujours où je suis, et vous pouvez être sûr qu'à moins qu'il ne m'arrive d'accident, tel que celui dont je vous ai déjà parlé ci-dessus, les ordres vous parviendront d'une manière plus régulière.

P.S. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait un seul Français en Espagne ce soir de ce côté-ci.

To Earl Bathurst.

San Estevan, 1st Aug. 1813.

Two practicable breaches having been effected at San Sebastian on the

24th July, orders were given that they should be attacked on the morning of the 25th. I am concerned to have to report that this attempt to obtain possession of the place failed, and that our loss was very considerable.

I went to the siege on the 25th, and, having conferred with Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham and the officers of the engineers and artillery, it appeared to me that it would be necessary to increase the facilities of the attack before it should be repeated. But, upon adverting to the state of our ammunition, I found that we had not a sufficiency to do anything effectual till that should arrive for which I had written on the 26th June, which I had reason to believe was embarked at Portsmouth, and to expect every hour. I therefore desired that the siege should for the moment be converted into a blockade, a measure which I found to be the more desirable when I returned to Lesaca in the evening.

Marshal Soult had been appointed *Lieutenant de l'Empereur*, and Commander in Chief of the French armies in Spain and the southern provinces of France, by a *Décret Impérial* on the 1st July; and he joined and took the command of the army on the 13th July, which having been joined nearly about the same time by the corps which had been in Spain under the command of Gen. Clausel, and by other reinforcements, was called *L'armée d'Espagne*, and re-formed into 9 divisions of infantry, forming the right, centre, and left, under the command of Gen. Reille, the Comte d'Erlon, and Gen. Clausel, as Lieut. Generals, and a reserve under Gen. Villatte, and 2 divisions of dragoons and one of light cavalry, the two former under the command of Gens. Treillard and Tilly, and the latter under the command of Gen. Pierre Soult. There was besides allotted to the army a large proportion of artillery, and a considerable number of guns had already joined.*

The allied army was posted, as I have already informed your Lordship, in the passes of the mountains, with a view to cover the blockade of Pamplona and the siege of San Sebastian. Major Gen. Byng's brigade of British infantry, and Gen. Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, were on the right in the pass of Roncesvalles; Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole was posted at Viscarret to support those troops; and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, with the 3d division, at Olague in reserve. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill occupied the valley of Baztan with the remainder of the 2d division, and the Portuguese division under the Conde de Amarante, detaching Gen. Campbell's Portuguese brigade to Les Alduides, within the French territory. The Light and 7th occupied the heights of S^{ta} Barbara and the town of Vera, and the Puerto de Echalar, and kept the communication with the valley of Baztan; and the 6th division was in reserve at San Estevan. Gen. Longa's division kept the communication between the troops at Vera and those under Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham and Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron on the great road. The Conde de la Bisbal blockaded Pamplona.

The defect of this position was that the communication between the several divisions was very tedious and difficult, while the communications of the enemy in front of the passes were easy and short; and in case of

* See Appendix, No. XI.

attack those in the front line could not support each other, and could look for support only from their rear.

On the 24th Marshal Soult collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of the centre and 2 divisions of cavalry, at St. Jean Pied de Port; and on the 25th attacked, with between 30,000 and 40,000 men, Gen. Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division, and these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout the day; but the enemy turned it in the afternoon, and Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole considered it to be necessary to withdraw in the night; and he marched to the neighbourhood of Zubiri. In the actions which took place on this day the 20th regt. distinguished themselves.

Two divisions of the centre of the enemy's army attacked Sir R. Hill's position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the valley of Baztan, in the afternoon of the same day.* The brunt of the action fell upon Major Gen. Pringle's and Major Gen. Walker's brigades, in the 2d division, under the command of Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give way, but having been supported by Major Gen. Barnes's brigade of the 7th division, they regained that part of their post which was the key of the whole, and which would have enabled them to reassume it if circumstances had permitted it. But Sir R. Hill having been apprised of the necessity that Sir L. Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise to Irurita, and the enemy did not advance on the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya.

Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority of numbers, they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops during the 7 hours they were engaged. All the regiments charged with the bayonet. The conduct of the 82d regt., which moved up with Major Gen. Barnes's brigade, is particularly reported. Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart was slightly wounded.

I was not apprised of these events till late in the night of the 25th and 26th; and I adopted immediate measures to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pamplona.

This would have been effected early on the 27th, only that Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton concurred in thinking their post at Zubiri not tenable for the time during which it would have been necessary for them to wait in it. They therefore retired early on the 27th, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona, having the right, consisting of the 3d division, in front of Huarte, and extending to the hills beyond Olaz; the left, consisting of the 4th division, Major Gen. Byng's brigade of the 2d division, and Brig. Gen. Campbell's (Portuguese) brigade of the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, on the heights in front of Villaba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the high road from Ostiz to Pamplona, and their right resting upon a height which defended the high road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. Gen. Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, and that part of the Conde de la Bisbal's corps not engaged in the blockade, were in reserve. From the latter the regiment of *Pravia* and that of *El Principe* were detached

* See Appendix, No. XI.

to occupy part of the hill on the right of the 4th division, by which the road from Zubiri was defended.

The British cavalry under Lieut. Gen. Sir S. Cotton were placed near Huarte on the right, being the only ground on which it was possible to use the cavalry.

The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allied, and on the right of the French army, along the road to Ostiz; beyond this river there is another range of mountains connected with Lizaso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

I joined the 3d and 4th divisions just as they were taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards the enemy formed their army on a mountain, the front of which extends from the high road to Ostiz to the high road to Zubiri; and they placed one division on the left of that road on a height, and in some villages in front of the 3d division: they had here also a large body of cavalry.

In a short time after they had taken up their ground, the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the 4th division, which was then occupied by one battalion of the 4th Portuguese regt., and by the Spanish regiment of *Pravia*. These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill to our position, I reinforced it with the 40th regt., and this regiment, with the Spanish regiments *El Principe* and *Pravia*, held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain possession of it. Nearly at the same time that the enemy attacked this height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of Sorauren on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the communication by that road, and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the 6th division of infantry, and I directed that the heights should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz, and that the 6th division should form across the valley in rear of the left of the 4th division, resting their right on Oricain, and their left on the heights above mentioned. The 6th division had scarcely taken their position when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy which had been assembled in the village of Sorauren. Their front was, however, so well defended by the fire of their own light troops, from the heights on their left, and by the fire from the heights occupied by the 4th division and Brig. Gen. Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss from a fire on their front, both flanks, and rear.

In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in which they found themselves in their situation in the valley of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, which was occupied by the 7th caçadores, of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were attacked, however, again by the 7th caçadores, supported by Major Gen. Ross with his brigade of the 4th division, and were driven down with great loss.

The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights

occupied by the 4th division, and in every part in our favor, excepting where one battalion of the 10th Portuguese regt. of Major Gen. Campbell's brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, and having been obliged to give way immediately on the right of Major Gen. Ross's brigade, the enemy established themselves on our line, and Major Gen. Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post. I however ordered the 27th and 48th regts. to charge, first, that body of the enemy which had first established themselves on the height, and next, those on the left. Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down with immense loss; and the 6th division having moved forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the 4th, the attack upon this front ceased entirely, and was continued but faintly on other points of our line.

In the course of this contest, the gallant 4th division, which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and Major Gen. Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments *El Principe* and *Pravia*.

I had ordered Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill to march by Lanz upon Lizaso, as soon as I found that Lieut. Gens. Sir T. Picton and Sir L. Cole had moved from Zubiri, and Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie from San Estevan to the same place, where both arrived on the 28th, and the 7th division came to Marcalain.

The enemy's force which had been in front of Sir R. Hill, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. The enemy thus reinforced, and occupying a position on the mountains which appeared little liable to attack, and finding that they could make no impression on our front, determined to endeavor to turn our left by an attack on Sir R. Hill's corps. They reinforced with one division the troops which had been already opposed to him, still occupying the same points in the mountain on which was formed their principal force; but they drew in to their left the troops which occupied the heights opposite the 3d division; and they had, during the night of the 29th and 30th, occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on our left of the Lanz opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions; thus connecting their right in their position with the divisions detached to attack Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill.

I, however, determined to attack their position, and ordered Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the enemy's right would be turned; and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's left had stood, and to turn their left by the road to Roncesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the front of the enemy's position, as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, whom I had sent to take the command of the 6th division, Major Gen. Pack having been wounded, turned the village of Sorauren as soon as the Earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain by which that flank was defended; and the 6th division, and

Major Gen. Byng's brigade, which had relieved the 4th division on the left of our position on the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village. Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole likewise attacked the front of the enemy's main position with the 7th caçadores, supported by the 11th Portuguese regt., the 40th, and the battalion under Col. Bingham, consisting of the 53d and Queen's regt. All these operations obliged the enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by troops.

In their retreat from this position, the enemy lost a great number of prisoners. I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all the General officers, officers, and troops throughout these operations. The attack made by Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie was admirably conducted by his Lordship, and executed by Major Gen. Inglis and the troops composing his brigade; and that by Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham, and Major Gen. Byng, and that by Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole; and the movement made by Sir T. Picton merited my highest commendation. The latter officer co-operated in the attack of the mountain, by detaching troops to his left, in which Lieut. Col. the Hon. R. Trench was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

While these operations were going on, and in proportion as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill. The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended manœuvre upon his left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied behind Lizaso to the next range. He there, however, maintained himself; and I enclose his report of the conduct of the troops.*

I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat from the mountain to Olague, where I was at sunset immediately in the rear of their

* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.
31st July, 1813.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that, although from the immense superiority of force which the enemy directed against the position intrusted to my charge yesterday, it became in my opinion imperiously necessary for me to retire from that ground, the conduct of the officers and troops, British and Portuguese, was such as to entitle them to my entire approbation, and I could not have wished it to be better.

Major Gen. Pringle, with Major Gen. Walker's brigade, under Lieut. Col. Fitzgerald, of the 60th regt., supported by the 34th regt. and 14th Portuguese regt., opposed the ascent of the enemy to the ridge on the left of the position, in a most gallant style; drove him repeatedly back, and although unable ultimately to prevent him from ascending the ridge, by a more distant movement, our troops kept their ground firmly, and when ordered to retire, performed it under Major Gen. Pringle with the greatest regularity, and with small loss, covered by a battalion of the 14th Portuguese regt., under Lieut. Col. M'Donald, of the conduct of which officer, and the steadiness of his regiment, the Major General speaks in terms of the greatest praise.

Col. Ashworth's brigade, also attacked in his position by a superior force, met the attack with the greatest steadiness, and drove the enemy before him at the point of the bayonet, and held his ground as long as I thought it prudent for him to do so; and a battalion of Brig. Gen. da Costa's brigade held the ridge on the right of the position to the last, covering the formation of the troops on the ground they were directed to take up: the enemy attempted to force the point, but were repulsed by Brig. Gen. da Costa, and finally driven down the ridge at the point of the bayonet by that battalion, a part of Col. Ashworth's brigade, and a small detachment of the 28th regt. On the whole, I can assure your Lordship that the enemy had nothing to boast of, nor was our loss severe, considering the disparity of our forces.

I feel particularly indebted to Major Gen. Pringle for his conduct on this occasion, as well as to Col. Ashworth, Col. O'Callaghan, and Lieut. Col. Fitzgerald, 60th foot, com-

attack upon Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill. They withdrew from his front in the night; and yesterday took up a strong position with 2 divisions to cover their rear on the pass of Doña Maria. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill and the Earl of Dalhousie attacked and carried the pass, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy, and the strength of their position. I am concerned to add that Lieut. Gen. the Hon. W. Stewart was wounded upon this occasion. I enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill's report.*

In the mean time, I moved with Major Gen. Byng's brigade, and the 4th division, under Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir L. Cole, by the pass of Velate, upon Irurita, in order to turn the enemy's position on Doña Maria. Major Gen. Byng took in Elizondo a large convoy going to the enemy, and made many prisoners. We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy in the valley of the Bidasoa, and many prisoners and much baggage have been taken. Major Gen. Byng has possessed himself of the valley of Baztan, and of the position on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this night nearly in the same positions which they occupied on the 25th July.

I trust that H. R. H. the Prince Regent will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops of His Majesty, and of his allies, on this occasion. The enemy having been considerably reinforced and re-equipped, after their late defeat, made a most formidable attempt to relieve the blockade of

manding brigades under him, and also to Lieut. Gen. the Conde de Amarante, and Brig. Gen. da Costa, who was wounded.

P.S. I must not omit to mention the services of Col. Pamplona, and Lieut. Col. Pyn, 18th regt., Lieut. Col. Grant and Major Mitchell, commanding the 6th of the line and 6th Portuguese in Col. Ashworth's brigade.

* Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Elizondo, 1st Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship, that, in compliance with the instructions I received through Major Gen. Murray, I proceeded yesterday with the column under my orders, on the road to Doña Maria. On our arrival at the foot of the pass, we found the enemy ascending the hill in great haste, and closely pressed by the 7th division, moving by a road parallel and to the right of that which my column was on. The rear of the enemy's column having begun to ascend the hills before our arrival, it was impossible to cut off any part of it. It was, however, considerably annoyed on its march by one 9 pounder and a howitzer. I immediately ordered the 2d division, under Lieut. Gen. Stewart, to ascend the hill by the road we were on, whilst the Earl of Dalhousie's column ascended by one more to the right. The enemy took up a strong position at the top of the pass, with a cloud of skirmishers in the front.

The attack on our side was led by Lieut. Gen. Stewart, with Major Gen. Walker's brigade, under Lieut. Col. Fitzgerald of the 60th, who forced back the enemy's skirmishers to the summit of the hill; but coming upon their main body, found them so numerous and so strongly posted, that Lieut. Gen. Stewart was induced to withdraw them until the 7th division should be in closer co-operation with him. About this time the Lieut. General was wounded, and the command of the division devolved upon Major Gen. Pringle, who, with his own brigade, commanded by Col. O'Callaghan, renewed the attack on our side, whilst the 7th division pressed them on the other, and both divisions gained the height about the same time, the enemy retiring, after sustaining a very considerable loss. The conduct of Lieut. Gen. Stewart, Major Gen. Pringle, and of the officers and troops in general, was conspicuously good, and I regret that the very thick fog prevented our taking that advantage of the situation of the enemy which we might otherwise have done. A part of each division pursued them some distance down the hill, and occasioned them a considerable loss. Having thus far performed your Lordship's instructions, I withdrew my column from the pass, and moved it upon Almandoz.

Major Gen. Pringle praises the conduct of Capt. Heise and Capt. Thorn, on this occasion; and I believe it is the intention of Lieut. Gen. Stewart to report the good conduct of some other officers, but his wound has probably delayed it.

Pamplona, with the whole of their forces, excepting the reserve under Gen. Villatte, which remained in front of our troops on the great road from Irun. This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the operations of a part only of the allied army; and the enemy has sustained a defeat, and suffered a severe loss in officers and men.

The enemy's expectations of success beyond the point of raising the blockade of Pamplona, were certainly very sanguine. They brought into Spain a large body of cavalry, and a great number of guns; neither of which arms could be used to any great extent by either party in the battle which took place. They sent off the guns to St. Jean Pied de Port, on the evening of the 28th, which have thus returned to France in safety.

The detail of the operations will show your Lordship how much reason I have to be satisfied with the conduct of all the General officers, officers, and troops. It is impossible to describe the enthusiastic bravery of the 4th division; and I was much indebted to Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole for the manner in which he directed their operations; to Major Gen. Ross, Major Gen. Anson, Major Gen. Byng, and Brig. Gen. Campbell, of the Portuguese service. All the officers commanding, and the officers of the regiments, were remarkable for their gallantry; but I particularly observed Lieut. Col. O'Toole, of the 7th caçadores, in the charge upon the enemy on our left on the 28th; and Capt. J. Telles Jurdão, of the 11th Portuguese regt., in the attack of the mountain on the 30th.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention likewise to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill; and from Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, in those of the 30th and 31st July. To the Conde de la Bisbal, likewise, I am indebted for every assistance it was in his power to give consistently with his attention to the blockade. I have already mentioned the conduct of the regiments of *Pravia* and *El Principe*, belonging to the army of reserve of Andalusia, in a most trying situation; and the whole corps appeared animated by the same zealous spirit which pervaded all the troops in that position.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford was with me throughout these operations; and I received from him all the assistance which his talents so well qualify him to afford me. The good conduct of the Portuguese officers and troops in all the operations of the present campaign, and the spirit which they show on every occasion, are not less honorable to that nation than they are to the military character of the officer who, by his judicious measures, has re-established discipline, and renewed a military spirit in the army.

I have again to draw your Lordship's attention to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from Major Gen. Murray, the Q. M. G., and Major Gen. Pakenham, the Adj. Gen., and the officers of those departments respectively; from Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Lieut. Col. Campbell, and the officers of my personal Staff.

Although our wounded are numerous, I am happy to say that the cases in general are slight; and I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship, that the utmost attention has been paid to them by the In-

spector General, Dr. M'Grigor, and by the officers of the department under his direction.

Adverting to the extent and nature of our operations, and the difficulties of our communications at all times, I have reason to be extremely well satisfied with the zeal and exertions of Sir R. Kennedy, the Commissary Gen., and the officers of his department, throughout the campaign; which, upon the whole, have been more successful in supplying the troops than could have been expected.

I transmit this dispatch to your Lordship by H. S. H. the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who is perfectly acquainted with all that has passed, and with the situation of the army; and will be able to inform your Lordship of many details relating to this series of operations, for which a dispatch does not afford scope. His Highness had a horse shot under him in the battle near Sorauren on the 28th July.

P.S. I have omitted to inform your Lordship in the body of the dispatch, that the troops in the Puerto de Maya lost there 4 Portuguese guns on the 25th July. Major Gen. Pringle, who commanded when the attack commenced, had ordered them to retire towards Maya; and when Lieut. Gen. Stewart came up, he ordered that they might return, and retire by the mountain road to Elizondo. In the mean time, the enemy were in possession of the pass, and the communication with that road was lost, and they could not reach it.

I enclose returns of the loss before San Sebastian, from the 7th to the 27th July, and returns of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations from the 25th ult. to the 1st inst.*

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

1st Aug. 1813.

About 2500 prisoners of war are on their march from the army, and on their arrival at Vitoria you will be pleased to cause them to be sent to Bilbao, in the usual manner, for the purpose of being embarked for England.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Aug. 1813.

In answer to your Lordship's letter in regard to Capt. Cardoso, I have to inform you that I know the government of Portugal will insist upon his being tried before he shall be allowed to serve in the Portuguese army, which I acknowledge I consider but reasonable, and from experience I believe to be attended with little risk to Capt. Cardoso. It would not answer for me to allow a person under accusation, as Capt. Cardoso is, to come and serve in any of the allied armies, and I hope that the Conde de

* These returns are included in the General Return of killed, wounded, and missing, during these operations, at p. 652.

Q.M.G. to the Conde de la Bisbal.

San Estevan, 2 Août, 1813, à 9½ du matin.

Avant de partir d'ici ce matin, le Duc de Ciudad Rodrigo m'avait donné ordre d'écrire à votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire marcher, aujourd'hui, les troupes Espagnoles sous ses ordres au village de Sumbilla, qui est à une demie lieue d'ici en descendant la Bidasoa. Je viens de savoir cependant que la partie des troupes de votre Excellence qui est du côté de Doña Maria ne pourra se mettre en mouvement que vers les 3 heures de l'après midi, sur quoi je prie votre Excellence de ne faire marcher à Sumbilla que les 2000 hommes seulement qui sont près d'ici, et d'amener le reste de ses troupes à San Estevan.

Le Duc est allé du côté de la frontière par Echalar, où je vais le suivre incessamment par les montagnes; mais le quartier général sera rétabli à Lesaca.

Funchal, instead of pressing me to commit such an irregularity, will apply to his brother, who has the principal influence in the local government of Portugal, to have Capt. Cardoso pardoned before, or rather without a trial.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter regarding the Red Riband for Lord Dalhousie. You may depend upon it that I had no intention to express any dissatisfaction with his conduct: the lateness of the communication with his column might have been owing to the natural difficulties of the country, or to the fault of the officer charged to make it; but I thought it necessary to mention it, as it occasioned delay and some loss in Sir R. Hill's corps after they were established in Subijana de Alava, and a departure from the original plan of the action as affecting the 4th and Light divisions.

We have had some desperate fighting in these mountains, and I have

G. O.

Lesaca, 3d Aug. 1813.

1. The Paymasters of regiments are to wait upon the Paymaster Gen. to receive the balances due upon their several estimates to the 24th Feb. and to the 24th March last, at Tolosa.

2. Under the orders of the Commander of the Forces of the 24th Jan. 1810, the balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their accounts to the 24th Jan. and to the 24th Feb. would now be to be paid; but the Commander of the Forces being desirous of establishing the system of giving the soldier a day's pay on every day, desires that the amount of the balances may be settled as follows:

3. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private man of the 2 regiments of Life Guards, on the 24th Jan. and on the 24th Feb., is to be consolidated; and the non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, and privates are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 45s. for each corporal and trumpeter, and 30s. for each private man.

4. The sums of 45s. for each corporal and trumpeter, and of 30s. for each private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the corporals and trumpeter each 1s. 6d., and the privates each 1s. a day, till the whole sum will be paid.

5. The balance due to each corporal, trumpeter, and private of the Royal regt. of Horse Guards, on the 24th Jan. and 24th Feb., is to be consolidated, and the corporals, trumpeters, and privates are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sum of 37s. 6d. for each corporal, and of 22s. 6d. for each trumpeter and private man. The sums of 37s. 6d. for each corporal, and of 22s. 6d. for each trumpeter and private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the corporal 1s. 3d., and the trumpeter and private 9d. per day, till the whole sum will be paid.

6. The balance due to each non-commissioned officer and soldier of the cavalry, and of the Foot Guards and other regiments of infantry, on the 24th Jan. and on the 24th Feb., is also to be consolidated, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to receive in hand whatever the total may amount to beyond the sums of 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private. The sums of 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private, are to remain in the hands of the Captain, from which he is to give the serjeants each 1s., the corporals and the trumpeter, or drummer, 8d., and the soldiers 6d. a day each, until the whole sum will be paid.

7. In case the balances due to any non-commissioned officer or soldier, on their accounts to the 24th Jan. and 24th Feb., should not amount to 30s. for each serjeant, 20s. for each corporal, trumpeter, or drummer, and 15s. for each private, the officer commanding the troop or company is to divide whatever sum the balance to any non-commissioned officer or soldier may amount to by 30, and is to give such non-commissioned officer or soldier on each day the proportion of whatever the balance may be.

8. It must be observed, that in case any soldier wants necessaries, the Captain must take care to stop their price from the daily payment above ordered to be made to the soldier, either by stopping the whole sum ordered to be paid daily, or a proportion, as may be settled by the officer commanding the regiment.

9. The soldiers will see, however, what an interest they have in taking care of their necessaries, and it is to be hoped there will be but little occasion for stoppages on this account.

never known the troops behave so well. In the battle of the 28th we had hard fighting, and in my life I never saw such an attack as was made by Gen. Barnes' brigade, in the 7th division, upon the enemy above Echalar yesterday; the loss of the French is immense. I understand they say themselves that they have lost 15,000 men: that is what I estimated their loss; but if they acknowledge that number, I ought to estimate it at 20,000 men, which is the number more generally believed.

The A.G. to the Commandant at Berrioplano.

3d Aug. 1813.

You will be so good as to visit the villages in the neighbourhood of the field of action of the 28th and 30th of last month, and inquire from the magistrates whether all the wounded collected in them by order or accident have been removed to the station under your command. You will also, as far as possible, have the wounded of the enemy in all respects treated as soldiers of our own service. You will report to me the result of your inquiry; and should you hear of any wounded within 6 leagues of Berrioplano in an unprotected situation, immediately take measures for their relief and removal.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813, 9 A.M.

I have received your letters to the 3d inst., which I have been obliged to delay acknowledging till this moment. The troops are of course a good deal fatigued, and we have suffered very considerably, particularly the English troops in the 2d division, in the affair in the Puerto de Maya, which, with the existing want of shoes and of musket ammunition, induces me to delay for a day or two any forward movement, and to doubt the expediency of making one at all. I keep every thing in readiness, however. I am perfectly aware of the objections to our positions in the Pyrenees; but if we should not be able to advance from them without incurring more loss than we ought, or than we can well afford, I am afraid that we cannot well retire from them.

Many events turned out unfortunately for us on the 1st inst., each of which ought to have been in our favor; and we should have done the enemy a great deal more mischief than we did in his passage down this valley. But as it is, I hope that Soult will not feel an inclination to renew his expedition, on this side at least. The French army must have suffered terribly. Between the 25th of last month and 2d of this, they were engaged seriously not less than 10 times; on many occasions in attacking very strong positions, in others beat from them or pursued. I understand that the officers say they have lost 15,000 men. I thought so; but as they say so, I now think more. I believe we have about 4000 prisoners. It is strange enough that our diminution of strength to the 31st does not exceed 1500 men; although I believe our casualties are 6000.

I propose to resume the operations of the siege as soon as the train and stores shall arrive from England; and I gave orders to the Commissary Gen. to give compensation as is proposed for the loss of boats, and to have the boats repaired. I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions, if you have not already given them, that the road from Pasages to

G. O.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

3. Surgeons of regiments are immediately to send to Pasages, where, on application to Staff Surgeon Baxter, their panniers will be completed agreeably to the requisition approved of by the Inspector of hospitals.

the wharf, and the wharf itself, may be repaired according to the memorandums, Nos. 3 and 4, in Col. Dickson's letter to you of the 1st inst. Also, if you will apply to Sir G. Collier to have a derrick erected on the wharf according to his memorandum No. 5.

I shall have the boats called from the different harbours, but I will not answer for their coming.

I have written several times to England, and I write again by this occasion, to have our naval force increased; which is the only mode of having either an efficient blockade, or means to carry on the siege as we ought.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will order Col. May, of the artillery, to head quarters, to arrange the ammunition concerns of the army, which are now in my hands.

I have received from Sir R. Fletcher a plan for the recommencement and prosecution of the siege; and he appears to think it necessary that more works should be constructed. If that be the case, he had better commence them immediately, and Col. Dickson had better commence the re-landing of the guns, &c., and re-arming the batteries, at least so far as to protect Sir R. Fletcher's works.

To Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

Several boats have been damaged, and others have been entirely lost, in the harbour of Pasages, in the operations of disembarking and embarking the guns and stores for the siege of San Sebastian. I request you to give directions that measures may be taken, in communication with Col. Dickson, to have the damaged boats caulked and otherwise repaired, and that the owners may be paid their value for the boats lost. This should be done without loss of time.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Sir C. Stuart, from which you will see that the Portuguese finances are not in so bad a state. There is nothing new whatever. I desired Pakenham to send you a report that there are 2000 recovered Portuguese at Vitoria.

My rheumatism still keeps me at home.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter (No. 6) of the 22d July, from Vinaroz, since which I have received one of the 30th from Mina, from Zaragoza, in which he sends me intelligence which he has received from Catalonia, stating that a detachment of 1500 men had been sent from Tortosa to Tarragona, about the 24th or 25th. I should be inclined, therefore, to doubt the truth of the intelligence of the intention of Suchet to destroy that port; but if he should destroy it, I acknowledge that I am still inclined to adhere to the plan of attacking Tortosa, and obtaining possession of the Ebro before you shall go farther north.

You will observe that your operations are now not solely maritime. You are necessarily connected with the 2d and 3d Spanish armies, who must hold their communication with Valencia. If, therefore, your Lordship should determine to cross the Ebro, and attack Barcelona, you must

blockade Tortosa in strength, at the same time that you must have at least 15,000 men, some of them your best troops, to attack Barcelona; and you must have a large covering army. This covering army must have two objects for its attention, viz., the siege of Barcelona, and the blockade of Tortosa; and I am afraid that no covering army which your Lordship would be able to assemble, after providing troops to blockade the different places to be blockaded, and troops to besiege Barcelona, would be equal to its objects.

For this reason, I confess that, in the existing state of affairs, I should prefer the attack of Tortosa, even to that of Tarragona, supposing the latter place not to be destroyed; and the 4th paragraph of my instruction of the 14th April leaves it to your Lordship to begin with any of the objects held out to your attention which you may prefer. The same reasoning applies still more forcibly to the attack of Barcelona.

I am perfectly sensible of the additional difficulties with which you will meet in the attack of Tarragona and Barcelona at a later period of the season, occasioned by the precariousness of the weather. But if you should once get possession of the mouth of the Ebro, you will not be without a neighbouring port for your transports; and Sir E. Pellew, feeling an interest in your Lordship's operations, will aid them by the presence of his fleet, which will be able to remain on and communicate with the coast, at periods when it would be imprudent, and indeed impossible, to keep transports on the coast.

I feel the more anxious on this subject, from feeling myself the difficulty of having a double object in view at the same time. This army necessarily blockades Pamplona, because if it did not do so at present, the place would get supplies of provisions, and much time would elapse before it would fall; and we at the same time lay siege to San Sebastian, because if advantage is not taken of the fair weather to perform that operation, it cannot be performed at all. But in order to cover both, the army necessarily occupies a very extended line.

Marshal Soult, who now commands in my front, took advantage of this situation of affairs, a few days ago, to attack our right, and I was obliged to collect the right and centre of the army in front of Pamplona, where, on the 27th and 28th ult., a detachment, consisting of the 3d, 4th, and 6th divisions, under my command, gained a complete victory. We attacked the enemy on the 30th, the right and centre having been tolerably concentrated; and we have again driven the enemy into France, with immense loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that H. S. H. the Prince of Orange, Baron Constant,* and Mr. Johnson,† may be furnished with passage to England, His Serene Highness having dispatches from me.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, ce 4 Août, 1813, à 10½ heures.

Je reçois votre lettre du 3, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé.

* Baron Constant de Rebecque.

† Sir H. Johnson, Bart.

Jamais je n'ai vu les troupes se conduire mieux qu'elles ne l'ont fait dans ces derniers jours. Dans la bataille du 28, l'anniversaire de Talavera, la 4^{me} division a fait des merveilles.

Faites mes complimens au Général Castaños quand vous lui écrirez.

To the Rev. J. Lemman, Bath.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I received by the last post your letter of the 5th July, and I am much flattered by your recollection of me. The possession of the '*Tableau Historique de la Guerre de la Révolution de France*' would be highly desirable to me, and I shall be very much obliged to you to send that copy, which you are so kind as to offer to me, to the Sec. of State, to be sent to me by the first opportunity.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

This letter* has been detained till this day; and your Lordship will see the result of our attempt to defend the passes of the Pyrenees against a large army attacking them from France. The result would not have been very different if they had been ever so well fortified, excepting by posts to be occupied permanently. Sir L. Cole, whose retreat occasioned the retreat of the whole, retired, not because he could not hold his position, but because his right flank was turned. It is a great disadvantage when the Officer Commanding in Chief must be absent, and probably at a distance. For this reason there is nothing I dislike so much as these extended operations, which I cannot direct myself.

———'s affair of the 25th was in fact a surprise, occasioned by the fancy which people have to attend to other matters but their own concerns, and to form opinions of what is passing in other quarters. It was known that Soult had marched to St. Jean Pied de Port, and that Gen. Cole was attacked on the morning of the 25th, and ———, having 10,000 or 12,000 men about a mile in his front, and having been prepared to receive the attack, decided that the enemy would not attack him; and he sent half the troops a league to the rear to their camp, and ordered the whole to cook, and went himself to Elizondo. In the mean time the French formed in the wood, under the height, on which he had nobody. I give the troops great credit for getting out of the scrape as well as they did. With common precaution, ——— had men enough to defend the pass.

The enemy had no success on any other ground, and were terribly beat after I joined the troops at Sorauren. Their loss cannot be less than 15,000 men, and I am not certain that it is not 20,000 men. We have about 4000 prisoners. I never saw such fighting as on the 27th and 28th July, the anniversary of the battle of Talavera, nor such determination as the troops showed.

I wish some measures could be adopted to punish the recruiters for the foreign corps. Above 150 men deserted from the Chasseurs Britanniques from Legasa in one night; and the Brunswick Oels lost by desertion 90 men in the course of a very few days on the outposts. The fact

* See letter to Lord Liverpool, 25th July, 1813, p. 627.

is, the men were enlisted from the prisons. There are now not less than 800 deserters in confinement at Lisbon, whom the Admiralty have forbidden should be sent home; and they are excessively discontented with their treatment, which has now effectually stopped desertion in the French army in aid of the enlistment of deserters by the York light infantry.

The desertion of the foreign troops has had the bad effect of teaching desertion to our own troops.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

The Prince of Orange having been detained till this day for the returns, I have to inform your Lordship that the enemy still continued posted on the morning of the 2d, with a force of two divisions, in the Puerto de Echalar, and nearly the whole army behind the Puerto, when the 4th, 7th, and Light divisions advanced by the valley of the Bidasoa to the frontier; and I had determined to dislodge them by a combined attack and movement of the three divisions.

The 7th division, however, having crossed the mountains from Sumbilla, and having necessarily preceded the arrival of the 4th, Major Gen. Barnes' brigade was formed for the attack, and advanced before the 4th and Light divisions could co-operate, with a regularity and gallantry which I have seldom seen equalled, and actually drove two divisions of the enemy from the formidable heights, notwithstanding the resistance opposed to them. It is impossible that I can extol too highly the conduct of Major Gen. Barnes, and of these brave troops, which was the admiration of all who were witnesses of it. Major Gen. Kempt's brigade of the Light division likewise drove a very considerable force from the rock which forms the left of the Puerto. There is now no enemy in the field within this part of the Spanish frontier.

I have the honor to enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's report of the assault of San Sebastian.*

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.
Hernani, 27th July, 1813.

The attack of the breach in the line wall on the left flank of San Sebastian took place on the morning of the 25th, when the fall of the tide left the foot of the wall dry, which was soon after daylight. I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the distinguished gallantry of the troops employed, some of whom did force their way into the town, the attack did not succeed. The enemy occupied in force all the defences of the place which looked that way, and from which, and from all round the breach, they were enabled to bring so destructive a fire of grape and musketry, flanking and enfilading the column, and to throw over so many hand grenades on the troops, that it became necessary to desist from the assault. The loss sustained was therefore severe, especially by the 3d batt. Royal Scots, the leading one of Major Gen. Hay's brigade, which being on duty in the trenches, formed the column of attack; Major Gen. Spry's Portuguese brigade, that of Major Gen. Robinson, and the 4th caçadores of Brig. Gen. Wilson's being in reserve in the trenches; the whole under the direction of Major Gen. Oswald, commanding the 5th division. Though this attack has failed, it would be great injustice not to assure your Lordship, that the troops conducted themselves with their usual gallantry, and only retired when I thought a further perseverance in the attack would have occasioned a useless sacrifice of brave men. Major Gen. Hay, Major Frazer, Col. the Hon. C. F. Greville, and Col. Cameron, commanding the Royal Scots, 38th and 9th regts., greatly distinguished themselves. Major Frazer lost his life on the breach, with many of his brave comrades.

The conduct throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of the officers and men of the Royal artillery and engineers, never was exceeded in indefatigable zeal,

While the troops were engaged in the neighbourhood of Pamplona, as reported in my dispatch of the 1st inst., Brig. Gen. Longa occupied with his division this part of the Bidasoa, including the town of Vera. That part of the enemy's army which had been left in observation of the allied troops on the great road from Irun, attacked him on the 28th, but were repulsed with considerable loss. I have great pleasure in reporting the good conduct of these troops on all occasions, and likewise of a battalion of Spanish caçadores, in Gen. Barcena's division of the Galician army, which had been sent to the bridge of Yanci, on the enemy's retreat on the 1st inst., which it held against very superior numbers during a great part of the day.

The division of the 4th army, under Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, having joined, I have left him in charge of the blockade of Pamplona, aided by a detachment from the army of reserve of Andalusia. The Conde de la Bisbal, with the remainder of that army, has joined the army under my command.

Nothing of importance has occurred in Aragon since my dispatch of the 19th July. I have a report from Lord W. Bentinck from Vinaroz on the 21st July, and he was making preparations to cross the Ebro.

activity, and gallantry; and I beg to mention, particularly, to your Lordship, Lieut. Cols. Dickson, Frazer, and May, and Major Webber Smith, of the Royal artillery; Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, and Majors Ellicombe and C. F. Smith, of the Royal engineers. Three officers of this corps, employed to conduct different parts of the columns of attack, behaved admirably, but suffered severely. Capt. Lewis has lost his leg; Lieut. Jones was wounded in the breach, and taken; and Lieut. Machell, after his return, was killed in the trenches.

I beg to recommend to your Lordship Lieut. Campbell, of the 9th,* who led the forlorn hope, and who was severely wounded on the breach. I have the greatest satisfaction too in assuring your Lordship of the most cordial support and assistance afforded by Sir G. Collier, commanding His Majesty's ships on this coast, and of all the officers and seamen of the squadron employed on shore.

No exertion that could be afforded was wanting, and Lieut. Col. Dickson has represented to me, in the strongest terms, the steady and gallant conduct of a detachment of seamen in the batteries, under the command of Lieut. O'Reilly (first Lieut. of H. M. S. *Surveillante*), and of their exemplary behaviour while on shore. I beg, too, to mention Mr. Digby Marsh, master's mate, acting as Lieut. in the batteries, after Lieut. Dunlop was severely wounded.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege of San Sebastian, from the 7th to the 27th July, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	11	9	184	204
Wounded	44	34	696	774
Missing	6	6	288	300

Portuguese loss included.

* Now Col. Colin Campbell, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen (now commanding the 98th regt. in China). He wrote to the Compiler as follows: 'I led the left wing of the Royal Scots, and not the forlorn hope.'

I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the attack of the enemy's position on the 2d inst.

General Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the 25th July to the 2d Aug., inclusive, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.	British.	Portuguese.
Killed	43	59	779	881	559	322
Wounded	331	261	4918	5510	3693	1817
Missing	17	16	672	705	504	201

This return includes the whole of the casualties during the operations between the 25th July and the 2d Aug., enclosed in the dispatch of the 1st as well as of the 4th Aug.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I enclose two more letters from Sir J. Murray, but I have not yet received his narrative of his transactions. I wish your Lordship to reconsider the propriety of bringing Sir J. Murray before a Court Martial in any part of the Peninsula, excepting in the army on the Eastern coast. Without calling Adm. Hallowell and other officers from their duty, it appears impossible to bring the facts under the consideration of any Court Martial to be assembled here. Then comes the question whether it will be fair to try him by the officers of the army on the Eastern coast, particularly if it be true that a spirit of party prevails in that army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I feel a great regard for Fremantle on his own, as well as his father's account; but I should be sorry if any irregularity were committed in promoting him only because I feel a regard for him.

Lord Clinton obtained two steps of promotion on taking home the accounts of the battle of Salamanca, as I believe, not because he took home the accounts of a great victory, but because he had been promised promotion, and was on the point of being, if not actually, promoted before he arrived; and then the second step of promotion was given to him.

I should be delighted and obliged by any favor done by His Royal Highness to Fremantle, but I acknowledge that if I were in His Royal Highness' situation, I would not depart from the old rule of one step of promotion for the officer who bears the tidings of a victory on any account. If that rule should be once departed from, there will always be a question whether a victory is deserving one or two steps of promotion to the bearer of the news, which might be awkward.

I hope that success will not be wanting to enable me to send Fremantle home again with the intelligence, to obtain for him the other step of promotion; and if it should, I rely upon His Royal Highness' goodness to promote him when a fair opportunity shall offer.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will recommend that Major Canning, my aide de camp, may be promoted, and may receive the usual warrant, for carrying home the dispatches which I have sent by the Prince of Orange. I should have sent Major Canning if I had not sent the Prince.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

Sir T. Graham reports that there is a daily communication between San Sebastian and the French army by sea; and, in fact, boats go in and out as they please.

The siege was much delayed; and in case it should be necessary to raise the siege, the loss of guns and stores would be infallible, owing to the want of naval means, the harbour boats at Pasages being excessively bad, and all navigated by women, who are unequal to the labor of loading and unloading them; and the greatest number of boats are already destroyed by the weights we have put in them.

I entreat your Lordship to consider these points, and to let me know whether government will or not send a sufficient naval force to co-operate with the army in this siege. The place has 9 months' provisions, and there is no chance of getting it except by siege.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Aug. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that 5000 stand of arms, and 5000 sets of buff accoutrements, may be sent out to Pasages as soon as may be possible. It is desirable they should be sent out 1000 at a time. Our soldiers have a practice of losing their arms and accoutrements when they are wounded, of which I have done every thing in my power to get the better, as I am told, with some success; but I am afraid there are many in the hospitals who are unprovided with arms and accoutrements, and it is desirable that we should have some to give them when they recover.

I have not yet got the states, and am not able to tell you what the diminution of our numbers has been in the last 6 days; but I understand that the troops are very healthy, notwithstanding the bad weather and their fatigue, and I hope that the diminution of numbers does not equal the amount of killed and wounded.

Our loss is distressing, however, as having fallen a good deal upon Gen. Hill's corps: the number of British troops there has become too small in proportion to the foreigners.

The A.G. to Capt. Rhodes, R.E., Badajoz.

4th Aug. 1813.

In consequence of a representation from the Commissary Gen. I have received directions from the Commander of the Forces to desire that Mr. —, of the Commissariat department, may be released from the arrest in which he has been placed by your order at Badajoz on the 5th of last month. It is to be hoped that the restraint under which he has been kept since that period will have made him fully aware that he must be more circumspect in his conduct in future.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I have omitted till now to reply to your letter regarding Lieut. Gen. Robertson. I should be very happy to forward the views of any officer recommended by you to serve in this army, but there is now no situation

open for an officer of his rank ; and if such a one should open, it will be but fair to attend to the claims of those officers high among the Major Generals, who have long commanded brigades in the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 22d July, and I have but little to add to my dispatch of this date.*

I never saw such fighting as we have had here. It began on the 25th, and, excepting the 29th, when not a shot was fired, we had it every day till the 2d. The battle of the 28th was fair *bludgeon* work. The 4th division was principally engaged ; and the loss of the enemy was immense. Our loss has likewise been very severe, but not of a nature to cripple us.

I shall send you a detailed account of our operations as soon as I can get one copied for you.

* See the letter alluded to, 4th Aug., p. 647.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I sent you this afternoon, by Lieut. Col. Abercromby, the outline of the arrangement for placing the troops under your immediate orders upon the right of the army, and bringing the 6th and 3d divisions towards the centre. The enclosed contains a few more details in regard to that arrangement, the copies of which for Sir T. Picton, and for Major Gen. Colville, I have put up under your cover, as the safest and most direct mode of forwarding them. I beg leave to observe to you, that it is essential that an officer, who is well acquainted with the nature of the positions near Maya, should be left with Major Gen. Colville for a short time.

It is Lord Wellington's intention that the troops which you place in the valley of Les Alduides should make such arrangements as will give every possible security, on that side, to the divisions in the valleys of Baztan and Maya ; and it should be recommended to these latter divisions to have also posts of advertisement of their own, along with the outposts of your troops, which will be next to them.

I beg you will be so good as communicate to the 13th light dragoons, as also to the several brigades of artillery mentioned in the enclosed arrangement, those parts of it which respectively concern each.

Arrangements referred to above :

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

It is intended that the infantry under the immediate command of Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill shall be placed upon the right of the army, and shall occupy the passes in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles, and also those in the valley of Les Alduides.

Under this arrangement the 3d and the 6th divisions are to move towards the centre ; the 6th division occupying, in the first instance, the Puerto de Maya and its neighbourhood, and the 3d division being in reserve to the 6th, in the valley of Baztan.

Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, Major Gen. Colville, and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, will be so good, therefore, as concert measures, without delay, for this alteration of the positions of the troops above mentioned, making their arrangements in such manner as that no part of the line may be exposed to an attack under unfavorable circumstances whilst the change is taking place.

Sir R. Hill will be so good as send an officer acquainted with the country, both to the 6th and to the 3d divisions, to continue with them until Major Gen. Colville and Sir T. Picton have made their arrangements in the positions which they are respectively to occupy.

A report is to be transmitted to the Q.M.G. of the manner in which the above alteration is to be carried into effect, as also of the positions of the troops when they have reached their several destinations.

Whilst the above arrangements are carrying into effect, the artillery of the 2d division will move round, by Lanz and Olague, into the Roncesvalles road ; and when it has reached that destination, the artillery of the 3d division will move from the Roncesvalles road to Olague, there to remain till further orders.

The 13th regt. of light dragoons will likewise move round at the same time by Lanz and Olague to Linzoain ; and Sir R. Hill will cause the detachment of cavalry now upon the Roncesvalles road, attached to the 3d division, to be relieved by the 13th light dragoons, and sent back to its brigade near Pamplona.

The artillery of the 4th division, and that of the 6th division, at present near Elizondo, will move back to Berrueta, reporting their arrival at that place to the Q.M.G.

To the President of the Junta of Aragon.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I have received with much pleasure your letter of the 22d July. I am much gratified that the heroic and patriotic city of Zaragoza is at last relieved from its long oppression, and I beg leave to offer my congratulations to its brave inhabitants on the occasion.

I thank you and the Junta for the kind attention in attributing to me and the army under my immediate command the advantages acquired at the battle of Vitoria; they have since been increased by the late important events; and I have the honor to assure you that I shall have great pleasure in contributing to the utmost of my power to the happiness of the meritorious kingdom of Aragon.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Lesaca, ce 5 Août, 1813, 10 heures du matin.

J'ai reçu ce matin votre lettre. Nous avons eu de rudes affaires dans ces derniers jours, mais nous avons battu l'ennemi joliment.

Je serai bien aise de vous voir avant que vous ne partiez, et vous pourrez facilement passer d'Oyarzun ici à cheval, quoique le chemin ne soit pas des meilleurs. Mais je ne peux vous accorder ni vous refuser permission d'aller en Biscaye, quand une fois vous serez destitué du commandement, puisque, comme *Consejero de Estado*, je n'ai rien à vous dire.

Je vous conseille cependant d'obéir aux ordres du gouvernement, et de vous mettre en marche aussitôt après que j'aurai eu le plaisir de vous voir. D'abord soyez persuadé d'une vérité, que tant que le gouvernement et les Cortes resteront à Cadix, ce sera le parti libéral qui dominera dans cette assemblée. Il a la populace de Cadix de son côté; les autres le savent bien, et même quand ils ont raison ils en ont tant peur qu'ils n'osent pas même parler, beaucoup moins agir. Voilà la vérité; ainsi il ne faut rien attendre de leur part.

De l'autre côté, si vous n'obéissez pas aux ordres du gouvernement, et surtout si vous vous rendez dans un pays supposé n'être pas bien cordial envers les institutions du jour, vous allez vous faire de mauvaises affaires pour rien; ainsi je vous conseille de faire dire que vous vous mettrez en route tout de suite après m'avoir fait une visite.

To Gen. Espoz y Mina.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I have just received your letter of the 30th.

You will have heard of recent events in this quarter, and of the defeats sustained by the enemy, and the terrible loss which they have suffered. It must be expected, however, that they will renew their efforts to raise the blockade of Pamplona and the siege of San Sebastian; and the eventual success of the campaign, and the future safety of Spain, depend upon our being able to persevere in those objects.

I am most anxious, therefore, that you and the troops under your command should be nearer to us. You may rely upon it, if we get Pamplona and San Sebastian, that Zaragoza, and every thing in Aragon, must fall; and if we should fail in obtaining these objects, we shall not be able to hold much in Aragon.

It is impossible to send you any heavy guns at present, in order to attack the castle of Zaragoza seriously. That, therefore, which I wish you

to do immediately is, first, to leave about 1500 men of those belonging to Gen. Duran, if you should have any with you, to blockade Zaragoza, so as that the town may be saved from the depredations of the enemy in the castle; and that you should collect the remainder of your infantry at least at Tudela. When arrived there, it would be desirable to move it upon Sangüesa, in order to be nearer the army.

The cavalry might be left between Jaca and Zaragoza, to cut off the communication between the two, and observe what passes at the former.

You have nothing to apprehend on the side of Catalonia.

To Vice Adm. Sir S. Smith, Knt.

Lesaca, 5th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and have forwarded the enclosure to my mother.

I am very much obliged to you for your suggestion. The fact is, however, that I have not, at present, any troops to spare.

We have had some most desperate fighting here, between the 25th of last month and 2d of this; every day excepting the 29th: the enemy having attacked our right, in order to disengage Pamplona and San Sebastian. We have, however, beat Marshal Soult completely, and driven him back into France, with immense loss. Ours has been severe likewise; but by no means of a description to cripple the operations of the army.

I send this letter to Lord W. Bentinck, who will forward it to you.

The A.G. to the A.A.Gs. 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th divisions.

5th Aug. 1813.

In remarking to you that I have not received any daily state from the — division since the 28th July, I beg to call your attention to the extreme inconvenience which an omission of this nature invariably occasions in putting it out of my power to place before the Commander of the Forces the effective strength of the army under his command at the times he has ordered when it should be made known to him. I am not aware of any reason which should, under any circumstances, delay the daily state of a division for more than one day beyond that which is fixed for its transmission to this office. I beg you will forward immediately the whole of the states wanting from the 11th July to this day.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Rooke, A.A.G., 2d division.

5th Aug. 1813.

I am concerned in having to communicate to you in reply for Lieut. Gen. Stewart's information that his Excellency does not conceive it proper to liberate those prisoners, a statement of their supposed criminality having been referred to the government of Portugal for decision as to the mode of process. The letters on this subject have been put into the hands of the Military Sec. for transmission to Sir C. Stuart at Lisbon, whose interference has been further requested in bringing the matter to conclusion.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Howard, 1st division.

5th Aug. 1813.

I have laid your letter of the 29th ult. and enclosures before the Marquis of Wellington, and I am desired to observe that his Lordship has seldom perused papers that have afforded him so much concern. My Lord Wellington has always been in the habit of considering and upholding the Guards as an example to the rest of the army, and the disappointment at the receipt of such a gross proof of indiscipline and insubordination was therefore the more unexpected. It was the duty of Col. —, as Commanding officer of the 1st batt. — Guards, to express his dissatisfaction with the sentence of a Regimental Court Martial, and point out to the officers who had been members of that Court their errors in the discharge of their duty if he conceived error to exist, and reproof or reference to such a point of duty was admissible and legal. It was also at the discretion of Col. — to perform this duty in the manner he should think proper, taking care always to

use the language which one officer ought to address to another. The statement contained in the letter of the 11th July, even supposing it to be founded in all its parts, is therefore no justification to those who wrote that letter; but being, as it appears by Col. —'s letter, unfounded, it is quite unjustifiable. The Commander of the Forces is excessively anxious that for the credit of the Guards (a corps with which he has had such right to be satisfied) the officers in question should make a proper apology for their conduct, and that Col. — in consequence should be so indulgent as to pass it over; and I am now distinctly to explain that nothing but consideration for the Guards has prevented his Excellency's causing the improper conduct of these officers and their letters of the 24th July, which mark so clearly their desire to humiliate their Commanding officer, being made the subject of an investigation before a General Court Martial. It is to be hoped, however, that Major Gen. Howard, with the aid of his Excellency's opinion, will be able to convince these officers of their error, and further to induce them to apply the abilities, which they evidently possess, to support the authority of their Commanding officer and forward the objects of their profession, rather than to destroy both.

The A.G. to J. Fernandez, D.A.C.G., Salamanca.

5th Aug. 1813.

In answer to your application of the 19th ult. I am to inform you his Excellency the Marquis of Wellington has no objection to your receiving into your service Louis Piero, prisoner of war.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813, 7 A.M.

The messenger brought me the enclosed letter yesterday, in regard to the train expected from England, from which it appears that the different proportions had not been prepared and embarked as I had expected, and that even after receipt of my letter of the 26th June there had been some mistake. I shall be much obliged to you if you will show Col. Dickson the enclosure in this letter. It appears that these ships contain every thing but what we want, viz., shot. It is really quite ridiculous how little is known in England of the nature of a military operation. Wherever they are left to themselves they blunder. I, besides, doubt whether these guns on garrison carriages will be of any use to us.

I shall be glad to have Dickson's report of the state of the 24 and 18 pounder shot, including the large supply (400) received from the Channel fleet, and upon this equipment. Those demanded are, however, coming, besides that to which the enclosed relates.

The scheme of renewing the attack on the place will require a much

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole, K.B.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813.

Lord Wellington has given orders to the Conde de la Bisbal to move the Spanish corps under his command into the neighbourhood of Echalar to-morrow to replace the 4th division, which you will be so good as march into the vicinity of this place.

The Conde de la Bisbal is instructed to move his troops in the morning to Echalar, and you will be so good as march the 4th division from thence in the afternoon, when the roads have been cleared of the baggage of the Conde's troops.

I beg you will send an officer forward in the morning to ascertain what ground the 4th division can most conveniently occupy in this neighbourhood.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813.

Enclosed I transmit for your Lordship's information the copy of a letter addressed to Sir L. Cole, respecting the 4th division being replaced to-morrow in the neighbourhood of Echalar by the troops of the Conde de la Bisbal.

The Conde de la Bisbal has been informed that it is Lord Wellington's intention that he should arrange with your Lordship what share of the outpost duties the troops of each are to take upon that part of the line which lies between the posts of the division occupying the Puerto de Maya and the Light division.

I have to request your Lordship will make me acquainted with the arrangements settled with the Conde de la Bisbal on this head.

larger equipment of carts than that which we before followed, and I have already spoken to Alava on the subject. It will be necessary, however, that Dickson should make me a detailed report, stating how many carts he will want on each side.

There are many carts with Wilson's and Bradford's brigades, with the German Legion, and even with the corps of the 5th division, I understand; and I shall be obliged to you if you will enforce the orders of the army on this subject, which are, that they are to have none, if they have spring waggons. If they have not spring waggons, they are to have one for each regiment. All these carts should be given over to the Commissariat. I conclude that Sir R. Fletcher will want none.

I am very anxious to see Major Smith's scheme for fortifying the position at Irun.

P.S. In a postscript of a letter from Lord Bathurst, of the 27th, he says that the fleet had been detained by contrary winds, and that the mistake regarding ordnance had been rectified. I am therefore in hopes that we shall have what we want.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813, 7 A.M.

A great deal might be done to strengthen the positions of the army on the right; but engineer officers and intrenching tools will be required. I beg to know where the field equipments of intrenching tools are, and what officers can be sent on this service, without loss of time.

To the Archbishop of Santiago.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th July, and it has given me the greatest concern to see that any circumstance had occasioned a difference of opinion among the Spanish nation, whose only view and object ought to have been to drive the common enemy from their country.

Although interested in every thing which can affect the Spanish nation, as a stranger I can have no concern in the question on which this difference of opinion exists; and I never interfere in any thing which is not my particular business. I am desirous therefore to avoid giving any opinion on the subject to which your letter relates.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 6th Aug. 1813.

Since I wrote to you the day before yesterday I have received a dispatch, with enclosures, from Lord Bathurst, of which I enclose copies, containing directions to you to make a remonstrance to the Spanish government regarding Gen. Castaños' removal till I receive further directions. When these orders were written, the British government certainly did not advert to the arrangement made between the Spanish government and me, which does not contain one word to prevent the government from removing any officer whom they may please to remove. It would not have been proper to ask for such a condition, and would have been very improper to grant it; the orders of the British government therefore to both of us are founded upon a misconception of the arrangement: and I trust that if this letter should not reach you in time, you will have received that which I wrote to you on the 24th July, before

you will have received that from Lord Castlereagh of the 22d, of which I now enclose a copy, and that you will have delayed to obey the orders which they contain till you should receive further instructions.

But they are not only founded on a misconception, but recite an order to me, the knowledge of which would do us more injury than any thing that could occur. The British government give me an order not to obey the orders of the Spanish government on an affair purely Spanish. The enemies of the English, of the connexion between the two countries, and of the measure of placing the command in my hands, could not desire any thing better; they would proclaim this order to the nation as an attack upon their independence; and we know enough of the Spaniards to be certain that there is not one of them who would not concur in thinking that it was not proper that their government should be liable to such interference with the execution of their orders. I would, besides, observe upon this order to me, that it is quite out of date.

Gen. Castaños and Gen. Giron were removed by an order, dated the 16th June. I must have remonstrated or must have submitted long before this order of the 22d July could have been written; and, in fact, before it was written, Gen. Lacy had taken the command in Galicia; and Gen. Freyre had arrived to take the command of the 4th army before it was received.

The A.G. to Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

6th Aug. 1813.

Referring to your letter of the 21st ult. and the papers which accompanied it, I herewith enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. May, the officer of the department attached to the Royal artillery, with a copy of an order given by Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, directing the issue of an extra allowance of spirits to the Royal artillery and troops employed in the siege of San Sebastian during the continuance of the bad weather. The papers which accompanied your letter are herewith returned.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Doyly, A.A.G., 7th division.

6th Aug. 1813.

By a letter from the Sec. of State's department it appears that private J. Macpherson, of the 2d batt. 24th regt., has been left a considerable property in Ireland, of which it is necessary he should take possession. His Excellency has therefore been pleased to decide that Macpherson should without delay return to England; and you will therefore direct the officer commanding the 24th regt. to send that soldier with as little loss of time as possible to head quarters, his accounts being first closed to the 24th of the present month, and his balance paid so far as the ordered issue to the battalion admits. You will be so good as to give Macpherson a note to me, to avoid mistakes or delay.

To the Governor of Valladolid.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

I enclose the answer which I have received from the government to the application which I forwarded from Doña Ana Carasa de O'Farrill, which I beg you will take an opportunity of communicating to her.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor to receive one letter from your Excellency of the 19th July, and 3 of the 25th, by my aide de camp, the Chef d'Escadron Cruquembourg.

I am very much obliged to your Excellency for the definition which you have taken the trouble of giving me of the nature of the responsibility

of the person filling your office. I had understood it otherwise; and that the organs of the government were responsible for the expediency of all their acts at the moment of performing them, whether legal or otherwise.

It was on the ground of the inexpediency of removing Capt. Gen. Castaños at the moment, and of the injustice of punishing him by that removal, for a supposed offence, that I ventured to address your Excellency, and not against the act as being one beyond the power of the government. Neither did I remonstrate against the act as being a breach of the engagement which the Regency had made with me in December, 1812, and January, 1813. That engagement does not state one syllable about the removal, by the Regency, of officers from their situations; and it would have been very improper for me to endeavor to limit the authority of the government in that respect, and highly inexpedient for the government to consent to limit its authority.

Neither have I complained, as a breach of an engagement made with me, of the refusal of the government to comply with my recommendation, that certain officers should be promoted; all of them officers deservedly high in the estimation of the army and of the public, and of the government themselves; all of them employed in high situations, some of them in command of armies to which they have been appointed by the government and not by me, and one of them the Minister at War. I had hoped, that after such a victory as was gained by the allies on the 21st June, it would have been deemed gracious on the part of the government to promote certain officers, and I recommended those to the government who appeared to me, by their services, to be most deserving. But it belongs to the Regency and not to me to make the promotion; and I have received their decision with the respectful silence which is due to them; nor should I now notice this matter, only that it forms the subject of one of the letters from your Excellency, to which I am now replying; and that I write to remove all doubt and ambiguity from my letter of the 2d July, and from what follows in this.

That of which I complain is, that when the Regency thought proper to remove Capt. Gen. Castaños and Gen. Giron from their situations, they should have selected Gen. Freyre and Gen. Lacy to fill them, contrary to the engagement made with me, in the letter from the Minister at War of January, 1813; that they should have appointed Gen. Giron and Gen. — to serve in the army of Catalonia, contrary to the same engagement; that this engagement appears to exist only that it may be broken; and that the Regency should now deny that it ever intended to adhere to the engagement made by its predecessors when it authorised the late Minister at War, Don J. de Carvajal, to write to me on the 28th March, 1813.

It has always been my wish, as your Excellency knows, to support the existing authority; and there are not wanting instances, since I have held the command of the Spanish army, of my having interposed to prevent officers in high stations from assuming authority not belonging to them, and from using language in their addresses to be laid before the government more expressive of their irritated feelings than of their respect. Such conduct and language is, in ordinary circumstances, quite excusable; and the only excuse which can be alleged for its existence

(which is none for its continuance) is the state in which the government and army of Spain had been for some time past. From this state I hoped, backed by the confidence and support of the government, and by their liberal adherence to the engagements which they had made with me, that I should have been able to extricate the army; and in the mean time, I have uniformly, as in duty bound, in every instance upheld the authority of government.

I would, however, observe to your Excellency, that the government would avoid this evil, if they were to adhere to the 4th article of the engagement of the 1st Jan. 1813, which points out the mode in which the reports and applications of the army are to reach the government, and the orders and decisions of the government to reach the army. It would not be in the power then of any officer to address them in disrespectful, doubtful, or ambiguous terms; and if such an address were to reach them, he who should forward it would be responsible for its contents.

Nor does it appear that this mode of doing business can prevent the government from having the earliest knowledge of all that passes. I believe that an order has been already given by the government to all officers in command, to send direct to the Minister at War copies of all reports made to me, and of all orders sent by me; to which order, if it had passed through the regular channel, I should not have the slightest objection. By enforcing this order, government would have, in an authentic shape, all the information for which they could wish, at the earliest possible period of time.

I acknowledge that I feel some astonishment that the Regency, having found it so easy to dismiss Capt. Gen. Castaños from his situations for no assigned fault, should have felt any scruple about dismissing the Duque del Parque, he being supposed to have written to your Excellency in improper terms.

It is useless now to trouble your Excellency with the motives which induced me to ask the late Regency to enter into certain engagements with me, previous to my taking upon myself the command of the Spanish army, to which I had been appointed by the Cortes; these reasons are to be found fully detailed in my addresses of the 4th Dec. 1812, and every day's experience has convinced me of the expediency of what I asked in order to enable me to perform my duty. The existing government have broken the engagements into which, it appears by your Excellency's letter, they do not consider they ever entered; and it further appears by your Excellency's letter, that they are dissatisfied with that part of the arrangement made with the former Regency, which relates to the communication between the government and the army.

I have above explained myself upon this point, in a manner which will, I hope, prove satisfactory to the Regency. But having before been mistaken respecting the intentions of the Regency, in regard to the engagements with me as explained by the late Minister at War, I trust that your Excellency will now be pleased to explain their intentions in language that cannot be misunderstood.

I am sincerely desirous of serving the Spanish nation, to which I am indebted for so much favor and kindness, in every way that may be in

my power, and I will continue to serve them at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army, whatever may be the decision of the Regency on what is now brought before them. I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, into which it is not necessary to enter, if I should be obliged to relinquish the command of the Spanish army, which the Cortes and the late Regency had confided to me, in consequence of the decision of the existing Regency; but if I should, I can only assure your Excellency, that I will do it at the period and in the mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the Regency; and that I will at all times act most cordially with, and assist to the utmost of my power, any officer who may be named to succeed me.

It must appear to your Excellency to be very desirable to the government, for the welfare of the army, and to myself, to receive their early decision on the contents of this letter.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

Upon reconsidering what I wrote to you the other day regarding the General Court Martial on Sir J. Murray, I conceive that it would be best to try him in some of the stations of the army on the coast of the Mediterranean, where all the witnesses can be conveniently assembled. Justice would not be done if the Court were composed of officers belonging to that army; and I cannot spare from this army a sufficient number of rank. I think, therefore, it would be best to send these officers from England and Gibraltar. The former might land in this part of the country, and proceed along the Ebro: the latter would proceed by sea.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

I cannot better explain to you what I think regarding the orders to me, to suspend the execution of the orders of the Spanish government regarding Gen. Castaños and Gen. Giron, than by sending you the copy of the letter which I wrote to my brother on the subject, in which I have urged him to suspend the execution of the orders which he had received from Lord Castlereagh. The fact is, that you were misled by my letter to you of the 29th June, in which I told you that those arrangements were in direct violation of their agreements with me. The removal of Gens. Giron and Castaños is not so; the appointment of officers to fill those stations without my knowledge and without my recommendation, is.

The Spanish government have behaved very ill in this, as they have in every other transaction; but in the existing state of affairs, I don't think it wise to push them to extremities, or to manifest an inclination so to treat them. The Cortes and people of Cadiz are, as usual, making an intrigue of this concern; and I have, therefore, thought it best to act in this instance, as I have in all others, on my own grounds, according to my own judgment of what is most for the public interests, and keeping myself clear of the intrigues and cabals of others.

The only chance the party against the English influence and alliance have, is to work upon the prejudices of all Spaniards against foreign interference in their internal concerns. The note proposed to be presented by my brother, would give them a terrible instrument to work with; and

I am quite convinced that we have not a friend in Spain who would not be shaken by such a document. You may depend upon it that I will not miss a fair opportunity that may offer to give the democratical party a shake; and so much depends upon the state of opinion at Cadiz and in the provinces at this moment, that it is much better to leave to my brother and me the choice of the opportunity and means, than to incur the risk of instructing us from England.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 7th Aug. 1813.

I enclose Col. Dickson's report on the state of the ordnance and stores to continue the siege of San Sebastian: when that expected in the *Three Sisters* and *Friendship* shall arrive, you will see that we shall still be very deficient in ammunition, and even in ordnance; and the carriages are not of a kind to be conveniently used in batteries. I hope, therefore, that the ordnance equipments originally required will be sent out.

A S. A. R. le Duc de Berri.

Lesaca, ce 8 Août, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Altesse Royale m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 14 du mois passé; et comme l'affaire dont votre Altesse Royale a traité a des rapports militaires et politiques d'une grande étendue, non seulement avec ce qui se passe ici, mais aussi avec ce qui se passe au nord de l'Europe, j'ai cru de mon devoir d'en écrire à Lord Bathurst, le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté; et je l'ai prié de donner la réponse à votre Altesse Royale.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 8th Aug. 1813.

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from the Duc de Berri; and as the answer will involve the discussion of some military and political questions, upon which you may wish to know my opinion, and upon which government must determine, and as I write with more facility in English than in French, I think it best to write it to your Lordship, and to refer the Duc de Berri to you.

It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs, to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French from the frontiers of Portugal and Madrid to the frontiers of France, it is generally expected that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be at Paris in a month. None appear to have taken a correct view of our situation on the frontier, of which the enemy still possess all the strongholds within Spain itself; of which strongholds, or at least some of them, we must get possession before the season closes, or we shall have no communication whatever with the interior of Spain. Then in France, on the same great communications, there are other strongholds, of which we must likewise get possession.

An army which has made such marches, and has fought such battles, as that under my command has, is necessarily much deteriorated. Independently of the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and sickness, many men and officers are out of the ranks for various causes. The equipment of the army, their ammunition, the soldiers' shoes, &c., require

renewal; the magazines for the new operations require to be collected and formed, and many arrangements to be made, without which the army could not exist a day, but which are not generally understood by those who have not had the direction of such concerns in their hands. Then observe, that this new operation is the invasion of France, in which country every body is a soldier, where the whole population is armed and organised, under persons, not, as in other countries, inexperienced in arms, but men who, in the course of the last 25 years, in which France has been engaged in war with all Europe, must, the majority of them, at least, have served somewhere.

I entertain no doubt that I could to-morrow enter France, and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no farther certainly. If peace should be made by the Powers of the North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain, and the retreat, however short, would be difficult, on account of the hostility and the warlike disposition of the inhabitants, particularly of this part of the country, and the military direction they would receive from the gentry their leaders. To this add, that the difficulty of all that must be done to set the army to rights, after its late severe battles and victories, will be much increased by its removal into France at an early period; and that it must stop short in the autumn if it now moves at too early a period.

So far for the immediate invasion of France, which, from what I have seen of the state of the negotiations in the north of Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the convenience of my own operations.

The next point for consideration is the proposal of the Duc de Berri to join this army, taking the command of the 20,000 men who he says are ready, organised, and even armed, in order to act with us. My opinion is, that the interests of the House of Bourbon and of all Europe are the same, viz., in some manner or other, to get the better and rid of Buonaparte.

Although, therefore, the allies in the north of Europe, and even Great Britain and Spain, might not be prepared to go the length of declaring that they would not lay down their arms till Buonaparte should be dethroned, they would be justified in taking this assistance from the House of Bourbon, and their French party who are dissatisfied with the government of Buonaparte. It might be a question with the House of Bourbon, whether they would involve their partisans in France upon any thing not short of such a declaration, but none with the allies whether they would receive such assistance. Indeed, there would scarcely be a question for the Princes of the House of Bourbon, if they are acquainted with the real nature and extent of Buonaparte's power. He rests internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption that was ever established in any country, and externally upon his military power, which is supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. If he can be confined to the limits of France by any means, his system must fall. He cannot bear the expense of his internal government and of his army; and the reduction of either would be fatal to him. Any measures, therefore, which should go only to confine him to France

would forward, and ultimately attain, the objects of the House of Bourbon and of their partisans.

If the House of Bourbon and the allies, however, don't concur in this reasoning, we must then, before the Duc de Berri is allowed to join the army, get from the allies in the north of Europe a declaration how far they will persevere in the contest with a view to dethrone Buonaparte; and the British government must make up their minds on the question, and come to an understanding upon it with those of the Peninsula.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 8th Aug. 1813.

I am highly flattered by the Duke of Richmond's and Sir J. Hope's letters, of which you have transmitted me the copies. I hope I deserve the good opinion they appear to entertain of me; but I am afraid I shall fail at last. However, I work as hard as I can in every way in order to succeed.

I entertain a very high opinion of ———'s talents; but he always appeared to me to want what is better than abilities, viz., sound sense. There is always some mistaken principle in what he does.

I confess that I don't know what to make of ———'s charges. Raising the siege I don't care about; it might have been necessary when the enemy approached him; nor do I care much about his embarking; his instructions would warrant his doing so if he raised the siege, and did not think he could fight a decidedly successful action. But what I cannot bear is his leaving his guns and stores; and strange to say, not only does he not think he was wrong in so doing, but he writes of it as being rather meritorious, and says he did it before at Biar. It appears that he knew on the 7th and 8th that Suchet was approaching him on one side, and Maurice Mathieu on the other.

I shall charge him with having omitted then to make arrangements to raise the siege and to embark his guns and stores. I shall then charge him with disobedience of his instructions in not having gone to Valencia to join the Duque del Parque, when he raised the siege and embarked. If he had raised the siege on the 7th or 8th, or rather had then discontinued to disembark his guns and stores, and had afterwards embarked his corps on the 12th or 13th, upon finding Suchet approaching him, and thinking the enemy too strong for him, and had then sailed for the coast of Valencia, he would have obeyed his instructions, and the manœuvre would have answered; that is to say, he would have gained the lines of the Jucar, and probably more ground in Valencia without a battle. Instead of that, after losing his guns, he stayed till the evening of the 17th; then Lord William embarked the army, which since the 12th had been disembarked at the Coll de Balaguer; and in fact Suchet, after having obliged Sir J. Murray to raise the siege of Tarragona, returned and forced the Duque del Parque to abandon the Jucar before he could be supported by Lord W. Bentinck.

The best of the story is, that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu ran away; Sir J. Murray ran away; and so did Suchet. He was afraid to strike at Sir J. Murray without his artillery, and knew nothing of Maurice Mathieu; and he returned into Valencia either to strike at the

Duque del Parque, or to get the assistance of Harispe, whom he had left opposed to the Duque del Parque. I know that in his first proclamation to his army on their success, he knew so little what had passed at Tarragona, that he mentioned the English General having raised the siege, but not his having left his artillery. He could therefore have had no communication with the place when he marched; and he must have known of the raising of the siege afterwards only by the reports of the country.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, 5th division.

8th Aug. 1813.

In consequence of your representation of the 6th inst. I have the honor to acquaint you his Excellency the Commander of the Forces has been pleased to direct that one month's subsistence shall be issued to the 59th regt. from the 24th May, and the Military Sec. has transmitted the authority for that issue to the Paymaster Gen. I have at the same time to beg you will recommend the officer commanding the 59th regt. so to economise this issue as to render further advance unnecessary, till the corps shall enter on the period from which the rest of the army shall be entitled to the same advance.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's dispatches, Nos. 7 and 8, of the 1st inst. Your Lordship will observe, by mine of the 4th, that I doubted the destruction of Tarragona. You must be the best judge, and are entirely free under your instructions to decide, whether to attack Tarragona or Tortosa; and I shall approve of whatever your Lordship may determine. You may depend upon it that Suchet will endeavor to interrupt any operation of this kind that you may attempt; and you will do well to be prepared accordingly.

I am astonished that the Duque del Parque should have hesitated about obeying your Lordship's directions to embark, as it appears to me that the 28th paragraph of the instructions of the 14th April is positive upon this or any other point relating to the operations of the army.

I have ordered the Empecinado to march upon Alcañiz, and have desired Gen. Elio to send him orders there.

I have no desire that your Lordship should send me the account of the flour delivered to the Spanish troops until you should consider the recovery of it hopeless.

I entirely approve of your Lordship's communicating with His Majesty's Ambassador at Cadiz upon any subject that you may think fit to bring under his consideration.

I would observe to you, however, that no British authority has any thing to say to the interior details of the Spanish army, excepting to assist, by every means in their power, the Spanish Generals in the performance of their arduous duties.

I refer your Lordship to my private letter of this date for my observations on the contents of your letter to Sir H. Wellesley.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

I have received your several letters of the 23d and 25th July and 1st Aug.; and as in general the reply requires little but explanation, I reply

to nearly all the points they contain in a private form. It is unlucky that Sir J. Murray did not leave you his correspondence with me, as, having already gone into all these subjects with him, we should both have been saved a good deal of trouble.

I don't know where Gen. Roche found an agreement from the British government to pay and clothe 7000 men under his command; and, in order to let your Lordship know how this matter stands, I must enter into the history of Gen. Roche's division. Two or three years ago Gen. Roche and Gen. Whittingham were employed to raise and train a certain number of battalions and squadrons by the Spanish government; and my brother promised that those troops should be clothed, and that he would assist them with money. Gen. Whittingham's division or legion was to be at Majorca, and Gen. Roche's at Alicante, and to form part of the 3d, as it was then called, now the 2d army. When the troops were expected from Sicily last year, I got my brother to prevail upon the Spanish government to allow these two divisions to serve with them under your command; Gen. Roche's division, however, still belonging to, though detached from, the 2d army.

I believe that no regular subsidy was given to Spain till the year 1812, when a million was given, and clothing for 100,000 men; and I then insisted upon it that those troops should be paid out of the subsidy, in the first instance, who were serving with detachments of the British army, and under the command of British officers. The agreement, then, as it is called, if there be any, is an arrangement of mine for securing out of the subsidy the pay of those troops serving under your Lordship's command. As for the clothing, these same divisions get their proportion of the 100,000 suits of clothing.

Now for Gen. Roche's 7000 men. When I was at Cadiz last winter I settled with Sir H. Wellesley, among other things, the distribution of the subsidy: and I enclose the copy of the letter written to Gen. Roche regarding his division. You will observe that the troops to be paid were to be in the field, serving with the army under your Lordship's command, and the depôt was to be 1000 only. When Gen. Roche goes to collect *dispersos*, it becomes a question, whether to pay these *dispersos* till they are fit for service is the best mode of disposing of the subsidy for the general cause. I certainly think it is not; and I shall not allow any pay in future for a division under Gen. Roche, as he has no such division serving in the field.

Generally speaking, my dear Lord, it is very desirable, and it will save us both a good deal of trouble, if you will keep yourself clear of the details of the Spanish service. The Spaniards will not allow either of us to interfere much in their concerns, and will adopt but unwillingly any suggestions which we may make for their improvement. It is besides probable that, with the best intentions, you and I may not take the same view of a subject, and we shall only create confusion by working both at the same point. You will observe also that, by the instructions of the 14th April, under which the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies are placed under your command, the detail of the service in each of those armies is reserved to the Commanding officer. This was done, not to prevent suggestions of im-

provement, but that source of jealousy which is always to be found in discussions on matters of detail.

I acknowledge that I differ from your Lordship on many points in your letter to Sir H. Wellesley of the 1st Aug., who, you may depend upon it, can do nothing on the subjects to which it relates.

1st; I and all the Spanish General officers conceive that the Captains General of the provinces have not power sufficient to realise the resources of the country for the armies. This is one of the points which the jealousy of the democracy at Cadiz of the military power prevented me from carrying to the extent I wished last winter; and, as I am still pressing it, and that, in fact, till the powers of the Captains General are increased, there exists no authority whatever in the country, it would be an awkward circumstance if it were discovered that you thought the powers of the Captains General ample for all the purposes required. I have not time now, and I have too much to write to you about, to enter into this subject; but you may depend upon it that I don't form these opinions lightly, and that there is not an officer commanding an army, or a Staff officer, or any other person acquainted with the subject, who does not concur with me.

2dly; In regard to the division of the Spanish forces into armies, I concur with you, as you are aware, on the principle; that is to say, that I have always thought the 2d and 3d armies ought to be one only; but I entertain great doubts respecting the expediency of now joining them into one. If the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies are to be joined into one, who is to command them? I know of no officer capable of taking such a command. If such a one could be found, then comes another question: would he, or would the country or the government, submit to have this large army placed, not under your command, but under the command of the *six* officers who have commanded the Anglo-Sicilian corps since that corps has been in Spain? Would the British government or the army like to see that corps under the command of any Spanish General that has appeared in the last 150 years? In great arrangements, and to do great good, we must submit to trifling inconveniences, particularly having the Spanish people as our instruments.

I will now proceed to show you that whatever good might result from the junction of the three armies into one, greater facility in supplying them would not be found from it than would result from measures very simple to be adopted for the supply of the three armies, separated as they now are. You may depend upon it that very little will be brought to the armies from any distance under any arrangement. The Spaniards have no money to pay for means of transport; and if they had money, very little would be procured. They must exist therefore upon the seat of the war and its neighbourhood, and upon such magazines as, with your assistance and Mr. Tupper's, can be formed for them on the neighbouring sea coast.

If these three armies were formed into one, consisting, we will suppose, of ten divisions, the arrangement to be made would be to direct that each division should draw from a particular district of country; for as to forming a magazine in the interior of the country, of all the supplies it can

afford, you may depend upon it that it is impracticable. Why should not the same arrangement and division and allotment of districts be made between the four armies (including the Anglo-Sicilian corps), which would be made if the three armies were formed into one, among the several divisions of which it is composed?

The army under my command consists of, 1st, British; 2d, Portuguese in British divisions, fed by the British Commissariat; 3d, Portuguese not in British divisions, fed by the Portuguese Commissariat; 4th, Galician, or 4th army; 5th, that part of the 4th army, heretofore the 7th, under Gen. Mendizabal; 6th, the army of reserve of Andalusia; 7th, Don Carlos de España's division of the 4th army, serving in the centre; 8th, Gen. Morillo's division of the 4th army, serving on the right; 9th, Mina's troops. All these troops draw from the country, some for payment, others without; and the different districts and villages are allotted to them, from which they are to draw their supplies. Why should not the same be done with the army on the eastern coast? The system is not perfect; but what is perfect with such instruments, and such defective means? It would be much more easy and convenient for me, and for the British army, to join all the Spaniards into one corps, all the British into another, and all the Portuguese into a third. That would be the most simple arrangement. But some fine morning I should find both Spaniards and Portuguese surprised and defeated, and the British would cut but a poor figure alone. I must therefore submit to the inconvenience and defects of a system bad in some points, and excessively inconvenient in all, in order to produce a great good; and upon the same ground, often as I have reflected upon altering the organisation of at least the 2d and 3d armies, I have upon the whole thought it best to leave them as they are.

The system of allotting the revenues of certain provinces to the support of certain armies, is, as you observe, founded upon the state in which they were previous to the commencement of the present campaign. It was founded principally, but not solely, upon that state. It afforded likewise the only chance of getting any thing for the armies. Very little has been got; and I assure you still less would find its way into the military chests if the system were altered. This point is referable to the state of politics, manners, and public principle at Cadiz, and in Spain in general, which it is evident would require a longer discussion than I have leisure to write at present. You may depend upon it, however, that I am not unaware of the inconvenience and evils of the existing system; and that I allow it to continue, for I could alter it by a stroke of my pen, only because I am quite certain that, bad as it is, it is the only one under which the army could get any thing.

I enclose the letter and its enclosures to Gen. Murray on the charges against Gen. Roche. Lord Bathurst never told me who made those charges; but he must be a shabby fellow, as, after making them, he desired that his name might be kept secret.

I will address you officially upon other points. I send you a copy of my dispatch upon our last operations. There is nothing new. I conclude that you know that the armistice is renewed; the French say to the *mi-Août*. It appears from accounts from England, to the 10th Aug.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray, Bart. Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

I enclose you a letter from government, from which you will see that it has been determined to bring your conduct under investigation. I thought this was likely, and that the best mode of avoiding it, which is always desirable, was to call for your narrative, which I received yesterday, and I wrote that I would give no opinion on the subject till I should receive further information. My letter went home by Capt. Carroll, who left us on the 4th or 5th July, and had not arrived in England, I believe, when government determined, on Adm. Hallowell's letter, to bring you before a Court Martial.

I understand that orders have been sent to Gibraltar that you should go to Cadiz, in order that I might direct the assembly of the Court Martial upon you. It might not be pleasant to you to be there, and I recommend to you, therefore, rather to go to Valencia. You must be tried on the east coast, and I have written to beg that officers may be sent from England for the purpose, as I cannot spare any from hence; and in the Anglo-Sicilian corps you might encounter prejudice, which you could not easily remove.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B. Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 24th ult., with the enclosed extract of a letter from Major Gen. Whittingham, regarding the rate of pay which is to be given to Capt. Foley for performing the duty of Paymaster to the division under his command; and I beg to acquaint you that I think he ought to receive the sum of 10*s. per diem* during the period of his filling that situation, including the expense of clerks and stationery.

To Earl Bathurst. Lesaca, 9th Aug. 1813.

I have not had a great deal of reason to complain of the conduct of the troops since the last battles; but we pulled up on the frontiers of France, and they are getting into good order again. As we are getting many men out of hospital, I hope that we shall soon have in the ranks within 2000 or 3000 men of the number we had before the late battles. But our soldiers are terrible fellows for every thing but fighting with their regiments. What do you think of 70 or 80 of them having wandered from their regiments during the late operations, and having surrendered themselves to some of the French peasantry who accompanied the French army, and whom they ought, and would at other times, have eaten up? The foreign troops desert terribly: 150 men deserted from the Chasseurs Britanniques in one night, at Legasa.

Our having so much money has enabled me to adopt a plan for paying every non-commissioned officer and soldier a day's pay every day, which will, I think, produce a great reform in their conduct. Many of their outrages are certainly to be attributed to want of money.

Nothing has yet been done, my dear Lord, about a naval force for us, which is really necessary.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, 5th division. 9th Aug. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 7th inst. covering an application submitted by Paymaster —, of the — regt., for two months' leave of absence to England on

account of family calamity, I am to acquaint you his Excellency finds it necessary to decline granting the indulgence requested by Mr. —, as leading to embarrassment in regimental accounts; but I am further to observe that should Mr. — consider himself bound to make further exertions to obtain leave, the Commander of the Forces has no kind of objection to that officer addressing direct the Rt. Hon. the Sec. at War on that subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813, 11 A.M.

I have received yours of the 9th. I have sent orders to the General officers commanding the several Spanish corps regarding the ammunition, and, in the mean time, I shall be obliged to you if you will tell Col. Dickson that I beg he will give none for which the requisition is not authorised by yourself, by Sir R. Hill, or by me.

I have spoken to Sir R. Kennedy regarding Sir G. Collier's complaint of the Spanish armed vessels, which complaint, I observe, refers to the old story of the American vessel driven into the Bidasoa, which it appears that Giron has contrived to get off to the westward. I have no command, nor has anybody else, that I know of, over the Spanish navy, excepting the Captain of the port at Pasages, whom I have requested to attend to Sir G. Collier's requisitions in every thing.

I hope that our navy will have a sufficient force of their own without the Spaniards. It would be a great advantage indeed to be able to interrupt the *cabotage* along the coast from Bordeaux to Bayonne; but we must first secure our own.

To what lines do you refer as wanting guns for them?

P.S. There is nothing new whatever.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

If the Duc de Dalmatie desires it, I shall have no objection to make an exchange with him of English, Spanish, and Portuguese officers and soldiers recently taken, against French officers and soldiers in the same situation; but I must have a list of the names of the officers proposed to be exchanged by the French Commander in Chief, and a return of the men of the several nations, specifying to what regiments they belong.

To Lieut. Gen. Macleod, R.A.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 17th July, and you do me justice in believing that I should be happy to do every thing in my power to have every mark of respect paid to the memory of your deceased son; but I have lately received a letter from the Sec. of State, acquainting me with

G. O.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces has desired the Commissary Gen. to direct the Commissaries with the several brigades of infantry and regiments of cavalry to make issues of bread, in the manner usual in all armies, for 3 days at a time. It will be necessary, however, that the Commanding officers of regiments, and of companies, should particularly attend to their men on this subject, and should inspect the bread twice a day, and see that the soldiers do not consume in one day what is given them to last 3. The Commander of the Forces requests the General officers commanding divisions and brigades to give orders on this subject.

2. The state of the ammunition of the soldiers likewise requires the constant attention of the officers, and the Commander of the Forces begs that the G. O. on this subject may be particularly attended to.

the rules under which application was to be made to Parliament for monuments to commemorate those officers who should fall in the service of the country, and I am concerned to tell you that his case does not come within the rule as it has been stated to me.

The brigade, of which the 43d regt. formed a part, was not under his command when he went into the action in which he lost his life, and without a further extension of the rule, the subject cannot be brought under the consideration of Parliament by the Regent's ministers.

To Col. Bloomfield.*

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

I send by Capt. Blanckley a sword of very curious workmanship, which belonged to King Joseph, and was taken by a Spanish officer in the battle of Vitoria, and he has since given it to me; probably His Royal Highness may deem it worthy of a place in his armoury, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will lay it at his feet, with my most dutiful respects.

* Lieut. Gen. Lord Bloomfield, G.C.B.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B., commanding the troops in the valleys of Maya and Baztan.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

It is the intention of the Commander of the Forces that the whole of the arrangements which more immediately concern the defence of the valley of Baztan should be for the present under your superintendence. The troops allotted for that part of the general position of the army are the 6th and 3d divisions; and there is a squadron of light dragoons in the vicinity of Elizondo, the object of which is, to furnish the necessary letter parties and means of communication to the right and left, and to the rear by Almandoz and Lanz.

Lord Wellington has directed that, in the first instance, the 6th division shall occupy the Puerto de Maya, and the posts immediately connected with it, and that the 3d division shall be placed in reserve in the neighbourhood of Arizcun, from whence it can give support to the 6th division by the valley of Maya, and also guard the passes which communicate by Errazu with the valley of Baigorri.

One brigade to be upon the heights (where the 82d regt. was formerly encamped) near the road which leads along the hills, from the left of the Puerto de Maya to Elizondo. This brigade will be able to give support to the left of the 6th division, and also to secure for it the line of retreat upon Elizondo by the road above mentioned, in case circumstances should render it necessary for the 6th division to retire that way.

Sir R. Hill will have apprised you of the situation of that part of the force under his orders, which is immediately upon your right, and which is ordered to secure all the passes on that side into the valley of Baztan, which lie more to the rear than the passes between Errazu and Baigorri. It will be expedient that you should establish the most direct and secure communications with these troops.

The 7th division is on your left, between the Puerto de Maya and the Puerto de Echalar.

Copy of a memorandum respecting the connexion of the outposts of that division with those of the troops in the Puerto de Maya, and also respecting the direct line of communication with Echalar, is enclosed for your information.

Lieut. Potts of the Royal engineers has been directed to report himself to you, and to give such assistance as you may desire towards strengthening the positions for the defence of the valleys of Maya and Baztan.

You will be so good as bear in mind, however, that it is not Lord Wellington's intention that any permanent or very considerable works should be undertaken for the present, but such merely as will give an advantageous cover to our troops against the enemy's musketry, and enable them to maintain themselves more obstinately on the principal points of their positions, and those most exposed to be attacked.

I beg leave to turn your attention particularly to the importance, in the present situation of the army, of the most prompt communication of intelligence; and I request that you will be so good as have that part of the enemy's force which is to be seen from the positions near the Puerto de Maya very closely observed, and cause a report to be made to head quarters of every alteration that takes place, either in the enemy's numbers, or in the situation of any part of his troops.

Lord Wellington considers it essential that the division which occupies the Puerto de Maya should have a piquet in the village of Urdax.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th July, and in reply I beg leave to acquaint you that, in my opinion, it will be convenient to have the clothing for the army in the Peninsula sent to Falmouth or Plymouth, according as there may be found store room at the former for the depôts about to be formed there for this army; and when the clothing is required, I will send vessels to convey it to the port where it may appear to me to be most convenient to receive it.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 10th Aug. 1813.

I enclose a letter from the Minister at War of the Spanish Regency, in which he has informed me that the Cortes have been pleased to confer upon me the Royal possession in Granada called El Soto de Roma, to be held according to the laws and constitution of Spain; and I beg your Lordship to lay this letter before H. R. H. the Prince Regent, and to request his permission for me to accept this gift from the Cortes.* In case His Royal Highness should consent to my acceptance of this possession, it is my intention to pay the rent of it into the Spanish treasury during the continuance of the contest for the independence of the country.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst.

It is desirable that the vessels which have come from Lisbon should return thither when they have discharged their cargoes. I will speak to the Commissary Gen. respecting the arrangements to be made to get from Bilbao or Santander the provision store ships in proportion as they will be wanted, and I will bear in mind your opinion of the preference to be given to Santander over Bilbao, as a rendezvous for our shipping, after the end of this month.

I never heard of any artillerymen in the *Freya*; but, generally speaking, it is desirable that all troops, artillery, and ordnance stores should be brought on to Pasages.

As soon as the transports with the infantry shall arrive from England at Pasages, I beg:

1st; That those for 500 or 600 men may be allotted to carry to England that number of French prisoners from Pasages, who have been sent thither.

2d; That the horse ships which will carry the horses to Bilbao may be sent back to England without loss of time.

3d; That infantry transports for 2800 men may be sent to Bilbao, to take to England that number of prisoners sent there.

4th; That a good infantry transport for 200 men may be sent to Bilbao, to take to England that number of invalids of the British army sent there, being generally men whose limbs have been amputated, in consequence of wounds received in the battle of Vitoria.

The transports which will go from Pasages to Bilbao may carry any sick or wounded soldiers there may be at Pasages, upon which subject I request you to communicate with Major Gen. Lord Aylmer. All the

* See Appendix, No. XII.

infantry transports which come out from England, not to be employed as above pointed out, should be sent back without loss of time.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

Some days previous to the death of Lieut. Col. Ridewood, of the 45th regt., who died of the wounds he received at the battle of Vitoria, he signed his resignation, which I understand has been transmitted by his widow to the office of the Commander in Chief.

Although I believe it is not usual for His Royal Highness to accept the resignation of officers on their death bed, and moreover that the Lieutenant Colonel did not purchase his commissions, I am induced, from the very favorable opinion which I entertained of his services and merits as an officer, and from the knowledge that his family have been left but scanty means of support, to recommend the question to the Commander in Chief's kind attention, and to express a hope that, at all events, his widow may receive a liberal provision.

In case, however, His Royal Highness should not think proper to allow Lieut. Col. Ridewood's commission to be disposed of, I avail myself of the opportunity to recommend Brevet Lieut. Col. Craufurd, of the 9th regt., as an officer well qualified to succeed him in the 45th regt. He has been many years in the service, has frequently commanded the 9th regt. on important occasions, and has always distinguished himself.

I beg to mention that — — — and — — —, the seniors of their rank in the 45th regt., are not in this country, and that the latter has hardly ever been in a state of health to admit of his doing duty with the army in the field.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

I enclose the last morning state, from which you will observe that the diminution since July 16th is less than 6000 men. From what I learn, however, of the state of the convalescent depôts, I believe that in the course of this week we shall get up to their regiments about 2000 Portuguese, and about 1500 British, not including the men lately sent from England, who have already begun to join. None of them are, however, yet carried to account on the strength.

When the Duke of York and government have decided on a measure, I don't wish to propose it again; but I wish that, if it were possible, his decision respecting the provisional battalions were re-considered. I assure you that some of the best battalions of the army are the provisional battalions. I have lately seen two of them engaged, viz., that formed of the 2d batts. of the 24th and 58th regts., and that formed of the Queen's and 2d batt. 53d regt.: it is impossible for any troops to behave better.

The same arrangement could now be applied with great advantage to the 51st and 68th regts., and both the regiments and Lord Dalhousie have applied for it. It might also be applied to others. It is certainly more easy and simple to send the regiments home; but you will observe that we lose so many trained British soldiers, which, under existing circumstances, it is very desirable to retain.

I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship that the 77th regt. might be

sent from Lisbon to Gibraltar, to relieve the 37th; and that the 29th regt. might likewise be brought to join the army, probably to be in the garrison of San Sebastian.

As the provisional battalion, consisting of the 2d batt. 30th and 2d batt. 44th, was sent home when the 2d batt. 59th regt. joined, I believe your *protégé*, Lieut. —, of the 44th, is not with the army; but I will inquire about him.

P.S. I enclose the list of the General officers whose names have been omitted in the vote of thanks recently passed in the Houses of Lords and Commons.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

No particular change has taken place in the position of either of the contending armies on this frontier since I wrote to your Lordship on the 4th inst.

I deemed it expedient that Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill should be on the extreme right of the army; and I therefore moved the troops, which had been till now under his orders, to Roncesvalles and Les Alduides, and have brought the 3d and 6th divisions into the valley of Baztan.

I have likewise moved the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the Conde de la Bisbal, to the heights of Echalar, bringing the 4th division of the allied British and Portuguese army in reserve to this neighbourhood.

The operations of the siege of San Sebastian are waiting for the arrival of ordnance and ammunition expected from England.

The various battles which had been fought between the 25th of last month and the 2d inst. had nearly consumed the musket ammunition in reserve with the several divisions of the army, and some days elapsed after the enemy were driven across the frontier before these could be completed; and then, upon a general review of our situation, and adverting to the state of affairs in the North of Europe, where I knew that the armistice had been renewed till the middle of August, *mi-Août*, according to the French accounts, with a view to negotiations for peace, I did not deem it expedient to attack the enemy again with the object of establishing the allied army within the French frontier.

Our right would still have been vulnerable by the possession which the enemy would have held of the fort of St. Jean Pied de Port; and although we should have enjoyed advantages in consequence of the improved communication between one part of our line and the other, we should have suffered some disadvantages in a more advanced position within the enemy's frontier, in the various arrangements to be adopted for the establishment of our magazines, for the possession of the Spanish fortresses, and for the junction of the reinforcements and recovered men expected. To these considerations must be added, that the advantages, whatever they might be, which should result from our establishment within the French frontier, were to be purchased at the cost of fresh losses in an action to be fought to obtain them against increased numbers of the enemy, whom it must be expected we shall find in arms whenever we shall enter France; and that, in case either the pacification of the North

of Europe, or any misfortune to the armies on the Eastern coast, or the manœuvres of the enemy in my front towards our own right, should render it necessary to repass the frontier, the operation would become exceedingly difficult and dangerous.

I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that the enemy's fortified post at Zaragoza surrendered by capitulation to Gen. Mina on the 30th ult. He has taken there above 500 prisoners, 47 pieces of cannon, a vast quantity of ammunition, arms, clothing, &c. &c.

The last accounts which I have received from Lord W. Bentinck are of the 1st inst. He was then in the neighbourhood of Tarragona, which place he intended to attack as soon as he should be joined by the army under the command of the Duque del Parque.

I enclose a return of killed and wounded, who were not included in the returns transmitted to your Lordship in my dispatches of the 1st and 4th inst.*

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose for your Lordship's consideration, a representation from the Commandant at Santander of the want of maritime protection on the Northern coast.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

The Conde de la Bisbal having stated to me, that the articles mentioned in the enclosed list are much required for the equipment of the cavalry of his army, I shall esteem it a favor if your Lordship will cause them to be sent to Pasages at an early period.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Aug. 1813.

In respect to the packets, it would be most convenient to the army to have a weekly packet, to come at present to Pasages. If you cannot let us have a weekly packet, you might send there the packet once a fortnight now ordered to Santander.

The arrangement of sending the Lisbon packets to Coruña is not a very convenient one for the army, and would, I should think, be inconvenient to the trade of Lisbon, in which our money concerns are much involved. There are no horses on the road from Coruña to the army, and if we cannot have a weekly packet to Pasages, it would be better that the army letters should go once a fortnight to Lisbon than Coruña.

It appears to me that it would be most desirable to government, as well as to the army, to establish a regular weekly communication. In no other manner can you receive regular weekly reports, as you have hitherto, of all transactions. While writing upon the subject, I beg to draw your attention to a rule which has been made by the Post office, that the packets shall carry out no parcels for the officers of the army, which is excessively inconvenient to them, at the same time that the public object in making this rule cannot be discovered. Indeed, when it is considered that some of the officers of the army have been out here nearly five years, and that every thing they require must come from England, it will appear as-

* See General Return at p. 652.

tonishing that they have been able to go on so long with such a rule in existence. As their communication with the packets will now be more easy, however, if they should be sent to Pasages, it is very desirable that this rule should be altered.

You will observe that I have not adverted to the means of communication by the ships of war, besides that by the packets; but with a weekly packet we may do without that by the ships of war entirely. These may then be employed for military purposes solely, in giving security to our communications by the coast, in aiding in our operations against the fortified posts on the coast, and what is more important, and has not yet been attended to at all, in preventing the intercourse between Bayonne and Bordeaux by the coasting vessels. If this last object should be effected, as it ought to be, the war on the frontier will become much more burthensome and difficult to the enemy; and I doubt their being able to maintain a large body of men in our front.

P.S. You will scarcely believe that the naval blockade of San Sebastian is so ineffectually maintained, as that we have the proofs among Gen. Gazan's papers, taken in the late operations, that shoes and sand bags have been sent into that place by sea from St. Jean de Luz.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 13th Aug. 1813.

I received last night the enclosed papers by the *Polly*. Mr. Croker tells me on the 5th, that a convoy under charge of the *President*, having the 1st division of the battering train on board, was wind bound at Falmouth.

The accounts of the battle of Vitoria had been received at the Austrian head quarters at Brandeiss, from Dresden, on the 8th July. The news had been kept secret at Dresden, even from the Duc de Bassano; but Count Bubna had discovered it, and sent it off on the 7th. Lord Cathcart says, it was likely to have great effect on the tone of the negotiations about to be commenced at Brandeiss. Mr. Thornton appears to think that, in consequence of the affairs in Spain, Buonaparte may be induced to agree to the Austrian basis, which will divide Austria from the allies, as it appears that they have not agreed to the basis of a peace proposed by Austria. The Allies appear to be well together, and I think the Austrians show a disposition to join in the war, if Buonaparte should not agree to the terms they had proposed as the basis of a peace. The renewal of the armistice also was agreed to by the Emperor of Russia, avowedly because it was convenient to Austria.

But they have not agreed on the basis, much less the peace of which they are entering on the negotiations; nor is there, in any of the documents sent to me, the slightest trace of their making common cause with England and Spain, by which alone the peace of the world can be restored, excepting an article in the convention on the mediation between Austria and Buonaparte, in which the latter accepts the offer of the mediation of the former for a general peace, or for a continental peace, if a maritime peace cannot be obtained. I shall be obliged to you if you will send this letter and the newspapers to Beresford.

I enclose the report which Gen. Giron sent to me on Guetaria, and one

which I have received from Sir G. Collier this morning. I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Sir R. Fletcher to send an officer there, one on whom he can rely, to see what time and expense would be required to construct wells there; which, it appears to me, is all that the place requires. Also to estimate the garrison that ought to be there, as I will put water in casks for their supply, if the completion of the wells should take much time. The season is wearing away fast, and every point to give protection to our shipping becomes of importance.

It is to be hoped that the British government will at last discover the nature of the element by which they are surrounded; and will in future have their preparations made in time, particularly when the earliest notice is given to them.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

I have this day received a report from an officer, whom I have in observation towards Jaca, that Gen. Paris withdrew from thence into France on the night of the 11th, leaving there a garrison of 800 men. It was reported that Suchet was coming with his force from Catalonia also through France. I am not so certain of the truth of this report, as I am of the other; but if it should be true, the enemy will become too strong for me, as they have already been reinforced from the interior of France.

I beg therefore that if you find that Marshal Suchet marches himself, or detaches any considerable part of his force into France, you will likewise detach to join me as follows: 1st; the infantry of the 3d army; their cavalry are to be left with the 2d army, and their field pieces with the 1st army. Their artillerymen must march with the infantry. If your Lordship should find that the enemy weaken their disposable force in Catalonia, so considerably as that you will have the means of taking the strong places, and of covering your operations against them, with the 1st and 2d armies and the Anglo-Sicilian corps without Whittingham's division, I would then request you to send likewise the infantry of Whittingham's division. The cavalry and artillery are to remain with the Anglo-Sicilian corps. But you will keep Whittingham's division, if you should think that you will be at all cramped in Catalonia without them. The troops that will march are to come by Zaragoza on Tudela, where they will receive further orders.

I beg that your Lordship will give the Duque del Parque a route specifying the days he will arrive at Zaragoza and Tudela respectively, and let me have a copy of it; and that you will tell the Duque that he commands an army which I know has made and can still make rapid marches, although, in the march from Granada, in the month of May last, and in their late march from the city of Valencia, they did not shine in that way; but that I hope an effort will be made on this occasion.

G. O.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

1. The Commander of the Forces desires, that with the morning state of the 20th inst. the several regiments should send in a nominal list of the men returned in that state, 'Sick absent,' specifying the letter of the company and the name of the Captain to which each man belongs, and the man's number; and as far as may be possible, the general or detachment hospital at which the men are supposed to be.

If his health does not allow of his making this exertion, he had better make the command of his army over to his next in command, who is, I believe, the Principe de Anglona.

I shall be obliged to your Lordship, if you should have any shoes in store, to give the 3d army a little assistance in this way; and likewise a few days' biscuit. I shall desire Mina to take measures to provide for them at Zaragoza and Tudela, if I should find the report confirmed that Suchet has quitted Catalonia.

I enclose a letter which I received yesterday from Lord Bathurst, to which I request your attention.

It appears that the accounts of the battle of Vitoria were received at Brandeiss from Dresden on the 8th July; and it was thought were likely to have much influence on the tone of the negotiations about to be commenced. The Emperor of Austria was determined to join the allies, if he could not make a peace to his liking. In my front, however, the report of peace having been made is very general; and I must say, that I dislike the appearance of things in the north of Germany, as represented in Lord Cathcart's dispatch of the 12th, so far as that there was no concert among the allies, as to the terms of the peace about to be negotiated. The Russians and Prussians did not concur in the basis proposed by the Austrians, about which, I believe, we know nothing; and neither party appear to trouble their heads about England and Spain; and as for Bernadotte, he appears to have no more security for the peace for which he wishes, than the promise of the Emperor of Russia that he would not guarantee the dominions of the King of Denmark, in the negotiations for peace about to be opened at Prague.

There is nothing new in England, excepting that Lord Aberdeen is sent on a mission to Germany, I believe to the Emperor of Austria.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th inst., with 6 enclosures, on the subject of an application made by Lieut. —, a deserter from the French service, which I have referred to Major Gen. Peacocke, the Commandant at Lisbon. In the mean time, however, I beg to assure you, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that I never made Lieut. — any promise whatever.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

I enclose a letter which has been received from Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir L. Cole, with an enclosure from Col. Bodecker of the 1st line batt. K. G. L., stating the indigent state in which the widow and child of Brigade Major Aveman have been left, and recommending that some provision should be made for them.

Brigade Major Aveman was killed in the action of the 28th ult., in which he had distinguished himself; and his conduct on every occasion had gained him the approbation of the officers under whom he served.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

This letter will be delivered to you by Major Krauchenberg, who is

going to join the 3d hussars, which corps is, I understand, employed in the army under the command of the Prince Royal of Sweden. I have no means of communicating with this personage, or I would recommend Major Krauchenberg to his protection as a most active, gallant, and intelligent officer, who, I have no doubt, will soon make himself as useful to the army under that command as he has always been to this. I shall be much obliged to you, however, if you will adopt some means to draw the attention of the Crown Prince to Major Krauchenberg.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal.

Lesaca, ce 14 Août, 1813.

Je vous envoie le Colonel Ruman, qui vous fera savoir les détails d'une plainte qu'il m'a remise par écrit de la conduite d'un des postes avancés Espagnols près d'Echalar.

La correspondance qui vient de la France, et les intelligences qui viennent, ou au Général O'Lawlor, ou au Colonel Ruman, et plus d'une fois les personnes portant des lettres, ont été arrêtées et maltraitées, et leur papiers leur ont été ôtés. Enfin il paraît qu'on peut vérifier les faits, afin de pouvoir punir ceux qui ont commis cette irrégularité, et l'empêcher dorénavant.

Il est très raisonnable de ne laisser passer personne par les avant-postes sans ordre, même muni d'un passeport; mais les soldats d'un poste ne peuvent pas être les juges à qui on doit donner permission de passer, beaucoup moins d'ôter les lettres, les passeports, et les effets à ceux qui désirent passer.

Je vous serai bien obligé si vous voulez donner ordre là-dessus, et dire, si l'officier de l'avant-poste a raison de douter de celui qui demande à passer, qu'il vous l'envoie, avec ses papiers, &c., et qu'il soit responsable qu'on ne lui fasse aucun mal.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst., and, in reference to the subject to which it relates, I beg to enclose, to be laid before the Portuguese government, some additional papers, which will show that on the 29th ult. the soldier of the 11th Veteran battalion was still in confinement, and had, a few days before, received further ill-treatment from the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 14th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 5th inst., enclosing Lord Cathcart's dispatch of the 12th July, and one from Mr. Hamilton of the same date, with the copy of Mr. Thornton's letter of the 12th July.

I confess that I am not satisfied with the state of affairs in the north of Germany, which, however, is probably owing to my not knowing what has passed between the King's government and the allies on the Continent, in regard either to peace, or to carrying on the war.

It appears to me that Buonaparte has the allies, including Austria, exactly in the state in which he would wish to have them. In regard to peace, it appears that the Austrians propose a basis to which the Russians and Prussians don't agree; and that these powers don't make common

cause with England and Spain, as to peace: and as to the Prince Royal of Sweden, he appears to stand alone likewise, and that his hopes of the peace, for which he wishes, are confined to an engagement by the Emperor of Russia that he will not guarantee the dominions of Denmark in the negotiations about to be entered upon.

There may therefore be fairly counted four parties among the allies, by concession to any one of which Buonaparte would gain such an advantage as would place the game in his hands, if the accounts given of the relative force of the French and the allies be correct: or it would require great firmness and conduct to carry on the war, supposing Mr. Thornton's notion to be correct, that there would still remain a sufficient force for the contest, even if the Austrians were to be satisfied, and to withdraw their assistance. In this notion, however, I should doubt Mr. Thornton's having taken into consideration the possibility that the concession to the Austrians should be such as to induce them to take part in the war against the allies to compel them to a peace, which would not be inconsistent with the Austrian character of mediator; or, what is more probable, should adopt a system of neutrality hostile to the allies, and friendly to France.

There appears, therefore, no concert or common cause in the negotiations for peace; and as for the operations of the war, there may be something better, as Lord Cathcart has not gone into details at all; but there does not appear to exist any thing, in writing or any where, excepting in loose conversations among Princes. For my part, I would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system.

Probably what I am about to write has already occurred to the King's government, and that matters are not ripe for such a scheme; or that the notions and claims of some of the allies are so wild and unreasonable, or so selfish, that they cannot be reconciled to the general interest, at the same time that the forces and resources, particularly of the greater powers, cannot be spared.

There are some leading principles, however, in the political state of Europe on which the interests of all parties would coincide, such as the independence of Spain, Germany, Italy, and Holland, of France; the restoration of Hanover to the King's family; the re-establishment of the Prussian frontier, and of the Prussian influence over Saxony and Hesse; a frontier for the Austrian monarchy, and influence in Germany to balance that of Prussia; the re-establishment of the independence of the Hanse Towns, &c.; an understanding between England and Russia; and the powers less immediately interested might bring the others to take a general view of the common interests, without which all may depend upon it that they cannot make peace with security, or war with honor or advantage.

The object of each should be to diminish the power and influence of France, by which alone the peace of the world can be restored and maintained: and although the aggrandisement and security of the power of one's own country is the duty of every man, all nations may depend upon it that the best security for power, and for every advantage now possessed, or to be acquired, is to be found in the reduction of the power and influence of the grand disturber; and in the adoption of some scheme for that object, to be acted upon by the allies in concert, whether in the

negotiation for peace, or in the operations of war. For my part, I repeat what I told you before, I shall enter France, or not, (unless I should be ordered,) according to what I think best for my own operations, as I have no reliance whatever upon what is doing in the north.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813, 8 P.M.

I was very much concerned to find from your note delivered to me by Gen. Oswald, that your health was in such a state as to induce you to think of returning to England. However much I regret this circumstance, I cannot but think you are right in giving up, if you find your health not equal to the calls upon your exertions; and I can only return my thanks for returning to us when you did. I will make the King's government acquainted with the state of your health by the first opportunity.

I have received your note of this day regarding the works to be constructed in the second line behind the Bidasoa. You may depend upon it that, whatever we may do elsewhere, we cannot make the position between Oyarzun and the Bidasoa too strong. I have been on horseback to-day, and I hope to be able in a day or two to go over and look at the ground; but in the mean time it is desirable that no time should be lost in commencing on the works of the second line which you propose. The second line is, if possible, more important than the first, which it is not very easy to hold with an inferior body of troops without a strong second line.

I am glad to hear of the approach of the fleet.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813, 8 P.M.

I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th, and from what you say, I think it quite clear that Guetaria can be of no use to us; and I therefore wait only for the report of the officers of Engineers to order that it may be destroyed entirely.

There is nothing new whatever. I enclose the project of a peace sent to me by my correspondent, which he swears is handed about as what Napoleon is ready to consent to. It proves only that they are preparing the minds of the people in France to large cessions.

I am glad to find you are better. I am so likewise, but not yet quite free from pain when I move, and sometimes even when sitting still.

P.S. By the bye there is news that Gen. Paris has retired from Jaca to France. Mina says driven by *his* troops, with whom they certainly had an action on the 11th. A garrison of 800 men has been left in Jaca.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 6th, and I have given directions that a letter should be written to the Portuguese government in regard to Gen. Peacocke, which will, I hope, be satisfactory to them. I shall, besides, send their letter to England by an early opportunity.

I never entertained the slightest doubt of the advantage which the country derived from the presence of the army in Portugal; I only hope that it will not suffer so much from its absence as that the revenue will fail.

I have not written to you for a long time, and I am afraid that you have not been better treated in the way of correspondence by others. In the way of military news and intentions, I have nothing to add to my dispatches. I think I am too strong for Soult, on the defensive; and I shall probably take the offensive as soon as I can take San Sebastian or Pampuna, and can hear of the northern Powers deciding upon their line one way or other.

It is reported on the frontier that peace is made, but I have no reason to believe it. I don't, however, like the state in which matters were in Germany early in July, although ministers and Lord Cathcart did. In order to show you how they stood, and my opinion upon them, I enclose, *entre nous*, the copy of a letter which I wrote to Lord Bathurst yesterday.

The accounts of the battle of Vitoria were received at Brandeiss from Dresden on the 8th July. Buonaparte knew of the battle only on the 6th, and it was kept secret even from Maret; but Count Bubna discovered it on the 7th. The last battles, however, are more important; and I am only afraid that they will lead to concessions by Buonaparte to Austria and to Russia and Prussia which may lead to a peace with those Powers, to the exclusion of England and the Powers of the Peninsula.

To the Hon. F. North.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813.

I received only this day your letter of the 11th, for which I am very much obliged to you; and I am very sorry that I have not had the pleasure of meeting you.

I write to Sir G. Collier, who commands the squadron on the north coast of Spain, to request that he will facilitate to you, by every means in his power, a passage to England for yourself and your party at Bilbao. I am inclined to believe, from what I have heard of the navigation of the river at Bilbao since I have directed that some of the transports should go there, that you will accomplish your object sooner either by coming to Pasages, from whence some transports will be dispatched immediately, or by going to Santander, where there is a packet waiting to be dispatched, and which I will not order to England till Sunday next, the 22d.

I write to Sir G. Collier, who will send you this letter, to request that he will advise you what to do. But I must add to the advice which he will give you, that the siege of San Sebastian is carrying on within 2 miles of Pasages, and that that harbour is full of transports, ordnance, store ships, victuallers, &c., and the town and its neighbourhood of soldiers of all nations, muleteers, &c. &c., and that you would be very uncomfortable while waiting there. I would therefore rather recommend the packet at Santander; but I must tell you that you cannot get there in a carriage. I don't believe there will be another packet at Santander, as I have desired that they may in future come to Pasages.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 15th Aug. 1813.

Mr. North and a party of gentlemen, consisting of Lord Bayning, Mr. Joinville, Mr. Howard, Dr. Holland, and Mr. Taylor, are at Bilbao, and are desirous of going to England; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will facilitate the means of their going in a transport

either from thence or from Pasages. Adverting to what you have stated of the difficulty of getting out of Bilbao, I have told Mr. North that you would probably think it advisable that he should come to Pasages; but there, on the other hand, he will find a want of accommodation, and other inconveniences resulting from the operations going on in the neighbourhood. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send to Mr. North at Bilbao the enclosed letter, with what you will write to him regarding his passage to England.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, ce 15 Août, 1813.

Le Gén. Wimpffen vous aura écrit pour vous faire savoir que le Gén. — — — est malade, et se trouve dans la nécessité d'aller prendre les bains pour sa blessure; et vous aura proposé de ma part de venir prendre le commandement de l'armée de réserve de l'Andalousie, qui se trouve campée près d'Echalar. J'ai seulement à ajouter à ce qu'il vous dit là-dessus mes vœux qu'il vous puisse convenir de faire ce que nous souhaitons.

The A.G. to the Commandants of established Hospital stations.

15th Aug. 1813.

By the first number of G. O. of the 14th inst. the regiments of the army are required to send, through the several A. A. Gs. of divisions, nominal lists of non-commissioned officers and soldiers sick absent on the 20th of the present month, for the purpose of comparing them with the lists of similar description required by the Inspector of hospitals from the Purveyors of the several stations. As the convalescents and recovered men in the dépôt will not appear in the Purveyor's list, and yet will appear in the regimental list of absentees, it will be necessary for you to transmit a nominal list of men in dépôt on the 20th of the month, which you must have taken from the squad rolls of that morning parade. Your detachments having been classed agreeably to my former recommendation, viz., each battalion or squad, each brigade or company, and the several brigade detachments as organised in the army, placed in a dépôt division, will enable you to call on the officers for a nominal list of their own responsibility. As you are enabled to class these rolls divisionally, transmit them, with any remarks tending to afford information regarding the absentees, to this office.

The A.G. to the Commandants of passing Hospital stations.

15th Aug. 1813.

The Commander of the Forces is desirous of obtaining from the several hospitals and passing stations nominal lists of soldiers actually at those dépôts on the 20th of the present month, for the purpose of comparing them with nominal lists to be furnished by the several regiments composing this army, required by the G. O. of the 14th inst. As there is not any member of the Purveyor's department at the station under your charge, you will, with the assistance of the Medical officer, be pleased to send in to this office a nominal list of every non-commissioned officer and soldier at the station on the 20th of the present month, whatever may be their class, state of health, or employment. You will please to observe at the conclusion of the report any detachment that may have marched, so immediately preceding the date of the required return as to lead to a supposition that the men composing it may not be included in any of the lists to be transmitted from the adjacent station.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

15th Aug. 1813.

In answer to your private note, which I showed to my Lord Wellington, I am directed to request you will mention to Sir T. Graham that his Lordship has observed the Spanish troops always break capitulations, in the same manner as the French have already in every instance done with them.

No communication whatever has reached my Lord Wellington respecting ex-

change, as referring to Capt. Renaud, or any of the troops which were under his command.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 16th Aug. 1813.

——— has desired leave to quit his army on account of his health, and is about to absent himself. He proposes to go to some baths in Andalusia. I believe that his wound is in a very bad way; but I likewise believe that he is but little inclined to serve in the situation in which alone under circumstances he can serve: I mean in the command of his own *corps d'armée*.

Of all the officers that I have yet had to deal with, ——— is the most difficult. Since the correspondence which I told you I had had with him last spring, nothing has passed between him and me excepting what was very polite; but he very lately wrote a most improper letter to Wimpffen, because Wimpffen had used the word '*quiere*' instead of '*desea*,' in conveying an order to him; and he has more than once manifested the most impracticable temper that I have yet met with in any country. What he wants is, that the 1st, 2d, and 3d armies should be joined into one, and that he should be appointed to command this army in Catalonia; the result of which arrangement would be, that he must likewise command the Anglo-Sicilian corps there, or he would quarrel with Lord W. Bentinck; and I am certain that, if I find him not easy to manage, Lord William would find him quite impracticable.

When he found on conversation with me that I did not like this scheme, he then, in a letter to Wimpffen, stated that the Spanish nation and army expected, and were anxious, that all the Spanish troops acting on this side should be joined together, and should act as one corps. I sent him word, that I had not lately heard of any Spanish troops acting together as one corps that had not been destroyed; and that the last that had so acted had been destroyed by half their numbers. That under these circumstances, I, who was responsible, would not assemble the Spanish troops in one corps, till I should see better means of maintaining them as one corps, and of their acting together. In two days afterwards, he sent to desire leave to go to the baths; and in the mean time we are upon very civil terms. Castaños told me, however, that he did not think the scale of command sufficient for him who had commanded in Catalonia; he ought to have added, who had lost an army there, and the province, for that is the fact. I mention these circumstances to you, because I think it probable that ——— will endeavor to push his objects at Cadiz as the moment of the grand intrigue approaches at the opening of the new Cortes in October.

I find from Lord W. Bentinck, that Roche, having given over the troops of his division to Gen. Whittingham (by what authority does not

G. O.

Lesaca, 16th Aug. 1813.

1. The Commanding officers of regiments will give directions to the Paymasters to state their objections (if they should entertain any) to the accounts of hospital stoppages received from any hospital station, within two months after the receipt of such accounts of hospital stoppages.

2. If the objections are not stated within that period, the accounts against the regiments will be considered final.

exactly appear, but I believe by Lord W. Bentinck, under an erroneous notion that they were paid and clothed by Great Britain, and therefore that he had a right to do with them as he pleased), was about to form another division of 7000 men from '*dispersos*' in Valencia. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will tell him, that you can have nothing to say to this new division, and that he must look solely to the Spanish authorities for his orders respecting it, as well as for its subsistence, clothing, &c.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 16th Aug. 1813.

When the orders were received for the removal of — from the command of the 4th army, he expressed great anxiety respecting the state of his affairs, and stated the impossibility of his being able to live at Cadiz on the income of a *Consejero de Estado*, which is only 2000 dollars a year. This does appear sufficiently clear, certainly, adverting to the expense of living at Cadiz; and he requested me to endeavor to obtain for him something from England. Such an arrangement is quite out of the question at the present moment, and would have been equally injurious to — and to ourselves; and he would have lost the ability which he possesses to render any service hereafter to the alliance, supposing him to be so inclined. I therefore considered it best to recommend to you to continue to pay him his allowance as Captain General not employed: that is to say, the difference between that allowance and that of Counsellor of State, until we shall see the result of the existing crisis.

I don't know whether you give the Spanish government a detailed account of the expenditure of the subsidy; but if you should, it will be best to keep this article out of sight for some time. If at last it should be necessary, I will apply to the British government to make this allowance to — in addition to the subsidy.

To Dom M. Forjaz.

Lesaca, 16th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of the 2d inst., and, in respect to its contents, I feel it incumbent upon me to acquaint your Excellency that I experience great satisfaction in hearing that the conduct of Major Gen. Peacocke, in the discharge of the duties of his command at Lisbon, has been always regulated in a manner satisfactory to their Excellencies the Governors of the Kingdom, who have directed your Excellency to make it known to me.

Your Excellency may assure their Excellencies that I shall take the earliest opportunity to make known to the superiors of that officer, the favorable opinion which their Excellencies manifest in his behalf, and, at the same time, I most decidedly concur in the desire expressed by their Excellencies, of making known to H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal the meritorious conduct of that officer.

Au Gén. Dumouriez.

Lesaca, ce 16 Août, 1813.

Vous aurez vu ce que nous avons fait ici depuis que je vous ai écrit la dernière lettre. Le Maréchal Soult a fait une mauvaise opération, et a perdu beaucoup de monde. Des accidens inconcevables l'ont laissé

parvenir à échapper lui-même : et, après tout, il fut obligé de faire marcher 6 divisions par un petit défilé le long de la Bidasoa pendant 3 lieues, les troupes Espagnoles tirant sur sa colonne. Ils ont perdu leur bagages : et si le Général Espagnol Bárcenas eut tenu le pont de Yanci avec une brigade qu'il avait, au lieu d'avec un bataillon de *cazadores* Espagnols, jusqu'à l'arrivée des Anglais, Soult et ses divisions étaient encore perdus.

Je ne crois pas que j'aie si vite que l'imagination de beaucoup de personnes ; mais je me suis avancé autant que je crois le pouvoir dans les circonstances actuelles, sans risquer un malheur qui serait bien funeste au monde.

Cependant j'espère bientôt être en mesure de porter des coups forts et décisifs.

The A.G. to Dr. M^cGrigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

16th Aug. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 12th inst. covering the Purveyor's request that Paymasters should be bound to return, within a limited time, accounts objected to by regiments, I have to refer you to the 1st number of G. O. of this date, wherein Paymasters are allowed two months from the period of receipt to return demands esteemed objectionable, in failure of which the accounts are to be considered closed.

The A.G. to Capt. Swain, Bilbao.

16th Aug. 1813.

From the great increase of the dépôt at Bilbao and the liability of addition to the numbers already collected there, you are authorised to appoint Lieut. Holmes, of the 36th regt., Adjutant of that station ; and you will take credit for the usual allowance for such appointment in your contingent account, to be addressed periodically to the Military Sec. Serj. J. Bulger, of the same corps, may act as Assist. Provost Marshal to the station ; but his employment in that Staff situation, for the present, is to be considered purely probationary. Referring to your report of the 7th inst. respecting the communication between Bilbao and head quarters, I have to acquaint you the subject has been considered, and some improvement may be expected ; however, the post must pass by Vitoria, the established line of communication.

I find the effective prisoners of war, amounting to 30 French officers and 1500 soldiers, have arrived at Bilbao. I conclude you must add the charge of this class to your other duties, and you will inform me what arrangements have been made for the security of the soldiery and the regularity of the officers. I should suppose it might be expedient for you to explain to the senior officer of the Spanish troops, as also to the magistrates of Bilbao, the arrangements you make on this head of service. Should any of the officers have been already allowed the liberty of the town on parole, and have made a proper use of the permission, do not deprive them of it without necessity ; but his Excellency is not much disposed to relax from the rights of war, the French officers taken at Vitoria having much abused indulgence of that nature some weeks since. You will be so good as to request the senior French officer to have regimental nominal lists made out of the French officers and soldiers now prisoners of war at Bilbao, to further any disposition for exchange that may be shown by the Commander in Chief of the opposed armies.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 17th Aug. 1813.

I received about an hour ago your letter of 4½ P.M. yesterday, regarding Guetaria.

I have received two letters from Sir W. Beresford, who has looked at that post, and he appears to be of opinion that it is entirely useless as a protection to the roadstead and harbour ; that the town cannot be held against a superior force ; and that the use of the post would only be to

prevent a superior maritime enemy from using the harbour and roadstead, which, however, as is above stated, it could not effectually protect.

I waited therefore only for the engineer's report to order that it might be effectually destroyed. The directions which you have given to Sir R. Fletcher don't materially interfere with this intention, and, if executed in full, will cost only 150 dollars. It may be as well, however, to stop the contract, if it can be done, till I shall have the engineer's report.

Au Gén. Conde de la Bisbal. Lesaca, ce 17 Août, 1813, à 3 heures de l'après-midi.

Je suis bien fâché de ne pas avoir le plaisir de vous voir, surtout pour la cause de votre absence.

Le Général Giron est ici, et sera avec vous demain matin de très bonne heure, pour recevoir le commandement de l'armée *ad interim*. Il vous portera une lettre du Général Wimpffen. Je serais bien aise de vous voir avant votre départ.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

Lesaca, 17th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a Regimental Court Martial, on the trial of ———, ———, ———, and ———, of the Cavalry Staff corps; and, as it appears by the proceedings and sentence that these men are very unfit to perform the duties expected from this corps, I have thought it proper to order that they may be sent to the army dépôt in England; and I beg leave to submit that they may be ordered to join their respective regiments.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 17th Aug. 1813.

In your letter to me on the subject of Guetaria, you mentioned that the 600 men in garrison there might as well be employed elsewhere. We did not know that there were any men there, but it is just possible that Mendizabal may have sent some of his men there; and if there are any there, I am desirous that they should go to Bilbao, where there are a great many prisoners, and nobody to take care of them. If, therefore, there are any troops at Guetaria, I shall be obliged to you if you will send their Commanding officer the enclosed letters: if there are none, I beg you to return the letters.

The A.G. to Dr. M^cGrigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

17th Aug. 1813.

I enclose for your perusal a very injudicious statement made by Staff Surgeon — of the loss of the medical pannier mule of the 6th division, which, it appears, was separated from the division to which it belonged, as well as a soldier to whom it was improperly intrusted; the absence of the man from his regiment, and the mule, &c. from the division to which it was attached, being direct breaches of G. O., and which instances in a much less glaring point of view have already been subject of public inquiry in this army. A moment's reflection must have convinced Mr. — that violation of established rules never could be admitted as justification or satisfaction for a loss on the part of the public, added to temporary inconvenience in the arrangements for that divisional branch of the service for which he was personally responsible. I have, under these circumstances, to beg you will explain to Staff Surgeon — that it is expedient he should provide for the replacing of the public property so reported to be lost, to prevent a further

reference of the case to the Commander of the Forces, the circumstances of which could in no way bear him through an explanation without animadversion.

To Major Gen. Brisbane.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

I have received the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of — —, private soldier of the — regt., for desertion, and your recommendation of him.

I would observe to the Court that the soldiers tried by a General Court Martial are selected, among many criminals, as those whose crimes it is expedient to punish to the full extent of the law, either from the enormity of the offence, or from the circumstances under which it is committed, or from the necessity of making an example at the moment.

All these objects are defeated by the recommendations in which General Courts Martial are too much in the habit of indulging themselves; and their time and attention in trying the prisoner, and mine in preparing the charge and evidence for them, and afterwards in perusing and considering their proceedings, are entirely thrown away.

I have to inform the General Court Martial that, for some time past, the number of desertions from the army has been enormous, and that no reason whatever exists for it. Examples of punishment are therefore necessary; and it rests with them to determine whether they will or not persist in their recommendation.

To J. C. Herries, Esq., Commissary in Chief.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

Mr. Dep. Commissary of Accounts Dickens having applied to me to appoint Messrs. Arckroyd and Jesse to act as Dep. Assistants in his department, till the pleasure of the Lords of the Treasury should be known, I beg to acquaint you that I have thought it proper to desire him to refer his recommendation to you, as I think the service will not suffer by the delay, and you will be able to judge whether it is necessary to have the number of officers in the Account department augmented.

I beg leave to add that Messrs. Arckroyd and Jesse have been several years in the department, and are reported to me to be gentlemen very well qualified for promotion.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, regarding Major —, of the — regt.

Considering that Col. — is the Lieut. Colonel, and Major — the Major of that corps, the — has, in my opinion, the greatest merit for being what it is. In justice to Col. —, I must say that he is a most gallant soldier, and deserves my commendation for his conduct in the several actions in which he has been engaged in the present campaign.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

The enemy's detachment, under Gen. Paris, which had remained at Jaca since it retired from the Ebro, retired again from that place into France on the night of the 11th. This detachment had been attacked on the 11th by a detachment of the infantry of Gen. Mina's division; but I imagine that its retreat from Jaca was occasioned by the recent operations.

in this quarter, and by the necessity of reinforcing the army in my front. A garrison of 800 men has been left in Jaca.

No movement has been made by the allied troops, nor any of consequence by the enemy, since my last report. I am still waiting for the ordnance and ammunition to continue the attack of San Sebastian. I have no recent accounts from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck. I learn from Gen. Mina that Daroca surrendered on the 11th inst.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

I enclose what the Commissary Gen. says upon Mr. Sampayo being employed to purchase grain in Ireland.

I likewise enclose the state. The desertion is terrible, and is quite unaccountable, particularly among the British troops. I am not astonished that the foreigners should go, as those who enlisted the foreigners for government have taken them in general from the prisons; but, unless they entice away the British soldiers, there is no accounting for their going in such numbers as they do. Then we treat deserters in such a manner, that we have for the last 3 years got none from the enemy. There are at this moment from 800 to 900 in confinement at Lisbon, who have been there, I believe, 2 years, because the Admiralty have given orders that they should not be sent home. This, and enlisting them at Lisbon for Gen. Campbell's West India corps, have cured the French army of deserting to us.

We have not yet taken on the strength the 76th and 84th regts., which have arrived. We have taken on the strength, however, the first 300 recruits that arrived.

Your Lordship will see by my report, that we are still waiting for the battering train; and we have thus lost 16 days in the month of August since I should have renewed the attack upon San Sebastian, if I had had the means. This is a most important period in the campaign, particularly for the attack of a place in the Bay of Biscay. How we are to attack Bayonne afterwards I am sure I don't know. A British minister cannot have too often under his view the element by which he is surrounded, and cannot make his preparations for the operations of the campaign at too early a period.

We hear from France that peace is concluded. All that I am apprehensive of is, that the Allies may be induced to consent to a renewal of the armistice for a lengthened period of time, in order to finish the negotiations for peace, by which Buonaparte may be enabled to detach a large force against us. I hope they understand that if he should do so, and we should by accident be overpowered, which I don't think likely, he will not fulfil any expectations of favorable terms which he may have held out to them.

P.S. We have as yet no increase of naval force, excepting in dispatch vessels. It is curious enough that all the intelligence I have of San Sebastian comes from the French head quarters, they getting it by sea! I have just heard that a detachment of *sapeurs*, and some medical men, have arrived in the place; and I see Gen. Rey's account of the assault in the *Journal de Paris*.*

* See Appendix, No. X.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

I have received a letter from Sir T. Graham, in which he tells me that he finds his health so much affected by the service and the climate, that it will be necessary for him to go home in a few weeks. You will be the best judge whether it will be necessary to send any one else out.

To Col. Malcolm.

Lesaca, 18th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 25th July. I don't think I can be of much use to you in any way, and I should imagine of none in forwarding your views upon Constantinople. That Court is sometimes the seat of important diplomatic negotiations, and, at others, a sort of splendid retreat for ambassadors. You would be considered an interloper, by either the active or the declining diplomate. You had better adhere to your objects in India. Get into Parliament, if you can afford it; be nobody's man but your own, and you will soon be known, and get on.

P.S. I am afraid your brother in law will lose his leg, but he is in good health, and will get a pension in return. I have recommended him for promotion.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813, 11 A.M.

I enclose the report of the engineer on Guetaria. The only question that occurs to my mind on the destruction of this place is, whether in the winter there is sufficient water on the island to maintain a post which the enemy might place on it, when our ships should leave the coast, and thus prevent us from using the harbour, we being in possession of the main land. I shall be obliged to you if you will have inquiry made on this point as soon as possible.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813, 8 P.M.

I enclose a letter which I have received from — in regard to his rank. I was wrong in the decision which I had made, and I have altered it; but as it is quite impossible to leave the — liable to the chance of being commanded even for a day by —, in which I believe you concur with me, I shall be obliged to you if you will remove him from it.

To Sir R. H. Kennedy, Commissary General.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I send you the proceedings of another Court Martial in the 6th division, from which you will see how very ill they were supplied during the period in which I was induced to report favorably of the Commissariat. The proceedings of this Court Martial must go before the Prince Regent; and I am sure I don't know what I am to say respecting the report in my dispatch.

The deficiency of supply in the 6th division is certainly unpardonable. Before the late operations, the 6th division were at Sumbilla and San Estevan, and, by common care from the Commissary, ought to have had several days' bread beforehand when the operations commenced. I shall be much obliged to you if you will have inquiry made, and report to me what the 6th division received on every day from the 25th July to the 14th Aug., and the cause of the deficiency.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813, 9 P.M.

Major Fremantle has delivered me your letter of this day, containing the enclosed paper, of which I have kept a copy.

I wrote to England to request that all the infantry might be sent to Pasages, and the cavalry to Bilbao; but it appears that about 1200 infantry have been put on board the ships with the horses, and are gone to Bilbao, which is a great inconvenience, as no measures have been adopted either to equip them on their arrival, or to feed them on their road to their regiments from Bilbao. I shall therefore be very much obliged to you if you will take measures to have this infantry transported by sea from Bilbao to Pasages.

It appears to me that this can be done, either by having them embarked in the infantry transports which brought out the 76th and 84th regts., and, I conclude, have gone to Bilbao to remove the prisoners; or if these should have already sailed from Bilbao, by sending to that port the ships in the enclosed list, which, having brought infantry only, must now be at Pasages. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions accordingly.

I enclose a letter from the Q. M. G., directing that the infantry now in the horse ships at Bilbao may be removed to the infantry ships which you will appoint to receive them.

To Don M. de Alava.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I am sorry to inform you that no boats have come to the harbour of Pasages to aid in the operations of the siege of San Sebastian; and that there are no carts of the country for this operation. I cannot avoid saying, and I beg it may be made known to the people of the provinces, that the magistrates have given no assistance to enable me to carry on the operations which are necessary for the deliverance of the province from the enemy; and that I shall make known my opinion of their conduct to the whole of Spain.

I likewise enclose a letter which has been received from Mr. Dunmore, in regard to the assistance received from the town of Vitoria. The people of that town, and of these provinces, will experience the difference, if, in consequence of this want of assistance, I should be obliged to abandon them to the enemy.

I likewise enclose you a report which I have received from Bilbao, from which it appears that the magistrates have refused to give us the use of the convents for hospitals. I beg that it may be observed, that these hospitals are required for officers and soldiers wounded in fighting the battles of this country; and I trust that some measures will be adopted to oblige these magistrates to give the assistance required from them. At all events, I will take care that the whole country shall know of their conduct.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I have received your note of 6 A.M. this morning, and I am sorry that I can do no more about the boats than I have done. I have never seen

matters otherwise in Spain : there is always a great deal of enthusiasm, and a great desire for success ; but when exertion is called for, the call is never answered. I have written to Gen. Alava both about carts and boats. I am happy to say, however, that the artillery have 100 carts of our own, and that there are 100 more coming up to Tolosa, of which 30 are arrived there, and are applicable to this service. These will do more than the 300 country carts called for.

To the Conde de Funchal.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter by Major Fremantle.

Capt. Cardoso being a person liable to trial in case he should return to Portugal, and being therefore in a state of accusation, I don't think it would be deemed respectful on my part towards the government if I were to employ him in any manner in the army. I am very sorry, therefore, that it is not in my power to do as your Excellency desires.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I enclose 3 charges * upon which I propose that Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Murray should be tried before a General Court Martial ; the first two founded upon my instructions, the last upon Adm. Hallowell's letter.

I likewise enclose a fourth charge, founded upon the enclosed journal, transmitted to me by Gen. Copons, who commands the 1st Spanish army in Catalonia. I doubt, however, the expediency of trying Sir J. Murray on this charge, as the proof must rest a good deal upon Spanish evidence ; and it might cause dissensions between the two armies. I request to

* CHARGES AGAINST LIEUT. GEN. SIR JOHN MURRAY, BART.

The charges drawn and preferred at the suggestion of the Marquis of Wellington.

1st Charge ; For landing, or continuing on shore when landed, between the 7th and 12th June, near Tarragona, a large quantity of heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores, when he had good reason to believe that no real benefit could be derived for 10 or 12 days as to producing the fall of Tarragona by these means ; and when he had received information, which he believed, that long before that time a superior force of the enemy would be near him ; and was aware that the siege must then be abandoned ; knowing, at the same time, the great difficulties and dangers attending a sudden re-embarkation on that coast. Such conduct being highly unmilitary, and against the spirit of his instructions.

2d Charge ; For neglect of duty and disobedience of the express written orders of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, the Commander of His Majesty's forces in the Peninsula, by not re-embarking the whole of the forces under his command after he had determined to raise, and had actually raised the siege of Tarragona, and returning to Valencia, in order to assist the Spanish armies in that province in securing the positions which they might have acquired there.

The charge drawn upon the Admiral's letter and statement.

3d Charge ; For neglect of duty in hastily re-embarking the forces under his command without any previous preparation or arrangement, and thus precipitately and unnecessarily abandoning a considerable quantity of artillery, stores, and ammunition, about the 12th June, 1813, near Tarragona, when he was so far from being compelled to this degrading measure by the immediate approach of any superior force, or by any other sufficient cause, that by due zeal, firmness, and exertion, the greater part, if not the whole, might have been embarked in safety, Adm. Hallowell, who was at that time on duty on the station, engaging to effect

have your Lordship's orders regarding these charges, and that you will return the enclosed papers from Gen. Copons.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I learn from Sir T. Graham, that the *Sparrow* arrived from England at Pasages last night, having sailed on the 10th. She spoke the *President* in the offing with a convoy of ordnance store ships; but there are no accounts of any increase of the naval force on this coast; and Sir T. Graham informs me that Lord Keith had told him that he had recommended that a line of battle ship might be sent to this coast, but had received no answer, and that nothing was left to his discretion. I beg leave again to bring under your Lordship's view, in an official form, a representation of the inconveniences and disadvantages under which the army is carrying on its operations, in consequence of the want of an adequate naval force on this coast.

The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and other ports in Portugal, and from Coruña, are delayed for want of convoy; the maritime blockade of San Sebastian is not kept at all; the enemy have a constant communication with San Sebastian from St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne; and they have introduced, besides supplies of different kinds, reinforcements to the garrison of artillerymen and *sapeurs*, and some officers belonging to the medical department. The fact of the communication between San Sebastian and the ports of France is notorious to the whole world; as Gen. Rey's report of the assault of the 25th July has been published in the French newspapers.

the same. Such conduct being highly to the prejudice of the service, and detrimental to the British military character.

A charge drawn from the statement of Gen. Copons and Gen. Murray's own letters, submitted but not preferred by the Marquis of Wellington.

4th Charge; For a series of irresolute, indecisive, and vacillating conduct, from the 3d to the 17th June, not tending to any of the main objects of his instructions; more particularly, by continuing the siege of Tarragona, and at the same time determining to attack that part of the French forces marching from Barcelona, after he had heard of Marshal Suchet's approach; and afterwards precipitately abandoning both these objects, with the loss of his artillery, ammunition, and stores; at the same time withdrawing, about the 12th June, a part of the English forces which were stationed as an *appui* to Gen. Copons, with whom he was acting, without giving him previous notice, and leaving that General, then under his command, without explicit orders or instructions, or any information as to two Spanish battalions belonging to the 1st Spanish army, which were at the Coll de Balaguer, but recommending him to come and join him, Gen. Sir J. Murray, on the very day he began to embark. And further, by again landing his infantry at the Coll de Balaguer, for the purpose of attacking part of Marshal Suchet's force, contrary to his instructions, and the causes of his former hasty re-embarkation remaining the same. At the same time ordering Gen. Copons, who was then no stronger than he had been (and to whom he had but just before written to do the best he could for his own safety), first, to watch Marshal Suchet on the artillery road; then, if he could not join him in giving battle (which he before thought impracticable), to try and cut off his resources, and again, afterwards, to try and detain the Barcelona force; and, finally, when Gen. Copons was attempting to perform this operation, and in part succeeding, by waiting a whole day in expectation of an attack from this same Barcelona force, and then suddenly abandoning the whole plan and determining to re-embark, without giving any notice to Gen. Copons of this further hasty change of operations.

In the attack of a maritime place, some assistance has generally been received by the army from the navy; but the naval force on this coast is too weak to give us any of the description we require, and for the want of which we shall now be much distressed. The soldiers are obliged to work in the transports to unload the vessels, because no seamen can be furnished; and we have been obliged to use the harbour boats of Pasages, navigated by women, in landing the ordnance and stores, because there was no naval force to supply us with the assistance which we should have required in boats. These harbour boats being light, and of a weak construction, have many of them been destroyed; and we shall be put to much inconvenience, and there will be great delay from the want of boats in the further operations of the siege; and the soldiers are obliged to load and unload the boats, the women who navigate them being unequal to the labor. It is my opinion, that if we had a sufficient naval force, we might, if the weather permitted, make an attack from the sea at the same time that we should make the attack upon the breaches in the walls. This attack would, at all events, divide the enemy's attention; and would probably prevent much of the loss in the assault of the breaches, if it did not tend to insure the success of the assault.

I also beg to draw your Lordship's attention to an official communication of my opinion that material advantage would be gained by impeding the coasting trade called *cabotage*, between the Garonne and Bayonne, and St. Jean de Luz. The enemy would then be obliged to use the land transport of the country in collecting his magazines on the Adour, by which the collection of store magazines would be much delayed, if their collection to any great extent could be at all effected; and the distress occasioned by the war, and its consequent unpopularity in France, would be considerably increased. But the naval force off this coast being unequal even to the blockade of San Sebastian, cannot be supposed equal to the effectual blockade of the coast between the Garonne and Bayonne.

I have never been in the habit of troubling government with requisitions for force, but have always carried on the service to the best of my ability with that which has been placed at my disposal; and if the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than one frigate and a few brigs and cutters, fit and used only to carry dispatches, to co-operate with this army in the siege of a maritime place, the possession of which, before the bad season commences, is important to the army as well as to the navy, I must be satisfied, and do the best I can without such assistance; but I hope your Lordship will let me know positively whether I am, or not, to have any further assistance in naval means.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 19th Aug. 1813.

I write to Mr. Smith by this occasion, to beg him to buy for me Cassini's Map of France, and likewise a map which it is said he has published of the Pyrenees. As I understand these maps are very scarce, I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will assist him with the influence of government in procuring them, as it is very desirable that I should have them.

The A.G. to Major Burton, Vitoria.

19th Aug. 1813.

You will be pleased to ascertain what quantity of captured French clothing now remains in store at Vitoria, as his Excellency the Marquis of Wellington has decided on giving the clothing of that description, whatever may be its amount, to the disposal of Gen. Mina, of the Spanish service. You are to make any communication you may esteem necessary to the Spanish Governor or authorities, to insure that the pleasure of the Commander of the Forces on this subject be fully complied with; and you will be pleased to report to me, at your earliest convenience, the measures taken on this subject and the probable result of them. Directions have been issued through the Chief of the Spanish Staff that an application should be made to you to the purpose above stated.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th Aug. 1813.

I have just received your note of 6½ p.m. of last night. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will represent to Capt. Otway the state of the naval blockade of San Sebastian. The enemy have a daily intercourse with the place. This is obvious, not only from the information which I have, but from the publication in the Paris papers of Rey's account of the assault of the 25th of last month. I hear that besides supplies they have sent into the place artillerymen, *sapeurs*, and officers of the medical staff; and in fact they may send what they please.

But besides the blockade, the navy in general give some assistance in the attack of a maritime place in those parts of the labor of the service to which seamen are more accustomed; such as in loading and unloading boats, and in the boats themselves. The assistance of a naval force in the siege of San Sebastian is most important; but it must be obvious, that with all Sir G. Collier's zeal, one frigate can do nothing in those ways.

I say nothing about the relative state of the enemy's naval force and that of His Majesty on this coast; but I believe that the enemy are superior, and can drive off Sir George whenever they please; nor do I advert to other services, which it is most desirable should be performed by the navy in aid of the army; but I must say we have not the assistance we ought to have, and which every other army has had, in the attack of this place, which it is most important to the army and navy to get possession of before the bad season commences. I believe you concur with me in thinking that if we had sufficient naval means, and the weather should be

G. O.

Lesaca, 20th Aug. 1813.

1. At a General Court Martial, held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c., &c., serjeant —, of the 5th batt. — regt., was arraigned upon the following charge:

The Court having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the evidence produced on the part of the prosecution, as well as what the prisoner has offered in defence, are of opinion that he, the prisoner, serjeant —, 5th batt. — regt., is guilty of the charge preferred against him, viz.; 'For deserting from his battalion towards the enemy, on or about the 17th Nov. 1812, near San Muñoz, and being dressed in the uniform of a French serjeant when taken prisoner at Vitoria after the battle,' in breach of the Articles of War; and the Court do, by virtue of the said Articles, sentence him, the prisoner, serjeant —, of the 5th batt. — regt., to be shot to death, at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of serjeant —, of the 5th batt. — regt., is to be carried into execution on the 22d Aug. in front of the lines of the 6th division of infantry, under the direction of the Assist. Provost Marshal attached to the 3d division, in presence of such troops of the 6th division, and the 5th batt. — regt., as can be conveniently assembled, to be paraded for that purpose.

fair when the assault should be made, great assistance would be derived from an attack on the sea front of the castle. But this attack cannot be made without great naval assistance. Under these circumstances, Capt. Otway will judge whether he ought or can stay. I think it but fair, however, to inform him, that for the last year I have represented to government the inadequacy of the naval force on the coasts of Spain and Portugal; and that, since I crossed the Ebro, and particularly in the last 8 months, not an opportunity has been missed of bringing the subject distinctly under the view of the Sec. of State.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th Aug. 1813.

In answer to that part of your note of last night which relates to the equipments, I have to mention, that I think it will be best to begin by using our own equipment, leaving that of Cuxhaven entire till we shall require assistance from it.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 20th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 4th. You will see that we have had hard and warm work here in the last 8 or 10 days. The French have lost immense numbers of men. Col. Cruquenbourg is not yet arrived, and I know nothing of the intentions of the Spanish government. I trust, however, that my last letter will have enabled you to make the Spanish government and the leading members of the Cortes, and the Minister at War, acquainted with my way of thinking regarding Gen. Castaños' removal.

The agreement made with me does not contain a word about removing officers from their stations by the government. They have a full right to remove them when they please, and to refuse to listen to any remonstrance which I may make in their favor, or to give me any reason for removing them. They ought, however, to communicate the order for removal through me. Under these circumstances, I am astonished that the Minister at War, having found it so easy to remove Gen. Castaños, finds any difficulty in removing the Duque del Parque if he has given dissatisfaction to the government.

This is not the case, however, with regard to appointments. The agreement with me is clear upon this point; and yet there is not a day that passes in which it is not broken by the government. I am astonished that the Minister at War should have said, that the existing Regents could agree only to what had been directed by the Cortes; and that they could not confirm any agreement made by their predecessors. This is quite a new principle of government, which I am convinced it cannot be intended to put in practice. If it is, the changes in the Spanish government are much more important to those who have any concerns with it than we were before aware of. The fact is, however, that this ground is not only untenable in principle, but in fact; and I enclose you a letter in which you will see that the existing government have, after full consideration, confirmed all the agreements made with me by their predecessors. The Minister at War, therefore, must have been misinformed.

In regard to an alteration in what was agreed to with me, I acknow-

ledge that I don't see how it can be altered, so as to enable me to hold the command with advantage to the public, or honor to myself. Indeed matters cannot go on much longer as they are: either I must possess the confidence and the support of the government, and of the Minister at War, whatever may be the nature of the agreement with me, or I must resign the command of the army; notwithstanding the consequences, of which I am as well aware as any man. I beg, however, that you will tell the gentlemen at Cadiz, that if I am obliged to take this step, I will do it in the manner which shall be most agreeable to them, and least injurious to the public service; and that I shall continue, as I have always done to this moment, to serve the cause zealously.

P.S. Observing upon the *insolent* letter stated to have been written to the government by the Duque del Parque, I should wish to know why they correspond with him. Their agreement with me is clear upon this point; viz., that all reports, applications, &c., from the army, and all their orders and instructions to the army, are to come through me. I will engage that the Duque del Parque will not write me an *insolent* letter, nor send me one to be forwarded to the government; if he did once, he would not a second time. But I never yet heard of a government, or of any other authority, that departed from the established order of communication, that did not suffer in its authority from such deviation.

While talking to the government and leaders of the Cortes upon this subject, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will point out to them the necessity of adopting some measures to subsist their armies, which are now maintained principally from my magazines, but which I neither can nor will maintain any longer. I know that a great deal could be done to set all this matter right; but I will do nothing till I know that I possess the confidence of the government, and that what I shall do will be approved of; and till the little jealousy which pervades the government disappears.

Since the present Minister at War has been in office, I am quite certain that I have not brought to a conclusion any one point referred to him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813.

I have received yours of the 20th, and have written to Sir G. Collier, and have sent a letter for Lord Keith containing one for Lord Melville.

I have ordered 2 brigades of artillery to Tolosa, that attached to the 3d and that to the 4th divisions; they are at Dickson's service.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813, 11 A.M.

I received the day before yesterday your letter regarding Gen. Morillo's wants, and I have sent to the General officer, commanding the 4th army, to desire that measures may be taken to supply him with the mules he wants. In regard to cavalry, I don't believe he wants any now; when he does, I will take care he shall have it.

To Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., R.E.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813, 1½ P.M.

I am desirous that some measures should be adopted to strengthen our

position in front, and in the neighbourhood of Irun, upon which I wish that the officers of engineers may be employed. I mean that the first line on the right should rest upon the valley of Andarra, and should occupy the heights on which the convent of San Marcial stands. It does not appear to me that this ground will require any works in its front excepting breastworks, abattis, and musketry posts, which the troops on the ground will construct. There should be a closed battery on the left of this ground immediately above the bridge, in order to prevent the enemy from working to repair the bridge, or to lay down another, till those heights should be carried. There should likewise be 2 redoubts in rear of the right, each for 300 men, on 2 points which Capt. Todd of the Staff corps will point out, in order to command the access to this ground, and to secure the retreat from it on this side.

In the rear of these heights there is another range, also on the right of the high road and of Irun, looking to the Bidasoa, on which it is necessary that some works should be constructed, connecting it with the town of Irun. Capt. Todd will show the spot for these works, as also for one on a height in the rear of the town of Irun. Major Smith of the Royal Engineers will show where I wish works to be constructed between the town and Fuenterrabia and the sea, which will be the left of the two lines above described.

The second line to this position is the line of heights extending from the Peña de Aya on the right to the Monte Jaitzquibel on the left; and Major Smith will point out where it will be necessary to construct some works in rear of the right of the Peña de Aya, to cover the roads leading from the valley of the Bidasoa towards Irun and Oyarzun, upon which I beg you to communicate with the Q. M. G.

As soon as the ground shall be looked at and marked out, and you shall make a calculation of the number of men you will require at each work, I will order parties for you. They will generally be Spaniards, but I should hope that by paying them, tasking them, and overlooking them well, we shall get on with the works.

Au Gén. Don M. Freyre.

Lesaca, ce 21 Août, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 20. Votre Excellence observera que j'ai une grande armée Anglaise et Portugaise à nourrir, et que les moyens de transport appartenant à l'armée sont employés au siège de San Sébastien, aucun moyen n'ayant été donné pour ce service par le pays.

Vous observerez aussi que, dans les dernières 6 semaines, j'ai donné 60,000 rations de biscuit aux 3 divisions du centre de la 4^{me} armée, outre la ration journalière à la division du Général Longa, et 130,000 rations de biscuit à l'Armée de Réserve de l'Andalousie. Ces secours en pain sont outre la viande salée, et outre la paye pour 5 divisions de la 4^{me} armée, et pour la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo, et 25,000 *duros* pour la division de Longa, sans compter l'argent pour l'Armée de Réserve de l'Andalousie.

Il paraîtrait par tout ceci que, si le territoire de la 4^{me} armée peut donner quelque chose pour son maintien, il n'a, au moins jusqu'à pré-

sent, donné rien ; et que vous seriez mieux sans Intendant et employés de Hacienda.

Cependant je peux vous assurer qu'autant que je pourrai je donnerai de l'aide aux armées Espagnoles ; et je vous envoie à présent un ordre sur le magasin de Tolosa pour 25,000 livres de riz, et sur celui de Vitoria pour 100,000 livres de biscuit.

C'est tout ce que je peux faire ; et j'espère que vous ferez travailler votre Intendant de manière que vous n'aurez plus d'occasion de venir aux magasins des étrangers, qui devraient plutôt avoir recours aux vôtres.

To Adm. Lord Keith, K.B.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813.

I did not trouble you with an answer to your letter, because I had nothing to tell you deserving your attention which you would not have heard from other quarters, and indeed the same reason exists for not troubling you at present ; but having just heard that a vessel is going off to you, and having to trouble you with the enclosed to Lord Melville, I write you a few lines to thank you for your former letter, and to express my best wishes for your success.

I beg to be kindly remembered to my old friend Malcolm.

To Visc. Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 28th July. I don't know what Sir C. Stuart has written to government regarding want of naval means on the Lisbon station. What I have written has been founded upon my own sense of the want of naval assistance on this coast, as well as on the coast of Portugal ; and I assure you that I neither know nor care what has passed, or may pass, in Parliament or in the newspapers on the subject.

I complain of an actual want of necessary naval assistance and co-operation with the army, of which I believe no man will entertain a doubt who reads the facts stated in my reports to government. I know nothing about the cause of the evil ; it may be owing to a general deficiency of naval force for all the objects to which it is necessary to attend in an extended system of war. It may be owing to a proper preference of other services over this, or it may be owing to the inapplication of the force intrusted to their command by the Admirals and Captains. I state the fact, which nobody will deny ; and leave it to government to apply a remedy or not, as they may think proper, hoping only that they will let me know whether they propose to apply a remedy or not.

As far as I am concerned, I have no objection to the whole, or any part of the navy, being employed in expeditions against the French and American ports, if government think that policy preferable to that which they have followed lately. I may entertain an opinion upon the subject ; but as the Commander of the army, I should not think it necessary to say one word on the subject, any more than I shall regarding the deficiency of the naval means to assist us as we ought to be assisted by the navy, when I shall know from government that they don't propose to give us any more. It will then remain for me to see whether the service can be carried on during the winter, under the circumstances of the delays and disappointments to which we are now liable, from the want of security

for vessels to sail on the coast singly, and from the want of convoys for them to sail together, and to report to government if I should find it cannot.

I beg to observe that the circumstances of the coast of Portugal are very different from those of the Channel, in regard to the facilities which the enemy has of interrupting the communication; and it is for many reasons much more easy to guard. The inconveniences also to which the public service is exposed, from the want of the secure navigation of the coast of Spain and Portugal by the navy, are of a far greater magnitude than those suffered by the want of security on the coasts of the Channel. If the insecurity should be of any considerable duration in point of time, it will affect the army in its bread and corn; and the truth is, that the delay of any one ship affects the operations of the army, as I assure you that we have not more of any thing than we want; and the delay or loss of some particular ships, loaded with ordnance or military stores, would go far to impede all the operations of the campaign. For instance, we have done literally nothing since the 2d Aug., because there was a mistake regarding the preparation of an ordnance equipment, which was afterwards delayed by contrary winds; and the delay for want of convoy, or capture on the coast, of a vessel having on board ammunition or stores, commonly called camp equipments, would just stop the operations of the army till the ammunition or stores could be replaced. For this reason, I acknowledge that I should differ with you in thinking this the last point to be attended to. Allowing for the partiality I may be supposed to feel for it, I should think that, considering the expense already incurred by keeping this army in the field, it would be bad policy to cramp their operations by leaving their maritime communications insecure.

I shall not trouble you with the facts, as they will come before you from another quarter. And I believe nobody will deny, that either we have not sufficient naval means, or that they are misapplied. But besides these facts, I assure you that there is not an hour in the day in which some statement does not come before me of the inconvenience resulting from the want of naval means; and even while writing this letter the Commissary Gen. has been here to complain that his empty provision ships are detained at Santander for want of convoy!

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813, noon.

I have had the honor of receiving two letters from you, dated the 20th, one at 3 P.M. I wrote to you on the 19th regarding the disposal of the transports which brought to Pasages the 85th, and the recruits for the infantry.

I have reason to believe that there are 4000 prisoners at Bilbao, instead of 2800, which number I stated to you in my letter of the 11th; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make provision accordingly to send them to England.

I beg you will decide regarding the best mode of disposing of Lieut. Delafons for the service.

Adverting to the increased difficulties of the bar of Bilbao, it appears to me that it will be expedient in future to order all vessels in the first in-

stance to Santander, and thence to bring them as wanted to Guetaria, where they could remain till they could be received in Pasages. None should enter Bilbao excepting those of so light a draught of water as that they could come out at high water at all times. It is my opinion that as long as the enemy remain in Laredo, the fishing vessels of that port ought not to be allowed to go to sea.

In regard to the services of the *President, Révolutionnaire, &c.*, and the general naval means on this coast and the coast of Portugal, I enclose an extract of my last letter to the Sec. of State, which will make known to you my opinion on all the points adverted to in the dispatch from Lord Keith.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 21st Aug. 1813.

In answer to your private letter of the 20th, I have to thank you for the newspaper. It does not appear to me to contain any thing regarding the operations of the siege to which any body can object. I reply to you officially regarding naval reinforcements.

The A.G. to Dr. M^cGrigor, Inspector General of hospitals.

21st Aug. 1813.

I have laid your letter of the 9th inst. and enclosures from Dr. Dickson before the Marquis of Wellington. In both the letters enclosed, the Purveyor seems to solicit the establishment of a general rule for a periodical clearing of the pack stores at stations, without reference to head quarters. The Commander of the Forces has decided not to accede to such an arrangement either in regard to the soldiers', the Colonel's, or government property.

By the 2d Art. of the 19th section of the Articles of War the property of non-commissioned officers and soldiers who die or are killed in the service is directed to be sold, and the produce to be applied, in the first instance, to the discharge of regimental debts, and the balance after remaining to be placed in the hands of the paymaster.

To conform to the spirit of the above article, the property of soldiers who die at stations distant from their corps should be offered at public sale, and the Purveyor who at the time is possessed of the property of the deceased should account for the produce of the sale. There can be no objection to such sale taking place periodically, as on the 1st of each month. An officer of each division should be present, and the Assist. Provost of the station should always attend.

To prevent a repetition of such mistakes as those alluded to in Dr. Dickson's letter of the 27th Jan. 1813, between the soldiers', or Colonel's, or government property, a schedule of what may properly be disposed of for the soldier's benefit, or be retained on the Colonel's or public account till ordered out of store, is herewith sent. It is very probable that part of the property offered for sale may not be purchased; in such cases the articles left must be returned into store, and there remain apart till a board shall decide on the expediency of destroying the whole or any part of such articles, and the board, so to be empowered to decide, must be appointed from this office. The Colonel's property of accoutrements and government property of arms are to be subject to the same restrictions, and are not to be transferred from the Purveyor's to the Ordnance responsibility without his Excellency's specific authority.

The A.G. to Capt. Swain, Bilbao.

21st Aug. 1813.

By your letter of the 13th inst. I observe you state that the hospital duties are furnished by the detachments under the command of Lieut. Col. Marston. I must request a more explicit report on this subject, as I do not know what detachments could possibly come under the command of a member of the Q. M. G.'s department, though subject to his interference, if such should have been expedient, and distinctly to receive marching orders from him. Be pleased to mention whether the detachments to which you alluded have been noticed in any of your

returns; if not, where those returns have been sent, who signed the returns, and who may be the senior duty officer.

In future you are to consider it one of your attentions to notice all detachments of British troops arriving at or remaining at Bilbao; and when the period of recovery shall arrive, you are to report the departure of all detachments also. Should a senior officer on duty accidentally reach Bilbao, you will, if necessary, explain your instructions, and solicit his assistance in the furtherance of your duties, with which he is on no account to interfere, as being of a specific and distinct nature.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 22d Aug. 1813, 8 A.M.

Capt. Otway would so far do us good by remaining off the coast, as that he would aid in the blockade, and would prevent that mode of communication which I told you was put in practice. But I would not, on any account, interfere with his instructions from Lord Keith.

I wrote to Sir G. Collier yesterday in answer to a letter from him, and communicated to him what I had written to the Sec. of State on the 19th. I hope that he will be induced to retain the *Révolutionnaire* and the *President*.

I wrote to Sir R. Fletcher yesterday respecting the works, and I hope that he will be able to send an engineer to undertake them.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 22d Aug. 1813.

In returning officers for the medal for Vitoria, I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what I should do about your Portuguese Adj. Gen. and Secretary. Were they in the action?

We have a report that the armistice has been renewed to the 15th Sept. The French officers tell ours that the peace is settled, excepting as to Holland, which the Allies wished to restore to the House of Orange, and Buonaparte wished to give to Jerome as King. Malta, they say, remains with the English. They expect also, that as soon as our minister reaches the Congress, we shall receive orders to suspend hostilities!

P.S. I send you some late American papers. We appear to have *rompéd** Hampton in Virginia.

Au Ministre de la Guerre, Cadiz.

Lesaca, ce 22 Août, 1813.

Dans la dépêche que j'ai adressée à votre Excellence de Ostiz le 3 Juillet, je vous ai dit que le Gén. Clausel avait passé l'Ebre à Tudela le 27 Juin, '*pero informado por el Alcalde, de hallarse nuestras tropas en el camino, inmediatamente lo repaso, y se dirigió á Zaragoza.*'

Connaissant le degré de la calomnie qui agit dans les guerres de révolution, je n'aurais pas écrit ce qui est dit là-dessus si je n'avais pas été sûr que je pouvais me fier aux informations que j'en avais reçues, lesquelles furent à peu près comme elles paraissent dans les papiers inclus.

* An expression in the Peninsular army for 'destroyed.'

G. O.

Lesaca, 22d Aug. 1813.

1. The A. A. Gs. of divisions are to send to the A. G.'s office, with the states of the 3d Sept., regimental nominal lists of soldiers who were not accounted for during the last winter, in consequence of the inquiry instituted by the G. O. of the 14th Feb. last, and whom officers commanding regiments are led to consider lost to the service. The supposed cause of casualty to be stated in the column of remarks.

Mais ces papiers prouvent, de la manière la plus claire, que j'ai été trompé, que le rapport qui m'a été fait était fondé sur une calomnie, et que la personne qui l'a dit a été convaincue et a confessé la fausseté.

Sous ces circonstances je ne peux pas rendre justice à la réputation de l'Alcalde de Tudela trop tôt, ni d'une manière trop publique; et je prie votre Excellence de demander permission à la Régence de faire insérer dans la Gazette cette lettre et les papiers inclus.

To His Excellency Sir C. Stuart, K.B.

Lesaca, 22d Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th inst. I have reason to believe that the outrage at Figueira, complained of in your letter, was committed by invalid soldiers of the 30th and 44th regts.; and they and the officers in charge of them have long since gone to England.

The cause of the outrage was a drunken quarrel. The truth is that I have never been able to get one person punished in Portugal for buying the soldiers' arms, accoutrements, and necessaries. The soldiers will sell these articles to buy wine, which the Portuguese wine dealers are too ready to sell them for any thing. When the soldiers get too much wine, they are quite unmanageable, and this and many other outrages have been occasioned by the same causes.

To J. W. Croker, Esq.

Lesaca, 23d Aug. 1813.

I have received all your letters, including that of the 6th. I will send the enclosure, and any other letters you may forward to me, without loss of time to Lord W. Bentinck, and will forward any answers which the Admiral may send by the same channel. I have a perfect communication with Lord William along the Ebro.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 23d Aug. 1813, 10½ A.M.

I have this morning received your letter of yesterday.

I beg that you will consider yourself authorised to use all the howitzers and mortars in any way you may think fit, belonging to all the equipments. It is unlucky that ——— did not ascertain his distance a little more correctly, and did not discover at an earlier period the advantages to be derived on the left attack from mortars and howitzers, as earlier measures might then have been adopted to transport thither the stores which we have all along had in possession.

I desired Gen. Murray to communicate to you my opinion respecting this plan of bombardment; and now I put it in writing, in order that ——— may know what I think of it, which he will recollect is in exact conformity with what I have always thought, decided, and carried into execution in former sieges.

I am quite certain that the use of mortars and howitzers in a siege, for the purpose of what ——— calls *general annoyance*, answers no purpose whatever against a Spanish place occupied by the French troops, excepting against the inhabitants of the place; and eventually, when we shall get the place, against ourselves, and the convenience we should derive from having the houses of the place in a perfect state of repair. If ——— intended to use his mortars and howitzers against any par-

ticular work occupied by the enemy, such as the cavalier, their use would answer his purpose; if he knew exactly where the enemy's intrenchment was situated, their use *might* answer his purpose. I say *might*, because I recollect that, at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, our trenches were bombarded by 11 or 13 large mortars and howitzers for 10 days, in which time 13,000 shells were thrown, which occasioned us but little loss, notwithstanding that our trenches were always full, and I may safely say did not impede our progress for one moment. I think it therefore doubtful that, even if — — — knew where the enemy's intrenchment was, his bombardment would have more effect upon it than the enemy's bombardment from Ciudad Rodrigo had upon our trenches. If this effect of the bombardment is a matter of doubt, it remains to be stated by — — — what advantage will be derived from a general bombardment of the town; and upon this point I hope he will not forget the opinions entertained at the time the breach was first practicable at San Sebastian, of the increased difficulties of storming it, in consequence of the fire in the neighbourhood. If the general bombardment should set fire to the town, as it probably will, then the attack of the enemy's intrenchment will become impracticable. I don't believe that the use of our mortars and howitzers at San Sebastian has hitherto done the enemy the slightest mischief. If the garrison lies out, it is obvious that no bombardment can materially injure them; at the same time that it is an immense increase of the difficulty and labor of the siege; and the conflagration which it may occasion may be materially injurious in the attack, and will be very inconvenient to our friends the inhabitants, and eventually to ourselves.

These are my opinions, and the grounds for them, and I have invariably, as — — — knows, acted upon them; and where there has been a partial departure from them, as there was in the second siege of Badajoz, I believe principally from the want of other ordnance, — — — knows that the bombardment answered no purpose whatever, excepting to destroy the town. I am not at all desirous, however, that these opinions should be acted upon; and only suggest, that if the town is to be bombarded, it may as well be done from the sand hills as from the left, and that this measure will save much transport and labor.

I am very sorry to hear of the indiscretion of the principal officers of the — division. It is impossible to stop people's mouths, if they are so indiscreet as to deliver their opinions on such a subject as the practicability of storming a breach, where those opinions can be of no use, excepting to render success quite unattainable by the inferior officers and troops who hear such opinions. There are some very valuable officers, and some of the best regiments in the army, in the — division; and I shall be very sorry to relieve them, in order that the officers and troops of other divisions may storm the place. I must do so, however, if it should be necessary, and must also make known the cause for this necessity.

I entertain no doubt that the enemy have worked within the breach; but if all was done that was proposed, I can't see how they can prevent us from establishing ourselves on the half bastion, on the proper left of the interior line, and on the left tower looking towards the place. If

———'s 13 gun battery is not near enough, it should be advanced nearer.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 23d Aug. 1813.

I enclose a dispatch under a flying seal, which has been transmitted to me by the Sec. of State.

I likewise enclose the copy of the report which I received from Gen. Giron, who commanded the troops which seized the ship *Brothers* in Fuenterrabia; and my report to the Minister at War, from which you will observe that I have not taken the same view of the case as is taken by Lord Castlereagh.

As far as I have any knowledge, the cargo in the *Brothers* was consumed by the Spanish army; and I believe the ship herself has been sent to Santander. I have received no orders respecting her from the Spanish government.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 23d Aug. 1813.

——— has sent me several pairs of his shoes, which I have endeavored to prevail upon him to desist from sending me, in terms not to mortify him. They are, in fact, of no use whatever. Those who travel on foot in this country don't wear shoes of that description. The Basques and Navarros, and even some of the Castilians, wear sandals. The shoes worn by the common people, who do wear shoes, are made of brown leather. A man who might have on his feet, or in his possession, a pair of such shoes, would be suspected immediately. They are, besides, too small for any common man. They are really quite useless, and it is better that no more should be sent.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 23d Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 14th, with ———'s scheme. It is like all those which I have received from French officers, and might answer well enough if I could afford, or the British government or nation would allow of my being as prodigal of men as every French General is. They forget, however, that we have but one army, and that the same men who fought at Vimeiro and Talavera fought the other day at Sorauren; and that, if I am to preserve that army, I must proceed with caution. Indeed, this becomes doubly necessary, as I see that, notwithstanding the fondness of the British nation for the sport, and their exultation upon our success, they began to cry out the other day upon the loss of 300 or 400 men in the unsuccessful storm of San Sebastian, and of the men in the affair at the ———. The troops, however, will sometimes behave ill, and posts will sometimes be surprised, and the troops engaged be roughly handled.

The affair at the ——— is certainly the worst that has ever occurred to the troops under my command; and the only one in which any guns have been lost, excepting at the battle of * * *; and it was entirely owing to † † †'s settling in his own mind that the enemy would not attack him. If the troops had not regained their post, and behaved remarkably well, I should not have passed this affair without notice.

Your Lordship may depend upon it that I am by no means tired of success; and that I shall do every thing in my power to draw the attention of the enemy to this quarter, as soon as I shall know that hostilities are really renewed in Germany.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 24th Aug. 1813.

I have received your note of this day. There is no doubt that the howitzers and mortars will be most efficient, if the only means of attacking the castle; and I beg they may be all used against the town, if it be thought that they can be of any advantage in any way that can be pointed out. I only hope they will not be used on ———'s notion of 'general annoyance,' and that the houses of the town will not be destroyed unless it should be necessary.

P.S. I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire Col. Dickson to send me a return of each equipment, not including that intended for Cuxhaven, that I may send for more ammunition for howitzers and mortars.

To the Earl of Mulgrave.

Lesaca, 24th Aug. 1813.

I received only yesterday your letter of the 16th July, which conveyed to me the first intelligence of your kind attention to the principal officers of the artillery with this army.* Your Lordship may depend upon it that no reward was ever better deserved, and that the public money has never been laid out to greater advantage than under this recommendation of yours.

It will excite hundreds to exertion. I shall not presume to do more than express the satisfaction which I have derived from this mark of your Lordship's attention to the officers of the artillery of this army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 24th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 16th, enclosing the abstract of Sir C. Stewart's dispatches of the 27th and 30th July, and of Mr. Jackson's of the 27th, and copies of other papers.

It is impossible to form a correct judgment of the state of affairs on the Continent from the information which I possess. I judge from the papers, that Buonaparte is seeking to renew the operations of the war with the Northern Powers only (Russians, Prussians, and Swedes); and if he can-

* Pensions recommended by the Master Gen. of the Ordnance were granted to the officers who commanded troops and brigades of the Royal Artillery at the battle of Vitoria.

G. O.

Lesaca, 24th Aug. 1813.

3. A Board of claims is to assemble at the Hussar brigade, consisting of

*	*	*	*	*	*	*
*	*	*	*	*	*	*

for the consideration of all claims of officers and soldiers of this army.

4. Major Gen. Lord E. Somerset, and any 2 of the officers above named, may constitute the Board.

5. The officers and men of the army are referred to the G. O. of the 15th Dec. 1811, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, relative to the principles on which claims will be considered and decided upon.

6. Claims intended for the consideration of the Board must be transmitted to the Military Sec. within one month from the date of this order; it is, however, to be understood that the Board is only authorised to decide on claims of a date prior to the 1st May, 1813.

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not effect that object, he will try to renew the armistice with the whole; and I don't see any thing in the papers to show that he will not succeed in one or the other of the objects, or to bear out the opinion of the King's ministers abroad, that the Austrians will take part in the war immediately if the armistice should be put an end to on the 10th Aug. There may be, however, further information, which I have not got. There is a passage in Count Metternich's letter to Count Bubna, of the 22d July, in which the Emperor of Austria declares that he will not take charge of a '*négo-ciation stérile au de-là du terme de la reprise des hostilités; les questions sont trop avancées pour que la paix ou la guerre ne soit pas la seule attitude admissible, &c. &c., au de-là du terme du 16 Août;*' which, if it had been in the same, or in any other terms, in the letter of the same date to the Duc de Bassano, would have been a sufficiently clear indication of the Emperor of Austria's intentions.

1st; Does not the omission of this declaration in the letter to the Duc de Bassano show that it is that of an intention not entirely decided? What course are these proceedings to take? The Russians, Prussians, and Swedes are at war, and are bound by an engagement to suspend hostilities till the 16th Aug., when their war begins, and their first movement is to be to break up the great Russian and Prussian army, and to march into Bohemia with part. But the Austrians are not parties to this agreement of co-operation; and what is to happen, supposing that they should not declare a decision, and probably not decide for some days, or a fortnight for instance, after the termination of the armistice?

We hear here to-day that the war will certainly be renewed; but if I am to judge from these papers, I should say that the armistice would be renewed for a short time longer. If it is not, there will certainly be an awkward moment at the commencement of hostilities, even if afterwards the Austrians should join in the war.

In answer to your Lordship's letter regarding the number of prisoners and the enemy's loss, the fact is, that it is impossible, at first, to form any accurate report of the number of prisoners, or an opinion of the enemy's loss. I believe we have now got 7000 prisoners, but I have not yet got an accurate return; and the enemy have certainly lost between 15,000 and 20,000 men; probably more nearly the latter number than the former. When I sent away the dispatches I thought we had from 5000 to 6000 prisoners. But it is quite out of the question waiting for accurate returns; and as I wish to be near the truth when I state a fact in a report to government, I cannot venture to give an opinion without returns, or some known *data* to judge by.

In regard to the lateness of these reports, the fact is, that when these great operations are going on, I am in the field or on the road during the whole of the time I am not asleep, and I have not time to write reports. Sometimes I am obliged to wait for reports from inferior officers, in order that government may know how the facts really stood. The last report I wrote on the 1st inst., at intervals when the troops halted, and on the 2d, after the operations were concluded; but after the report is drawn and out of my hands, it must be copied; many copies must be made, and then we have to wait for the returns from the different divisions of the

army, which must be made up into a general return before the dispatch can be sent off.

Certainly, ——— should not have sent off a vessel till I had desired him, particularly as so many events had occurred, and such a variety of reports were in circulation; but he could not resist the desire of being the first to communicate a piece of interesting news. I understand that some of the officers of the ——— said at Plymouth that I was taken prisoner, and the army defeated.

The A.G. to General officers commanding divisions.

24th Aug. 1813.

I am directed to bring to your notice the number of Spanish women who have been sent back to this country from the French lines, and who must pass through our cantonments to reach the interior. My Lord Wellington, with every considerate disposition towards the army and the people in question, wishes you seriously to guard against an unnecessary increase of followers of this description to the division under your command, which might possibly occur under these circumstances from an inclination on the part of the officers and soldiers to relieve evident distress. It is to be recollected that in proportion to the number of women admitted with a corps, baggage and animals to carry that baggage must increase; and if unlimited, must evidently produce impediments, in the event of rapid movement, perhaps equal to those experienced by the enemy in the course of this campaign, and cause a relaxation in the discipline of the army inseparable from licentiousness.

I request you will report to me for his Excellency's information whether the soldiery of your division are now in daily course of payment, agreeably to the late order, and your opinion as to the expediency of the plan, should you have had occasion to observe on its operation.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

Since I wrote to you on the 14th, I have heard nothing more upon which I can rely of Suchet's movement. It is now talked of in the army in my front; some saying that he is to come through France, others that he is to march upon Zaragoza. Gen. Paris is about Oleron.

We have been waiting for the ordnance store ships to renew our attack upon San Sebastian, which have at last arrived; and we shall open our fire to-morrow.

There is nothing new from the Continent. The French negotiators had not gone to Prague on the 24th July; but I see in a late French paper that they had arrived. The Austrians appear determined to join in the war if the armistice should be broken off; but it does not appear to me to be a determination so declared as that the other allies can act upon it.

I enclose you a note marked A, given to me by Gen. Wimpffen, the Chief of the Spanish staff. His library is in the house mentioned, and he is very anxious to save it.

I wish you would report officially and in detail your arrangements transferring the troops of Roche's division, and others, to Whittingham's division, as I am already getting into difficulties on that subject, as I told you I should in a former letter. You may put the whole army, if you like it, under Whittingham's command; but let each separate division, or brigade, or battalion, be under its own commanding officer, and report to the staff of the particular army to which he belongs. Pray observe

particularly the 29th Article of the Instructions in regard to the several commands.

The organization of the Spanish army, as it now stands, was fixed by the government, and of course cannot be altered, at least without making a special report to government, stating the reasons for the alteration. It would be very desirable, therefore, that you should refer here any alteration that you may wish to make. The consequence of not doing so is, that you involve me not only with the government, but the Staff officers are unable to account for the army. I wish likewise that Gen. Whittingham would attend to what has been frequently stated to him, viz. that when a Spanish soldier gets his full pay, he has no right to more than one pound and a half of bread as ration. I have daily complaints of his demands, and the Minister at War has written to me upon them.

I send you letters from England, and enclose one from Sir E. Pellew.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have received your dispatches and letters from the 16th to the 18th inst. I was quite certain that Suchet would move upon you to interrupt your operations; and it is fortunate that you were able to raise the siege without the loss of any of your guns or stores. I enclose my dispatch of this day, in which you will see that I have reported to all the allied governments that I have approved of your proceedings. If Suchet stays in Catalonia, you may depend upon it that he will not allow you to make the siege of Tortosa, without attempting to interrupt it. You must therefore be prepared to collect your whole force in a position to protect it. You should have at least two passages over the Ebro, protected by *têtes de pont*; and I beg you not to send the Duque del Parque till you shall be sure of Suchet having marched, or having largely detached. Arrange a mode of junction for Gen. Copons, or in which he can co-operate with you effectually, and directly, upon the enemy, in case he should advance to raise your siege.

Don't allow Gen. Clinton's corps to get too far off. The French troops march better than ours, particularly, I believe, Suchet's; and he is not unlikely to form a scheme to cut them off. I think it probable Suchet moved at the time he did, because he had heard of Soult's loss and retreat, and that he thought it better at once to carry into execution his scheme respecting Tarragona.

If you should find it necessary to feed Whittingham's or any other Spanish troops, give them a magazine either afloat or on the coast; but don't on any account take upon your departments the burthen and expense of carriage and delivery to them. This is what they always want, because it saves them trouble and thought.

I would give the world to get rid of the ———, but I don't know how to manage the matter. I know * * * well: he is a good administrator, but, I believe, no officer. I have a very good opinion, from what I have heard, of † † †, but I understand that he has a most violent, impracticable temper. * * * * * has quitted his army here, and wishes to go to Catalonia. He is by far the ablest and most energetic man I have seen in Spain, and is really an able officer; but his temper is probably the most difficult to manage that can be met with.

It is necessary to attend to all these points with this people. A man of that description getting himself into a dispute on a professional point with one of our officers would raise a flame in the country which would go to the breach of the alliance; and one of the characteristics of all Spaniards, which is to be attributed, I believe, to the desperate situation in which their affairs have been, is a thorough contempt for all the consequences of their actions, more particularly as they may affect the alliance of their country with foreign powers.

To Adm. Sir E. Pellew, Bart.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

I enclose you a letter from Mr. Croker. He has desired me to let you know whether I could send your letters through Spain; and I have informed him that I have a regular communication with Lord W. Bentinck, by which letters to you could be sent; and Lord W. Bentinck might send here any letters that you might wish to send to England. As this communication is by messengers, it would probably be desirable that your own dispatches and letters should be sent by it.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a letter addressed by Major Despard of the Royal Fusiliers to Major Gen. the Hon. E. Pakenham. Major Despard died lately of the wounds he received at the battle of Sorauren, and has left a widow and 4 children very slenderly provided for. I am therefore induced to trouble H. R. H. the Commander in Chief in their behalf; and I shall feel very much obliged to him if some provision can be made for them.

To Col. Torrens, Military Secretary.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 29th June, containing a memorial from 4 French officers, deserters from the enemy; and I beg to state, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that I never held out any inducement to the officers of the French army to abandon their service, although I promised the soldiers who would desert pay, which those who have come over actually receive.

I think it, however, very likely that some of the British officers who were authorised by the Sec. of State to encourage desertion from the enemy's troops in the Peninsula may have stated in a proclamation that officers who would desert should receive a daily pay, according to their rank; but I never heard that such a prospect had been held out to them.

In reply to the memorial of the French officers before mentioned, I have the honor to enclose a letter from Major Gen. Peacocke, with a statement of the money and clothes each officer received during his stay at Lisbon.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

A great number of soldiers of this army having offered to re-enlist (the period of their services being nearly expired), since the proclamation of H. R. H. the Prince Regent was made known to them, I beg to be

informed if they are to be re-enlisted before the expiration of the 3 years, which by the proclamation they are bound to serve.

I take this opportunity of transmitting to you a list of men in the Chasseurs Britanniques, who have either completed their period of service, or are within 2 months of it, and who, as it appears by the enclosed letter from Major Gen. Inglis, were enlisted without reference to any Act of Parliament as to their re-enlistment. I am therefore of opinion that they ought to be discharged; and I will thank you to favor me with H. R. H. the Commander in Chief's orders on the subject.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

No movement of importance has been made by the enemy or by the Allies since I transmitted my last report. It is generally reported, and it appears, that the enemy have been reinforced, and it is said that a considerable body of men are expected from the interior of France. Gen. Paris's detachment is stated to be in the neighbourhood of Oleron. The enemy are strengthening their positions by works.

The ordnance vessels having arrived at Pasages, the fire against San Sebastian will recommence to-morrow morning.

I have received reports from Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck to the 19th inst., copies and extracts of which I have the honor to enclose,* from

* Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Cambrils, 16th Aug. 1813.

On the 3d the Duque del Parque's corps came up to Tarragona; as did the division of Gen. Sarsfield on the 11th. Gen. Elio could not spare the 3 regiments of the division of Mijares, which I had requested him to send me.

On the 10th I heard that Marshal Suchet had returned to Villa Franca from Barcelona, and had brought with him 5000 men. The reports of the succeeding days left no doubt of its being his intention to move forward; and on the 14th I learned from the Baron de Eroles and Col. Manso, that besides collecting all he could from the garrisons, he had been joined by Decaen with 6000 men.

In consequence of this intelligence, I suspended all operations for the siege of Tarragona, except the making of fascines, and landed neither artillery nor stores.

There was no position on the Gaya, as I had in my former letter supposed. There are only 2 carriageable roads across it, but they are at a distance of 10 miles from each other. The river having no water in it, and being only impassable from the steepness of its banks, is passable for infantry everywhere. A corps placed in the centre could not reach either flank in time to prevent the passage of the enemy. Gen. Whittingham, whom I had sent with his corps to the Colls of S^{ta} Cristina and Llebra, reported them not to be defensible with so small a force as we could allot to this object.

I had intended to have pushed on to the Llobregat. Suchet's army was at one time divided between Barcelona and Villa Franca and its environs. A rapid movement might possibly have enabled me to fall separately upon his advanced corps, and to obtain possession of the ridge of mountains on this side the Llobregat before he could have time to bring up his troops from Barcelona. I could not execute this movement before being joined by Sarsfield, and previously Suchet had concentrated his force in Villa Franca and its neighbourhood. Suchet's force has been variously reported, from 20,000 to 25,000 men.

The immediate vicinity of Tarragona offered a very good position in itself, but it may be completely turned by an enemy who, crossing the Colls, should approach Tarragona by Valls and Reus.

On the 14th Suchet moved a large corps upon Altafulla, but the road being close to the beach, the gun boats prevented him from passing, if such were his intention.

On the 15th he drove back the posts on the Colls of S^{ta} Cristina and Llebra, and afterwards forced the corps at Brafim, by which they were supported, to retire. His whole army marched by this route.

Upon Suchet's continuing to advance towards Tarragona, I resolved upon retiring in the night; and the army arrived here this morning without any loss, and without receiving

which it appears that Marshal Suchet collected the troops under his command at Villa Franca on the 10th, consisting of from 20,000 to 25,000 men; and Lord William collected those he had within his reach in a position on the river Gaya, having suspended all the operations of the siege of Tarragona. His Lordship, however, was not satisfied with his position, which he could not occupy in sufficient strength, as he had not been joined by all the troops which he expected, and which was liable to be turned on both flanks: he therefore retired upon Cambrils, without loss, in proportion as Marshal Suchet advanced, leaving Tarragona open, which place the French have blown up and evacuated; and Marshal Suchet has again retired towards Barcelona.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention particularly to the enclosed report* of Col. Lord F. Bentinck of the conduct of a detachment of the Brunswick hussars in an affair with the enemy on the 15th.

I entirely approve of Lord W. Bentinck's retiring when he had not been able to collect his whole force, and did not consider himself sufficiently strong to fight a general action with the enemy.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship a list of the officers of the allied British and Portuguese army, who, according to the rule laid down in the Earl of Liverpool's dispatch of the 3d Sept. 1811, are entitled to a medal, or other badge of distinction, in commemoration of the battle of Vitoria.

any molestation from the enemy. If there had been any fair chance of success, I would have given them battle.

* Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.

Hospitalet, 19th Aug. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report which Lord F. Bentinck has made to me, respecting an affair which took place on the 15th, when the enemy were advancing towards Tarragona, and which terminated in a manner highly creditable to the Brunswick hussars, a part of which regiment alone was engaged with a very superior number of the enemy's cavalry.

Col. Lord F. Bentinck to Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

Camp, near Cambrils, 16th Aug. 1813.

In obedience to your directions, I marched yesterday afternoon, with the brigade of cavalry under my command, beyond Nulles and Villabella, and reconnoitred the enemy's column, which was advancing upon Valls. As soon as we began to retire, the enemy followed us both with cavalry and infantry, and a squadron of the 4th hussars pressed closely upon our rear-guard, formed by Capt. Wulffen's troop of the Brunswick hussars, and attempted to charge and overpower it. The enemy was opposed each time with determined spirit and resolution; and Capt. Ericheson, with his troop, being sent to the support of Capt. Wulffen, the enemy were driven back, with the loss of one officer killed, another officer wounded, and between 20 and 30 men left sabred on the field. 16 prisoners and 11 horses fell into our hands. I had sincere pleasure in observing the spirit displayed by the officers and men of the Brunswick hussars.

Lieut. Col. Schrader, at all times zealous, was particularly useful on this occasion in restraining the impetuosity of his men.

Circumstanced as we were, with a strong column of the enemy far advanced upon our right flank, and 2 battalions of infantry (as I was informed by the prisoners) upon our left and rear, and in an enclosed country, I did not deem it prudent to pursue the advantage we had gained.

I regret to say that Cornet Radant, of the Brunswick hussars, was wounded and taken, and I subjoin a return of the remainder of the wounded and missing.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 25th Aug. 1813.

I send you the last morning state. We have taken on the strength the 76th, 84th, and 85th regts., 1797 R. and F., and about 800 of the recruits, making in all 2600 men, so that we have gained about 500 British in the last week, and about 1500 Portuguese from the hospitals; and we are gaining some men from the hospitals every day. I don't doubt that we are now as strong as we were on the 25th of last month; and that in the course of a short time we shall be within 5000 or 6000 men as strong as we were the day before the battle of Vitoria. The troops continue remarkably healthy: there is indeed no sickness among them.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813, 11 A.M.

I was very sorry that I had not the pleasure of seeing you yesterday. I left you a note, however, with my opinion of the state of affairs, which I observe by your note of 2 P.M. agrees very nearly with your own; and I requested Major Smith to point out to you the spot to which I thought 6 guns of the left hand battery ought to be removed, from which it appeared to me that they would certainly see the bottom of the right face of the bastion, and would bring it down in a few hours. At all events, the battery, in its present situation, will answer no purpose whatever, being too distant to injure materially even the defences; and if the foot of the wall cannot be seen from the spot to which it is proposed to remove it, it may at least be expected that the fire on the defences will be more effectual. I entertain no doubt, however, that the wall will be breached from the new site.

It will be necessary to prepare immediately for the assault of the place; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you still doubt the troops of the —; as, if you do, we must send over some others, who, with the — —, will show the — that they have not been called upon to perform what is impracticable.

It would be very desirable to have the back of the rock closely examined by some Staff and Engineer officers, and some of those of the navy, in order to ascertain whether an attack there would be likely to be successful.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire Major Smith to send me a report of his, marking out the redoubts, &c., with a statement of

Q. M. G. to Brig. Longa.

Lesaca, 26 Août, 1813.

D'après les ordres du général en Chef, le général Longa voudra bien mettre ses troupes en marche demain matin pour les conduire par le sentier qui mène depuis le moulin d'Andarra vers la montagne de Aya, pour y entrer dans un autre chemin qui se dirige sur Irun. Le général Longa établira le gros de ses troupes, en bivouac, sur la pente de la montagne de Aya, entre le déboucher du dit sentier et le camp où se trouvent actuellement les troupes Hanovriennes de la 1^{re} division. Le général Longa laissera cependant les postes qu'il a présentement dans la vallée d'Andarra.

L'intention du général en Chef est, que les troupes du général Longa soient en mesure, dans leur nouvelle position, ou de soutenir la droite de l'armée de Galice dans le cas que ce corps vint à être attaqué, ou bien de marcher, s'il devenait nécessaire, vers la grande route qui va d'Oyarzun à Irun.

La brigade Portugaise de la 4^{me} division occupera le terrain que la division du général Longa doit quitter demain matin, et le général Cole fera savoir aujourd'hui au général Longa l'heure à laquelle les postes Espagnoles laissés du côté de Salain et de la barca de Endalaza seront relevés par les troupes Portugaises.

Le général Longa voudra bien faire connaître l'arrivée de ses troupes dans leur nouvelle position, au général Graham, qui commande les divisions de la gauche de l'armée.

the proposed profile, ditch, &c. for each, and an estimate of the number of men required to work at each, that I may give orders for their execution.

I shall likewise be much obliged to you if you will desire Col. Dickson to send me a report of the ordnance and ammunition come with each of the last equipments, in order that I may write for more mortar and howitzer ammunition.

I enclose a letter from Gen. Alava, in regard to a magazine of French goods belonging to a Spaniard, taken by Gen. Bradford at Tolosa, and divided among his men. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Gen. Bradford to state what he knows and wishes to say on this subject.

P.S. I return your plan of San Sebastian.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813, noon.

I have been so much occupied for these several days, that I have not been able to write to you. I was yesterday at San Sebastian, where I did not think matters were going on exactly right. There is nothing new on the frontier. The last reports were warlike. The accounts which I received from England from Baron Trip, did not throw much new light on the affairs of the Continent. Buonaparte evidently wanted either to renew the armistice after the 10th Aug., or to commence hostilities with the Russians and Prussians alone. I think he was likely to succeed in the former object. The negotiations had not commenced, and his Plenipotentiaries had not even arrived at Prague on the 24th and 25th July. I see, however, an article in the French papers, which shows that they had arrived afterwards, and the usual visits had been paid.

I hope that you are getting better.

To — — —.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 25th inst., to which it is so difficult for me to give you an answer, that I should refrain from doing it altogether, if such omission was not likely to be misinterpreted.

I don't know any officer of the British army, excepting myself, on whom the Spanish government have thought proper to confer the marks of distinction to which you refer; and, as I am entirely unacquainted with the motives or causes for which they have been conferred upon me, excepting so far as they are expressed in the instruments conveying them, I can't assign a reason why they have not been conferred upon yourself and others. I can safely say, however, that it has not been owing to any omission of mine to report my sense of the merits of all the officers who have been employed in this army.

In regard to the Portuguese government, I may safely say that the omission of your name among those on whom H. R. H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer a mark of his favor, is not to be attributed to any want of a sense of your services and merits. I don't think that it would be quite proper in me to answer any question regarding the disposal of his favors by His Royal Highness; but if you will look over the list, I think you will find that your name could not have

been included in it, without a departure from the principle on which it was made, which would have made the list much longer than it ought to have been.

I have only to add, that I shall not fail to take every opportunity of reporting my sense of your merits; and I sincerely hope that they will meet with the reward which will be most agreeable to yourself.

To Major Gen. Peacocke.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I beg that you will give directions that the 77th regt. may be embarked at Lisbon as soon as vessels shall be prepared to receive them, and may be brought round to Santander, where they will receive further orders.

To the Officer Commanding, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

It is intended to withdraw from Cadiz 2 of the companies of the Royal artillery now there; which are to be prepared to embark as soon as vessels shall be sent to Cadiz to bring them away.

To Vice Adm. G. Martin.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I have ordered the 29th regt. to Gibraltar from Cadiz, to relieve the 37th regt., which is to come round to Santander; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will facilitate their transport. I have likewise desired that the 77th regt. might be sent from Lisbon to Santander; and I shall be obliged to you if you will facilitate their transport.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I enclose the translation of the directions which I have sent to Gen. Freyre, in regard to the Spanish armed boats and their crews now in the harbour of Pasages; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to let me have your opinion of these boats and their crews, as soon as possible after their Commander shall have communicated with you, and you have been able to ascertain their fitness for the service.

To the Rev. Dr. Curtis.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3d inst.; and I beg to return my best thanks for your congratulations upon our recent successes in this quarter. I sincerely hope they are of a nature to secure the future independence and happiness of the Spanish nation.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 27th Aug. 1813.

I have received your letter regarding the proposed relief of 2 companies of artillery at Cadiz, or Carthagena; and I give directions that 2 of the companies may be prepared to embark, when vessels shall be sent for them. It is desirable that the artillery should not be entirely withdrawn from Carthagena.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 28th Aug. 1813, 2½ P.M.

I have received your letter of 7 A.M. this morning. I have ordered 300 men of the 4th and Light divisions to march to Oyarzun to-morrow morning; and I shall be obliged to you if you will order 400 of the 1st

division to assemble at the same place. I should hope these and some of Lord Aylmer's brigade would be enough to show the way to the breach, if it should be practicable to storm it.

I shall go over to Pasages in the morning, to talk to Sir G. Collier respecting an attack from the sea, the measures for it, &c.

Memorandum for the Q. M. Gen. and for the Adj. Gen.

Lesaca, 28th Aug. 1813.

—— must be removed forthwith from Bilbao.

The Commandant of the British Hospitals at Bilbao is to be instructed as follows: He is to wait upon the magistrates of the town, and to inform them, that he has my directions to withdraw his application for the use of the rope walk; unless the owner of it (Jarala) should be willing to allow us to have it on hire. He is to understand, that as there is a Spanish hospital as well as a British hospital at Bilbao, he is not to interfere with or apply for the use of the building appropriated to the former; nor is he to apply for the quarters of any Spanish regiment quartered at Bilbao; and he is to inform the magistrates that he has received these directions.

He is to understand that he is in a garrison town, of which there is a Spanish Colonel Commandant; and he is to refer to and obey all the orders of the army referrible to the mode of treating the Spanish Colonel his superior officer. He is particularly to inform him of the landing, the embarkation, the march, &c., of all troops at or from Bilbao; and is to conduct himself in every manner as becomes an inferior towards a superior officer.

He is at the same time to conduct his own duties, for which he is responsible, according to the orders of the army, and the particular orders which he will receive from time to time. He is to wait upon the Spanish Commandant with these instructions, a copy of which will besides be sent to him.

He is to preserve the strictest discipline among the officers of the army who are or may be stationed at Bilbao. I desire that these officers may be informed, that I require from them, not only to perform their military duty with punctuality, but that they shall not offend against the laws and customs and rules of the police of the place; and I particularly desire that they will not ride on horseback on the public walks, which is not only contrary to the laws of the police of the place, but entirely disagreeable to the inhabitants of Bilbao, and which must be prevented.

The A.G. to Capt. Swain, 36th regt., Bilbao.

28th Aug. 1813.

The annexed memorandum has been drawn out by the Marquis of Wellington in consequence of representations having reached his Lordship from the Spanish government that inattention and want of proper understanding has been very evident on the part of the British responsible officers towards the municipality and senior military officers of the Spanish service at Bilbao. You will report to me your immediate compliance with the 3d and last paragraphs of the 5th number of these instructions, and your having published his Excellency's prohibition to officers riding on the public walks adjacent to the town, and your having sent an extract of that order to the officer in charge of cavalry detachments. I cannot too forcibly impress on you the necessity of adhering to the instructions in the accompanying memorandum, as well as your requiring the officers belonging to the station doing so likewise, and the instructions are equally binding on officers who may visit Bilbao on indulgence.

The A.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. G. L. Cole, 4th division, and Major Gen. C. Baron Allen, Light division. 28th Aug. 1813.

I am commanded to desire you to give a detachment from the division under your command, to consist of 100 British and 50 Portuguese, of a description to give example to a column of attack, the success of which is an object of moment, and which it requires conduct alone to secure. The division is to furnish a Field officer; each British brigade one captain, 2 subalterns, 4 serjeants, and 50 R. and F.; the Portuguese, one officer, 2 serjeants, and 25 R. and F. This detachment is to march to-morrow morning at daylight for Oyarzun, where the senior officer will receive further orders from Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.

The A.G. to Major Cimitiere, Santander. 28th Aug. 1813.

I herewith transwith to you a memorandum which has been drawn up by my Lord Wellington, with the view to remove some difficulties and to promote a good understanding between the municipality of Bilbao and the British Commandant stationed at that place, which memorandum, being in some degree applicable to your command, I recommend it to your serious perusal; and I am most anxious to impress upon your mind how much the public service will be benefited by your constantly avoiding unnecessary interference with the Spanish authorities or troops, and by your endeavoring to obtain their good will and assistance in carrying on your duties rather than to give cause for complaint.

The A.G. to Capt. Swain, 36th regt., Bilbao. 29th Aug. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 20th inst. I am to inform you his Excellency has approved of your having received temporary accommodation for the convalescents in depôt in an issue of rice from the store at Bilbao for the purpose of breakfasting the men, which you will cause to be accounted for out of the sum issued to you on public account. You will see the expediency of forming your command at once into pay squads or divisions, to be placed under the charge of officers belonging to the same regiments, brigades, or divisions, who are to be responsible for the detailed disbursement of such money as you may issue them on account of vegetables and other comforts necessary to the soldiers. As far as possible you will attend to the brigading of the army in forming these divisions, and in the posting of superintending officers to them, to enable which I send you the brigade and divisional distribution of the army.

The Q. M. G. has received instructions to send to England the prisoners of war, whom you report to have been given over to your charge, by the earliest opportunity convoy may warrant.

The A.G. to the A.A.Gs. and Royal artillery. 28th Aug. 1813.

In the transmission of invalided soldiers' accounts to this office, particularly those sent direct by the officers commanding regiments, there is such an universal deviation from the form of return required on such occasions, that I am under the necessity of desiring you will call on the officers commanding regiments as far as possible to comply with the established form of return required from the Commandants at the place of embarkation, as hereto annexed, and which is calculated to inform the officer commanding the depôt at the Isle of Wight, of the state of the men's accounts, claims, and period of service, and from which document in all probability the soldiers' final disposal may be much decided. The accounts drawn up in this manner, regimentally, for soldiers invalided at the same period, should be accompanied by the conditional discharge of each soldier; and those whose services so entitle them should be of recommendatory form, so as to require nothing but confirmation upon final inspection and report in England. As a voucher to the regimental return of soldiers' accounts when invalided, and satisfaction to the soldier on separating from his regiment, the extract of each man's account from the last settlement is to be enclosed within his conditional discharge. As these instructions generally relate to soldiers invalided, you will keep a copy of them, as also the form of regimental accounts to be rendered, which must be attended to on all similar occasions.

P.S. Returns in the enclosed form are required to be sent to this office, with as

little delay as possible, of all men who have been notified *from hence* since the 1st Aug. as invalided for England, whether on account of being unfit for service or for recovery.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 30th Aug. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 20th Aug., in answer to that which I had the honor of addressing to you on the 7th inst.

It is certain that the word *Convenio*, which is more properly applicable to an agreement between two characters, equal in power and in public estimation and respect, ought not to be applied to the engagement into which the late Regency entered with me, or the promises which they made to me, in order to induce me to take upon myself the command of the Spanish armies; which engagements or promises I considered confirmed by the existing Regency by the letter of the late Minister at War, of the 28th March last; or I should not have continued to hold a command which I should not have originally accepted if those engagements or promises had not been made.

The command of an army, however honorable, is that charge above all others which every individual has a right to decline to accept; and in all the discussions which have passed on this subject, it was never doubted that I had a right, if I thought proper, to decline to accept the command,

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Hon. C. Colville.

Lesaca, 30th Aug. 1813.

All reports received within these two days agree in stating that the enemy have augmented their force very considerably upon the right of their line, and that it is expected amongst them that an attempt will be made against our left for the relief of San Sebastian.

The enemy's force in the vicinity of Sarre was very considerably diminished the day before yesterday, and there appeared to be, yesterday, fewer troops by a good deal in their camp behind Ainhoué than there had before been.

Lord Wellington thinks it desirable, under these circumstances, to try to effect some diversion in favor of our left, by endeavoring to disquiet the troops the enemy has left opposite our centre.

This may be effected by making rather more show than usual upon the heights which are in sight of the enemy's camp; and by pushing forward strong patrols in such situations as are most likely to give him uneasiness and make him apprehend an attack.

These diversions should be made this evening, and also early to-morrow morning, if no material change of circumstances takes place.

You will be so good as bear in mind, however, that it is by no means Lord Wellington's intention that any serious attempt should be made against the enemy, or that the troops employed should be in any manner committed. I have written to the same effect to Lord Dalhousie and to Major Gen. Giron.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie.

Lesaca, 30th Aug. 1813.

The enemy appear to have assembled a very considerable force towards Irun, opposite our left, and also to have added something to their strength near Vera, opposite the position of the Light division.

All the rumours coming from them agree, also, that they mean to make an attempt for the relief of San Sebastian.

Lord Wellington desires, therefore, that you will be so good as move the 51st regt. immediately to the neighbourhood of the bridge of Lesaca, and bring to the same place after it the remainder of that brigade.

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 30th Aug. 1813.

I send you a copy of a letter I have just written to Major Gen. Colville, that you may be aware of the appearance of things in this quarter.

If you can give the enemy a little alert in your neighbourhood, it may be well to do so; for if he does not act against our left immediately, that will serve to distract his attention, and the distance may add to his uncertainty of what is really intended.

which, on the same grounds, I have now the right, if I think proper, to resign. Neither can any body in Spain or elsewhere complain, with justice, of my declining to accept, or now resigning, such command, as long as I shall continue to serve the cause in that situation of which the powers are intrusted to me to fulfil the duties.

On this clear and undeniable ground of my right as an individual to accept or decline the offer of the command which was made to me, and now to resign it, I stated to the late Regency certain arrangements which I wished should be made, and certain engagements which I wished should be entered into with me, in order to induce me to accept the command of the Spanish army; and I repeat, that if it is wished that I should continue to hold the command of the Spanish army, the same arrangements must be made, and the same engagements must be entered into by the existing government; and, moreover, must be inviolably adhered to.

The nature of these arrangements and engagements, and the grounds of my wish that they should be entered into, are fully stated in my addresses to the late Minister at War, of the 4th* and 25th† Dec. 1812; and his Excellency's answer of the 1st Jan. 1813;‡ to which I have but little to add. Every day's experience has convinced me, that I cannot do justice to the trust which the Spanish nation have reposed in me, or to my own character, unless what is therein detailed should be adhered to.

There is nothing contained in those letters that is inconsistent with the *Ordenanzas* of the Spanish army; which, in my opinion, are perfect; excepting as far as relates to the trial and punishment of officers and soldiers for offences and neglect of duty.

It is notorious to every person acquainted with the Spanish army, that there are some officers still under trial, who have been in arrest since the year 1808; that the number of officers under arrest is immense and unknown; and that it is next to impossible to bring an officer to punishment for the most obvious offences against military discipline and subordination, or for neglects of duty, which go to the very existence of the army.

It is likewise obvious, that it is impossible to carry on services of the nature of those required by the modern system of war, or to revive and maintain in an army military discipline and subordination, and a true military spirit, unless the officer charged with the conduct of those services, and who is obliged to urge and animate others to perform them, has the power not only of punishing, but of recommending for rewards; and that the government, who alone can have the power of dispensing those rewards, should positively declare that those only should receive them who should be thought deserving of them by that officer to whom the nation and the government had thought proper to intrust the conduct of the military operations of the State.

I observe likewise, that this concession in regard to extraordinary promotions is in conformity with the *Ordenanzas*, which require that every officer or soldier promoted in the ordinary way should be recommended for such promotion by his immediate superior; and it is peculiarly neces-

*. See p. 195.

† See p. 219.

‡ See p. 231.

sary, under the existing circumstances of the Spanish government and nation, in order to induce the officers of the army to look for advancement to the laborious performance of their duty with the army in the field, rather than to recommend themselves to the leaders of the parties of the day at the seat of government.

It is likewise conformable with the *Ordenanzas* of the Spanish army, that all applications, reports, &c., from inferiors, should reach the Sovereign authority through the channel of their respective immediate superiors; and that the orders of the Sovereign authority should reach the inferiors through the superiors. I ask only that the principle of that which is laid down in the *Ordenanzas* regarding the inferior officers of the army, should be extended to the high office with which I am intrusted; and that the Regency would be pleased to receive from my hands the reports and applications of the army, and to convey through me the orders which they may wish to give to their army.

It must be recollected, that the army placed under my command is not in garrison, or in a state of peace, but it is in a state of active operation against the enemy, on plans concerted and ordered by me, and in combination with armies of other nations likewise under my command.

There is nobody better aware than your Excellency is, of the inconvenience resulting from a departure from this state of the engagement by the late Regency; and I would request you to state to the existing Regency what you know of the inconvenience resulting to the service, from my having given orders which I was competent to give, and the late Regency having given orders to the same body of troops, not through the channel settled by their arrangements with me. With the best intentions on both sides, it is scarcely possible that those orders should precisely agree; the utmost confusion must ensue even in times of tranquillity; and the operations of war must be impracticable; and the fact is, that at this moment the service is feeling the inconvenience of this departure, by the late Regency, from the terms of their engagement with me.

This arrangement, then, which is not only consistent with the letter and spirit of the *Ordenanzas* of the Spanish army, but conformable with the practice of all the armies in the world, I consider indispensable. But I have been too long intrusted with the command of armies, and I am, I hope, sufficiently acquainted with the duties of my situation and the nature of the trust reposed in me by the government, to entertain the slightest hesitation about giving government the earliest information, not only of all the reports and applications made to me, but of the orders issued by me; whether relating to discipline, movements, interior economy, or any other object which can be the subject of a military communication.

I am quite certain that no part of the Spanish army has ever been moved from the situation in which they were placed when I took the command in January last, that a special report has not been made to your Excellency, or your predecessor, not only of the movement, but of the motives and objects of it; and since the army has been in operation, your Excellency has received a weekly report of the movements and operations, not only of that part of the Spanish army under my immediate command,

but of the movements of the British and Portuguese armies; and every report received from other officers, not acting immediately under my directions, whether of movements or of operations, has been transmitted to your Excellency as soon as received.

I shall not have the smallest hesitation in transmitting to your Excellency exact copies of the orders under which all these movements and operations are made, and of all other orders issued by me to the Spanish troops; nor have I the slightest objection to the officers of the army transmitting to your Excellency directly the reports and applications made to me. All I request is, that the principle of the *Ordenanzas* and of the engagement made to me should be so far adhered to, as that, 1st, the government should not give any decision whatever till they shall have received my report; and, 2dly, that they will convey their decision, whatever it may be, through me.

With this explanation of the term *Convenio*, and of what relates to the mode of communication, I expect that the existing Regency will be pleased to ratify the agreement made by their predecessors in the letter from the late Minister at War, of the 1st Jan. 1813, in such terms as that I cannot be mistaken, as I was before, regarding the meaning intended to be conveyed by the letter from the late Minister at War, of the 28th March, 1813.

It is really necessary, for many reasons connected with the public service, that the government should come to an early and final decision upon this subject, and should have an opportunity of making a new arrangement for the command of their armies, if they should think that they ought not to comply with what I have now had the honor of submitting to your Excellency.

Therefore, in case the Regency should not think it proper to comply with my requests, I beg leave hereby to resign the command of the Spanish armies, with which the Cortes and Regency of Spain have honored me; and, in laying this letter before the Regency, and in conveying it to be laid before the Cortes, I beg that your Excellency will renew the assurance of my gratitude for the repeated marks of favor and distinction which I have received from the Spanish nation, and of my desire and intention to continue to serve them to the utmost of my power at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army; and to render every assistance in my power to any officer or officers who may be appointed to command the Spanish troops.

Wishing to be clearly understood upon the subjects above referred to, I have not adverted to other topics connected with my original acceptance of the command of the Spanish army, as they stand at present.

In a letter which I addressed to the government on the 27th Dec. 1812,* I conveyed my opinion of the arrangements of a civil and financial nature, which it was my opinion ought to be made, with a view to establish the authority of government in the provinces recently recovered from the enemy; to provide for the immediate maintenance of the army, in order to continue the operations of the war; and to lay the foundations of a better and more wise system of government, to be eventually established in the

* See p. 231.

provinces. The Cortes, however, preferred the system adopted by their decree of the 6th Jan. 1813, and every effort has been made to carry into execution what their wisdom decreed. Experience, however, has proved that these provisions, although well intended, have not answered the end expected from them.

More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year ; and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon, since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country ; millions of money spent by the contending armies in the Peninsula are circulating every where ; and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea ; and I am concerned to inform your Excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all ; and, notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence ; and to know that the Spanish troops employed in the blockade of Pamplona and Santoña were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system, then, is inefficient to procure supplies for the army ; and at the same time I assure your Excellency, that it is the most oppressive and injurious to the country, on which it is inflicted, that could be devised.

It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary for its defence : those means are undoubtedly superabundant ; and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence.

The cause, then, of this deficiency of all the means necessary to support an army must be looked for elsewhere ; and, considering that the rich provinces of Estremadura, and Castille, and Asturias, and Leon, and Galicia, have literally supplied nothing to the 4th army, and others but little or nothing to those which their resources were destined to maintain, the deficiency must be attributed to the want of ability, or want of power, or to both those wants, in those persons employed to realise and apply these resources to the public service.

Sir, the fact is notorious, that there is no authority in the country to enforce the law and the due payment of the contributions to government ; and the officers of the *Hacienda* don't perform their duty. They are infinitely more numerous than is necessary, and their maintenance exhausts the revenues which ought to be employed in the maintenance of the troops on the frontiers. I have sent to your Excellency's office proofs that some branches of the revenue cost 70 and 80 *per cent.* to collect them.

It must be obvious to your Excellency that matters cannot go on long as they are. The winter is approaching, and no magazine or other pro-

vision of any kind has been made for the Spanish troops, who, as I have above stated, have not at present even enough for their daily subsistence. With every wish to assist all the troops under my command, particularly those with whose conduct I have reason to be satisfied, and the continuance of whose services is so important to the prosperous issue of the campaign, it must be obvious to your Excellency that there are limits to the assistance of this kind which can be afforded. The state of the season will soon render the navigation of the north coast of Spain very difficult, if not entirely impracticable; and I must expect that the magazines of the British army will be less plentifully supplied; and greater economy must be observed in the expenditure of them; and the issue must necessarily be confined to those troops for whose wants they were intended to provide.

I would also request your Excellency to observe, that the pecuniary resources of Great Britain, although large, are not unlimited; and their realization, and the possibility of applying them to the assistance of her allies, are confined by the continuance of the disturbances in America; and that Great Britain, even for Spanish objects, has calls upon her assistance from the north of Europe, which she cannot neglect without neglecting the essential interests of Spain, and of the rest of the world.

Under these circumstances, whether I am to remain in the command of the Spanish army or not, I earnestly entreat your Excellency to exert the influence which you possess over the councils of the Regency, to turn their attention in the most serious manner to the state of the public authority, and of the financial system in the provinces, and to its connexion with the military, as the only mode by which a Spanish army can be maintained, and the independence and happiness of Spain can be insured.

I am very much flattered by the government having delayed to remove the Duque del Parque from his command, till they should receive my opinion whether the measure would be attended with inconvenience. It is always inconvenient to change the person who commands an army; but I am not aware of any particular inconvenience attending the change at

Q.M.G. to Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, 31 Août, 1813, 7 du matin.

Le général Kempt, qui commande actuellement la division Légère, nous donne avis que l'ennemi fait descendre des troupes de la montagne au dessus de Vera.* En cas que la division Légère vint à être attaquée d'une manière sérieuse, le Général en Chef désire que vous appuyiez sur votre gauche pour soutenir cette division. Vous aurez soin pourtant de tenir toujours sur les hauteurs qui regardent du côté de Sarre, une force suffisante pour s'opposer aux tentatives que l'ennemi pourrait faire de ce côté-là; et de l'importance desquelles vous sauriez juger toujours d'après les forces qu'il y aura, en avant, et dans les environs de Sarre.

Le général Kempt aura une instruction par laquelle il lui sera permis de quitter la position qu'il occupe à présent sur les hauteurs de Sta Barbara, soit pour se porter en avant vers Vera, soit pour marcher au soutien des troupes qui se trouvent sur la rive gauche de la Bidasoa au dessus de Salain. Si le général Kempt se décide à faire l'un ou l'autre de ces mouvemens, il aura ordre de vous en donner avis; et le Général en Chef désire que dans ce cas vous fassiez promptement occuper la position de Sta Barbara par une partie des troupes à vos ordres, en remplacement de la division Légère.

La 7^{me} division a ordre de se mettre en marche incessamment pour Lesaca, mais elle va être remplacée en avant d'Echalar par des troupes de la 3^{me} division.

* Report from Major Gen. Kempt to the Q.M.G. Camp near Vera, 31st Aug. 1813, 5½ A.M.

The enemy appears to be moving down from the position above Vera in very considerable force. He is moving down the great gorge from the right of his position, and forming columns behind the lower heights.

the present moment; and as soon as I shall be made acquainted that it is the pleasure of government that his Excellency should be removed, I shall have the honor of addressing your Excellency regarding a successor, if it should likewise be the pleasure of government that I should retain the command of the Spanish armies.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B. Lesaca, 2d Sept. 1813, 20 minutes before 7 A.M.

I have only this moment received your letter of 6 P.M. yesterday, which is an additional proof how little the ordinary communication is to be trusted when it is desired to have early communication of directions from hence.

I conceive Lord Aylmer's brigade, and all other men immediately from England, to be quite unfit for active service, and therefore, although they may do very well to restore order to the town, they cannot carry on the siege.

The best thing to be done with the 5th division is, to relieve them by two brigades of the 1st division, and send the 5th division out to the camp of the 1st division. These, with Pack's and Bradford's brigades, would, I should think, be sufficient to complete what has been done. Spaniards would do you no good. You had better send a provost into the town, and have a gallows erected; and the gates kept shut, and *nobody* to be

Q.M.G. to Major Gen. Kempt, or officer commanding the Light division.

Lesaca, 31st Aug. 1813, 8 A.M.

In the event of its appearing to you to be necessary or advisable to make a movement in aid of the troops stationed to maintain the heights above Salain, you are authorised to do so, either by making a direct attack upon the enemy, should circumstances admit of your doing so without committing the Light division, or by moving the division, or a part of it, to the left bank of the Bidasoa.

In the event of your making any movement, however, which would leave the position of Sta Barbara unoccupied, you will apprise Gen. Giron as soon as possible, and request him to send a part of the Spanish troops to replace the Light division upon the heights of Sta Barbara.

Gen. Giron has been written to upon this subject, and has also been requested to give support from his left to the Light division in the position of Sta Barbara, should it become necessary.

Q.M.G. to the officer commanding Head Quarters. Lesaca, 31st Aug. 1813, $\frac{1}{2}$ before 8 A.M.

The baggage of head quarters is to be packed immediately, and is to proceed to Yanci, there to remain till further orders. If it should become necessary to move the baggage from Yanci farther to the rear, it will be directed upon Articuza. Guides should therefore be procured who know the road from Yanci to Articuza.

Q.M.G. to Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, 31 Août, 1813, 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ du matin.

Je viens de recevoir, à l'instant, un billet du Général en Chef, qui se trouvait alors sur les hauteurs au-dessus de San Antonio. S. E. vous fait dire, mon général, de marcher tout de suite, avec toutes les troupes que vous aurez disponibles, pour soutenir la division Légère dans la position de Sta Barbara.

Instructions communicated by the Q.M.G.

Lesaca, 31st Aug. 1813.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as order the baggage of the 7th division to Aranaz, there to wait further orders. It can move to Aranaz by the bridge of Yanci or by Sumbilla.

Lord Dalhousie will be so good as send forward an officer to Major Gen. Inglis's brigade, to receive whatever further orders may be sent there for him. The brigade has been moved from Lesaca to the heights on the road towards Oyarzun, about 2 or 3 miles from hence.

If Lord Dalhousie does not receive any orders before reaching Lesaca, or at Lesaca, he will be so good as move on the troops with him to support Gen. Inglis upon the heights above mentioned.

allowed to go in excepting on duty. I have no objection to Rey being summoned, but I have no notion of his surrendering.

Freyre has sent me word that he expects to be attacked this morning; but I have as yet heard nothing of this attack; and I see all the camps in this neighbourhood quite quiet.

P.S. The dragoon states that he was not despatched till 9 last night. The delay in the communication occurs so frequently, that it is worth inquiring into.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 2d Sept. 1813

I enclose the report which I have received from Gen. Don M. Freyre, of the action fought by that part of the 4th army under his immediate command, on the 31st Aug.; and the report received from Gen. Don P. A. Giron, of the operations of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia on the 30th and 31st Aug.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 2d Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 23d July, in which you have conveyed to me, by order of the government, the decree of the Cortes of the 22d July, by which His Majesty has granted to me the possession called the Soto de Roma.

I have received such repeated marks of the favor of the Cortes, that I can scarcely find words adequate to express my sense of them, more particularly for this last, by which I have been adopted by the Spanish nation in a manner most honorable and gratifying to my feelings.

I can only evince my gratitude by continuing to devote myself to the just cause of this nation, and by persevering in the same conduct which has hitherto obtained me such repeated and honorable marks of the favor of the government and Cortes.

To H. R. H. the Commander in Chief.

Lesaca, 2d Sept. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Sec. of State, giving an account of the capture by assault of the town of San Sebastian, on the 31st Aug., and of other military operations, which I hope will meet with your Royal Highness' approbation.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 2d Sept. 1813.

The fire against the fort of San Sebastian was opened on the 26th Aug., and directed against the towers which flanked the bastion on the eastern face; against the demi bastion on the south east angle, and the termination of the curtain of the south face.*

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham had directed that an establishment should be formed on the island of Sta Clara, which was effected on the night of the 26th, and the enemy's detachment on the island were made prisoners. Capt. Cameron of the 9th had the command of the detachment which effected this operation, and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham particularly applauds his conduct, and that of Lieut. Chadwick, of the Royal Engineers. The conduct of Lieut. the Hon. J. Arbuthnot, of the Royal Navy, who commanded the boats, was highly meritorious, as likewise that of Lieut.

* See Appendix, No. X.

Bell, of the Royal Marines. All that was deemed practicable to carry into execution in order to facilitate the approach to the breaches before made in the wall of San Sebastian, having been effected on the 30th Aug., and the breach having been made at the termination of the bastion, the place was stormed at 11 o'clock in the day on the 31st, and carried.

The loss on our side has been severe. Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith, who had joined the army only two days before, and Major Gens. Oswald and Robinson, were unfortunately wounded in the breach; and Col. Sir R. Fletcher was killed by a musket ball at the mouth of the trenches. In this officer, and in Lieut. Col. Craufurd of the 9th regt., His Majesty's service has sustained a serious loss.

I have the honor to enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's report * of

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.
Oyarzun, 1st Sept. 1813.

In obedience to your Lordship's orders of the preceding day, to attack and form a lodgment on the breach of San Sebastian, which now extended to the left, so as to embrace the outermost tower, the end and front of the curtain immediately over the left bastion, as well as the faces of the bastion itself, the assault took place at 11 o'clock, A.M., yesterday; and I have the honor to report to your Lordship, that the heroic perseverance of all the troops concerned was at last crowned with success.

The column of attack was formed of the 2d brigade of the 5th division, commanded by Major Gen. Robinson, with an immediate support of detachments as per margin,† and having in reserve the remainder of the 5th division, consisting of Major Gen. Spry's Portuguese brigade, and the 1st brigade under Major Gen. Hay, as also the 5th batt. of caçadores of Gen. Bradford's brigade, under Major Hill; the whole under the direction of Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith, commanding the 5th division.

Having arranged every thing with Sir J. Leith, I crossed the Urumea to the batteries of the right attack, where every thing could be most distinctly seen, and from whence the orders for the fire of the batteries, according to circumstances, could be immediately given.

The column in filing out of the right of the trenches was as before exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape shot, and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the counterscarp of the hornwork, which did great damage, but did not check the ardor of the troops in advancing to the attack. There never was any thing so fallacious as the external appearance of the breach; without some description, the almost insuperable difficulties of the breach cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least 20 feet to the level of the streets; so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, from want of ammunition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses, in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain.

Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge: and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgment for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle, as was particularly directed, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions; and, at all events, a secure lodgment could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.

In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with Col. Dickson, commanding the Royal artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain.

† 150 volunteers of the Light division, commanded by Lieut. Col. Hunt, of the 52d regt.; 400 of the 1st division (consisting of 200 of the brigades of Guards, under Lieut. Col. Cook; of 100 of the Light battalion, and 100 of the line battalions K. G. L.), under Major Robertson; and 200 volunteers of the 4th division, under Major Rose, of the 20th foot.

this operation, in which your Lordship will observe with pleasure another distinguished instance of the gallantry and perseverance of His Majesty's officers and troops under the most trying difficulties.

All reports concur in praise of the conduct of the detachment from the 10th Portuguese brigade, under Major Snodgrass, which crossed the river Urumea, and stormed the breach on the right under all the fire which could be directed upon them from the castle and town.

The garrison retired to the castle, leaving about 270 prisoners in our hands; and I hope that I shall soon have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that we have possession of that post.

Since the fire against San Sebastian had been recommenced, the enemy had drawn the greatest part of their force to the camp of Urrugne; and there was every reason to believe that they would make an attempt to relieve the place. Three divisions of the 4th Spanish army, commanded

A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it; passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. Meanwhile I accepted the offer of a part of Major Gen. Bradford's Portuguese brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The advance of the 1st batt. 13th regt., under Major Snodgrass, over the open beach, and across the river; and of a detachment of the 24th regt., under Lieut. Col. Mac Bean, in support, was made in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snodgrass attacked, and finally carried, the small breach on the right of the great one; and Lieut. Col. Mac Bean's detachment occupied the right of the great breach. I ought not to omit to mention, that a similar offer was made by the 1st Portuguese regt. of Brig. Gen. Wilson's brigade, under Lieut. Col. Fearon; and that both Major Gen. Bradford and Brig. Gen. Wilson had, from the beginning, urged most anxiously the employment of their respective brigades in the attack, as they had had so large a share in the labor and fatigues of the right attack. Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same time that an attempt should be made to storm the hornwork.

It fell to the lot of the 2d brigade of the 5th division, under the command of Col. the Hon. C. Greville, to move out of the trenches for this purpose, and the 3d batt. of the Royal Scots under Lieut. Col. Barns, supported by the 38th, under Lieut. Col. Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a severe conflict; and the troops on the right of the breach, having about this time succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an assault which lasted above two hours, under the most trying circumstances, a firm footing was obtained.

It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences prepared in the streets, suffering a severe loss on their retreat to the castle, and leaving the whole town in our possession.

Though it must be evident to your Lordship, that the troops were all animated with the most enthusiastic and devoted gallantry, and that all are entitled to the highest commendation, yet, I am sure, your Lordship will wish to be informed more particularly concerning those who, from their situations, had opportunities of gaining peculiar distinction; and, as the distance I was at myself does not enable me to perform this act of justice from personal observation, I have taken every pains to collect information from the superior officers. Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith justified, in the fullest manner, the confidence reposed in his tried judgment and distinguished gallantry, conducting and directing the attack, till obliged to be reluctantly carried off, after receiving a most severe contusion on the breast, and having his left arm broken.

Major Gen. Hay succeeded to the command, and ably conducted the attack to the last. Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith expresses his great obligations to Major Gens. Hay and Robinson (the latter was obliged to leave the field from a severe wound in the face), and to Lieut. Cols. Berkeley and Gomm, A. A. G. and A. Q. M. G. of the 5th division, for their zealous services during this arduous contest. He warmly recommends to your Lordship's notice his aide de camp, Capt. Belches, of the 59th foot; and, in conjunction with Major Gen. Hay, he bears testimony to the highly meritorious conduct of Capt. J. Stewart, of the 3d batt. Royal Scots, aide de camp to Major Gen. Hay; and he recommends to your Lord-

by Gen. Don M. Freyre, occupied the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun, by which the approach to San Sebastian by the high road was covered and protected; and they were supported by the 1st division of British infantry under Gen. Howard, and Lord Aylmer's brigade, on their left and in the rear of Irun; and by Gen. Longa's division, encamped near the Sierra de Aya, in rear of their right. In order to secure them still further, I moved 2 brigades of the 4th division, on the 30th, to the Convent of San Antonio, one of which (Gen. Ross'), under Lieut. Gen. Sir L. Cole, the same day, afterwards moved up to the Sierra de Aya, and the other on the morning of the 31st; leaving the 9th Portuguese brigade on the heights between the Convent of Vera and Lesaca. Major Gen. Inglis's brigade of the 7th division was moved on the 30th to the bridge of Lesaca; and I gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Echalar, Zugarramurdi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened posts in front of these positions.

ship's notice Major Gen. Robinson's aide de camp, Capt. Wood, 4th foot, as also Capt. Williamson and Jones of that regiment: the former was severely wounded in the command of the 4th, following the forlorn hope in the best style, and remaining long after his wound. Capt. Jones succeeded to the command of the brigade, and conducted it with great ability.

Sir J. Leith likewise particularises Capt. Taylor, 48th regt., Brigade Major to the 1st brigade, and Lieut. Le Blanc, of the 4th foot, who led the light infantry company of the regiment, immediately after the forlorn hope, and is the only surviving officer of the advance. Major Gen. Robinson unites his testimony of praise of Capt. Williamson and Jones, and Lieut. Le Blanc, above mentioned. He likewise commends highly Capt. Livesay, who succeeded to the command of the 47th foot, on Major Kelly being killed, and kept it till wounded, when the command devolved on Lieut. Power, who ably performed the duty, as also Capt. Pilkington, who succeeded to the command of the 59th on Capt. Scott being killed, and retained it till wounded, when the command of that battalion fell to Capt. Halford, who led it with great credit, and also Brevet Major Anwyll, Brigade Major of the 2d brigade.

Major Gen. Hay having now the command of the 5th division, mentions in terms of great praise the excellent conduct of Major Gen. Spry, commanding the Portuguese brigade, and the very distinguished gallantry of Col. de Rego, and the 15th Portuguese regt., under his command, and of Col. M'Crae, with the 3d Portuguese regt.; and Major Gen. Spry mentions in terms of high praise, Lieut. Col. Hill, commanding the 8th caçadores, and Major C. Stuart Campbell, commanding the 3d Portuguese regt. in Col. M'Crae's absence on general duty; and he expresses his great obligations to Capt. Brackenbury, of the 61st regt., his aide de camp, and to Brigade Major Fitzgerald. Major Gen. Hay speaks most highly of the services of Col. the Hon. C. Greville, of the 38th, in command of the 2d brigade, and of the conspicuous gallantry of Lieut. Col. Barns, in the successful assault of the curtain, with the brave battalion of the Royal Scots, and also of the exemplary conduct of Lieut. Col. Cameron, of the 9th foot, and Lieut. Cols. Miles and Dean, of the 38th, and all the officers and troops engaged; and he expresses himself as most particularly indebted to the zeal, intelligence, and intrepidity of Brigade Major Taylor, and Capt. Stewart, of the Royal Scots, acting as his aide de camp, formerly mentioned.

Major Gen. Hay likewise expresses his great satisfaction with the gallant and judicious conduct of Lieut. Col. Cook, commanding the detachment of Guards; of Lieut. Col. Hunt, commanding the detachment of the Light division, who was severely wounded; and of all the other officers and troops of the detachments.

Major Gen. Hay conducted the division along the ramparts himself, with the judgment and gallantry that have so often marked his conduct.

I have now only to repeat the expressions of my highest satisfaction with the conduct of the officers of the Royal artillery and Engineers, as formerly particularised in the report of the first attack. Every branch of the Artillery service has been conducted by Col. Dickson with the greatest ability, as was that of the Engineer department by Lieut. Col. Sir R. Fletcher, until the moment of his much lamented fall at the mouth of the trenches. Lieut. Col. Burgoyne succeeded to the command, and is anxious that I should convey to your Lordship Sir R. Fletcher's sense of the great merit and gallantry of Capt. Henderson, in the attack of the Island, on the morning of the 27th ult.; and of the persevering exertions

The enemy crossed the Bidasoa by the fords between Andarra and the destroyed bridge on the high road, before daylight on the morning of the 30th, with a very large force, with which they made a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the heights of San Marcial. They were beat back, some of them even across the river, in the most gallant style, by the Spanish troops, whose conduct was equal to that of any troops that I have ever seen engaged, and the attack, having been frequently repeated, was upon every occasion defeated with the same gallantry and determination. The course of the river being immediately under the heights on the French side, on which the enemy had placed a considerable quantity of cannon, they were enabled to throw a bridge across the river three quarters of a mile above the high

of Majors Ellicombe and Smith, in pushing forward the operations of the two attacks; the latter officer having had the merit of the first arrangements for the attack on the right.

Lieut. Col. Burgoyne was himself wounded, and only quitted the field from loss of blood; but I am happy to say he is able to carry on the duty of the department.

The conduct of the Navy has been continued on the same principle of zealous co-operation by Sir G. Collier; and the services of Lieut. O'Reilly, with the seamen employed in the batteries, have been equally conspicuous as before.

Your Lordship will now permit me to call your attention to the conduct of that distinguished officer Major Gen. Oswald, who has had the temporary command of the 5th division in Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith's absence, during the whole of the campaign, and who resigned the command of the division on Sir J. Leith's arrival on the 30th ult.

Having carried on with indefatigable attention all the laborious duties of the left attack, no person was more able to give Sir J. Leith the best information and assistance. This Sir J. Leith acknowledges he did with a liberality and zeal for the service in the highest degree praiseworthy, and he continued his valuable services to the last, by acting as a volunteer, and accompanying Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith to the trenches on the occasion of the assault. I have infinite satisfaction in assuring your Lordship of my perfect approbation of Major Gen. Oswald's conduct, ever since the 5th division formed a part of the left column of the army.

I beg to assure your Lordship that Col. De Lancey, D. Q. M. G., and Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A. A. G., attached to the left column, have continued to render me the most valuable assistance, and that the zeal of Capt. Calvert, of the 29th regt., my first aide de camp, as well as that of the rest of the officers of my personal Staff, entitle them all to my warmest and perfect approbation.

Your Lordship has, with an attention extremely grateful to me, permitted me to name an officer to be the bearer of your Lordship's dispatches home; and I beg to recommend for that commission Major Hare, of the 12th foot, a gallant soldier of fortune, who has on many former occasions served on my Staff, and is now attached to it as A. A. G.

P.S. No return of artillery and stores has yet been sent in, and I fear the returns of the severe losses of the troops may not be quite correct.

I have omitted to mention the gallant conduct of Lieut. Gethin, 11th regt., acting Engineer, who conducted a Portuguese column to the attack, and took the enemy's colors from the cavalier.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, at the siege, assault, and capture of San Sebastian, from the 28th July to the 31st Aug. 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.	British.	Portuguese.
Killed	45	40	676	761	572	189
Wounded	105	93	1499	1697	1103	594
Missing	1	—	44	45	41	4

road, over which, in the afternoon, they marched again a considerable body, who, with those who had crossed the fords, again made a desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. This was equally beat back; and at length, finding all their efforts on that side fruitless, the enemy took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to retire their troops from this front entirely.

Notwithstanding that, as I have above informed your Lordship, I had a British division on each flank of the 4th Spanish army, I am happy to be able to report that the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously good, and they were so capable of defending their post without assistance, in spite of the desperate efforts of the enemy to carry it, that, finding that the ground did not allow of my making use of the 1st or 4th divisions on the flanks of the enemy's attacking corps, neither of them were in the least engaged during the action.

Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the Bidasoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they likewise crossed that river with about 3 divisions of infantry in 2 columns, by the fords below Salain, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. I ordered Gen. Inglis to support this brigade with that of the 7th division under his command; and as soon as I was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, I sent to Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie, to request that he would likewise move towards the Bidasoa with the 7th division; and to the Light division to support Major Gen. Inglis by every means in their power. Major Gen. Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights between Lesaca and the Bidasoa, and he withdrew to those in front of the Convent of San Antonio, which he maintained. In the mean time Major Gen. Kempt moved one brigade of the Light division to Lesaca; by which he kept the enemy in check, and covered the march of the Earl of Dalhousie to join Gen. Inglis.

The enemy, however, having completely failed in their attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the heights of San Marcial, and finding that Major Gen. Inglis had taken a position from which they could not drive him, at the same time that it covered and protected the right of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San Sebastian by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the Bidasoa was becoming at every moment more critical, retired during the night.

The fall of rain during the evening and night had so swollen the Bidasoa that the rear of their column was obliged to cross the bridge of Vera. In order to effect this object, they attacked the posts of Major Gen. Skerrett's brigade of the Light division, at about 3 in the morning, both from the Puerto de Vera, and from the left of the Bidasoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after daylight, it was made under the fire of a great part of Major Gen. Skerrett's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the operation must have been very considerable.

While this was going on upon the left of the army, Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Echalar on the 30th and 31st. Lieut. Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie made Gen. Le Cor attack those in front of Zugarramurdi with the 6th Portuguese

brigade on the 31st, and Major Gen. the Hon. C. Colville made Col. Douglas attack the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Maya on the same day, with the 7th Portuguese brigade. All these troops conducted themselves well.

The attack made by the Earl of Dalhousie delayed his march till late in the afternoon of the 31st; but he was in the evening in a favorable situation for his further progress; and in the morning of the 1st in that allotted for him.

In these operations, in which a second attempt by the enemy to prevent the establishment of the Allies upon the frontier has been defeated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, at the very moment at which the fort of San Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and ability of the officers, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops.

The different reports which I have transmitted to your Lordship, from Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, will have shown the ability and perseverance with which he has conducted the arduous enterprise intrusted to his direction, and the zeal and exertion of all the officers employed under him.

I fully concur in the Lieut. General's report of the cordial assistance which he has received from Capt. Sir G. Collier and the officers, seamen, and marines under his command, who have done every thing in their power to facilitate and insure our success. The seamen have served with the artillery in the batteries, and have, upon every occasion, manifested that spirit which is characteristic of the British navy.

I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Mariscal de Campo Don M. Freyre, the Commander in Chief of the 4th Spanish army, who, whilst he made every disposition which was proper for the troops under his command, set them an example of gallantry which, having been followed by the General officers and chiefs, and other officers of the regiments, insured the success of the day. In his report, in which I concur, the General expresses the difficulty which he finds of selecting particular instances of gallantry, in a case in which all have conducted themselves so well; but he has particularly mentioned Gen. Mendizabal, who volunteered his assistance, and commanded on the height of San Marcial; Mariscal de Campo Losada, who commanded in the centre, and was wounded; Mariscal de Campo Don José Garcia de Paredes, the Commanding officer of the artillery; Brig. Gen. Don Juan Diaz Porlier; Don Josef Maria Espeleta; Don Stanislas Sanchez Salvador, the Chief of the Staff of the 4th army; and Don Antonio Roselló; and Cols. Fuente Pita, the commanding engineer; Don Juan Loarte, of the regiment *de la Constitucion*, and Don Juan Ugarte Mendia.

Major Gen. Inglis and the regiments in his brigade, of the 7th division, conducted themselves remarkably well. The 51st regt., under Col. Mitchell, and the 68th, under Lieut. Col. Hawkins, covered the change of position by the troops from the heights between the Bidasoa and Lesaca to those of San Antonio; and these corps were distinguished.

Throughout these operations I have received every assistance from the Adj. Gen., Major Gen. Pakenham, and the Q. M. G., Major Gen. Murray, and all the officers of the Staff, and of my own family.

I transmit this dispatch by Major Hare, acting Assist. Adj. General with this army, attached to Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection.

P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the operations of the 31st ult. and 1st inst., and returns of the loss before San Sebastian, from the 28th July to the 31st Aug.*

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, on the 31st Aug. and 1st Sept. 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	R. and F.	Total loss of Officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. and F.	British.	Spanish.	Portuguese.	Horses.
Killed .	29	20	351	400	51	261	88	2
Wounded	159	115	1823	2067	331	1347	386	4
Missing .	5	3	148	156	32	71	53	—

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813, 5½ P.M.

I have just received your notes of 6 A.M., and 10½ A.M., despatched at 12¼ from Hernani.

I should think that Gen. Hay would find no difficulty in cutting off the communication between the fire and the unburnt parts of the town, by pulling down a house or two; or, at all events, he might communicate by the post to which the fire has not reached for some time, and then by a part on which it may be hoped that the fire, having nothing more to feed upon, will have been extinguished.

It is probable that Rey wishes to treat; as, if he did not, the object of his letter would be equally gained by hoisting a black flag at the place inhabited by our wounded. The demand of the *Etat Nominatif* is nonsense.

I recommend to you to tell him, that it was observed (as I understand it was) that our prisoners were employed at work on the fortifications of the place, under the fire of the besiegers, which is contrary to all the rules of war; that we always take care of our prisoners, particularly of the wounded, and that we hope it will be found that he has done the same. You might then point out to him, that all the efforts which have been made for his relief have failed, and offer him a capitulation for the last time.

In these moonlight nights, particularly, there is nothing to prevent horsemen from going at all hours of the night; and any man on horseback can come from Oyarzun here in 3 hours, without fatiguing his horse. Footmen could not do it in twice the time. But the truth is, that our officers don't take care to make the dragoon understand clearly where he is going, and the importance that he should arrive to his time, before he sets out; and I have never yet seen communications by letter parties, upon which any reliance whatever could be placed, for that reason only. If the

* See page 730.

dragoon, instead of having a letter simply given into his hand, received detailed directions where to go, from the Staff officer, and was told the time it was expected he should be on the road, and the arrival was noted, and any irregularity in the time was strictly inquired into, this duty would be done like every other.

Au Cap. Gén. Don F. X. Castaños.

Lesaca, ce 3 Sept. 1813.

J'ai reçu votre lettre de Bilbao du 24 Août, pour laquelle je vous suis bien obligé.

Je vous conseille de ne pas aller par Madrid si vous le pouvez. Il pourrait y avoir quelqu' expression populaire qui vous ferait du mal dans ces temps-ci.

Vous aurez appris avec plaisir la conduite et les succès de votre ancienne armée de la Galice. Je lui ai fait battre Soult toute seule. Les Anglais n'ont pas tiré un seul coup de ce côté-là. La prise de San Sébastian est une bonne affaire.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

In consequence of the report which I forward this day, of the gallant action fought by a part of the 4th army on the heights of San Marcial, on the 31st Aug., I beg to submit to the Regency the expediency of promoting the officers whose names are in the margin.*

A sense of justice to the claims of others would have induced me to propose them likewise for a step of promotion, on an occasion so honorable to the Spanish arms, but your Excellency having already objected to those whom I should have recommended, I don't wish to bring their names forward again.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

It gives me the utmost concern to forward along with the report of the gallant action fought by a part of the 4th army the enclosed note from their Commander in Chief, Gen. Freyre, giving an account of their wants and sufferings, even on the day on which their conduct had been so conspicuously honorable to themselves, and advantageous to their country.

I should not trouble your Excellency so repeatedly upon this subject, if I was not quite certain that Spain possesses resources amply sufficient for the maintenance of the armies in her service, if proper arrangements were adopted to realise them; but I entreat your Excellency to request the Regency to consider in what a situation they place me, who am obliged to urge these brave soldiers to exertion, and to make them meet the enemy in the field, at the very moment that I know they are starving; and that, for the want of proper arrangements, there are no means of taking care of them when they are wounded.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

I received last week your letters of the 16th and 20th, and the dis-

* Mariscal de Campo Don Manuel Freyre; Don J. Diaz Porlier; Brigadier Don J. M. Espeleta; Brigadier Don S. Sanchez Salvador; Brigadier Don Antonio Roselló; Brigadier Don Fred. Castaños; Col. Don J. Fuente Pita; Col. Don Juan Loarte; Col. Don J. U. Mendia.

patches that will go to Cadiz by this occasion will show you what we have been doing since. I should think that the Spaniards will be better pleased with the battle of San Marcial than with any event of the campaign. Their troops certainly behaved remarkably well. They were a little desirous of being relieved towards the end of the day ; but I saw that the enemy were done, and I would not relieve them.

I think you have managed your note about the engagement to me admirably. Nobody can, with justice, complain of it, and an ally has a right to interfere in the way you have interfered for the British government. What I dreaded was the communication of the order to me not to allow the order of the Spanish government for the removal of Castaños to be put in execution. That would have been foreign interference with a vengeance, in a concern purely domestic.

I enclose you the letter which the Minister at War wrote to me, and my answer, in which you will see that I have brought matters to a crisis, and they now must decide to take me upon the terms stated, or to leave me, and to have this letter circulated, together with all the correspondence, throughout Europe. They appear to me to be going on terribly ; and the whole of Spain is disgusted with them.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Rear Adm. T. B. Martin at Plymouth, from which you will see that the armistice is broken off, and that Austria takes part with the Allies in the war. I don't know the particulars, as the main facts, viz., the renewal of hostilities, and the part taken by Austria, were communicated to Plymouth by telegraph. By late accounts, however, from the Continent, it appeared that the negotiations at Prague were a mere farce. Caulaincourt never proceeded upon his full powers ; and Metternich declared, that if preliminaries of peace were not signed on the 10th, Austria would declare war on the 11th. You may state these facts to the Spanish government as authentic.

P.S. Your boy Gerald has been ill, but he is better ; but I suppose Lady W. writes to you about him. I will settle the business for Mrs. Strange as she wishes.

Pray return the enclosed papers, as I have no copy of them.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

I have the honor to enclose a requisition for additional heavy ordnance and stores for this army.

The heavy ordnance requested by my dispatch of the 10th Feb. was in three proportions, of which the first arrived in the Peninsula, and the stores were consumed, and the ordnance absolutely worn out by fire in the commencement of the siege of San Sebastian. The stores of the two other proportions, as well as those intended for Cuxhaven, are nearly consumed ; and this requisition goes to supply the ordnance of the first proportion worn out, and the stores of all three which will have been consumed.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

Adverting to that part of your letter marked E, of the 25th, in which you mention the treaty between the Allies in favor of Murat, I beg your

Lordship to look over my letter to Lord W. Bentinck, of the 1st July, enclosed in one to your Lordship, of the 2d July, in which you will see that I have authorised him to take his army from Spain, in case he should conclude the treaty with Murat, which had been under discussion. As it is probable that Murat will now conclude that treaty, or something of the same kind, I beg to know whether your Lordship approves of Lord William's quitting Spain with his army.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

I enclose a very interesting letter from a very intelligent officer, who was taken prisoner about a year and a half ago, and has been during that time in France, from whence he has recently made his escape. I shall be obliged to you if you will return it to me.

I will send you a selection of Joseph's papers; but as the Sec. of State's office is a sink of papers, and these are really curious, and will hereafter tend to illustrate many things that have occurred here, particularly in the last year, I shall be glad to have them again, and that they should remain among my papers.

In your official letters to me, regarding the battle of Sorauren, you omitted to mention the name of Sir W. Beresford, which, I acknowledge, did not occur to me at the time, or I should not have published in the G. O. of the army that part relating to Sir R. Hill and the troops, which I did publish according to the usual practice.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 3d Sept. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 20th, regarding Gen. Sir J. Murray's Court Martial, which shall, as you desire, be formed of officers of this army; but as it will only take 16 or 18, you are mistaken if you suppose that you will prevent them by any thing but a positive order from flocking to England in the winter; and even a positive order will not prevent Members of Parliament from going.

I have likewise received your letter of the 19th, regarding the augmentation of the fleet on the coast, upon which subject I have again sent for the opinion of Sir T. Graham; and I have inquired from Sir G. Collier whether he can undertake all that he has to do without the aid of the two ships of the line. I will let you know what they say by the first occasion. I shall be glad to know when the depôts will be formed at Plymouth.

When the plan for the receipt and transmission of parcels for officers shall be matured, I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know its details, that I may publish them in the G. O. of the army.

We have not got on very well, lately, in our money concerns at Lisbon, Cadiz, or Gibraltar. We have got little or no money at Lisbon since the money jobbers have had it in their power to purchase Commissariat bills in the market. These persons, who I am sorry to find are listened to by gentlemen in office in England, are *sharks*, who can never be satisfied with moderate profits; and they will not deal with us upon the profits of the exchange only. They wish to make, besides, all that they can get out of the pocket of our unfortunate creditors. Then the little that is got

at Cadiz goes to pay the Spanish subsidy ; and Mr. Bissett, who managed our concerns at Gibraltar, having been removed from thence, we now get nothing there. I am afraid, therefore, that we shall be in want ; more particularly as we must assist these *fighting* Spaniards.

P.S. It would be very desirable to adopt some measure respecting the 51st and 68th regts., that is to say, either to order them home, or to allow me to form them into a provisional battalion. They are fully officered, with very few men ; and it is quite shocking to see the list of killed and wounded officers when they go into action. The other day the 51st lost 12 officers killed and wounded, and I believe not quite 100 men. As to sending them home, I must tell you that, in this country in particular, one old soldier is worth at least five new ones. This place is about 18 miles from Pasages, where the drafts recently arrived have been landed, and they came that distance in two marches ; but they had two mountains to pass, and they are so knocked up by marching over them, that I have not seen one detachment go through entire.

Lord Aylmer's brigade cannot, I am convinced, march 5 miles in corps.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 4th Sept. 1813.

Sir W. Beresford is anxious to go to Lisbon on the public service, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what prospect you have of the arrival of the *Freya* on the coast ; to what port she is coming, and if she does not come, whether you could, or it would suit your convenience, to send with him a vessel to Lisbon.

To F. S. Larpent, Esq., Dep. Judge Advocate General.

Lesaca, 4th Sept. 1813.

I was very much concerned to hear of your misfortune, which, however, I don't doubt, will have been alleviated by Comte Gazan as far as may have been in his power, as soon as he shall have known that to your humanity, in the first instance, he owed the safety of his wife.

In former wars, a person in your situation would have been considered a non-combatant, and would have been immediately released ; but in this war, which, on account of the violence of enmity with which it is conducted, it is to be hoped will be the last, for some time at least, every body taken is considered a prisoner of war, and none are released without exchange. There are several persons now in my power in the same situation with yourself in that respect ; that is to say, non-combatants, according to the known and anciently practised rules of war ; among others, there is the secretary of the Governor of San Sebastian ; and I authorise you to tell the Duc de Dalmatie or Comte Gazan, that I will send back any person in exchange for you that they shall point out.

I send you with this letter the sum of 200 dollars, of which I request you to acknowledge the receipt, and that you will let me know whether I can do any thing else for you.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 4th Sept. 1813.

I write just to correct an error in my dispatch of the 2d inst. The

number of prisoners taken at San Sebastian is 670, and not 270, as I supposed.

The Governor has had a communication with Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, the object of which certainly was to commence a negotiation for the surrender of the place. Advantage was taken of this communication to send him a summons; but he demanded a suspension of hostilities for a fortnight; then to surrender unless relieved, but to march his garrison into France with arms and baggage, without being prisoners of war. These conditions were rejected, and the fire, which had ceased for some time, yesterday was recommenced in the evening.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, 5th division.

4th Sept. 1813.

I have communicated to my Lord Wellington the purport of your letter of the 2d inst., and have in reply to acquaint you that his Lordship is of opinion you had better continue for the present with the 5th division, till Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Leith shall so far have recovered from his wounds as to be equal fully to assume the charge of his proper command.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813, 9½ A.M.

I did not receive your letter of the 3d, 6 P.M., as you know, till I saw you yesterday, and did not peruse the enclosures till I returned here last night.

I observe that Lieut. Jones's letter to the Governor mentions that the prisoners are kept in the yard of the magazine '*sans blindages*,' and many have been killed and wounded by the fire directed against that building.

I don't know that I have ever heard of such conduct; and the pretension founded upon it, viz., that we should not direct our fire against the place, is too ridiculous. I request you to send in to Gen. Rey a protest against his keeping his prisoners in the yard of this magazine, '*sans blindages*,' and likewise against his making them work under fire.

As to an exchange, it might be very well to think of it, if we had no chance of taking the place, as we should then get our men in exchange for an equal number of others; but as we shall probably get them without such sacrifice, I don't think that I ought to make it, even though they should continue exposed to the ill treatment and misery which they now endure, and the danger from our own fire, for a few days longer. More particularly, in my opinion, ought we not to exchange them for soldiers to be sent into the garrison.

I have turned over in my mind Gen. Hay's position in the town. I think he ought to keep his first line light, supported by a second in the Plaza; and his greatest force on the rampart, or in the street of the rampart of the south face. I think that the enemy have the power of turning his left; if they have, they would not be stopped till they should come to the ramparts of the south face at all events, and he would lose many men in the contest in the town. If he should be light in front, and should be turned, his loss will be trifling in the town, and he would be certain of regaining, not only his posts, but something more, by the advance of his reserve to drive the enemy out.

This need not prevent, indeed it will render necessary, his making his barricades in front excessively strong.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have received your letters of the 3d at 11 p.m. and 4th, and am much obliged to you for the paper.

I enclose an official application for Col. Stewart, Col. King, and Capt. Blanckley. The government are very strict on the subject of passages to England, and have more than once positively ordered me not to apply for a passage for any officer who should not return home on account of the public service, or of wounds or of sickness acquired in the public service.

When in Portugal, I agreed with Adm. Martin as follows: that application should always be made officially for those returning home as above described; and for others, if I apply at all, it will be a private application, with which you will comply or not, as you may think proper.

I beg you to observe, likewise, that these applications must be made directly from me.

P.S. I enclose a letter for England.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th Aug., in which you have sent me one of the 17th Aug. from the Minister of *Hacienda*, in regard, principally, to the formation of a magazine at Almagro, and, secondly, to the formation and collocation of magazines in the country in general.

I have read in the public papers accounts of some discussions in the Cortes upon this subject, which, as intimately connected with the operations of the army, and indeed, as the operations of the army depend in some measure upon the arrangements to be made, I have always considered with great interest.

The magazines to be formed for the army ought to be established with a view to its operations. Now it must be obvious to your Excellency, and to the whole world, that there is little probability, it is to be hoped, of the removal of the seat of the war to the Tagus. The formation of a large magazine, then, at Almagro, or in the Sierra de Alcaraz, composed of the grain belonging to the nation in La Mancha, must be entirely useless to the army, and a burthen instead of an advantage to the public. If this magazine is to be rendered of any use to the army under existing circumstances, it ought to be removed from Almagro towards the frontiers of Navarre; but your Excellency must be aware of the total impracticability of the execution of this measure.

The same reasoning applies to the formation of all the magazines to be formed at a distance from the armies, excepting those on the sea coast of Murcia and Valencia, and those on the sea coast of Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, which might be conveyed by sea; the former to the armies operating in Catalonia, the latter to the armies on the frontiers of Navarre.

If, therefore, I had been consulted by the government when these measures in regard to magazines had been first in contemplation, I should have

recommended to them to take not in kind, but the value in money of those contributions intended to be applied to the formation of magazines for the armies; and that then the magazines should be formed by purchases in the neighbourhood of the seat of the war. This would be the best system to adopt at present, if it is still possible.

As the government have opened this subject to my consideration, and as it is possible that they may not have it in their power now to convert into money the large quantities of corn which belong to the nation in the several provinces of the Kingdom, I take the liberty to recommend, first, that for the present this corn should not be collected in one magazine in each province; because such a measure, at the same time that it would be expensive, would render the removal more difficult in case it should be practicable to move the magazine forward, or the occurrence of disaster should render it expedient to move the magazine back, or out of the enemy's way.

That, therefore, which the Intendants of the inland provinces should now be directed to do, should be to obtain an accurate knowledge of the species and quantities of grain belonging to the public in the possession of any town, village, or individual, within the province; and the readiest means of getting at each quantity in case it should be practicable or necessary.

The magazines in the maritime provinces should be collected in the stations on the sea coast at which it would be most convenient to embark them; the Intendants of the provinces making the Intendants of the army acquainted at what stations they are placed.

Although it is not expedient to collect large magazines at stated places in the inland provinces of the Kingdom, it does not follow that, even if the grain belonging to the nation cannot be converted into money, it will be quite useless to the public service.

It will, in my opinion, be expedient to fix upon certain roads throughout the Kingdom by which all detachments of troops, or single officers and soldiers, shall invariably march, always by route or order. On these roads it would be proper to fix magazines at certain stages, at which alone these officers, soldiers, or detachments, should receive their provisions on their march. The marches of these persons would be then much more regular; their arrival at their destination would be certain, because they could receive provisions only at the places and for the time named in their routes; and the country would be relieved from the intolerable burthen of providing for these people in the irregular and oppressive manner in which they are now provided for.

I beg to hear from your Excellency if the Regency should approve of these suggestions, particularly of the last; in order that, if they should, I may have the routes regularly made out, and the places fixed upon for the establishment of the magazines on the several roads.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have the honor to inform you, that having some time ago thought it probable that the successes of the allies in this quarter would induce the enemy to weaken his force in Catalonia in order to strengthen that in my

front, I directed that, in case the enemy's force in Catalonia should be considerably weakened, the 3d army, with the exception of their cavalry and artillery, should be put in march along the Ebro to join this army by Zaragoza and Tudela, leaving their artillery with the 1st army, and their cavalry with the 2d. The event expected having occurred, I have learnt that the 3d army are in march in this direction, and that they will arrive at Tudela on the 9th and 10th inst.

To Gen. Don F. Copons y Navia.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 14th, and I am concerned that you should have considered yourself under the necessity of transmitting to me your correspondence with Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

It gives me great pleasure to observe in that correspondence your desire to forward the views of that General, and obedience to the instructions from me of the 14th April, 1813; and I am quite convinced that any difficulties which arose in your communications with his Excellency are to be attributed to his desire to forward the service in the shortest and most expeditious mode.

I have requested, however, his Excellency's particular attention to the article of my instructions of the 14th April; and your Excellency may rest assured, from what I know of him, that he is in every way disposed to carry on the service in a way which shall be agreeable to you. I have likewise had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 23d Aug. from Manresa, for which I am much obliged to you.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 27th Aug., and I am very much obliged to you for detaching the 3d army to join that under my command upon hearing of the movement from Catalonia of that under Marshal Suchet. I have not heard of this movement yet from any other quarter.

I am concerned to learn the wants of the Spanish armies on the Eastern coast. I cannot say, however, that I am surprised at them, as the same wants exist here, and in all parts of the country where there are Spanish troops.

It will not be in my power to attack Mequinenza, at least at present. I have more on my hands than I wish, and as much as I can manage; and I cannot venture to extend the operations of this army.

We took the town of San Sebastian by storm on the 31st. The enemy retired to the castle, of which I hope that we shall soon have possession. On the same day the enemy made an attempt to relieve San Sebastian by attacking our posts on the Bidasoa, but were completely defeated, with considerable loss, by 3 divisions of the 4th Spanish army, under the command of Gen. Freyre. The 1st British division were on one flank of the Spanish troops, and the 4th British division on another; but the Spaniards defended their post so well, that I did not find it necessary to engage either.

To Lieut. Gen. Lord W. Bentinck, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have received your letter of the 27th. My letter of the 9th would have explained to your Lordship, I hoped, the reason for which I thought it expedient not to ask that the system established for the government of the provinces, and for obtaining supplies for the several armies, should be altered in the manner appearing to you to be best. I can only assure you, that I have no prejudice in favor of this or any other system, and that I have acted according to the best of my judgment.

You may depend upon it, also, that all the Spanish armies are equally *hors de combat* in point of supplies, pay, &c. &c., and that they always have been so. Just to show you how these things are here, I enclose an extract and copy of two letters I recently wrote to the Minister at War, and the copy of one to Gen. Freyre, who commands the 4th Spanish army. But you will say, if things are so bad, why not alter them? I answer, because I know they would be worse.

There is no man better aware than I am of the state of every officer's reputation who has to command troops with such miserable means of support as these have, particularly in these days in which such extravagant expectations are excited by that excessively wise and useful class of people, the editors of newspapers. If I had been at any time capable of doing what these gentlemen expected, I should now, I believe, have been in the moon.

They have long ago expected me at Bordeaux; nay, I understand that there are many of their wise readers (amateurs of the military art) who are waiting to join the army till head quarters shall arrive in that city; and when they shall hear of the late Spanish battle, I conclude that they will defer their voyage till I shall arrive at Paris. But you may depend upon this: 1st; that I shall neither myself form, nor encourage in others, extravagant expectations: 2dly; that you shall have my full support in any measure that you think proper to adopt under your instructions: and 3dly; that if you do your own duty (as I am sure you will) according to the best of your judgment, and satisfy yourself, you will satisfy your employers, and eventually the British public.

I earnestly recommend to you, however, to be most scrupulous in the observance of the article of my instructions of the 14th April, in regard to the commands of the several officers. The Spaniards are excessively jealous upon this subject, more particularly so with us; as in every instance in which I have detached British troops to be under the command of Spanish officers, such as to Cadiz, and Carthagena, and Tarifa, and with Ballesteros, I have insisted upon the same condition. I can only tell you, that for many years before I commanded the Spanish army, I have acted in co-operation with the Spanish Generals, and I have always found them ready to act in every respect as I wished, as much so as I have since I have commanded their army; but I have invariably attended to and respected the order and subordination of their army.

I mention this subject again, because Gen. Copons has sent me his correspondence with you, which renders it quite clear to me, that the difficulties you have met with in your transactions with him are to be attributed to his jealousy of your communications with Baron de Eroles and

Manso ; and you may depend upon it, that you will derive equal advantage from the service of both by directing them in the regular manner through their chief.

You will have heard probably, before you will receive this, that the armistice was *denounced* on the 10th Aug. ; and hostilities were consequently to recommence the 16th ; the Austrians taking part with the other Allies.

P.S. I have heard so many debates, that I never read one ; more especially as I know, that unless a gentleman takes the trouble of writing his speech, the report of it in the newspapers is not very accurate. Since Lord Wellesley quitted Spain in 1809, I have never written to, or received from him, one letter upon any public subject whatever ; and I don't know what he said or thought on the Alicante army. I should think, however, that he could have had no accurate information to enable him to form an opinion at all.

To the Rt. Hon. Sir H. Wellesley, K.B.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have nothing new to tell you. We shall open our fire on the castle of San Sebastian on the 8th, and I should think it will not hold out above a day or two.

It is reported that Suchet has retired from Catalonia, and in consequence thereof, the 3d Spanish army is in march this way, and will arrive at Tudela on the 9th and 10th.

It is reported on the frontier that the French had gained a victory within 2 leagues of Dresden, on the 25th Aug.

To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor of London.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving the unanimous resolutions of the Court of Common Council of the City of London, of the 12th July, in which the Court have been pleased to express their approbation of my conduct, and of that of the General officers, officers, and troops under my command, in the recent battle fought near Vitoria, on the 21st June.

This mark of the approbation of your Lordship, and of the Common Council of the City of London, is most gratifying to those upon whom it has been conferred, and has been received with corresponding sentiments of gratitude and respect ; and I beg leave to return my thanks for the distinguished honor conferred upon me by the resolutions of the Court.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 5th Sept. 1813.

I did not answer your Lordship's letter of the 25th, marked D, by Major Hare, although the subject was not new to me ; and I had already written to my brother upon it.

Before we decide whether our influence shall or shall not be exerted for or against the claims of the Princess of Brazil to be the Regent of Spain, it is worth while to consider whether we have really any influence which we can exert. It may be rather mortifying to our vanity, but I am afraid that a review of our transactions with the Spanish government, since the year 1808, will prove that we possess in fact none, and have never possessed any influence over their councils.

Review all the transactions with the Spanish government in relation to the operations of the war; the negotiations respecting a British garrison at Cadiz, and the mode in which that measure was at last accomplished; look at your negotiations about America; at all that passed about my having the command, and the mode in which that object was accomplished; at the change of government accomplished last year by my brother, and its consequences; at the attempt made by me in the spring to obtain the consent of the government to introduce Russian troops into the Peninsula, and the mode in which what I recommended was refused; and the fate of the recent recommendation of the British government to transfer the Spanish government to Madrid; and it will be admitted that, as a government, we have no influence over the Spanish councils.

I think that our opinion for or against the Princess of Brazil will neither add to nor diminish her chance of success; and if by our influence is meant the number of votes we should give for her, or against her, in Cortes, I believe I may say positively, that we should not give her or deprive her of one. But the degree of assistance which our opinion could give to or withhold from the Princess of Brazil is not the only view which we should take of this question; and your Lordship has adverted to the effects upon the mind of the Princess, in case she should succeed in obtaining the Regency, of our neutrality, or of our opposing her claims.

If the Princess is to be a Regent according to the constitution, the British government need not feel much anxiety respecting her feelings or her conduct. She will be the slave of the Cortes, as all the other Regents have been, and must be, so long as matters continue as they are; and the Cortes will continue to be the slaves of the mob of the place of their residence, and of their leaders the writers of the newspapers, as all such assemblies, particularly of Spaniards, must be.

You will lose nothing, therefore, by remaining neutral, or opposing her claims; and you will gain nothing by supporting them, excepting, indeed, the discredit of having countenanced the placing the government in the hands of the woman of the worst character that exists.

I recommend to the British government, then, as I recently recommended to my brother, to take no part either for or against the Princess of Brazil; to discountenance by every means in their power the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes; and if their opinion be asked regarding the formation of a Regency, to recommend, first, the establishment of a system which is to give some authority to the executive government, whether in the hands of a Regent or of a King, by the alteration of those parts of the constitution which have lodged all power in the Cortes; and next, the selection of that person of the Royal family to fill the office of Regent, who should unite the strongest claim from birth with the best capacity; and if one cannot be found with sufficient capacity, then that Spaniard who should be deemed most deserving the situation.

Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the democratical transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate, well thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe; and if the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the Assembly seize upon landed property to

supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.

The question is, how we shall discountenance them. It is not easy, possibly, for the persons composing the King's government to do so in public ; and you may depend upon it that no public remonstrance uncalled for, upon that or any other subject, will ever have the smallest effect upon the Spanish government. But something may be done to save our character at least by the British Embassy at Cadiz, and by the British subjects in Spain in general, to bring democracy into discredit ; and by taking every opportunity to point out to the Spanish nation the inconvenience and danger of the principle on which the government are acting ; and by encouragement and countenance to the opposite party.

You have seen lately how the *Liberales* defeated the measure of removing the government from Cadiz. They defeated the Princess in the same way in the winter ; and although she had a majority in the Assembly, not a soul dared to mention her name. They destroyed the Duque del Infantado's government (supposed, by the bye, to have been established by our influence) in the same way, and the Duque has assured me that they had a majority in the Assembly at the time ; and they recently defeated, in the same way, Castaños' friends, likewise the majority, who, if they had had any spirit, would have saved him, and would have turned out the government. But Solano's ghost was staring them in the face, and they were afraid of the mob of Cadiz.

It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of Generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it ; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell, and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the King should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit ; but things have gone so far, and the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion : and I earnestly recommend to the British government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy.

I wish you would let me know whether, if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it.

I sent you some time ago a letter which I had received from La Vega. I now send you the copy of that which I wrote to him, which contains my opinion of the state of the Spanish government, and what it ought to be ; and I recommend to the British government, if they interfere at all, to recommend something of the same kind.

The A.G. to the A.A.Gs. of divisions.

5th Sept. 1813.

Since the advance of the allied army into Spain numerous references have reached head quarters in consequence of irregularities alleged against and, in some instances, proved to have been committed by Portuguese followers of the army. The increased number of depredations of this class has led the Commander of the Forces to suppose that many Portuguese of the lower order have entered the ser-

vice of British and Portuguese officers when in Portugal, to avoid the conscription and service required of them by the laws of that country, from the influence of which laws being now in some measure removed, many individuals have separated from their masters and have become vagabond followers to the several divisions. To overcome this growing inconvenience, I am to acquaint you that it is the pleasure of his Excellency that any Portuguese follower of the army who cannot fully account for his mode of subsistence and employment is to be arrested, and sent under escort to head quarters for the purpose of being further removed to one of the Portuguese military depôts, which you will accordingly report to the Lieutenant General commanding the division.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 7th Sept. 1813.

I enclose a letter for yourself, and one for Lord Castlereagh, from Lord W. Bentinck, together with the copy of one which he has written to myself, from which you will see that his Lordship is going to Sicily. This departure will make the 7th change of hands in the command of the Anglo-Sicilian corps in the course of about twice the number of months; and the enclosed extract of Lord W. Bentinck's private letter shows that there must be an 8th change, and probably, when his Lordship shall come back, a 9th.

Your Lordship may depend upon it that the management of concerns, such as these officers have in hand, cannot be taken up and laid down at pleasure, without great public inconvenience; and I am quite certain that I could not have quitted my situation for any day for nearly five years without incurring the greatest. It is most desirable, therefore, that some permanent commanding officer should be appointed for this corps. It is impossible for me to send any officer from hence to relieve Gen. W. Clinton. The state of the command of the Anglo-Sicilian corps is important in view, not only to that corps, but to the Spaniards.

Your Lordship will have observed that I have placed all the Spaniards on that side of the Peninsula under the command of the officer commanding that corps, but things have not been carried on at least very successfully; and although perhaps nobody can object to the principle on which I made that arrangement, I believe there is no Spanish General officer who does not think that he would have been more successful, and there are some who are positively looking to obtain this very command.

When O'Donell left his army the other day on account of his old

G. O.

Lesaca, 6th Sept. 1813.

1. At a General Court Martial held by virtue of a warrant, and in pursuance of an order from, &c., &c., private —, of the — regt., was arraigned upon the following charge, viz.: 'For leaving his post before he was regularly relieved when sentinel, on the night of the 21st July, 1813, and attempting to desert towards the enemy.'

The Court having deliberately and maturely weighed and considered the evidence for the prosecution, together with what the prisoner has offered in his defence, and the evidence produced in support of it, is of opinion he is guilty of the crime of which he is charged, being in breach of the Articles of War, and does therefore sentence him, the said —, to be shot to death, at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

2. The sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of private —, of the — regt., is to be carried into execution on Thursday, the 9th Sept. 1813, under the direction of the Assist. Provost Marshal attached to the 2d division of infantry, in front of the lines of that division, and in presence of the — regt., and such other troops as can be conveniently assembled, to be paraded for that purpose.

wounds, he proposed himself to me to command in Catalonia. I don't know that the Spanish government would consent to his taking this command; and I don't suppose that the British government would like to place the Anglo-Sicilian corps under the command of any Spanish General officer who has appeared for the last 150 years.

But I hope your Lordship will perceive the additional difficulties in which I am involved by the perpetual changes of the person commanding the Anglo-Sicilian corps; that some person will be fixed upon who is capable of managing such a concern; and that he will go to his post with a determination to remain at it till the last.

I hope the fire will open against the castle of San Sebastian to-morrow.

Suchet has detached a large body of troops from Catalonia; and Lord W. Bentinck has ordered the 3d Spanish army to march in this direction, in consequence of orders which I had given him in expectation of this movement.

Notwithstanding the beating which Soult has received, it is generally reported, and there is some appearance of preparation for another operation to relieve Pamplona, most probably connected with the movement from Catalonia. However, I may hope, by the 10th or 11th, to have the castle of San Sebastian; and at the same time the 3d army will be at Tudela, so that I shall be too strong for them. But the perseverance to endeavor to relieve these places, after the enormous loss sustained already, shows what command of men the French have, and the manner in which they sacrifice their lives for the credit of relieving a place which they must know that, under existing circumstances, they cannot hold.

G. O.

Lesaca, 7th Sept. 1813.

2. The balances due to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers on the face of their several accounts, closed to the 24th March, are to be paid to them according to the mode pointed out in the G. O. of the 3d Aug. 1813; that is to say, the sum due to each man is to be divided by 30, and the soldiers are to receive on every day the 30th.

3. It is to be understood that the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Life Guards, Horse Guards, the Dragoons, Artillery, and Foot Guards, are to receive the full amount of their daily subsistence as fixed by the regulations, if the balances due should be sufficient to cover the daily issue to that amount for the month.

4. At a General Court Martial held by virtue of a warrant and in pursuance of an order, &c., Lieut. —, of the —, was arraigned upon the following charge:

* * * * *

The Court having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the evidence produced in support of the prosecution, together with what the prisoner, Lieut. —, of the —, has offered in his defence, are of opinion that he is not guilty of the first part of the charge preferred against him, viz.; 'For highly unofficerlike conduct,' and do therefore acquit him, Lieut. —, thereof; but the Court find the prisoner guilty of the second part of the said charge, viz.; 'In ill-treating and repeatedly striking private —, of the same corps, with the flat part of his sword on the back, on or about the evening of the 11th Aug. 1813, in his, Lieut. —'s tent,' and do therefore sentence him, the prisoner, Lieut. —, of the —, to be reprimanded in such manner and at such time and place as his Excellency the Commander of the Forces may be pleased to direct.

The Court has been induced to pass a sentence thus lenient, it appearing to it that the custom which did exist in the regiment of punishing with the flat part of the sword had not, to the period of the commission of the act, been formally forbid.

Which opinion and sentence have been confirmed by his Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

5. The practice of striking soldiers with the flat of the sword must be discontinued entirely in the —, and the Commander of the Forces trusts that Lieut. — will take warning from the lenient sentence which has been passed, and not be guilty of such an act in future.

He is hereby reprimanded, and is to be released from his arrest and to return to his duty.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. May, A.A.G., Royal artillery.

7th Sept. 1813.

You will report to Lieut. Col. Dickson, commanding the Royal artillery, that it is his Excellency's pleasure Capt. — should be relieved in his command of the artillery brigade attached to the — division of infantry, preparatory to his being sent to England as a mark of the Field Marshal's particular disapprobation. When Capt. — shall be relieved of his present responsibility he is to be put in arrest at large, in which state that officer is to return to the head quarters of his corps at Woolwich. Although I have no doubt the Commander of the Forces proposes fully communicating with Col. Dickson in reference to this case previous to the departure of Capt. —, I now think it as well generally to state that this severity has been decided on to discourage the omissions of which Capt. — is considered guilty, in not maintaining discipline and not having sufficient control over his soldiers in quarters, and denying his attention and assistance to redress the outrages evidently committed by his soldiers on travellers and inhabitants; and that in consequence of such unjustifiable relaxation and deficiency of attention, the irregularities referred to in this statement took place on or about the 13th ult.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, — —, Hernani.

7th Sept. 1813.

I have received the Commander of the Forces' directions to require you to send for Paymaster —, of the — —, and read to him the annexed extract of my letter of the 27th ult., expressive of his Excellency's disapproval of that officer's irregular mode of communicating direct with head quarters, contrary to the custom of the service. Should the censure given by you to that officer have been of a more serious nature than therein contained, it must be attributed to your having misconceived my instructions, and you will be so good as to express yourself to Paymaster —. You are to understand that such issues as may be made by the Paymaster of the — — in consequence of any order or interference on your part, and which disbursement may not be fully authorised by general regulation or specific instruction, must be on your own responsibility, and is chargeable against your subsistence.

I am concerned in having now to acquaint you that the Field Marshal is dissatisfied at the misunderstanding which is evidently apparent between you and the Paymaster of the — —. Should any further impediment occur in the usual course of regimental duty from such injudicious proceedings, his Excellency has it in intention to send Paymaster — to England, and to solicit that an officer may be sent out to the — — to assume a command which it would, in such event, appear you are unequal to control.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 8th Sept. 1813.

Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton being under the necessity of returning to England for the recovery of his health, I have the honor to request that you will provide him with a passage in a man of war, when an opportunity offers.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Picton, K.B.

Lesaca, 8th Sept. 1813.

Gen. Pakenham delivered me your message. I am very much concerned that the state of your health should have deprived the public of your services, and me of your assistance, at this interesting moment;

Q.M.G. to Lieut. Gen. Sir R. Hill, K.B.

Lesaca, 7th Sept. 1813.

I enclose you a copy of a letter from Marshal Soult, addressed to the Governor of Pamplona, which has been intercepted.

Since I wrote to you this morning, Lord Wellington has had some communications from Gen. Mina, which induce him to desire that Mina's corps should be left entirely disposable for the object of watching whatever movements the enemy may make upon the side of Jaca.

You will be so good, therefore, as consider Gen. Mina's corps as having a specific destination for the present, under instructions that have been transmitted to that officer through the Spanish staff, and limit your communications with him to a mutual interchange of such information as may be interesting to both.

but, however I may regret your departure, I cannot but approve and recommend it to you.

I beg leave again to return you my thanks for the assistance which I have received from you.

Au Gén. Don P. A. Giron.

Lesaca, ce 8 Sept. 1813.

J'ai été hier à vos postes, et j'ai vu la redoute que vous faites sur la hauteur en arrière du Puerto de Echalar. Elle me paraît très bien placée, et une défense sur ce mamelon est importante. Mais il faut observer que l'armée étant à présent en position pour couvrir deux opérations, et que les circonstances pouvant exiger comme elles l'ont fait déjà deux fois que nous quittions une partie de nos positions, il est important de ne pas faire des ouvrages qui puissent être utiles à l'ennemi en ce cas-là.

Si vous finissez la redoute sur le plan que vous avez commencé, il faudrait faire une opération majeure pour regagner le Puerto de Echalar, en cas que nous fussions jamais dans le cas de l'abandonner pour le moment, pour manœuvrer sur la droite ou sur la gauche; parceque le flanc droit de la redoute et son derrière regarde exactement les deux points d'où il faut venir pour attaquer le Puerto, en cas que l'ennemi l'eut en sa possession. Ce que je vous conseille donc est de faire les deux flancs et le derrière de votre ouvrage ou d'abattis ou de palisades, et d'étendre la ligne qui regarde vers le Puerto, prenant garde toujours qu'elle ne soit de nulle manière une défense contre ceux qui pourraient avancer du côté de Echalar.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Sept. 1813, 7 A.M.

I have just received the Articles of Capitulation of the castle of San Sebastian, and I consent to the stipulation of the 10th article. I request you therefore to take the parole of honor of the officer who shall be named by Gen. Rey to return to my head quarters in 7 days, if a British officer of the same rank with himself should not be sent back to my head quarters in exchange for him.

In regard to the person named in the 5th article, I will do every thing in my power to exchange him; and he will remain at Pasages till the Commander in Chief shall decide whether he will send back a person of the same description in exchange for him.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Sept. 1813, 7 A.M.

I have received the capitulation, and sincerely congratulate you upon your success. I write you a few lines officially upon the capitulation. I believe Sir George ought to have been a party to it, as, if I recollect right, the operations on the island were lately carried on exclusively by the navy.

It is unlucky that we did not think of it sooner; but he may be invited to concur in it and to sign it. I have no objection to his sending Capt. Bloye home, and I will recommend both Sir George and Capt. Bloye.

P.S. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have particular attention paid to the examination of the *non-combattans* and *vieillards* referred to in the 4th article. I conclude that the examination means

whether they are or not '*non-combattans*.' The non-combatants to be sent to France don't mean, I conclude, the '*29 officiers*' and '*5 troupes*' returned *non-combattans* in the return. I send back the capitulation and other papers, lest you should not have kept a copy of them, but I shall be glad to have them again.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 9th Sept. 1813, 9½ A.M.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give the following orders to the officer in charge of the Engineer department.

The pontoon train must be got together, with the exception of those boats absolutely necessary for the communication with San Sebastian, and the train should be assembled somewhere near Oyarzun.

He must immediately take measures for securing the place against a *coup de main*, by clearing the rubbish from and blockading the breaches; and he must let me have, without loss of time, a plan and estimate for the repair of the place, with such improvements as he may wish to suggest. He should also take measures to rebuild the bridge; and in doing so, it probably might be expedient to alter the site, and convert the sand hills into a *tête de pont*. I throw this out for consideration; but in the mean time it will be necessary to construct a bridge of the country boats, or to have a good flying bridge of the same, for the common communication on foot. I have ordered a Spanish garrison to be prepared for the place, which will go into it as soon as you shall state that all our troops, &c., can be withdrawn with convenience, and our departments are prepared to give over to the Spanish departments the stores and other articles it contains.

In the mean time, the 5th division had better be brought across the Urumea, and encamped in any convenient ground near Oyarzun. All the artillerymen should return to their several brigades; and the 18 pounder brigade, with its ammunition, should be brought out to the high road. Col. Dickson should order the ordnance and stores to be embarked. That still fit for service should be so arranged in the vessels as that we may easily get at it; that unfit for service should be embarked and sent to England.

Col. Dickson should continue to give rewards for our shot, till the engineers shall begin to work upon the breach, and then collect it without reward. He will take care to pile any that may be found.

To Capt. Sir G. Collier, R.N.

Lesaca, 9th Sept. 1813.

The public service requiring the presence of Marshal Beresford at Lisbon, I have the honor to request that you will appropriate a ship for the conveyance of his Excellency and his suite.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813, 10¼ A.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday. I have no objection to leave for the present the damaged guns and our carriages in San Sebastian.

I will speak to the Commissary Gen. about victualling the transports. I should think 14 days' provisions in each fully sufficient. The horse

transports must surely be provided with casks to supply horses with water, which must be amply sufficient for all the men they can hold.

The Surgeon Major of the place, and the officers who went down the breach, shall be sent back to France on their parole.

P.S. The Commissary Gen. will have no difficulty in giving 14 days' provisions for the transports to carry the prisoners home; that is to say, biscuit and salt meat.

To ———.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

I received last night your letters of the 22d July and 9th Sept., and I acknowledge that I wish you had followed the advice of ———, and had omitted to send me either; and I will detain both till I shall have received your answer upon what I am now about to state to you.

I have never interfered directly to procure for any officer serving under my command those marks of His Majesty's favor by which many have been honored; nor do I believe that any have ever applied for them, or have hinted through any other quarter their desire to obtain them. They have been conferred, as far as I have any knowledge, spontaneously, in the only mode, in my opinion, in which favors can be acceptable, or honors and distinction can be received with satisfaction. The only share which I have had in these transactions has been by bringing the merits and services of the several officers of the army distinctly under the view of the Sovereign and the public, in my reports to the Sec. of State; and I am happy to state, that no General in this army has more frequently than yourself deserved and obtained this favorable report of your services and conduct.

It is impossible for me even to guess what are the shades of distinction by which those are guided who advise the Prince Regent in the bestowing those honorable marks of distinction, and you will not expect that I should enter upon such a discussion. What I would recommend to you is, to express neither disappointment nor wishes upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, much less to the government. Continue, as you have done hitherto, to deserve the honorable distinction to which you aspire, and you may be certain that, if the government is wise, you will obtain it. If you should not obtain it, you may depend upon it that there is no person of whose good opinion you would be solicitous, who will think the worse of you on that account.

The comparison between myself, who have been the most favored of His Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed quite correct; and I advert to my own situation only to tell you, that I recommend to you conduct which I have always followed. Notwithstanding the numerous favors that I have received from the Crown, I have never solicited one; and I have never hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relations venture to hint for me, a desire to receive even one; and much as I have been favored, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously by the King and Regent, gives me more satisfaction than any thing else.

I recommend to you the same conduct, and patience; and, above all, resignation, if, after all, you should not succeed in acquiring what you wish; and I beg you to recall your letters, which you may be certain will be of no use to you.

To Rear Adm. Sir H. Neale, Bart.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d inst., enclosing the copy of the orders of the 18th Aug., which you had received from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and in answer thereto, I communicate to you the copy of a letter which I have this day written to Capt. Otway, of H.M.S. *Ajax*.

To Capt. Otway, R.N.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813, 9 A.M.

I received last night your letter of the 9th inst., dated off San Sebastian. You will have heard that the town was taken by storm on the 31st Aug., and that the garrison in the castle capitulated on the 8th inst.

The only naval aid that is required by the army at present, is to remove about 2000 prisoners in our hands, of whom 97 are officers, and whom Capt. Sir G. Collier appears to be of opinion it would be improper to allow to accompany their men in the small transports. If you could take some of them, and even of the soldiers, on board the *Ajax* and *Bellona*, you would relieve us from a great inconvenience.

I mention this because I conclude that under the orders which you say you have received, you would not think it proper to remain on this coast for the other objects in which we require naval assistance, viz., to secure for us the navigation of the north coast of Spain, and the coast of Portugal, and to interrupt the enemy's communication between the Garonne and the Adour rivers.

If you can take any of the officers or soldiers above referred to, I request you to communicate on the subject with Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

In addition to the demand for stores which I have transmitted to your Lordship in my dispatch, No. 81, I have now the honor to enclose a further requisition for ordnance ammunition stores, which I beg may be sent to this country as soon as possible.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 10th Sept. 1813.

A battery was constructed in the hornwork with great difficulty against the works of the castle of San Sebastian, which opened on the morning of the 8th inst.; and I have the pleasure to inform you, that the garrison surrendered before evening. I enclose Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham's report,*

* Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B., to Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G.
Hernani, 8th Sept. 1813.

I have the satisfaction to report to your Lordship, that the castle of San Sebastian has surrendered; and I have the honor to transmit the capitulation, which, under all the circumstances of the case, I trust your Lordship will think I did right to grant to a garrison which certainly made a very gallant defence.

Ever since the assault of the 31st ult., the vertical fire of the mortars, &c. of the right attack was occasionally kept up against the castle, causing a very severe loss to the enemy; and yesterday morning a battery of seventeen 24 pounders in the hornwork, and another of three 18 pounders, still more on the left, having been completed by the extraordinary exertions of the officers of artillery and engineers, aided by the indefatigable zeal of all the troops; the whole of the ordnance, amounting to 54 pieces, including two 24 pounders and 1 howitzer on the island, opened at 10 A.M. against the castle, and with such effect that before 1 P.M. a flag of truce was hoisted at the Mirador battery by the enemy; and after some discussion, the terms of the surrender were agreed on: thus

and the terms of capitulation agreed upon with the garrison, returns of ordnance, ammunition, &c., in the place.

The loss of the garrison during the siege is stated to have amounted to two thirds of their number at its commencement.

I beg leave again to draw your Lordship's attention to the conduct of Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, and of the General officers and troops under his command, in the arduous undertaking of which I am now reporting the successful close.

Under the *Ordonnance* recently issued by the French government, the difficulties of the operations of a siege, and the length of time it must take, are greatly increased; and they can be brought to a conclusion only by the storm of the breach of the body of the place. The merit of success, therefore, is proportionally increased; and if that time is subtracted from the duration of the operations against San Sebastian, during which the

giving your Lordship another great result of the campaign, in the acquisition to the allied armies of this interesting point on the coast, and near the frontier.

Capt. Stewart, of the Royals, aide de camp to Major Gen. Hay, who so greatly distinguished himself during the siege, is unfortunately among the killed since the last return.

I omitted in my last report to mention my obligations to the great zeal of Capt. Smith of the Royal Navy, who undertook and executed the difficult task of getting guns up the steep scarp of the island into a battery which was manned by seamen under his command, and which was of much service. Capt. Bloye, of the *Lyra*, has been from the beginning constantly and most actively employed on shore, and I feel greatly indebted to his services.

Besides the officers of artillery formerly mentioned, who have continued to serve with equal distinction, I should not omit the names of Capts. Morrison, Power, and Parker, who have been constantly in the breaching batteries, and in the command of companies. I beg leave to repeat my former recommendation of Capt. Cameron, of the 9th foot, who volunteered to command the attack of the island, and who conducted himself so ably on that occasion, and during all the time he commanded there.

CONVENTION proposed for the Capitulation of the Fort of La Motte of San Sebastian, by the Adjutant Commandant, Chevalier de Sonjeon, Chief of the Staff to the troops stationed in the Fort, charged with full powers by Gen. Rey, commanding the said troops, on the one side; and by Col. de Lancey, D. Q. M. G., Lieut. Col. Dickson, commanding the Artillery, and Lieut. Col. Bouverie, charged with full powers by Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, on the other side.

The above-named having exchanged their full powers, agreed as follows:

Article I. The French troops forming the garrison of Fort La Motte shall be prisoners of war to His Majesty's troops and their allies. *Agreed.*

Art. II. They shall be embarked in His Britannic Majesty's ships and conveyed to England direct, without being obliged to go farther by land than to the port of Pasages. *Agreed.*

Art. III. The General and other superior officers, and the officers of regiments and of the staff, as well as the medical officers, shall preserve their swords and their private baggage, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall preserve their knapsacks. *Agreed.*

Art. IV. The women, the children, and the old men, not being military, shall be sent back to France, as well as the other non-combatants, preserving their private baggage. *Granted, for the women and children. The old men and non-combatants must be examined.*

Art. V. The Commissaire des Guerres, Bourbier de Guilly, having with him the wife and the two daughters of his brother, who died at Pamplona, requests Sir T. Graham to authorise his return to France, with the three above-named ladies, as he is their chief support. He is not a military man. *This article shall be submitted to the Marquis of Wellington by Sir T. Graham.*

Art. VI. The sick and wounded shall be treated according to their rank, and taken care of as English officers and soldiers. *Agreed.*

Art. VII. The French troops shall file out to-morrow morning, by the gate of Mirador, with all the honors of war, with arms and baggage, and drums beating, to the outside, where they will lay down their arms; the officers of all ranks preserving their swords, their

besiegers waited for ammunition, viz., from the 25th July to the 26th Aug., it will be found that the operations did not last longer than has been usually required for a place which possessed three lines of defence, including the convent of San Bartolomeo.

During the operations against the castle, the navy took charge of the attack from the island of S^{ta} Clara, by which the enemy was much annoyed in his position in the castle.

Capt. Sir G. Collier, and the officers, seamen, and marines, have continued to afford every assistance in their power, and Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham mentions particularly Capt. Bloye, of the *Lyra*, and Capt. Smith; and Lieut. Col. Dickson, commanding the artillery, has reported his obligations to Lieut. O'Reilly, of the *Surveillante*, who commanded the seamen employed in the batteries. It appears that throughout the siege of the town, the enemy had a constant communication with Bayonne,

servants, horses, and baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks, as mentioned in the third article. *Agreed.*

Art. VIII. A detachment of the allied army, consisting of 100 men, shall occupy in the evening the gate of Mirador; a like detachment shall occupy the gate of the Governor's battery. These two posts shall be for that purpose evacuated by the French troops, as soon as the present capitulation shall be accepted and ratified by the Commanding Generals. *Agreed.*

Art. IX. The plans and all the papers regarding the fortifications shall be given over to an English officer; and officers shall be named equally on each side, to regulate all that concerns the artillery, engineer, and commissariat departments. *Agreed.*

Art. X. The General commanding the French troops shall be authorised to send to His Excellency Marshal Soult an officer of the staff, who shall sign his parole of honor, for his exchange with a British officer of his rank. This officer shall be the bearer of a copy of the present capitulation. *Submitted for the decision of Lord Wellington. The officer to be sent to Marshal Soult shall be chosen by the Commanding officer of the French troops.*

Art. XI. If any difficulties or misunderstanding shall arise in the execution of the articles of this capitulation, they shall be always decided in favor of the French garrison. *Agreed.*

Made and concluded this 8th day of September, 1813.

LE CHEVALIER DE SONGEON, Adj. Comm.

WM. DE LANCEY, Col.

ALEXANDER DICKSON, Lieut. Col. com. R. A.

H. BOUVERIE, Lieut. Col.

Approved, {

Le Général REY, Gouverneur.

THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut. Gen.

Approved on the part of }
the Royal Navy, }

GEORGE COLLIER, Commanding the Squadron of His Majesty's Ships off San Sebastian.

Return of the killed and wounded in the siege of the castle of San Sebastian, from the 1st to the 8th Sept. 1813.

	Officers.	R. and F.	Total loss of officers, non-commissioned officers, and R. & F.
Killed	1	1	2
Wounded	1	9	10

Portuguese loss not included.

from whence they received supplies of all kinds, including ordnance and ammunition, and reinforcements of all descriptions of officers and troops; and they sent away all their wounded officers and several of their men; but this was owing to circumstances not in the power of Capt. Sir G. Collier, and the squadron under his command, to remedy.

Since my last the enemy have collected their troops towards their left; but have again resumed their old positions since the fall of San Sebastian.

Having thought it probable, after the defeat of the enemy near Pamploña, that Marshal Soult would call Marshal Suchet to his assistance, I desired that if the latter should march himself, or any large detachment should be made from his troops, the 3d Spanish army should be sent to join me.

Gen. Lord W. Bentinck has since informed me that Gen. Decaen had marched into France with a force, reported by some to be 10,000, and by others 15,000 men; and the Duque del Parque had consequently marched with the 3d army, and was likely to be at Tudela on the 9th and 10th inst.

Nothing extraordinary has occurred on that side of the Peninsula. It appears by a report from the Duque del Parque, of which I transmit a copy by this opportunity, that when the 3d Spanish army were recently crossing the Ebro at Amposta, after the allies had retired from before Tarragona, the enemy made a sortie on the 19th ult., along the left bank of the Ebro, from Tortosa, with about 4000 men, and attacked the 3d division of the army. The Duque del Parque detached troops from the right bank, under the command of the acting Chief of the Staff of the Army, Don F^{co} Ferraz, and the enemy were immediately repulsed with considerable loss. It appears that on this occasion the conduct of the troops was remarkably good; and the Duque del Parque highly applauds the conduct of the Chief of the Staff.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 11th Sept. 1813, 9 A.M.

I received in the night yours of 4 P.M. yesterday, and I enclose a letter which I have written to Capt. Otway, which I beg you will peruse, to forward to him. You did not enclose the paper of Sir G. Collier's arrangements, nor the return of the transports. I write to Alava and Gen. Freyre respecting the civil engineer, Spanish masons and carpenters, and laborers.

I should be very happy to give relief in such a case as that of Col. Sentuary, but it is necessary to look a little to the case of our own countrymen in France. I beg that Col. Sentuary may be told, that to my certain knowledge, hundreds of French officers have been allowed to go from England on parole, either to return in a limited time, or to send officers of the same rank in exchange, and not one has returned, nor has one English officer been sent in exchange for the many French officers sent in this manner to France. I don't say it is their fault; the French government, probably, prevented their return, would not comply with the other condition of their engagements, and has forced them, most probably, to serve against Austrians, Prussians, Russians, &c.; but that is nothing

to me. Knowing the fact, I must act accordingly, and I will allow no officer to go away upon his parole, unless, as in the case of the Surgeon Major and Captain about whom you before wrote, they should have established a claim by services. In allowing them to go, I know that I am giving them to the enemy; Soult will send nobody in return.

P.S. I have received from Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Sir G. Collier's arrangements respecting prisoners; that which he proposes for British sick and wounded need not be considered at present.

To Gen. Don M. Freyre.

Lesaca, 11th Sept. 1813.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send the civil engineer of the province of Biscay to communicate with Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, the engineer in the service of His Britannic Majesty, in regard to the repairs of the place of San Sebastian. Gen. Mendizabal will probably be able to let you know where he is.

I likewise request you to order a principal mason and principal carpenter of the province to attend the same officer; and that directions may be given to the civil magistrates to collect masons, carpenters, and common laborers, in order to perform the works necessary to be done there without loss of time.

To Earl Bathurst.

Lesaca, 11th Sept. 1813.

I received your Lordship's letter of the 19th Aug.; and before I sent for the two sail of the line from Basque roads, adverted to in the letter from the Admiralty, I thought it proper to call for the opinion of Capt. Sir G. Collier, whether he considered himself able, with the vessels already under his command, to perform the various services required from the squadron on this station in co-operation with the army; and I enclose the copy of his answer received last night.

In the mean time the town of San Sebastian was taken by storm, on the 31st Aug.; the garrison capitulated in the castle on the 8th; and on the 9th, Capt. Otway appeared off San Sebastian with the *Ajax* and *Bellona*, having come from Basque roads. I enclose the copy of the letter which I have this day addressed to Capt. Otway.

Your Lordship will observe what Sir G. Collier states regarding the security of the navigation of the coast for our victuallers, and store and hospital ships. I beg to refer your Lordship to the Admiralty upon this point, in order that some arrangement may be adopted and ordered to be carried into execution by Adm. Martin and Sir G. Collier, one of them commanding as far north as Cape Finisterre, the other from Cape Finisterre, as he says, to the Adour.

I had before proposed that the whole coast of Spain and Portugal should be put under the command of one officer; but that arrangement, it appears, would have interfered with the ancient rule for the extent of the command of the officer in command of the Channel fleet. But as that arrangement cannot be adopted, it will be necessary for some superior authority to arrange for the relief of the vessels of war going with convoys, at a particular place; or that vessels going with convoys from here, or from the

coast of Portugal respectively, should go the whole distance which the vessels convoyed are required to go.

While writing upon this subject I beg to mention, that as the *Freya* is going to England with prisoners, it is very desirable that she should be sent back here without loss of time.

To Don Blas de Ostolaza.

Lesaca, 12th Sept. 1813.

I had the honor, yesterday, of receiving your letter of the 26th Aug., which is the only one that I have received from you.

Many events which have occurred lately, and some decisions, have given me the greatest concern; but you must be aware that in the situation which I fill, and in my quality of stranger, my duties are confined to the war against the common enemy, and I can interfere in no manner whatever in the internal concerns of the country.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Dickson, Royal artillery.

12th Sept. 1813.

Major Gen. Hay has requested that Lieut. St. Clair, of the Royal artillery, may be appointed his aide de camp till the pleasure of H. R. H. the Prince Regent may be known, and the Major General has been induced to believe you will accede to the arrangement by your admitting that Lieut. St. Clair can be spared from the duty of the corps. My Lord Wellington, with every disposition to meet the wishes of Major Gen. Hay and forward the interests of a young officer well esteemed, has conceived it fit that I should ascertain from you, previous to giving a reply, whether a special permission is not either expected or required by the Master General before officers are removed from the duties of the corps to Staff appointments which have no connexion with the artillery service.

To Lieut. Gen. the Hon. Sir W. Stewart, K.B.

Lesaca, 13th Sept. 1813.

I have read, with the attention which they deserve, your letter of the 11th, and that from — of the 8th; and I acknowledge that I feel very unwilling to draw the attention of the Sec. of State, again, to the loss of the guns in the Puerto de Maya, in order to show that they were lost going to a position to which you had ordered them by the very same road, and under the very same circumstances, under which I had stated they were lost retiring to Elizondo. I was very sorry to have lost those guns, as they are the only guns that have ever been lost by troops acting under my command; but I attributed their loss then, as I do now, to unfortunate accident to which the best arrangements must be liable, and above all, to that most unfortunate accident of your being absent when the attack was made, and —, who commanded, having been with the division only two days. But there is nothing in my report which conveys any blame to any individual; and I must say, that the correction proposed to be made of the statement, instead of proving that you and — did not differ in opinion respecting the disposal of the guns, would prove in the clearest manner that you did: I therefore must beg leave to decline to write any more to the Sec. of State upon this subject.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. May, A.A.G., Royal artillery.

13th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor to receive and have laid before the Commander of the Forces Capt. —'s report of the 12th inst., in which he states his having found

out 11 of the soldiers concerned in robbing the Spaniards, as laid to the charge of the brigade of artillery attached to the — division. His Excellency has in consequence acceded to Capt. —'s request in permitting his prosecuting the supposed offenders before the General Court Martial now sitting in the 3d division cantonments, and you are hereby authorised to liberate Capt. — from his arrest, that he may effectually perform the duty required from him. I should wish to have the substance of the offence proposed to be brought against the prisoners, and the evidence intended to be called in support of the charges to be deduced from it. One or two of the prisoners may be permitted to turn evidence should they be found necessary to substantiate the charge or charges.

P.S. The extra parades of the brigade of Royal artillery attached to the — division are dispensed with.

The A.G. to Lieut. Stirling, 42d regt.

13th Sept. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 11th inst. I have the honor to inform you that your application for leave to enter the Portuguese service was submitted to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces some time ago, and by his order referred to Marshal Beresford, who made an objection to the appointment, as he conceived that you were too junior an officer in the British service to obtain the rank of Captain in the Portuguese. However, in consideration of the losses lately sustained in officers by the latter service, his Excellency feels disposed to attend to your application when you have forwarded the Marshal's desire, as alluded to in your letter to this office.

The A.G. to F. S. Larpent, Esq., Judge Advocate General.

13th Sept. 1813.

Your letter of the 1st inst. did not reach me till yesterday. I am in hopes you will long ere this have received a letter from the Marquis of Wellington, by which it will appear to you his Excellency feels disposed to forward your exchange. I have notwithstanding forwarded to you the selection of articles of apparel you have seemed to desire, and which your friends are of opinion may be most useful to you, together with the money and animals you have specified, as recapitulated in the annexed list. It is impossible to calculate on the causes which may impede your immediate release, although I must confess the Field Marshal fully expects you will be allowed to return forthwith, on the reasonable grounds of reciprocation, as the civilians and non-combatants taken at San Sebastian have been sent to France, to which I may add the general indulgence that has been shown to the adherents and followers of the French army whom the fortune of war has thrown into the power of the allies. In national concerns personal consideration cannot always have its influence; I am, however, well pleased to find you have had an opportunity of communicating with Gen. Comte Gazan, as that officer may possibly be aware that his family, at a critical moment of contest, received useful and becoming attention from you. That you had no business to place yourself in a situation of risk is true, but the error has brought its punishment with it, and I therefore recommend your banishing any mortifying reflections on that account, and meeting your fortune with good countenance, whatever it may prove.

To Don M. de Alava.

Lesaca, 14th Sept. 1813.

I think it proper to enclose you a representation which has been made to me by Col. Harvey, a staff officer attached to the Portuguese army, of the conduct of a person employed in the *Hacienda* at Hernani, towards Marshal Beresford, the Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, in regard to quarters.

I believe that, according to the laws of Spain, no person employed in the *Hacienda* is entitled to military quarters; but at all events, if he is so, he cannot be entitled on the same rank with a Field Marshal and Captain General Commanding an Army in Chief; and to say the least of it, the

conduct of this gentleman has not been civil or conciliating towards a person of the Marshal's rank.

To the Minister at War, Cadiz.

Lesaca, 14th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Aug., in which you have explained the wishes of the Regency, and have desired to have my opinion upon a new scheme for the organization of the Spanish armies; and you have enclosed a list of General officers, from among whom the Regency have permitted me to recommend those to be appointed to command these armies, according to their new organization. I would beg the Regency to observe, that this alteration cannot be made without a repeal of the decree of the Cortes of the 6th Jan. 1813.

I am not unaware that certain inconveniences attend the existing organization of the army, which, however, are more apparent than real, and are not of a nature to be insurmountable; and I would beg leave to observe to your Excellency, that, whatever may be the nature of the advantages to be derived from the organization of the army now proposed, a saving of expense would not be one of them. Upon this point I beg to refer your Excellency to the letters which I addressed to your predecessor on the 4th and the 11th Dec. last,* in which you will find a statement of the expense of the consumption of provisions, and of the confusion from the clashing of authorities, by the appointment of a Captain General in Castille and in Estremadura, independent of the Captain General of the army.

It is, I am afraid, but too true, that great waste and confusion are the attendants on the consumption of all large armies, and that these evils augment in proportion to their size. There is no doubt of the existence of these evils to a very great degree in the Spanish armies, which is to be attributed much to the fact, that the resources of the country are not fairly applied to the support of the troops, and much to the inexperience and consequent want of ability of the persons in the employment of the *Hacienda* attached to the armies.

These evils will, of course, increase in proportion as the services to be performed by these persons will be increased. It is obvious, that a man who is not capable of superintending the provision for the consumption of 10,000 men, will not be capable of the superintendence of the provision for the consumption of 30,000; and the additional assistance which he will receive, attended as it is by the necessity for superior intelligence and

* See pp. 195, 210.

G. O.

Lesaca, 14th Sept. 1813.

3. The following extract of a letter from the Regency of Portugal to his Excellency the Commander of the Forces is published for general information:

‘We beg your Excellency will be pleased, in the name of H. R. H. the Prince Regent, to accept and communicate to the General officers, officers, and soldiers under your Excellency's command, His Royal Highness' sincere and grateful acknowledgment for the late brilliant victories which they have obtained in the field of honor, by the most heroic sacrifices in contending for the independence of his crown, the salvation of the Peninsula, and the liberty of the world.’

4. The Commanding officers of regiments are informed that tin camp kettles cost 600 *reis* each, and the bags 200 *reis* each, and these articles are to be charged at these rates to those men who may lose them.

arrangement of all the parts of the service, will only increase the confusion.

I would likewise beg leave to suggest to your Excellency, that, although the Spanish army is not without General officers capable of commanding large armies, and that the officers of the Etat Major in particular are excellent; and although the officers and soldiers of the infantry in particular have had opportunities of showing, and have shown their discipline and spirit, it still wants many essentials to constitute an army; and that much time must elapse, and the government must make itself master of large pecuniary resources, before it can hope to possess such a body.

I confess that I should not think I did my duty, either by the government or by the army, if I were to place a corps of 30,000 Spanish troops to act alone upon any particular point. There is no tract of country which could be the seat of their operations, which would be sufficient to supply the various demands with which they must necessarily come upon it under existing circumstances; and the only mode in which they can be supplied and rendered useful is, as at present, mixed in a line occupied by a larger number of men.

Thus they enjoy the resources of a country three times the extent of that which they would occupy by their own numbers. It is not impossible to assist all parts by the greater and better arranged resources of their allies in proportion as assistance may be required; and all parts of the extent of the line which it is necessary, or circumstances may render it expedient, to occupy, will be equally strong. This could not be the case under the scheme proposed by your Excellency. I would besides beg leave to suggest to your Excellency, that the proposed scheme cannot divest those officers, who will be employed to command the armies respectively in chief, of the command appertaining to the Captain General of the province in the neighbourhood of which they would act, without recalling the — title of the *Ordenanza*. Indeed it would be highly inconvenient, and, under existing circumstances, absolutely impossible, to carry on the service if they were deprived of this authority.

If, however, the government think proper to make the alteration after this letter shall have been laid before them, I will proceed to make it with due diligence.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Burgoyne, Royal Engineers.

14th Sept. 1813.

I have had the honor to receive, through my Lord FitzRoy Somerset, and submit to the Commander of the Forces, your letter of the 12th inst., containing an application for leave of absence for Mr. —, clerk of Ordnance stores, to proceed to England. In reply, I am to inform you that his Excellency has considered it expedient to decline granting any indulgence to this branch of the service till it shall be fully ascertained by whom and in what mode the accounts left in an unsettled state shall be carried forward and arranged.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir T. Graham, K.B.

Lesaca, 15th Sept. 1813, 6 P.M.

I received this day your letter of yesterday. I am very unwilling to allow any persons to return to France without exchange, whatever may be their state, as there is no instance of a similar indulgence to our people on

the part of the French, excepting one by Gen. Maucune to a Lieutenant of the 61st, for which he afterwards claimed and obtained the release of a *Commissaire des Guerres*, who had been his secretary.

What do you think of their making Col. Fenwick, and his Surgeon, sign their parole, when they passed Almandoz in July; the former being at the time delirious, and supposed to be on his death bed? and they now claim him! There can be no generous dealing with such persons.

Besides, I understand from M'Grigor, that these *estropiés*, both officers and men, have been very insolent to Mr. Gunning and the gentlemen assisting him; and I desired M'Grigor to tell Gunning to let them know that I would not allow of such conduct, and that they would receive the reverse of indulgence if it should continue.

I intended to go over to San Marcial to see the ground again, with one of the engineers, before I should fix upon what should be done there. I believe we should have a good redoubt on the left, somewhere near where the Spanish camp is, and one possibly on the right of the same height.

I saw the work on the Peña de Aya this morning, which certainly requires something in addition.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know when the pontoon train is likely to be on the road with its equipments.

An Lieut. Gén. Comte Gazan.

Au quartier général, ce 15 Sept. 1813.

Je viens d'avoir l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence m'a adressée le 13, et je vous remercie de la lettre de M. Larpent.

M. Payan, Inspecteur des Postes de l'armée Française, pris à Vitoria, a déjà passé en Angleterre, mais j'écris pour qu'on le renvoie tout de suite en France en échange pour M. Jesse. M. Robert, Commissaire, est toujours ici, et vous sera envoyé en échange pour M. Larpent.

Pour ce qui regarde le Chef d'Escadron Anthoine, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir, qu'ayant été pris par les troupes Espagnoles de la division du Gén. Mina, ce Général est en correspondance avec le Maréchal Duc d'Albufera pour un échange, que je crois être arrangé.

Le Lieut. Gén. Sir R. Hill a déjà envoyé à M. le Gén. Comte d'Erlon la liste des officiers Français qui étaient dans ce temps-là toujours ici; et j'aurai l'honneur d'en envoyer la liste de même à votre Excellence. Je vous prie aussi de me faire passer la liste des officiers des armées alliées prisonniers de guerre, qui sont toujours dans l'arrondissement de l'armée.

Si votre Excellence désirait faire l'échange de ces officiers pour des officiers de l'armée Française, prisonniers en Angleterre, plutôt que pour ceux qui sont toujours dans l'arrondissement de l'armée, je peux répondre que ceux que vous nommerez seront renvoyés en France.

Le Capitaine Le Clerc et le Sous-Lieut. La Lamre Louis sont passés en Angleterre; mais je leur envoie les lettres à leur adresse, et l'argent qui a été transmis pour eux.

The A.G. to Major Gen. Oswald, 5th division.

15th Sept. 1813.

I have submitted the request contained in your letter of the 13th inst. to the Marquis of Wellington, and am to acquaint you his Lordship has no objection that

Major Gen. — should go to Bilbao for any convenient time. I am desired, however, to express, that the Commander of the Forces has felt concern that it should be the intention of the Major General to establish his family at that place, or in that part of Spain. Should the General officers begin this practice, the example will soon be followed by others of inferior rank; and as it is certain the inhabitants of Bilbao, or any other town, will not give up quarters to ladies unrequited, very inconvenient discussions must ensue. Should any reference be made to head quarters on this subject, his Excellency will be obliged to decide that the ladies of officers, of whatever rank, are not entitled to quarters separate from their husbands. However, should it be the intention of the General to hire a house for Mrs. —, there can be no objection to her being established at Bilbao; for there is no other ground of objection to such an arrangement, except from the difficulties to be expected to arise out of the representation of the inhabitants.

The A.G. to A.A.Gs. (except the cavalry), and to Major Gen. Lord Aylmer, for his brigade. 15th Sept. 1813.

The Commanding officers of regiments have in general been solicitous to know whether the Proclamation of the 31st July is to be considered as precluding such soldiers as may be desirous to renew their engagements, for such term as they may feel disposed to serve, re-enlisting, and receiving a proportionate bounty in consequence. On this subject, which has been submitted to the Commander of the Forces, I am to observe, that as all soldiers engaged for a limited period had it in their option to re-enlist previous to the issue of the Proclamation, and that they are now compelled to serve under its influence, neither hardship can be felt by the individuals so circumstanced, nor injury suffered by the service. His Excellency has therefore decided on referring the case to the Horse Guards for decision, as on it depends the class of service of so large a proportion of this army; although it is hardly to be doubted the soldiers now serving under the Proclamation will be allowed to re-enlist, and receive bounty accordingly.

The A.G. to Lieut. Col. Bouverie, A.A.G., 1st division.

15th Sept. 1813.

His Excellency has received a letter from the Chief of the Staff of the French army, proposing to exchange the Judge Advocate, Mr. Larpent, against M. Robert, *Commissaire des guerres*. As no such person appears in the nominal list of prisoners, which solely includes officers who bore arms, I have to request you will ascertain, and communicate to me, for my Lord Wellington's information, in what manner M. Robert was disposed of.

APPENDIX

TO

THE SIXTH VOLUME.

No. I. (Vol. V. p. 682.)

Le général de division Gazan, chef d'état major de l'armée du Midi, au Duc de Feltre,
Ministre de la Guerre. Seville, le 5 Juin, 1812.

Depuis la reconnaissance poussée par le général Sir Stapleton Cotton sur Usagre, le 11 Avril dernier, les divisions Anglaises restées en Estramadure sous les ordres du général Hill n'avaient fait aucun mouvement ; mais dans les premiers jours du mois le lieutenant-général Graham l'ayant renforcé par deux autres divisions d'infanterie, et une brigade de cavalerie, le lieutenant-général Hill partit le 13 d'Almendralejo pour se porter avec une partie de son ancien corps vers le Tage, dans la direction d'Almaraz.

S. E. M. le Duc de Dalmatie, commandant en chef l'armée du Midi, instruit de ce mouvement, donna sur-le-champ l'ordre au général Comte d'Erlon, dont toutes les troupes étaient dispersées dans les villages de la Serena, pour pouvoir vivre avec plus de facilité, de les réunir à Castuera, et de se porter sur les derrières du général Hill, afin de le forcer à revenir sur ses pas, ou de le compromettre, s'il s'obstinait à poursuivre le mouvement qu'il avait commencé.

Le général en chef réunit en même temps, dans la province de Cordoue, un autre corps de troupes pour soutenir au besoin le Comte d'Erlon ; mais aux premiers mouvemens que fit ce général sur la gauche de l'ennemi, et à l'apparition de la cavalerie à Ribera et Don Benito, d'où tous les avant-postes ennemis furent culbutés et chassés, le général Hill arrêta son mouvement et se replia sur Merida en abandonnant l'opération qu'il avait entreprise contre le fort de Mirabete.

La diversion que le général en chef s'était proposée de faire en faveur de l'armée de Portugal ayant parfaitement réussi, le général Hill vint rétablir son quartier-général à Almendralejo ; ses troupes reprirent leurs anciennes positions, et celles de renforts que lui avait conduites le général Graham se replièrent sur Portalegre ; leur mouvement fut terminé le 30 Mai.

Le général en chef fit rentrer toutes les troupes qu'il avait rassemblées pour s'opposer aux opérations du général Hill, et le Comte d'Erlon établit, le 27 Mai, son quartier-général à Fuente Ovejuna, afin d'être mieux à même de surveiller les mouvemens des ennemis en Estramadure, et de s'opposer avec plus de succès aux opérations qu'ils paraissaient vouloir entreprendre sur l'Andalousie ; ses avant-postes restèrent à Don Benito, sur la Guadiana, d'où ils communiquaient fréquemment avec la gauche de l'armée de Portugal à Maguilla, Valencia de las Torres, &c.

No. II. (Vol. V. p. 715.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre. Ce 15 Juin, 1812.

Depuis plusieurs jours l'ennemi faisait des mouvemens en Estramadure ; les émissaires confirmaient que les généraux Anglais recevaient fréquemment de nouveaux renforts, et qu'ils se disposaient à entrer en opérations. Pour fixer nos idées à cet égard, M. le général de brigade Lallemand reçut ordre de se porter en reconnaissance avec quatre escadrons des 17^e et 27^e régimens de dragons en avant de Maguilla, pour éclairer les directions de Ribera et Los Santos, par Llera et Usagre.

Le 11 au matin, le général Lallemand sortit de Maguilla, et se porta sur Va-

lencia de las Torres, d'où il détacha ses éclaireurs sur Llera. Ils étaient près d'arriver dans ce dernier endroit, lorsqu'ils aperçurent une forte colonne de cavalerie Anglaise qui se dirigeait sur Valencia. Le général Lallemand fit aussitôt des dispositions pour repasser le défilé de Maguilla, en avant duquel il se trouvait ; mais, pressé vivement par l'ennemi, il prit le sage parti de faire face. Deux de ses escadrons furent d'abord ramenés ; le 27^e de dragons, qui était en réserve, s'avança aussitôt, enfonça les escadrons Anglais, et facilita le ralliement des deux escadrons du 17^e régiment, qui vinrent à leur tour soutenir le 27^e. La mêlée dura plus d'un quart d'heure, et l'ennemi céda le terrain à nos dragons, qui le poursuivirent plus d'une lieue, et lui firent 130 prisonniers, dont plusieurs officiers. Plus de 60 Anglais sont restés sur le champ de bataille, parmi lesquels 3 officiers, dont l'un paraît être d'un grade supérieur.

Le général Lallemand, après avoir fait ramasser tous les blessés, les fit transporter à Maguilla, où il se retira pour faire reposer les hommes et les chevaux. Le but de son expédition étant atteint, il rentra le 12 au matin à la Granja, où il reprit sa position ; 96 autres prisonniers et 3 officiers furent en même temps dirigés sur Fuente Ovejuna, au quartier de M. le Comte d'Erlon.

Notre perte a été 2 dragons, 3 chevaux tués, et 15 blessés. Le 27^e de dragons a eu un officier tué, 2 blessés, 10 sous-officiers et dragons blessés, un dragon et un cheval pris. L'aide de camp du général Lallemand a aussi été pris dans la première charge.

La perte de l'ennemi est évaluée à 300 hommes, et au moins à autant de chevaux hors de combat, y compris 150 qu'on lui a pris. Les forces étaient le double des nôtres, et se composaient des 1^{re} et 3^e régiments de dragons sous les ordres du général Slade, lequel, sur l'avis de la marche du général Lallemand, était parti de Ribera, dans l'espoir de surprendre notre cavalerie, et avait manœuvré de manière à l'engager dans une embuscade où il s'était placé près de Llera, mais, découvert par nos éclaireurs, il se confia à la supériorité de ses forces, et fut battu.

Cette affaire fait honneur au général Lallemand et aux 17^e et 27^e régiments de dragons qui étaient sous ses ordres.

No. III. (p. 23.)

Le général de division Treillard au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Albacete, ce 22 Août, 1812.

Les marches continuelles qu'a faites ma division depuis l'affaire qu'elle a eue le 11 de ce mois avec l'avant-garde de l'armée Anglaise, m'ont empêché d'adresser plus tôt à V. E. le rapport que j'ai l'honneur de lui présenter aujourd'hui.

Le 10, à 1 heure du matin, je reçus à Naval Carnero l'ordre d'aller, avec ma division, occuper les villages de Majadahonda et de Las Rozas, afin de m'assurer, par des reconnaissances, si le corps de l'armée Anglaise, venant de Ségovie, avait passé le Guadarrama. La division Italienne, commandé par le général Palombini, occupait en arrière de moi le village de Boadilla, et le quartier-général de S. M. C. se trouvait à Alcorcon. Le 11, avant le jour, j'ordonnai à la 1^{re} brigade de ma division, composée du 13^e et du 18^e de dragons, qui occupait Las Rozas, de faire éclairer les routes de Galapagar, Torrelodones, et Colmenar, sur lesquelles elle rencontra l'avant garde de l'armée du Lord Wellington, composée de 3 bataillons d'infanterie, 5 pièces d'artillerie, et 1200 chevaux, qui descendait les montagnes.

Cette brigade soutint avec fermeté l'attaque de l'avant-garde ennemie ; je lui envoyai l'ordre de se replier sur la 2^{de} brigade, conformément à celui que j'avais reçu de me retirer sur la division Palombini, dans le cas où je serais attaqué par des forces supérieures. Cet officier-général, que j'avais prévenu de mon mouvement, m'envoya de suite un renfort composé du régiment de dragons Napoléon, et des lanciers ; je fis porter de suite ceux-ci en avant, avec les tirailleurs, tandis que M. le général Schiasetti, commandant ces deux corps, envoya par mon ordre une reconnaissance dans la direction de l'Escorial, pour couvrir mon flanc gauche pendant ma retraite sur Boadilla. Cette marche rétrograde se fit dans le plus grand ordre, sous le feu de 5 pièces d'artillerie, et à la vue de 12 à 14 escadrons, et de 3 à 4 bataillons Anglais. La division prit 4 heures pour faire une retraite d'une lieue et demie, depuis Las Rozas à Boadilla, où l'ennemi, à qui je fis tirer quelques coups de canon, cessa de nous suivre. La division du général Palom-

bini s'étant déjà retirée de Boadilla, je pris position à un quart de lieue en arrière de ce village, où j'attendais de nouveaux ordres.

A 2 heures après midi, S. M. désirant s'assurer d'une manière positive quelle était la force de l'ennemi de ce côté du Guadarrama, et connaître le nombre de troupes qui se disposait à suivre cette avant-garde, m'envoya l'ordre de reprendre ma position du matin, et de pousser vivement l'ennemi pour lui faire des prisonniers. Au reçu de cet ordre, et sans attendre un renfort d'une brigade d'infanterie et de 6 pièces de canon, qui devaient marcher avec moi, je partis avec ma division, qui brûlait d'impatience de se mesurer avec les Anglais. J'arrivai à Majadahonda, où l'ennemi avait pris, à un quart de lieue en avant du village, une position avantageuse, soutenue par 4 pièces en batterie : j'ordonnai de suite de l'attaquer. M. le colonel Reizet, commandant la 1^{re} brigade, chargea à la tête du 13^e soutenu par le 18^e de dragons. Trois pièces furent enlevées en un instant ; de nombreux escadrons ennemis chargèrent avec une valeur et une opiniâtreté sans égale pour les reprendre ; trois fois la brigade fut ramenée, et trois fois elle retourne à la charge ; accablée par le nombre, elle était forcée de se retirer, lorsque j'ordonnai aux deux premiers escadrons de la 2^e brigade de charger : l'ennemi fut culbuté ; mais, arrivé sur les hauteurs qui dominent Las Rosas, ils y trouvèrent plusieurs escadrons réunis, qui les obligèrent à une retraite qui nous aurait fait perdre le fruit de cette journée, si je ne les avais fait soutenir par la seconde ligne, composée des 22^e et 19^e de dragons, et du régiment de dragons Napoléon qui formait ma réserve, à la tête desquels chargèrent M. le général Schiasetti, le colonel Rozat, le colonel Maranessi, M. le capitaine Pitard. Cette charge, aussi vigoureuse que faite à propos, eut un succès complet, et l'ennemi se retira dans le plus grand désordre.

Outre les 3 pièces d'artillerie enlevées par la 1^{re} brigade, et que la 2^e empêcha d'être reprises, de nombreux bagages et plus de 200 chevaux tombèrent au pouvoir de la division ; 2 lieutenans colonels blessés, avec une soixantaine de prisonniers, furent ramenés au quartier-général. Un officier supérieur, et plus de 150 Anglais et Portugais, restèrent étendus sur le champ de bataille ; enfin, la perte de l'ennemi peut être évaluée à 700 ou 800 hommes tués, prisonniers, ou hors de combat. Je ne doute pas que cette belle affaire n'ait puissamment contribué à retarder la marche de l'ennemi et à assurer la tranquillité de la nôtre.

Ce combat de cavalerie est un des plus beaux et des plus extraordinaires qui aient eu lieu, tant par la valeur que par l'acharnement qu'on y montra des deux côtés. Tous les régimens de ma division, celui des dragons Napoléon et les lanciers, ont rivalisé de zèle et d'intrépidité.

Je ne puis trop faire l'éloge de la valeur, du sang-froid, et des connaissances militaires qu'a montrés M. le colonel Reizet, qui, dans la retraite du matin, a soutenu seul, à la tête de la 1^{re} brigade qu'il commande, tous les efforts de l'ennemi. Cet officier, dans la charge du soir, a été blessé de trois coups de sabre. M. le général Schiasetti, et MM. les colonels Rozat, Barb, et Maranessi, se sont conduits, pendant toute l'affaire, de la manière la plus brillante. J'ai également à me louer des officiers de mon état-major, qui, par leur zèle et leur dévouement, m'ont parfaitement secondé dans cette journée. Je joins ici l'état des officiers pour lesquels je réclame les bontés de S. M. l'Empereur. Je supplie votre Excellence de vouloir bien appuyer ces demandes près de S. M. C.

No. IV. (p. 49.)

Proclamation du Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie.

Seville, le 15 Août, 1812.

Soldats ! Nous célébrons aujourd'hui l'anniversaire de la naissance de S. M. l'Empereur et Roi, notre Souverain. Cet anniversaire offre à notre esprit des idées agréables, et nous rappelle nos devoirs. Notre Empereur est à l'autre extrémité de l'Europe : il combat pour obliger nos ennemis à faire la paix et à respecter dorénavant les traités qu'ils auront signés.

Placé à cette énorme distance, S. M. a jeté les yeux sur son armée du Midi ; elle a prévu les résultats, et pris des mesures pour nous faire connaître la confiance qu'elle met en nous. Nous allons marcher pour venger l'échec éprouvé par une de ces armées dans une autre partie de la Péninsule.

Soldats, obéissez à la voix de vos chefs. Votre courage surmontera tous les obstacles, et résistera à toutes les fatigues.

Respectez les personnes et les propriétés : les habitans du midi ont admiré votre discipline : donnez un semblable exemple partout où vous porterez vos pas. Le jour viendra où les Espagnols actuellement armés contre nous deviendront nos amis. Leurs véritables intérêts, le temps, la réflexion, opéreront un salutaire changement dans leurs idées. Il n'est pas naturel de penser qu'ils puissent conserver leur amitié pour les ennemis de leur propriété et de leur indépendance.

Aucun établissement ne sera détruit, pas même nos nombreux magasins. Les Andalous savent bien comment ils pourront nous les conserver, et se rappelleront que nous reviendrons leur demander compte de la manière dont ils auront été conservés.

Que tout ce qui n'est pas utile pour la marche ou le combat disparaisse. Les mouvemens de l'armée doivent être libres de tout ce qui serait superflu. Il doit être publié un règlement à ce sujet, ainsi que sur la discipline et l'ordre de la marche. Quiconque manquera sur ces points sera puni suivant toute la rigueur des lois : une commission militaire sera établie à cet effet.

No. V. (p. 102.)

Decreto de 22 de Setiembre de 1812.

Siendo indispensable para la mas pronta y segura destruccion del enemigo comun que haya unidad en los planes y operaciones de los exercitos aliados en la Péninsula, y no pudiendo conseguirse tan importante objeto sin que un solo general mande en gefe todas las tropas Españolas de la misma, las Cortes generales y extraordinarias, attendida la urgente necesidad de aprovechar los gloriosos triunfos de las armas aliadas, y las favorables circunstancias que van acelerando el deseado momento de poner fin à los males que han afligido à la nacion; y apreciando en gran manera los distinguidos talentos y relevantes servicios del Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, capitán general de los exercitos nacionales, han venido en decretar, y decretan : Que durante la cooperacion de las fuerzas aliadas en la defensa de la misma Península, se le confiera el mando en gefe de todos ellos, exerciéndolo conforme à las ordenanzas generales sin mas diferencia que hacerse, como respecto del mencionado Duque se hace por el presente decreto extensivo à todas las provincias de la Península cuanto proviene el Artículo VI., título I. tratado VII. de ellas debiendo aquel illustre caudillo entenderse con el gobièrno Español por la Secretaria del Despacho universal de la Guerra. Tendrálo entendido la Regencia del Reino, y despondrá lo necesario para su cumplimiento, haciéndolo imprimir, publicar, y circular. Dado en Cadiz á 22 de Setiembre, de 1812. *Andres Angel de la Vega Infanzon*, Presidente; *Juan Nicario Gallego*, Deputado Secretario; *Juan Bernardo O. Gavaro*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. lib. 2, fol. 64.

No. VI. (pp. 135-167.)

RELATING TO THE SIEGE OF BURGOS AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

Le général Souham au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre. Briviesca, le 2 Oct. 1812.

Par votre lettre du 6 Oct. vous m'annoncez que le Duc de Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que le Roi allait se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En conséquence de ces mouvemens, je résolu de marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18, toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les positions ainsi qu'il suit : la droite à Temiño, le centre sur les hauteurs de Monasterio, et la gauche à Villa Escusa la Solana et Villa Escusa la Sombria. La journée du 20 devait être celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à l'instant, à 2 heures du matin, par un aide de camp, une lettre de S. M. C., qui m'ordonne de ne point engager d'affaire générale, et d'attendre que par ses manœuvres Lord Wellington soit forcé d'évacuer sa position de Burgos ; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, et non sans un violent chagrin ; car je puis assurer V. E. que mon armée était parfaitement disposée, et que j'aurais pu combattre l'ennemi avec avantage. Cependant l'armée n'a des vivres que pour quatre jours, et à cette époque, si Lord Wellin-

ton n'est point en retraite, je serai forcé de l'attaquer. J'entrevois moins de péril de marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le moral du soldat commence à se raffermir, tout mouvement en arrière produit le plus mauvais effet.

Rapport de l'Armée de Portugal et du Nord de l'Espagne.

Depuis les derniers événemens militaires survenus dans le nord d'Espagne entre l'armée de Portugal et l'armée Anglaise, il ne s'est passé aucun fait important. L'armée Française, après une marche habilement combinée, qui a trompé les calculs de l'ennemi, et dans laquelle on n'a pas perdu une seule voiture, a été ramenée dans le plus grand ordre à Valladolid, et de là sous les murs de Burgos. Le général Clausel, qui commandait provisoirement l'armée, a su, dans le cours même de cette marche, pourvoir à tous les besoins, réunir et conserver toutes les ressources de l'armée, disputer pas à pas le terrain à l'ennemi, et lui imposer au point de rester maître de ses mouvemens.

Lord Wellington avait paru un instant abandonner toute idée d'opérations offensives devant l'armée de Portugal ; mais bientôt il reporta de nouveau ses efforts du côté de Burgos. Le 17 Sept. l'armée Anglaise se dirigea sur cette place ; l'armée de Portugal prit position à quelques lieues en arrière de la ville, laissant le fort approvisionné de tout ce qui était nécessaire à sa défense, avec une garnison suffisante commandée par le général Dubreton.

Le 19 l'ennemi commença ses opérations par l'attaque du Mont S^t Michel, position défendue par un commencement de fortifications, ou plutôt par quelques ouvrages en terre non terminés. Quoique l'on n'y eût laissé qu'un faible détachement, l'ennemi éprouva une vigoureuse résistance ; il ne se rendit maître des ouvrages qu'après de longs efforts, et avec une perte de plus de 400 hommes, tant tués que blessés.

L'ennemi fit ensuite ses dispositions pour attaquer le fort même de Burgos. Pendant trois semaines, il a livré à ce fort plusieurs assauts, qui ont été constamment repoussés : à l'attaque du 23 Sept. il paraît n'avoir pas perdu moins de 2000 à 2500 hommes ; à celle qui a eu lieu le 11 Oct., les Ecossais du 42^e régt. ont été très-maltraités, et ont perdu beaucoup de monde. Le 14 Oct. le fort continuait de se défendre avec vigueur.

L'armée Française, à cette époque, ayant reçu les renforts qu'elle attendait, se préparait à reprendre l'offensive, et à dégager le fort de Burgos ; mais avant même l'arrivée de ces renforts, elle n'avait pas cessé d'inquiéter l'ennemi, et de lui faire éprouver journellement des pertes plus ou moins considérables. Le 29 Sept. le général Clausel avait fait pousser plusieurs reconnaissances dont le résultat mérite d'être connu.

L'une de ces reconnaissances fut dirigée par le général Foy, qui, à la tête de la 1^{re} division, se porta sur Poza, où il trouva et détruisit un bataillon Espagnol. Le 6^e d'infanterie légère, commandé par le lieutenant colonel Frossard, surprit ce bataillon dès la pointe du jour au milieu de la place : tout ce qui voulut résister fut tué ; le reste, au nombre de 200 hommes, fut fait prisonnier.

Le général Maucune, qui se trouvait à l'avant-garde de l'armée à Briviesca, se porta avec sa cavalerie légère sur Monasterio ; il rencontra à Pradanos plusieurs escadrons des chevaux-légers de l'armée Anglaise, les chargea avec vivacité, et les poussa jusqu'à Monasterio. Le chef d'escadron Talman, du 1^{er} régt. de hussards, se distingua dans cette circonstance ; M. Lachapelle, aide de camp du général Maucune, fit lui-même plusieurs prisonniers, et eut un cheval tué sous lui.

Deux autres reconnaissances furent poussées sur Carrias et Villa Franca par la 3^e division et la division de dragons ; mais les troupes Espagnoles qui occupaient ces deux points n'attendirent point nos troupes, et se retirèrent à leur approche.

Le 2 Oct. il y eut un engagement entre 2000 Espagnols de l'avant-garde de l'armée Anglaise et la brigade du général Gautier aux environs de Pradanos.

A cette époque, Lord Wellington avait son quartier-général à Villa Toro ; celui de Castaños était à Quintanilla.

L'armée de Portugal, renforcée et parfaitement rétablie, n'attendait plus pour se porter en avant que la première nouvelle de la diversion que les armées du Centre et du Midi, réunies sous les ordres directs de S. M. C., devaient opérer de leur côté.

La désunion commence à se glisser entre quelques chefs de l'armée Espagnole. Porlier a abandonné Mendizabal ; tous n'approuvent pas les opérations des Anglais. Les habitans de la Castille voient avec peine l'évacuation sur Rodrigo et le Portugal de beaucoup d'objets pris à Madrid, et l'enlèvement des grains de toutes les provinces, pour être dirigés par convois vers le Portugal ; mesure qui annonce que les Anglais eux-mêmes ne comptent pas faire un long séjour en Espagne. Les Anglais ne paient rien dans le pays ; ils délivrent des bons ou des reçus pour les fournitures qui leur sont faites. Cette manière de payer déplaît fortement aux paysans, qui espéraient mieux de ceux qui se disent leurs libérateurs.

Le général de division Caffarelli au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Briviesca, ce 21 Oct. 1812.

Depuis hier nous sommes en présence ; l'armée de Portugal occupe les hauteurs de Monasterio, et nous voyons les camps des ennemis.

Les deux armées de Portugal et du Nord peuvent être en ligne dans les 24 heures. Notre cavalerie est très-belle ; l'artillerie, nombreuse, est en très-bon état.

Hier, après-midi, nous avons replié tous les avant-postes de l'ennemi. Nos soldats ont montré beaucoup d'ardeur ; le canon a dû être entendu du fort de Burgos, qui fait toujours une défense très opiniâtre, et qui a fait éprouver à l'ennemi, d'après tous les rapports, une perte de plus de 4000 hommes. On ajoute que les ennemis ayant mis en batterie 4 pièces de 24, elles ont été aussitôt démontées, à la réserve d'une, qui même ne tire plus ; les ennemis ont perdu plusieurs officiers de marque, notamment un major Lawrie, du 79^{me} régt. (Écossais.)

J'espère que le fort sera bientôt dégagé, et je demanderai alors à V. E., en lui faisant connaître le journal du siège, une récompense honorable pour le général Dubreton, et pour les officiers et soldats qui se sont si vaillamment comportés.

Le général de division Thiébault au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Vitoria, ce 23 Oct. 1812, à 9 heures du soir.

Les armées de Portugal et du Nord sont entrées hier à 6 heures du matin à Burgos. Vers 2 heures du soir, et après l'échange de quelques coups de canon, l'ennemi a passé le ravin de Buniel, et s'est mis en pleine retraite, ce qui achève de prouver que les armées du Centre et du Midi arrivent.

Ce mouvement change naturellement toute la situation du nord d'Espagne, et le rôle des armées du Nord et de Portugal.

Le général Comte Caffarelli au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Burgos, ce 23 Oct. 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. E. que nous attendions d'un moment à l'autre le moment favorable pour marcher en avant, et dégager le fort de Burgos. Le 20, nous fîmes une reconnaissance, dont j'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte.

Le 22, plusieurs corps d'infanterie et de cavalerie, parmi lesquels se trouvaient le 15^e régt. de chasseurs à cheval, les lanciers de Berg, et la légion de gendarmerie, appartenans à l'armée du Nord, ainsi que le 1^{er} régt. de hussards et le 31^e régt. de chasseurs, furent placés à l'extrême droit de l'armée ; l'infanterie de l'armée du Nord avait sa tête à Briviesca, et sa gauche à Pancorbo ; les dernières troupes de Portugal n'étaient qu'à une demi-lieue de Briviesca. Je m'attendais, d'un instant à l'autre, que le général Souham se déterminerait à attaquer l'armée Anglaise.

Hier matin, à 11 heures, nous fûmes instruits qu'elle était en pleine retraite. Nous nous sommes aussitôt mis en mouvement. Une affaire d'arrière-garde a eu lieu en avant de Burgos, vers 5 heures du soir, et on a fait quelques prisonniers. Les ennemis, en levant le siège de Burgos, ont abandonné deux pièces de 6 et un obusier encloué.

Je suis arrivé de ma personne à Burgos hier au soir. Je rencontrai en route un courrier du général Souham, chargé d'aller annoncer à V. E. que les ennemis étaient en retraite. Je ne me permis pas de l'arrêter pour écrire à V. E., et surtout pour lui annoncer la levée du siège de Burgos ; j'aurais pu le faire si son départ eût été retardé.

Il paraît que les ennemis se sont déterminés à un mouvement rétrograde, par l'arrivée du secours de l'armée du Nord, et par la nouvelle qu'ils ont reçue d'une bataille perdue sur le Tage par le général Hill.

J'aurais peine à exprimer à V. E. toute la joie que j'ai éprouvée à revoir la garnison du fort de Burgos, et le brave général Dubreton, qui y commandait. Jè viens de parcourir le terrain : chaque pas laisse la preuve de ce que peuvent faire des troupes bien dirigées et animées d'un bon esprit. Tout ce qui était nécessaire à la défense a été prévu, et tout a été employé, parce que les ordres ont été donnés avec discernement, que leur exécution a été suivie avec persévérance, et que chacun s'est empressé d'y obéir par devoir, par honneur, par zèle, par attachement et dévouement à S. M.

Le général Dubreton et la garnison du fort méritent des récompenses ; je les sollicite de V. E. Le journal que je vais avoir l'honneur de mettre sous vos yeux, vous prouvera, Monseigneur, combien ont acquis de titres à la bienveillance de S. M. les officiers et soldats de cette garnison. J'attends, ce matin, l'arrivée des deux divisions d'infanterie et de l'artillerie, et je vais continuer à appuyer l'armée de Portugal, jusqu'à ce que je sache qu'elle n'a plus besoin de moi.

Le général Comte Caffarelli au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Burgos, ce 23 Oct. 1812.

V. E. sait que le fort de Burgos est construit en terre ; ce fort vient de soutenir un siège de 35 jours ; et s'il eût été attaqué avec les moyens prescrits par les règles ordinaires, ce fort aurait succombé. Les ennemis ont fait des brèches au moyen de boulets creux ; et à la faveur des éboulemens que l'explosion des boulets a occasionnés, les ennemis ont pu tenter 5 assauts.

Je dois à la vérité de dire que la défense a été tellement opiniâtre, qu'une partie des palissades du camp retranché a été entièrement hachée par les balles à un pied et demi de terre, et que ce n'est que par la bravoure des troupes que cette partie, la plus foible du camp retranché, n'a point été enlevée par l'ennemi logé sur la crête du glacis.

Nota. Des ordres ont été donnés par le général Comte Caffarelli à M. le chef de bataillon Pinot, directeur du génie à Burgos, pour les réparations du fort, du camp retranché, et du Mont St. Michel.

Le général Comte Caffarelli au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Cigales, près Valladolid, ce 30 Oct. 1812.

J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à V. E. de la levée du siège de Burgos, et de la retraite de l'armée Anglaise de devant cette ville, le 22 de ce mois.

L'armée de Portugal se mit en devoir de la poursuivre, et j'appuyai son mouvement. Dès la veille, la cavalerie était entrée en ligne. Le 23, cette cavalerie, et deux autres régimens qui appartiennent à l'armée du Nord, la cavalerie légère et les dragons de l'armée de Portugal, rencontrèrent près Villodrigo l'arrière-garde ennemie ; elle fut chargée à fond par la gendarmerie, le 15^e de chasseurs, et les lanciers de Berg : jamais charge ne fut plus brillante ni plus décidée. La mêlée fut terrible, et coûta à l'ennemi plus de 300 hommes. Par une fatalité que l'on ne peut concevoir, la division de dragons qui était en ligne à la droite de ces corps, et devait les soutenir, se porta au grand trot sur la droite, et disparut. Si elle les eût appuyés, la cavalerie Anglaise était détruite, deux bataillons Anglais qui étaient formés en carré dans Villodrigo étaient pris, et l'on assure que Lord Wellington et le Prince d'Orange se trouvaient dans la carré.

Malgré ce contre-temps, notre cavalerie continua à se battre avec le plus grand succès, enfonça les deux lignes, fit des prisonniers ; et lorsqu'elle se rallia et voulut fournir une seconde charge, l'ennemi la refusa et se retira en toute hâte. Elle avait devant elle la meilleure cavalerie Anglaise.

A la droite, le 1^{er} de hussards et le 31^e de chasseurs manœuvrèrent pour tourner la gauche de l'ennemi. Les difficultés du chemin et du terrain ne permirent qu'au premier de charger le 16^e régt. de dragons légers, où il fit des prisonniers, entr'autres le colonel, et le mit en fuite.

V. E. jugera de l'acharnement avec lequel on s'est battu, lorsqu'elle apprendra que le brave colonel Beteille et 6 officiers de la légion de gendarmerie ont été blessés ; que, dans le 15^e régt. de chasseurs, le colonel et tous les officiers, excepté deux, ont reçu des coups de sabre ou des contusions ; et que les lanciers de Berg ont eu, dans leur escadron, plusieurs officiers blessés.

J'ai demandé les noms des militaires qui se sont plus particulièrement distingués : j'aurai l'honneur de les soumettre à V. E. Toute l'armée a donné les plus grands

éloges à la conduite des troupes de l'armée du Nord. Je ne me permets de parler que de celle-ci : le général en chef de l'armée de Portugal fera connaître en détail à V. E. ce que concerne son armée.

Le 25, M. de Toll, chef d'escadron des lanciers de Berg, rencontra près de Palencia la queue d'un convoi, la défit, enleva 400 hommes et beaucoup d'équipages.

L'ennemi, en se retirant de Torquemada, prit position derrière le Carrion et la Pisuerga, et rompit tous les ponts. Il s'est porté ensuite derrière Cabezon, position formidable ; a rompu le pont de Valladolid ; a réuni ses forces à Cabezon, et a fait filer ses équipages sur Puente de Duero et sur Tudela. Les gués de la Pisuerga ont été sondés. L'infanterie aurait eu de l'eau jusqu'aux épaules. On a manœuvré sur Simancas et Tordesillas ; et alors Lord Wellington s'est décidé à évacuer Cabezon, dont il a fait sauter le pont hier matin. Je vais à Valladolid, dont on répare le pont ; celui de Cabezon exigera du temps, parce que l'arche a au moins 55 pieds ; qu'il ne s'y trouve ni matériaux ni ouvriers.

L'armée de Portugal part aujourd'hui pour prendre position sur le Duero. J'ai dû la suivre jusqu'ici. Sous deux ou trois jours, je me mettrai en marche pour rentrer dans le territoire de l'armée.

Le général Comte Souham au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Tordesillas, ce 1 Nov. 1812.

Lorsque je suis arrivé à l'armée de Portugal pour en prendre le commandement, elle occupait des cantonnemens entre la rive droite de l'Ebre et Briviesca. Voulant forcer l'ennemi à lever le siège de Burgos, que couvrait l'armée Anglaise, j'ai donné l'ordre à l'armée de se réunir pour se porter en avant. Le 18 Oct. elle s'est mise en marche, et a été suivie par un corps d'infanterie et de cavalerie de l'armée du Nord, sous les ordres de M. le général Caffarelli. Le quartier-général a été établi à Briviesca. L'avant-garde de l'armée a occupé les villages de Quintanavides et de S^{ta} Olalla, que l'ennemi a été forcé d'évacuer, et où on lui a fait bon nombre de prisonniers.

Dans la nuit du 18 au 19 l'ennemi a abandonné Monasterio, et a indiqué, par son mouvement de retraite, qu'il renonce à l'espoir de pouvoir défendre la belle position qui domine ce village, et qui a été occupée immédiatement par nos troupes. J'ai voulu alors reconnaître la position qu'avait choisie l'armée Anglaise, et, en conséquence, le 20 au matin j'ai donné l'ordre à M. le général Maucune, commandant l'avant-garde de l'armée, de se porter, avec les 5^e et 8^e divisions, et une partie de la cavalerie légère, à Quintanapalla, et d'en chasser l'ennemi ; ce qui a été exécuté sur le champ, et avec succès. Ce mouvement a mis à découvert l'armée Anglaise, qui était campée sur les hauteurs en arrière d'Olmos et de Quintanapalla. Après avoir observé les manœuvres inquiètes de ses divisions, j'ai fait prendre position à l'armée sur les hauteurs en avant de Monasterio, la droite à Temiño, et la gauche à Fresno de Ribera. L'ennemi connaissant alors l'impossibilité de continuer plus long-temps les efforts infructueux qu'il avait faits pour s'emparer du fort de Burgos, s'est décidé à la retraite, qu'il a commencé à effectuer dans la nuit du 21 au 22. L'armée s'est mise sur le champ à sa poursuite, la droite dirigée sur Villalon, et est entrée le même jour dans Burgos. On a trouvé à Villatoro deux pièces de canon de 18, que l'ennemi avait été forcé d'abandonner.

Le 23, au matin, l'armée a continué sa marche sur les traces de l'armée Anglaise. L'avant-garde, qui l'avait poursuivie la veille jusqu'à San Mames, et lui avait enlevé une pièce de canon de 8, n'a pas tardé à la joindre. La brigade de cavalerie légère, sous les ordres de M. le colonel Shée, s'est précipitée sur l'ennemi, et l'a mis en pleine déroute. Dans cette affaire brillante, M. le colonel Shée a montré beaucoup d'intrépidité et de sang froid. Une seconde charge, exécutée quelque temps après par la brigade de cavalerie commandée par M. le colonel Merlin, a achevé de mettre le désordre dans les rangs ennemis. L'armée Anglaise, pressée si vivement, a senti alors la nécessité de soutenir la retraite d'une de ses colonnes qui suivait la route de Castroxeriz, et qui allait se trouver débordée. Son arrière-garde a été renforcée de toute sa cavalerie, et elle a ralenti son mouvement à la hauteur de Celada. J'ai donné de suite l'ordre à la brigade de cavalerie de l'armée du Nord de se porter en avant et de charger l'ennemi, qui, malgré la supériorité de nombre, a été culbuté aussitôt qu'attaqué, et a abandonné le champ de bataille, qu'il a laissé couvert de morts et de blessés. La cavalerie de l'armée du

Nord s'est couverte de gloire dans cette journée. M. le colonel Beteille, commandant la légion de gendarmerie, et M. le colonel Faverot, commandant le 15^e de chasseurs, ainsi que le commandant des lanciers, se sont particulièrement distingués. Le premier a été grièvement blessé, et le second a reçu plusieurs coups de sabre. On a continué de poursuivre vivement l'ennemi, auquel on a fait quelques centaines de prisonniers. La nuit seule a suspendu nos succès.

L'armée a pris position le soir à Villodrigo. Le lendemain, à la pointe du jour, elle s'est remise en marche. Le grand nombre de prisonniers faits à l'ennemi, et celui de ses déserteurs, prouvaient assez que sa retraite se faisait avec une précipitation qui entraînait le désordre. Il a cherché alors à arrêter notre marche victorieuse par tous les obstacles que la nature du pays pouvait nous présenter. Le pont de Torquemada, défendu un instant par son artillerie, a été bientôt en notre pouvoir, malgré le désavantage qu'offrait la position.

Après une canonnade de peu de durée, l'ennemi a été obligé de se retirer précipitamment sur Dueñas. L'avant-garde l'a poursuivi jusqu'à Baños. Le quartier-général a été transféré à Magaz, et la droite de l'armée, sous les ordres de M. le général Foy, a été dirigée de Torquemada sur Palencia.

Le 25, au matin, M. le général Maucune a poussé une reconnaissance sur la route de Dueñas, et s'est assuré que l'armée Anglaise occupait les hauteurs en avant de cette ville, son front couvert par le Carrion, et ayant de forts détachemens chargés de défendre l'approche des ponts de San Isidro et de Villa Muriel. M. le général Maucune a fait attaquer vivement la tête du pont de Villa Muriel par la 5^e division. L'ennemi a été culbuté et rejeté en un instant de l'autre côté de la rivière. Déjà nos troupes s'élançaient sur le pont, lorsque l'explosion d'un fourneau de mines, qui y avait été préparé, a renversé une des arches, et a arrêté la marche de la colonne qui allait s'en emparer. J'ai senti la nécessité de forcer promptement l'ennemi à évacuer le pont de San Isidro, qui était également miné, et j'ai donné l'ordre de passer la Pisuerga au pont au-dessous de Baños ; mais ce pont a sauté au moment où ce mouvement allait s'exécuter. Cependant, le fourneau n'ayant pas produit entièrement son effet, la portion de l'arche qui n'avait pas été détruite a donné le moyen de faire passer de suite, sur la rive gauche, quelques escadrons de dragons, qui ont poursuivi vivement l'infanterie Anglaise chargée de la garde du pont, et qui, quoique soutenue par la cavalerie, a été enveloppée et faite prisonnière. L'ennemi, s'apercevant que nous étions maîtres de la rive gauche de la Pisuerga, s'est empressé d'accélérer sa retraite, et a fait sauter le pont de San Isidro, situé sur la grande route de Torquemada à Dueñas.

On s'est occupé de suite de la réparation des ponts. Ces travaux ont été protégés par la 5^e division et par l'artillerie placée sur la rive gauche du Carrion, qui foudroyait les masses ennemies, qui avaient perdu dans cette journée 1000 hommes, tant tués, que blessés, ou prisonniers.

Pendant que l'on forçait ainsi l'armée Anglaise à abandonner honteusement la belle position de Dueñas, la droite de l'armée, commandée par M. le général Foy, s'emparait de Palencia. L'ennemi a été repoussé avec une telle vigueur par la 1^{re} division, que, dans sa fuite, il a été forcé d'abandonner le pont de Palencia sans avoir eu le temps de le détruire, malgré les préparatifs qui avaient été faits.

Forcée sur tous les points, l'arrière-garde de l'armée ennemie s'est retirée pendant la nuit ; et le 26, les ponts étant réparés, l'armée Française a continué sa marche. Le quartier général a été établi à Dueñas.

Le 27, au matin, j'ai reconnu la position occupée par l'ennemi à Cabezon, où la Pisuerga le séparait encore de nous ; et pour rendre inutiles ses dispositions, j'ai donné l'ordre à l'armée de se diriger sur Valladolid et Simancas, par la rive droite de la Pisuerga, en laissant toutefois les 5^e et 6^e divisions vis-à-vis Cabezon pour observer les mouvemens de l'ennemi. La droite de l'armée a occupé Zaratan ; les 3^e et 4^e divisions se sont portées en avant de Cigales, près du gué de la Pisuerga ; le reste de l'armée à Cigales. Le 28, M. le général Foy s'est emparé de Simancas, et est entré dans Tordesillas le 29. Le pont de Simancas sur la Pisuerga, et celui de Tordesillas sur le Duero, avaient été rompus à l'approche des troupes Françaises. La tête du pont de Tordesillas était encore occupée par les Anglais ; il fallait les chasser de cette position pour pouvoir réparer la coupure avec célérité. Soixante braves de la 1^{re} division et quelques sapeurs, ayant à leur tête le capitaine Guingret, du 6^e léger, se jettent à la nage, le sabre aux dents, et parviennent à l'autre rive, malgré le feu très-vif de l'ennemi, qui, surpris d'une action si hardie, fuit épou-

vanté, laissant quelques prisonniers en notre pouvoir. Cette entreprise nous a rendus maîtres de la tête du pont.

L'ennemi, informé de la marche de l'armée sur le Duero, a senti combien il devenait dangereux pour lui de rester plus long-temps sur la rive droite de ce fleuve, et s'est hâté, pendant qu'il en était encore temps, d'abandonner ses positions. Il a continué sa retraite le 29, après avoir fait sauter successivement les deux ponts de Cabezon et de Valladolid. L'armée Française est entrée le 29 dans Valladolid, et le quartier général est arrivé le 30 à Tordesillas.

La perte de l'ennemi, dans ces différens combats, est de 2000 prisonniers, tous Anglais et Portugais, et en grande partie de cavalerie. Dans ce nombre on compte un colonel, un major, deux lieutenans colonels, et 25 officiers. L'armée Anglaise a perdu 600 chevaux. Sa perte, en tués et blessés, peut être évaluée, sans exagération, à 2500 hommes. Le général Espagnol Alava a été blessé dangereusement. Notre perte est de 300 hommes tués ou blessés.

Je dois à M. le général de division Clausel les éloges les plus mérités sur le bon état de l'armée, dont il m'a remis le commandement. Ce général, quoique malade encore par suite de ses blessures, a rendu les plus grands services par la connaissance parfaite qu'il avait du pays, et nous a donné de grands avantages sur l'ennemi. M. le général Comte Caffarelli a également montré la meilleure volonté de secourir l'armée de Portugal, dans les cas où elle en aurait eu besoin ; sa cavalerie s'est couverte de gloire dans la charge qu'elle a faite sur la cavalerie ennemie. M. le général Baron de Lamartinière a mis dans ces différentes affaires tout le zèle et l'activité dont il est capable ; c'est un très-bon officier, qui mérite les bontés de S. M. l'Empereur.

M. le général de division Maucune, dans toutes les affaires qu'il a eues, a su inspirer aux troupes qu'il commande l'ardeur et le dévouement dont il a déjà donné tant de preuves.

L'artillerie, sous les ordres de M. le général Tirlet, a servi avec une grande distinction, et a fait beaucoup de mal à l'ennemi. En général, toutes les troupes se sont très-bien conduites.

V. E. remarquera que Lord Wellington, dans sa retraite de Burgos, a fait des journées trois fois plus fortes que ne les faisait l'armée de Portugal, lors de sa retraite de Salamanque sur cette première ville. La vérité est que les Anglais n'ont jamais couché dans la position qui leur était indiquée dans leur marche. Ils ont toujours été forcés dans leurs positions, et obligés d'aller coucher trois ou quatre lieues plus loin.

Il résulte, de l'aveu même des Anglais, qu'ils ont eu, pendant la durée du siège de Burgos, 2500 hommes hors de combat ; ce qui fait monter la perte totale de l'armée Anglaise, dans l'expédition qu'elle a faite sur Burgos, à 7000 hommes et 600 chevaux.

Ci-joint le rapport particulier des officiers qui se sont particulièrement distingués dans les différens combats qui ont eu lieu pendant la marche de l'armée, jusqu'à son arrivée sur le Duero.

Je demande, tout particulièrement, le grade de général de brigade pour M. le colonel Shée, et la croix de la légion pour le capitaine du génie Huz, attaché à ma division, et pour M. le capitaine Dumas, mon aide de camp.

Le Maréchal Jourdan au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Madrid, ce 3 Nov. 1812.

Le Roi est parti de Cuenca le 26, et a porté son quartier général à Horcajada : la tête de l'armée du Centre est arrivée le même jour à Tarancon.

Le 27, S. M. est arrivée à Tarancon : on a poussé des reconnaissances sur Fuentidueña, qui était encore occupé par les troupes Anglaises ; le pont de bateaux avait été retiré sur la rive droite du Tage.

M. le Duc de Dalmatie était arrivé le 25 à S^{ta} Cruz de la Zarza ; ce même jour la réserve de cavalerie de l'armée du Midi, commandée par le général Tilly, était à Villalobos. M. le Duc de Dalmatie lui ordonna de pousser une très forte reconnaissance sur Ocaña ; le général Bonnemain en eut le commandement. Il trouva à Ocaña 17 escadrons Anglais et Portugais, commandés par le général Long, qui ne voulut pas accepter le combat, et qui se replia sur Aranjuez. Le général Bonnemain le poursuivit jusqu'à une lieue au-delà d'Ocaña ; il atteignit son arrière-garde, lui sabra une trentaine d'hommes, et lui fit 20 prisonniers ; il ramena aussi

30 chevaux. M. le Duc de Dalmatie porta son quartier-général le 26 à Ocaña, d'où il envoya une reconnaissance sur Aranjuez. L'ennemi avait évacué cette ville, fait sauter le pont de la Reyna, et brûla celui qui est près du palais ; on vit dans le parc, sur la rive droite, des corps de cavalerie et d'infanterie. M. le Duc de Dalmatie fit commencer de suite les préparatifs pour rétablir les ponts. Les eaux du Tage étaient fort élevées ; les gués n'étaient pas praticables.

Le 28 S. M. se porta, avec sa réserve, à S^{ta} Cruz de la Zarza. Ce même jour, les troupes de l'armée du Centre, qui marchaient sur le Tage pour reconnaître la force et la position de l'ennemi, trouvèrent qu'il avait évacué Fuentidueña. Les barques du pont étaient sur la rive droite, sans cependant être endommagées ; les poutrelles et les câbles avaient été coupés, et les madriers enlevés. Un officier de sapeurs passa le fleuve à la nage : son exemple fut suivi par quelques soldats ; les barques furent replacées, et on s'occupa de suite du rétablissement du pont.

Le 29, le Roi porta son quartier général à Ocaña. Ce même jour, les troupes ennemies, qui étaient restées dans le parc d'Aranjuez, sur la rive droite du Tage, se retirèrent derrière le Jarama ; M. le Duc de Dalmatie se porta à Aranjuez.

Le 30, les ponts furent entièrement rétablis à Aranjuez et à Fuentidueña. Les rapports annonçaient que l'ennemi concentrait ses forces sur la rive droite du Jarama, et qu'il paraissait vouloir défendre cette position, qui est extrêmement forte. M. le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie fit ce jour-là une reconnaissance ; il trouva l'ennemi retranché sur le pont de Jarama, dit Puente Larga : après quelques volées de canon l'ennemi retira son artillerie, et mit le feu à deux mines qui firent sauter une arche du pont. M. le Duc de Dalmatie fit alors cesser la fusillade, qui était sans objet. Notre perte a été dans ce combat d'environ 25 blessés, parmi lesquels se trouve un officier de voltigeurs : celle de l'ennemi a été beaucoup plus considérable ; il a eu plusieurs hommes tués sur le pont.

M. le Duc de Dalmatie pensait toujours que l'ennemi avait le projet de recevoir bataille dans la position qui domine le Jarama ; et comme cette position est véritablement inattaquable de front, il fallait manœuvrer pour forcer l'ennemi à l'abandonner.

Le 31, M. le Duc de Dalmatie apprit et annonça à S. M. que l'ennemi avait abandonné le Puente Larga. On rétablit ce pont, et, le même jour, l'avant-garde de l'armée du Midi se porta jusqu'à Valdemoro, et ramassa environ 300 prisonniers. Les divisions de cette armée se mirent en marche, dans la nuit du 31, des divers points qu'elles occupaient, et vinrent passer le Tage à Aranjuez ; elles défilèrent pendant toute la journée du 1^{er} Nov. et pendant la nuit : l'armée n'eut entièrement passé le Tage que le 2 Nov. à 6 heures du matin.

Le Roi se porta le 31 à Aranjuez, et ordonna à M. le Comte d'Erlon de marcher sur ce point, pour suivre le mouvement de l'armée du Midi.

Le 1 Nov., les avant-postes de l'armée du Midi arrivèrent près de Madrid ; cette ville était évacuée, et l'ennemi faisait sa retraite par le Puerto de Guadarrama.

Le 2, l'armée du Midi s'est réunie aux environs de Madrid ; l'avant-garde s'est portée sur l'Escorial, et a continué à ramasser des prisonniers. Ce même jour, la division du général Villatte est entrée à Madrid, et S. M. y est arrivée avec sa garde. L'armée du Centre a défilé sur le pont d'Aranjuez.

Aujourd'hui 3, les troupes de l'armée du Midi ont marché dans la direction de l'Escorial et du Guadarrama ; l'avant-garde doit être portée au-delà des montagnes. L'armée du Centre est arrivée aux environs de Madrid ; la division du général Darmagnac a remplacé, dans Madrid, celle du général Villatte, qui a suivi le mouvement de l'armée du Midi. L'infanterie de la garde royale vient de partir pour aller coucher à las Rozas ; elle arrivera demain à Guadarrama, et le Roi la rejoindra avec la cavalerie. L'intention de S. M. est de suivre l'ennemi avec l'armée du Midi, et de se mettre en communication avec l'armée de Portugal. L'armée du Centre se tiendra réunie à Madrid et aux environs, et sera prête à venir joindre le Roi, si Lord Wellington concentre toutes ses forces pour livrer bataille.

Rapport du Chef de l'Etat-major Général le général Baron de la Martinière, sur les marches et les opérations de l'Armée de Portugal entre l'Ebre et le Duero, depuis le 17 jusqu'au 31 Oct. 1812.

Tordesillas, le 4 Nov. 1812.

L'armée de Portugal, après avoir passé sur la rive droite de l'Ebre et dans la

vallée de Tiron assez de temps pour se remettre de ses fatigues, incorporer des renforts envoyés de France, et former un approvisionnement de vivres, s'est ébranlée de tous ses cantonnemens, le 17 Oct., dans l'objet de faire lever le siège du château de Burgos, entrepris depuis le 17 Sept., et de revenir prendre position sur le Duero. M. le général Comte de Caffarelli, commandant en chef de l'armée du Nord d'Espagne, a voulu avoir part à ses opérations, en marchant lui-même à la tête de deux divisions de cette armée, l'une de la Garde Impériale, commandée par le général Dumoustier, l'autre aux ordres du général Vandermaesen, et d'une brigade de cavalerie, composée d'un escadron de lanciers de Berg, trois escadrons de gendarmerie, et trois du 15^e régt. de chasseurs à cheval.

Le quartier général fut transféré, le 17, de Pancorbo à Briviesca; le 18, l'avant-garde, commandée par M. le général de division Baron de Maucune, et composée des 5^e, 8^e divisions, et de celle de cavalerie légère, occupa Castil de Peones, Quintanavides, et S^{ta} Olalla, d'où les avant-postes furent rejetés sur Monasterio, avec perte de 30 hommes du corps de Brunswick et un officier, faits prisonniers.

Le 19, 16 compagnies d'élite et 300 chevaux, commandés par le général Gauthier, délogèrent l'ennemi de Monasterio; les 1^{re} et 7^e divisions et une brigade de cavalerie se portèrent de la droite à Robredo et Temiño; les 3^e et 4^e divisions et celle de dragons, venant de la vallée de Tiron, prirent position à S^{ta} Maria, Piedrahita, et Villa Escusa. Le gros de l'armée avança par la vallée de l'Oca; le quartier général s'établit à Castil de Peones.

Le 20, au matin, l'avant-garde déboucha de Monasterio; le général Maucune avait ordre de reconnaître les forces qui couvraient le siège de Burgos: il enleva, avec beaucoup d'élan, le village de Quintanapalla, fit contenir, par un corps d'observation et de tirailleurs, les forces qui occupaient El Olmos, et alla insulter, de très près, le camp ennemi, qui prit les armes. L'ennemi perdit du monde dans cette reconnaissance; nous lui fîmes des prisonniers. Il ne nous tua que 8 hommes, et en blessa 67.

Le général en chef faisait des dispositions, le 21, pour s'emparer du plateau d'El Olmos, couronné par une division trop détachée de son camp pour être soutenue; mais l'armée Anglaise décampa pendant la nuit du 21 au 22. Le général Maucune se mit sur sa trace, traversa Burgos, en ramassant des traînards et des déserteurs, poussa une reconnaissance sur la route de Lerma, où fut prise une pièce de 8, et continua à marcher sur celle de Valladolid. Il y rencontra l'arrière-garde ennemie. Ces escadrons furent chargés, rompus à plusieurs reprises, et rejetés sur Tamames par notre cavalerie légère, qui leur prit une trentaine d'hommes. Le général Foy, qui se dirigeait, avec les 1^{re} et 7^e divisions, sur Villalon, fit une centaine de prisonniers; deux pièces de canon de 18, 20 voitures d'artillerie brisées, et une centaine d'autres furent abandonnées.

Ainsi fut levé le siège du château de Burgos, après 35 jours d'investissement, cinq assauts, et une défense aussi bien entendue qu'intrépide, qui couvre de gloire le général Dubreton. Les Anglais avouent que 3000 hommes de leurs meilleures troupes y ont été mis hors de combat. Lord Wellington regrettera d'y avoir perdu un temps précieux et les fruits qu'il avait pu recueillir de sa victoire des Arapiles.

L'armée, réunie le 22 entre Burgos et Tamames, marcha le 23 sur deux colonnes. L'arrière-garde ennemie fut rencontrée en position sur le rio Hormaza, couverte par de l'artillerie et une nombreuse cavalerie. Le colonel Shée eut ordre de charger à la tête de sa brigade, composée des 13^e et 14^e régimens de chasseurs à cheval. Quoiqu'inférieur en nombre, il le fit avec audace; il pénétra jusqu'aux masses d'infanterie, près de Celados, et presque jusqu'à leur canon. Le général Maucune chargeait lui-même. Deux fois de suite la cavalerie Anglaise revint au combat, et deux autres fois elle fut enfoncée, ayant beaucoup d'hommes tués et blessés, et nous laissant 62 prisonniers des chevaux-légers. Le major Latour-Foissac, commandant le 14^e, se distingua.

A midi, toute notre cavalerie, dont la majeure partie n'avait pu jusqu'alors déboucher à la tête de l'armée, eut ordre de passer à l'avant-garde. La division de cavalerie légère, commandée par M. le général Curto, ayant été dirigée sur la droite, au pied des hauteurs, le colonel Merlin, du 1^{er} de hussards, quoique entravé par un terrain difficile, quoique inférieur en nombre, et n'ayant pu déployer que des pelotons, tomba sur le 16^e régiment de chevaux-légers Anglais, et lui enleva 33 hommes, dont le colonel et 2 officiers subalternes; le colonel fut pris par le brigadier Decroix, du 1^{er} de hussards. Les escadrons de réserve, et ceux déjà défaits, ayant voulu revenir au combat, il y eut sur ce point 5 autres charges, où le

colonel Shée et le major Latour-Foissac méritèrent de nouveaux éloges. On y fit 100 prisonniers, et l'ennemi y éprouva une perte double en tués et blessés. Nous y eûmes 82 blessés, dont 10 officiers, et pas un seul homme tué ou pris.

Vers les 3 heures après midi, on continuait à serrer l'ennemi de très près dans sa retraite. La brigade auxiliaire de cavalerie de l'armée du Nord fut mise en première ligne ; elle marchait à gauche de la route. Elle fut obligée, par un obstacle, à venir chercher passage sur la chaussée, entre Villazopeque et Villodrigo. A peine les trois premiers escadrons, dont un de lanciers de Berg, étaient formés au-delà du défilé, que déjà, sous le feu de canon, à distance de 60 toises, elle se trouva à 150 pas de neuf escadrons, dont trois en première, six en seconde ligne, venaient à elle au trot ; elle était adossée à un ruisseau. Dans cette situation critique, le colonel Faverot, du 15^e de chasseurs à cheval, s'élance au galop au-devant de la charge dont il est menacé ; on se mêle, on combat corps à corps avec acharnement pendant 7 à 8 minutes : les escadrons Anglais fuient ; leur seconde ligne s'alarme, mais alors le colonel Beteille venait de déboucher à la tête de la légion de gendarmerie ; il se jette sur son flanc droit, la défait, et la chasse jusqu'à Villodrigo, sous la protection de l'infanterie. Cet engagement brillant, où sept escadrons Français ont croisé le sabre contre neuf escadrons Anglais, coûta à l'ennemi environ 300 hommes mis hors de combat, dont 67 prisonniers, parmi lesquels 2 officiers supérieurs, 5 officiers subalternes, plus de 40 chevaux ; nous y avons eu 5 hommes tués, 95 blessés, dont 5 ont été pris. Le brave colonel Beteille y a reçu plusieurs blessures graves, qui donnent des inquiétudes pour ses jours. Le colonel Faverot a été atteint de trois coups de sabre, dont aucun n'est dangereux. Tous les officiers de son régiment, deux exceptés, ont eu des blessures ou des contusions.

Cette journée donna un résultat de 500 prisonniers ; elle se termina par une charge de la division de dragons, devant laquelle la cavalerie ennemie plia encore avec perte, et où le major Dumolard, commandant le 25^e de dragons, fut grièvement blessé : deux carrés d'infanterie arrêtaient l'effet qu'elle pouvait avoir.

L'armée venait de faire huit lieues de pays, son avant-garde manœuvrant, et la cavalerie combattant toujours ; elle passa la nuit à Villodrigo.

On doit de grands éloges au général Maucune pour son activité et sa valeur sur le champ de bataille ; ses dispositions furent toutes d'un officier-général expérimenté.

L'armée continua à marcher le 24, dès la pointe du jour ; l'arrivée rapide de l'avant-garde interrompit les travaux commencés à Quintana del Puente pour en rompre le pont, et ne donna pas le temps à l'ennemi d'en entreprendre à celui de Torquemada, où la supériorité de notre feu et quelques compagnies de voltigeurs mirent fin à une canonnade, seul obstacle qui nous fut opposé. Le capitaine Grallard, commandant la batterie légère de l'avant-garde, y fut atteint d'un biscaien à la tête, et ne voulut pas quitter le commandement de sa batterie. On avait fait une soixantaine de prisonniers à Quintana del Puente, et on en prit 200 à Torquemada.

L'armée se porta sur Magaz, y passa la nuit, et se mit en mouvement le 25 à la pointe du jour.

L'ennemi s'était déjà couvert par le Carrion, dont il gardait tous les ponts ; il couronnait les hauteurs escarpées de Dueñas, et occupait le couvent de San Isidro, près le confluent de cette rivière avec la Pisuerga, par beaucoup d'infanterie et du canon, qui protégeaient aussi des batteries sur la rive droite. Le général Maucune s'en approcha avec la 5^e division et la cavalerie légère. Son artillerie, mise en batterie avant d'être aperçue, porta le ravage et le désordre dans les masses : elles cherchèrent leur sûreté sur les hauteurs qui dominant le Carrion. Quelques compagnies de voltigeurs allèrent aussitôt à la course, pour s'emparer du pont ; il fit explosion à leur barbe, mais pas un seul homme n'y fut blessé. Plusieurs heures se passèrent en échange de coups de canon et en engagements de tirailleurs. Un escadron eut ordre de passer le gué, chaque cavalier prenant un voltigeur en croupe. Ce mouvement tardait trop à l'impatience des voltigeurs ; ils s'élancèrent dans la rivière ; ils firent reculer l'ennemi avec perte ; tout le pied de la position fut nettoyé.

Le général en chef de l'armée Anglaise en ayant conçu de l'inquiétude pour le sort de quelques pièces de canon alors exposées, se décida, sur les 4 heures après midi, à attaquer cette division avec une immense supériorité de forces. Il fit donc

descendre du plateau 4 colonnes d'infanterie très profondes. La brigade de cavalerie légère se retira par un gué. La 5^e division repassa à celui de Villamuriel, ne laissant sur la rive droite qu'une partie de sa 1^{re} brigade postée dans le village, et une bonne ligne de tirailleurs. Ces troupes combattirent avec le plus grand courage ; leur feu y fut très meurtrier. Notre artillerie, les soutenant de la rive gauche, foudroya et dissipa les colonnes d'attaque ; l'ennemi ne put plus entretenir le combat que par des tirailleurs : cette affaire lui coûta 1000 à 1200 hommes ; un général Anglais et le général Espagnol Alava y furent blessés. Le soir, on lui céda la possession du village de Villamuriel, qu'il n'était pas possible de conserver pendant la nuit. Notre perte fut de 30 hommes tués, 5 ou 6 noyés, 180 blessés, et 30 prisonniers. M. Burgevin, aide-de-camp de M. le général Chauvel, y a été tué au milieu des rangs Anglais. Les capitaines Lafond et Lachapelle, aides-de-camp du général Maucune, s'y sont fait remarquer par une valeur brillante, en se mêlant à nos tirailleurs, les dirigeant, se jetant au milieu de ceux de l'ennemi, et lui faisant des prisonniers. Le chef de bataillon Girard, chef d'état-major de la 5^e division, y a reçu une forte contusion à l'épaule, et n'a pas voulu quitter le champ de bataille.

Pendant le combat de Villamuriel, l'ennemi retira ses troupes du couvent de San Isidro, et fit sauter le pont du Carrion sur la chaussée royale. Le général Gauthier attaqua celui de Tariego sur la Pisuerga ; ce pont fit explosion au moment d'être attaqué ; sa coupure ne fut pas telle que l'infanterie ne pût y passer ; les voltigeurs le franchirent, et prirent 50 Ecossais.

Dès le matin, le général Foy s'était porté sur Palencia, occupé par des troupes Anglaises et quelques corps de l'armée de Galice. Les Espagnols y commirent une lâcheté digne du général sans honneur qui avait violé la capitulation d'Astorga. Ayant répondu à la première sommation qu'ils ouvriraient les portes si le général se présentait lui-même, il leur fut de nouveau envoyé un aide-de-camp précédé d'un trompette. Les soldats du perfide Castaños les laissèrent approcher, et leur lâchèrent, à bout portant du guichet et de dessus les murailles, une fusillade qui heureusement ne blessa qu'un cheval. Les portes barricadées furent aussitôt enfoncées à coupes de haches. Le général Chemineau se jeta dans la ville, à la tête du second bataillon du 69^e régt., poussant les Anglais l'épée aux reins, arriva rapidement au pont du Carrion, l'emporta de vive force, et s'empara de barils de poudre disposés pour le faire sauter. La 1^{re} division fut mis aussitôt à la poursuite de l'ennemi, et le jeta avec perte au-delà du canal ; la cavalerie légère fit des courses sur ses derrières, dans la direction de Villamuriel à Cigales. 55 lanciers de Berg, commandés par le chef d'escadron de Toll, atteignirent une colonne de bagages, sabrèrent les troupes d'escorte, et firent 400 prisonniers Anglais et Portugais, dont 11 officiers. 100 blessés de l'armée ennemie étaient à Palencia. A la fin de cette journée, 1000 prisonniers furent réunis au quartier général, non compris ceux de la veille.

L'armée Anglaise nous voyant maître du débouché de Palencia, pendant qu'un corps de cavalerie et une brigade d'infanterie étaient passés à Tariego, eut l'inquiétude d'être devancée à Tordesillas ou à Cabezon ; elle se retira sur ce village dans la nuit du 26, après avoir fait filer ses bagages sur Valladolid. Le pont de Dueñas ayant été promptement rétabli, l'avant-garde, deux autres divisions, et la cavalerie prirent position sur les hauteurs de Cabillas, de S^{ta} Maria, et Quintanilla ; le reste de l'armée à Dueñas ; les divisions Dumoustier et Vandermaesen à Baños et Tariego. Les troupes qui avaient débouché par Villamuriel rencontrèrent dans leur marche environ 200 blessés abandonnés sans secours sur la route, ou confiés à la pitié des alcaldes dans les villages.

Le 27, on s'assura par une reconnaissance, où l'on fit des prisonniers, qu'il était impossible d'enlever le pont de Cabezon déjà miné et situé immédiatement au pied d'une position formidable, où l'ennemi avait ses principales forces. L'avant-garde et les divisions Dumoustier et Vandermaesen eurent ordre de l'observer ; deux divisions furent placées devant le gué de S^{ta} Obenia ; la première se porta à Zaratan, et y fit 40 prisonniers. Le quartier-général était à Cigales.

Le 28, un bataillon Portugais fut délogé du faubourg de Valladolid, et la 1^{re} division chassa de Simancas le corps de Brunswick et deux bataillons de la légion Allemande du roi d'Angleterre, qui s'empressèrent de faire sauter deux arches du pont de cette ville sur la Pisuerga.

Le 29, deux explosions aux ponts de Cabezon et de Valladolid signalèrent la

retraite de l'ennemi sur la rive droite du Duero, qui fut immédiatement suivie de la rupture de 5 autres ponts ; ceux de Tudela, Puente de Duero, Aniago, Tordesillas, et Toro ; le général en chef fit aussitôt marcher l'armée ; la droite se porta à Toro, la gauche appuyée à Valladolid.

Tordesillas vit un beau fait d'armes : la rupture du pont avait été telle, que la tour qui le surmonte restait du côté de l'ennemi, qui continua d'y tenir une garnison de 30 hommes, soutenue par des postes embusqués derrière des murs, et par un bataillon de Brunswick, formé dans un bois de sapins. Ces dispositions rendaient la réparation du pont impossible ; mais 11 officiers et 40 sous-officiers et soldats, tant de la 1^{re} division que des sapeurs du génie, s'offrirent pour passer le fleuve à la nage. Ils s'y jetèrent protégés par l'artillerie, ayant réuni leurs armes et leurs gibernes sur un assemblage de quelques planches, trainé par des nageurs. Parvenus à la rive opposée, après avoir essuyé une longue fusillade, ils combattirent nus, s'emparèrent de la tour, et firent 11 prisonniers. Cette entreprise hardie, proposée et dirigée avec tant de vigueur par le capitaine Guingret du 6^e léger, qu'on est accoutumé à voir le premier où il y a de la gloire à acquérir, étonna tellement le bataillon de Brunswick, qu'au lieu de venir attaquer ces braves, il se mit en retraite en toute hâte.

Le lieutenant Rose, du 60^e régt., aborda le premier sur la rive, suivi du brave Geoffroy, voltigeur au 6^e léger. On doit d'autant plus d'éloges au capitaine Chastagnac, du 69^e, à MM. Jacquemard, Galo, Mobrat, Bisiau, Gabriel, Lagrange, officier du 39^e, qu'ils rivalisèrent de vitesse. Le fleuve a beaucoup de largeur et est très-profond devant Tordesillas. Le temps était très froid.

Le 30, le quartier-général s'établit à Tordesillas, et l'armée ennemie prit position en face, sur les hauteurs de Rueda, où elle travailla aussitôt à se couvrir par des retranchemens. On envoya vers Zamora une reconnaissance, à l'approche de laquelle le beau pont de cette ville fit explosion. Ce fut le onzième rompu par les Anglais dans leur retraite. Une autre reconnaissance ramena 200 prisonniers de la direction de Medina de Rio Seco.

Là fut suspendue la marche de l'armée de Portugal, tant par la nécessité de réparer les ponts et de faire des vivres, que par l'obligation de se conformer aux instructions du Roi d'Espagne, et du Ministre de la Guerre, qui prescrivaient de manœuvrer uniquement dans l'objet d'opérer une jonction avec les armées du Centre et du Midi, tout en suivant et harcelant Lord Wellington, et avaient défendu d'engager une action générale.

Ses mouvemens ont eu toute la rapidité que comportent les forces de l'homme ; ses attaques ont été vives et intrépides ; ses succès ont affaibli l'armée Anglaise de 3500 hommes au moins, dont 1500 tués ou blessés, 2000 prisonniers, tous Anglais, Allemands, et Portugais. On ne fait pas compte de la ridicule armée de Galice, dont le tiers au moins s'est débandé. Ces pertes, ajoutées à celles de 3000 hommes consommés au siège de Burgos, seront d'autant plus sensibles à l'ennemi que la victoire d'Arapiles lui avait évidemment coûté 8000 hommes.

En comparant la retraite des Anglais, depuis Burgos jusqu'au Duero, retraite précipitée qui leur a coûté presque autant qu'une bataille de second ordre, avec la marche lente et méthodique du 7 au 17 Sept. que l'armée de Portugal opéra en onze jours pour se porter de Valladolid sur Burgos, on remarquera que celle-ci ne mit jamais entr'elle et l'ennemi que la distance de portée de canon, dédaigna de rompre les ponts, et manœuvrant toujours par échelons, fit si bonne contenance qu'elle ne perdit pas un seul homme ni une seule voiture de bagages.

Je ne terminerai pas ce rapport sans faire observer combien la coopération du renfort de l'armée du Nord a été utile, et que la meilleure harmonie régnait entre les deux généraux en chef. M. le général Comte Caffarelli, toujours avec nous aux avant-postes, nous a secondés avec toute la franchise et l'empressement dont on le sait animé par dévouement au service de l'Empereur.

M. le général Comte Caffarelli nous ayant vus établis en position inattaquable sur le Duero, et ayant complètement rempli ses engagements avec l'armée de Portugal, s'est mis en marche de Cigales le 3 Nov. pour retourner sur le territoire de son commandement. Il nous a laissé la majeure partie de ses munitions en remplacement de celles que nous avons consommées.

Le général Comte Caffarelli au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Burgos, ce 6 Nov. 1812.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. E. le rapport du siège de Burgos, qui m'a été

remis par le général Dubreton. J'y joins les états des officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats, qui se sont le plus particulièrement distingués, et que je crois dignes de la bienveillance de S. M. J'invoque pour eux toute la sollicitude de V. E. Dès les premiers jours la garnison s'est vue exposée à l'un des besoins les plus affreux, celui de l'eau ; elle n'avait point d'abri ; le mauvais temps l'a forcée à être presque toujours dans la boue et dans l'humidité. Elle a tout supporté avec une patience et une fermeté dont ses chefs lui ont donné l'exemple ; mais c'est surtout au dévouement du général Dubreton qu'est due cette constance dans la défense, dont il a donné la preuve. M. le major St. Hilaire, qui remplissait les fonctions de chef d'état-major, a parfaitement secondé le général Dubreton, ainsi que M. Briot, chef de bataillon du génie. Ce dernier a multiplié les moyens de défense ; il en a créé de nouveaux ; il était partout, à toutes les heures, à tous les momens ; il a parfaitement bien servi, et je sollicite pour lui les bontés de V. E. Je donnerai aussi une part d'éloges bien mérités à M. Dehon, capitaine du génie, qui a construit la place. L'artillerie commandée par M. Mauroy, capitaine du 17^e régt., a fort bien servi, et a fait beaucoup de mal à l'ennemi ; elle a prouvé que le bon esprit de l'armée se conserve toujours, et se montre avec éclat dans les occasions difficiles.

M. Fondousse, colonel du 34^e régt. ; M. Pontenay, chef de bataillon du 130^e, se sont montrés comme doivent le faire des chefs de corps ; le premier surtout est un officier distingué. La 2^e compagnie des pionniers, commandée par le capitaine Noailles, s'est parfaitement conduite.

Ce qui se trouvait au fort, de la Garde de Paris, a été affecté au service de l'artillerie. Cette petite troupe d'excellens soldats, qui ont constamment donné des preuves de leur bonne conduite, mérite une mention particulière.

A cette dépêche est joint le journal des opérations de la défense du fort de Burgos. On voit par ce journal que le siège a duré 35 jours, depuis le 18 Sept. jusqu'au 22 Oct., pendant lesquels l'ennemi a fait jouer quatre mines, fait cinq brèches, tant par la mine que par le canon, et livré cinq assauts, dont un seul lui a réussi. La garnison Française, de son côté, a fait cinq sorties constamment heureuses. La perte de l'ennemi a été de plus de 2000 hommes, la nôtre, tant tués que blessés, a été de 16 officiers, 607 sous-officiers et soldats ; parmi ces derniers, 304 hommes ont été tués ou sont morts de leurs blessures.

Rapport du général Dubreton sur la défense du château de Burgos en 1812. *

Au fort de Burgos, le 22 Oct. 1812.

L'armée Française, aux ordres du général Clausel, était campée le 17 Sept. en avant de Burgos. Elle s'est mise en marche le 18, à 3½ heures du matin, pour continuer sa retraite. Sa droite a dépassé Burgos à 7 heures, sa gauche à 6 heures, et son arrière-garde à 10½ heures. L'ennemi ayant suivi ce mouvement, le fort s'est trouvé enveloppé.

La garnison a dû s'occuper à se baraquier dans les divers ouvrages extérieurs, n'ayant aucune espèce de couvert préparé à l'avance. On avait commencé la démolition des maisons avoisinant le fort tant pour se procurer des matériaux que pour se débarrasser de couverts dangereux ; mais l'ennemi ayant occupé la ville par des tirailleurs, ce travail n'a pu se continuer, de sorte que la garnison s'est trouvée sans abri et dans la nécessité de bivouaquer, fâcheux début pour un siège, où, à l'abondance près de grains et de farines, l'on a manqué d'une infinité d'objets de première nécessité, tels que vin, vinaigre, fourrage pour la nourriture des bestiaux sur pied, grenades, obus de calibre, affûts de rechange, outils, sacs à terre, gabions, fascines, charbon, etc. On a mis le feu aux maisons qui avoisinaient l'enceinte ; mais cette opération a eu peu de succès.

Le fort, ainsi qu'on vient de le dire, n'étant point en état de siège, la garnison a été employée à y faire les travaux les plus pressants. On a armé l'ouvrage à cornes de St. Michel, dont l'imperfection était telle, et la position si mauvaise, qu'on ne devait pas espérer de s'y maintenir contre un ennemi nombreux et entreprenant. Pour éclairer les abords de cet ouvrage, on a commencé sur la gauche un petit redan qui, gardé par un poste, pût éloigner l'ennemi des couverts situés à moins de dix toises du saillant du demi-bastion de gauche. Un pareil redan a été commencé dans le même but en avant de la demi-lune. Ces deux redans ont été occupés par la compagnie de grenadiers du 130^{me} régt.

Le palissadement entrepris à la gorge de l'ouvrage à cornes de St. Michel

n'étant pas terminé, on s'est empressé d'y travailler pour tâcher de mettre cet ouvrage à l'abri d'un coup de main.

On a commencé au fort à blinder la porte et les évents du magasin à poudre, et la garnison a travaillé à se former quelques chétifs abris sur les emplacements que chaque corps devait défendre.

Les batteries ont été mises en état, et l'on y a élevé quelques traverses pour couvrir les canonnières de la fusillade. On a élevé aussi des masques en avant des portes de sortie, qui sont extrêmement faibles. A défaut de gabions et de fascines pour faire ces travaux, on y a employé des caisses remplies de terre.

Les hôpitaux de la ville n'ayant pu être évacués entièrement, 78 malades qui s'y trouvaient ont été conduits au fort. L'ennemi a envoyé quelques troupes en reconnaissance, sur lesquelles nos batteries des enceintes basses ont tiré. Il n'a fait aucun mouvement dans la nuit du 18 au 19, et ses postes sont restés dans les mêmes positions. Nous avons eu un pionnier de tué.

Dans la journée du 19, l'ennemi s'est porté en force sur la hauteur St. Michel. Il a refoulé tous nos postes avancés, et s'est emparé des deux redans commencés en avant de l'ouvrage à cornes. Nous avons entrepris vainement de les réoccuper ; dans cette tentative un officier du 130^{me} régt. a été tué, et un autre a été blessé.

A la faveur des postes avancés qu'il occupait, et des couverts que lui offrait le terrain, l'ennemi s'est établi à portée de pistolet de l'ouvrage à cornes de St. Michel. Ayant reconnu le mauvais état de cet ouvrage, la nullité de ses communications, et l'insuffisance de l'appui qu'il tirait du fort principal, il résolut de l'attaquer de vive force. A cet effet, il réunit pendant le jour ses colonnes derrière les plis du terrain qui le couvraient, et à 6½ heures du soir, 4 bataillons en débouchèrent et attaquèrent à la fois le front de l'ouvrage à cornes, la branche de gauche, et la gorge. Le 2^e bataillon du 34^{me} régt. de ligne, qui défendait cet ouvrage, fit tous les efforts possibles pour repousser l'ennemi ; mais le grand développement des fortifications ne lui ayant pas permis de garder tous les points accessibles, et le palissadement de la gorge n'étant pas achevé, il n'a pu empêcher les Anglais de pénétrer jusque dans le terre-plein, sous le feu soutenu de toutes les parties du fort principal. Les défenseurs, accablés par le nombre, sont cependant parvenus à se frayer un passage à la baïonnette, et sont rentrés dans le fort, mais non pas sans avoir éprouvé des pertes graves. M. Thomas, chef de bataillon, a été grièvement blessé, et notre perte totale s'élève à 142 hommes tués ou blessés, dont 5 officiers.

1^{re} Nuit, du 19 au 20 Sept. Dès que l'ennemi se fut rendu maître de l'ouvrage à cornes, il s'établit dans le fossé du front, et, débouchant par la poterne, il se porta par un zigzag jusqu'à la gorge, où il travailla avec activité, malgré le feu le plus vif de toutes nos batteries. Au jour, il était à peu près à couvert dans les deux communications qu'il avait entreprises dans le terre-plein de l'ouvrage, et sur la branche gauche ; il n'a riposté par aucun feu.

Journée du 20 Sept. L'ennemi a continué de perfectionner ses travaux sous le feu soutenu de notre artillerie et de notre fusillade. Nous avons établi 2 pièces de 12 sur la courtine du réduit, pour contre-battre la batterie de brèche que nous supposons que l'ennemi avait commencée à la gorge de l'ouvrage à cornes de St. Michel, et qui se trouvait masquée par les palissades de la gorge que nous n'avons pu détruire. On a percé une nouvelle communication pour arriver à couvert à l'église San Roman, parce que celle qui existait était vue de l'ennemi.

Le personnel de l'artillerie étant insuffisant, on y a adjoint comme auxiliaire le petit bataillon de la Garde de Paris.

Le manque d'eau nous a obligé de rationner la garnison à deux pintes par homme, et à abattre les bestiaux en approvisionnement, pour n'avoir pas à les abreuver.

2^e Nuit, du 20 au 21 Sept. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux sur la hauteur de St. Michel, contre lesquels notre artillerie a soutenu son feu pendant toute la nuit. De notre côté, nous avons continué à travailler. La batterie supérieure du magasin à poudre a été armée d'un obusier et de deux pièces de 8.

Nous n'eûmes, dans les 24 heures, qu'un homme de blessé.

Journée du 21 Sept. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux, et nous notre feu.

3^e Nuit, du 21 au 22 Sept. L'ennemi a commencé sur la hauteur de St.

Michel une batterie qu'on suppose destinée à prendre de revers les défenses du camp retranché, et il a exécuté ce travail, malgré notre feu, qui a été des plus vifs.*

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 8 hommes de blessés.

Journée du 22 Sept. De grands mouvements ont eu lieu dans les environs du fort, et l'ennemi a fait des transports de gabions et de fascines sur la hauteur de St. Michel; d'où l'on conclut qu'il poursuit avec activité l'établissement de ses batteries. Il a continué à perfectionner ses communications, tant dans l'intérieur de l'ouvrage à cornes que sur la branche de droite. Notre artillerie a placé une troisième pièce de 12 sur la courtine du réduit. Cette batterie, et toutes celles du front d'attaque, y compris la batterie Napoléon, ont fait un feu des plus vifs sur les travaux de l'ennemi. Nous avons entrepris une communication du donjon à l'église de la Blanca, afin de couvrir le terre-plein du réduit contre le feu de l'ennemi dans la lutte des batteries.

4^e Nuit, du 22 au 23 Sept. A 11 heures du soir, l'ennemi s'est porté sur le camp retranché avec des échelles, et a cherché à l'emporter de vive force. Il a fait son attaque en deux colonnes, l'une du côté de la ville, la seconde sur le front de la route de Santander. Cette dernière colonne donna l'assaut avec résolution, et fut reçue avec vigueur par 5 compagnies du 2^{me} bataillon du 34^{me} de ligne. Quelques-uns des assaillants parvinrent jusque sur le parapet, mais ils furent culbutés, et le reste fut mis en fuite par notre fusillade et par des obus chargés, que nous roulâmes dans le fossé. La colonne qui attaqua du côté de la ville fut reçue avec la même vigueur, et ne put descendre la contrescarpe. Elle se retira alors dans les premières maisons, d'où elle fit un feu très-vif sur le fort; elle fut en revanche vivement battue par notre artillerie. L'ennemi a beaucoup souffert dans cette action, et a laissé dans les fossés les échelles qu'il avait apportées, et une quarantaine de morts, dont trois officiers. Il a dû remporter un grand nombre de blessés, si l'on en juge par les débris abandonnés sur les points qu'il a attaqués.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été d'un officier et de 8 hommes tués, d'un officier et 12 hommes blessés.

Journée du 23 Sept. Au jour, notre artillerie ayant aperçu une batterie que l'ennemi avait établie sur la hauteur de St. Michel, y dirigea son feu et la ruina en peu de temps.

À midi, le général Anglais envoya un parlementaire pour demander la permission de retirer ses morts et de les enterrer. Le gouverneur ordonna qu'ils seraient portés par un détachement de la garnison à 200 toises de la contrescarpe: cette opération amena une suspension d'armes de trois heures. Le reste du jour fut employé, comme de coutume, à faire un feu continu d'artillerie de tous les points des fronts attaqués, pour retarder la marche des travaux de l'ennemi.

5^e Nuit, du 23 au 24 Sept. L'ennemi, débouchant des maisons du faubourg de San Pedro, a entrepris à la sape volante une communication pour gagner les ravins et les chemins creux qui bordent l'enceinte du camp retranché, et s'est approché jusqu'à dix toises de l'escarpe. On a fait dans la place divers travaux d'artillerie pour battre le logement de l'ennemi.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été de 4 hommes tués et de 15 blessés.

Journée du 24 Sept. L'ennemi ayant crénelé l'église et les maisons du faubourg de San Pedro, a fait un feu très-vif sur nos ouvrages, et a rendu pour le moment nos batteries inhabitables. Il a continué à cheminer contre le camp retranché, et s'en est approché sans en être vu.

6^e Nuit, du 24 au 25 Sept. L'ennemi s'est approché de la contrescarpe du camp retranché vers la pointe du corps de garde crénelé, à laquelle on suppose

* Le lieutenant-colonel du génie Anglais Jones, dans sa relation du siège de Burgos, fait observer que cette prétendue batterie dont parle le gouverneur n'est autre chose qu'une partie du parapet de la tranchée, qui, se trouvant sur le roc, avait exigé une gabionnade. Qu'au jour, le château ayant dirigé tous ses feux sur ce point, le passage y devint fort dangereux; qu'alors un des ingénieurs qui se trouvaient dans la tranchée eut l'idée de faire enlever les gabions pour faire voir aux défenseurs qu'il n'y avait point de batterie, et que le feu du château cessa aussitôt. L'auteur cite ce fait pour prouver combien un feu soutenu peut retarder l'exécution des travaux de siège, et par conséquent combien il est nécessaire, lorsque le feu de la place est en pleine activité, de cacher à l'ennemi la position des batteries de brèche jusqu'au moment où elles doivent jouer.

qu'il a intention d'attacher le mineur. Notre artillerie a lancé quelques obus, et la garnison s'est tenue sous les armes dans l'attente d'un assaut.

Les pièces qui armaient le camp retranché n'ayant plus d'effet sur les travaux de l'ennemi, vu leur proximité, on les a rentrées dans l'intérieur du fort. Au jour, l'ennemi se trouvait établi sur la contrescarpe même du camp retranché.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été de 6 hommes tués et de 16 blessés, dont un officier.

Journée du 25 Sept. Présument toujours que l'ennemi ferait brèche par la mine, nous préparâmes plusieurs moyens de chicane pour repousser l'assaut. Une pièce de 4 fut disposée dans le seul emplacement de l'enceinte supérieure qui pût voir le débouché de la brèche; on pratiqua des banquettes dans le parapet, l'on construisit des augets pour jeter à la main des obus dans le fossé, et l'on établit des traverses avec des futaillies et des caisses remplies de terre, pour empêcher l'ennemi de s'étendre dans les terre-pleins. On commença à miner les piliers du clocher de San Roman, qui domine la seconde enceinte, afin de le faire sauter dans le cas où la garnison serait forcée d'évacuer ce poste.

L'ennemi fit un feu très-vif pendant tout le jour, et tira de la batterie qu'il avait établie sur le penchant de la hauteur de St. Michel, et près de la branche gauche de l'ouvrage à cornes.

7^e Nuit, du 25 au 26 Sept. L'ennemi prolongea sur la droite le logement qu'il avait commencé sur le glacis du camp retranché, et poussa plusieurs zigzags sur la pente de la hauteur de St. Michel, pour se rapprocher du fort.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été de 2 hommes tués et 2 blessés.

Journée du 26 Sept. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux, tant sur les glacis du camp retranché que sur la pente de la hauteur St. Michel; ceux-ci ont eu beaucoup à souffrir du feu de notre artillerie.

8^e Nuit, du 26 au 27 Sept. L'ennemi a essayé de pousser un nouveau cheminement sur la partie basse du camp retranché; mais il a été obligé de l'abandonner par suite de notre feu. Il a continué à descendre par un double zigzag de la hauteur de St. Michel.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été d'un homme tué et 2 blessés.

Journée du 27 Sept. Les travaux entrepris la veille par l'ennemi n'ont pu avancer, tant en raison de leur peu de perfection qu'à cause de notre feu.

9^e Nuit, du 27 au 28 Sept. L'ennemi a ouvert une première parallèle de la hauteur de St. Michel au faubourg de San Pedro; il a conduit ce travail avec une telle activité, qu'au jour il était entièrement à couvert.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 2 hommes de blessés.

Journée du 28 Sept. L'ennemi a perfectionné les travaux qu'il avait entrepris dans la nuit, et il a continué l'attaque souterraine qu'on suppose qu'il dirige contre le camp retranché. Des dispositions ont été prises pour repousser l'assaut.

10^e Nuit, du 28 au 29 Sept. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux, et nous notre feu.

Notre perte a été d'un homme tué et de 4 blessés.

Journée du 29 Sept. L'ennemi a travaillé à ses communications. Le grand nombre d'obus que nous lui avons jetés, au moyen de quelques petites bouches à feu, a paru l'inquiéter, et a ralenti son travail.

11^e Nuit, du 29 au 30 Sept. L'ennemi a continué ses zigzags sur la partie haute du camp retranché. Ce travail a été contrarié par notre feu, qui a dû lui faire perdre beaucoup de monde, si l'on en juge par les débris d'armes et d'outils qu'il a abandonnés.

A 1½ heure du matin, l'ennemi a donné le feu aux fourneaux qu'il avait établis sous le terre-plein du camp retranché, entre la traverse et le magasin à poudre; mais les poudres ayant été placées trop bas, la brèche ne s'est point trouvée praticable, et l'ennemi, après s'être présenté pour donner l'assaut, a été obligé de faire sa retraite dans ses tranchées sous notre feu meurtrier. Il faisait insulter en même temps le front de la ville par une forte colonne, qui, reçue vigoureusement, a eu aussi peu de succès que la première. On a profité du reste de la nuit pour former sur la brèche un masque en sacs à terre.

Nous avons eu un homme tué et 9 de blessés.

Journée du 30 Sept. L'ennemi a continué à perfectionner sa parallèle et ses communications. S'étant aperçu que nous avions conservé, sur l'un des contreforts attenant à la brèche, un petit logement d'où nous pouvions flanquer le pied

de cette brèche, il démasqua une nouvelle batterie, armée de pièces de 24, de 16, et de 8, établie sur la hauteur de St. Michel, et ruina en peu d'instants notre logement ; ce qui lui offrit le moyen d'arriver à couvert au pied de la brèche, et d'y travailler pour en adoucir le talus.

Nous avons construit des banquettes aux saillants de la contrescarpe de la seconde enceinte, pour flanquer les deux coupures.

12^e Nuit, du 30 Sept. au 1 Oct. L'ennemi a construit une quatrième batterie, et y a amené 3 bouches à feu.

Nous avons eu 3 hommes de tués et 4 de blessés.

Journée du 1 Oct. La batterie construite la nuit précédente par l'ennemi, étant vue de flanc du crochet de la partie basse du camp retranché, on y a établi une pièce de 4 et un obusier, qui ont tiré avec vigueur sur la batterie ennemie, et l'ont ruinée en quelques heures.

13^e Nuit, du 1 au 2 Oct. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux, et a reporté sa batterie, détruite pendant le jour, sur un autre emplacement un peu plus à gauche.

Nous avons eu 6 hommes de tués et 8 de blessés.

Journée du 2 Oct. L'ennemi a continué les zigzags qu'il avait entrepris pour descendre de la hauteur de St. Michel. Notre artillerie n'a pas pu contrarier ce travail, ces embrasures n'ayant ni la direction ni la plongée nécessaires ; elle doit les refaire la nuit prochaine.

L'ennemi, écrasé par nos projectiles creux, a été obligé d'abandonner la batterie qu'il avait commencée la nuit précédente ; notre canon n'a pu tirer contre cette batterie qu'il ne voyait que sous un angle trop aigu.

Nous remarquâmes qu'une colonne de 2000 à 3000 hommes venait rejoindre l'armée assiégeante, et quelques autres mouvements nous firent présumer que l'ennemi méditait une nouvelle attaque.

14^e Nuit, du 2 au 3 Oct. La nuit étant très-mauvaise, l'ennemi a peu travaillé, mais il a enlevé l'artillerie qu'il avait dans la dernière batterie qu'il avait entreprise, et il a renoncé d'y travailler.

Nous avons eu un homme de tué et 2 de blessés.

Journée du 3 Oct. Le temps s'est remis au beau, et l'ennemi a repris ses travaux ; il a perfectionné sa parallèle et ses communications de la hauteur St. Michel.

Nous avons construit une palanque dans le fossé du front de la ville, et nous avons ouvert un débouché près la porte de la ville dite de St. Gil, pour communiquer au fond du fossé.

15^e Nuit, du 3 au 4 Oct. Quelques indices nous ayant fait penser que l'ennemi travaillait à une seconde attaque souterraine dans la partie basse du camp retranché, nous jetâmes dans le fossé des paquets d'artifices pour l'éclairer, et nous continuâmes à diriger un feu nourri sur tous les points où nous entendions travailler.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, a été d'un homme tué et de 2 blessés.

Journée du 4 Oct. L'ennemi a dirigé le feu de toutes les pièces de la batterie qu'il avait sur la croupe de la hauteur de St. Michel, afin de faire ébouler les terres de la brèche ouverte par la mine à la partie haute du camp retranché : nous avons contrarié ce feu autant que possible par celui de nos batteries.

Dans la matinée, l'ennemi a placé un obusier derrière le moulin de las Huelgas, une pièce de 8 derrière la maison du Roi, et une pièce de 4 dans le champ de la ville sur la rive droite de l'Arlanzon ; pendant toute la journée il a fait un feu soutenu de ces bouches à feu.

A 5½ heures du soir, l'ennemi donna le feu à la mine qu'il avait préparée sous la partie basse du camp retranché : l'explosion fut très forte ; aussitôt une colonne de grenadiers se porta brusquement sur la brèche, tandis qu'une autre colonne assaillait en même temps la brèche anciennement fait un peu plus loin. L'ennemi, malgré notre feu dirigé sur lui à brûle-pourpoint, nous força par ses efforts redoublés à nous retirer derrière nos coupures. Ce fut en vain qu'il tenta de nous en déloger, mais il resta maître des 2 brèches et du camp retranché.

Nous avons commencé un retranchement en arrière de l'emplacement que nous supposions que la nouvelle brèche devait occuper, mais ce retranchement se trouvait si peu avancé que nous ne pûmes nous en servir.

16^e Nuit, du 4 au 5 Oct. L'ennemi, profitant de la nuit, qui mit fin à l'action, couronna les 2 brèches, et retourna contre le fort une partie des parapets du camp

retranché ; il poussa ensuite une sape sur les saillants de la 3^{me} enceinte, et ouvrit une tranchée qui enveloppa le front d'attaque. Nous continuâmes de tenir derrière les coupures et dans les petits logements pratiqués aux saillants de la contrescarpe.

A 2 heures, l'ennemi fit une nouvelle tentative pour nous déloger de nos coupures ; mais il fut si bien reçu par notre fusillade qu'il n'osa pas arriver jusqu'à nous.

Notre perte a été de 27 hommes tués et de 42 blessés. Celle de l'ennemi doit avoir été très-grande, à en juger par les hommes tués qui sont restés dans l'ouvrage dont il s'est emparé.

Journée du 5 Oct. L'ennemi a continué ses travaux dans les parties hautes et basses du camp retranché, et il s'est établi dans le fossé de la contre-garde. Le gouverneur, voulant le chasser, fit sortir une compagnie de voltigeurs du 34^m régt., une compagnie du 130^{me}, et un détachement de la 2^{me} compagnie de pionniers : ces troupes marchèrent à l'ennemi avec la plus grande audace, et tuèrent à la baïonnette tous ceux qui ne furent pas assez lestes pour se retirer. Nous réoccupâmes le camp retranché, où nous restâmes jusqu'à ce que les travaux de l'ennemi furent rasés. Nous nous retirâmes ensuite lentement, emportant les gabions, les armes, et les outils que les Anglais avaient abandonnés. Cette expédition fut très meurtrière pour l'ennemi.

17^e Nuit, du 5 au 6 Oct. L'ennemi, ayant réoccupé le camp retranché, recommença ses travaux pour s'y loger. Il établit à l'un des saillants de la partie supérieure une communication qui devait se prolonger jusqu'à la contrescarpe de la deuxième enceinte, et il démasqua une nouvelle batterie de 4 bouches à feu sur la hauteur de St. Michel.

Le fossé de la deuxième enceinte sur le front attaqué étant à la disposition de l'ennemi, on y établit un barrage en palissades pour la sûreté des postes établis dans les petits logements pratiqués aux saillants de contrescarpe.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 17 hommes de tués et 48 de blessés.

Journée du 6 Oct. L'ennemi fit feu de sa nouvelle batterie sur la pointe de la deuxième enceinte pour ruiner le palissadement et faire ébouler le talus de l'escarpe : les pièces qu'il avait placées sur la rive gauche de l'Arlanzon soutinrent cette batterie, qui fut dirigée ensuite contre le flanc de la contre-garde, afin d'y faire brèche. Nous entreprîmes aussitôt 2 coupures de ce côté, pour renfermer l'ennemi dans le débouché de la brèche et l'obliger à la couronner. On creusa aussi 3 fourneaux sous les 3 saillants du camp retranché, où l'on supposait que l'ennemi devait s'établir. Nous eûmes beaucoup à souffrir du feu de l'ennemi dans ces divers travaux.

18^e Nuit, du 6 au 7 Oct. De part et d'autre, la nuit fut employée à accélérer les travaux commencés. Le manque de matériaux nous obligea de découvrir plusieurs baraques pour avoir des bois propres à faire des augets, d'employer des pièces de drap destinées à l'habillement, pour confectionner les saucissons, et du bois vert pour faire les fusées.

Notre perte a été de 5 hommes tués et 9 blessés.

Journée du 7 Oct. L'ennemi fit une portion de tranchée de sa droite à sa gauche dans le camp retranché. Notre artillerie se trouva trop élevée pour inquiéter ce travail d'une manière efficace.

La brèche du flanc de la contre-garde permettant à l'ennemi de prendre à dos une des coupures voisines, on fut obligé de détruire cette coupure, et d'en faire une autre plus en arrière.

19^e Nuit, du 7 au 8 Oct. L'ennemi continuant ses travaux dans le camp retranché contre la deuxième enceinte, et paraissant même y vouloir diriger une attaque souterraine, le gouverneur ordonna une nouvelle sortie. Trois compagnies de grenadiers, deux sections de voltigeurs, et un détachement de pionniers et de travailleurs, débouchèrent avec rapidité, et marchèrent avec une telle précision sur les débouchés par lesquels l'ennemi communiquait à sa parallèle, que tout ce qui se trouvait dans le camp retranché, hormis 2 officiers Anglais et 36 soldats faits prisonniers, fut passé à la baïonnette par les voltigeurs, et enterré dans les tranchées. Nos troupes, après avoir comblé les travaux de l'ennemi, firent leur retraite en bon ordre. Nous eûmes dans cette sortie un officier et 10 hommes de tués, 2 officiers et 20 de blessés.

Journée du 8 Oct. L'ennemi revint dans le camp retranché, et, posté derrière

les parapets, il fit un grand feu sur la place. La batterie de brèche qu'il avait établie à la gorge de l'ouvrage à cornes de St. Michel continua à tirer sur le pan coupé de l'angle de la contre-garde, et dans l'après-midi la brèche se trouva praticable.

Il était fort difficile de rétablir le retranchement construit au sommet de cette brèche; on se contenta d'établir sous les décombres un chapelet de bombes, afin de faire sauter l'ennemi au moment où il entrerait dans la contre-garde.

20^e Nuit, du 8 au 9 Oct. La garnison, s'attendant à un assaut, resta toute la nuit sous les armes derrière la brèche et sur le parapet; mais, soit que l'ennemi ne se crût pas assez sûr de ses débouchés, soit qu'il eût mal jugé la brèche, il ne tenta aucune attaque. Il employa la nuit à se porter par un zigzag dans le fossé de la partie haute du camp retranché, et à pousser un boyau à la sape volante dans le terre-plein de la partie basse, pour intercepter par ces feux notre communication à cet ouvrage. Nous travaillâmes une partie de la nuit à couronner la brèche avec des sacs à terre.

Nous avons eu 11 hommes de tués et 21 de blessés.

Journée du 9 Oct. L'ennemi a poussé son cheminement dans la partie basse du camp retranché jusqu'auprès de la première coupure, dont il espérait s'emparer, pour nous faire évacuer ensuite les petites places d'armes que nous occupions encore sur la contrescarpe de la deuxième enceinte. Pour éviter d'être tournés derrière cette coupure, nous y fîmes aussitôt un crochet en retraite sur la gauche.

La batterie qu'avait l'ennemi sur la croupe de St. Michel tira à boulets rouges contre les bâtiments du fort; il y mit le feu, mais nous parvînmes presque aussitôt à l'éteindre.

21^e Nuit, du 9 au 10 Oct. La brèche étant praticable, nous nous attendions à être attaqués; mais l'ennemi ne bougea point. Nous travaillâmes avec activité à escarper le pied de la brèche.

Notre perte, dans les 24 heures, fut de 3 hommes tués et de 15 blessés.

Journée du 10 Oct. L'ennemi, qui toute la nuit n'avait cessé de faire une vive fusillade, recommença au jour son tir à boulets rouges. Le feu prit à des caisses dans la salle d'armes, qu'il a fallu évacuer, et nous fûmes obligés de brûler les armes, hors de service, ne sachant où les placer.

Depuis plusieurs jours, le temps était extrêmement pluvieux, et la garnison, qui depuis le commencement du siège était sans abri et toujours de service, souffrait beaucoup. Un tambour du 34^{me} passa à l'ennemi.

22^e Nuit, du 10 au 11 Oct. La nuit se passa sans aucun événement, et l'ennemi ne fit aucun travail ostensible; nous présumâmes qu'il dirigeait une attaque souterraine sous le flanc de la contre-garde le long du mur du camp retranché.

Nous eûmes 4 hommes de tués et 4 de blessés.

Journée du 11 Oct. L'ennemi continua de tirer à boulets rouges pour détruire nos établissements.

23^e Nuit, du 11 au 12 Oct. Le temps, qui avait été très-mauvais dans la journée, devint affreux pendant la nuit, et le soldat, constamment sous les armes et sans abri, souffrit beaucoup.

L'ennemi prolongea, à la sape volante, un logement qu'il avait commencé près de la contre-garde.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 4 hommes de tués et 4 de blessés.

Journée du 12 Oct. La pluie continua de tomber avec violence, et nous fûmes obligés de renouveler les saucissons de fourneaux que nous avions préparés sous le terre-plein de la deuxième enceinte. L'ennemi ne cessa de tirer à boulets rouges.

24^e Nuit, du 12 au 13 Oct. L'ennemi ne fit aucuns travaux apparents.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 4 hommes de tués et 8 de blessés.

Journée du 13 Oct. Nous entreprîmes un retranchement sur la rampe du réduit, pour arrêter l'ennemi lorsqu'il donnerait l'assaut à la deuxième enceinte.

25^e Nuit, du 13 au 14 Oct. La nuit s'est passée sans aucun événement.

Nous avons eu un homme de blessé.

Journée du 14 Oct. L'ennemi reprit le feu de toutes ses batteries de St. Michel, et de la rive droite de l'Arlanzon; nous y ripostâmes avec vigueur. Sur le soir, nous entendîmes scier du bois dans le fossé de la première enceinte, près du point où nous soupçonnions qu'il dirigeait une attaque souterraine; nous en conclûmes que, ses fourneaux étant chargés, il s'occupait de les bourrer, ou qu'il débitait du bois pour faire des châssis de mine.

26^e *Nuit, du 14 au 15 Oct.* Nous supposâmes que l'ennemi continuait son attaque souterraine sous la traverse du camp retranché. L'approvisionnement en viande diminuant considérablement, le gouverneur ordonna qu'il n'en serait plus distribué par jour qu'un quart de ration à chaque soldat.

Nous eûmes un homme de tué et 2 de blessés.

Journée du 15 Oct. L'ennemi a fait tous ses efforts pour démonter, par son artillerie, notre batterie principale établie au donjon ; mais nous ripostâmes avec une telle vivacité, qu'après une lutte d'une demi-heure l'ennemi fut obligé de cesser son feu.

Nous perçâmes 6 embrasures dans la fausse braie du donjon, afin de battre le terre-plein du réduit dans la partie où l'ennemi avait commencé une brèche à la courtine. Nous fîmes également 2 crochets, pour servir de retranchement contre cette même brèche, à la communication établie dans le terre-plein du réduit, et aboutissant à l'église de la Blanca.

27^e *Nuit, du 15 au 16 Oct.* L'ennemi ne fit aucun mouvement ostensible.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, 7 hommes de blessés.

Journée du 16 Oct. L'ennemi a tiré sur la brèche du réduit.

28^e *Nuit, du 16 au 17 Oct.* L'ennemi travailla au logement qu'il avait fait derrière la traverse du camp retranché. Nous pensâmes qu'il continuait à pousser une galerie souterraine. Nous entendîmes pendant la nuit un grand mouvement de voitures.

Nous eûmes 4 hommes de blessés.

Journée du 17 Oct. L'ennemi a fait un feu continu de toutes ses batteries, et a cherché principalement à agrandir la brèche de la contre-garde, et celle du réduit, qui le soir même se sont trouvées praticables.

Les travaux de l'ennemi derrière la première coupure du camp retranché nous donnant la certitude qu'il y préparait une mine, nous préparâmes une fougasse pour faire sauter son logement. Elle était finie à 7 heures du soir, lorsque l'ennemi fit jouer, près de notre traverse, un fourneau, qui ne fit d'autre effet que de l'ébranler et d'abattre une portion de la palissade. L'ennemi se présenta pour emporter cette traverse ; ce qui donna lieu à une vive fusillade, sans autre résultat que quelques hommes blessés de part et d'autre.

29^e *Nuit, du 17 au 18 Oct.* Nous travaillâmes à déblayer le pied de la brèche du réduit et à jeter les terres du côté opposé, pour faire un nouveau masque derrière la brèche de la contre-garde.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, un homme de tué, 2 officiers et 15 hommes de blessés.

Journée du 18 Oct. L'ennemi fit dès le matin un feu vigoureux de toutes ses batteries pour perfectionner les brèches, et il réunit dans ses tranchées 8 bataillons, divisés en 3 colonnes, pour donner l'assaut.

A 4 heures du soir, au feu d'une mine préparée sous la terrasse de l'église de San Roman, qui fit sauter tout le mur crénelé qui entourait cette église, les trois colonnes de l'ennemi s'ébranlèrent et se portèrent brusquement, la première sur la brèche de San Roman, la seconde sur la pointe de la deuxième enceinte, et la troisième sur la brèche de la contre-garde du côté de St. Michel. La compagnie qui était à San Roman, n'ayant pu arrêter l'ennemi, se replia derrière la seconde enceinte, et l'on mit aussitôt le feu aux poudres qui étaient placées dans l'église : l'explosion fut telle que cette église s'écroula en entier, et écrasa un grand nombre d'Anglais qui y étaient entrés, tandis que le feu de la demi-lune battait en flanc toute la colonne. L'ennemi épouvanté se retira en désordre dans les maisons de la ville d'où il était sorti.

La seconde colonne, qui tentait l'escalade de la deuxième enceinte, fut reçue avec tant de vigueur qu'elle échoua également.

L'attaque seule de la brèche de la contre-garde, que fit la troisième colonne, et pour laquelle l'ennemi avait réservé ses meilleures troupes, réussit un instant, et quelques Anglais pénétrèrent jusque dans le terre-plein du réduit. Mais le combat changea bientôt de face, et l'ennemi fut renversé aux cris de '*Vive l'Empereur !*' après avoir vu massacrer sur la brèche ceux qui s'étaient le plus avancés. Ce succès fut dû en partie à M. Villermet, capitaine des voltigeurs du 34^{me}, qui fut tué à la fin du combat.

L'action a duré une heure. Parmi les hommes tués que l'ennemi a perdus sur la brèche, se trouve un major Hanovrien. Nous eûmes 11 hommes de tués et 30 de blessés.

30^e *Nuit, du 18 au 19 Oct.* Nous présumions que l'ennemi tenterait un nouvel assaut; en conséquence la garnison s'est tenue constamment sous les armes.

Journée du 19 Oct. Nous avons entrepris une nouvelle traverse, pour couvrir la communication de la demi-lune à la deuxième enceinte, dans le cas où l'ennemi viendrait à forcer le front de San Roman, que nous ne pouvions garder qu'avec peu de monde.

Dans la matinée, une sortie de la garnison eut lieu pour reprendre le poste de San Roman; l'ennemi en fut chassé, et nous détruisîmes le logement qu'il y avait commencé.

31^e *Nuit, du 19 au 20 Oct.* Vers 9 heures du soir, l'ennemi, profitant du mauvais temps, et croyant surprendre le poste de la petite traverse que nous occupions encore dans le camp retranché, se présenta avec des échelles pour l'escalader, mais il fut reçu par une si vive fusillade qu'il se retira sans rien tenter.

Nous eûmes un homme de tué et 6 de blessés.

Journée du 20 Oct. L'ennemi s'étant de nouveau établi à San Roman, une seconde sortie eut lieu pour reprendre ce poste et y établir des fougasses. La garde ennemie fut mise en fuite, après avoir perdu 6 ou 8 hommes tués ou blessés, et nos troupes ne se retirèrent qu'à la nuit.

On commença un fossé au pied de la brèche du réduit pour en augmenter l'escarpement.

32^e *Nuit, du 20 au 21 Oct.* La garnison passa toute la nuit sous les armes dans l'attente d'un nouvel assaut, que l'on avait lieu d'appréhender par le grand nombre de troupes ennemies que l'on avait vu entrer dans les boyaux.

Nous eûmes, dans les 24 heures, un homme de tué et 8 de blessés.

Journée du 21 Oct. L'ennemi avait réoccupé San Roman; mais ne s'étant pas assez avancé pour être en prise à nos fougasses, nous n'y mîmes pas le feu, et nous fîmes une nouvelle sortie sur ce point pour en construire deux autres. Cette sortie, soutenue par le feu de nos batteries, a eu le même succès que celles qui avaient déjà eu lieu. Nous fîmes 5 prisonniers.

Nous vîmes pendant le jour beaucoup de mouvements de troupes sur les hauteurs du côté de la route de France, ce qui nous fit penser que les armées étaient en présence, et nous donna l'espoir d'une prompte délivrance.

Nous eûmes, dans la journée, un homme de tué et 2 de blessés.

33^e *Nuit, du 21 au 22 Oct.* L'ennemi est resté assez tranquille dans ses tranchées; mais on a entendu beaucoup de bruit dans la ville et dans les environs.

Journée du 22 Oct. Une demi-heure avant le jour, on entendit une forte explosion qui eut lieu sur la hauteur de St. Michel, et la fusillade cessa presque en même temps sur tout le front d'attaque. On reconnut au jour que l'ennemi s'était retiré et battait en retraite, après avoir mis le feu à l'arsenal de la ville, où il était resté beaucoup d'objets lors de la retraite de l'armée. Le gouverneur envoya aussitôt en ville deux compagnies d'élite, avec un détachement de pionniers, pour éteindre l'incendie: ces troupes y réussirent en sacrifiant une aile du bâtiment, et firent encore quelques prisonniers. A 10 heures du matin, l'avant-garde de l'armée Française parut à Villa Frias; à 11 heures elle fut reconnue, et entra dans la ville.

Tel est le narré fidèle des événements qui ont eu lieu pendant le siège, qui a duré 35 jours. L'ennemi a fait 5 brèches, soit par la mine, soit par le canon, et a livré 5 assauts, dont un seul lui a réussi. De notre côté, nous avons fait 5 sorties, qui toutes ont été couronnées de succès. Une voix unanime porte la perte de l'ennemi à plus de 2000 hommes. La nôtre a été de 16 officiers et 607 sous-officiers et soldats, dont 304 ont été tués, ou sont morts des suites de leurs blessures.

Le Maréchal Prince d'Essling au Roi d'Espagne.

Oct. 1812.

J'ai reçu les lettres que V. M. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire par le gén. Lucot et par son courrier. Je prends la liberté d'adresser à V. M. l'état de situation de l'armée de Portugal, que je viens de recevoir. Le gén. Souham me prévient qu'il s'est porté sur Burgos avec un renfort de 10,000 hommes de l'armée du Nord pour dégager le fort, qui se trouve vivement pressé par Lord Wellington. Le gén. Souham m'assure que Lord Wellington est devant Burgos avec 60,000 hommes, Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnols, et que 3 divisions venant de Madrid doivent le rejoindre.

L'officier d'ordonnance que V. M. a envoyé à l'armée de Portugal m'a assuré à

son retour ici, qu'il était porteur des lettres de change dont V. M. m'a fait l'honneur de me parler dans sa lettre du 27 Sept. J'ai été absolument étranger à l'envoi des fonds dont le gén. Lhuillier a été chargé.

Ma santé est à peu près toujours la même. J'attends que S. M. l'Empereur ait prononcé mon rappel.

Que V. M. daigne croire à tous mes regrets de ne pouvoir lui donner des nouvelles preuves de mon sincère et respectueux dévouement.

Le général Thouvenot à S. E. le Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Vitoria, le 26 Oct. 1812.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à Votre Excellence l'extrait des rapports qui me sont parvenus aujourd'hui. L'escadre Anglaise a entièrement disparu de la vue des côtes du 4^{me} gouvernement, mais l'occupation de Bilbao, Castro, et Santander par les ennemis empêcherait probablement pendant l'hiver toute communication par mer avec Santoña. Quelques chaloupes ou trincadoures isolées pourront bien passer de nuit, mais je doute qu'on puisse introduire dans cette place aucuns forts convois de vivres et de munitions. Cependant la conservation de Santoña doit constamment fixer l'attention, pour que cette place ne soit pas obligée de se rendre faute de vivres et de munitions. Les mois s'écoulent vite, et au retour de la croisière Anglaise au printemps prochain, cette place importante serait compromise, si d'ici à cette époque on n'y introduisait pas des vivres. J'ai constamment réclamé l'occupation de la côte de manière à empêcher toute communication par mer entre les croisières et les bandes. C'est alors qu'on pourra commencer à améliorer notre position dans le 4^{me} gouvernement, et parvenir successivement à la destruction de l'ennemi.

Le Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre, au Roi d'Espagne. Paris, le 10 Nov. 1812.

La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m'a écrite de Requena le 18 Oct. m'est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l'ai sur-le-champ transmise à l'Empereur, qui ne la recevra, toutefois, que 19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance où l'Empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux, du moins momentanément. Si la conduite de M. le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et cauteleuse; si ses démarches présentent le même aspect que celles qu'il paraît avoir faites, et qui ont précédé l'abandon du Portugal après la prise d'Oporto, il viendra un moment où l'Empereur pourra l'en punir, s'il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins dangereux où il est qu'il ne le serait ici, où quelques factieux ont pu, du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient, méditer, en l'absence de l'Empereur, une révolution contre l'Empereur et sa dynastie, et presque l'exécuter, le 2 et 3 Oct. dernier. Je pense donc, Sire, qu'il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses qu'il pourrait tenter, et en s'assurant de la fidélité des principaux officiers de l'armée du Midi envers l'Empereur, et même de celle des Espagnols qu'il traîne à sa suite. L'arme du ridicule, qu'il est facile de manier en cette occasion, suffira, ce me semble, pour déjouer ses coupables projets, s'ils existent, et le ramener à son devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu'il ne s'en écarte jamais.

Quoi qu'il en soit, je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité d'attendre les ordres de l'Empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de V. M., datée de Requena, le 18 Oct. Elle voit, par la présente, que je partage ses sentimens sur l'objet dont elle traite; je viens d'être assez heureux pour donner à l'Empereur et à sa famille de nouvelles preuves de ma fidélité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Oct., elle la trouvera conforme aux sentimens que je me suis fait un plaisir de lui exprimer en faveur de l'Empereur et de sa famille au moment où j'ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville, il y a quelques années, &c. &c.

Le Maréchal Jourdan au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Salamanque, ce 10 Nov. 1812.

Ainsi que j'ai l'honneur d'en prévenir V. E., par ma lettre du 3 courant, le Roi est parti le 4 de Madrid avec sa Garde. Ce même jour, S. M. a établi son quartier général à Guadarrama: la cavalerie de l'armée du Midi a occupé San

Antonio de las Navas et Villa Castin ; une partie de l'infanterie est venue à Espinar et la Venta San Raphael ; l'autre partie est restée à Guadarrama et Galapagar.

Dans la nuit du 4 au 5, M. le Duc de Dalmatie rendit compte au Roi que le général Hill continuait sa retraite, et qu'il paraissait se diriger sur Arevalo, où on disait qu'il devait se réunir à Lord Wellington. Le Roi n'avait aucune nouvelle certaine de l'armée de Portugal ; cependant tous les renseignemens qu'on avait pu se procurer portaient que cette armée était arrivée sur la rive droite du Duero, que l'ennemi avait détruit tous les ponts, et que Lord Wellington annonçait avoir l'intention de laisser sur la rive gauche une portion de son armée pour observer celle de Portugal, et de se réunir avec le restant au général Hill à Arevalo, pour combattre séparément l'armée du Midi. S. M. jugea que pour ne rien compromettre, elle devait appeler à elle l'armée du Centre, qui était restée à Madrid. Elle adressa donc le 5 au matin, l'ordre à M. le Comte d'Erlon de partir de suite de Madrid, et de se porter le plus rapidement possible sur Villa Castin, d'où ensuite il suivrait la direction qu'aurait prise l'armée.

Le 5, le Roi porta son quartier général à Villa Castin ; ce même jour, notre cavalerie étant arrivée sur la Boltoya, elle aperçut sur la rive droite de cette rivière la cavalerie ennemie qui couvrait la marche de son infanterie. M. le Duc de Dalmatie fit presser la marche de son infanterie, et il réunit quelques divisions à Labajos, les autres restèrent aux environs de Villa Castin. La cavalerie suivit les mouvemens de l'ennemi, qui prit la direction de Peñaranda, et non pas celle d'Arevalo. Notre cavalerie prit poste à Villa Nueva de Gomez, Blasco Sancho, et Sanchidrian.

Le 6, le Roi porta son quartier général à Arevalo, et toute l'armée prit cette direction.

Le 7, S. M. resta à Arevalo ; on envoya des reconnaissances qui communiquèrent avec l'armée de Portugal, qui était arrivée à Medina del Campo. Les divisions de l'armée du Midi, qui étaient encore en arrière, continuèrent leur marche sur Arevalo. M. le général Comte Souham, commandant en chef l'armée de Portugal, rendit compte au Roi que Lord Wellington se dirigeait sur Salamanque avec quatre divisions de son armée et l'armée Espagnole commandée par Castaños.

Le 8, S. M. séjourna à Arevalo ; les troupes de l'armée du Midi, qui étaient encore en arrière, continuèrent leur marche, et l'armée du Centre arriva à Villa Castin ; ce même jour, M. le Duc de Dalmatie porta sa cavalerie sur Peñaranda, et quelques divisions d'infanterie vinrent à Flores de Avila.

Le 9, le Roi porta son quartier général à Flores de Avila ; l'armée du Centre se dirigea sur Fuentiveros ; celle de Portugal se dirigea sur Villoria, Babilafuente, et Huerta ; la cavalerie de l'armée du Midi se porta vers Alba de Tormes, et l'infanterie vint à Flores de Avila et à Peñaranda.

Aujourd'hui 10, le Roi est arrivé à Peñaranda, où S. M. a établi son quartier général : M. le général Comte d'Erlon a continué son mouvement pour venir s'établir à Macotera et aux environs ; l'armée de Portugal achève son mouvement sur Babilafuente. M. le Duc de Dalmatie s'est porté sur Alba de Tormes avec sa cavalerie et une partie de son infanterie. Alba de Tormes paraît être fortement occupé. M. le Duc de Dalmatie a fait tirer 1500 coups de canon sur ce poste sans pouvoir en déloger l'ennemi. M. le général Comte Souham a rendu compte que Lord Wellington occupe la position de San Christoval, en avant de Salamanque.

Pendant cette marche, on a ramassé quelques centaines de prisonniers et quelques équipages.

Le Roi d'Espagne au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Salamanque, ce 20 Nov. 1812.

Par ma lettre d'Arevalo, du 9, j'ai prié V. E. d'annoncer à l'Empereur la réunion de l'armée de Portugal aux armées du Centre et du Midi.

Le 11, je me portai devant Alba, qui était occupé par l'ennemi. Je descendis la Tormes jusqu'à Huerta, pour observer les gués et reconnaître l'armée Anglaise. Elle avait pris position et s'étendait depuis Alba jusqu'à San Christoval ; le général Hill à la droite, et Lord Wellington à la gauche. L'ennemi paraissant décidé à accepter la bataille, j'ordonnai tous les préparatifs pour le passage de la rivière, et je fis faire toutes les dispositions pour le 14.

J'ajoutai au commandement de M. le Duc de Dalmatie celui de deux divisions d'infanterie et d'une division de cavalerie de l'armée du Centre. Je donnai à M. le Comte d'Erlon le commandement de l'armée de Portugal, et je mis aux ordres de M. le général Merlin ma garde et les troupes Espagnoles.

La position occupée par l'ennemi était formidable : il l'avait étudiée depuis longtemps ; c'était toujours celle des Arapiles. Je fus d'abord tenté de faire attaquer de front ; enfoncé dans le centre, l'ennemi eût pu être séparé en deux, et perdre la moitié de son armée. Mais je fus frappé des observations des généraux qui connaissaient le pays, et je me décidai à opérer sur la droite de l'ennemi en passant la Tormes à Gali-sancho.

Les armées du Midi et du Centre devaient effectuer le passage le 14 au matin ; celle de Portugal faire des démonstrations sur les gués de Huerta, vis-à-vis Alba de Tormes, s'emparer d'Alba dès que cette ville serait évacuée par l'effet du mouvement de gauche, et se mettre en ligne avec les autres armées après avoir effectué le passage à Alba. Dans le cas où Alba n'eût pas été abandonné, elle devait passer la rivière sur les mêmes points où auraient passé les armées du Midi et du Centre.

Les ponts furent jetés sur la Tormes ; mais l'ardeur du soldat ne lui permit pas d'en attendre l'entier établissement ; le passage s'exécuta très-heureusement dans la matinée du 14. Les postes d'observation ennemis furent enlevés ; les 8000 hommes qui défendaient Alba l'évacuèrent. Dans la nuit du 14 au 15, les armées étaient sur la rive gauche de la Tormes, l'armée du Midi tenant la gauche à Mozarbes.

La cavalerie des armées du Midi et du Centre fut portée dans la soirée du 14 en avant du plateau de N^a. S^a. de Otero. Une division d'infanterie ennemie se montra, soutenue par quelques pièces d'artillerie qui couronnaient les hauteurs. Elle sembla d'abord vouloir occuper le plateau ; nous nous y établîmes. Il paraît que son mouvement n'avait pour but que de couvrir la retraite du corps qui avait abandonné Alba. L'armée de Portugal eut ordre d'appuyer le 15, sa droite du plateau de N^a. S^a. de Otero ; celles du Midi et du Centre de faire un mouvement sur leur gauche, afin de se porter sur la droite de l'ennemi et de couper sa ligne d'opérations. Le même jour, l'armée de Portugal occupait ce plateau, et les troupes des armées du Midi et du Centre les hauteurs de la chapelle de N^a. S^a. de Valbuena ; mais les mouvemens de l'ennemi étaient cachés par une brume épaisse, à laquelle succéda une pluie non interrompue, qui rendit infructueux tous les efforts qui furent tentés ; les moindres ravins étaient devenus tout-à-coup des torrens qui gênèrent singulièrement tous les mouvemens.

Cependant plusieurs explosions eurent lieu à Salamanque et annoncèrent la retraite de l'ennemi. La cavalerie se porta sur la communication de Ciudad Rodrigo. L'armée ennemie était effectivement en pleine retraite. La cavalerie suivit le lendemain 16. Quelques milliers de prisonniers, dont beaucoup d'officiers, parmi lesquels le général Paget, commandant la 1^{re} division de l'armée Anglaise, beaucoup de bagages, beaucoup de voitures, sont tombés au pouvoir de la cavalerie des armées du Midi, de Portugal, et du Centre. Les rapports particuliers des généraux commandant les armées, que j'aurai soin d'adresser à V. E., la mettront dans le cas de ne rien laisser ignorer à l'Empereur de ce qui est passé.

Je ne pense pas exagérer en avançant que depuis la réunion de l'armée du Midi et du Centre, qui a forcé l'ennemi d'abandonner ses projets sur le nord, son armée a perdu plus de 12,000 hommes à Chinchilla, au passage du Tage, à Burgos, à Cabezón, sur la Tormes, à Matilla, etc.

Ordre.

Au quartier général de Salamanque, ce 20 Nov. 1812.

Nous, Joseph Napoléon, Roi d'Espagne et des Indes, Commandant en Chef les armées Impériales en Espagne, considérant que les trois armées du Midi, du Portugal, et du Centre, sont destinées à opérer ensemble et sous notre commandement immédiat, qu'il est par conséquent indispensable de centraliser les diverses branches de service des trois armées, et d'en confier la surveillance à un état major général qui réside près de nous ;

Nous ordonnons ce qui suit :

M. le général de division Lery se rendra près de nous ; il remplira les fonctions de Commandant en Chef du génie des armées du Midi, du Portugal, et du Centre : il sera remplacé à l'armée du Midi par le général du génie le plus ancien.

M. le général Dedon remplira les fonctions de Commandant en Chef de l'artillerie des trois armées.

M. le commissaire ordonnateur Mathieu Favier se rendra près de nous ; il remplira les fonctions de commissaire ordonnateur en Chef des trois armées : il sera remplacé à l'armée du Midi par le commissaire ordonnateur le plus ancien.

M. l'Inspecteur aux revues Garreau se rendra également près de nous ; il

remplira les fonctions d'Inspecteur en Chef des trois armées : il sera remplacé à l'armée du Midi par l'inspecteur ou le sous-inspecteur le plus ancien.

MM. les généraux commandants du génie, MM. les généraux commandants l'artillerie, MM. les commissaires ordonnateurs en chef, et MM. les inspecteurs aux revues des armées du Midi, du Portugal, et du Centre, correspondront chacun dans sa partie avec MM. les généraux Lery et Dedon, M. l'ordonnateur en chef Mathieu Favier, et M. l'inspecteur aux revues Garreau : ils leur rendront compte de leurs opérations, et exécuteront leurs ordres.

M. le maréchal d'Empire Jourdan, notre Chef d'état major général, est chargé de l'exécution du présent ordre, qui sera mis à l'ordre des armées du Midi, du Portugal, et du Centre.

No. VII. (p. 242.)

Edital.

Lisboa, 28 de Dezembro, de 1812.

O Senado da Camara, sendo sciente de que o Heróe deste Seculo, o Ill^{mo} e Ex^{mo} Senhor Marquez de Torres Vedras, o Defensor da Peninsula, e muito particularmente dos Portuguezes, recolhendo-se de Cadis para o seu Quartel-General, faz caminho por esta Cidade; a mais devedora, entre muitas, da sua muito particular, e famosa defeza, em o momento, que ella era ameaçada da mais horrorosa catastrophe; vai fazer demonstraçoẽs de regozijo (naõ as que deseja, e Sua Excellencia morece; mas aquellas, que o tempo, e as actuaes circunstancias permittem) eo mesmo Senado tem o maior gosto deo annunciar aos moradores desta Cidade; naõ determinando, mas sim esperando de hum povo que pela sua grandeza d'alma he o mais leal, e agradecido, o acompanhe em os mesmos regozijos, conforme as suas faculdades o permittirem.

No. VIII. (p. 441.)

DOM JOAÕ, por Graça de Deos, Principe Regente de Portugal, e dos Algarves, d'aquem, e d'além mar, em Africa Senhor de Guiné, e da Conquista, Navegaçaõ, e Commercio da Ethiopia, da Arabia, Persia, e da India, &c. Faço saber aos que esta Minha Carta virem. Que Querendo dar ao Marquez de Torres Vedras, Marechal General, e Commandante em Chefe dos exercitos alliados, hum novo testemunho da Minha Real Satisfaçaõ e Reconhecimento de que tanto se faz credor pela continuacão das brilhantes victorias com que tem com immortal gloria abatido o orgulho do inimigo commun, e malogrado os seus projectos na Peninsula, e fazendo-se merecedor de que Eu o Accrescente em grandeza com hum titulo que recorde taõ memoraveis triunfos. Hei por bem e Me Praz Fazer-lhe mercê do titulo de Duque da Victoria. Izentando-o do pagamento dos novos e velhos direitos, e quaesquer outros emolumentos que por esta mercê se costumãõ pagar, e Quero e Mando que o referido Marquez de Torres Vedras se chame Duque da Victoria, e que com este titulo goze de todas as honras, preeminencias, authoridades, prerogativas, privilegios, izençoens e franquezas que haõ e tem e de que usaõ, e sempre usáraõ os Duques destes Reinos, assim como de direito, e por uso e antigo costume lhe pertencem, e que lhe sejaõ guardadas em todos os actos e tempos sem mingoamento ou duvida alguma que a isso lhe seja posta; por que assim he Minha Mercê e Vontade. E com o referido titulo de Duque da Victoria haverá o assentamento que lhe pertencer de que pelo Conselho da Minha Real Fazenda se lhe passará Alvará na forma costumada. E por firmeza de tudo o que dito he, lhe Mandeí dar esta Carta por Mim assinada, passada pela Chancelaria, e sellada com o sello pendente das Minhas armas. Naõ pagon novos direitos nem velhos por assim o haver determinado.

Dada no Palacio do Rio de Janeiro, aos onze dias do mez de Janeiro, anno do nascimento de nosso Senhor Jesu Christo de mil oito centos e treze.

No. IX. (p. 613.)

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neufchâtel, Major Général, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne.
Paris, le 25 Août, 1811.

L'Empereur me charge de prévenir V. M. que Figüères s'est rendu à discrétion; mais toute la province de Catalogne est restée en insurrection. C'est le seul pays de l'Espagne qui se soit soulevé avec autant d'acharnement. La haine qui a constamment animé ce pays contre la France, et qui en moins d'un siècle lui a coûté tant de sang, a décidé l'Empereur à réunir la Catalogne à l'Empire Français, quoiqu'elle ne soit pas vaincue, et qu'il faudra la conquérir village par

village. Dans aucune autre province d'Espagne rien n'approche de ce qui se passe dans ce pays ; et S. M., pour l'intérêt de l'Empire, veut y mettre ordre pour toujours. La Catalogne est tellement dévastée qu'il faudra bien des années pour la rétablir, et pour qu'elle puisse être de quelque secours.

No. X. (pp. 637, 690, 726.)

SIEGE OF S. SEBASTIAN.

Le général Rey au Ministre de la Guerre.

St. Sébastien, le 25 Juillet, 1813.

Le 22, le général Anglais qui commande le siège m'a envoyé un parlementaire, que j'ai refusé de recevoir, quoique la brèche fût praticable.

Le 23 et le 24, l'ennemi a continué son feu avec 30 ou 35 bouches à feu. Il a ouvert deux nouvelles brèches, et ruiné toutes les maisons qui se trouvent en arrière du front de la Zurriola, depuis la grande courtine jusqu'au bastion St. Elme. Dès le 22, il avait mis le feu sur plusieurs points de la ville, et il l'a alimenté les jours suivants par le jet continu de ses bombes et de ses obus.

Ce matin 25, à 4 heures, les Anglais, profitant de la conduite des eaux de la ville, y ont établi une mine qui a renversé la contrescarpe et bouleversé la place d'armes rentrante du chemin couvert. A ce signal, des colonnes d'attaque se sont élancées ; mais partout l'ennemi a été reçu avec la plus grande vigueur, et mis en fuite : tout ce qui a abordé les brèches a été tué ou blessé. Ce fait d'armes fait le plus grand honneur à la garnison de St. Sébastien, et j'aurai l'honneur de faire connaître à Votre Excellence, dans mon premier rapport, les noms des braves qui se sont particulièrement distingués.

J'estime que les Anglais ont perdu de 1400 à 1500 hommes, tant aux brèches que dans le chemin couvert de l'ouvrage à cornes. Le général Anglais m'ayant demandé à faire enterrer ses morts, j'ai accordé une suspension d'armes d'une heure pour faire cette opération. Nos troupes ont fait sur la brèche ou à son pied un assez grand nombre de prisonniers, dont 13 officiers ; ces prisonniers assurent que 10 de leurs officiers ont été tués, entre autres le général major qui commandait la première colonne.

M. le colonel de Songeon, à qui j'avais confié le commandement de la gauche de mes opérations, tandis que je dirigeais celles du centre et de la droite, m'a parfaitement secondé. M. le chef de bataillon Blanchard, du 62^{me} de ligne, qui commande les postes extérieurs ; M. Gillet, chef de bataillon du génie ; MM. Goblet et St. George, officiers du génie ; M. le capitaine Doat, mon aide de camp, et M. le chef de bataillon Brion, commandant l'artillerie, ont rendu de grands services.

J'aurai l'honneur de faire connaître à Son Excellence M. le Duc de Dalmatie, dans un rapport particulier, les noms de MM. les officiers, sous-officiers, et soldats qui se sont particulièrement distingués dans cette journée, afin qu'il veuille bien solliciter pour eux les grâces de l'Empereur ; je recommande ces braves à votre bienveillance. M. le chef de bataillon Desailly, du 22^{me} de ligne, a été tué sur la brèche ; M. le capitaine Bidon, commandant les sapeurs, a été tué au poste d'honneur. Notre perte ne passe pas 40 hommes mis hors de combat.

J'écris très à la hâte à Votre Excellence. M. le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie m'a fait l'honneur de me mander qu'il se mettrait prochainement en mouvement pour forcer l'ennemi à lever le siège.

Le général Rey au Ministre de la Guerre.

St. Sébastien, le 26 Juillet, 1813.

Un officier parlementaire s'est présenté cette après-midi pour demander des renseignements sur plusieurs officiers prisonniers. Il paraissait très-inquiet sur le sort du colonel du 1^{er} régiment Royal, qui a été blessé mortellement sur la brèche. Cet officier a confirmé ce que les prisonniers avaient déjà dit, que leurs plus belles compagnies de grenadiers avaient totalement été détruites dans l'assaut d'hier. Il est certain que les Anglais ont perdu à cet assaut, 1 colonel, 4 lieutenants-colonels ou majors, 42 officiers, et 1900 sous-officiers ou soldats tués, blessés, ou prisonniers. L'officier parlementaire nous a remercié, au nom de son général, des soins qu'il nous a vu prendre de ses blessés. L'ennemi a embarqué aujourd'hui 36 chaloupes de blessés. Son feu s'est ralenti, et il n'a jete que quelques obus sur les maisons incendiées, ce qui me fait présumer qu'il commence à embarquer ses troupes.

La moitié de la ville est totalement détruite par le feu, et la plus grande partie

des maisons restantes sont extrêmement endommagées. On n'a pu encore parvenir à arrêter l'incendie ; si le vent s'élevait, le reste de la ville serait perdu.

Les Anglais ont consommé une quantité prodigieuse de munitions avec leurs 46 bouches à feu constamment en action ; la proximité de leur flotte pouvait seule suffire à cette consommation.

Je continue à faire barricader les rues de la ville, que je compte défendre pied à pied, si toutefois j'étais forcé de quitter ma première ligne. Votre Excellence peut compter que la garnison de St. Sébastien fera son devoir, et continuera de donner des preuves de son absolu dévouement à notre auguste Empereur.

P.S. J'avais oublié de parler à Votre Excellence des échelles dont s'étaient munies les troupes ennemies pour l'attaque des brèches et de l'ouvrage à cornes ; nous nous en sommes emparés.

Le général Rey au Ministre de la Guerre.

St. Sébastien, le 27 Juillet, 1813.

Ce matin, à 4 heures, en faisant une tournée des postes avancés de gauche avec M. le colonel de Songeon, qui les commande, je me suis aperçu que plusieurs chaloupes quittaient les dunes de la rive droite de l'Uruméa pour rejoindre la croisière, et je me suis aussitôt convaincu que les batteries de brèche établies dans ces dunes étaient désarmées. Je me suis aussitôt rendu aux postes avancés du front de terre, où l'ennemi avait cessé également ses travaux, et ne tirait plus. Je me suis alors décidé à faire faire une sortie pour aller à la découverte. J'ordonnai donc aux 2 compagnies de chasseurs de montagne du 3^{me} bataillon, aux voltigeurs du 62^{me} régiment, et aux sapeurs qui étaient aux travaux, de marcher rapidement sur les tranchées, et de détruire ou prendre tout ce qu'ils rencontreraient : l'artillerie reçut l'ordre de protéger ces troupes. Ainsi que je l'avais présumé, l'ennemi a été surpris, et tout ce qui se trouvait dans la tranchée a été égorgé. Nos troupes se sont portées d'un côté jusqu'au pont brûlé de Ste. Catherine, et de l'autre jusqu'au faubourg de St. Martin, et sont ensuite rentrées en ville, après avoir comblé une partie des tranchées.

Cette opération a été parfaitement conduite par M. le chef de bataillon Blanchard. Nous avons fait 81 prisonniers, dont 9 officiers ; et 140 hommes Anglais, qui voulaient passer la rivière, se sont noyés.

Notre artillerie a fait beaucoup de mal à l'ennemi, qui, en moins d'une heure, a perdu plus de 200 hommes, c'est-à-dire, presque tout ce qui était de tranchée. Nos troupes ont agi avec la plus grande vigueur. Les chasseurs de montagne, le 62^{me}, et les sapeurs méritent les plus grands éloges. M. le lieutenant Dugas, des chasseurs de montagne, s'est particulièrement fait remarquer en s'élançant un des premiers dans la parallèle, où il a été blessé. L'ennemi n'a riposté à notre feu qu'avec 5 pièces de bataille, savoir : 1 au Mont Ulia, 1 à l'ancienne batterie de brèche, 1 au couvent St. Bartholomé, et 2 en avant de ce couvent. L'ennemi a commencé ses préparatifs pour lever le siège. Malgré tous nos efforts, l'incendie continue ses ravages, le vent ayant augmenté : cette ville méritait un meilleur sort.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

St. Sébastien, le 2 Août, 1813.

J'ai l'honneur de rendre compte à Votre Excellence, que, dans la nuit du 29 au 30, j'ai fait une petite sortie qui a ramené 6 soldats Anglais ; l'ennemi a eu 15 d'hommes tués ou blessés. Cette nuit, une nouvelle sortie a fait 7 prisonniers, dont un sergent très-intelligent de la légion Britannique : je le crois sortant des régiments Napolitains. Il était arrivé depuis 3 jours de Vitoria. Il m'a assuré que Wellington, qui se trouve dans les montagnes de la Navarre, avait demandé beaucoup d'artillerie de celle qui nous avait été prise à Vitoria, et qu'on la lui a envoyée conduite par des bœufs ; que le général Castaños est à Tolosa avec 3000 ou 4000 hommes ; que des renforts ont été envoyés dans les montagnes, et qu'on s'attend que les Français attaqueront bientôt. S'ils sont victorieux, dit-il, il y aura beaucoup de désertion.

L'ennemi ne conserve sur les sables de la rive droite de l'Uruméa, et au Mont Ulia, que 5 pièces, dont 2 obusiers : si je pouvais réunir 100 nageurs, j'aurais cherché à faire enclouer ces pièces. Il travaille lentement aux batteries qu'il a entreprises à la Antiqua et près de St. Bartholomé, où il conserve 6 pièces, dont 1 obusier. La facilité avec laquelle il forme ses tranchées dans le sable m'a déterminé à ne rien entreprendre de sérieux pour les combler. Pour arriver à ce résultat, il faudrait plusieurs heures de travaux qui, faits sous la mitraille, nous

occasionneraient des pertes graves sans obtenir un avantage assez grand pour les balancer. La garnison est animée du meilleur esprit, et il est essentiel de lui conserver jusqu'à de nouvelles attaques cette supériorité qu'elle a sur l'ennemi. J'ai lieu d'espérer, Monseigneur, que si les Anglais se présentent de nouveau, ils seront bien reçus.

J'ai fait réparer la contrescarpe à la place d'armes rentrante de l'ouvrage à cornes qui avait été renversée par l'ennemi lors de l'attaque du 25 Juillet : on remplacera également les palissades qui manquent au chemin couvert. On a ouvert plusieurs galeries de mine pour s'opposer aux travaux que l'ennemi pourrait tenter, et l'on s'occupe chaque jour de rendre les brèches impraticables, en réparant la nuit ce que l'ennemi détruit pendant le jour. Les traverses pour la défense de la ville sont achevées, et nous nous en servirons, je pense, avec succès, si nous y sommes forcés. Le nombre de nos blessés et de ceux qui ont été pris à l'ennemi s'élève à 480, sans compter un grand nombre de soldats légèrement blessés et traités à la chambre.

Hier matin, malgré la croisière Anglaise, composée de 9 voiles, de 4 transports, et de 12 péniches, il nous est arrivé de St. Jean de Luz 2 trincadours, 1 chaloupe, et 1 lanche, conduisant 6 officiers de santé, 1 officier d'artillerie, et 4 canonniers. Ces bâtiments ont débarqué 2 tonneaux de linge, 900 pelles rondes, et plusieurs caisses de clous. Le temps étant favorable, je ferai partir ce soir les 2 trincadours ; je conserverai la chaloupe pour mes prochaines dépêches.

Dans ma position, tout doit être employé pour me maintenir le plus longtemps possible dans la place, afin d'attendre le résultat de vos opérations. Votre Excellence peut compter que rien ne sera oublié pour remplir cette attente, et que nous mériterons votre bienveillance en nous rendant dignes des grâces de notre auguste Empereur.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

St. Sébastien, le 7 Août, 1813, à 4 heures du soir.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence le 2 au soir par le retour de deux trincadours qui étaient arrivées dans la nuit du 31 Juillet au 1^{er} Août.

Dans la journée du 3, l'ennemi a beaucoup tiré dans le port, avec l'intention de couler les bâtiments qui s'y trouvent. Il a coupé quelques mâts, et un de ses boulets a endommagé la trincadour *la Biscaye* ; mais un travail de deux ou trois heures suffira pour la réparer : je pense qu'il croyait que les deux trincadours parties la veille étaient encore dans le port. L'ennemi a beaucoup augmenté le nombre de ses travailleurs sur la hauteur de St. Bartholomé, et il lance constamment des boulets creux sur nos travailleurs et sur la ville.

Le 4, l'ennemi a continué ses travaux sur la hauteur de St. Bartholomé, et a entrepris une grande communication, qui le conduira à couvert, de ses camps dans les ouvrages avancés. Plusieurs généraux ou officiers supérieurs ont été aperçus en reconnaissance, à portée de canon de la place. Une frégate venant de l'ouest a apporté des munitions.

Le 5, l'ennemi a travaillé avec beaucoup d'activité à achever ses batteries sur la hauteur de St. Bartholomé, et à perfectionner ses communications. Il a renforcé ses postes du côté du couvent de San Francisco. Vers 4 heures de l'après-midi, nous avons vu arriver par la route d'Hernani un convoi d'artillerie, composé de 20 pièces, de 6 obusiers, et de 5 caissons.

Dans les journées du 4 et du 5, l'ennemi a paru très-occupé à confectionner des gabions et des fascines. Il a montré la même activité le 6, et paraîtrait avoir l'intention de faire de nouveaux travaux à la batterie de brèche. Il a lancé des obus et des boulets creux, et pendant la nuit il a beaucoup agrandi la batterie de 4 pièces qu'il avait établie le 23, à gauche de la batterie de brèche, sans doute pour ouvrir à la fois le septième bastion de gauche, la fausse braie, le bastion St. Jean, et toute la partie de la muraille qui se trouve à la droite de la brèche. Aujourd'hui, même activité dans ses travaux, et il est probable qu'il se dispose à reprendre le siège.

Notre artillerie a constamment cherché à inquiéter les travailleurs de l'ennemi, et nos travaux ont été poussés avec activité. On a achevé de perfectionner la traverse du septième bastion de droite. On a palissadé l'ouverture qui se trouve près de la mer entre le bastion du cavalier, la contre-garde, et le chemin couvert de l'ouvrage à cornes. On a fortifié le derrière des brèches, et l'on s'est occupé des moyens d'améliorer l'armement des divers ouvrages et de plusieurs travaux

partiels devant concourir à la défense de la place. Je puis assurer à Votre Excellence que tout le monde travaille avec la plus grande activité à se mettre en mesure de bien recevoir l'ennemi. Votre Excellence peut compter que la garnison, qui est animée du meilleur esprit, fera son devoir.

Il serait bien à désirer, Monseigneur, que le gouvernement adoptât comme moyen de défense les boulets creux. Ce projectile, que l'ennemi a trouvé le moyen de faire éclater à volonté, nous fait beaucoup de mal : n'en ayant pas, nous mettons dans nos obus 60 de balles, ce qui nous réussit assez bien. Nous aurions grand besoin des 10,000 sacs à terre que vous m'aviez annoncés : j'écris à M. Depoge pour qu'il fasse en sorte de me les faire arriver. La santé du soldat est bonne. Les autorités locales se conduisent parfaitement.

Le capitaine de frégate Depoge, commandant de la marine à St. Jean de Luz, au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie. St. Jean de Luz, le 8 Août, 1813.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que, depuis le 15 Juillet dernier, j'ai rendu compte tous les jours à M. le général Comte Gazan, chef de l'état-major, des mouvements du port, de ceux de la division ennemie sur cette côte, ainsi que des objets qui ont été expédiés pour St. Sébastien. J'aurai l'honneur d'adresser à l'avenir ces rapports directement à Votre Excellence.

Le 6, à 8 heures du soir, j'expédiai pour St. Sébastien deux trincadoures, sur lesquelles j'avais fait embarquer 6 ballots, contenant 1500 chemises, 2 barriques de souliers, 8 ballots de linge à pansement, et 8 artilleurs. A minuit, les trincadoures étaient rendues à deux lieues dans le N. O. de Fontarabie, où elles trouvèrent les vents d'ouest joli frais. A 1 heure, leurs efforts pour avancer devenant inutiles, elles rentrèrent au Socoa à 2½ heures.

Hier à 8 heures du soir, j'expédiai de nouveau ces trincadoures. A minuit, elles étaient rendues à une lieue et demie dans le nord de St. Sébastien, lorsqu'elles eurent connaissance de 6 bâtiments, dont 3 à la voile. A minuit et un quart, elles furent aperçues du bâtiment le plus au large, qui les chassa jusque par le travers de Fontarabie, et les força de rentrer au Socoa ce matin à 4 heures. Il est extrêmement difficile, Monseigneur, de faire ces expéditions avec succès, lorsque surtout la lune éclaire toute la nuit. Une petite lanche, que j'avais expédiée le 1^{er} de ce mois pour St. Sébastien, a fait son retour ce matin à 4½ heures. Le patron était porteur d'une dépêche de M. le général Rey pour Votre Excellence. J'ai remis aussitôt cette dépêche à la mairie. D'après le rapport que je reçois de St. Sébastien, il y a devant cette place 2 frégates, 2 bricks, 1 goëlette, 1 lougre, et 7 ou 8 lanches armées par les Anglais, qui se tiennent toutes les nuits entre les bâtiments et la terre. Il y a dans le port du Pasages 5 bricks, dont un de guerre ; dans la rade de Guetaria, 4 transports ; et dans celle de Fontarabie, un brick et un cutter.

Il reste dans le magasin du Socoa 10,000 sacs à terre, 600 pèles, 1200 planches, un baril de clous, et 8 ballots de linge à pansement. Il y a aussi 11 canonnières destinés pour St. Sébastien. J'en ai fait embarquer 8 sur les trincadoures qui ont relâché ce matin, et qui partiront ce soir, si le temps le permet.

J'avais remis la première dépêche de Votre Excellence pour M. le général Rey, au capitaine d'une trincadoure. La dernière dépêche ne m'a été remise qu'hier soir, à 8½ heures, et les trincadoures étaient alors parties. J'expédierai cette dépêche ce soir par la petite lanche, excellente embarcation, ou par les trincadoures.

Depuis 48 heures on n'a pas entendu tirer le canon de St. Sébastien, et il est très-difficile de l'entendre lorsque les vents sont dans la partie du N.E. au S.E.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie. St. Sébastien, le 9 Août, 1813.

J'ignore si la chaloupe que j'ai dépêchée le 7 au soir est arrivée à sa destination. J'avais l'honneur de vous rendre compte que, depuis le 3, l'ennemi avait multiplié ses travaux, tant sur les sables de St. François que sur la hauteur de St. Bartholomé. Ce matin, il a démasqué 10 nouvelles embrasures en avant de sa batterie de brèche. 5 de ces pièces voient le chemin des rondes de la Zurriola et le bastion St. Elme. Les autres sont dirigées contre la partie de droite de la brèche, le bastion St. Jean, la fausse braie, et le demi-bastion de gauche de l'ouvrage à cornes. Deux nouvelles embrasures ont également été démasquées contre le front de terre à la redoute de St. Bartholomé. L'ennemi continue ses travaux avec activité ; ses préparatifs sont considérables, et il est à croire, qu'après

tant de sacrifices, il prendra tous les moyens pour réussir. Votre Excellence peut être certaine que la garnison fera son devoir, et se défendra avec vigueur.

Dans ma dernière dépêche, j'avais l'honneur de vous mander que le 4 il était arrivé au camp derrière St. Bartholomé un parc de 13 pièces, dont 6 obusiers. Une frégate venant du nord apporta des munitions; et hier au soir il est arrivé au Pasages, venant de l'ouest, 11 gros transports chargés: j'ignore s'il y avait des troupes à bord.

Cette nuit, on a entendu une fusillade en mer. Je crains que ce ne soit quelque bateau qui m'apportait des dépêches; c'est ce qui me détermine à faire partir une embarcation ce soir, pour prévenir que ce bateau n'est point arrivé. L'ennemi continue à tirer des obus et des boulets creux. Un officier de grenadiers du 22^{me} a été tué aujourd'hui: je le regrette beaucoup.

J'attends avec impatience des nouvelles de France, et je désire fort en recevoir directement de Votre Excellence.

On travaille beaucoup pour se mettre dans le meilleur état de défense, et opposer à l'ennemi le plus d'obstacles possibles. Nul doute qu'une partie des moyens de défense que nous avons préparés ne soient détruits par les nouvelles dispositions de l'ennemi. Nous ferons tout pour y suppléer.

Du 10 au soir.

La mer a été tellement mauvaise la dernière nuit, et les vents si contraires, qu'il n'a point été possible au bateau de partir. J'espère qu'il pourra sortir ce soir.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie. St. Sébastien, le 11 Août, 1813.

J'ai reçu cette nuit les lettres que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 4 et le 9 du courant, ainsi qu'un envoi de 1500 chemises, un ballot de linge de pansement, et 9 canonniers. J'écris à M. l'intendant général de nous faire passer de la viande salée dont nous avons besoin, et des moutons pour les hôpitaux. Je prie Votre Excellence de nous faire parvenir, outre les sacs à terre demandés, des pioches, dont nous manquons totalement; le peu qu'on nous enverra nous sera très-utile.

Nous ne cessons pas un instant de travailler..... Je puis assurer Votre Excellence que jour et nuit nous sommes occupés des moyens qui doivent améliorer notre situation. Le bateau que j'avais fait sortir hier a été chassé à une lieue et demie, et obligé de rentrer dans le port.

Je compte faire partir ce soir les deux trincadoures et la chaloupe. Je ferai évacuer avec ces transports 20 malades dont la guérison ne peut être prompte. Je craindrais, Monseigneur, de hasarder les prisonniers Anglais, qui, s'ils étaient repris, pourraient donner des renseignements sur la situation intérieure de la place, étant obligé de les occuper à divers travaux. Ils sont bien surveillés, et ils me rendent des services. Lorsque les nuits seront plus longues, et le passage plus facile, je tâcherai d'en faire évacuer une partie sur St. Jean de Luz.

J'ai fait connaître à la garnison ce que Votre Excellence veut bien me dire de flatteur pour elle, et elle n'oubliera rien pour mériter votre bienveillance et les grâces de notre auguste Empereur.

P.S. L'ennemi continue de nous jeter quelques obus et boulets creux. Il travaille avec activité à établir ses batteries et à faire des gabions.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie. St. Sébastien, le 29 Août, 1813.

Le capitaine Doat, mon aide de camp, est arrivé heureusement ce matin à 1 heure.

Hier et aujourd'hui l'ennemi a fait un feu épouvantable d'artillerie, de plus de 70 pièces, mortiers ou obusiers. Le fort est écrasé de projectiles, et la presque totalité des édifices du donjon est détruite. Vous ne pouvez, Monseigneur, vous faire une idée de la quantité de bombes et d'obus que l'ennemi y lance. Dans la ville, c'est une grêle continuelle d'éclats d'obus, de boulets creux, et de balles. Hier matin l'ennemi a démasqué une batterie de 4 pièces de 27, qu'il avait établie à 100 toises de la place, au delà de son boyau le plus avancé de droite, et il en construit une nouvelle plus rapprochée encore de nos ouvrages. La face et le flanc du bastion sont entièrement ruinés. L'extrémité gauche de la courtine présente une brèche très-praticable, qui s'étend jusqu'à la première brèche, et la totalité de la muraille entre la première et la deuxième brèche se trouve ouverte, en sorte qu'il n'existe plus maintenant qu'une seule brèche depuis le bastion St. Jean jusqu'à la gauche

de la deuxième brèche. Tous les obstacles qu'il avait été possible de créer pour la défense de ces brèches ont été détruits. L'ennemi a dans ses camps beaucoup de monde, et ce matin encore nous avons vu arriver une colonne de 2000 hommes. Il cherchera probablement à donner l'assaut la nuit prochaine. Toutes nos dispositions sont prises, pour faire en sorte de le repousser, et le soldat est bien disposé. Si, malgré tous nos efforts, et vu les forces de l'ennemi, nous sommes forcés d'abandonner la ville, nous tâcherons de nous réfugier dans le fort. J'ai si peu de monde que quand tous mes postes sont placés, il ne me reste plus que deux réserves de 125 hommes chacune. Nous avons fait beaucoup de pertes ; elles s'augmentent à chaque instant, et elles seront bien plus grandes encore, quand nous serons retirés dans le fort, où nous nous trouverons sans abris, et sans moyens d'en former. Pour augmenter encore ses feux, l'ennemi établit de nouvelles batteries à la Antigua, au rocher de S^{ta} Clara, et au fanal ; toutes sont dirigées contre le fort ou ses communications. Voilà exactement, Monseigneur, quelle est notre position ; vous devez voir s'il est urgent que V. E. arrive promptement. Ce dont vous pouvez être certain, c'est que tous nos efforts seront employés pour repousser vivement l'ennemi. Quel que soit le sort qui attende la garnison de St. Sébastien, cette garnison aura bien rempli son devoir. Je le répéterai à V. E., je suis bien secondé par M. le colonel de Songeon et par MM. les chefs de corps. Je désire vivement être bientôt à même de solliciter de V. E. les récompenses auxquelles ces officiers ont droit par leurs bons services. Tout le monde est animé du dévouement le plus absolu pour notre auguste Empereur. Dans aucune circonstance son nom immortel n'aura été invoqué au milieu d'un plus grand nombre de bombes, d'obus, et de boulets creux.

Je prie V. E. d'avoir la bonté de prévenir le Ministre de la Guerre de notre position, et de ce qu'a fait la garnison de St. Sébastien, pour mériter que notre auguste Souverain dise d'elle qu'il en est content.

Vers 4 heures, on a aperçu dans les batteries 5 généraux, parmi lesquels on a cru reconnaître Wellington ; aussi le feu a-t-il été redoublé, s'il est possible.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

Au Fort de St. Sébastien, le 31 Août, 1813.

Ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de le mander à V. E. par le capitaine Doat, mon aide de camp, parti le 29 au soir, et qui, je l'espère, aura pu passer à travers la croisière, l'ennemi, au lieu de nous attaquer le 30, nous a attaqués le 31, à 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ du matin. Les dispositions étaient prises pour le bien recevoir. A peine les troupes ennemies avaient-elles commencé à déboucher de leurs boyaux, qu'une mine chargée de 800 livres de poudre, préparée en avant du bastion de gauche de l'ouvrage à cornes, a sauté ; elle doit leur avoir fait éprouver une perte considérable, car elle ne se trouvait qu'à 4 toises des premiers boyaux, et a occasionné les plus grands dégâts. L'ennemi s'est présenté, sur plusieurs colonnes, à la brèche du bastion St. Jean, à celle de la grande courtine et le long de la Zurriola, en s'étendant vers le bastion St. Elme. Sur tous les points, il a été reçu avec la plus grande vigueur. Une pièce de 12, conservée avec beaucoup de soin sur le cavalier, et une pièce de 8, établie dans l'intérieur de la casemate du même cavalier, ont été dirigées sur l'ennemi avec le plus grand succès par M. le capitaine d'artillerie Duhamel, officier très-distingué : ces pièces, qui prenaient l'ennemi en flanc sur la brèche de St. Jean, lui ont fait éprouver une perte très-considérable. D'un autre côté, les défenseurs de l'ouvrage à cornes, sous les ordres du capitaine Blot du 62^{me}, se sont réunis dans le bastion de gauche de cet ouvrage, et ont écrasé l'ennemi par leur fusillade ; tandis qu'une pièce de 4, établie au centre même de ce bastion par M. le capitaine d'artillerie Gorse, qui l'avait amenée avec beaucoup de peine du bastion de droite, faisait aussi dans les rangs de l'ennemi les plus grands ravages. M. Gorse, officier d'un grand mérite, a été blessé grièvement dans l'action, et il a perdu tous ses canonniers. Des colonnes Portugaises, qui ont voulu passer à gué la rivière, pour attaquer de front la brèche de gauche, ont été repoussées, et ont éprouvé de grandes pertes, tant par la fusillade des défenseurs de la brèche que par le feu de l'artillerie du fort et d'une pièce de 16 conservée au bastion St. Elme.

Il n'y a pas d'exemple peut-être, Monseigneur, d'un assaut qui ait duré aussi longtemps, et où l'on se soit battu avec autant d'acharnement. Commencé à 10 $\frac{1}{2}$, il a duré jusqu'à 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ heures sans la moindre interruption. On s'y est même battu à coups de pierres. L'ennemi, repoussé quatre fois des brèches, a constamment renouvelé ses attaques par de nouvelles colonnes. De notre côté, nos faibles

réserves ont soutenu les troupes placées sur les brèches. Il est bien malheureux que la faiblesse de la garnison ne nous ait pas permis d'avoir quelques troupes de plus pour assurer le succès de cette journée, qui, quoique l'ennemi nous ait forcés à rentrer dans le fort, n'en est pas moins une des plus glorieuses pour la garnison.

Malheureusement l'explosion d'un dépôt de cartouches d'infanterie et de boulets creux, qui se trouvait sur la courtine, nous a occasionné des pertes, et a jeté parmi nous un moment de confusion. Mais l'enthousiasme et la bravoure des compagnies d'élite a empêché l'ennemi de pouvoir profiter de cet événement; car il n'a pas gagné un pouce de terrain, et ce n'est que longtemps après que l'ennemi, ayant réuni dans les décombres derrière les brèches des forces considérables, a fait plier le centre, et nous a forcés de songer à la retraite.

M. le colonel de Songeon, qui commandait à la gauche, m'a parfaitement secondé à la tête des troupes sous ses ordres: il a repoussé par deux fois l'ennemi sur la brèche, où il a été légèrement blessé d'un coup de feu et de plusieurs contusions. MM. les chefs de bataillon Cramaille, du 1^{er} de ligne, de Lupé, des chasseurs de montagne, et Gillet, du génie, ont été grièvement blessés.

A 6 heures du soir, les troupes de la garnison, après avoir défendu les traverses qui devaient assurer leur retraite dans le fort, étaient réparties dans les positions qu'elles devaient occuper autour de ce fort, où, se trouvant sans abris, elles auront beaucoup à souffrir des feux croisés de l'ennemi.

La journée du 31 Août, quoique fâcheuse pour la garnison, la couvre de gloire, et l'ennemi sera étonné lorsqu'il connaîtra combien peu de monde lui était opposé. Dans un rapport plus détaillé, j'aurai l'honneur de vous faire connaître tous les braves qui se sont distingués; le nombre en est grand. Chefs, officiers, soldats, tous ont rivalisé de zèle et de dévouement. Je prierai V. E. de solliciter pour eux les grâces de l'Empereur; ils s'en sont rendus dignes. J'estime notre perte à 400 hommes hors de combat, dont 20 officiers. Celle de l'ennemi doit être immense.

Cette place, dans un dénûment absolu de toutes choses, et dans le plus mauvais état, n'en a pas moins soutenu, avec la plus grande vigueur, les efforts de l'ennemi pendant 63 jours, dont 56 de tranchée ouverte. Pour mon compte, Monseigneur, j'ai tout fait pour mériter la confiance dont j'ai été honoré par l'Empereur.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

Au Fort de St. Sébastien, le 31 Août, 1813.

A 1 heure, la marée étant basse, des colonnes Anglaises ont monté à l'assaut; elles ont été repoussées aux cris de '*Vive l'Empereur!*' par deux fois, des colonnes Portugaises très-fortes se sont présentées, et deux fois elles ont été repoussées, soit à la droite, soit à la gauche. Le feu était si vif que malheureusement des obus et des boulets creux, placés aux traverses sur la courtine, et des cartouches d'infanterie, ont pris feu, et tous nos grenadiers, sapeurs, et chasseurs de montagne, ont été brûlés ou tués. Malgré ce malheur, mes postes avancés sont rentrés, et la ville a été défendue pied à pied. A 7 heures, au moment où je vous écris, je rentre dans le fort, après avoir soutenu la retraite de toutes mes troupes. Je pense que l'ennemi sera assez juste pour dire que sans l'explosion de nos obus, de nos boulets creux, et de nos cartouches, il n'eût jamais pénétré dans la ville.

Infanterie, artillerie, tout le monde a fait son devoir; sans ce malheur, l'ennemi n'aurait pas obtenu le soi-disant succès qu'il a eu sur nous. Au moment de l'explosion, nous avions 9 officiers Anglais faits prisonniers dans les deux premiers assauts; ce sont de braves gens qui ont donné franchement. L'ennemi a fait des pertes immenses; la nôtre est considérable, surtout à cause de l'explosion.

Je tiendrai dans le fort jusqu'à la dernière extrémité. Nos moyens en artillerie sont nuls, et nos projectiles creux sont épuisés. Nous n'avons que quelques baïonnettes et des cartouches; nous les emploierons. Que V. E. voie notre situation, et qu'elle fasse un effort, s'il est possible, pour nous secourir. La garnison de St. Sébastien a fait son devoir: je vous recommande, Monseigneur, les braves gens qui restent. J'ai fait de grandes pertes, car tout le monde se disputait l'honneur de combattre sur la brèche; je n'ai été malheureusement que blessé légèrement.

Je vous prie de dire à S. M. que la garnison de St. Sébastien mérite ses bontés et ses grâces. Je vous attends, Monseigneur, et je ne puis vous dire jusqu'à quelle époque je pourrai prolonger ma défense, car je ne connais pas encore toutes mes pertes. Mais je vous le certifie, sans l'explosion de nos obus et de nos boulets creux, l'ennemi n'aurait pas pénétré dans la ville.

Les compagnies d'élite qui étaient sur la courtine ne comptent chacune que 10 hommes, et c'est porter leur force au plus haut.

Le général Rey au Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie.

St. Sébastien, le 7 Sept. 1813, au matin.

J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à V. E. de la journée du 31 Août, dans laquelle la brave garnison de St. Sébastien a soutenu un assaut de quatre heures consécutives, qui a coûté à l'ennemi plus de 3000 hommes. Il a eu deux généraux de blessés, et il a perdu beaucoup d'officiers. Les jours suivants jusqu'au 4 Sept., 17 mortiers et 9 obusiers ont continuellement lancé sur le fort une quantité considérable de projectiles qui ont mis le donjon dans un tel état de destruction, qu'il était impossible d'y conserver un seul homme.

Le 5 et le 6, l'ennemi a continué son feu. Il avait travaillé depuis le 1^{er} à une grande batterie de 17 pièces de canon, qu'il avait placée au bas de la courtine de l'ouvrage à cornes. Il avait établi aussi deux nouvelles batteries dans la presque île près du Rondeau. Sa batterie de brèche était dirigée contre le fort, et il avait augmenté sa batterie du Mont Ulia et celle de St^a Clara.

Le 7, l'ennemi augmenta son feu de projectiles creux, qui écrasa nos troupes sans abri, nos hôpitaux et nos magasins. Dès le 5, le conseil de défense reconnut qu'il était impossible, dans l'état où nous nous trouvions, de résister plus longtemps à l'ennemi, n'ayant pas une pièce d'artillerie en état de tirer, et le donjon se trouvant dans un état complet de destruction.

Le 8 au matin, l'ennemi ayant achevé la grande batterie qu'il avait entreprise sur la courtine de l'ouvrage à cornes, il a commencé à tirer sur tous les points avec 62 bouches à feu. En moins de quatre heures la batterie du Mirador, celle de la Reine, et toutes les murailles du fort ont été ouvertes. N'ayant pas le moindre espoir de résister plus longtemps, j'ai cru, ainsi que j'y étais autorisé par le conseil de défense, devoir accepter la capitulation honorable qui deux fois m'avait été offerte par M. le général Graham, et que j'avais refusée.

J'ai l'honneur, Monseigneur, de joindre ici la capitulation et le procès-verbal de la délibération du conseil de défense. En résistant trois jours de plus que ce conseil ne le demandait, notre situation était devenue encore plus fâcheuse, et le soldat, qui se voyait écrasé sans pouvoir se défendre, ne montrait plus cette ardeur qui l'animait auparavant. Les officiers Anglais, en prenant possession du fort, ont été étonnés de l'état de destruction dans lequel ils l'ont trouvé.

La brave garnison de St. Sébastien, réduite à peu près au tiers de la force qu'elle avait au commencement du siège, a soutenu, pendant 73 jours, tous les efforts d'un ennemi nombreux, qui a déployé contre elle les plus grands moyens d'attaque. V. E. a tout fait pour la secourir ; n'ayant pu réussir, il a fallu succomber.

Les généraux et officiers Anglais disent hautement que c'est la résistance la plus opiniâtre qui se soit faite depuis le commencement de la guerre.

Je vous supplie donc, Monseigneur, d'avoir la bonté, en mettant sous les yeux de l'Empereur la conduite de la brave garnison de St. Sébastien, de demander pour elle, que S. M. daigne, conformément à son décret de 1811, prescrire au Ministre de la Guerre de prendre de suite des mesures pour en assurer promptement l'échange. Je sollicite vivement cette grâce pour elle. Je vous prie, Monseigneur, d'appuyer vivement auprès de l'Empereur l'obtention des récompenses que je demande pour les braves qui se sont plus particulièrement distingués.

Le Maréchal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, au Ministre de la Guerre.

Bayonne, le 12 Sept. 1813.

J'ai parcouru aujourd'hui la ligne de St. Jean de Luz à Cambo, où je fais élever des ouvrages ; et je me suis rendu à Bayonne, pour voir l'état des travaux, et pour faire entreprendre ceux du grand camp retranché en avant du front d'Espagne, au sujet duquel j'aurai l'honneur de faire un rapport particulier à V. E., à mon arrivée de Bayonne. J'ai reçu par M. Goblet, lieutenant du génie, diverses lettres de M. le général Rey, ex-commandant de St. Sébastien, sous la date du 31 Août et du 10 de ce mois. L'une de ces dernières renferme copie de la capitulation qu'il a approuvée le 8, en vertu de laquelle il a remis le fort de St. Sébastien aux troupes Anglaises, et s'est rendu prisonnier avec le restant de sa garnison. Cette lettre renferme aussi une copie de la délibération du conseil de défense, qui l'autorise à faire des propositions pour obtenir la capitulation la plus honorable, et une copie d'une lettre du commandant de l'artillerie, en date du 4.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à V. E. copies de toutes ces lettres, rapports, états, et capitulation. Je la prie de vouloir bien les mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur, en sollicitant les grâces de S. M. en faveur des militaires de tous grades qui composaient les restes de cette vaillante garnison.

Le général Rey s'est conduit, pendant ce siège mémorable, avec la plus grande distinction. Il a perdu les deux tiers de sa garnison. Il a soutenu quatre assauts, et il était sans défense lorsqu'il a capitulé : les conditions qui lui ont été accordées sont honorables ; il ne pouvait en obtenir d'autres. Les ennemis ont admiré sa valeur, et les bonnes dispositions qu'il a faites pour résister, dans une mauvaise place, à tous leurs efforts. Ils n'ont pas trouvé, dans la ville, ni dans le fort, une seule pièce en état de faire feu. Les munitions et les vivres étaient presque épuisés, les blessés n'avaient aucun abri. C'est à l'appui de tous ces titres que j'invoque en sa faveur un témoignage éclatant de la satisfaction de S. M.

Je sollicite aussi les grâces de l'Empereur en faveur de l'adjudant commandant Songeon, chef d'état-major du général Rey, et généralement en faveur de tous les militaires encore existants de cette garnison, et des familles de ceux qui ont succombé au champ d'honneur. Le général Rey désigne, dans les deux états ci-joints, ceux qui en sont le plus dignes.

M. le général Rey sollicite encore que V. E. veuille bien faire payer à madame son épouse ce qui lui est dû pour appointements et traitements extraordinaires. J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le Duc, d'être favorable à cette demande.

Enfin, M. le général Rey invoque pour lui et sa garnison le bénéfice du décret impérial qui prescrit que les garnisons des places, qui se seront défendues avec honneur, soient immédiatement échangées. Je supplie V. E. de vouloir bien prendre à ce sujet les ordres de S. M.

L'officier du génie qui m'a apporté ces lettres est le seul qui soit resté des officiers de son arme, ainsi que 20 sapeurs ; les autres ont été tués. Il a donné parole qu'il se reconstituerait prisonnier, s'il n'était point échangé. Je vais le retenir, et envoyer en place un lieutenant Anglais.

No. XI. (p. 638.)

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Au bivouac sur les hauteurs d'Altabisca, le 25 Juillet, 1813, à 11 heures du soir.

J'ai attaqué aujourd'hui la droite de l'ennemi, qui était formée par deux divisions Anglaises et la division Espagnole de Murillo. Nous les avons chassées d'une très forte position qui est en avant du défilé d'Altabisca. Un brouillard extraordinairement épais nous a surpris à 3½ heures, au moment où nous poursuivions l'ennemi, et nous a empêchés d'attaquer le plateau d'Altabisca ; demain à la pointe du jour cela aura lieu ; nous n'avons pu faire que 200 prisonniers ennemis ; mais les Anglais ont beaucoup souffert. M. le général Reille n'a pu arriver au Lindus, où il devait prendre position ; il a remarqué un mouvement de la ligne ennemie sur sa droite. Je n'ai reçu dans la journée aucun rapport de M. le Comte d'Erlon : il devait attaquer le col de Maya. Je n'en ai pas non plus du général Villatte.

Les troupes montrent beaucoup d'ardeur, et les généraux un grand dévouement. Les 6^e et 25^e de ligne se sont parfaitement conduits.

Lorsque les opérations me donneront un peu plus de temps, j'aurai l'honneur de faire à V. E. un rapport plus circonstancié.

Le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie au Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre.

Linzoain, ce 26 Juillet, 1813, à 11 heures du soir.

L'ennemi a évacué pendant la nuit sa position du col de Ronceveaux ; il s'est aussi retiré de celle de Lindus, devant laquelle M. le Comte Reille était avec les divisions de l'aile droite. A la pointe du jour j'ai fait mettre les troupes en marche ; les divisions de la gauche commandées par M. le lieutenant général Clausel ont suivi la route qui conduit à Pampelune ; l'avant-garde a joint les premiers postes ennemis en avant de Viscarret, et les a poussés jusqu'aux hauteurs qui sont en avant de Zubiri, où ils se sont ralliés à leur ligne ; les difficultés de la route et un brouillard très épais qui a eu lieu toute la nuit, ont retardé notre marche, aussi il était déjà tard quand la tête de la colonne a pu s'emparer des hauteurs qui sont en avant de Linzoain et d'Erro, où il y a eu un petit engagement ; mais je n'ai pas jugé devoir attaquer ce soir la position des ennemis, où ils nous ont présenté à peu près 15,000 hommes, dont 9000 à 10,000 Anglais de deux divisions, et le reste Espagnols ; ils ont aussi montré quelques pièces de canon.

M. le lieutenant général Comte Reille devait, après avoir forcé la position de Lindus, manœuvrer par sa droite, en gardant la crête des montagnes, pour s'emparer successivement des débouchés qui viennent de la vallée de Baztan ; et ainsi obliger les ennemis à se retirer, ce qui eût favorisé M. le Comte d'Erlon pour déboucher ; ce matin, à 10 heures, les guides n'ont pas voulu le conduire dans cette direction ; le brouillard ne permettait pas de distinguer les objets à dix pas ; ils ont craint d'égarer la colonne dans quelque précipice, ce qui a déterminé M. le Comte Reille à venir joindre celle de gauche à Espinal ; je l'ai fait établir en arrière de Linzoain ; demain il formera l'attaque de gauche, si l'ennemi garde sa position.

M. le Comte d'Erlon m'a écrit hier, à 3 heures après midi, que, conformément à mes ordres, les divisions du centre ont attaqué et emporté la forte position du Col de Maya, malgré la vigoureuse résistance que les ennemis y ont faite. La 2^e division, commandée par le général Darmagnac, a montré en cette circonstance une ardeur extraordinaire. Après cet échec, l'ennemi divisa ses troupes en deux colonnes ; l'une descendit la vallée de Baztan, l'autre prit la route d'Echalar. M. le Comte d'Erlon les fit poursuivre ; mais ensuite il jugea à propos d'arrêter ce mouvement, et de réunir les divisions du centre au Col de Maya ; l'ennemi se maintenait encore à la montagne d'Abchiola ; je regrette d'autant plus ce contre-tems que j'avais ordonné à M. le Comte d'Erlon de manœuvrer pour se rapprocher de moi ; je viens de lui réitérer le même ordre.

Les Anglais ont perdu beaucoup de monde dans ce combat ; on leur a aussi pris 8 pièces de canon : ils ont également perdu beaucoup à l'attaque de M. le Comte Reille ; le 10^e régt. a été presque détruit ; un bataillon du 6^e d'infanterie légère de la division Foy a chargé ce régiment à la baïonnette, et l'a renversé ; enfin, ils ont aussi beaucoup perdu à l'attaque de la montagne d'Altabisca, par M. le général Baron Clausel, dans laquelle plusieurs officiers de marque ont été tués, et nous avons fait beaucoup de prisonniers.

J'ignore ce qui s'est passé hier et aujourd'hui sur la Basse Bidasoa ; je n'ai rien reçu du général Villatte, qui a d'ailleurs ses instructions.

Je n'ai jamais vu les troupes mieux disposées, ni montrer plus d'ardeur ; les gardes nationales des Landes et des Basses Pyrénées, et les compagnies de chasseurs de montagne, que j'ai employées jusqu'à la frontière, ont rivalisé d'ardeur avec elles ; j'en ferai mention dans le rapport général que j'aurai l'honneur d'adresser à V. E.

No. XII. (pp. 673, 726.)

Decreto de 22 de Julio de 1813.

Las Córtes generales y extraordinarias, á nombre de la nacion Española, en testimonio de su mas sincera gratitud, decretan : Se adjudica al Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo para si, sus herederos y sucesores, el sitio y posesion Real, conocido en la vega de Granada, por *el Soto de Roma*, con inclusion del terreno llamado *de las Chanchinas*, que si halla situado dentro el mismo término del Soto para que si hayan y desfruten con aseglo á la Constitucion y á las leyes. Lo tendrá entendido la Regencia del Reino para su cumplimiento, y lo hara publicar. Dado en Cadiz á 22 de Julio de 1813. *Josef Antonio Sombiola*, Presidente ; *Manuel Gorganes*, Deputado Secretario ; *Fermin de Clementi*, Deputado Secretario. A la Regencia del Reino, Reg. lib. 2, fol. 222.

END OF THE SIXTH VOLUME.

ERRATA.

IN THE FOURTH VOLUME.

- P. 45, at bottom, *add* 25th and 26th to Portalegre. It appears that since that time Gen. Reg-
- P. 236, line 17 from bottom, *for* 1810 *read* 1809.
- P. 332, line 7 from bottom, *for* Gohde *read* der Göhrde.
... last line, *for* Lunenburg *read* Blankenburg.
- P. 687, line 24 from bottom, *for* Barnes *read* Barns.
- P. 723, last line, *for* nephew *read* brother.
- P. 737, lines 4 and 2 from bottom, *for* Capitraz *read* Capitaz.

NOTE.—A number of copies of the Fourth Volume having been worked off before the line at the bottom of p. 45 was discovered to have been omitted, by accident, the accompanying leaf is given for the purpose of being substituted in the copies in which the error has not been corrected.

IN THE FIFTH VOLUME.

It was found desirable to alter the arrangement of the matter in the Appendix after the sheets were worked, which will account for the following errors in the references to the Appendix.]

- P. 19, note at bottom, *for* See Appendix, Nos. II. and III., *read* See Appendix, No. I.
- P. 41, note at bottom, *for* See Appendix, Nos. I. and IV., *read* See Appendix, No. III.
- P. 45, note at bottom, *to* See Appendix, No. III., *add* No. XV.
- P. 46, note at bottom, *for* See Appendix, Nos. I. and IV., *read* See Appendix, No. III.
- P. 104, note at bottom, *for* See Appendix, Vol. III., No. XXXIX., *read* See Appendix, Vol. IV., No. XXXVIII.
- P. 255, note at bottom, *for* See Appendix, No. VII., *read* See Appendix, No. VIII.
- P. 327, line 20, *for* Auchmuty *read* Ahmuty.
- P. 447, line 3 from bottom, *for* See Appendix, No. XVI., *read* See Appendix, No. XI.
- P. 472, line 6, *for* Seson *read* Teson.
- P. 484, line 14, *for* Maior *read* Mayor.

TABLE

IN THE FIRST VOLUME

1. The first volume of the series is devoted to the history of the United States from the discovery of the continent to the present time. It contains a full and complete account of the political, social, and economic changes which have taken place in the country during the last three centuries. The author has drawn upon the most reliable sources of information, and has presented the facts in a clear and concise manner. The volume is well illustrated with numerous maps and diagrams, and is bound in a handsome style. It is a valuable work for all who are interested in the history of the United States.

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I have already informed your Lordship that there are several Portuguese vessels in the Tagus which might be employed in the embarkation either of individuals of the Portuguese nation, if His Majesty's government should think it proper to encourage a general emigration, or the Portuguese army. It is necessary, however, that these vessels should be previously prepared, in whatever way it may be deemed proper to employ them; and it is desirable that His Majesty's minister at Lisbon should be instructed upon this subject.

To Brig. Gen. R. Craufurd.

Celorico, 2d May, 1810.

I received in the night your letter of the 1st. There is no doubt that we might now raise the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the success of the operation would answer no purpose. The enemy's artillery and means for the siege are still at Salamanca, and the question whether we should be able to get possession of them is the same as it was a fortnight ago. I am convinced that we should not be able to pass the Tormes before Ney could bring upon us a much larger force than I have; particularly now that the siege of Astorga is finished.

I send you the return of Victor's corps of last year, in which you will see the organization of a French corps. It is, in fact, an army composed of divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions, with its cavalry, staff, commissariat, artillery, engineers, &c., complete. You will also observe that the cavalry forms a complete division in the corps; and although, for purposes of operation, parts of the cavalry may be attached at times to divisions of infantry, the division of infantry has no cavalry belonging to it. Of these corps there are in our front Ney's, which was the 3d corps of the army in Spain; Loison's, which consists, with very few exceptions, of foreign troops; Kellermann's, which is the old 6th corps of the army in Spain, and was Bessièrès': this had in it in 1808 and the beginning of 1809, the Imperial Guards; these were withdrawn early last year, and it had not been reinforced in infantry, unless by some of the conscripts lately arrived; and Junot's, or the 8th corps of the army in Spain, in Leon, and part of it at Valladolid. This corps has arrived since the beginning of the year. The corps complete is nearly 40,000 men. I should think that if these corps are averaged at about 15,000 or 16,000, it is the most they have. I should think Ney has 20,000, Loison had 14,000: I reckon these 2 about 30,000. Junot brought into Spain 23,000, and I reckon his corps and Kellermann's about 30,000 more.

I have heard from Cadiz to the 23d; we have lost the Matagorda Fort, but the French have certainly weakened their force in front of Cadiz, and have reinforced their corps in Estremadura. Is the Agueda filled again by the rains?

To the Earl of Liverpool.

Celorico, 2d May, 1810.

The movement which I informed your Lordship in my last dispatch of the 26th April, that Lieut. Gen. Hill intended to make through the Sierra de San Mamed, had the desired effect of relieving Gen. O'Donell from the attack with which his position at Alburquerque was threatened. The enemy retired to his position at Merida, and Gen. Hill returned on the 25th and 26th to Portalegre. It appears that since that time Gen. Reg-

nier has received a reinforcement, said to be 4000 men, from Toledo, by the bridge of Arzobispo; and 4000 men arrived at Merida on the 26th April, detached from Mortier's corps in Andalusia. They reconnoitred Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 27th. The divisions of Gens. Ballesteros and Contreras, of the Marques de la Romana's corps, are in the same positions at Aroche, and near Xerez de los Caballeros.

By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz, it appears that the enemy have obtained possession of Fort Matagorda, having been able to bring upon that post a very heavy fire. I conclude that your Lordship will have received the detailed account of this event from Lieut. Gen. Graham. I understand that the loss sustained in the attack of the enemy made upon this post was 15 R. and F. killed, and 45 wounded. Major Lefebure was unfortunately killed by a cannon shot at the moment the post was evacuated.*

The accounts from Cadiz tend to confirm the reports that the enemy have detached troops from Andalusia into Estremadura.

I received accounts on the night of the 26th April, some hours after I had dispatched the courier with my last letter to your Lordship, that the enemy had broken up from the Tormes, and had approached Ciudad Rodrigo on the 25th, which place has been since invested on the right of the Agueda. As soon as I received those accounts, I gave directions for the

* Lieut. Gen. Graham to Lord Liverpool.

Isla, 22d April, 1810.

From the information your Lordship already had of the miserable state of the fort of Matagorda (never to be considered free from the danger of assault), it will not be matter of surprise that after holding it 2 months it should now be abandoned.

I have the honor to enclose Capt. Maclaine's† (of the 94th) report to me. It would be an injustice to the service not to recommend him in the warmest manner to your Lordship's notice, as well as the officers who continued with him to the last of this arduous duty: Lieut. Brereton, of the Royal artillery; Ensigns Cannon and Scott, of the 94th; and Mr. Dobson, midshipman of H.M.S. *Invincible*. The defence of Matagorda has been witnessed by every body with admiration, and I should not have been justified in allowing it to be continued so long but from the expectation of the possibility of some diversion being made in its favor, which, however, was found to be impracticable.

It is impossible that I should not endeavor to express to your Lordship the feelings of universal and deep regret excited by the untimely fall of that distinguished officer Major Lefebure, of the Royal engineers, whose zeal carried him from the Admiral's ship to be the bearer of my orders for the evacuation of the fort, that he might be satisfied that it was no longer tenable. The chief direction of that important department now devolves on Capt. Birch. Your Lordship is well acquainted with my opinion of his merit and talents, so well calculated to inspire confidence under this misfortune.

P.S. The original garrison of the fort of Matagorda consisted of Capt. Maclaine and Ensigns Cannon and Scott, 94th regt.; 25 Royal artillery, under Lieut. Brereton; 25 Royal marines; 25 seamen, under Mr. Dobson; and 67 non-commissioned officers and privates of the 94th regt. Reinforcements were sent in the evening of the 21st, and reliefs of the whole were offered, but declined.

Capt. Maclaine, 94th regt., to Lieut. Gen. Graham.

Cadiz, 23d April, 1810.

I have the honor to inform you, that at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the enemy opened upon the 74 gun ship S. Pablo, and gun boats stationed near Fort Matagorda, with hot shot, and succeeded in forcing them to abandon their position.

Immediately after this they opened upon Fort Matagorda a very heavy cannonade of guns and mortars; but as it would have been impossible to direct our fire with a certainty, I ordered Lieut. Brereton, of the Royal artillery, to delay our fire until daybreak.

The morning discovered 3 batteries opposed to us, in the Trocadero, of 21 guns, and from the flight of their shells we judged they had 8 mortars in other 3 batteries. From the time they commenced firing at the fort, they kept up a most tremendous cannonade of shot and shells with great effect until night, when the enemy and the fort both discontinued. That

† Major Gen. Sir A. Maclaine, C.B.

*

Franz Steckel
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Wellington, Arthur Wellesley

The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France

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